

COMMENTARIES
ON THE
LAW OF AGENCY

AS A BRANCH OF
COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME JURISPRUDENCE,
WITH OCCASIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS FROM
THE CIVIL AND FOREIGN LAW.

By JOSEPH STORY, LL. D.
ONE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
AND DANE PROFESSOR OF LAW IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

"The Maritime Law is not the Law of a particular country." — LORD MANSFIELD.

"If Law be a Science, and really deserve so sublime a name, it must be founded on principle, and claim an exalted rank in the Empire of Reason." — SIR WILLIAM JONES.

SIXTH EDITION
REVISED, CORRECTED, AND ENLARGED, .
By EDMUND H. BENNETT.

BOSTON:
LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY.
1863.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1857, by
WILLIAM W. STORY,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1862, by
WILLIAM W. STORY,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts.

ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE SIXTH EDITION.

In the preparation of a new edition of these Commentaries, the late English and American cases have been carefully examined and so far as applicable, have been referred to. The law of *Respondcat Superior* has received special attention, and considerable addition will be found to the chapter on that subject. The new matter, except mere cases, is always included in brackets, thus []. All the citations, old and new, have been accurately verified by actual examination of the volume and page cited.

EDMUND HASTINGS BENNETT.

Boston, October 1st, 1862.

TO THE HONORABLE

JOHN DAVIS, LL. D.

DISTRICT JUDGE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS DISTRICT.

SIR,

IN dedicating this work to you, I perform one of the most pleasant duties of my life, — the duty of paying a public homage to your character, and of inscribing on these pages a memorial of our long and uninterrupted friendship. Nearly twenty-eight years have elapsed, since, upon my advancement to the Bench of the Supreme Court, I had the satisfaction of meeting you as my colleague in the Circuit Court. During the intermediate period, we have passed through many trying scenes of peace and war, of excited controversies between the great political parties of our country, of seasons of severe prohibitions and pressures upon the commercial and other interests of the community, and of changes of public policy, carrying in their train penalties and forfeitures, which made even the ordinary administration of justice assume a stern and almost a vindictive aspect. The patience, the candor, the urbanity, the sound discretion, and the eminent ability with which you performed all your judicial functions during this period, are known to no one better than to myself; for I have been the constant witness of them, and have sometimes partaken of them, and have always been instructed by them. In the earlier part of your judicial career, you led the way in exploring the then almost untrodden paths of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisprudence, and laid

the profession under lasting obligations, by unfolding its various learning and its comprehensive principles. Your judgments have stood the test of time, and are destined to be laid up among the *Responsa Prudentium* for professional instruction in future ages.

But I confess myself more desirous, on this occasion, to acknowledge with unaffected gratitude my deep sense of your personal friendship and continued kindness. They have lightened many heavy labors; they have cheered many saddened hours; and, above all, they have taught me to feel the value of the truth, that the indulgent approbation of the wise and good is among the most enviable of human blessings. Truly may I say to you, in the language of Lælius, as recorded by Cicero: — Sed tamen recordatione nostræ amicitiae sic fruor, ut beate vixisse videor, quia cum Scipione vixerim; quocum mihi conjuncta cura de re publica et privata. fuit; — et (id, in quo est omnis vis amicitiae) voluntatum, studiorum, sententiarum, summa consensio.

I am, with the highest respect,

Your obliged friend,

JOSEPH STORY.

CAMBRIDGE, July 18, 1839.

PREFACE.

THE present volume is the commencement of a series of Commentaries, which, in pursuance of the original scheme of the Dane Professorship, it is my design, if my life and health are prolonged, to publish, upon the different branches of commercial and maritime jurisprudence. The task is truly formidable, and full of difficulties; and I approach it with a diffidence proportionate to the public sense of its importance, and to my own consciousness that its perfect execution will require a leisure, and learning, and ability, which are very far beyond my reach. So various are the topics to be discussed, and so numerous the authorities to be consulted, that a whole life might well be spent in collecting and mastering the materials. Even when these should be brought together, the labor of analyzing the principles, and reducing them to a text of a moderate extent, with the practical illustrations necessary to explain and confirm them, might be found sufficient to create some discouragement even in minds accustomed to the close discipline of juridical studies. What I propose to do, therefore, I beg may be treated as an approximation only towards the accomplishment of such a desirable object. My efforts will be to present accurate outlines of the leading doctrines of commercial and maritime law. But it must be left to more gifted minds to enjoy the enviable distinction of having embodied in a durable form the entire details of this vast science.

Although it is my intention to consult the works of foreign jurists and civilians, and to introduce into the text illustrations from the Roman law, and the maritime jurisprudence of Continental Europe, so far as my own imperfect studies will enable me to do so; yet I shall mainly rely upon the elementary treatises and judicial decisions of England and America; as furnishing the most solid and useful expositions of all the doctrines which are to be maintained in these Commentaries. It would betray a narrow subjection to mere prejudice, or a wanton disregard of some of the best sources of instruction, to pass by with neglect the glorious labors of the Roman jurists, or the masterly treatises of such men as Pothier, and Emerigon, and Valin, which have furnished so much to improve and adorn our own law. Sir William Jones has with great felicity said: "What is good sense in one age must be good sense, all circumstances remaining, in another; and pure, unsophisticated reason is the same in Italy and in England, in the mind of a Papinian and of a Blackstone." Still, however, it will scarcely be denied, that the judgments of the Courts of Common Law, upon the great topics of Commercial and Maritime Jurisprudence, since the elevation of Lord Mansfield to the Bench, place them in advance of all others for practical wisdom, profound reasoning, acute discrimination, and comprehensive equity.

In dismissing the present work, and asking for it the indulgent consideration of the Profession, I desire to make a single explanatory remark. As the work is mainly designed for the elementary instruction of students, (although, I trust, it may be found useful to lawyers of a more advanced standing,) the same train of observations will be found occasionally repeated in different connections. This has been done in order to avoid the embarrassment of perpetual references to other parts of the work, which students could scarcely be presumed to keep constantly before their minds; as well as to furnish them with qualifications, and limitations, and illustrations of principles, which

might not otherwise be obvious, or fully appreciated, when presented in a disconnected form. The admonition of our ancient master, Littleton, should never be forgotten, that by the arguments and reasons in the law a man sooner shall come to the certainty and knowledge of the law. "*Lex plus laudatur, quando ratione probatur.*"

CAMBRIDGE, near Boston,
July 18, 1889.

CONTENTS.

INDEX TO CASES CITED	xiii
--------------------------------	------

CHAPTER I.

Agency in general	Sections, 1-4
-----------------------------	------------------

CHAPTER II.

Who are capable of becoming Principals and Agents	5-22
---	------

CHAPTER III.

Different kinds of Agents	23-37
-------------------------------------	-------

CHAPTER IV.

Joint Principals and Joint Agents.	38-44
--	-------

CHAPTER V.

Appointment of Agents	45-56
---------------------------------	-------

CHAPTER VI.

Nature and Extent of Authority	57-143
--	--------

CHAPTER VII.

Duties and Obligations of Agents in executing Authority	144-217 a
---	-----------

CHAPTER VIII.

Liabilities of Agents to their Principals	217 b-234
---	-----------

CHAPTER IX.

Defences of Agents against Principals	Sections 235-260
---	---------------------

CHAPTER X.

Liabilities of Agents to third Persons, on Contracts . . .	261-301
--	---------

CHAPTER XI.

Liabilities of Public Agents on Contracts	302-307 a
---	-----------

CHAPTER XII.

Liability of Agents for Torts	308-322
---	---------

CHAPTER XIII.

Rights of Agents in regard to their Principals	323-350
--	---------

CHAPTER XIV.

Right of Lien of Agents	351-390
-----------------------------------	---------

CHAPTER XV.

Rights of Agents in regard to third Persons	391-416
---	---------

CHAPTER XVI.

Rights of Principals against third Persons	417-440
--	---------

CHAPTER XVII.

Rights of third Persons against Principals	441-461
--	---------

CHAPTER XVIII.

Dissolution, or Determination, of Agency	462-500
--	---------

INDEX	p. 631
-----------------	--------

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

The References are to the Sections.

A.		Section	Section
Aatey v. Trevilion		179	Amos v. Temperley 263, 274, 395
Abbe v. Rood		255	Anchor v. Bank of England 435
Abbey v. Chase		264 a	Anderson v. Clark 361
Abraham v. Reynolds		453 g	— v. Coonley 17, 18, 19, 58, 59, 138
Aker v. Campbell		312	— v. Highland Turnpike Company 152
Adams v. Adams		167	— v. Sanderson 138
— v. Lindsell		493	— v. Saunderson 138
— v. Oakes		394	Andrews v. Estes 147, 148, 160, 364 a
Adamson v. Jarvis	308, 312, 313, 339		— v. Kneeland 18, 59, 72, 73, 102, 109, 126, 133
Addison v. Gandassequi	267, 288, 289, 290, 291, 400, 423, 446, 448		Anonymous 6, 50, 56, 104, 149, 153
Agace, <i>ex parte</i>	124, 125		— v. Harrison 470, 478
Agricola (The Ship)	454 a, 456, 456 a		— v. Hopkins 6, 8
Akin v. Bedford	135, 155		— v. Jolland 204, 207
Alexander v. Alexander	166, 167		Appleton v. Binks 148, 155, 273, 275, 278
— v. Bank of Rutland	154		Appleton Bank v. McGilvray 14
— v. Barker	270		Arbouin v. Anderson 228
— v. Gibson	59, 73, 135		Arfridson v. Ladd 147
— v. Mackenzie	119		Arlington v. Hinds 325
— v. Southey	310		Armistead, <i>ex parte</i> 228, 229, 274
Alexander (The Ship)	119 a		Armory v. Merryweather 346
Alford v. Egglefield	269		Armstrong v. Gilchrist 239, 255
Allair v. Ouland	339		— v. Toler 195, 330, 344, 346, 347
Allen v. Ayres	160, 161		Asrott v. Brown 208, 217 c, 220
— v. Coit	269, 446 a		Arthur v. Barton 119 a, 122
— v. Hayward	454 c		Aspinwall v. Bartlett 296, 298
— v. McKeen	300, 301		Assop v. Gates 453 a
— v. Ogden	73, 126		Astor v. Wells 149
— v. Suydam	189		Atkins v. Amber 107, 161, 397, 402, 404, 407
Alley v. Hotson	488		— v. Batten 394
Althorp v. Wolfe	453		Attorney-General v. Berryman 13
American Fur Co. v. Gibson	134		— v. Case 456 a
— v. U. States	134		— v. Corporation of Leices- 217 c
American Ins. Co. v. Coster	118		
— v. Oakley	54		
Amiable Nancy (The Ship)	220, 221		
Amory v. Hamilton	253, 256		
— v. Merryweather	346		

	Section		Section
Benny v. Rhodes	113	Boston & Maine Railroad v. Whitcher	274
Bensley v. Bignold	235, 346	Bottsford v. Barr	50
Bentley v. Columbia Ins. Co.	9	Boucher v. Lawson	121, 343
Berkeley v. Hardy	49, 149, 274 a	— v. Nordstrom	318, 319, 321, 454
— v. Watling	119, 140	Bouchout v. Goldsmid	225
Bernard v. Torrance	302	Bousfield v. Creswell	103, 109
Berthoud v. Gordon	190	Bowcher v. Nordstrom	456
Bertram v. Godfrey	75	Bowen v. Morris	53, 154, 264, 270, 275, 278, 302, 303, 395
Betham v. Benson	137, 138	Bower v. Jones	326
Betts v. Gibbins	339	Bowerbank v. Morris	470
Bevans v. Waters	354	Boytown v. Turner	239
Beverley v. Lincoln Gas Light and Coke Co.	53, 55	Boyson v. Coles	113, 224, 225, 227, 367
Bexwell v. Christie	195, 235	Blace v. Duchess of Marlborough	352
Bickerton v. Bunnell	396, 398, 406, 446	Bracken v. Meller	140, 141
Bigelow v. Walker	186	Bradford v. Bush	59, 102, 498
Biggs v. Lawrence	136	— v. Eastburn	308
Billings v. Morrow	239	Bradlee v. Boston Glass Manufactory	147, 154, 268, 270
Billon v. Hyde	250, 259	Bradley v. Richardson	215
Bingham v. Cabot	138	Bramah v. Roberts	380
Binney v. Crineley	394, 395	Branby v. Coxwell	317 a
Bird v. Boulter	27	Bray v. Kettell	268 a
Bird's Syndic v. Dix's Estate	204	Bridin v. Dubarry	258
Blackburn v. Scholes	93, 98, 430	Bree v. Holbeck	134
Blackett v. Royal Exchequer Ins. Co.	74	Breedlove v. Warrack	239
Blackstock v. N. Y. & Erie Railroad	452	Brennan v. Currier	362 a
Blackwell v. Wiswall	454	Brewster v. Hobert	13
Blades v. Free	265 a, 488	— v. Saul	420
Blake v. Ferris	454 a, 454 c	Bridge v. Austin	188
— v. Nicholson	355	— v. Niagara Ins. Co.	418
Blake v. Stenbridge	454	Brigham v. Marcan	394
Blanchard v. Page	394	— v. Peters	90, 136
Blandy v. Allen	113	Brimley v. Mann	149, 164 a
Blood v. Goodrich	49, 161, 242, 252, 395, 422	Bristow v. Porter	465
Blore v. Sutton	13, 146, 249	Broad v. Thomas	329
Blot v. Boiceau	74, 192	Brock v. Jones	242
Bloxam, ex parte	380	Brockway v. Allen	154, 266, 277, 278
Bocock v. Pavvy	13	Bromley v. Coxwell	14, 34, 201, 202
Bogart v. De Bussy	148, 274 a	— v. Holland	477
Bolland v. Bygrave	228, 380	Brookshire v. Brookshire	49, 50, 468
Bollen v. Hyde	259	Bronson v. Woolsey	302
Bolton v. Buller	228, 380	Broughton v. Manchester Water Works Co.	52
— v. Hillersden	56	Brown v. Austin	302
Bonbonus, ex parte	124	— v. Boorman	32 a
Bothlingk v. Inglis	440	— v. Croft	334
Boyd v. McLean	230	— v. Duncan	346
— v. Vanderkemp	140	— v. Frantum	126
Boor v. Vandall	343	— v. Heathcote	361
Booth v. Hodgson	235	— v. Lent	313, 454
— v. Mister	453	— v. Maxwell	453 e
Bootle v. Blundell	67	— v. McGraw	74
Bosquet v. Dudman	228, 370, 380	— v. Puriance	456
Boson v. Sanford	116	— v. Rundlett	306
		— v. Southouse	205

	Section		Section
Brown v. Trantum	126	Campbell v. Leach	167
— v. Turner	346	— v. Pennsylvania Life	
Bruce v. Hunter	338	Ins. Co.	211
Brucker v. Fromont	453, 456	— v. Proctor	368
Brussard v. De Cloets	183	— v. Walker	210, 211
Bryan v. Lewis	238	Campnari v. Woodburn	488
— v. Nix	361	Canaan v. Bryce	235, 346
— v. Wilson	393	Cane v. Allen	210, 211, 212
Bryant v. Moore	19, 102, 126, 253	Canonge v. Louisiana State Bank	208
Bryce v. Brooks	31	Capel v. Thornton	102, 108
Bryden v. Stewart	453 h	Capp v. Topham	336, 339
Buchannon v. Upshaw	289, 244	Carey v. Webster	301, 451
Buckmaster v. Harrop	27	Carmichael v. Buck	127
Buffalo v. Holloway	454 a	Carpenter v. American Ins. Co.	134,
Buffum v. Chadwicke	894		139
Buller v. Harrison	301, 302	Carr v. Hinchliff	420, 430
Bulmer, ex parte	235	Carriger v. Whittington	265 a, 488
Bunker v. Miles	9	Carruthers v. Sidebottom	456 a
Burgess v. Gray	454 c	Carstairs v. Bates	228
Burls v. Smith	285, 287, 289	Cartwright v. Hatley	203, 217
Burn v. Brown	360	Case v. Jennings	478
Burnes v. Pennel	126	Case v. Ruddle	155
Burney v. Plumley	393, 394, 395	Cassiday v. McKenzie	483
Burnham v. Williams	147	Castling v. Aubert	379
Buron v. Denman	246	Castrique v. Buttigieg	157
Burrell v. Jones	74, 155, 269, 278,	Cathin v. Bell	13, 14, 34, 146, 193, 195,
	280, 393		201
Burrill v. Phillips	86, 198, 342, 376,	Cayhill v. Fitzherbert	148, 155
	385	Chamberlain v. Harrod	211
Burrough v. Skinner	206	— v. M & M. Railroad	453 g
Bursey v. Donaldson	456 a	Champion v. Plummer	28
Burt v. Palmer	138	Chapman v. Darby	378
Bush v. Steinman	311, 313, 322, 452,	— v. De Tastet	326
	453 a, 454, 454 c, 460	— v. Morton	141
Byarr v. Doores	264 a	— v. Walton	183
Byers v. Fowler	135	Charnley v. Winstanley	481
Byrne v. Doughty	253	Charter v. Trevellyan	9
— v. Schwing	110	Chase & Westmore	354, 355, 356, 362,
Byron v. N. Y. State Printing			362 a
Telegraph Co.	453 h	Chedworth v. Edwards	203, 205, 229,
			332, 333
		Cheever v. Smith	431, 434
		Cheeves v. Smith	449
		Chesapeake Ins. Co. v. Stark	103
Cady v. Sheppard	49, 51, 125, 242, 251	Cheviot v. Brooks	183
Caffrey v. Darby	96, 200, 208, 217,	Childsey v. Porter	55
	218, 219	Chilcot v. Bromley	453 a
Cairnes v. Bleecker	243, 258	Child v. Corp	200
Caldwell v. Harrison	42	— v. Morley	336
Callandar v. Marsh	320	Childs v. Monins	280
— v. Oelricks	331	Chorpening's Appeal	211
Calton v. Bragg	338	Church v. Imperial Gas Light and	
Cameron v. Reynolds	308	Coke Co.	53
Campbell v. Baker	154, 261	— v. Marine Ins. Co.	210, 211
— v. Hall	301	— v. Mansfield	456
— v. Haasell	98, 103, 109	Cincinnati v. Stone	454
— v. Hillman	264	City Council v. Duncan	490

	Section		Section
City of London Gas Light and		Colvin v. Holbrook	263
Coke Co. v. Nicholls	53	Comber v. Anderson	191, 200
Clark v. Corporation of Wash-		Commercial Bank v. Cunningham	140 a
ington	52, 308	— v. French	160 a,
— v. Butney	147, 148, 149, 150,	161, 394, 395, 396	
151, 152, 160, 188		— v. Warren	253
— v. Guardians of Cuckfield		Commercial Bank of Buffalo v.	
Union	55	Kortright	127
— v. Highgate Archway		Commercial Bank of Erie v. Nor-	
Company	52	ton	13, 14, 137
— v. Merchant's Bank	228	Commercial Bank of New Orleans	
— v. Moody	332	— Martin	201
— v. Pigot	394	Commons v. Marshall	167
— v. Shree	435, 437, 438, 439	Conard v. Atlantic Ins Co	229
— v. Van Northwick	60	Condit v. Baldwin	126
— v. Vermont & Canada		Conkey v. Bond	211
Railroad	454	Conn v. Penn	239, 253
Clark's Executors v. Van Reimsdyk		Consequa v. Fanning	342
161, 162, 200, 253		Conwell v. Voorhes	319 a
— v. Wilson	160	Coch v. Goodman	276
Clark's Lessees v. Courtney	58	Cook v. Parham	453 e
Clarke v. Tipping	171, 186, 204, 209,	Cooke v. Wilson	155, 269
333		Cooker v. Child	395
Clay v. Oakley	264 a	Cooley v. Norton	137
Clealand v. Walker	449	Coombe's case	6, 12, 13, 49, 146, 147,
Cleaves v. Stockwell	201	148, 150, 151, 152, 458	
Cleveland v. Steward	276	Coon v. The Utica R. R.	453 e, 453 g
Clement v. Leverett	227	Coop v. Lyne	38
Cleason v. Davidson	361, 367	Cooper's case	6
Cleveland, &c., Rail Co. v. Keary	453 g	Cooper v. Gooderick	53
Clifford v. Burton	138	— v. Rankin	49
Chnan v. Cooke	50	Coore v. Callaway	247, 440
Coates v. Lewes	164, 420, 430	Copeland v. Merchants' Ins Co	12,
Cobb v. Becke	201	148, 210, 211, 239, 243, 209, 474	
Cochran v. Hlam	13, 14, 29, 34, 113,	— v. New England Mar. Ins.	
201, 217 a, 367, 389		Co.	453 e
— v. Newton	21	— v. Stein	349, 377
Cock v. Taylor	274, 298	Copes v. Matthews	302, 306
Cocke v. Campbell	59	Copper Mining Co (The) v. Fox	55
— v. The Comm. Ins. Co.	36	Copping v. Craig	397, 399, 403, 404,
Coddington v. Bay	228	407	
Codwise v. Hacker	243, 253	— v. Walker	390, 397, 403, 404,
Collman v. Harrison	264 a	405, 407	
Coggs v. Bernard	182, 188, 453	Corbin v. Adams	185
Cohen v. Paget	326	— v. American Mills	341
Colburn v. Phillips	395	Coches v. Cumming	38, 385, 429, 431
Coleman v. Lambert	274	— v. Widdefield	179, 204 a, 342
— v. Riches	59, 119, 451	Cornfoot v. Fowke	139
Coles v. Bell	247, 440	Cornforth v. Rivett	362
— v. Trecothick	14, 50, 108, 146,	Corning v. Southland	250, 266
249		— v. Strong	63 a
Collen v. Wright	261	Cornwall v. Wilson	111, 143, 198, 244,
Collins v. Butts	160 a, 251, 261	250, 259	
— v. Martin	288	Corser v. Paul	114
— v. Tilton	216	Courcier v. Ritter	74, 255, 256, 258
Colthay v. Fennell	160 a	Couturier v. Hastie	215
Columbian Ins. Co. v. Lawrence	111		

	Section		Section
Dinwiddie v. Bailey	350	E.	
Diplock v. Blackburn	207		
Dixon v. Bromfield	9, 211	Eagle Bank v. Smith	95
— v. Ewart	482, 486	Earl v. Rowcroft	36
— v. Diamond	217	Earle v. Hall	454 c
— v. Rankin	453 g	Eastern Railroad v. Benedict	161, 395
Dodge v. D'Wolf	74	East India Co. v. Glover	53
— v. Lambert	259	— v. Henschman	211, 214
— v. Perkins	204	— v. Hensley	109, 131, 133, 264
— v. Tileston	217 c, 331, 333, 348	East London Water Works Co. v.	
Dodsley v. Varley	368	Bailey	52, 53
Doe d. Lyster v. Goldwin	246	Eaton v. Bell	155, 156, 157, 269,
— v. Marten	452		283
— v. Summersett	246	— v. Welton	203
— Mann v. Walters	246, 410	Edgar v. Fowler	235
— Thomas v. Roberts	6	Egerton v. Thomas	7
Doe v. Bingham	49	Edmiston v. Wright	336
— v. Robinson	134	Edmond v. Caldwell	160 a
— v. Thompson	394	Edwards v. Grand Junction	
Dorchester Bank v. New England		Canal Co.	53
Bank	14	— v. Hodding	300, 301
Doubleday v. Muskett	285, 286	Eicke v. Meyer	326
Dougal v. Kemble	274	Ekins v. Macklish	60, 63, 74
Douglass v. Moody	118	Eland v. Carr	362
Dow v. Spenny	253	Eliza Cornish (The)	118
Dowding v. Goodwin	376	Elliot v. Abbott	114
Downman v. Jones	154, 264, 264 a	— v. Swartwout	301, 307, 433
Dows v. Greene	55	— v. Walker	339
Drake v. Marryatt	136	Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Co.	454 c
Dr. Bethune's case	406	— v. Turner	443, 452
Drew v. Bird	274	Else v. Gutward	478
Drinkwater v. Goodwin	112, 364, 367,	Elwell v. Shaw	146, 147, 148, 149
	368, 376, 407, 409	Emerson v. Blonden	7
Drummond v. Wood	85, 141	— v. Heels	27
Dubois v. Delaware & Hudson		— v. The Providence Hat	
Canal Co.	154, 160, 161, 162, 263,	Man. Co.	13, 77, 154
	275, 277, 278, 422, 450	Emery v. Fell	53
Ducarrey v. Gill	68	Enloe v. Hall	302
Duchess of Cleveland v. Dashwood	98	Episcopal Charity Soc. v. Epis-	
Duclos v. Ryland	78	copal Church in Dedham	254
Duke of Norfolk v. Worthy	406, 435	Erick v. Johnson	255, 256
Duncan v. Fiddlater	321, 454, 459	Esdaile v. La Nauze	62
Dundee (The Ship)	453	Essex Turnpike Corporation v.	
— v. Lambert	274, 393, 395	Collins	52
— v. Munroe	314, 319, 319 a	Evans v. Ellis	212
Dunstan v. Imperial Gas Light Co.	53	— v. Martell, or Marlett	274, 395
Dupont v. Mount Pleasant Ferry		— v. Potter	113, 198
Co.	160 a	— v. Root	110
Durnford v. Patterson	208	— v. Wells	154
Dassar v. Perit	193, 237	Everett v. Collins	431
Dusenbury v. Ellis	155, 264, 264 a	Ezell v. Franklin	59
Dutton v. Poole	395		
Duval v. Craig	155, 273	F.	
Dwinehe v. Henriquez	302		
Dyer v. Burnham	147	Faikney v. Reynous	235, 346, 347
— v. Pearson	93, 104	Fairbrother v. Simmons	9, 27, 31
Dynen v. Leach	453 h		

	Section		Section
Fairfield v. Adams	160 a, 269, 393, 394	Foot v. Wiswall	308, 316, 317
Fairlie v. Hastings	134, 135, 136, 137	Ford v. Williams	160
Farebrother v. Ansley	308, 309, 312, 339	Forrestier v. Bordman	60, 85, 110, 141, 200, 201, 208, 237, 253, 255
Farmer v. Davis	296, 297, 298, 299	Forster v. Fuller	280
—— v. Robinson	465	Forsyth v. Day	91, 147
—— v. Russell	235, 347	Fortitude (The Ship)	116, 122
Farmers' Bank v. Troy City Bank	154	Foster v. Essex Bank	115, 308, 368
Farmers' Bank, &c. v. Butchers', &c. Bank	17, 119	—— v. Hoyt	365, 379
Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Walworth	250	—— v. Preston	201, 217 a
Farnsworth v. Hennon	31, 54	Fowle v. Common Council of Alexandria	308*
Farrin v. Oswell	191	—— v. Stevenson	255
Farwell v. The Boston & Worcester Railroad Corporation	308, 453 e, 453 g	Fowler v. Bledsoe	58
Favenc v. Bennett	98, 429, 430	—— v. Shearer	148, 149
Feeter v. Heath	264, 264 a	Fox v. Drake	278, 362, 304, 305, 306
Felker v. Emerson	7	—— v. Frith	151, 152
Felton v. Deall	454	—— v. Sandford	453 d
Fenimore v. The United States	259	Foxcroft v. Devonshire	377
Fenn v. Harrison	19, 59, 73, 97, 126, 131, 132, 133, 253, 279	Foxwist v. Tremaine	6
Ferguson v. Carrington	250, 259, 390	Frankfort Bank v. Johnson	114, 115
Fetter v. Field	148	Franklin Bank v. Steward	115
Fallis v. Brutton	139	Franklin v. Ezell	59
Filter v. The Commonwealth	449	—— v. Lamond	27
Findley v. Breedlove	174, 250	Freeman v. Boynton	247
Finney v. Bedford Com. Ins. Co.	161	—— v. East India Co.	117
Fisher v. Ellis	160 a, 269, 393, 394, 399	—— v. Loder	28
—— v. Willard	239	French v. Backhouse	35, 111
Fisher's Appeal	211	—— v. Otis	305, 306
Fishmonger's Co. v. Robertson	53	—— v. Price	44, 449
Fisk v. Barber	211	—— v. Reed	190
—— v. Ofrit	60	Frieze v. Wray	350
Fiske v. Eldridge	276	Frixione v. Tagliaferro	239, 339
Fitchett v. Adams	245, 255	Frontin v. Small	148, 149, 274 a
Fitzherbert v. Mather	127, 134, 140	Frothingham v. Everton	74
Fitzherbert's case	11	—— v. Haley	244
Fitzpatrick v. New Albany Railroad	453 g	Frye v. Lockwood	300, 301, 307
—— v. School Commissioners	253	Fuller v. Bennett	140
Fitzsimmons v. Joslin	126, 256	—— v. Hooper	160 a, 269
Fleckner v. Bank of U. States	52, 53, 114	—— v. Voght	455
Fletcher v. Gillespie	422, 450	—— v. Wilson	134
—— v. Harcott	308, 339	Fulton Bank of N. York v. N. York and Sharon Canal Co.	140, 140 a, 140 b
—— v. Walker	205, 208	Furnivall v. Coombes	286 a
Flint v. Clinton	52		G.
—— v. Clinton Co. & Trust.	149	Gage v. Allison	489
Flower v. Adam	454, 455	Gainsford v. Dutillet	361, 367
Fogg v. Virgin	276	Gall v. Comber	33, 215
Folger v. Chase	114	—— v. Tappan	488
Fomin v. Oswell	222	—— v. Wells	28
		Galt v. Gallaway	488
		Gardner v. Bailey	64

	Section		Section
Gardner v. Gardner	51	Goupy v. Harden	157, 269, 279
— v. Lachlan	161	Gov. & Co of Plate Manufac-	
— v. McCutchan	123 a, 334 a	— turers v. Meredith	320
— v. Norman	6	Grafton Bank v. Flanders	264 a
Garland, Inhabitants of, v. Rey-		Graham v. Ackroyd	112
nolds	160 a, 269, 393, 394, 395	— v. Dyster	113
Garnham v. Bennett	297	— v. Mussen	270
Garrett v. Handley	160 a, 272	— v. Schmidt	134
Garth v. Howard	138	— v. Stamper	263
Gausson v. Morton	477	Gram v. Seton	49, 242
General Int. Ins. Co. v. Ruggles	118,	Grammar v. Nixon	310, 453
	119, 121	Grant v. Fletcher	28
George v. Claggett	390, 404, 419, 444	— v. Ludlow	76, 95, 217 c
Gerard v. Baker	98	— v. Norway	119, 451
Gerbier v. Emery	60	— v. Vaughan	228
Ghent v. Adams	302	Gratitude (The Ship)	116, 118, 141,
Gibson v. Colt	59, 73, 131		164, 237
— v. Winter	420, 430	Graves v. Key	90, 91
Gidley v. Lord Palmerston	305	Gray v. Murray	14
Gilbey v. Copley	395	— v. Portland Bank	308
Giles v. Perkins	228, 380	Greely v. Bartlett	60, 110, 342
Gill v. Brown	306	Green v. Farmer	350, 352, 354, 355,
Gillenwater v. Madison Railroad	453 g		371
Gillet v. Offor	266, 287, 268	— v. Goddard	339
— v. Peppercorne	210	— v. Kopke	268, 290
Gilley v. Logan	200	— v. London Omnibus Co.	308
Gillis v. Bailey	13, 14	— v. Miller	42
Gilman v. Brown	352, 362	— v. Munamara	456
Gilmore v. Pope	269, 395, 396	— v. Winter	211
Gilshannon v. Stony Brook R. R.	453 e, 453 g	Greene v. Haskell	205, 229
Giralomo (The Ship)	456 a	Gregg v. Robbins	116
Girard v. Taggard	27, 401, 403	Gregory v. Parker	138
Gladstone v. Birley	352, 354, 355,	Griffith v. Ingledew	394, 395
	356	Griffiths v. Gwlow	453 h
Gleason v. Dodd	488	Grindley v. Barker	42
Glynn v. Baker	225	Grojan v. Wade	418, 420
Godfrey v. Furzo	229	Grove v. Dubois	33, 336
— v. Saunders	44, 232	Guernsey v. Burns	394
Godin v. London Assur. Co.	376	Guerrero v. Peile	78, 113, 127
Gonzales v. Sladen	290	Gunn v. Cantine	269, 391
Goodale v. Wheeler	58	Gunnis v. Exhart	107, 137
Goodbaylie's case	263	Guthrie v. Armstrong	42
Goodenow v. Tyler	60		
Goodland v. Blewith	103 a, 451	H.	
Goodlow v. City of Cincinnati	308	Hagedorn v. Oliverson	242, 248, 418
Goodman v. Harvey	228	Haught v. Sahler	261
Goodson v. Brooks	58, 99, 109	Haile v. Smith	111, 274, 361
Goodtitle v. Woodward	245, 246	Haines v. Busk	330
Goodwin v. Union Screw Co.	52	Halbertly v. Ward	451
Goom v. Aflalo	28, 30	Hall v. Bambridge	148, 149, 151, 160,
— v. Buchanan	170		161, 276, 278, 422, 450
Gordon v. Bulkley	48, 49	— v. Huntoon	263
Goslin v. Birnie	217	— v. Mayor, &c. of Swansea	52,
Goswell v. Dunkley	14, 201, 202,		53
	217 a	— v. Smith	111, 308, 326, 321
Gould v. Norfolk Lead Co.	77		

	Section		Section
Hall v. Sprigg	231	Heane v. Keene	100
Hallett v. Barsfield	361	—— v. Rogers	90, 91
Hallowell & Augusta Bank v. Hamlin	140 a	Heard v. Lodge	44
Ham v. Boody	259	—— v. March	42
Hammarakald v. Bull	302, 306	Heasley v. Pruyn	299, 300
Hammon v. Cottle	202, 208	Hefferman v. Addams	65, 117
Hammond v. Barclay	352, 376, 377	Helyear v. Hawke	58, 59, 73, 102, 132, 133, 135, 137
—— v. Holiday	329	Henback v. Mollman	157, 269
Hanond v. Holiday	331, 333	Henderson v. Barnwell	13, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 109, 146, 249
Hampton v. Matthews	78, 92	—— v. The Australian Royal Mail Steam Nav. Co.	55
Haney v. Donnelly	386	Henn v. Conisby	98
Hanford v. McNair	49, 212, 252, 394, 422	Hern v. Nichols	310, 452, 453 a
Hannay v. Stewart	136, 137	Hervey v. Luddard	361
Hanson v. Roberdeau	267	Heyman v. Neale	28
Hapgood v. Batcheller	342	Heyward, <i>ex parte</i>	233
Hardman v. Wilcock	217	Heywood v. Waring	361
Hargreaves v. Rothwell	140	—— v. Watson	380
Harrow v. Hunniston	453	Hibblewhite v. McMorine	49, 51, 238, 242
Hatman v. Anderson	217	Hickcock v. Plattsburgh	454 a
Harper v. Charlesworth	53	Hicks v. Hankin	28, 59, 73, 129
—— v. Hampton	147, 148	—— v. Whitmore	160 a, 420
—— v. Little	264 a, 458	Hern v. Mill	110, 141
Harris v. Baker	321, 451 c	Higgins v. Delinger	270
—— v. Nicholas	456	—— v. Livingston	293, 284
—— v. Mobry	452	—— v. Moore	58, 109
Harrison v. Jackson	49, 125	—— v. Senior	28, 50, 147, 155, 160 a, 161, 162, 266, 268, 269, 270, 392, 395, 446
Hart v. Ten Eyck	332	Hill v. Packard	339
Hartley v. Hitchcock	370, 371	Holland v. Richardson	454
Hartop, <i>ex parte</i>	261, 263, 267	Hills v. Bannister	154, 276, 278, 280
Hartshorn v. Wright	239	—— v. Featherstonhaugh	331
Harvey v. French	269	—— v. Ross	313
—— v. Turner	208, 217 c	Hinckley v. Arey	28, 31
Hasleman v. Young	125	Hinde v. Whitehouse	27, 28
Hastelow v. Jackson	235	Hinds v. Stone	395
Hastings v. Lovering	155, 266	Hipp v. The State	317, 318
Hatch v. Burr	277	Hiscox v. Greenwood	360
—— v. Taylor	126	Hoare v. Dawes	38
Hatfield v. Reynolds	104	Hodges v. Runyan	303
Haverhill Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Newhall	154, 276	Hodgson v. Anderson	465, 466, 477
Hawes v. Martin	335	—— v. Dexter	302, 308
—— v. Watson	217	Hogg v. Snaith	63, 76
Hawtayne v. Bourne	21, 22, 69, 87, 119 a	Holbrook v. Wight	33, 34, 111, 217, 274, 374
Hay v. Colloes Co.	308, 310	Holcroft v. Halbert	116
—— v. Goldsmidt	21, 62	Holderness v. Collinson	354, 384
Hayden v. Smithville Manuf. Co.	453 h	Holl v. Griffin	217
Hayes v. The Western R. Corp.	453 e, 453 g	Holland v. Hall	344
Hayford v. Andrews	49	Holland's Assignees v. Humble's Assignees	352, 361
Hays v. Lynn	78, 99, 160 a, 270	Hollis v. Caridge	383
Hazard v. Treadwell	56; 470	Holly v. Huggefurd	372
Hazeltine v. Miller	68, 77		
Heald v. Kenworthy	446, 449		

	Section		Section
Holman v. Johnson	195, 344	Hunter v. The Hudson Riv. Iron Co.	451
Holmes v. Onion	453	— v. The State	452
Holt v. Ely	398	Huntington v. Knox	160 a, 161, 410
Homersham v. Wolverhampton Water Works Co.	55	Hurlbert v. Pacific Ins. Co.	390, 444
Hood v. Tahnestock	140	Hurlbut v. Kneeland	126
Hopkins v. Lacouture	160 a, 162, 163, 269, 270, 271, 292	Hurst v. Holding	393, 384
— v. Mehaffey	154, 155, 269, 264 a, 273, 277, 289	Hussey v. Allen	116, 297
— v. Mollineaux	7, 244	— v. Christie	294, 297, 299
Hornblower v. Proud	228	Hutchins v. Brackett	319 a
Horner v. Ill. Central R. R.	453 e	Hutchinson v. Stevens	24
Hoskins v. Johnson	58, 102	— v. York, Newcastle, and Berwick Railway	453 e, 453 g
Hosmer v. Beebe	200	Hutton v. Cantril	488
Horn v. Ivy	53	— v. Revett	49
Horsfall v. Fauntleroy	243, 291	Hutton v. Bragg	362 a
Horsley v. Bell	239, 282	Hyde v. Paige	449
— v. Rush	49	— v. Wolf	160 a, 162, 266, 270, 288, 291, 292, 294, 296
Horquiebie v. Gerard	229		
Horton v. Towns	253	I.	
Hoskins v. Johnson	58, 102	Illidge v. Goodwin	453
— v. Slayton	285, 299	Illinois (State of) v. Delafield	78
Houghtaling v. Marvin	488	Isley v. Merriam	419
Houghton v. Mathews	60, 289, 290, 354, 365, 368, 369, 376, 398, 401, 407	Ingersoll v. Van Bokkelin	161
Housatonic, &c. Bank v. Martin	140 a	Inghis, ex parte	228
Houston v. Robertson	488	Ingram v. Ingram	13
Hovey v. Blakeman	329	Inhab. of First Parish in Sutton v. Cole	42
— v. Blanchard	140	Inhab. of Garland v. Reynolds	160 a
Howell v. Pack	250, 259, 390	Irish v. Barber	269
— v. Wardell	379	— v. Webster	269, 302, 395, 396
Howard v. Baillie	21, 58, 64, 97, 101, 165	Ish v. Crane	151, 495
— v. Braithwaite	107, 126, 127, 137	Ives v. Davenport	60
— v. Tucker	336	Iveson v. Conington	155, 268, 269, 279, 393
Howell v. Ransom	212		
Hoyt v. Thompson	13	J.	
Hubbard v. Elmer	67, 68, 134, 137	Jackson v. Baker	179, 204 a
Hubberty v. Ward	119	— v. Clarke	225, 229, 231, 259, 360, 365
Huber v. Zimmerman	58	— v. Cummins	362
Hudson v. Granger	376, 393, 395, 401, 407, 408, 486	Jacobs v. Latour	367
— v. Revett	49	— v. Pollard	339
Hughes v. Boyer	453, 453 a, 454, 455	James v. McCready	60
Huguenin v. Baseley	210	— v. Bixby	116, 119, 161, 266, 294, 296, 297, 299
Humble v. Hunter	406	James, ex parte	210, 211
Humphrey v. Pratt	339	Jannen v. Green	28
Hunt v. Haskell	373	Jaques v. Todd	431
— v. Rousmaniere's Adm'r.	150, 164, 477, 481, 488, 489	Jarvis v. Rogers	356, 360, 362, 365, 367, 376, 382
Hunter v. Jameson	59	Jeffrey v. Bigelow	133, 217 c
— v. Miller	153	Jeffs v. York	264 a, 278
— v. Parker	49, 233, 242		
— v. Prinseps	259, 438		

	Section		Section
Jenkins v. Hutchinson	264 a	Kendall (Postmaster-General)	
— v. Kemishe	167	— v. United States	305
Jennings v. Griffith	444	Kendray v. Hodgson	275, 278
Jewett v. Alton	42	Kendrick v. Delafield	36
Johns v. Simonds	119 a	Kennaway v. Treleavan	53
Johnson v. Barber	452	Kennedy v. Gouveia	154, 155, 158, 273, 278
— v. Catlin	894, 895	Kent v. Tyson	56
— v. Cleaves	449	Kenworthy v. Bate	67
— v. Cunningham	14	Kerns v. Piper	87, 92, 442
— v. Jones	19, 131, 258, 256	Kervis v. Piper	456
— v. McGruder	58	Kidson v. Dilworth	157, 159
— v. New York Central		Kieran v. Sanders	217
— Railroad	192	Kilgour v. Finlyson	21, 69
— v. Ogilby	261, 263, 264	Kimball v. Tucker	450
— v. O'Hara	179, 204 a	Kinder v. Shaw	78
— v. Roberts	27	King (The) v. Beeston	42
— v. Small	453	King v. Boston & Worcester R. R.	
— v. Usborne	112	—	463 c, 453 h
— v. Weed	431	— v. Longnor	51
— v. Wingate	87, 118	— v. Thorn	280
Jolly v. Blanchard	372	Kingston v. Kincaid	198, 256
Jones v. Bird	320, 321	Kinlock v. Craig	361, 377
— v. Downman	261	Kirk v. Hyatt	63 a
— v. Edney	137	Kirkman v. Shawcross	352
— v. Farley	78, 99	Kirkpatrick v. Stainer	268, 269, 400
— v. Hart	451, 453	Kirmutz v. Surrey	31
— v. Hoyt	333	Kirton v. Braithwaite	103 a
— v. La Tombe	302	Knapp v. Alvord	374, 477, 489 a
— v. Littledale	27, 160 a, 266, 267, 269, 270, 298, 446	Knight v. Fox	454, 454 c
— v. Pearl	370	— v. Lord Plymouth	202
— v. Warner	87	Knipe v. Jesson	343
Jordan v. James	34	Knox v. Hack	6
— v. Norton	126	Kortright v. Buffalo Bank	53
Joseph v. Knox	394, 397, 414	Kruger v. Wilcox	367, 376
Joseph v. Pebrer	330, 344	Krumbhaar v. Ludeling	261
Jourdane v. Lefevre	228, 380	Kupfer v. Inhab. of So. Parish in	
Judith (The Vrow)	36	— Augusta	42
Judson v. Etheridge	362	Kymer v. Suwercropp	266, 446, 448, 449
— v. Sturges	85		

K.

Kain v. Old	137
Kean v. Davis	63, 154
Keane v. Boycott	6
Keegan v. The Western-Railway	
— Corp.	453 c, 453 h
Keen v. Sprague	266
Kelley v. Lindsey	21
Kelly v. Munson	242, 259
— v. New York	454 a
— v. Smith	113
Kemble v. Atkins	28
Kemp v. Pryor	143
Kempys v. Proctor	27

L.

Lacey, <i>ex parte</i>	210, 211
Ladd v. Chotard	474
La Farge v. Kneeland	189, 261
— v. Ripley	261
Lagow v. Patterson	63 a
Lambert v. Knott	285
Lamprell v. Billerica Union	55
Lanchester v. Tricker	283, 285
Lane v. Cotton	201, 308, 310, 311, 314, 319, 452
— v. Dighton	229, 230
Lang v. Smyth	228
Langhorne v. Alnutt	137
Langley v. Warner	300, 301

	Section		Section
Langton v. Hughes	355, 348	Tipscombe v. Kitsail	102
Lanyon v. Blanchard	360, 389, 390	Lissett v. Reeve	270
Lathrop v. Blake	58	Little v. Obmen	394
— v. Harlow	170	Littledale v. Lonsdale	454, 454 c, 455
Laugher v. Pointer	452, 453 a, 453 b,	Littlejohn v. Ramsay	200
	453 c, 454, 454 c, 455	Little Miami Railroad v. Stevens	453 g
Laussatt v. Lippincott	14, 60, 78, 113,	Little Rock, Mayor and Aldermen	
	227	— of, v. State Bank	165
Lawler v. Keaquick	85, 141, 183	Lloyd v. Mayor of New York	308
Lawrence v. McArter	6	Lobdell v. Baker	131, 133, 134, 137
— v. Tucker	140	Locke v. Alexander	264 a
Laying v. Stewart	264	— v. Stearns	127, 452
Lazarus v. Shearer	154, 264 a	Lockwood v. Abdy	201
Leach v. Blad	276	— v. Levick	329
Leadbitter v. Farrow	153, 155, 156,	Lombard v. Winslow	68
	157, 269	London and Birmingham Railway	
Leader v. Moxon	320, 321	Co v Winter	52, 53
Leave v. Prentice	183	London Gas Light and Coke Co.	
Le Breton v. Peirce	229	— v. Nicholls	53
Lebetter v. Walker	49	Long v. Colburn	46, 154, 253, 264,
Lee v. Munroe	133, 134, 307		264 a
— v. Tinges	78	— v. Long	67
Leed's Bank	228	Longworth v. Conwell	73
Leeds v. Marine Ins. Co.	396, 397,	Loraine v. Cartwright	74, 253
	398, 404	Lord North's case	201
Lees v. Nuttall	211	Loudon Sav. Society v. Hagers-	
LeFevre v. Lloyd	155, 156, 157, 269	town Bank	17
Legal v. Miller	50	Louisiana State Bank v. Senecal	140 a,
Legg v. Evans	361		140 b
Leggett v. Simmons	452	Lovelace's (Lord) case	51
LeGuen v. Gouverneur	189, 235	Low v. Perkins	42
Lempriere v. Pasley	360, 361, 377,	Lowell v. Boston and Lowell R. R.	454,
	378		454 c
Lench v. Lench	229, 230, 242	Lowther v. Kelly	395
Le Neve v. Le Neve	140	— v. Lowther	210, 511
Lennard v. Robinson	269	Luby v. Hudson River Railroad	135
Lent v. Padelford	244	Lucas v. Barrett	251
Le Roy v. Beard	58	— v. Dorrien	360, 361, 381
Leonard v. Huntington	297	— v. Groning	74, 75, 199,
Lepard v. Vernon	477, 488		215, 269
Leshar v. Wabash Nav. Co.	454 c	Lucena v. Crawford	33, 111, 161, 190,
Leslie v. Pounds	454, 455		242
— v. Wilson	161	Lucey v. Ingram	456, 456 a
Leverick v. Meigs	183, 186, 200, 204,	Ludlow (Mayor, &c. of) v.	
	215, 401, 420	Charlton	52, 53
Levy v. Bank of U. States	115	Lupton v. White	205, 295, 332, 333
— v. Yates	347	Luttrell v. Hazen	455
Lewis v. Nicholson	264 a	Lutz v. Linthicum	148, 150
— v. Sawyer	465	Lyman v. Sherwood	154
Lickbarrow v. Mason	119, 352	Lynch v. Postlethwaite	146, 147
Little Rock Bank v. Plimpton	390, 404,	Lynn v. Burgoyne	13
	444	Lyon v. Williams	267
Lincoln v. Battelle	388, 43		
Lindus v. Bradwell	147, 154, 160 a, 270		
Linsley v. Lovely	452		
Linton v. Smith	454		
Liottard v. Graves	141, 338		

M.

Maans v. Henderson 360, 365, 379, 389
 Mabar v. Massias 157, 378

	Section		Section
Macbeath v. Haldimand	75, 83, 199, 278, 302, 303, 306	Mayor, &c. of Ludlow v. Charl-	52, 83
Macdonnell v. Harding	208, 302	ton	
Macfarlane v. Giannacopulo	449	Mayor, &c. of Stafford v. Till	53
Mackinley v. McGregor	7	Mayor, &c. of Thetford's case	53
Maclean v. Douglass	6	Max v. Roberts	214
—— v. Dun	244, 418, 440, 445	McClellan v. Parker	266
Madden v. Kempster	860	McComb v. Wright	27
Madeira v. Townsley	182, 183	McCombie v. Davis	118, 312, 360, 366, 367, 389, 437
Magee v. Atkinson	269, 270	McConnell v. Thomas	394
Mahoney v. Kekule	268, 268 a	McCulloch v. McKee	99
Mainwaring v. Brandon	201, 202	—— v. The Eagle Ins. Co.	498
Mair v. Glennie	861	McDaniel v. Emanuel	453 e
Malough v. Barber	191, 200, 218	McDermott v. Pacific Railroad	453 e
Manella v. Barry	81, 192	McDonald v. Bear River Co.	161
Mann v. Chandler	154, 275, 276	McGatriek v. Watson	253 h
—— v. Forrester	379, 390, 429	McGavock v. Woodlief	329
—— v. Shifner	113, 360, 367, 376, 388, 389	McGillivray v. Simpson	362
Marcadier v. Chesap. Ins. Co.	116	McHenry v. Ridgely	394
Marchington v. Vernon	895	McIntosh v. Slade	456 a
Many v. Beekman Iron Co.	154	McIver v. Humble	444
Marder v. Lee	485	McKenzie v. Scott	215
Mare v. Charles	159	McKinnell v. Robinson	285, 346
Marfield v. Douglas	34, 74, 192, 477	McKinstry v. Pearsall	60
Maria (The Ship)	456, 456 a	McLaughlin v. Prior	453 a
Mark v. Bowers	14, 15, 113	McManus v. Crickett	453, 454, 456
Marlett v. Martel	271	McMillan v. Eastman	314, 319 a
Marquand v. Webb	297, 299	—— v. The Saratoga, &c.	
Marr v. Plummer	241	Wash R. Co.	453 b
Marsh v. Pedder	431, 432, 433, 449	McNaughten v. Partridge	49, 148, 149, 153, 242, 252
Martin v. Almond	153	Mead v. Hammond	451
—— v. Blithman	308	Mears v. Morrison	147, 148, 153
—— v. Flowers	148	Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria	
—— v. Lemon	42	r. Bank of Columbia	63, 77, 114, 154, 270
—— v. Temperley	453 b, 453 c, 454 a, 456, 456 a	Mechanics' Bank v. Merchants' Bank	183
Martini v. Coles	78, 111, 113, 164, 227, 367	Medina v. Stoughton	308
Martyn v. Hinde	395	Medway Cotton Manuf. Co. v.	
Marzetti v. Williams	217 c, 222	Adams	395, 396
Marzion v. Pioche	489	Meech v. Smith	264, 264 a, 338
Massey v. Banner	96, 200, 208, 302	Menken v. Watson	250
—— v. Davis	9, 192, 207, 213, 214	Merchants' Bank v. Central Bank	59
—— v. Scott	153	—— r. Marine Bank	115
Masters v. Abraham	137	Meriel v. Wymandsold	285
Mathes, ex parte	346	Merrick v. Barnard	217 a
Matson v. Booth	49	Merrick's Estate	490
Matthews v. Haydon	98, 451	Merrifield v. Parritt	242
Mauri v. Heffernan	261, 266	Merryweather v. Nixon	308, 339
May v. Bliss	455	Metcalf v. Clough	477
—— v. Mitchell	77	Meyer v. Barker	154, 158, 161, 261, 263, 273
Maydew v. Forrester	191	—— v. Nios	362
Mayhew v. Eames	140 d	Michael v. Alestree	454 c, 456
—— v. Prince	156, 264 a, 269	Michigan Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth	489
Mayor, &c. of Little v. State Bank	53	Middlebury v. Case	395
Mayor, &c. of London v. Goree	53		

	Section		Section
Middleton v. Fowler	454, 456	Munn v. Commission Ins. Co.	72, 73,
Milbank v. Dennistoun	193		126, 181, 133
Miles v. O'Hara	157, 158, 159	Murray v. East India Co.	52, 53, 62,
Milldam Foundry v. Hovey	149		63, 67
Miller v. Aris	300, 301	— v. South Car. R. Co.	453 e,
— v. Edmonstone	63 a		453 g
— v. Ford	302	— v. Toland	15
— v. Livingston	326	Myler v. Fitzpatrick	203, 217 a
— v. Race	228	Mynn v. Jolliffe	102, 108
Milligan v. Wedge	201, 308, 452, 453 a, 453 b, 453 c, 454, 454 a, 454 c, 556 a	Myrtle v. Beaver	305
Mills v. Hunt	27, 155, 266, 269, 270	N.	
Minard v. Mead	147, 160 a, 274 b	National Bank v. Norton	140 a, 140 b
Minett v. Forrester	482	National Exchange Co. v. Drew	126
Minor v. Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria	114	Neal v. Sheatheld	49
Miranda v. City Bank of New Orleans	208	Neilson v. Hartford	63
Mires v. Solebay	300	Nelson v. Cowing	59
Mitchell v. Cockburne.	346	— v. Powell	160 a
— v. Crassweller	456	Nelson (The Ship)	297, 298
— v. Eades	488	Neptune 2d (The Ship)	453, 456 a
— v. St. Andrew's Bay Land Co.	49	Nesbit v. Burry	192
Moffat v. Parsons	103 a	Nesbitt, et parte	383
Moir v. Hopkins	455	Newbold v. Wright	113
Monte Allegre (The Ship)	107, 109	Newell v. Hurlbert	250
Montillat v. Bank of U. States	208	New England Marine Ins. Co. v. De Wolf	138, 147, 148, 154, 160, 160 a, 264 a
Moody v. Webster	379	Newhall v. Dunlap	155, 269
Moor v. Wilson	264 a	Newsome v. Thornton	60, 78, 225
Moore v. Clementson	227, 270	New York & Wash. Print Tel. Co. v. Dryburg	308
— v. Hussey	242	New York Central Ins. Co. v. Nat. Prot. Ins. Co.	211
— v. Morgue	96, 191	New York Life & Trust Co. v. Beebe	184
Moorsom v. Kymar	160, 274	Nicholls v. Diamond	159
Morgan v. Cader	266	Nichols v. Clent	377
— v. Lewis	332	— v. House	185
— v. Stell	470, 474	— v. Moody	302
Morell v. Frith	199	Nicholson v. Knowles	215, 217
Morley v. Gaisford	453	— v. Mounsey	313, 315, 316, 321, 322, 454
Morris v. Cleasby	33, 93, 112, 161, 215, 403, 407, 411, 413, 429, 430, 444	— v. Willan	188
— v. Summerl	111, 190, 218	Nickson v. Brohan	56, 59
Morse v. Conn. River Railroad	134	Nind v. Marshall	58
— v. Royall	210	Nixon v. Hyserott	59, 165
— v. Slue	308, 309, 310, 316, 453	— v. Palmer	72, 243
Morsell v. Frith	63, 75	Norris v. Cook	255, 258
Mortlock v. Bulley	50	Northampton Bank v. Parson	114
Mott v. Hicks	53, 154, 159, 269, 276, 302, 306	— v. Pepon	264 a
Mountfort v. Scott	381	North River Bank v. Aymar	69, 72, 73, 127, 134, 137, 140 a, 140 b, 165
Mowatt v. McLellan	300, 301	Norton v. Herron	155, 269, 275, 278
Muldon v. Whitelock	160 a, 270, 295, 297, 431, 434		
Muller v. Bohlens	215		

[illegible]

	Section		Section
Reinhold v. Dertzell	159	Roseiter v. Roseiter	65, 73, 73, 126, 181, 133, 251, 264
Rice v. Austin	361, 371, 377	Rourke v. Story	73
— v. Chute	305	Routh v. Thompson	242, 248, 418
— v. Gove	147, 154, 160 a, 264 a, 272, 275	Rowning v. Goodchild	305, 308, 314, 319 a, 319 b
Rich v. Coe	294, 297, 298, 299, 446, 448	Royall v. Sprinkle	135
Richardson v. Anderson	58, 103, 109	Royer v. Allen	264 a
— v. Kimball	311	Rucker v. Cammeyer	28
— v. Weston	200	Ruggles v. Gen. Int. Ins. Co.	133
Richmond Manufacturing Co. v. Starks	253, 258, 259	Rundle v. Moore	192
Richmond S. Co. v. Vanderbilt	456	Runquist v. Ditchill	73, 116
Riddle v. Locks and Canals on Merrimack River	308	Rusby v. Scarlett	56
Ridgely v. Dobson	285, 287	Rushforth v. Hadfield	354, 382
Ridson v. Dilworth	269	Russell v. Bangley	98, 103, 109
Right d. Fisher v. Cuthell	246	— v. Hankey	96, 202
Rigs v. Cage	488	— v. Hudson River Railroad	453 e, 453 g
Riley v. Minor	49	Ryall v. Rolle	229
Ringo v. Binns	211	Ryan v. Cumberland Val. R.	453 e, 453 g
Ripley v. Gelston	300, 301, 307		S.
Risbourg v. Bruckner	290	Sadler v. Henlock	454, 454 a, 454 c
River Clyde Trustees v. Duncan	98, 104	— v. Leigh	401, 403
Robbins v. Fennell	201	Sadock v. Burton	199
Roberts v. Button	154, 264 a, 280	Salem Bank v. Gloucester Bank	87, 115, 305, 308
— v. Dixall	67	Salte v. Field	470, 488
— v. Fennereau	139	Salter v. Kingly	264 a, 396
— v. Jackson	326	Saltmarsh v. Smith	488
— v. Ogilby	217	Sammel v. Wright	453 a
— v. Pierson	6	Sampson v. Somerset Iron Works	332
— v. Smith	453 h	Sanders v. The Guardians of the St. Neot's Union	55
Robertson v. Clarke	118	— v. Powell	308
— v. Livingston	342	Sandford v. Handy	134
— v. Pope	154	Sandilands v. Marsh	125, 126
Robinnett v. The Ship Exeter	120	Sargeant, ex parte	228
Robinson, ex parte	59	Sargent v. Morris	394, 395, 397
— v. Fitchburg Railroad	134	Saunderson v. Bell	362
— v. Green	55	— v. Marr	6
— v. McDonnell	361	— v. Walker	210
— v. New York Ins. Co.	326	Savage v. Birkhead	183, 217 c, 308, 348
— v. Rutter	27, 107, 397	— v. Rix	17, 147, 164, 276
Rochester (Dean, &c. of) v. Pierce	53	Savignac v. Roome	456
Rodriguez v. Heffernan	113	Savings Bank v. Davis	149
Roe v. The Birkenhead &c. Rail. Co.	456	Scaife v. Tobin	274, 274 a
— v. Davis	440	Scarborough v. Reynolds	99
— v. Dean of Rochester	52	Searle v. Morgan	353, 354, 355, 356, 362
— v. Pierce	246	Schack v. Anthony	147, 160, 161, 394, 422
— v. Prideaux	167	Schermerhorn v. Loines	296, 431, 434
Rogers v. Coit	269, 446 a	Schieffelin v. Harvey	303, 314, 315, 316
— v. Kneeland	58, 242, 244, 253, 339		
— v. Wilson	414		
Roswell v. Prior	454 c		
Ross v. Rosetta	140		

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

xxx

	Section		Section
Schimmelpennick v. Bayard	72, 73, 81, 133	Shriver v. Stephens	69
Schmaling v. Tomlinson	13, 201, 202, 387, 389	Sickens v. Irving	121
Schmalz v. Avery	406	Sifkin v. Wray	350
Schroyer v. Lynch	319 a	Sigourney v. Lloyd	228, 438
Scott v. Detroit Society	42	Simon & Motivos	27
— v. Franklin	228, 371, 380	Simonds v. Heard	269, 276
— v. Irving	98, 103, 109	Simpson v. Huggins	270
— v. Manchester	308, 321	— v. Lamb	329
— v. McGrath	102	— v. Nichols	235
— v. Shepherd	456	— v. Swan	123, 183, 269
— v. Surman	60, 202, 229, 231	Sim v. Bond	270, 396
Scotthorn v. South Staffordshire R. Co.	463	— v. Britain	270
Scrace v. Whittington	279	Skinner v. Dayton	49, 242
Scripps v. Alderton	407, 429	— v. Gunn	59, 148
Scruggs v. Driver	488	Skip v. Eastern Co.'s Rail Co.	453 e
Sea v. Carpenter	331	Small v. Atwood	160, 160 a, 418, 420
Seaman v. Fomereau	139	Sinart v. Sanders	74, 371, 477
Seaber v. Hawks	269	Smith v. Birmingham Gas Co	53, 53, 308
Searle v. Scovell	118	— v. Cologan	96, 194, 243, 249, 250
Seidell v. Peckworth	300	— v. Condry	217 c, 220, 221, 456 a
Seignot & Walmer's case	59, 132, 418, 421	— v. East India Co.	73, 74, 104, 126
Seiple v. Irwin	102	— v. Ferrand	431
Seller v. Work	191	— v. Holson	250, 259
Seton v. Slade	108, 499, 500	— v. Lascelles	111, 190, 218
Seymour v. Greenwood	456	— v. McGuire	72, 73, 119
— v. Maddox	453 e	— v. O'enden	343
— v. Pychlau	418, 421, 431, 432, 446, 448	— v. Plummer	356
— v. Van Slyck	314, 319	— v. Rice	499
Shack v. Anthony	147, 394, 422	— v. White	490
Shank, <i>ex parte</i>	365	Smout v. Ilbery	264, 265 a, 488, 495, 498, 499
Sharland v. Mildon	312	Smvth v. Anderson	268, 449
Sharp v. Emmet	156, 157, 269	— v. Craig	477
— v. Emmett	153	Snee v. Prescott	161, 350
Shaw v. Arden	331	Snook v. Davidson	379, 388, 389, 391
— v. Nudd	50	Snow v. Perry	133
— v. Reed	453	Snowdon v. Davis	300
— v. Sherwood	395	Soames v. Spencer	244, 249, 445
Sheffield v. Watson	202, 302, 306	Soares v. Thornton	116
Sheldon v. Drummond	140	Sollers, <i>ex parte</i>	228
— v. Dunlap	147, 148	Solly v. Forbes	58
Shelton v. Darling	154, 269, 276	— v. Rathbone	13, 34, 118, 146, 190, 201, 217 a, 367, 389
Shepherd v. Percy	210	Solomon v. Bank of England	228, 394, 405, 414
Sheriff v. Axe	329	— v. Dawes	247, 440
Sherman v. Rochester, &c. R. Co.	453 e, 453 g	South Carolina Bank v. Case	124
Sherwood v. Roys	394	Southerne v. How	310, 389
Shields v. Davis	116	Southwark Bridge Co. v. Sills	53
Shipley v. Kymer	14, 78, 113, 367	Southwick v. Estes	452
Shipman v. Thompson	488, 489	Speering v. De Grave	448
Shirley v. Wilkinson	139		
Short v. Skipwith	220, 221		
— v. Spackman	270		

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

xxiii

	Section		Section
Templat v. McLachlan	333	Treustel v. Brandon	228, 435
Temple v. Pomroy	77	Triplett v. Neale	300
Tenant v. Elliot	235, 347	Trueman v. Loder	28, 160 a, 268, 269, 400, 401
Terrill v. Flower	253	Tuberville v. Stamp	456
Texiras v. Evans	49	Tulbs v. Hoft	302
Thacher v. Dinsmore	280	Tucker v. Moreland	6
— v. Winslow	394	Twogood, ex parte	228
Thalhimer v. Brinckerhoff	134, 135	Tyler v. Freeman	396
Thames (The Ship)*	453		
The Thames Steamboat Co. v. Housatonic Railroad	453		
Thomas v. Bishop	159, 269	U.	
Thomas' Ex'r v. Edwards	261	Underwood v. Nicholls	98
Thompson, ex parte	228	Union Bank v. Beune	42
— v. Farmer	367	United Ins. Co. v. Scott	38, 118
— v. Giles	226	United States Bank v. Binney	126
— v. Havelock	334	United States v. Bartlett	435, 463, 466
— v. Perkins	33, 112, 215, 229, 231	— v. Dugan	394, 412
Thomson v. Davenport	160 a, 261, 264, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 288, 289, 290, 291, 293, 400, 423, 446, 448, 449	— v. Fillebrown	324, 325
— v. Thomson	235	— v. Halberstadt	308
Thorndike v. Godfrey	213	— v. Jarvis	124, 463, 466, 467
Thorne v. Deas	478	— v. Kirkpatrick	319
Thornton v. Kempster	28	— v. McDaniel	325
Thorold v. Smith	101, 238	— v. Parmele	160, 161
Thwayes v. Dye	67	— v. Ripley	235
Ticket v. Short	190, 217 a	Unwin v. Woolseley	302, 303
Tide Water Canal Co. v. Archer	221	Upham v. Lafavour	385
Tilton v. Warwick Gas Light Co.	53, 222, 450	Upton v. Gray	266, 291
Tilton (The Schooner)	164, 211	— v. Suffolk County Mills	60
Tidnall v. Brown	217	Ure v. Currell	192
Tippetts v. Walker	13, 148, 149, 155, 273, 276, 278, 302	Urquhart v. McIver	78, 113, 367
Tobey v. Barber	431	Uspanha v. Noble	394
— v. Clathin	287		
Tobin v. Crawford	274	V.	
Todd v. Emly	289, 442	Valentine v. Piper	58
— v. Reid	98, 103, 109	Vanada v. Hopkins	59
Tomlinson v. Collett	17, 73, 126	Van Allen v. Vanderpool	60
Toulmin v. Steere	140	Van Amringe v. Peabody	113, 225
Towle v. Jackson	243	Van Brunt v. Schenck	312
— v. Leavitt	72, 102	Vanderbilt v. Richmond Turnpike Co.	317, 318
Townsend v. Corning	264 a	Vandervaldy v. Barry	343
— v. Hubbard	148, 149, 154, 264 a, 274 a	Vanderzee v. Willis	381
— v. Inglis	430	Vandyke v. Brown	336
— v. Susquehanna Turnpike Co.	308	Vanguard (The Ship)	195, 344
Tracy v. Swartwout	300, 301, 307	Vanhook v. Frick	50
Traderman's Bank v. Astor	191, 165	Van Rensdyck v. Kane	153
Trask v. Roberts	154, 276	Van Rensselaer v. Morris	138
Trelawney v. Thomas	338	Van Staphorst v. Pearce	394
		Varden v. Parker	204
		Vetrie v. Williams	138
		Veil v. Mitchell's Adm'rs	231
		Vellejo v. Wheeler	118
		Vere v. Ashby	124

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

XXV

	Section		Section
Williams v Walsby	49	Wood v Van Dusen	346
— " Winchester	160 a, 420	Wooles i Dennett	154, 264 a, 274
— " Woods	13	Woodford v McLenahan	59
— " Woodward	67	Woodhouse v Meredith	210
Williamson v Price	456 a	Woodin v Burlord	126
Willink v Hollingsworth	253, 259, 389	Woodrop Sims (The Ship)	453
Willis i Bank of England	• 110 d	Woodstock Bank v Downer	395
— i Glover	139	Woodward v Suydam	217 c, 221, 259, 333
Wilson - Auderton	217, 440	Woolsey v Tompkins	42
— i Banks	270	Worrall i Munn	49
— i Bullour	303	Wostenholm i Davies	98
— i Coffin	200	Wren v Kitten	200, 205, 208, 218
— i Craghton	36	Wright i Boynton	255
— v Edmonds	458	— i Dunith	9, 31, 211
— i Foster	468	— v N Y Central Railroad	403 h
— v Hut	291, 441, 448	— i Snell	352
— v Heather	336	Wyatt i Marquis of Hertford	296, 433, 434, 449
— i Keymer	274	Wyburd i Stinton	330
— v Peverly	406	Wyman i Gray	151
— i Poultet	242, 250, 259	Wynne i Thomas	468
— i Rich	6		
— i Short	217 e		
— i Tammam	247, 251 a		
— i Wilson	74 192		
— i Zuluctta	268 400		
Wiltshire i Sims •	60, 78 2-6		
Winster, ci pot	13		
— i Giggys	266 267		
Winter i Coit	361		
Winterbottom i Wright	201, 308, 402, 453 453 b, 454 a, 457		
Wiswall i Brinson	451, 454 c		
Withington i Herring	58, 68, 72, 73, 133		
Witte i Hagut	414		
Wolf i Horncastle	111, 141, 161, 239, 346		
— v Koppell	215		
Womack i Sharp	126		
Wood i Auburn & Rochester Rail	40		
— i Denette	104, 27		
— i Goodridge	68, 118		
— i McCun	65		
		Zachme v Nash	261
		Zano i Verdelle	259
		Zott v Milladen	371
		Zouch v Parsons	6

COMMENTARIES ON AGENCY.

CHAPTER I.

AGENCY IN GENERAL.

§ 1. In conformity with the original plan, prescribed to me by the Founder of the Dane Professorship, my design in the present Commentaries is to expound the elementary principles belonging to the leading branches of commercial and maritime jurisprudence. And, in the first place, let us proceed to the consideration of the Law of Agency, a subject intimately connected with all these branches, and in no small degree necessary to a full and exact exposition of the doctrines applicable to them. From this we shall be led, by every easy and natural transition, to the Law of Partnership. And these being discussed, the path to others will lie open before us, unobstructed by any collateral inquiries, which may embarrass our progress.

§ 2. It is obvious to remark, that a large proportion of the business of human life must necessarily be carried on by persons, not acting in their own right, or from their own intrinsic authority, over the subject-matter, but acting under an authority derived from others, who, by the principles of natural and civil law, are exclusively invested with the full and complete original dominion, authority, and right over such subject-matter. By the general theory of our municipal jurisprudence, and probably by that of all civilized nations, professing to be governed by a regular system of laws, every person is invested with a general authority to dispose of his own property, to enter into contracts and engagements, and to perform acts, which respect his personal rights, interests, duties, and obligations, except in cases where some positive or known disability is imposed upon him by the

laws of the country, in which he resides, and to which he owes allegiance. Every person, not under such a disability, is treated as being *sui juris*, and capable, not only of acting personally in all such matters by his own proper act, but of accomplishing the same object through the instrumentality of others, to whom he may choose to delegate, either generally, or specially, his own authority for such a purpose.¹ In the expanded intercourse of modern society it is easy to perceive, that the exigencies of trade and commerce, the urgent pressure of professional, official, and other pursuits, the temporary existence of personal illness or infirmity, the necessity of transacting business at the same time in various and remote places, and the importance of securing accuracy, skill, ability and speed in the accomplishment of the great concerns of human life, must require the aid and assistance and labors of many persons, in addition to the immediate superintendence of him, whose rights and interests are to be directly affected by the results.² Hence the general maxim of our law, subject only to a few exceptions above hinted at, is, that whatever a man *sui juris* may do of himself, he may do by another; and as correlative of the maxim, that what is done by another is to be deemed done by the party himself. *Qui facit per alium, per seipsum facere videtur.*³

§ 3. In the common language of life, he who, being competent, and *sui juris*, to do any act for his own benefit, or on his own account, employs another person to do it, is called the Principal, Constituent, or Employer; and he, who is thus employed, is called the Agent, Attorney, Proxy, or Delegate of the Principal, Constituent, or Employer.⁴ The relation, thus created, between the parties, is termed an Agency. The power, thus delegated, is called in law an Authority. And the act, when performed, is often designated as an act of Agency or Procuration; the latter word being derived from the Roman law, in which *Procuratio* signifies the same thing as Agency, or the ad-

¹ Bac. Abr. *Authority*, A.

² See 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15; Introduction to title Proxy, &c. 215, 216 — The Digest pithily puts the point. *Usus autem Procuratoris perquam necessarius est, ut qui rebus suis ipsi superesse vel nolunt, vel non possunt, per alios possint, vel agere, vel conveniri* Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 3, l. 1, § 2.

³ Co Litt. 258 a.

⁴ See 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, Intro.

administration of the business of another.¹ When the Agency is created by a formal written instrument, especially if it be under seal, it is with us commonly called a Letter of Attorney; by foreign writers, it is more commonly called a Procuration.² In the Roman law the Agent was called a Procurator, and he was thus defined: *Procurator est, qui aliena negotia mandatu Domini administrat*; ³ so that the *Dominus* (master) of the Civil Law answered exactly to the principal of our law. Indeed, the definition of an agent at the common law seems borrowed from this very source; and Lord Chief Baron Comyns has well expressed it, when he says, that "An attorney is he, who is appointed to do anything in the place of another."⁴

§ 4. It may not be without use to remark, that in the Roman law an agency was sometimes called, in a large sense, a *Mandatum* (mandate); and the principal was denominated *Mandator* or *Mandans*, (the employer or mandant,) and the agent *Mandatarius*, (the employee or mandatary.)⁵ For, in the primitive sense of the term, *Mandatum* was not so much a contract, from which there sprung up a civil obligation and action, as a business or negotiation, (*negotium*), which was confided to the discretion of the mandatary; *Mandare est gerendum quid alicui committere*.⁶ But, in the more ordinary sense of the word, *Mandatum* was limited to such an agency, as was authorized and undertaken for another gratuitously, and without reward. For, if a compensation was to be received, it fell under another head, and was a *Locatio*

¹ Brisson. De Verb. Sign. Procuratio; Code of Louisiana, tit. 15, art. 2954; Civil Code of France, art. 1984, 1985; Malyne, Lex Merc. 79; 1 Bell, Comm. 385, (4th edit.); Id. B. 3, pt. 1, ch. 3, p. 476, (5th edit.)

² Co. Litt. 52 a; Malyne, Lex Merc. 78, 79. — Thus, for example, Domat defines a procuration in this manner. "La procuration est un acte par lequel celui, qui ne peut vaquer lui même à ses affaires, donne pouvoir à un autre de le faire pour lui, comme s'il était lui même présent; soit qu'il faille simplement gérer et prendre soin de quelque bien, ou de quelque affaire, on que ce soit pour traiter avec d'autres." 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 1, art. 1.

³ Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 3, l. 1; Heinecc. ad Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, §§ 415, 423; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, n. 2.

⁴ Com. Dig. Attorney, A.

⁵ See 1 Stair, Inst. B. 1, tit. 12, p. 127, edit. by Brodie; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 31; Story on Bailm. § 138.

⁶ Brisson. Verb. Signif. Mandare; Noodt. in Pand. tom. 2, p. 372; Heinecc. ad Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, § 230, note; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, Introd.

et Conductio, a letting and hiring of the services of the agent; and it was then governed by somewhat different obligations and duties.¹ Hence it is declared; *Mandatum, nisi gratuitum, nullum est, nam originem ex officio et amicitia trahit. Contrarium ergo est officio merces; interveniente enim pecunia res ad locationem et conductionem potius respicit.*² But this distinction and the consequences thereof have been fully expounded in the Commentaries on Bailments, to which the learned reader is referred for more exact information.³ The Agency, which will be principally, though not exclusively, treated of in the present work, is that which arises in the course of commercial affairs; and illustrations will be borrowed from other sources, only when they may serve more fully to explain the doctrines applicable to the former.

CHAPTER II.

WHO ARE CAPABLE OF BECOMING PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS.

§ 5. LET us next proceed to the consideration of the question, Who is capable of becoming a principal, and in regard to what matters; and who is capable of becoming an agent, and in regard to what matters. In general, it may be said, that every person *sui juris*, is capable of becoming both a principal and an agent, unless there exists some disability or prohibition by the municipal law, which is to regulate his rights and duties. In order, therefore, to arrive at any accurate understanding of this subject, we are to examine the exceptions created by that municipal law; and where these exceptions cease, the natural presumption is, that in all other cases the general rule prevails.

¹ It is in the broad sense above stated, that the word "mandate" is used in the present Civil Code of France, as well as in the Civil Code of Louisiana. See Civil Code of France, art 1981, 1986; Civil Code of Louisiana, art 2954, 2955, 2960. The modern Scottish mercantile law seems to apply the word *mandate* in the same broad sense. 1 Bell, Comm. 385, § 408 (4th edit.); *Id.* B. 3, pt. 1, ch. 3, § 3, p. 476, (5th edit.); 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, *Introd.*

² Dig. Lib 17, tit. 1, l. 1, § 4; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 1, art. 9.

³ Story on Bailm. § 137 to 156.

§ 6. And first, who are principals, capable of delegating authority to others to act in their behalf and for their interest. In general it may be stated (as has been already intimated), as a rule of the common law, that, whenever a person has a power, as owner, or in his own right, to do a thing, he may do it by an agent.¹ Every person, therefore, of full age, and not otherwise disabled, has a complete capacity for this purpose. But Infants, Married Women, Idiots, Lunatics, and other persons not *sui juris*, are either wholly or partially incapable of appointing an agent. Idiots, lunatics, and other persons not *sui juris*, are wholly incapable; and infants and married women are incapable, except under special circumstances.² Thus, for example, an infant may authorize another person to do any act which is for his benefit; but he cannot authorize him to do an act which is to his prejudice.³ If, therefore, an infant should make a letter of attorney to another, to take livery of lands on a feoffment to him, it will be good; for it will be intended to be for his benefit.⁴ But if an

¹ Coombe's case, 9 Co. R. 75 b; Com. Dig. *Attorney*, C. 1; Heinecc. ad Pand. Pt. 1, Lib. 3, tit. 1, § 424. Ante, § 2.

² The civil law included the like disabilities. Thus, for example, an idiot or lunatic was rendered incapable of contracting, and could not delegate authority to another to act for him, *Furiosus nullum negotium gerere potest, quia non intelligit, quod agit* Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 20, § 8.

The same rule applied to an infant, as contradistinguished from a minor of years of discretion. Nam infans, et qui infantie proximus est, non multum a furioso distat; quia hujusmodi ætatis, pupilli nullum habent intellectum. Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 20, § 10. Furiosi vel ejus, cui bonis interdictum sit, nulla voluntas est. Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 40; id. l. 5. — But then again a minor or pupil might sometimes act by an agent, with the consent of his guardian or tutor. Verum, si ipse pupillus præposuerit, si quidem tutoris auctoritate, obligabitur; si minus, non Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 9; Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 20, § 9, Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, n. 17, 18, Pothier on Oblig. n. 49 to 52, Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 5. Heineccius lays down the general rule, and the exceptions, in the following brief terms. (1) Ut à demum procuratorem constituent, qui et mandare et res suas libere administrare possunt, adeoque, (2.) Non furiosi mente capti, infantes, surpi, muti, prodigi. Heinecc. ad Pand. P. 1, Lib. 3, tit. 3, § 424. See Pothier on Oblig. n. 49 to 52, n. 74, 75.

³ Keane v. Boycott, 2 H. Black. R. 515; Tucker v. Moreland, 10 Peters, R. 58, 69; Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. R. 463; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 31, p. 233 to 243 (4th edit.)

⁴ Com. Dig. *Infant*, B. 1; 1 Roll. Abr. 730, l. 10; Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burr. R. 1808; Coombe's case, 9 Co. R. 76 b; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 31, p. 233 to 244 (4th edit.)

infant should make a feoffment, and execute a letter of attorney to another, to make livery in his name to the feoffee, it will be void [or at least voidable]; for such feoffment and livery will be intended to be to his prejudice.¹ So in regard to married women, ordinarily, they are incapable of appointing an agent or attorney; and even in case of a joint suit at law, an appointment of an attorney by a married woman is void; and her husband may make an attorney for both.² But where a married woman is capable of doing an act, or of transferring property or rights with the assent of her husband, there, perhaps, she may, with the assent of her husband, appoint an agent or attorney to do the same.³ So with regard to her separate property, she may, perhaps, be entitled to dispose of it, or to incumber it, through an agent or attorney; because in relation to such separate property she is generally treated as a feme sole.⁴ I say, perhaps; for it may admit of question; and there do not seem to be any satisfactory authorities directly on the point.⁵

§ 7. Secondly, who are capable of becoming agents. And here it may be stated, that there are few persons who are ex-

¹ Com. Dig. *Infant*, C. 2; Perkins, Grant, 13; *Louch v. Parsons*, 3 Burr. 1804; *Coombe's case*, 9 Co. R. 75, 76; *Lawrence v. McArter*, 10 Ohio R. 37; *Pyle v. Cravens*, 4 Littell, 18; *Doe d. Thomas v. Roberts*, 16 M. & W. 778; *Bennett v. Davis*, 6 Cowen, 393; *Waples v. Hastings*, 3 Harrington, 403, *Knox v. Hack*, 10 Harris, 337. See Bingham on Infancy, (Bennett's ed.)

² *Saunderson v. Marr*, 1 H. Bl. 75; *Roberts v. Peirson*, 2 Wils. R. 3, *Foxwiste v. Tremaine*, 2 Saund. R. 212, 213; *Bacon, Abr. Baron & Feme*, I, *Wilkins v. Wetherell*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 220; *Maclean v. Douglas*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 128, *Viner, Abr. Attorney*, C. pl. 5, 7; *Co. Litt.* 42 b; *Harg.* note 4; *Co. Litt.* 112 a, *Harg.* note 6.

³ *Sed quære.*

⁴ See 2 Story on Equity Jurisp. § 1391 to 1402.

⁵ See Clancy on Husband and Wife, 166 to 169; *Id.* ch. 5, p. 282 to 294; *Roper on Husband and Wife*, ch. 16, p. 97 to 100; *Id.* 107, 108, 126; *Id.* ch. 19, pp. 184, 185, 193, 194. — It is laid down in Com. Dig. *Baron & Feme*, G. 3, that, if there be a demise for years by husband and wife of the lands of the wife, with a letter of attorney, signed by both, to deliver the lease upon the land, it is a good demise of both during the coverture though the wife cannot make an attorney. And for this is cited — *v. Hopkins*, Cro. Car. 165; and *Cooper's case*, 2 Leon. R. 200; and *Anon.* 2 Bulst. R. 13; which are directly in point. But *Gardner v. Norman*, Cro. Jac. 617; *Wilson v. Rich*, Yelv. R. 1; *S. C.* 1 Brownl. R. 134; *Plomer v. Hockhead*, 2 Brownl. R. 248, are to the contrary. *Adams*, in his work on Ejectment, (p. 179 [174.] third edition,) lays down the rule according to these latter cases. See also *Runnington on Ejectment*, 148.

cluded from acting as agents, or from exercising an authority delegated to them by others. Therefore, it is by no means necessary for a person to be *sui juris*, or capable of acting in his or her own right, in order to qualify himself or herself to act for others. Thus, for example, monks, infants, *femes covert*, persons attainted, outlawed, or excommunicated, villeins, [slaves,] and aliens may be agents for others.¹ For the execution of a naked authority can be attended with no manner of prejudice to persons under such incapacities or disabilities, or to any other person, who by law may claim any interest under such incapacitated or disabled persons after their death.² Nay, a *feme covert* may be an attorney of another to make livery to her husband upon a feoffment; and a husband may make such livery to his wife; although they are generally deemed but one person in law.³ [So the husband may act as agent for his wife in investing her money in real estate, and though he take the title to himself, it will not avail his creditors, there being no fraud.]⁴ She may also act as the agent or attorney of her own husband, and as such, with his consent, bind him by her contract or other act;⁵ or she may act as the agent of another in a contract with her own husband.⁶ There are, indeed, some exceptions to the general rule above stated; for an idiot, lunatic, or other person otherwise non compos mentis, cannot do any act, as an agent or attorney, binding upon the principal; for they have not any legal discretion or understanding to bestow upon the affairs of others, any more

¹ Thomson on Bills, p. 220 (2d edit.), 1836, Co. Litt. 52 a; Bacon, Abr. *Authority*, B., Com. Dig. *Attorney*, C. 4, Id. *Baron & Feme*, P. 3, Chastain v. Bowman, 1 Hill, (S. C.) 270. Aliens are enumerated by Lord Coke (as in the text) as capable of being agents for others. By this Lord Coke probably had in view alien friends, who, although they have not a capacity to hold real estate for themselves, may act as attorneys for others in letting or selling real estate.

² Bacon, Abr. *Authority*, B.

³ Emerson v. Blonden, 1 Esp. Rep. 142; Prestwick v. Marshall, 7 Bing. R. 565; Palethorp v. Furnish, 2 Esp. R. 511, note; Hopkins v. Mollineux, 4 Wend. R. 465.

⁴ Ready v. Bragg, 1 Head, (Tenn.) 511.

⁵ Bacon, Abr. *Authority*, B.; Co. Litt. 112, and Harg. note 6; Pothier on Oblig. n. 74, 82; Pickering v. Pickering, 6 N. H. R. 124; MacKinley v. McGregor, 3 Wharton, 369; Felker v. Emerson, 16 Verm. 653; Story on Bailments, § 162. Edgerton v. Thomas, 5 Sld. 40.

⁶ Co. Litt. 58 a; Com. Dig. *Attorney*, C. 4; Id. *Baron & Feme*, D.

than upon their own.¹ And even in case of a feme covert, although in general she is competent to act as an agent of a third person; yet it is by no means clear, that she can do so against the express dissent of her husband, as such agency may involve duties and services inconsistent with those which appertain to her peculiar relations to her husband and family.

§ 8. Distinctions, not unlike these, existed in the civil law; for by that law a minor, a feme covert, a servant, a slave, a kinsman, or an alien, might be appointed as an agent. And especially does this seem to have been applicable to the common course of transactions in the ordinary business of a store or shop, where the person, who superintended it, was ordinarily called Institor. *Institor appellatus est ex eo, quod negotio gerendo instet, nec multum facit; tabernæ sit præpositus, an cuilibet alii negotiationi.*² *Parvi autem refert, quis sit institor; masculus, an fæmina; liber, an servus; proprius, vel alienus: — Item, quisquis præposuit; nam, et si mulier præposuit, competit institoria, (actio,) exemplo exercitoria actionis; et, si mulier sit præposita, tenebitur etiam ipsa. Sed et, si filia familiæ sit, vel ancilla præposita, competit institoria actio. Pupillus autem institor obligat eum, qui eum præposuit, institoria actione; quoniam sibi imputare debet, qui eum præposuit. Nam plerique pueros puellasque tabernis præponunt.*³

¹ Thomson on Bills, p. 220 (2d edit.), 1836.

² Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 3; Id. l. 5, Introd. and § 1 to 4; Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, n. 74 to 82, n. 447 to 456; 1 Bell, Comm. 385, (4th edit.); Id. p. 478 to 481, (5th edit.); 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, arts. 1, 4, 5; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 17, 18; Id. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 11, 12; 1 Stair, Inst. by Brodie, B. 1, tit. 12, § 19. — In another passage the definition of Institor is somewhat differently given. *Institor est, qui tabernæ, locove, ad emendum vendendumne, præponitur, quique sine loco ad eundem actum præponitur.* Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 18. Mr. Bell, in his Commentaries on the Laws of Scotland, Vol. 1, p. 385, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 479, 480, (5th edit.,) says, that the charge given to a clerk to manage a store or shop is called Institorial power. See, also, 1 Stair, Inst. by Brodie, B. 1, tit. 11, §§ 12, 18, 19; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 46.

³ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 7, §§ 1, 2; Id. l. 8; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, art. 4; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, n. 17. — Heineccius may be thought to have drawn a somewhat broader inference; and to have insisted, that persons, generally disabled to act in their own affairs, were disabled to act as agents for others. *Ex eodem inferimus (says he,) naturâ inhabiles ad negotia aliorum gerenda, procuratores esse non posse; veluti furiosos, mente captos, infantes, surdos et mutos, minoris annis, &c.* Heinecc. ad Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, § 425. But he, most probably,

§ 9. But although all persons *sui juris*, are in general (as we have seen) capable of becoming agents; yet we are to understand, that they cannot at the same time take upon themselves incompatible duties and characters; or become agents in a transaction, where they have an adverse interest, or employment.¹ Thus, a person cannot act as agent in buying for another goods belonging to himself; and at a sale made for his principal, he cannot become the buyer.² Neither can he, when holding a fiduciary relation, such as trustee, guardian, attorney, or agent, contract with the same general binding force with his principal, as in ordinary cases, where such a relation does not exist.³ And a memorandum, made and signed by a seller, at the request of the purchaser, will not bind the latter, as a memorandum within the Statute of Frauds, on account of this incompatibility of character.⁴ [So the agent of an insurance company, however broad his authority, cannot receive an application from himself, and insure his own property so as to bind the company.⁵]

§ 10. The civil law recognized in the fullest manner the same doctrine. *Tutor rem pupilli emere non potest. Idemque porrigendum est ad similia, id est, ad curatores, procuratores, et qui negotia aliena gerunt.*⁶ The reason is laid down in another passage; that there is a natural incompatibility between the interest of the buyer and that of the seller. *Quemadmodum in emendo et vendendo naturaliter concessum est, quod pluri sit, minoris emere; quod minoris sit, pluri vendere; et ita invicem se circum-*

referred to such mental incapacity, as deprived them of a suitable discretion to perform the duties of an agent. See Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, n. 19, 20; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, art. 4.

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd (3d edit.) ch. 1, Pt. 1, § 7, art. 5, p. 33; Id. art. 6, p. 37, and note (4); 1 Story on Equity Jurisp. §§ 315, 316; Post, §§ 10, 210, 211. See *Stainback v. Read*, 11 Gratt. 281.

² Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 33 to 38; *Massey v. Davies*, 2 Ves. jr. 317; *Charter v. Trevellyan*, 11 Clark & Finn. 714; *Bunker v. Miles*, 30 Maine, 431; *Walker v. Palmer*, 24 Ala. 358; Post, §§ 210, 211, 213.

³ 1 Story on Equity, § 308 to 323, and cases cited in Paley on Agency, by Lloyd (3d edit.) p. 33 to 37; 1 Livermore on Agency, 416 to 433 (edit. 1818.)

⁴ *Wright v. Dannah*, 2 Camp. R. 203; *Dixon v. Bromfield*, 2 Chitty, R. 205; *Fairbrother v. Simmons*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 333.

⁵ *Bentley v. Columbia Ins. Co.* 19 Barbour, 595.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 18, tit. 1, l. 34, § 7; Post, § 213.

*scribere.*¹ Or, as it is elsewhere said; *In pretio emptionis et venditionis naturaliter licere contrahentibus se circumvenire.*² Cujacius has expounded the bearing of this doctrine on various occasions; and more especially, where he says; *Nec enim unquam aliquis quidquam vendibit sibi, sed alii. Denique idem homo emploris et venditoris officio fungi non potest. Cum vero idem non esset constitutum de curatore, quia, rem adolescentis vel furiosi, vel prodigi, curatorem emere non posse. Nec de Procuratore negotiorum constituto ex mandato, vel immiscente se negotiis, sine mandato, non posse hunc quoque etiam quidquam emere de rebus domini, ad quem negotia pertinent.*³

§ 11. In the next place, as to the subject-matter of an agency. Although, in general, what a person *sui juris* may do himself, he may delegate authority to another to do for him; yet there are exceptions to the doctrine. Thus, although a person may do an unlawful act, it is clear that he cannot delegate authority to another person to do it; for it is against the policy of the law to allow any such authority, and therefore the appointment is utterly void. It imports neither duty, nor obligation, nor responsibility, on either side; although it may involve both in punishment; *Consentientes et agentes pari pœna plectentur.*⁴ And this is clearly the dictate of natural justice; and as such is recognized in the civil law. *Rei turpis nullam mandatum est.*⁵ *Illud, quoque, mandatum non est obligatorium, quod contra bonos mores est; veluti, si Titius de furto, aut de damno faciendo, aut de*

¹ Dig. Lib. 19, tit. 2, l. 22, §§ 3; Post, § 210.

² Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 4, l. 16, § 4; Post, §§ 210, 213.

³ Cujacii Opera, Tom. 6, p. 90, ad Lib. 15, Dig. Salvii Juliani (edit. Neap. 1758); Id. Tom. 4, p. 963, C. Comm. in Lib. 3, Resp. Papin.; Id. Tom. 1, p. 968, C. ad tit. de minor. 25 annis; Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 4. See also Dig. Lib. 26, tit. 8, l. 5, § 2. — Mr. Livermore has cited another passage, 1 Liverm. on Agency, 417, note (edit. 1818,) from Cujacius; as contained in Cujac. ad Dig. Lib. 4, 4, 16, 4; Cujac. Opera, Tom. 1, p. 998, (edit. 1755.) It is: *Emptor emit quam minimo potest, venditor vendit quam maximo potest.* I do not find the passage in the place cited. But in Cujac. Comm. in Lib. 3, Respons. Papin. Cujac. Opera, Tom. 4, p. 963, (edit. 1758,) ad § Cum. Inter. [Dig. Lib. 46, tit. 1, l. 51, § 4.] is the following passage: "*Hæc scilicet est natura contractus emptionis et venditionis, ut vendat unus quanto pluris, emit alter quanto minoris possit.*" Post, § 210 and note.

⁴ Fitzherbert's case, 5 Co. R. 80.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 6, § 3; Post, § 20.

*injuriâ faciendâ mandat tibi; licet enim pœnam istius facti nomini præstiteris, non tamen ullam habes adversus Titium actionem.*¹

§ 12. But there are other exceptions of a different character, and standing upon different principles. They arise from this, that the act to be doné is of a personal nature, and incapable of being delegated; or that it is a personal trust or confidence, and therefore by implication prohibited from being delegated. Examples of both sorts are to be found in the common law. Thus, a person cannot do homage or fealty by attorney; for it is deemed inseparably annexed to the man doing it, as a personal service.² So, although, by the ancient common law, a lord might beat his villein for cause or without cause; yet he could not delegate his authority to another to beat his villein without cause.³

§ 13. For a like reason, one, who has a bare power or authority from another to do an act, must execute it himself, and cannot delegate his authority to another; for this being a trust or confidence reposed in him personally, it cannot be assigned to a stranger, whose ability and integrity might not be known to the principal, or who, if known, might not be selected by him for such a purpose.⁴ Therefore, if a man has a power given to him

¹ Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 27, § 7. — Mr. Livermore's remarks on this subject are worthy of the attention of the learned reader. 1 Liverm. on Agency, § 2, p. 14 to 23, (edit. 1818.)

² Coombe's case, 9 Co. R. 76 a; Com. Dig. Attorney, C. 3.

³ Coombe's case, 9 Co. R. 76 a; Com. Dig. Attorney, C. 3. — On the same account, where an act is required by statute to be done by the party, if it can be fairly inferred from the nature of the act, that it was intended to be personally done, it cannot be done by an attorney. Thus, for example, where a feme covert is authorized by the laws of a State to convey her right in any real estate by deed, duly acknowledged by her upon a privy examination of a magistrate, it may be presumed, that she cannot acknowledge the same by an attorney.

⁴ Bacon, Abr. Authority, D.; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 34; 1 Liverm. on Agency, § 5, p. 54 to 66 (edit. 1818); Com. Dig. Attorney, C. 3; 2 Kent, Com. Lect. 41, (4th edit.) 633; Coombe's case, 9 Co. R. 75 b; Blore v. Sutton, 3 Meriv. R. 237, 246; Schmaling v. Thomlinson, 6 Taunt. R. 147; Soley v. Rathbone, 2 M. & Selw. 298; Cockran v. Irlam, 2 M. & Selw. 301, 303, note; 1 Bell, Comm. B. 3, Pt. 1, ch. 4, § 4, p. 388, (4th edit.); Id. p. 482, (5th edit.); Emerson v. Providence Hat Manuf. Co. 12 Mass. R. 241, 242; Tippetts v. Walker, 4 Mass. R. 597; Commercial Bank of Lake Erie v. Norton, 1 Hill, R. 501; Lynn v. Burgoyne, 13 B. Monroe, 400.

by the owner to sell an estate,¹ or to make leases for him, he cannot act by an attorney or agent; for it is a personal trust. So, if, by a will, an executor has a power given to him to sell property;² or a person is vested with a power of appointment or distribution of property among certain persons, according to his discretion; in each case the power must be executed by him personally, and cannot be delegated to another.³ So, a factor cannot ordinarily delegate his employment, as such, to another, so as to raise a privity between such third person and his principal, or to confer on him, as to the principal, his own rights, duties, or obligations.⁴ The same rule applies to a broker; for he cannot delegate his authority to another to sign a contract in behalf of his principal, without the assent of the latter.⁵ [So where the directors of a corporation had power to execute a lease of certain premises, it was held they could not authorize a third person to execute a lease which should bind the corporation.⁶ So, where by a statute, a corporation was authorized to lay assessments on its members, it was considered that this power could not be delegated to the directors.⁷] The reason is plain; for in each of these cases, there is an exclusive personal trust and confidence reposed in the particular party. And hence is derived the maxim of the common law; *Delegata potestas non*

¹ *Bocock v. Pavey*, 8 Ohio St. R. 270.

² Com. Dig. *Attorney*, C. 3; *Coombe's case*, 9 Co. R. 75; 1 Roll. Abr. *Authority*, E. l. 30; Bacon, Abr. *Authority*, D.

³ 1 Roll. Abr. *Authority*, C. l. 15; *Ingram v. Ingram*, 2 Atk. 88; *Att.-Gen. v. Berryman*, cited 2 Ves. 643.

⁴ *Catlin v. Bell*, 4 Camp. R. 183; *Soley v. Rathbone*, 2 M. & Selw. 298; *Cockran v. Irlam*, 2 M. & Selw. 301, n.; *Schmaling v. Thomlinson*, 6 Taunt. R. 146; 1 Bell, Comm. 388, § 412, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 482, (5th edit.) See also Post, §§ 108, 110.

⁵ *Henderson v. Barnwell*, 1 Y. & Jerv. 387; 1 Bell, Comm. 388, § 412, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 482, (5th edit.); Post, § 109. [But it has been held that a broker may authorize his clerk to make and sign a memorandum of a contract, in his presence, and when the clerk acts merely ministerially and exercises no discretion of his own. *Williams v. Woods*, 16 Md. R. 220.]

⁶ *Gillis v. Bailey*, 1 Foster, 149. See also *Despatch Line v. Bellamy Man. Co.* 12 N. H. R. 226; *Stoughton v. Baker*, 4 Mass. 522; *Emerson v. Providence Hat Co.* 12 Mass. 237; *Brewster v. Hobart*, 15 Pick. 302, *Wilde, J.*; *Blore v. Easton*, 3 Merivale, 237. See *Hoyt v. Thompson*, 5 Smith, 216.

⁷ *Winsor, ex parte*, 3 Story, R. 411. See *Mayer v. McLure*, 36 Miss. 394.

potest delegari.¹ And the like rule prevailed, to some extent, in the civil law; *Procuratorem alium procuratorem facere non posse*.² It seems also to be the general rule of the Scottish law.³

§ 14. In general, therefore, when it is intended, that an agent shall have a power to delegate his authority, it should be given to him by express terms of substitution.⁴ But there are cases, in which the authority may be implied; as where it is indispensable by the laws, in order to accomplish the end; or it is the ordinary custom of trade; or it is understood by the parties to be the mode, in which the particular business would or might be done;⁵ [or where from the nature of the agency a sub-agent is necessary.]⁶ Thus, if a person should order his goods to be sold

¹ 2 Inst. 597; Branch's Maxims, 38; 2 Kent, Com. Lect. 41, p. 633, (4th ed.); Catlin v. Bell, 4 Camp. 183.

² See Dig. Lib. 49, tit. 1, l. 4, § 5; Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 5; Id. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 8, § 3; Cujacii Opera, Tom. 10, p. 797, (edit. Neap. 1758); Heinecc. ad Pand. P. 1, Lib. 3, tit. 3, § 419 to 433; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 34; 2 Kent, Com. Lect. 41, p. 633, (4th edit.); 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 3. This seems regularly true in the civil law, in cases of suits ante litem contestatam: and perhaps there might be the like qualifications annexed to the rule in some other cases. Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 5; Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 8, § 3; Potliet, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 1, 2, 3; Id. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 23; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 3. Erskine, in his Institutes, (B. 3, tit. 3, § 34.) says, that by the Roman law, a mandatary might have committed the execution of the mandate to any third person; and for this he cites the Digest, Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 8, § 3. The passage seems to prove, that the action, mandati actio, would lie against the second mandatary in cases where the agency was for the administration of private affairs. Did the rule as to substitution, apply to the case of an institor, or common clerk in a shop? See the Digest, Lib. 14, l. 1, § 5; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 3.

³ 1 Stair, Inst. by Brodie, B. 1, tit. 12, § 7, p. 129; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 34.

⁴ See 1 Liverm. on Agency, 54-56, (edit. 1818); Commercial Bank of Lake Erie v. Norton, 1 Hill, R. 505.

⁵ Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234, 251, 252; 1 Bell, Com. 387 to 391, § 412, (4th edit.); Id. p. 482, (5th edit.); 3 Chitty on Com. and Manuf. 206; Shipley v. Kymer, 1 M. & Selw. 484; Cockran v. Irlam, 2 M. & Selw. 301, 303, note; Lausatt v. Lippincott, 6 Serg. & R. 386; Johnson v. Cunningham, 1 Alabama R. 249, N. S. See Appleton Bank v. McGilvray, 4 Gray, 522; Dorchester Bank v. New England Bank, 1 Cush. 177.

⁶ See The Quebec Railroad Co. v. Quinn, 12 E. F. Moore, (Privy Council) 233. [An agent has no right to delegate his authority to a sub-agent, without the assent of his principal; but, where from the nature of the agency, a sub-agent must necessarily be employed, the assent of the principal is implied; as, where a draft, payable at a distant place, is left with a bank for collection, it must be pre-

by an agent at public auction; and the sale could only be made by a licensed auctioneer, the authority to substitute him in the agency, so far as the sale is concerned, would be implied.¹ So where, by the custom of trade, a ship-broker, or other agent, is usually employed to procure a freight or charter-party for ships, seeking a freight, the master of such a ship, who is authorized to let the ship on freight, will incidentally have the authority to employ a broker, or agent for the owner, for this purpose. And the same principle will apply to a factor, where he is, by the usage of trade, authorized to delegate to another the authority to substitute another person to dispose of the property.² In short, the true doctrine, which is to be deduced from the decisions, is, (and it is entirely coincident with the dictates of natural justice,) that the authority is exclusively personal, unless, from the express language used, or from the fair presumptions, growing out of the particular transaction, or of the usage of trade, a broader power was intended to be conferred on the agent.³

§ 15. But although it is regularly true in our law, (for it seems to have been otherwise in the civil law,) that an agent cannot, without such express or implied permission, delegate his authority, so far as the principal is concerned; yet the substituted agent may still be responsible to the original agent for his acts under the substitution, inasmuch as the latter is, in some cases, responsible to the principal for the acts of the sub-agent.⁴ And this is upon the same enlarged principle, which governs in the civil law; that the act is not to be treated as void between the agent and his substitute, unless, indeed, the principal should interfere and prohibit the substitute from acting. *Si quis mandaverit alicui*

sumed that it is intended to be transmitted to a sub-agent at the place where it is payable, and not that the bank is to employ its own officers to proceed there, to obtain payment. *Dorch. & Milt. Bank v. New England Bank*, 1 Cush. 177.]

¹ See *Laussatt v. Lippincott*, 6 Serg. & R. 386.

² See *Cockran v. Irlam*, 2 M. & Selw. 301, note, 303; *Goswell v. Dunkley*, 1 Str. 680, 681; *Bromley v. Coxwell*, 2 Bos. & Pull. 438; *Gray v. Murray*, 3 John. Ch. R. 167, 178; *Laussatt v. Lippincott*, 6 Serg. & R. 386; Post, § 110.

³ 1 Bell, Com. 388, (4th edit.); Id. p. 482, (5th edit.); *Ersk. Inst. B. 3*, tit. 3, § 34; 2 Kent. Com. Lect. 41, p. 633, (4th edit.); *Mark v. Bowers*, 16 Martin, R. 95; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 2, 3; *Cockran v. Irlam*, 2 M. & Selw. 301, 303, note; *Catlin v. Bell*, 4 Camp. R. 188, 184; *Commercial Bank of Lake Erie v. Norton*, 1 Hill, R. 505.

⁴ Post, §§ 201, 217, 321, 322.

*gerenda negotia ejus, qui ipse sibi mandaverat, habebit mandati actionem, quia et ipse tenetur; tenetur autem quia agere potest.*¹

§ 16. We have thus seen, that, for the most part, where a party is of ability to do an act himself, he may do it by an attorney or agent. But there are cases, in which the act must be done by an agent or attorney, and cannot be done by the principal.² Thus, for example, an aggregate corporation, being a mere artificial being, cannot act, except through the instrumentality of an agent or attorney, either specially pointed out by the act of incorporation, or specially authorized by the corporation to act in its behalf.³ And, therefore, such a corporation cannot levy a fine, or acknowledge a deed, or appear in a suit, except by an attorney or agent.⁴ And the like rule existed in the civil law, for it was one of the privileges of a corporation (*Universitas*) by the civil law, to act, by means of an agent or attorney, who was known by the name of actor, or procurator, or, more familiarly, by the name of syndic. *Quibus autem permissum est corpus habere collegii, societatis, &c., et actorem, sive syndicum, per quem, tamquam in republicâ, quod communiter agi fierique oporteat, agatur, fiat.*⁵

§ 17. Let us, in the next place, proceed to the consideration of the nature and extent of the authority, which may be thus delegated to an agent. It is commonly divided into two sorts; (1.) a special agency; (2.) a general agency. A special agency properly exists, when there is a delegation of authority to do a single act; a general agency properly exists where there is a delegation to do all acts connected with a particular trade, business or employment.⁶ Thus, a person, who is authorized by his principal to

¹ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 8, § 3; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 34; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 23; Ante, § 13, and note. See also *Murray v. Toland*, 3 John. Ch. R. 578; Post, § 217.

² Post, § 201.

³ Co. Litt. 66 b.

⁴ Com. Dig. Attorney, C. 2.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 4, l. 1, § 1; Id. l. 6, § 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 4, n. 3, 9; Vicat. Vocabul. Syndicus; Heinecc. ad Pand. P. 1, Lib. 3, tit. 3, § 419; Id. tit. 4, § 439; Pothier on Oblig. n. 49.

⁶ 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 198, 199; Paley on Agency, Lloyd, (3d edit.), 2; Id. 199, 200; 2 Kept. Com. Lect. 41, pp. 620, 621, (4th edit.); *Parker v. Kett*, 1 Salk. R. 96, 97; *Whitehead v. Tuckett*, 15 East, 408; *Anderson v. Coonley*, 21 Wend. R. 279; *Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bank*, 16

execute a particular deed, or to sign a particular contract, or to purchase a particular parcel of merchandise, is a special agent. But a person, who is authorized by his principal to execute all deeds, sign all contracts, or purchase all goods required in a particular trade, business, or employment, is a general agent in that trade, business, or employment.

§ 18. A person is sometimes, (although perhaps not with entire accuracy,) called a general agent, who is not appointed with powers so general, as those above mentioned; but who has a general authority in regard to a particular object or thing; as, for example, to buy and sell a particular parcel of goods, or to negotiate a particular note or bill; his agency not being limited in the buying or selling such goods, or negotiating such note or bill, to any particular mode of doing it.¹ So an agent, who is appointed to do a particular thing in a prescribed mode, is often called a special agent, as contradistinguished from a general agent.²

§ 19. On the other hand, (although this is not the ordinary commercial sense,) a person is sometimes said to be a special agent, whose authority, although it extends to do acts generally in a particular business or employment, is yet qualified and restrained by limitations, conditions, and instructions of a special nature. In such a case the agent is deemed, as to persons dealing with him in ignorance of such special limitations, conditions, and instructions, to be a general agent; although, as between himself and his principal, he may be deemed a special agent.³ In short, the true distinction (as generally recognized) between a general and a special agent, (or, as he is sometimes called, a particular agent,) is this: a general agency does not import an

N. Y. R. 148; *Tomlinson v. Collet*, 3 Blackf. Ind. R. 486; *Walker v. Skipwith*, Meigs's Tenn. R. 502; *Savage v. Rix*, 9 N. H. R. 263; *Post*, § 126 to 134, especially notes to § 127 and 133.

¹ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, (3d edit.), 2; *Id.* 199, *Whitehead v. Tuckett*, 15 East, R. 408; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 10; *Anderson v. Coonley*, 21 Wend. R. 279. See *London Savings Society v. Hagerstown Bank*, 38 Penn. St. R. 498.

² *Andrews v. Kneeland*, 6 Cowen, R. 354.

³ See *Fenn v. Harrison*, 3 T. Rep. 757, 760, 762; *Whitehead v. Tuckett*, 15 East, R. 400, 408; 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 198, 199; 2 Kent, Com. Lect. 31, pp. 620, 621, (4th edit.); *Anderson v. Coonley*, 21 Wend. 279; *Bryant v. Moore*, 23 Maine R. 84; *Johnson v. Jones*, 4 Barbour, Sup. Ct. R. (N. Y.) 369.

unqualified authority, but that which is derived from a multitude of instances, or in the general course of an employment or business; whereas a special agency is confined to an individual transaction.¹

§ 20. The same distinction was well known in the civil law. Thus, it is said, *Procurator autem vel omnium rerum, vel unius rei esse potest.*² And although it seems to have been at one time doubted, whether a procuration was properly created by the mere delegation of authority to do a single act, yet that doubt was deemed to be unfounded; *Sed verius est, eum quoque procuratorem esse, qui ad unam rem datus sit.*³ And a procuration might either be limited or unlimited; conditional or absolute; restrictive or unqualified; provided it was not unlawful; *Item, Mandatum et in diem differi, et sub conditione contrahi potest. Rei turpis nullum mandatum est.*⁴

§ 21. At present it is not necessary to say more upon the subject of general agency and special agency, as contradistinguished from each other; inasmuch as it will hereafter occur in other connections.⁵ But the distinction between them, as to the rights and responsibilities, the duties and the obligations, both of principals and agents, is very important to be carefully observed, as the doctrines applicable to the one sometimes totally fail in regard to the other.⁶ It may, perhaps, be well to add, (what, indeed, has been already intimated,) that general agents are to be carefully distinguished from universal agents; that is, from agents, who may be appointed to do all the acts, which the principal can personally do, and which he may lawfully delegate the power

¹ *Whitehead v. Tuckett*, 15 East, R. 400, 408; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd (3d edit.), 199 and note; *Id.* 200, 201; *Andrews v. Kneeland*, 6 Cowen, R. 354.

² *Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 3, l. 1, § 1*; 1 *Domat*, B. 1, tit. 15, § 1, art. 7; *Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, n. 3* to 8.

³ *Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 3, l. 7, § 1*; 1 *Domat*, B. 1, tit. 15, § 1, art. 7; 1 *Stair Inst. by Brodie*, B. 1, tit. 12, § 11. — Heineccius says: *Et quia non ambigitur, vel omnium negotiorum bonorumque administrationem, vel unius rei, mandare posse; procuratores etiam in universales et singulares dividuntur.* Heinecc. ad *Pand. P. 1, Lib. 3, tit. 3, § 417*. By universales in this passage, Heineccius means, what we are accustomed to call, general agents; and by singulares, special agents.

⁴ *Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 1, § 3, l. 6, § 3, Lib. 3, tit. 3, l. 1*; *Id. Pothier, Pand, Lib. 17, tit. 3, n. 3, 19, 20.* Note, § 11.

⁵ *Post*, § 126 to 134.

⁶ See *Post*, § 126 to 134.

to another to do. Such an universal agency may potentially exist; but it must be of the very rarest occurrence. And, indeed, it is difficult to conceive of the existence of such an agency practically, inasmuch as it would be to make such an agent the complete master, not merely *Dux facti*, but *Dominus rerum*, the complete disposer of all the rights and property of the principal. It is very certain, that the law will not from any general expressions, however broad, infer the existence of any such unusual agency; but it will rather construe them as restrained to the principal business of the party, in respect to which, it is presumed, his intention to delegate the authority was principally directed.¹ Thus, for example, if a merchant, about to go abroad for temporary purposes, should delegate to an agent his full and entire authority to sell any of his personal property, or to buy any property for him, or on his account, or to make any contracts, and also to do any other acts whatsoever, which he could, if personally present; this general language would be construed to apply only to buying or selling, connected with his ordinary business as a merchant; and would not, at least without some more specific designation, be construed to apply to a sale of his household furniture, or his library, or the common utensils, provisions, and other necessities used in his family. Much less would it be construed to authorize any contracts to be made, which would be of an extraordinary or personal character, such as a contract of marriage, or a marriage settlement, or a sale of such things, as would break up and destroy his business as a merchant in his particular trade.²

§ 22. And in relation to general agency, one man may be a general agent for his principal in one business, and another may be his general agent in another business; and in such case each agent will be limited in his authority to the particular business within the scope of his peculiar agency. Thus, for example, if a man should be at once a banker and a merchant, carrying on

¹ See 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 198-200; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 192 to 198; Post, § 62 to 68.

² See 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 199, 200; Kilgour v. Finlayson, 1 H. Bl. 55; Harvard v. Baillie, 2 H. Bl. 618; Hay v. Goldsmidt, 1 Taunt. R. 349; Atwood v. Mannings, 7 B. & Cresw. 278; Cochran v. Newton, 5 Denio, R. 49. See, also, an agent has authority to borrow money or not, Hawtwayne v. Bourne, 7 Wall. 555, 599; Kelley v. Lindsey, 7 Gray, 387.

each business distinctly, with separate clerks and agents for each branch, an agent in the one would not be deemed to possess any authority to act in the other; although each would, or might, in a legal sense, be deemed a general agent.

CHAPTER III.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF AGENTS.

§ 23. IN the next place, as to the different kinds or classes of Agents. It will be found very difficult to enumerate them all in detail; but it may not be without use to state some of those which have acquired a distinctive appellation; as it may serve to give us a more exact view of the nature of the rights, the obligations, and the duties of each. For the want of a due discrimination in this respect, very erroneous inferences are frequently deduced from the reported decisions; which decisions, however correct with reference to the class of agents embraced therein, will often be found to mislead, unless taken with the implied and tacit qualifications, applicable to that peculiar class of agency.

§ 24. First. ATTORNEYS. This class is divisible into two kinds, differing very widely in their rights, duties, obligations, and responsibilities: (1.) Attorneys in law; (2.) Attorneys in fact.¹ The former class includes those persons who are ordinarily intrusted with the management of suits and controversies in Courts of Law and other judicial tribunals; answering to the *Procuratores ad litem* of the Civil Law in many particulars, although not perhaps in all respects clothed with as extensive an authority.² Among these are Attorneys in Courts

¹ Heinecc. ad Pand. P. 1, Lib. 3, tit. 3, § 416.

² 3 Black. Comm. 25; Co. Litt. 51, 52 a. — In the Civil Law, no person could appoint a Procurator ad Litem, except he was the Dominus Litis. The plaintiff himself (Actor) was, before the contestation of the suit, (*ante litem contestatam*), the sole Dominus Litis. But his Procurator, after the contestation of the suit, became Dominus Litis; and then, but not before, he could delegate his authority,

of Common Law, Solicitors in Courts of Equity, and Proctors in Courts of Admiralty and in the Ecclesiastical Courts.¹ These are wholly distinguishable from advocates or counsel in the Roman and English Courts, although not generally in the American Courts. In the Roman Courts, the office of an advocate was, and in the English Courts it is, purely honorary and gratuitous; that is to say, he is not entitled to charge or recover against his client any compensation for his services; as an attorney, solicitor, or proctor may. But whatever he receives for his services, is deemed to be an honorary donation,—*Quiddam honorarium*.² Indeed, the Roman law, at least under the Emperors, affected to treat it as a degradation of the order to serve for hire, or in any other manner than gratuitously and for reputation. *Apud Urbem autem Romanam etiam honoratis, qui hoc officium putaverint eligendum, eo usque liceat orare, quibus maluerint; videlicet, ut non ad turpe compendium stipemque deformem hæc arripiatur occasio; sed laudis per eam augmenta quærantur. • Nam si lucro pecuniæque capiantur, veluti abjecti atque digeneres inter vilissimos numerabuntur*.³ The theory of the English law was, perhaps, originally the same; but it has ceased to be known, except as a mere theory. As advocates are not in England entitled to recover their fees in a suit at law, they receive them in advance of their services, not indeed as a mere compensation *pro opere et labore*; but as a liberal emolument (*quiddam honorarium*) for the performance of the highest intellectual and moral duties for their clients in courts of justice;⁴ a trust, which, to the honor of the Bar, it may be said, they discharge with the most fearless and exalted ability and independence.⁵ Nor, indeed, can one easily

to another Procurator. Quod quis sibi debitum exigere tibi mandavit ante litis contestationem, tu alii potendum mandare non potes. Cod. Lib. 2, tit. 13, l. 8; Heinecc. ad Pand. P. 1, Lib. 3, tit. 3, §§ 421–423, 431; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, n. 21.

¹ 3 Bl. Comm. 25.

² 3 Bl. Comm. 27–29; Comm. Dig. Attorney, B. 18.

³ Cod. Lib. 2, tit. 6, l. 6, § 5; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 1, n. 17.

⁴ 3 Bl. Comm. 28; 2 Domat, Public Law, B. 2, tit. 6, § 2, art. 5.

⁵ I cannot but quote here, with great pleasure, the remarks made upon a very recent occasion by Lord Langdale in *Hutchinson v. Stephens*, (1 Keen, R. 668) "With respect to the task, (said he,) which I may be considered to have imposed upon counsel, I wish to observe, that it arises from the confidence, which long experience induces me to repose in them, and from a sense which I entertain of the

forget the dignified admonition of the Roman law on the true duties of an advocate, an admonition which should be present to the thoughts of every person practising in any court of justice. *Ante omnia autem universi Advocati ita præbeant patrocinia jurgantibus, ut non ultra, quam litium posoit utilitas in licentiam conviciandi, et male dicendi temeritatem prorumpant. Agant, quod causa desiderat; temperent se ab injuriâ. Nemo ex industriâ protrahat jurgium.*¹ But, as it is not our design in the present work to consider the rights, powers, duties, and obligations of persons acting as attorneys, or as advocates, in courts of justice, this subject will not be further pursued.²

truly honorable and important services which they constantly perform as ministers of justice, acting in aid of the judge, before whom they practise. No counsel supposes himself to be the mere advocate or agent of his client, to gain a victory, if he can, on a particular occasion. The zeal and the arguments of every counsel, knowing what is due to himself and his honorable profession, are qualified, not only by considerations affecting his own character as a man of honor, experience, and learning, but also by considerations affecting the general interests of justice. It is to these considerations that I apply myself; and I am far from thinking that any counsel, who attends here, will knowingly violate, or silently permit to be violated, any established rule of the Court, to promote the purpose of any client, or refuse to afford me the assistance, which I ask in these cases."

¹ Cod. Lib. 2, tit. 6, l. 6, §§ 1, 4; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 1, n. 20; 2 Domat, B. 2, tit. 6, § 2, Art. 1 to 5.

² See Comm. Dig. Attorney, B. 1-20. Domat has well remarked, that all these Rules of the Duties of Advocates may be reduced to two maxims. one, never to defend a cause which is unjust; and the other, not to defend just cause but by the way of justice and truth. And these two maxims are so essential to the duties of advocates, and so indispensably necessary, that, although they seem to be rather maxims of Religion, they are, however, in proper terms, expressed in the Laws of the Code and the Digest. 2 Domat, by Strahan, B. 2, tit. 6, § 2, sub. fin. p. 320, (edit. 1822.) *Patroni autem causarum, &c., juramentum præstent, quod omni quidem virtute sua omnique ope, quod verum et justum existimaverint, clientibus suis inferre procurabunt; nihil studii relinquentes, quod sibi possibile est. Non autem oredita sibi causa cognita, quod improba sit, vel penitus desperata, et ex mendacibus allegationibus composita, ipsi scientes prudentesque malâ conscientia liti patrocinabuntur; sed et si certamine procedente aliquid tale sit cognitum fuerit, a causâ recedent, ab hujusmodi communione sese penitus separantes.* Such is the oath and such the doctrine prescribed to lawyers in the days of Justinian. Cod. Lib. 3, tit. 1, l. 14, § 1. How well worthy is the doctrine for the consideration of Christian lawyers in our day. [The responsibility of Attorneys is discussed in an interesting manner by Lord Campbell, in a case before the House of Lords. "In an action such as this," he says, "by the client against the professional ad-

§ 25. Secondly. ATTORNEYS IN FACT. These are so called in contradistinction to Attorneys in law, or *Procuratores ad litem*, and may include all other agents employed in any business, or to do any act or acts *in pais* for another.¹ But it is sometimes used to designate persons, who act under a special agency, or a special letter of attorney, so that they are appointed *in factum*, for the deed, or act, required to be done.²

§ 26. The most common classes of commercial Agents are Auctioneers, Brokers, Factors, Consignees, Supercargoes, Ships-Husbands, Masters of Ships, and Partners. Of each of these a few words will be said in this place.³

viser, to recover damages arising from the misconduct of the professional adviser, I apprehend there is no distinction whatever between the law of Scotland and the law of England. The law must be the same in all countries where law has been considered as a science. The professional adviser has never been supposed to guarantee the soundness of his advice. I am sure I should have been sorry, when I had the honor to practise at the Bar of England, if barristers had been liable to such a responsibility. Though I was tolerably cautious in giving opinions, I have no doubt that I have repeatedly given erroneous opinions, and I think it was Mr. Justice Heath who said that it was a very difficult thing for a gentleman at the Bar to be called upon to give his opinion, because it was calling on him to conjecture what twelve other persons would say upon some points that had never before been determined. Well, then, this may happen in all grades of the profession of the law. Against the barrister in England, and the advocate in Scotland, luckily, no action can be maintained. But against the attorney, the professional adviser, or the procurator, an action may be maintained. But it is only if he has been guilty of gross negligence, because it would be monstrous to say that he is responsible for even falling into what must be considered a mistake. You can only expect from him that he will be honest and diligent; and if there is no fault to be found either with his integrity or diligence, that is all for which he is answerable. It would be utterly impossible that you could ever have a class of men who would give a guarantee binding themselves, in giving legal advice and conducting suits at law, to be always in the right." *Purves v. Landell*, 10 Clark & Finnelly, R. 91. See also, *Baikie v. Chandless*, 3 Camp. R. 17; *Pitt v. Holden*, 4 Burr. R. 2060.]

¹ An act, *in pais*, is literally an act in the country; but the phrase is technically used to express any act done, which is not a matter of record or done in a court of record. 2 Black. Comm. 294.

² See Bacon's Abridg. *Attorney*.

³ Mr. Bell, in his Commentaries on the Laws of Scotland, has remarked, that "In mercantile agency there is a vast variety of forms, in which the authority of a principal is daily delegated to others. Besides the occasional authority, by *procuration*, or *procuration*, to accept or draw bills of exchange, the charge given to a clerk to manage a store or shop, which is called *Institorial power*, the exten-

§ 27. First. AUCTIONEERS.¹ An auctioneer is a person, who is authorized to sell goods or merchandise at public auction or sale for a recompense, or (as it is commonly called) a commission. In two respects he differs from a mere broker. A broker may (as we shall presently see) buy, as well as sell;² whereas an auctioneer can only sell. So, a broker cannot sell personally at public auction; for that is the appropriate function of an auctioneer; but he may sell at private sale, which power an auctioneer (as such) does not possess.³ An auctioneer is primarily deemed to be the agent of the seller of the goods; but for certain purposes he is also deemed to be the agent of both parties.⁴ Thus, by knocking down the goods sold to the person who is the highest bidder, and inserting his name in his book or memorandum, as such, he is considered as the agent of both parties; and the memorandum so made by him will bind both parties, as being a memorandum sufficiently signed by an agent of both parties within the statute of frauds. Before the knocking down of the goods, he is, indeed, exclusively the agent of the seller; but after the knocking down, he becomes also the agent of the purchaser, and the latter is presumed to give him authority to write down his name as purchaser.⁵ An auctioneer has also a

sive trust given to a shipmaster, called Exercitatorial power, the powers of factors, agents, and brokers, are all included within the contract." 1 Bell, Comm. 385, (4th edit.); Id. p. 476, (5th edit.)

¹ As to powers of Auctioneers, see post, §§ 107, 108.

² Post, § 28.

³ Wilkes v. Ellis, 2 H. Bl. 555; Daniel v. Adams, Ambl. 495. Auctioneers were sometimes called Brokers in our old law. Spelman, in his Glossary, Auctionarii, defines them thus: Qui publicis subhastationibus præ-sunt, Propolæ, et quos, Angli, Brokers, dicimus. See also Jacob's Law Dict. *Brokers*.

⁴ See Johnson v. Roberts, 30 Eng. Law and Eq. R. 234.

⁵ Post, § 108. Simon v. Mitivos, 3 Burr. R. 1921; Emmerson v. Heelis, 2 Taunt. R. 38, 48; Kemeys v. Proctor, 1 Jac. & Walk. 350; 3 Ves. & B. 57, 58; White v. Proctor, 4 Taunt. R. 209, 211; McComb v. Wright, 4 John. Ch. R. 659; Hinde v. Whitehouse, 7 East, R. 558, 569; Bird v. Boulter, 4 B. & Adolph. 443; Buckmaster v. Harrop, 13 Ves. 472, 473; Henderson v. Barnwall, 1 Y. & Jerv. 389; Fairbrother v. Simmons, 5 Barn. & Ald. 333. In Williams v. Millington, (1 H. Bl. 85,) Mr. Justice Heath said, "Though he (an auctioneer) is an agent to some purposes, he is not so to all. He is an agent for each party in different things; but not in the same thing. When he prescribes the rules of bidding, and the terms of the sale, he is the agent for the seller. But when he puts down the name of the buyer, he is agent for him only."

special property in the goods sold by him, and a lien on the same and the proceeds thereof, for his commissions; and he may sue the purchaser at the sale in his own name,¹ as well as in the name of his principal.² An auctioneer is also deemed personally a vendor to the purchaser at the sale, unless at the time of the sale he discloses the name of his principal, and the transaction is treated as being exclusively between the principal and the vendee.³ An auctioneer can sell only for ready money, unless there be some usage of trade to sell on credit.⁴

§ 28. Secondly. **BROKERS.** The true definition of a broker seems to be, that he is an agent, employed to make bargains and contracts between other persons, in matters of trade, commerce, or navigation, for a compensation, commonly called brokerage.⁵ Or, to use the brief but expressive language of an eminent Judge, "A broker is one, who makes a bargain for another, and receives a commission for so doing."⁶ Properly speaking, a broker is a mere negotiator between the other parties, and he never acts in his own name, but in the names of those who employ him.⁷ Where he is employed to buy or to sell goods, he is

¹ Robinson v. Rutter, 30 Eng. Law and Eq. R. 401; 4 El. & Bl. 954.

² Williams v. Millington, 1 H. Bl. 81, 84, 85; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 210; Girard v. Taggart, 5 Serg. & Rawle, 19, 27.

³ Mills v. Hunt, 20 Wend. 431, Franklin v. Lamond, 4 Com. B. R. 637; Jones v. Littledale, 6 Ad. & Ell. 486; Post, §§ 160 a, 266, 269, 270.

⁴ Post, §§ 108, 209.

⁵ Com. Dig. Merchant, C. Terms de la Ley, Broker. Malyne, Lex. Mercat. 143; 1 Bell, Comm. 347, 385, 386, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 477, 478, 481, 483, (5th edit.); Wilkes v. Ellis, 2 H. Bl. 555, Jannen v. Green, 4 Burr. 2103; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 622; note (d,) (4th edit.) Cowel, in his Interpreter, gives the etymology of the word from the French word Broceur, Tritor, a person who breaks into small pieces, as if to say, he is a dealer in small wares.

⁶ In Pott v. Turner, 6 Bing. R. 702, 706, Lord Ch. Justice Tindal said: "A broker is one who makes a bargain for another, and receives a commission for so doing; as for instance a stock broker. But in common parlance one who receives payment of freights for the ship-owner and negotiates for cargoes, is a broker."

⁷ Baring v. Corrie, 2 B. & Ald. 137, 143, 146, 149. See also Kemble v. Atkins, 10 Tonn. R. 260; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 622, note d, (4th edit.); 1 Bell, Comm. pp. 346, 347, § 379, (4th edit.); Id. p. 385, § 409; Id. 477, 478, 481, 483, (5th edit.) Domat has given a very full and exact description according to the spirit of our law. "The engagement (says he) of a broker is like to that of a factor, and other agent; but with this difference, that, the broker being employed by persons who have opposite interests to manage, he is, as it were,

not intrusted with the custody or possession of them, and is not authorized to buy or to sell them in his own name.¹ He is strictly, therefore, a middle man, or intermediate negotiator between the parties; and for some purposes (as for the purpose of signing a contract within the statute of frauds) he is treated as the agent of both parties.² Hence, when he is employed to buy and sell goods, he is accustomed to give to the buyer a note of the sale, commonly called a sold note, and to the seller a like note, commonly called a bought note, in his own name, as agent of each, and thereby they are respectively bound, if he has not exceeded his authority.³ Hence also it is, that if a broker sells the goods of his principal in his own name, (without some spe-

agent both for the one and the other, to negotiate the commerce and affair, in which he concerns himself. Thus, his engagement is two-fold, and consists in being faithful to all the parties, in the execution of what every one of them intrusts him with. And his power is not to treat, but to explain the intentions of both parties, and to negotiate in such a manner, as to put those, who employ him, in a condition to treat together personally." 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 17, § 1, art. 1.

¹ Baring v. Corrie, 2 B. & Ald. 137, 143, 148. As to his powers and duties, see post, §§ 107, 108.

² Rucker v. Cammeyer, 1 Esp. R. 106; Hinde v. Whitehouse, 7 East, R. 558, 569; Kemble v. Atkins, 7 Taunt. 260; Henderson v. Barnwall, 1 Y. & Jerv. 387; Beal v. McKiernan, 6 Louis. R. 407; Post, §§ 107, 108; Hinckley v. Arey, 27 Maine R. 362.

³ Ibid.; Hicks v. Hankin, 4 Esp. R. 114; Heyman v. Neale, 2 Camp. R. 337; Dickinson v. Lilwal, 1 Stark. R. 128; Gale v. Wells, 1 Carr. & Payne, 888; Cumming v. Roebuck, 1 Holt's N. P. R. 172; Grant v. Fletcher, 5 Barn. & Cresw. 436; Thornton v. Kempster, 5 Taunt. 786; 1 Bell, Comm. 347, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 477, 478, (5th edit.); Goom v. Affalo, 6 B. & Cress. 117. The name of both the buyer and the seller, ought to appear upon the sale note given to the parties, though in practice the name of one party is sometimes omitted in the note given to him. Champion v. Plummer, 4 Bos. & Pull. 252; Picks v. Hankin, 4 Esp. R. 114, 115. I have given in the text the ordinary designation of the sale notes, as bought and sold notes. There is, however, some confusion in the books in the use of the terms, probably arising from the words of the instrument itself. Thus, in Baring v. Corrie, (2 B. & Ald. 144,) Lord Ch. Justice Abbott, speaking of the buyers in that case, says, "that they received a *sale* note, and were not required to sign a *bought* note." In the same case, Mr. Justice Bayley says, "that the brokers delivered to the plaintiffs (the sellers) a *sold* note, exactly in the proper form, supposing them to have sold in their character as brokers; and they delivered to the defendants (the buyers) a *bought* note, exactly suited to the case of their having sold as brokers, without disclosing the name of the seller." See the distinction in Freeman v. Loder, 11 Adolph. & Ellis, 589; Higgins v. Senior, 6 Mees. & Welsb. 834, 835.

cial authority so to do,) inasmuch as he exceeds his proper authority, the principal will have the same rights and remedies against the purchaser, as if his name had been disclosed by the broker.¹

§ 29. A broker, being personally confided in, cannot ordinarily delegate his authority to a sub-agent, or clerk under him, or to any other person. His authority, therefore, to delegate it, if it exists at all, must arise from an express or an implied assent of the principal thereto.²

§ 30. Brokers were a class of persons well known in the civil law under the description of *Proxenetæ*. Their functions, among the Romans, were not unlike those which are performed by them among all modern commercial nations; for in all these nations, they are a known, if not a necessary, order of agents.³ *Sunt* (says the Digest) *enim hujusmodi hominum, ut tam in magna civitate, officinæ. Est enim Proxenetarum modus, qui emptionibus, venditionibus, commerciis, contractibus licitis utiles, non adeo improbabili more se exhibent.*⁴ They were entitled to charge a brokerage compensation; and were not treated as ordinarily incurring any personal liability by their intervention, unless there was some fraud on their part. *Proxenetica jure licito petuntur. Si proxeneta intervenit faciendi nominis, ut multi solent, videamus, an possit quasi mandator teneri? Et non puto teneri. Quia hic monstrat magis nomen, quàm mandat, tametsi laudet nomen.*⁵

§ 31. It has been already suggested, that a broker is for some purposes treated as the agent of both parties. But primarily he is deemed merely the agent of the party by whom he is originally employed; and he becomes the agent of the other party, only when the bargain or contract is definitively settled, as to its terms, between the principals;⁶ for, as a middle man, he is not

¹ *Baring v. Corrie*, 2 B. & Ald. 137, 143-146.

² *Henderson v. Barnwall*, 1 Y. & Jerv. 387; *Cochran v. Irlam*, 2 M. & S. 301, note; Post, § 108.

³ See 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 17, Introd. and § 1, art. 1; *Goom v. Afalo*, 6 Barn. & Cresw. 117; *Henderson v. Barnwall*, 1 Y. & Jerv. 387, 393, 391; *Beaves, Lex. Merc. Brokers*, Vol. 1, p. 464, (6th edit.)

⁴ Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 14, l. 2, 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 17, § 1, art. 1.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 14, l. 1, 2; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 17, § 1, art. 2.

⁶ *Monks v. Searry*; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 171, note (p); *Henderson v. Barnwall*, 1 Y. & J. 387, 393, 399; *Hinckley v. Arey*, 27 Maine R. 362.

intrusted to fix the terms, but merely to interpret, (as it is sometimes phrased) between the principals.¹ It would be a fraud in a broker to act for both parties, concealing his agency for one from the other, in a case where he was intrusted by both with a discretion, as to buying and selling, and of course where his judgment was relied on. Thus, if A should employ a broker to sell goods for him for the highest price he could get, and his judgment should be confided in; and B should at the same time employ the same broker to purchase the like goods at the lowest price, for which they could be obtained; it is plain, that, if this mutual agency were concealed, it might operate as a complete surprise upon the confidence of both parties, and would thus be a fraud upon them. Indeed, it would be utterly incompatible with the duties of the broker to act for both under such circumstances; since, for all real purposes, he would be both buyer and seller; and the law will not tolerate any man in becoming both buyer and seller, where the interests of third persons are concerned.² [And a broker who so acts without informing his principals cannot recover a commission for his services; and evidence of a custom among brokers to charge commissions in such cases is incompetent.³]

¹ Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 14, l. 1, 2; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit 17, § 1, art. 1.

² See *Wright v. Dannab*; 2 Camp. R. 203; *Fairbrother v. Simmons*, 5 B. & Ald. 333; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, (3d edit.) 10; [*Pugsley v. Murray*, 4 E. D. Smith, (N. Y.) 245.]

³ [*Farnsworth v. Hemmer*, 1 Allen, 494, (Mass.). *Bigelow, C. J.*, there said: "The principle on which rests the well-settled doctrine, that a man cannot become the purchaser of property for his own use and benefit which is intrusted to him to sell, is equally applicable when the same person, without the authority or consent of the parties interested, undertakes to act as the agent of both vendor and purchaser. The law does not allow a man to assume relations so essentially inconsistent and repugnant to each other. The duty of an agent for a vendor is to sell the property at the highest price; of the agent of the purchaser to buy it for the lowest. These duties are so utterly irreconcilable and conflicting that they cannot be performed by the same person without great danger that the rights of one principal will be sacrificed to promote the interests of the other, or that neither of them will enjoy the benefit of a discreet and faithful exercise of the trust reposed in the agent. As it cannot be supposed that a vendor and purchaser would employ the same person to act as their agent to buy and sell the same property, it is clear that it operates as a surprise on both parties, and is a breach of the trust and confidence intended to be reposed in the agent by them respectively, if his intent to act as agent of both in the same transaction is con-

§ 32. There are various sorts of brokers now employed in commercial affairs, whose transactions form or may form a distinct and independent business. Thus, for example, there are exchange and money brokers, stock brokers, ship brokers, merchandise brokers, and insurance brokers, who are respectively employed in buying and selling bills of exchange, or promissory notes, or goods, or stocks, or ships and cargoes; or in procuring insurance and settling losses, or in procuring freights or charter-parties.¹

§ 32 *a*. The character of a broker is also sometimes combined in the same person with that of a factor.² In such cases we should carefully distinguish between his acts in the one character and in the other; as the same rules do not always precisely apply to each. There is nothing in our law to prevent a broker from becoming also a factor in the same transaction, if he chooses to undertake the mixed character. It is not commonly

concealed from them. It is of the essence of his contract that he will use his best skill and judgment to promote the interest of his employer. This he cannot do, where he acts for two persons whose interests are essentially adverse. He is therefore guilty of a breach of his contract. Nor is this all. He commits a fraud on his principals in undertaking, without their assent or knowledge, to act as their mutual agent, because he conceals from them an essential fact, entirely within his own knowledge, which he was bound in the exercise of good faith to disclose to them. Story on Agency, § 31; Copeland v. Mercantile Ins. Co. 6 Pick. 198, 204; Pugsley v. Murray, 4 E. D. Smith, 245; Rupp v. Sampson, 16 Gray, (not yet published.)

"Such being the well-settled rule of law, it follows that the evidence offered by the plaintiff was inadmissible. A custom or usage, to be legal and valid, must be reasonable and consistent with good morals and sound policy, so that parties may be supposed to have made their contracts with reference to it. If such a usage is shown to exist, then it becomes the law by which the rights of the parties are to be regulated and governed. But the usage on which the plaintiff relied was wanting in these essential elements. It would be unreasonable, because, if established, it would operate to prevent the faithful fulfilment of the contract of agency. It would be contrary to good morals and sound policy, because it would tend to sanction an unwarrantable concealment of facts essential to a contract, and operate as a fraud on parties who had a right to rely on the confidence reposed in their agents."]

¹ See Beawes, Lex Merc. Vol. 1, pp. 465-467 (6th edit.); 1 Bell, Comm. 385, 386, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 477, 478, 481, 483, (5th edit.); 1 Liverm. on Agency, 204, (edit. 1818); Malynes, Lex Merc. 85, 91.

² 1 Bell, Comm. B. 3, P. 1, ch. 4, art. 409, p. 386, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 477, 478, (5th edit.)

the duty of a broker, unless there are words importing that he is to perform such a duty, to see to the delivery of the goods on the payment of the price. But it may be the duty of a broker, under the employment he has undertaken, to see to the delivery of the goods and the payment of the price.¹

§ 33. Thirdly. FACTORS. A factor is commonly said to be an agent employed to sell goods or merchandise, consigned or delivered to him by or for his principal, for a compensation, commonly called factorage or commission.² Hence he is often called a commission-merchant or consignee; the goods received by him for sale are called a consignment;³ and when, for an additional compensation in case of sale, he undertakes to guarantee to his principal the payment of the debt due by the buyer, he is said to receive a *del credere* commission.⁴ The phrase

¹ Brown v. Boorman, 11 Clarke & Fin. 1, 44.

² Com. Dig. *Merchant*, B.; Mal. Lex Merc. 81; Beawes, Lex Merc. *Factors*, Vol. 1, p. 44, (6th edit.); 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 193; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 68, (edit. 1818); 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 17, Introd.; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 622, note (d), (4th edit.); 1 Bell, Comm. 385, §§ 408, 409, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 477, 478, (5th edit.); Post, § 110 to 114. In Baring v. Corrie, 2 B. & Ald. 143, Lord Chief Justice Abbott defines a factor thus: "A factor is a person, to whom goods are consigned for sale, by a merchant residing abroad, or at a distance from the place of sale." This is a correct definition, as to some sorts of factors. But a factor may be to buy, as well as to sell; and he may reside in the same place with his principal as well as at a distance. 1 Bell, Comm. 385, § 409; Id. 386, § 410, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 477, 478, (5th edit.)

³ 1 Bell, Comm. 212; Id. 385, §§ 408, 459; Id. 386; § 410; Id. pp. 477, 478, (5th edit.) The description here given of a factor answers precisely to that of a commission merchant or consignee for sale. But it has been well observed, that there are different sorts of consignees; some have a power to sell, manage, and dispose of the property, subject only to the rights of the consignor. Others have a mere naked right to take possession. Per Lord Eldon, in *Lucena v. Crawford*, 4 Bos. & Pull. 324; *De Forest v. Fulton Ins. Co.* 1 Hall, Rep. 84; Post, §§ 112, 215, 328.

⁴ Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 193, 194; *Grove v. Dubois*, 1 T. Rep. 112; 1 Bell, Comm. 289, § 313; Id. 387, § 411, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 477, 478, (5th edit.); *Morris v. Cleasby*, 4 M. & Selw. 576. It was laid down in *Grove v. Dubois*, 1 T. R. 112, 113, that a commission *del credere* amounts to an absolute engagement to the principal from the factor, and makes him liable in the first instance. But the doctrine of that case on this point seems incorrect. A factor, with a *del credere* commission, is liable to the principal, if the buyer fails to pay, or is incapable of paying. But he is not primarily the debtor. On the contrary, the principal may sue the buyer in his own name, notwithstanding the *del credere*

del credere, is borrowed from the Italian language, in which its signification is exactly equivalent to our word, guaranty or warranty.¹ A factor is called a home factor, when he resides in the same state or country with his principal; and he is called a foreign factor, when he resides in a different state or country.² Sometimes, in voyages abroad, an agent accompanies the cargo, to whom it is consigned for sale; and who is to purchase a return cargo out of the proceeds. In such cases the agent is properly a factor, and is usually called a supercargo.³ A factor may now ordinarily sell goods on credit, in all cases where there is no usage to the contrary.⁴

§ 34. A factor differs from a broker in some important particulars. A factor may buy and sell in his own name, as well as in the name of his principal. A broker (as we have seen) is always bound to buy and sell in the name of his principal.⁵ A factor is intrusted with the possession, management, control, and disposal of the goods, to be bought or sold, and has a special property in them, and a lien on them.⁶ A broker, on the con-

commission; so that the latter amounts to no more than a guaranty. See *Gale v. Comber*, 7 Taunt. R. 558; *Peele v. Northcote*, 7 Taunt. R. 478; *Morris v. Cleasby*, 4 M. & Selw. 566, 574, 575; *Thompson v. Perkins*, 3 Mason, R. 232; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 624, 625, note (e), (4th edit.); *Holbrook v. Wight*, 24 Wend. R. 169.

¹ *Ibid.*

² 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 193, 194; 1 Beawes, Lex Merc. 24, (6th edit.); 1 Bell, Comm. 385, 386, §§ 408, 409, (4th edit.); *Id.* pp. 475, 478, (5th edit.); Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 34.

³ 1 Beawes, Lex Merc. 44, 47, (6th edit.); 1 Liverm. on Agency, 69, 70; 1 Bell, Comm. 385, (4th edit.); *Id.* pp. 477, 478, (5th edit.); 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 2. Beawes gives the following description of them: "Supercargoes are persons employed by commercial companies, or private merchants, to take charge of the cargoes they export to foreign countries, to sell them there to the best advantage, and to purchase proper commodities to relade the ships on their return home. For this reason, supercargoes generally go out and return home with the ships on board of which they were embarked, and therein differ from factors, who reside abroad, at the settlements of the public companies, for whom they act." 1 Beawes, Lex Merc. 47, (6th edit.)

⁴ Post, §§ 60, 110, 209.

⁵ Ante, §§ 28, 31; *Baring v. Corrie*, 2 B. & Ald. 143, 147, 148; 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 193; *Id.* 210, 211, 241; 1 Bell, Comm. 212; *Id.* 385, 386, §§ 408, 409, 410, (4th edit.); *Id.* pp. 455, 478, (5th edit.); 3 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 622, note (d), (4th edit.); 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 17, § 1, art. 1.

⁶ Post, §§ 111, 112, 274; *Holbrook v. Wight*, 24 Wend. R. 169; *Bryce v.*

ary, usually has no such possession, management, control, or disposal of the goods, and consequently has no such special property or lien.¹

§ 34. A factor has not, any more than a broker, a power to delegate his authority to another person, unless it is conferred by the usages of trade, or by the assent of his principal, express or implied. And this also was a rule adopted to some extent, in the civil law, in relation to some classes of agents, such as clerks in warehouses and shops (*Institutores*); for although the master of a ship was permitted, for the benefit of trade, to substitute another person as master, the same rule did not apply to mere in-stitorial agents.² *Quippe res patitur, ut de conditione quis insti-*

Brooks, 26 Wend. R. 367; Post, § 384; *Jordan v. James*, 5 Hamm. Ohio R. 99; *Marfield v. Douglas*, 1 Sandford, Superior Ct. R. 360.

¹ *Ibid.*; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 13; 1 Bell, Comm. 385, 386, §§ 408, 409, 410, (4th edit.); *Id.* pp. 477, 478, (5th edit.) When a broker is intrusted with negotiable securities, indorsed in blank, for sale, he becomes rather a factor than a broker, for he is then intrusted with the disposal and control of them, and may, by his negotiation of them, pass a good title to them. Indeed, in practical business, the two characters are often confounded, and a broker is often a factor and a merchant, as well as a general agent. Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 13, and note (a); *Pickering v. Busk*, 15 East, 38, 43; *Anto*, §§ 32, 33, note 4. When a broker becomes possessed of the thing, about which he is employed, he acquires equally with a factor a lien for his commissions; as, for example, an insurance broker, having possession of a policy. 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 210, 211, 541; Blunt, Commercial Dig. ch. 15, p. 230. Mr. Bell has remarked, that "Sometimes agents or factors act as the ostensible vendors of property belonging to merchants residents in the same place, having warehouses and places fit for exhibiting the goods for sale. Sometimes they act as factors both for buyer and seller; the sale being perfected, and the delivery transferred, by delivery of the bills for the price, and an entry in the factor's books to the debit of the one party and the credit of the other. The character of factor and broker is frequently combined; the broker having possession of what he is employed to sell, or being empowered to obtain possession of what he is employed to purchase. Properly speaking, in these cases, he is a factor." 1 Bell, Comm. 386, § 409, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 478, (5th edit.)

² *Anto*, 13; *Catlin v. Ball*, 4 Camp. R. 183; *Bromley v. Coxwell*, 2 Bos. & Pull. 438; *Cochran v. Irlam*, 2 M. & Selw. 301, n; *Soley v. Rathbone*, 2 M. & Selw. 298 a; Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 2, 3; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 3; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 56, (edit. 1818). Domat, after stating the right of the master to delegate his authority, adds, as his interpretation of the text of the Digest; "But this rule is not to be extended indifferently to factors and others, set over any commerce or business at land, where

*toris dispiciat, et sic contrahat. In navis magistro non ita, nam interdum locus, tempus, non patitur plenius deliberandi constitum.*¹

§ 35. Fourthly. SHIPS'-HUSBANDS. A ship's-husband is a common expressive maritime phrase, to denote a peculiar sort of agency, created and delegated by the owner of a ship, in regard to the repairs, equipment, management, and other concerns of the ship.² A ship's-husband is sometimes appointed merely for the purpose of conducting the ordinary and necessary concerns of the ship on her return to her proper home port; such as making the proper entries at the custom-house; superintending the landing of the cargo; procuring the proper surveys of damage; settling the freight; and other incidents connected with the discharge of the cargo, and the termination of the voyage. But, generally, the person, designated as ship's-husband, has a much larger authority, and is understood to be the general agent of the owners, in regard to all the affairs of the ship in the home port.³ As such general agent, he is intrusted with authority to direct all proper repairs and equipments; and outfits for the ship; to hire the officers and crew; to enter into contracts for the freight or charter of the ship, if that is her usual employment; and to do all other acts necessary and proper to despatch her for and on her intended voyage.⁴ But his authority does not extend to the procuring of any policy of insurance on the ship, either in port, or for the voyage, without some express or implied assent of the owner.⁵

the necessity of treating with them is not the same, and where it is easier to learn who is the person employed as factor, and how far his power extends." 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 3, Strahan's translation. In the Civil Law, the word *Institor* was sometimes used for agent generally. *Cuicunque igitur negotio præpositus sit Institor recte appellabitur.* Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 5, Prelim.; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 5.

¹ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, Prelim.

² Abbott on Shipp. P. 1, ch. 3, § 2, p. 69, (edit. 1829); 1 Bell, Comm. §§ 426, 428, p. 410, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 503, 504, (5th edit.); Story on Partnership, § 418.

³ See Abbott on Shipp. P. 1, ch. 3, § 2, p. 69, (edit. 1829); 1 Bell, Comm. § 426 to 429, pp. 410, 411, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 503, 404, (5th edit.)

⁴ 1 Bell, Comm. §§ 426, 427, 428, pp. 410, 411, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 503, 504, (5th edit.); 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 45, p. 157, (4th edit.); 1 Liverm. on Agency, 28, 73, (edit. 1818.)

⁵ French v. Backhouse, 5 Burr. 2127; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 23, note

§ 36. Fifthly. **MASTERS OF SHIPS.** This is a well known class of agents, possessing what some foreign Jurists have called the **Exercitorial Power**, in relation to the equipment, outfit, repair,

(8); *Id.* 108, 109; *Abbott on Shipp.* p. 1, ch. 3, § 2, p. 69; *Id.* § 8, pp. 76, 77; *Marsh. on Ins. B.* 1, ch. 8, § 2; *Beawes (Lex Mercat.* 47, 6th edit.) has the following description of the powers and duties of **Ships'-Husbands**: "**Ships'-Husbands**, (says he,) a class of agents so called, whose chief employment in capital seaport towns, particularly in the port of London, is, to purchase the ship's stores for the voyage; to procure cargoes on freight; to settle the terms and obtain policies of insurance; to receive the amount of the freight both at home and abroad; to pay the captain or master his salary, and disbursements for the ship's use; and, finally, to make out an account for all these transactions for his employers, the owners of ships, to whom he is, as it were, a steward at land, as the officer bearing that name is, on board, when the ship is at sea." Mr. Bell gives the following description of their duties: "The duties of the **Ship's-Husband** are: 1. To see to the proper outfit of the vessel in the repairs adequate to the voyage, and in the tackle and furniture necessary for a seaworthy ship. 2. To have a proper master, mate, and crew for the ship, so that in this respect it shall be seaworthy. 3. To see to the due furnishing of provisions and stores, according to the necessities of the voyage. 4. To see to the regularity of all the clearances from the custom-house, and the regularity of the registry. 5. To settle the contracts, and provide for the payment of the furnishings, which are requisite in the performance of those duties. 6. To enter into proper charter-parties, or engage the vessel for general freight, under the usual conditions; and to settle for freight, and adjust averages with the merchant; and, 7. To preserve the proper certificates, surveys, and documents, in case of future disputes with insurers or freighters, and to keep regular books of the ship." 1 *Bell, Comm.* 410, § 428, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 504, (5th edit.) He then adds, "His powers, where not expressly limited, may be described generally as those requisite to the performance of the duties now enumerated. It may be observed, however, 1. That, without special powers, he cannot borrow money generally for the use of the ship; though he may settle the accounts of the creditors for furnishings, or grant bills for them, which will form debts against the concern, whether he has funds in his hands or not, with which he might have paid them. 2. That, although he may, in the general case, levy the freight, which is, by the bill of lading, payable on the delivery of the goods, it would seem, that he will not have power to take bills for the freight, and give up the possession and lien over the cargo, unless it has been so settled by charter-party, or unless he has special authority to give such indulgence. 3. That, under general authority as ship's-husband, he has no power to insure or to bind the owners for premiums; this requiring a special authority. 4. That, as the power of the master to enter into contracts of affreightment is superseded in the port of the owners, so is it by the presence of the ship's-husband, or the knowledge of the contracting parties that a ship's-husband has been appointed." 1 *Bell, Comm.* 411, § 429, (4th edit.); *Id.* pp. 504, 505, (5th edit.)

management, navigation, and usual employment of the ship committed to their charge.¹ The master of a ship is not, indeed, as the language of these Jurists might at first sight be thought to imply, for all purposes to be deemed *Exercitor Navis*; for that description properly applies only to the absolute owner, or to him who is the hirer or employer of the whole ship for the voyage, by a contract with the owner, (*Dominus Navis*), or his agent, the master.² The master of the ship in our law answers exactly to the description of the *Magister Navis* of the civil law. *Magistrum navis accipere debemus cui totius navis cura mandata est. Magistrum autem accipimus, non solum, quem Exercitor præposuit, sed et eum quem Magister.*³ And the master of the ship, by our law, as well as by the Roman law, possesses this power of appointing another person, as master, in his stead, and of delegating his authority, as master, to him, not indeed in all cases, nor in all places; but in cases of necessity, or sudden emergency in a foreign port, in the absence of the owner or employer or of his authorized agent, whenever it may be necessary and proper for the welfare of the ship, and the due accomplishment of the voyage.⁴ Sometimes the master is also appointed supercargo, or

¹ Abbott on Shipp. P. 2, ch. 1, § 1; Id. ch. 2, §§ 1, 2, 4, 5, pp. 90-93, (edit. 1829); 1 Bell, Comm. 385, § 409; Id. pp. 505, 506, (5th edit.)

² Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1; Dig. Lib. 4, l. 9, §§ 1, 2; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 2, art. 1 to 4; Abbott on Shipp. P. 2, ch. 2, § 3, and note (g.) (edit. 1829) *Exercitorem autem eum dicimus, ad quem obventiones et reditus omnes perveniunt, sive is Dominus navis sit, sive a Domino navem per aversionem conduxit, vel ad tempus, vel in perpetuum.* Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 15; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 1. The words, *per aversionem conduxit*, in this passage, mean a hiring of the whole ship. See Pothier, ubi supra, note (1). In the foreign laws, and especially in the early maritime Ordinances, the master of the ship is often designated as the Patron of the ship. He is generally so called in the Consolato del Mare. See also 1 Bell, Comm. B. 3, P. 1, ch. 5, §§ 1, 432, p. 412, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 505, 506, (5th edit.); 1 Stair, Inst. by Brodie, B. 1, tit. 12, §§ 18, 19; Post, § 117 to 123, 294, 295, 315.

³ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 1, 5; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 1; Abbott on Shipp. P. 2, ch. 2, § 3, note (g.), pp. 91, 92, (edit. 1829); 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 3, pp. 70, 71, (edit. 1818); 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 3; 3 Kent, Comm. Lect. 46, pp. 160, 161, (4th edit.)

⁴ See 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 3; 1 Bell, Comm. (4th edit.) B. 3, ch. 5, §§ 2, 433, p. 413, (4th edit.); Id. p. 505 to 508, (5th edit.); Pothier, *Traité de Chart.* Part. n. 48, 49. The Digest lays down the rule, that the owner or employer is bound by the act of substitution, notwithstanding he has privately pro-

consignee of the cargo, in which case the rights and duties of the latter character are superadded to his ordinary rights and duties as master. But his acts as master, are at the same time to be treated as distinct from those as supercargo, as if the acts, appropriate to each character, were confided to different persons.¹ Upon this subject we shall again touch hereafter.² But the full consideration of the rights, powers, and duties of masters of ships appropriately belongs to the law of shipping and navigation.

§ 37. Sixthly. PARTNERS. Partners are mutual agents of each other in all things which respect the partnership business. And, accordingly, we find that generally the act of any one, in the name of all, or for the benefit of all, in their common business, is deemed obligatory upon all the partners.³ But, here again, it may be remarked, that the proper consideration of this subject belongs to the law of partnership; and it may, for the present, be passed over, as it will occur in another connection

hibited the master from doing the act. *Quid tamen, si sic magistrum præposuit, ne alium ei liceret præponere? An adhuc Juliani Sententiam admittimus, videntum est. Finge, enim et nominatim eum prohibuisse, Ne Titio magistro utaris. Dicendum tamen erit, eo usque producendam utilitatem navigantium.* Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 5, Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 3. Pothier on Charter Parties lays down the same rule. See the excellent translation by Mr. Cushing of Pothier on Marit. Contr. p. 28, n. 49, and the note of the learned Editor, Id. 142, note 17, who cites Kuricke to the same effect. Roccus also asserts the same doctrine. See Ingersoll's Roccus, on Ships and Freight, note 4, p. 18; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 3; 1 Bell, Comm. p. 413, § 434, (4th edit.); Id. p. 505 to 508, (8th edit.) We have already seen, (ante, § 34, and note,) that a broad distinction is taken between the right of the master of a ship to delegate his authority, and certain other classes of agents, such as Institores and Factors.

¹ Abbott on Shipp. by Story, P. 2, ch. 4, § 1, b, note (1), p. 134, (edit. 1829); Kendrick v. Delafield, 2 Caines, R. 67; Earle v. Rowcroft, 8 East, 126, 140; Cook v. Commers. Ins. Co. 11 John. R. 40; Crousillat v. Ball, 4 Dall. 294; The Vrou Judith, 1 Rob. 150; The St. Nicholas, 1 Wheat. 417; 1 Liverm. on Agency. 72, (edit. 1818); 1 Bell, Comm. (4th edit.) B. 3, P. 1; ch. 5, § 433, p. 413; Id. p. 506, (5th edit.); 3 Kent, Comm. Lect. 46, pp. 159-164, (4th edit.); 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 3; Williams v. Nichols, 13 Wend. R. 58.

² Post, § 116 to 123, 294 to 300, 497.

³ The same rule was applied in the Civil Law. *Si plures navem exerceant, cum quolibet eorum in solidum agi potest. Ne in plures adversarios distringatur, qui cum uno contraxerit.* Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 25; Id. l. 2: 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 6, 7; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 10; Baring v. Lyman, 1 Story, Rep. 396.

hereafter. However, the rules applicable to it will be found in most, if not in all respects, to be the same as those which govern in relation to other cases of general agency.¹

CHAPTER IV.

JOINT PRINCIPALS AND JOINT AGENTS.

§ 38. LET us, in the next place, proceed to the consideration of cases, where there are two or more Principals and two or more Agents. (1.) In regard to cases of two or more principals, it may be generally laid down, that if they have a several and distinct interest, no one of them can ordinarily appoint an agent for all the others, without the assent and concurrence of all of them. Thus, for example, if two persons, by a joint instrument, should consign two parcels of goods to a consignee for sale, the one being the owner of one parcel, and the other the owner of the other parcel; in such a case, no joint interest, or joint agency, would be created; but the consignee would become the several factor of each owner; and of course the owner of one parcel could not give instructions to the consignee, which would bind both, unless by the express or implied consent of the other.² But this is true only upon the supposition that the consignee knows the facts; for otherwise, he is at liberty to treat it as a joint consignment for the benefit of both; and then the instructions of

¹ See Gow on Partn. ch. 2, § 2, p. 53 to 91, (edit. 1825); Collyer on Partn. B. 2, ch. 2, § 1, p. 104; Id. B. 3, ch. 1, § 1 to 5, p. 211 to 240; 3 Kent, Comm. Lect. 43, p. 40, (4th edit.); Story on Partnership, § 101 to 125; Post, §§ 124, 125.

² See Hoar v. Dawes, Doug. R. 371; Coope v. Eyre, 1 H. Bl. 37; United Ins. Co. v. Scott, 1 John R. 106. In many cases where a factor becomes the agent of different owners, and upon the sales made by him there is a loss, it will be apportioned among them all. Some cases to this effect are stated in Malynes, Lex Merc. 80, 81; Molloy, de Jure Marit. B. 3, ch. 8, § 4; 1 Liverson on Agency, § 2, pp. 85, 86, (edit. 1818); Corlies v. Cumming, 7 Cowen, R. 154; Post, § 179, note.

either; like the instructions of a partner, be binding upon the other; and both will become jointly liable to him for his commissions and disbursements.¹

§ 39. Upon the same ground, where different persons have separate and distinct, although undivided, interests in the same personal property, one of them cannot appoint an agent for all. Thus, for example, one tenant in common of a chattel cannot appoint an agent for both, to sell the property.² The same doctrine is equally true with regard to joint tenants of a chattel.³ But in cases of partnership the rule is different; for, as has been already intimated, each partner is treated, as to the partnership business, as the agent of all, and capable of binding all.⁴ And each partner has an implied authority, at least in cases where the business is ordinarily done through the instrumentality of agents, to appoint an agent for the firm. Thus, one partner may consign a cargo to an agent or factor, for sales and returns: and his letter of consignment and instructions will bind the firm in that respect, although his partners may be ignorant of his acts. This expansion of the principle of the delegation of a partner's authority seems indispensable to the security and facility of commercial operations.⁵

§ 40. In cases of part-owners of ships, there is some peculiarity in the law, growing out of the necessary adaptations of it to the exigencies and conveniences of commerce. Part-owners of ships are tenants in common, holding distinct but undivided interests; and each is deemed the agent of the others, as to the ordinary repairs, employments, and business of the ship, in the absence of any known dissent.⁶ But if any part-owner dissents, the others cannot bind his interest by their acts as agents, at least where the other party has notice of the dissent. A majority of the owners in interest have, however, a right to employ

¹ See 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 2, art. 5.

² See Abbott on Shipp. P. 1, ch. 3, § 2 to 7, p. 68 to 76.

³ See Comm. Dig. *Estates*, K. 1, 6.

⁴ Ante, § 37; Story on Partnership, §§ 1, 101 to 125.

⁵ See 3 Kent, Comm. Lect. 43, pp. 41, 44, 45, (4th edit.); Story on Partnership, ch. 7, § 101 to 125.

⁶ See 2 Bell, Comm. B. 7, ch. 2, §§ 4, 1222, 1223, p. 638, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 655, 656, (5th edit.); Story on Partn. § 412 to 440; Curling v. Robertson, 7 Mann. & Gr. 341.

the ship, in case the minority dissent; and they may appoint a master of the ship, notwithstanding such dissent.¹ And the master so appointed will, *virtute officii*, become entitled to bind all the owners by his acts in the ordinary business of the ship, unless the party dealing with him has notice of such dissent,² or the dissenting owners have, by proper proceedings in the Court of Admiralty, placed themselves in a position not to be deemed owners for the voyage, undertaken by the majority.³

¶ 41. The civil law adopted a policy substantially the same. If there were several owners or employers of a ship, each of them was liable *in solido*, and not merely in proportion to his share, for all the acts of the others in relation to the common concerns of the ship; and the master was treated as the common agent of all, and entitled to bind all. *Si plures navem exerceant, cum quolibet eorum in solidum agi potest. Nec quicquam facere, quotam quisque portionem in nave habeat; eumque qui præstiterit, societatis iudicio a cæteris conseruturum.*⁴ *Sed si plures exercean, unum autem de numero suo magistrum facerint, huius nomine in solidum poterunt conveniri.*⁵ And this rule applied not

¹ Abbott on Shipp P. 1, ch. 3, § 2 to 9, p. 68 to 77, and notes to Amer. edit. 1829; Id. P. 2, ch. 4, §§ 1, 6, note to p. 133; 1 Bell, Comm B 3, P 1, ch. 5, § 433, p. 412, (4th edit), Id pp. 506, 507, (5th edit), Story on Partnership, § 418 to 452.

² Ibid.

³ Abbott on Shipp P. 1, ch. 3, § 4, pp 70-72, 74, note (1), (Amer edit 1829); Id P. 2, ch 2, § 2, pp 90, 91; Story on Partnership, § 427 to 440

⁴ Dig. Lib. 14 tit. 1, l. 1, § 25, Id. l. 2 l. 3, l. 4, § 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 10, Pothier on Oblig. n. 450.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 1; Id. tit. 3, l. 13, § 2, Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 10, 11, 13; Id. tit. 3, n. 19, Heinecc. ad Pand P 4, Lib. 14, tit. 1, § 140; 1 Voet, ad. Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, § 5, 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 6, 7, Eisk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, §§ 43, 45. There are some real or apparent exceptions to the generality of the rule, for it is said, almost in the same connection; *Si tamen plures per se navem exercean, pro portionibus exertionis conveniuntur; neque enim invicem sui magistri videntur.* Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 4; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 7. From this passage it would seem, that although each was liable for the whole charge, where the contract was made by a master appointed on behalf of all; yet, where they all acted in the ship's business without any master, each was liable only for his share or proportion. Probably this was applied to cases, where the party dealing with them, knew the several interest of each, and contracted with each in regard to his share only. Voet, in commenting upon this passage, uses the following language. *Nisi singula per se navem exercean sine magistro, tunc enim; quia invicem sui magistri non sunt, pro portione.*

only in cases of contracts made by the master with strangers, but in contracts made with one of the owners or employers. *Si alius ex his Exercitoribus cum magistro navis contraxerit, agere cum aliis Exercitoribus poterit.*¹

§ 42. (2.) In regard to two or more agents. It is a general rule of the common law, that where an authority is given by the act of the principal² to two or more persons to do an act, the act is valid to bind the principal, only when all of them concur in doing it; for the authority is construed strictly, and the power is understood to be joint and not several.³ Hence it is, that if a letter of attorney is made to two persons, to give or to receive livery, both must concur in the act, or the livery is void.⁴ So, if an authority is given to two persons jointly to sell the property of the principal, one of them cannot separately execute the authority.⁵ Indeed, so strictly is the authority construed, that if it be given to three persons jointly and severally, two cannot properly execute it; but it must be done by one, or by all.⁶

bus Exercitionis singuli conveniendi forent 1 Voet, Comm Lib. 14, tit 1, § 5. See also Pothier, Pand Lib 14, tit. 1, n 10, 11; Ersk Inst B. 3, tit 3, § 45, n. 18. Among the maritime nations of the Continent, Heineccius seems to think that the rule, that all the employers shall be liable in solido, does not prevail (*vix datur*), at least that it does not prevail in Holland. Heinecc. ad. Pand. P. Lib. 11, tit. 1, § 142. See Pothier on Oblig. n. 450, 451; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 45.

¹ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 5, § 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 9-11, 13.

² It is otherwise as to an authority conferred by law. *Jewett v. Alton*, 7 N. Hamp 253; *Scott v. Detroit Society*, 1 Dougl. (Mich.) 119; *Caldwell v. Harrison*, 11 Ala. 755.

³ *Inhab. of Parish in Sutton v. Cole*, 3 Pick. R. 232; *Damon v. Inhab. of Granby*, 2 Pick. R. 315; *Kupfer v. Inhab. of South Parish in Augusta*, 12 Mass. R. 185; *Low v. Perkins*, 10 Verm. R. 532; *Despatch Line of Packets v. Bellamy Manufacturing Co.* 12 N. Hamp. 226; *Post*, § 139 a, *Woolsey v. Tompkins*, 23 Wend. 324; *Johnston v. Bingham*, 9 Watts & Serg. 56. *Heard v. March*, 12 Cush. 580; *Cross v. The United States*, 24 Boston Law Rep. 24.

⁴ Co. Litt. 49 b, 112 b, 113, and Harg. n. 2, Id. 181 b: *Com. Dig. Attorney*, C. 11; *Green v. Miller*, 6 John. R. 39.

⁵ *Copeland v. Merch. Ins. Co.* 6 Pick. R. 198; *Post*, § 139 a.

⁶ Co. Litt. 181, b; *Com. Dig. Attorney*, C. 11; 2 Roll. Abridg. *Feoffment*, p. 8, B. 1. 40; *Bacon, Abridg. Authority*, C. See *Guthrie v. Armstrong*, 5 B. & Ald. 628. This doctrine is regularly true in relation to private agencies only; for in public agencies an authority executed by a majority would be held obligatory, and a good execution of it. Lord Coke (Co. Litt. 181 b.) takes notice of this

However; the rule of interpretation is not so rigid, as to overcome the apparent intent of the party, if the words can be so construed, as to reach the case. Thus, if an authority be given to A. and B., or either of them, a joint execution, or a several execution by either of them, will be a valid execution of it.¹ So, a power of attorney by a party to fifteen persons named therein, as his attorneys, "jointly and separately for him and in his name, to sign and order all such policies as they, his said attorneys, or any of them," should jointly and separately think proper, has been held to make a policy, executed by four of these persons, binding upon the principal.² [But an authority to B. and A. B. to use the principal's name as an indorser, can be executed only by the two persons jointly.³]

§ 43. The same strictness in principle, although not perhaps the same strictness in the construction of the language of the authority, prevailed in the civil law; for in that law the agent was bound to follow the terms of the agency. *Diligenter fines mandati custodiendi sunt.*⁴ *Conditio autem præpositionis serranda est. Quid enim, si certa lege, vel interventu cujusdam personæ, vel sub pignore, voluit cum eo contrahi, vel ad certam rem; æquisimum erit, id servari, in quo præpositus est.*⁵ And if the authority was delegated to several, care was to be taken to ascertain whether all were required to act together, or whether one alone might act; for otherwise the act of one would be void. *Item, si plures habuit Institores; vel cum omnibus simul contrahi voluit, vel cum uno solo.*⁶

distinction and says: "Secondly, there is a diversity between authorities created by the party for private causes, and authority created by law, for execution of justice." 1 Roll Abridg 329, l. 5; Com. Dig Attorney, C. 15, Bac Abridg. Authority, C. See also *Green v. Miller*, 6 John R 39, *Grindley v. Barker*, 1 Bos & Pull 229, 234, *The King v. Beeston*, 3 T Rep. 692; *Sprague v. Bailey*, 19 Pick. 436; *Williams v. Lunenburg*, 21 Pick. 75, *Martin v. Lemon*, 26 Conn. 192; *People v. Batchelor*, 28 Barbour, 311.

¹ Co Litt 49 b; Dyer, R. 62.

² *Guthrie v. Armstrong*, 5 B & Ald 628.

³ *Union Bank v. Beirne*, 1 Gratt. 226.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 5; Post, §§ 70, 87, 88, 174.

⁵ Dig Lib 14, tit. 3, l. 11, § 5; Pothier, Pand. Lib 14, tit 3, n. 16; Post, §§ 70, 174.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 14, tit 3, l. 11, § 5; Pothier, Pand Lib. 14, tit 3, n. 16; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 3, art. 14; 1 Stair, Inst. by Brodie, B 1, tit. 12, § 13.

§ 44. But although the rule of the common law is thus strict, yet it is not inflexible, and in commercial transactions a more liberal interpretation in favor of trade is admitted, as thereby public confidence, as well as general convenience, is best consulted.¹ Hence, it is, that, in cases of a joint consignment of goods for sale to two factors, (whether they are partners or not,) each of them is understood to possess the whole power over the goods for the purposes of the consignment; for it has been well said, that every consignment to two factors jointly, imports a consent by the consignor for them to trust one another; and to deliver over the goods from one to the other for the purpose of sale.² On the other hand, such joint factors are co-obligors, or co-contractors, and, as such, are jointly accountable, and answerable for one another for the whole.³ And this rule is in entire coincidence with the civil law, which makes joint factors and other agents responsible *in solido* for each other. *Duobus quis mandavit negotiationum administrationem. Quæsitum est, an unusquisque mandati iudicio in solidum teneatur? Respondi, unumquemque pro solido conveniri debere, dummodo ab utroque non amplius debito exigatur.*⁴

CHAPTER V.

APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS.

§ 45. In the next place, let us proceed to the consideration of the various modes in which agents may be appointed, and the nature and extent of the authority, which is, or may be, conferred on them. An agency may be created by the express words or

¹ See *French v. Price*, 24 Pick. 13. An authority to several assignees to receive money on a debt due to their assignor may be exercised by one assignee in behalf of all. *Heard v. Lodge*, 20 Pick. 59.

² *Godfrey v. Saunders*, 3 Wils. 94, 114. See *Willett v. Chambers*, Cowp. R. 814. See 1 *Stair, Inst. by Brodie*, B. 1, tit. 12, § 13.

³ *Godfrey v. Saunders*, 3 Wils. 94, 114.

⁴ *Dig. Lib.* 17, tit. 1, l. 60, § 2; *Pothier, Pand. Lib.* 17, tit. 1, n. 24; 1 *Domat*, B. 2, tit. 26, § 3, art. 13; 1 *Stair, Inst. by Brodie*, B. 1, tit. 12, §§ 13, 14.

acts of the principal, or it may be implied from his conduct and acquiescence. So, also, the nature and extent of the authority of an agent may be expressly given by a solemn, or an unsolemn instrument, or it may be implied or inferred from circumstances.

§ 46. First. As to the modes of appointment of an agent. It is sometimes laid down in our books, that the delegation of authority to an attorney, or agent, should be by a deed or instrument under seal, for the reason, that it may appear, that the attorney or substitute had a commission or power to represent the party; and also, that it may appear, that the authority has been well pursued.¹ But this, as a general rule, is manifestly incorrect; and especially in regard to commercial transactions, where most matters of agency are transacted by informal instruments, or by verbal or implied delegations of authority.²

§ 47. The general rule may, indeed, be laid down the other way; that an agent or attorney may ordinarily be appointed by parol, in the broad sense of that term at the common law; that is, by a verbal declaration in writing, not under seal, or by acts and implications.³ And it is absolutely indispensable for the exigencies of commercial business, that the rule should be so; for otherwise, the most ordinary transactions, as well between persons in the same country, as between persons in foreign countries, would be greatly embarrassed, if not entirely obstructed. Thus, for example, if no one could sign or negotiate a promissory note, or bill of exchange, or sell or buy goods, or write a letter, or procure a policy for another, unless by a formal authority under seal, the occasions for the multiplication of such instruments would be almost innumerable; and would retard, at every step, the operations of merchants, and their factors, and clerks and other agents. The wisdom of the common law, therefore, has adopted and followed the rule on this subject prescribed in the civil law; and has allowed the authority to be conferred by verbal delegations, by informal writings, and by implication as

¹ Bac. Abr. *Authority*, A. See also Co. Litt. 52 a; Com. Dig. *Attorney*, C. 5.

² 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 194, 195; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 2, § 3, pp. 35-37, (edit. 1818); Long v. Colburn, 11 Mass. R. 97, 98; Post, §§ 54, 55, 84 to 106.

³ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 5; Id. pp. 194, 195; Rann v. Hughes, 7 T. R. 376.

well as by deeds. *Procurator constitutus vel coram, vel per nuncium, vel per epistolam.*¹ The plain reason is, that all, which ought to be required in ordinary cases, is the proof of the consent of the principal, *Obligatio mandati consensu contrahentium consistit.*²

§ 48. There are a few exceptions to the rule, proper to be considered, which seem, however, to have their true foundation in the strict principles and solemnities, required by the common law in regard to the transfer of real estate, and to the creation of formal obligations and covenants under seal, rather than in any enlarged public policy, applicable to the business and concerns of modern society.

§ 49. One exception is, that, whenever any act of agency is required to be done in the name of the principal under seal, the authority to do the act must generally be conferred by an instrument under seal.³ Thus, for example, if the principal should

¹ Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 3, l. 1, § 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, n. 3. 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 1, art. 5.

² Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 1; Post, § 87, 1 Stair Instit. by Brodie, B. 1, tit. 12, § 12.

³ Co. Litt. 48 b, and Harg. Note (2); 2 Roll. Abridg. 8, pl. 4. Coombe's case, 9 Co. Rep. 75, 77; Harrison v. Jackson, 7 T. R. 207; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 157, 158; 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 195, Damon v. Inhab. of Granby, 2 Pick. R. 345; 3 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 613, (1th edit.); Banorgce v. Hovey, 5 Mass. R. 11; Reed v. Van Ostrand, 1 Wend. R. 424, Hanford v. McNair, 9 Wend. R. 54, Blood v. Goodrich, 9 Wend. 68; Blood v. Goodrich, 12 Wend. 525; Cooper v. Rankin, 5 Binn. R. 473; Gordon v. Bulkley, 14 Serg. & Rawle, 331; Hunter v. Parker, 7 Mees. & Wels. 322, 343, Wells v. Evans, 20 Wend. R. 251, McNaughton v. Partridge, 11 Ohio R. 223; Cummings v. Cassilly, 5 B. Munroe, (Kentucky,) R. 75; Post, §§ 212, 232; Hibblewhite v. McMorine, 6 Mees. & Wels. 200, 214, 215. In this last case, the instrument was executed by the grantor, and a blank was left for the name of the grantee, whose name was inserted by an agent appointed by parol; and it was held, that the instrument was valid, because the appointment was not made by deed. Mr Baron Parke, in declaring the opinion of the Court, said: "Assuming, then, the instrument to be a deed, it was wholly improper, if the name of the vendee was left out; and to allow it to be afterwards filled up by an agent appointed by parol, and then delivered in the absence of the principal, as a deed, would be a violation of the principle, that an attorney, to execute and deliver a deed for another, must himself be appointed by deed. The only case cited in favor of the validity of a deed in blank, afterwards filled in, is that of Texira v. Evans; where Lord Mansfield held, that a bond was valid, which was given, with the name of the obligee and sum in blank, to a broker to obtain money upon it, and he borrowed a sum from

authorize an agent to make a deed in his name, he must confer the authority on the agent by a deed.¹ A mere unsealed writing

the plaintiff, and then inserted his name and the sum. But this case is justly questioned by Mr. Preston, in his edition of Shepp. Touch. 68, 'as it assumes there could be an attorney without deed;' and we think it cannot be considered to be law. On the other hand, there are several authorities, that an instrument, which has a blank in it, which prevents it from having any operation, when it is sealed and delivered, cannot become a valid deed by being afterwards filled up. In *Com. Dig. Fait*, A. 1, it is said, — 'If a deed be signed and sealed, and afterwards written, it is no deed.' To the same effect is Shepp. Touch. 54. In *Weeks v. Maillardet*, the instrument had nothing to operate upon, as it referred to a schedule as annexed, which was not annexed at the time of execution; and it was held, that the subsequent annexation, in the absence of one of the parties, did not give it operation as part of the deed. So, where a bail bond was executed, and a condition afterwards inserted, it was held bad as a bail bond. *Powell v. Duff*. The cases cited on the other side were all of them distinguishable. In one, *Hudson v. Revett*, a blank in a part material was filled up; but having been done in the presence of the party, and ratified by him, it was held that there was evidence of redelivery. In another, *Doe v. Bingham*, the blanks filled up were in no respect material to the operation of the deed, with respect to the party who executed before they were filled up, — as to him the deed was complete. In a third, *Matson v. Booth*, the point decided was, that a complete bond was not rendered void by the subsequent addition of another obligor with the assent of all parties. It is unnecessary to go through the others which were cited on the argument. It is enough to say that there is none that shows that an instrument, which, when executed, is incapable of having any operation, and is no deed, can afterwards become a deed, by being completed and delivered by a stranger in the absence of the party who executed, and unauthorized by instrument under seal. In truth, this is an attempt to make a deed transferable and negotiable like a bill of exchange or exchequer bill, which the law does not permit." In America, there has been some diversity of opinion expressed on this latter point; and it has been held in some of our courts, that a subsequent parol ratification would give validity to a deed, either executed in blank and filled up by the agent, or executed by an agent without authority, and then ratified by the principal by parol. See *Skinner v. Dayton*, 19 John. R. 512; *Cady v. Sheppard*, 11 Pick. R. 400; *Gram v. Seton*, 1 Hall, R. 262. See these cases cited more fully in *Story on Partnership*, § 122, note; *Post*, §§ 242, 252. But in every such case it is still held to be indispensable, that the instrument should be expressed in apt words so as to bind the principal; for if it purports to be the deed of the agent in his own name, acting for his principal, no ratification, either by parol or otherwise, will make it the deed of the principal. *Wells v. Evans*, 20 Wend. R. 451; *Post*, §§ 264 a, 450.

¹ *Worrall v. Munn*, 1 Selden, 229. [But the authority of an agent to make a contract that his principal will convey land need not be under seal, nor even in writing. *Riley v. Minor*, 29 Missouri, 439.]

will not be sufficient to make the execution of the deed by the agent valid at law; although a Court of Equity might, in such a case, compel the principal to confirm and give validity to the deed.¹ The ground of this doctrine seems to be, that the power to execute an instrument under seal should be evidenced by an instrument of equal solemnity;² by analogy to the known maxim of the common law, that a sealed contract can only be dissolved, or released³ by an instrument of as high a dignity or solemnity;

¹ *Harrison v. Jackson*, 7 T. R. 208; *Horsley v. Rush*, cited *ibid.*; *Williams v. Walby*, 4 Esp. Rep. 220; *Steiglitz v. Egginton*, Holt, N. P. R. 141; *Berkley v. Hardy*, 5 B. & Cressw. 655; *Hanford v. McNair*, 9 Wend. R. 51; *McNaughten v. Partridge*, 11 Ohio R. 223; *Ledbetter v. Walker*, 31 Ala. R. 175.

² *Ibid.*; 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 195.

³ [In *Brookshire v. Brookshire*, 8 Iredell, 74, it was held that a power of attorney, although under seal, might be revoked by parol. Nash, J., said: "It is not denied by the plaintiff, that, in this case, it was within the power of the defendant to put an end to his agency, by revoking his authority. Indeed, this is a doctrine, so consonant with justice and common sense, that it requires no reasoning to prove it. But he contends, that it is a maxim of the common law, that every instrument must be revoked by one of equal dignity. It is true an instrument under seal cannot be released or discharged by an instrument not under seal or by parol, but we do not consider the rule as applicable to the revocation of powers of attorney, especially to such an one as we are now considering. The authority of an agent is conferred at the mere will of his principal, and is to be executed for his benefit; the principal, therefore, has the right to put an end to the agency whenever he pleases, and the agent has no right to insist upon acting, when the confidence at first reposed in him is withdrawn. In this case, it was not necessary to enable the plaintiff to execute his agency, that his power should be under seal; one by parol, or by writing of any kind, would have been sufficient; it certainly cannot require more form to revoke the power than to create it. Mr. Story, in his *Treatise on Agency*, page 606, lays it down that the revocation of a power may be, by a direct and formal declaration publicly made known, or by an *informal writing*, or by parol; or it may be implied from circumstances; and he nowhere intimates, nor do any of the authorities we have looked into, that when the power is created by deed, it must be revoked by deed. And, as was before remarked, the nature of the connection between the principal and the agent seems to be at war with such a principle. It is stated, by Mr. Story, in the same page, that an agency may be revoked by implication, and all the text-writers lay down the same doctrine. Thus, if another agent is appointed to execute powers, previously intrusted to some other person, it is a revocation, in general, of the power of the latter. For this proposition, Mr. Story cites *Copeland v. The Marine Insurance Company*, 6 Pick. 199. In that case, it was decided that a power, given to one Pedrick to sell the interest of his principal in a vessel, was revoked by a subsequent letter of instruction to him and

— *Eodem modo, quo oritur, eodem modo dissolvitur.*¹ [Whether an instrument, to which an agent has unnecessarily affixed a seal, is binding upon the principal, when the agent's authority is not under seal, is left in some doubt upon the authorities; but the reason of the thing seems to be in favor of its validity as a simple contract.²]

§ 50. The common law, however, has not entirely followed out the principle of this exception; for it does not require, that an authority to an agent to sign an unsealed paper, or a written contract, should also be by a writing. Thus, for example, an agent may, by a verbal authority, or by a mere implied authority, sign or indorse promissory notes for another.³ And, even

the master to sell. As then, an agent may be appointed by parol, and as the appointment of a subsequent agent supersedes and revokes the powers previously granted to another, it follows, that the power of the latter, though created by deed, may be revoked by the principal, by parol. But the case in *Pickering* goes further. The case does not state, in so many words, that the power granted to *Pedrick* was under seal, but the facts set forth in the case show that was the fact; and, if so, is a direct authority in this case.”]

¹ *Bac. Abridg. Release*, A. 1; *Neal v. Sheafsfeld*, *Cro. Jac.* 254; 2 *Saund. R.* 47; *Williams's note* (1.); *Hayford v. Andrews*, *Cro. Eliz.* 697. The civil law seems to have acted throughout upon this principle, as to the dissolution of contracts, although not as to the creation of agencies. *Nihil (says the Digest), tam naturale est, quam eo genere quidque dissolvere, quo colligatum est. Ideo verborum obligatio verbis tollitur; nudi consensus obligatio contrario consensu dissolvitur. Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 35. See also Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, n. 571 to 580. Prout quidque contractum est, ita et solvi debet; ut cum re contraxerimus, re solvi debet. Dig. Lib. 46, tit. 3, l. 80. Pothier, Pand. Lib. 50, tit. 17, n. 1388. Et cum verbis aliquid contraximus, vel re, vel verbis, obligatio solvi debeat; verbis, veluti cum acceptum promissori sit; re, veluti cum solvit, quod promisit. Neque cum emptio, vel venditio, vel locatio contracta est; quoniam consensu nudo contrahi potest, etiam dissensu contrario dissolvi potest. Dig. Lib. 46, tit. 3, l. 80; Post, §§ 51, 125.*

² See *Cooper v. Rankin*, 5 *Binney*, 613; *Worrall v. Munn*, 1 *Selden*, 229; *Despatch Line v. Bellamy Man. Co.* 12 *N. H. R.* 205; *Hunter v. Parker*, 7 *M. & W.* 322; *Randall v. Van Vechten*, 19 *Johns.* 61; *Mitchell v. St. Andrew's Bay Land Co.* 4 *Florida*, 200; *Wood v. Auburn & Rochester Railroad*, 4 *Seld.* 167; *Ledbetter v. Walker*, 31 *Ala. R.* 175; *Bates v. Best*, 13 *B. Monr.* 215. But see *Baker v. Freeman*, 35 *Maine*, 485; *Wheeler v. Nevins*, 34 *Maine*, 51.

³ *Paley on Agency*, by *Lloyd*, 160, 161; *Anon.* 12 *Mod.* 564; *Rawson v. Curtis*, 10 *Ill.* 456. In *Vanhorne v. Frick*, 6 *Serg. & Rawle*, 90, the Supreme Court of *Pennsylvania* held, that a sale of lands, made by an agent under a parol authority, is void.

where a statute, such as the Statute of Frauds, requires an instrument to be in writing, in order to bind the party, he may, without writing, authorize an agent to sign it in his behalf, unless the statute positively requires that the authority also should be in writing.¹ So, where an agreement is in writing not under seal, it may be dissolved by parol.²

§ 51. And this very exception, as to instruments under seal, has an exception introduced into its generality; for although a person cannot ordinarily sign a deed for and as the agent of another, without an authority given to him under seal;³ yet this is true only in the absence of the principal; for if the principal

¹ *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 250; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 613, 614, (4th edit.); *Higgins v. Senior*, 8 Mees. & Wels. R. 844; Post, §§ 269, 270; *Brookshire v. Brookshire*, 8 Ired. 74. In the work of Mr. Paley on Agency, as edited by Mr. Lloyd, the rule and the distinction are stated in very clear terms. "For the purposes described in the 1st, 2d, and 3d sections of the Statute of Frauds, that is, for the purpose of making and creating leases, estates, interests of freehold, or terms for years, or any uncertain interest, other than leases under three years, in messuages, manors, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, by an agent, or for surrendering the same, (except copyhold interests,) the authority of the agent must be in writing. But for the purposes described by the fourth section, viz., 'to charge executors or administrators out of their own estates; or to charge any for the debt or default of another; or upon an agreement in consideration of marriage; or upon any contract or sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them; or upon any agreement not to be performed within a year;' although the several agreements recited must be in writing, signed by the party, or his agent thereunto by him lawfully authorized, the authority is not required to be in writing. And therefore the authority to contract for a lease, or other interest in land, need not be in writing, though the authority to sign the lease, or instrument, by which the interest passes, must be so. Neither does the 17th section, relating to the sale of goods above £10, which requires a note or memorandum in writing, signed by the parties to be charged, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized, make it necessary, that the authority should be in writing." Paley on Agency, ch. 3, pt. 1, § 1, n. 3, p. 158 to 160, (edit. 1833,) by Lloyd; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 614, (4th edit.)

² *Legal v. Miller*, 2 Ves. 299; *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 250; *Mortlock v. Buller*, 10 Ves. 311; *Shaw v. Nudd*, 8 Pick. R. 9; *Botsford v. Burr*, 2 John. Ch. R. 416; *Clihan v. Cooke*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 22; Ante, § 49; Post, §§ 242, 252; *Story on Partn.* § 117 to 122; *Gow on Partn.* ch. 2, § 2, p. 58 to 60, (3d edit.)

³ But see *Cady v. Shepherd*, 11 Pick. 400, cited ante, § 49; and post, §§ 242, 252, which is the other way. The doctrine, however, in *Hibblewhite v. McMorone*, 6 Mees & Wels. 200, 214, 215, is strongly in support of the text, and indeed seems firmly established, not only in England, but in most of the States of the Union. 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 614, (4th edit.)

is present, and verbally or impliedly authorizes the agent to fix his name to the deed, it becomes the deed of the principal; and it is deemed, to all intents and purposes, as binding upon him, as if he had personally sealed and executed it.¹ The distinction may seem nice and refined; but it proceeds upon the ground, that where the principal is present, the act of signing and sealing is to be deemed his personal act, as much as if he held the pen, and another person guided his hand and pressed it on the seal.

§ 52. Another exception founded upon the strict notions of the old common law, is, that the agent of a corporation must ordinarily receive his appointment to do any act for the corporation by an instrument under the common seal of the corporation; for, (it has been said,) a corporation cannot otherwise signify its assent to the agency, or the act, than under its common seal.² But this doctrine, although perhaps regularly true under the old common law, in regard to the solemn acts of corporations, which by that law, are incapable of acting, except by some consent or act made known through its common seal, has been greatly modified in modern times, and especially in relation to corporations created by charters of the crown or government, or by statutes. In cases of this sort, as the powers of the corporation to act depend essentially upon the modes pointed out by the charter, it is very clear, that an agent, appointed by the trustees, or directors, or other functionaries of the corporation, pursuant to the charter, would have full capacity to bind the corporation by a written vote.³ And as the appointment

¹ Ball v. Dunsterville, 4 T. Rep. 313, 314; Lord Lovelace's case, W. Jones, Rep. 268; Hibblewhite v. McMorine, 6 Mees. & Wels. 200, 214, 215; Gardner v. Gardner, 5 Cush. 483; King v. Longnor, 4 B. & Ad. 647; 1 Nev. & Man. 576.

² Comyn's Dig. *Franchise*, F. 12, F. 13; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, (3d edit.) 155, 156; East London Water Works Company v. Bailey, 4 Bing. R. 283, 286, 287.

³ See Smith v. Birmingham Gas Company, 1 Adolph. & Ell. 526; Bates v. Bank of State of Alabama, 2 Alabama R. 245, N. S.; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. R. 738; 2 Kent. Comm. Lect. 33, p. 288 to 291, (4th edit.); East London Water Works Company v. Bailey, 4 Bing. R. 283; Slark v. Highgate Archway Company, 5 Taunt. R. 792; Broughton v. Manchester Water Works Company, 3 Barn. & Ald. 12; Murray v. East India Company, 5 Barn. & Ald. 204; Mayor, &c., of Ludlow v. Charlton, 6 Mees. & Wels. 815; London

of an agent may not always be evidenced by the written vote of such functionaries, it is now the settled doctrine, at least in America, that it may be inferred and implied from the adoption or recognition of the acts of the agent by such functionaries, or by the corporation.¹ Thus, for example, if the cashier of a bank should openly act as such in all the common transactions of the bank, with the full knowledge and assent of the directors, his acts would be obligatory upon the bank, although there might be no written vote on record to establish his appointment.²

§ 53. Indeed, in England, the rule itself has been subject to some relaxations from very early times. Thus, for example, it has been held, that for convenience's sake, a corporation might act, in some ordinary matters, without seal; as to retain a butler, or a cook, or a servant.³ And the Courts have recently said that in cases of great necessity, they will imply an exception to the common rule; as for example, where a corporation has wrongfully received the plaintiff's money.⁴ So an agent, by an authority under seal, might bind the corporation by his agreement not under seal, if the agreement were within the scope of his authority.⁵ In America, the general doctrine is now firmly

& *Birm. Railway Co. v. Winter*, 1 Craig and Phillips, 57; *Hall v. Mayor, &c., of Swansea*, 5 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 526.

¹ *Bank of U. S. v. Dandridge*, 12 Wheat. R. 64, 69, 70-72, 74; *Yarborough v. Bank of England*, 16 East, 6; *Roe v. Dean, &c., of Rochester*, 2 Camp. R. 96; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 33, p. 288 to 291, (4th edit.); *Essex Turnpike Corpor. v. Collins*, 8 Mass. R. 299; *Clark v. Corporation of Washington*, 12 Wheat. R. 40; *Bank of the Metropolis v. Gutchlick*, 14 Peters, R. 19; *Fleckner v. Bank of United States*, 8 Wheat. 338; *Danforth v. Schoharie & Dutch Turnpike Co.* 12 John. R. 227; *Flint v. Chilton Co.* 12 New Hamp. R. 430; *Goodwin v. Union Screw Co.* 34 N. H. R. 380.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Bank of Columbia v. Patterson's Admr.*, 7 Cranch, 299, 306; *Bank of U. S. v. Dandridge*, 12 Wheat. 69-71; *Rex v. Biggs*, 3 P. Will. 419, 424; *Anon.* 1 Salk. 191; *Harper v. Charlesworth*, 4 B. & Cressw. 590, 591; *Yarborough v. Bank of England*, 16 East, R. 6; *Viner, Abridg., Corporation, K.*; *Smith v. Birmingham Gas Co.* 1 Adolph. & Ellis, 526; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 155, 156; *East London Water Works Co. v. Bailey*, 4 Bing. R. 283, 287; *Comyn's Dig. F.* 12, F. 13; *Mayor, &c., of Ludlow v. Charlton*, 6 Mees. & Wels. 815.

⁴ *Hall v. Mayor, &c., of Swansea*, 5 Ad. & El. N. S. 526.

⁵ *Ibid.*; *Murray v. East India Co.* 5 B. & Ald. 204; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, (3d edit.) 155, 156; *Bank of Columbia v. Patterson's Admr.* 7 Cranch, R. 299, 305, 306; *Bank of United States v. Dandridge*, 12 Wheat. R. 64, 67 to 75;

established, that, wherever a corporation is acting within the scope of the legitimate purposes of its institution, all parol contracts, made by its authorized agents, are express contracts of the corporation; and all duties imposed upon it by law, and all services rendered, and benefits conferred at the request of its agents, raise an implied promise, for the enforcement of which an action will lie against the corporation.¹ The same doctrine seems gradually to have found favor in England, and may now be deemed, after repeated and well considered adjudications, to be fully established, as the common law, at least, where the nature and business of corporations, created by charter or statute, constantly, if not daily, require contracts to be made, to carry on its corporate operations. Indeed, the doctrine seems almost indispensable to meet the common duties and exigencies of corporations, created by charters or by statutes in modern times; and it affords a beautiful illustration of the expansive power of

Fleckner v. Bank of United States, 8 Wheat. R. 338; *Danforth v. Schoharie & Duane Turnpike Co.* 12 John. R. 227; *Mayor, &c., of Ludlow v. Charlton*, 6 Mees. & Wels. 815. See also *Metcalf & Perkins's Digest*, title Corporation, ch. 1, § 115, &c.; *Angell & Ames on Corporations*, ch. 8, p. 162 to 209, (2d. edit.)

¹ *Bank of Columbia v. Patterson's Admr.* 7 Cranch, R. 299, 305, 306, and cases there cited; *Bank of U. S. v. Dandridge*, 12 Wheat. R. 64, 67, 68 to 75, and cases there cited; *Mott v. Hicks*, 1 Cowen, R. 513; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 33, p. 288; *Kortright v. Buffalo Bank*, 20 Wend. R. 91; *Fleckner v. Bank of U. S.* 8 Wheat. R. 338; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 33, p. 291, (4th edit.) and the cases there cited in the note; *Angell & Ames on Corporations*, ch. 8, p. 162 to 209, (edit. 1843); *Att.-Gen. v. Life & Fire Ins. Co.* 9 Paige, R. 470; *Murray v. East India Co.* 5 B. & Ald. 204, 210. The present doctrine in England seems to be, that an agent of a corporation need not be appointed under the seal of the corporation for acts, which are of an ordinary nature, and do not affect the interests of the corporation. Mr. Justice Taunton, in *Smith v. Birmingham Gas Co.* 1 Adolph. & Ellis, 530, said: "The distinction is between matters which do, and matters which do not, affect the interest of the corporation." See also *East London Water Works Co. v. Bailey*, 4 Bing. R. 283. The American doctrine seems to have proceeded upon a much broader ground; and to embrace all exercises of authority, which are in any way sanctioned by the corporation itself, or by its delegated directors, in regard to the rights, interests, or duties of the corporation, which are not, by the general laws of the land, required to be under seal, such as the passing of the title to real estate. See also *Edwards v. Grand Junction Canal Co.* 1 M. & Craig, 659, 672; *Murray v. East India Co.* 5 B. & Ald. 204, 209, 210, and cases cited; *Ante*, § 53, notes.

the common law, which acquires flexibility, and moulds itself from time to time, so as to accomplish the various ends of modern society.¹

¹ Without going to an earlier period, we may trace the gradual development and advancement of this doctrine from *Rex v. Biggs*, 3 P. Will. 419; *Rex v. Bank of England*, Doug. R. 524; *Bank of England v. Moffat*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 262; *Murray v. The East India Co.* 5 Barn. & Ald. 204; *East London Water Works Co.* 4 Bing. R. 283; *Mayor of Stafford v. Till*, 4 Bing. R. 75; *Tilson v. Warwick Gas Light Co.* 4 Barn. & Cresw. 962; until we come to the case of *Beverley v. The Lincoln Gas Light & Coke Co.* 6 Adolph. & Ell. 829, where the doctrine was examined with great learning and ability by Mr. Justice Paterson, in delivering the opinion of the Court. On that occasion he said: "This, therefore, brings us to the second question, which is, whether an action of assumpsit can be maintained against a corporation aggregate without a head, on an executed parol contract? It is well known that the ancient rule of the common law, that a corporation aggregate could speak and act only by its common seal, has been almost entirely superseded in practice by the Courts of the United States in America. The decisions of those Courts, although intrinsically entitled to the highest respect, cannot be cited as direct authority for our proceedings; and there are obvious circumstances which justify their advancing with a somewhat freer step to the discussion of ancient rules of our common law than would be proper for ourselves. It should be stated, however, that, in coming to the decision alluded to, those Courts have considered themselves, not as altering the law, but as justified by the progress of previous decisions in this country and in America. We, on our part, disclaim entirely the right or the wish to innovate on the law upon any ground of inconvenience, however strongly made out; but, when we have to deal with a rule established in a state of society very different from the present, at a time when corporations were comparatively few in number, and upon which it was very early found necessary to engraft many exceptions, we think we are justified in treating it with some degree of strictness, and are called upon not to recede from the principle of any relaxation in it which we find to have been established by previous decisions. If that principle, in fair reasoning, leads to a relaxation of the rule, for which no prior decision can be found expressly in point, the mere circumstance of novelty ought not to deter us; for it is the principle of every case, which is to be regarded; and a sound decision is authority for all the legitimate consequences which it involves. Several cases have determined that corporations aggregate may maintain actions on executed parol contracts. In *The Dean and Chapter of Rochester v. Pierce*, Lord Ellenborough first at Nisi Prius, and this Court afterwards, held that they might sue in debt for use and occupation of their lands; and the Court of Common Pleas, in *The Mayor of Stafford v. Till*, held the same as to assumpsit. This establishes that, where a benefit has been enjoyed, such as the occupation of their lands, by their permission, the law will imply a promise to make them compensation, which promise they are capable of accepting, and upon which they may maintain an action. The action for use and occupation is

§ 54. In regard to the mode of appointment of an agent in cases not required by law to be under seal, it may be either ex-

established by stat. 2, G. II. ch. 19, § 14; and according to the words of the statute, may be maintained "where *the agreement* is not by deed." Some agreement seems to be implied as the foundation; though it is well established that it need not amount to a formal demise, or even be express. To hold, then, that a corporation is within this statute, is to hold that it may be a party to an agreement not under seal, at least for the purpose of suing on it; and it would be rather strong to deny, at the same time, that it could be a party to it for the purpose of being sued on it. Lord Ellenborough, indeed, says, in *The Dean and Chapter of Rochester v. Pierce*, that the action for use and occupation does not necessarily suppose any demise. 'It is enough that the defendant used and occupied the premises by the permission of the plaintiff; and a corporation, as well as an individual, may without deed, permit a person to use and occupy premises of which they are seised.' But call it by whatever name we please, permission or demise, it clearly binds the corporation; the party occupying and paying rent under it acquires rights from the corporation, becomes their tenants from year to year, and can be ejected only by the same means as would be available for an individual landlord. Here, then, the law implies that the corporation has acted as a contracting party, and that, too, in a contract to the validity of which, for the purposes of this action, *the absence of any deed is essential*. If, in that case, an express agreement not under seal had been tendered in evidence to prove the terms on which the defendant held, it must have been received; and if, on the face of it, it had appeared that the plaintiffs had come under any conditions precedent to the recovery of rent on their part, such conditions would surely have been binding on them though not under seal; and the non-performance of them would have been in answer to the action. In *The Southwark Bridge Company v. Sills*, the contract for letting was proved by a series of letters. We agree that the relation between the corporation and the occupier of its land, may commence without express contract; that it may, in the first instance, appear to want many of the legal incidents of the relation between landlord and tenant; but add the fact of payment of rent for one year, and acceptance by the corporation, and you add nothing of express contract on the part of the corporation; it has apparently done no more than acquiesce in the receipt of a certain compensation for the occupation of its land for a year; and yet by the addition of that fact, the corporation and the occupier are demonstrated to be landlord and tenant. This appears to us to show that, in the eye of the law, the relation between them commenced in contract, though it wanted at first the evidence from which it might be inferred. But, if this be a contract to which a corporation may be a party, though not under seal, and any rights resulting from that agreement come to be enforced, may not that form of action be applied, which is appropriate to parol agreements? Is it not unreasonable to hold, that a corporation may make a binding promise, and yet that assumpsit shall not be maintainable against it, if the promise be broken? If, then, it be established that, upon the same contract, the remedies are mutual,

press or implied. An express appointment may be by a formal written instrument; as by a power of attorney. A more com-

that if the corporation may sue its tenant in assumpsit on a parol demise, the tenant may in turn sue it in the same form of action, we do not see how it can be denied, that a corporation, occupying land, may be sued in assumpsit generally. We may suppose two contracts entered into at the same moment in writings not under seal; by the one, a corporation professes to demise its lands to A. B., by the other A. B. demises his land to the corporation; an enjoyment of the premises is had under both. It would be surely an unsatisfactory state of the law, which should compel us to hold that, if the corporation sued A. B. in assumpsit for his rent, A. B. might not set off or sue in the same form for that which was due from the corporation. We have been thus minute in examining the case of use and occupation, because it appears to us very fairly to open the principle, on which this matter ought to stand. The same point has been ruled in an action for goods sold and delivered. *The City of London Gas Light and Coke Company v. Nicholls*, was assumpsit for gas supplied; the objection was taken, that the contract was not under seal. Best, C. J., overruled it at once, saying: 'It is quite absurd to say, that there is any necessity for a contract by deed in such a case.' If, in that case, a set-off had been pleaded for metres supplied to the company, could evidence in support of it have been rejected because there was no contract under seal for the supply? Yet, if it could not, upon what principle can it be maintained, that that supply might not have been made the ground of an action of indebitatus assumpsit? We have not overlooked the technical difficulty, which has been alleged upon the form of the declaration, in which a mere promise is stated. Part of our argument has already been addressed to meet it; it seems to us that it rests on no solid foundation. When the question is, whether a particular party can sue or be sued by a particular writ or count, or be counted against in any particular form? the true answer is to be found by putting another question: Can he enter into the contract, or bring himself, or be brought, within the special circumstances, which form essential parts of the statement in such writ or count? That this is the principle may be seen conclusively in the history of our forms of action, ancient and modern, given in the third volume of Blackstone's Commentaries. If, therefore, it be asked, whether a corporation can be sued in assumpsit? we ask, in return, can it bind itself by a parol contract? Can it make a promise? If it can, the former question must be answered in the affirmative. We, therefore, agree with the Court of Common Pleas in *The Mayor of Stafford v. Till*, that there is no substantial difference in this respect between assumpsit and debt. Every count, indeed, in debt for goods sold and delivered, charges a contract; 'the words "sold and delivered,"' says Buller, J., in *Emery v. Fell*, 'imply a contract; for there cannot be a sale, unless two parties agree.' *De Grave v. The Mayor and Corporation of Monmouth*, was debt against a corporation for the price of weights and measures. It was contended that the action could not be maintained, as a corporation cannot contract unless by some instrument under the common seal. The delivery had been proved, an examination of the goods at a full meeting of the

mon mode is by some informal written instrument, as by a letter of instructions, or by a written request, or by a memoran-

corporation, and subsequent use of them; the order for them was by the mayor de facto, who was afterwards ousted. Lord Tenterden thought the examination was the exercise of an act of ownership, *'and that, by so doing, the corporation have recognized the contract.'* The verdict passed for the plaintiffs, and was not disturbed. The recognition of a contract is its adoption;—the taking it to be the contract of the party so recognizing it; but that assumes it to be a contract, which the party was capable of entering into. Lord Tenterden, therefore, must have considered the corporation as capable of contracting for the purchase of goods without a deed. And in *Dunstan v. The Imperial Gas Light Company*, where the plaintiff failed on another ground, he carefully guards himself from being supposed to decide the contrary. We certainly have not found any decided case, in which it has been held that a corporation may be sued in assumpsit on an executed parol contract, a circumstance of great, but not conclusive weight. For, (not to mention that there is no case in which the contrary has been expressly decided upon argument,) if it be remembered what the course of the law has been on this subject, we shall find that circumstance not unnatural, and that some deduction must be made from the weight of dicta unfavorable to our present view, which may be found here and there in the books upon this subject. At first, the rule appears to have been exclusive, as indeed its principle required it to be. A corporation, it was said, being merely a body politic, invisible, subsisting only by supposition of law, could only act or speak by its common seal; the common seal, in the words of Peere Williams, in *Rex v. Bigg*, was the hand and mouth of the corporation. The rule therefore stood, not upon policy, but on necessity, and was of course equally applicable to small as to great matters; to acts of daily or of rare occurrence; to what regarded personal as well as real property. But this, though true in theory, was intolerable in practice; the very act of affixing the seal, of lifting the hand, or opening the mouth, could only be done by some individual member, in theory quite distinct from the body politic, or by some agent; the management of the corporate property, the daily sustenance of the members, the performance of the very duties for which the corporation was created, required incessantly that acts should be done, sometimes of daily recurrence, sometimes entirely unforeseen, yet admitting of no delay, sometimes of small importance, or relating to property of little value. The same causes also required that contracts to a small amount should often be entered into. In all these cases, to require the affixing of the common seal was impossible; and therefore, from time to time, as the exigencies of the case have required, exceptions have been admitted to the rule; and what we desire to draw attention to is this, — that these exceptions are not such as the rule might be supposed to have provided for, but are in truth inconsistent with its principle and justified only by necessity. As each exception of this kind was made, it was not unnatural that the rule in all other yet unforeseen cases should receive confirmation, though it would be hardly fair to anticipate thence what the opinion of the Judges would have been, if the cases had been presented before them and re-

dum for a sale or a purchase, or for some other act of agency. But the most usual mode of appointment is by an unwritten re-

quired their decision. In the progress, however, of these exceptions, it has been decided, that a corporation may sue in assumpsit on an executed parol contract; it has also been decided, that it may be sued in debt on a similar contract; the question now arises on the liability to be sued in assumpsit. It appears to us, that what has been already decided in principle, warrants us in holding that this action is maintainable. It seems clear that, for a matter of such constant requirement to a gas company as gas metres, and to so small an amount as £15, the company, whether with or without a head, might contract without affixing the common seal; see Bro. Abr. Corporations and Capacities, pl. 56, *Horn v. Ivy*; and it is clear, that they might have been sued in debt for goods sold and delivered. For the reasons given, we think they are equally liable in assumpsit; and consequently, this rule will be discharged." This was followed up by the decision in *Church v. The Imperial Gas Light and Coke Company*, 6 Adolph. & Ell. 846, where the Court held, that it makes no difference as to the right of a corporation to sue on a contract entered into by them not under seal, whether the contract be executed or executory. On that occasion, Lord Denman, in delivering the opinion of the Court, expounded the reasons of the doctrine in a very clear and satisfactory manner. He said: "Assuming it, therefore, to be now established in this Court, that a corporation may sue or be sued in assumpsit upon executed contracts of a certain kind, among which are included such as relate to the supply of articles essential to the purposes for which it is created, the first question will be, whether, as affecting this point and in respect of such contracts, there is any sound distinction between contracts executed or executory. Now, the same contract, which is executory to-day, may become executed to-morrow; if the breach of it, in its latter state, may be sued for, it can only be on the supposition, that the party was competent to enter into it in its former; and, if the party were so competent, on what ground can it be said that the peculiar remedy, which the law gives for the enforcement of such a contract, may not be used for the purpose? It appears to us a legal solecism to say, that parties are competent, by law, to enter into a valid contract in a particular form, and that the appropriate legal remedies for the enforcement or on breach of such a contract, are not available between them. Where the action is brought for the breach of an executed contract, the evidence of the contract, if an express one, must be the same as if the action were brought while it was executory. An oral or written agreement, or a series of letters, might be produced to prove the fact, and the terms of the contract. Could it be contended that these would be evidence of a valid contract after execution, but of a wholly inoperative one before? Unless positions such as these can be maintained, we do not see how to support any distinction between express executory and executed contracts of the description now under consideration. A distinction, however, seems to be intimated, in some cases, between the express contract of the parties, and that which the law will imply for them from an executed consideration. And a validity is attributed to the latter, which is denied to the former. But there is no

quest, or by implication from the recognition of the principal, or from his acquiescence in the acts of the agent.¹

foundation for this; the difference between express and implied contracts, is merely a difference in the mode of proof. On the one hand, a plaintiff, who should sue on a contract to be implied from certain acts done, must be nonsuited if those acts were shown to be in compliance with stipulations antecedently entered into, unless he was prepared with evidence of all the stipulations. On the other hand, no contract can be implied from the acts of parties, or result by law from benefits received, but such as the same parties were competent expressly to enter into. And this is important in the present argument, because it makes the decisions on implied contracts authority for our decision upon an express one. Upon these grounds, we are prepared to decide that the present action was maintainable. So far, therefore, as the decision of the Court of Common Pleas in *East London Water Works Company v. Bailey*, proceeded on the distinction between contracts executed and executory, we are compelled, after consideration, to express our opinion that it was wrongly decided. The case may be sustained, however, on another ground consistent with our previous remarks, and which affords another reason for our present decision. The general rule of law is, that a corporation contracts under its common seal; as a general rule, it is only in that way, that a corporation can express its will or do any act. That general rule, however, has from the earliest traceable periods been subject to exceptions, the decisions as to which furnish the principle on which they have been established, and are instances illustrating its application, but are not to be taken as so prescribing in terms the exact limit, that a merely circumstantial difference is to exclude from the exception. This principle appears to be convenience amounting almost to necessity. Wherever to hold the rule applicable would occasion very great inconvenience, or tend to defeat the very object for which the corporation was created, the exception has prevailed. Hence the retainer, by parol, of an inferior servant, the doing of acts very frequently recurring, or too insignificant to be worth the trouble of affixing the common seal, are established exceptions. On the same principle, stands the power of accepting bills of exchange, and issuing promissory notes, by companies incorporated for the purposes of trade, with the rights and liabilities consequent thereon. These principles were, it is evident, present to the attention of the Court of Common Pleas when the case in question was decided; and they might reasonably have held, that a contract with a water company, for the supply of iron pipes, was neither one of so frequent occurrence, or small importance, or so brought within the purpose of incorporation, that the principle of convenience above established, re-

• 1 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 613 to 616, (4th edit.); 1 Bell, Comm. B. 3, Pt. 1, ch. 4, § 4, art. 410; Id. p. 478 to 481, (5th edit.); *American Ins. Co. v. Oakley*, 9 Paige, R. 496; *Pickett v. Pearsons*, 17 Vermont, R. 470; Post, § 84 to 288; *Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. Butchers and Drovers Bank*, 16 N. Y. R. 145; *Summers v. Solomon*, 7 El. & Bl. 879. See *Burton v. Furnis*, 3 Hurl. & Nor. 926; (Am. ed.); *Ramozotti v. Bowring*, 7 J. Scott, (N. S.) 871.

§ 55. Cases of this latter description, arising from the grant of an agency by an unwritten or verbal request, or by implica-

quired it to be taken out of the general rule. See also, *London and Birmingham Railway Co. v. Winter*, 1 Craig & Phillips, R. 57. A later case on the subject is that of *The Mayor of Ludlow v. Charlton*, (6 Mees. & Wels. 815,) where it was held, that a municipal corporation cannot enter into a contract to pay a sum of money out of the corporate funds for the making improvements in the borough, except under the common seal. On that occasion, Mr. Baron Rolfe, in delivering the opinion of the Court said: "The rule of law on this subject, as laid down in all the old authorities, is, that a corporation can only bind itself by deed. See Comyn's Digest, tit. 'Franchise,' (F) 12, 13, and the authorities there referred to. The exceptions pointed out rather confirm than impeach the rule. A corporation, it is said, which has a head, may give a personal command, and do small acts; as it may retain a servant. It may authorize another to drive away cattle damage feasant, or make a distress, or the like. These are all matters so constantly recurring, or of so small importance, or so little admitting of delay, that to require in every such case the previous affixing of the seal, would be greatly to obstruct the every day ordinary convenience of the body corporate, without any adequate object. In such matters, the head of the corporation seems, from the earliest time, to have been considered as delegated by the rest of the members to act for them. In modern times, a new class of exceptions has arisen. Corporations have of late been established, sometimes by Royal Charter, more frequently by act of Parliament, for the purpose of carrying on trading speculations; and where the nature of their constitution has been such as to render the drawing of bills, or the constant making of any particular sort of contracts necessary for the purposes of the corporation, there the Courts have held that they would imply in those, who are, according to the provisions of the Charter or act of Parliament, carrying on the corporation concerns, an authority to do those acts, without which the corporation could not subsist. This principle will fully warrant the recent decision of the Court of Queen's Bench, in *Beverley v. Lincoln Gas Light and Coke Company*. The present case, however, was argued at the bar, as if, by the decision in that last case, the old rule of law was to be considered as exploded, and as if, in all cases of executed contracts, corporations were to be deemed bound in the same manner as individuals. But this would be pressing the decision in question far beyond its legitimate consequences; and that the Court of Queen's Bench had no such meaning, is plain from the subsequent case of *Church v. Imperial Gas Light Company*. Lord Denman, in delivering the judgment of the Court in that case, says: [Here the learned Judge quoted the words of Lord Denman, already cited in this note, beginning with the words: "The general rule of law is, that a corporation contracts under its common seal; as a general rule it is only in that way that a corporation can express its will, or do any act. That general rule, however, has from the earliest traceable periods, been subject to exceptions," &c. &c.] To every word of this we entirely subscribe, and, applying the language of Lord Denman to the present case, it is quite clear, that there was nothing to enable the corporation of

tion, are very familiar* in all the common business of life, and the common departments of trade. Thus, the appointment,

Ludlow to contract with the defendant otherwise than in the ordinary mode, under the corporate seal. In contracting without a seal, there was no paramount convenience so great as to amount almost to necessity. To have required a seal, would certainly not have tended to defeat the object for which the corporation was formed, nor was the subject-matter of the contract one either of frequent ordinary occurrence, or of urgency admitting no delay. Before dismissing this case, we feel ourselves called upon to say, that the rule of law requiring contracts entered into by corporations to be generally entered into under seal, and not by parol, appears to us to be one by no means of a merely technical nature, or which it would be at all safe to relax, except in cases warranted by the principles to which we have already adverted. The seal is required, as authenticating the concurrence of the whole body corporate. If the legislature, in erecting a body corporate, invest any member of it, either expressly or impliedly, with authority to bind the whole body by his mere signature, or otherwise, then, undoubtedly, the adding a seal would be matter purely of form, and not of substance. Every one becoming a member of such a corporation, knows, that he is liable to be bound in his corporate character by such an act; and persons dealing with the corporation know, that by such an act the body will be bound. But in other cases, the seal is the only authentic evidence of what the corporation has done, or agreed to do. The resolution of a meeting, however numerously attended, is, after all, not the act of the whole body. Every member knows he is bound by what is done under the corporate seal, and by nothing else. It is a great mistake, therefore, to speak of the necessity for a seal, as a relic of ignorant times. It is no such thing; either a seal, or some substitute for a seal, which by law shall be taken as conclusively evidencing the sense of the whole body corporate, is a necessity inherent in the very nature of a corporation; and the attempt to get rid of the old doctrine, by treating as valid contracts made with particular members, and which do not come within the exceptions to which we have adverted, might be productive of great inconvenience." In the still more recent case of *The Fishmonger's Company v. Robertson*, 5 Mann. & Grang. R. 151, the whole subject was elaborately discussed, and it was held, that a contract not under seal, which had been executed on the part of the corporation, and for which the defendants had received a full consideration, bound the other party. On that occasion, Lord Chief Justice Tindal said: "Upon the present state of the pleadings, the defendant Robertson has undoubtedly the right to raise any objection to the declaration which could have been made available on a general demurrer thereto; and it has accordingly been contended, on his behalf, that it may be assumed, from the declaration itself, that the contract, upon which this action is brought, was not sealed on the part of the plaintiffs with the common seal of the corporation: that, by the general rule of law, the plaintiffs, being a body corporate, cannot bind themselves by an agreement which is not under their common seal; that, although there are certain admitted and well-known exceptions to this general rule, yet that the present case does not fall within any of such exceptions; and,

by which the relation of master and servant is created, and the extent of the authority conferred on the latter, are ordinarily

lastly, that if the agreement be such that the corporation is not bound thereby, and cannot be sued thereon, so neither can the other party be bound thereby, nor can the corporation sustain an action, as plaintiffs, upon such an agreement.

"We concur with some of the positions above laid down on the part of the defendants. From the statement of the contract itself on the face of the declaration, and the mode of its execution by an agent on behalf of the corporation, as there described, we think it may be inferred, that the defendants' counsel is entitled to assume, that the common seal of the corporation was never affixed thereto. We agree also, in the general rule of law as above stated, and that the case now under consideration, does not fall within any of those exceptions which are so well known as to require no enumeration; but, whatever may be the consequences, where the agreement is entirely *executory* on the part of the corporation, yet, if the contract, instead of being *executory*, is executed on their part, — if the persons, who are parties to the contract with the corporation, *have received* the benefit of the consideration moving from the corporation, — in that case, we think, both upon principle and decided authorities, the other parties are bound by the contract, and liable to be sued thereon by the corporation. Even if the contract put in suit by the corporation had been, on their part, *executory* only, not executed — we feel little doubt but that their suing upon the contract would amount to an admission on record by them that such contract was duly entered into on their part, so as to be obligatory on themselves; and that such admission on the record would estop them from setting up as an objection, in a cross action, that it was not sealed with their common seal; on the same principle as it was held by Holt, C. J., and the Court, in *The Mayor of Thetford's* case, 'that, though a corporation cannot do an act *in pais* without their common seal, yet they may do an act *upon record*; and that is the case of the city of London every year, who make an attorney by warrant of attorney in this Court without either sealing or signing; and the reason is, because they are estopped by the record to say that it is not their act. So, if an action be brought against a corporation for a false return, they are estopped to say it is not their return, for, it is *responsio majoris et communitalis* upon record.' And in the present case, the direct allegation by the corporation upon this record, that the agreement was made by Towse on their behalf, would, as we think, amount to an estoppel to the corporation from denying the obligatory force of the agreement in a subsequent action against themselves. But it is unnecessary to determine this point on the present occasion, because, on the face of the declaration, there is, as we apprehend, an averment of the performance by the corporation, of every matter which amounts to a condition precedent on their part; at least, we so assume in the present stage of the argument, and before considering the pleas of the defendant. The question, therefore, becomes this, whether, in the case of a contract executed before suit brought, where it appears that the defendants have received the whole benefit of the consideration for which they bargained, it is an answer to an action of *assumpsit* by the corporation, that the corporation itself was not orig-

known and ascertained only by implication from the recognition, or conduct, or acquiescence of the master.¹ As, where a clerk

inally bound by such contract, the same not having been made under their common seal.

"Upon the general ground of reason and justice, no such answer can be set up. The defendants having had the benefit of the performance by the corporation, of the several stipulations into which they entered, have received the consideration for their own promise; such promise by them is therefore not nudum pactum; they never can want to sue the corporation upon the contract, in order to enforce the performance of those stipulations which have already been voluntarily performed; and therefore no sound reason can be suggested why they should justify their refusal to perform the stipulations made by them, on the ground of inability to sue the corporation, which suit they can never want to sustain. It may possibly be the case, that, up to the time of the corporation adopting the contract by performing the stipulations on their part, there was a want of mutuality, from the corporation not being compellable to perform their contract; and that the defendants might, during that interval, have the power to retract, and insist that their undertaking amounted to a nudum pactum only. But, after the adoption of the contract by the corporation, by performance on their part, upon general principles of reason, the right to set up this defence appears altogether to fail.

"Independently, however, of the reasonableness of such construction, there appears authority in law to support the position. In the case of *The Barber Surgeons of London v. Pelson* — assumpsit for a forfeiture under a by-law — where the objection was expressly taken, that a promise cannot be made to a corporation aggregate without deed, the Court held that the action will lay, and that the objection had been overruled in *The Mayor, &c., of London v. Goree*. Again, in *The Mayor, &c., of London v. Hunt*, assumpsit was held to be maintainable by a corporation for tolls. In *The Mayor, &c., of Stafford v. Till*, use and occupation was held to be maintainable by a corporation aggregate, though there was no demise under seal, the tenant having occupied, and paid rent; and the same point was ruled in the case of *The Dean and Chapter of Rochester v. Pierce*. The case of *The East India Company v. Glover*, carries the law further; for the action in that case was not upon a promise implied by law on an executed consideration, as, for goods sold, but was assumpsit by a corporation for not accepting and taking away coffee within the time mentioned by an agreement for sale. The objection, indeed, was not raised; but we cannot but suppose it would have been made, if thought maintainable; for, when the defendant wanted to show fraud upon the sale, on the execution of the writ of inquiry before Pratt, C. J., he refused to let in the evidence, saying, the defendant had admitted the contract to be as the plaintiff had declared, by suffering judgment by default, instead of pleading non assumpsit. And, again, the judgment of the Court of Error in *Bowen v. Morris*, although not directly an authority upon the

¹ 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 1 & 4.

is employed in a shop or warehouse to sell goods, his authority to make a particular sale is implied from his ordinary occupa-

point, shows a strong indication of the opinion of Mansfield, C. J., in support of the present action. In that case, the mayor of a corporation had signed a contract to sell landed property belonging to the corporation 'on behalf of himself and the rest of the burgesses and commonalty,' and the action was brought in the name of the mayor, who had signed the contract, to recover damages. The Lord Chief Justice, in giving judgment that the action was not maintainable in the name of the mayor, observes, 'that, although the corporation have not constituted the mayor their bailiff or agent by an instrument under seal, so that he was not competent by that contract to bind the corporation, yet as the mayor signed it, perhaps the corporation might have sustained an action on the contract.' And the cases referred to on guarantees, (see particularly the judgment in *Kennaway v. Treleavan*,) and on the Statute of Frauds, where the contract has been signed by the defendant only, and not by the plaintiff, but allowed to be enforced by action, notwithstanding the objection of a want of mutuality, tend strongly to support the principle on which we consider the present action maintainable. And the earlier case of *Cooper v. Gooderick*, may be adverted to, as showing the opinion of the Court upon the legal consequence of bringing an action by a body corporate. In that case, the defendant, as bailiff of Emanuel College, made consuance for rent granted to them in fee by indenture. The issue was non concessit; and the jury found that the grantor granted it by the deed, and delivered that deed to a stranger to their use, and they sealed the counterpart of that indenture; the question was whether a stranger, without letter of attorney from them to receive it, might receive the deed to their use; and it was held by all the Court that he might, and that the sealing of the counterpart was a sufficient agreement, and as well if they had made a letter of attorney; 'and, if they had not sealed the counterpart, but had brought an action upon it, that had made the grant perfect;' and judgment was given for the plaintiff.

"We therefore think the present action is maintainable by the corporation, unless some sufficient answer appears on the pleas, which we now proceed to consider." [See further on this subject, *Mayor of Ludlow v. Charlton*, 6 M. & W. 823; *Church v. Imperial Gas Co.* 6 Ad. & Ell. 861; *Williams v. Chester Railway Co.* 5 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 497; *Diggles v. London Railway*, 5 Exch. R. 442; *Denton v. East Anglian Railway Co.* 3 C. & K. 17; *Clark v. Guardians of Cuckfield Union*, 11 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 442; *Paine v. Strand Union*, 8 Q. B. 326, 810; *Lamprell v. Billerica Union*, 3 Exch. 288; *Homersham v. Wolverhampton Water Works Co.* 4 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 426. One of the most recent cases on this subject, decided June 23, 1855, is that of *Henderson v. The Australian Royal Mail Steam Nav. Co.* 32 Eng. Law & Eq. 167. *Wightman, J.*, said: "This is an action against the Australian Royal Mail Steam Navigation Company, which is a company constituted expressly for the purpose of carrying on a trade by vessels; it is incorporated 'for the purpose of undertaking the establishment and maintenance of a communication, by means of steam navigation or otherwise, and the carrying of the royal mails, passengers, and cargo, between

tion, and the acquiescence of the master.¹ So, where a clerk is usually intrusted to sign notes, or usually does sign notes for his

Great Britain and Ireland, and the Cape of Good Hope and Australasia,' and for that purpose it must maintain and employ many vessels. Can it be doubted that amongst the ordinary operations of the company, there would arise a necessity for employing persons to navigate or bring home vessels which met with accidents abroad? The words of the contract, as set out in the declaration, show an employment directly within the scope of the objects for which the company was incorporated. It is true that there is a conflict of authorities which it is difficult to reconcile. Two or three cases in the Court of Exchequer, *Lamprell v. The Billericay Union*, 3 Exch. 283, and *The Mayor of Ludlow v. Charlton*, 6 M. & W. 815, and *Arnold v. The Mayor of Poole*, 4 Man. & G. 868, in the Court of Common Pleas, appear to militate against the view taken by this Court. But those decisions proceeded upon a principle adapted to municipal corporations, which are created for other objects than trade; and the Court of Exchequer applied that principle to modern trading companies, which are of an entirely different character. In early times, there was a great relaxation of the rule which required that the contracts of corporations should be under seal, and that relaxation has been gradually extended. At first, the relaxation was made only in those cases mentioned by Mr. Lush, where the subject-matter of the contract was of small moment and frequent occurrence, which in the case of municipal corporations, might be the only exceptions necessary. But in the later case, there was a further relaxation, especially in the case of corporations created by charter for trading purposes, and other like corporations. The general result of the cases mentioned in *Clark v. The Guardians of the Cuckfield Union*, 16 Jur. 686; s. c. 11 Eng. Rep. 442, is, that in the case of trading corporations, wherever the contract relates, and is essential to the purpose for which the company was incorporated, it may be enforced, though not under seal. In deciding that case, I reviewed all the cases, and adhere to the opinion which I then expressed, that in such a case as the present, where the contract is essentially necessary to the objects of the company, and directly within the scope of their charter, it may be enforced, though made by parol." And Erle, J., added: "I am of opinion that the contract is binding on the corporation, though not under seal, on the ground that it is directly within the scope of the company's charter. The authorities are apparently conflicting, but none conflict with the principle laid down by my Brother Wightman, in which I concur. In *Beverley v. The Lincoln Gas Light and Coke Company*, 6 Ad. & El. 829, the supply of gas was directly incident to the purpose for which the company was incorporated. So also in *Church v. The Imperial Gas Light and Coke Company*, 6 Ad. & El. 846; and in *Sanders v. The Guardians of the St. Neot's Union*, 8 Q. B. 810; and in the elaborate judgment of Wightman, J., in *Clark v. The Guardians of the Cuckfield Union*, 16 Jur. 686; s. c. 11 Eng. Rep. 442, it was assumed that the matter was within the

¹ See *Kent v. Tyson*, 20 N. H. R. 121; *Robinson v. Green*, 5 Harring. (Del.) 115.

master, which are afterwards paid, or recognized to be valid, he is presumed to possess a rightful authority to do so in other instances, within the scope of the same business.¹

scope of the company's charter. The judgment, delivered by Lord Campbell, C. J., for this court, in the *Copper Miners Company v. Fox*, 16 Q. B. 229; s. c. 8 Eng. Rep. 420, enunciated the principle. The principle affirmed by this series of cases, does not conflict with the two leading cases in the Court of Exchequer, which were cases of municipal corporations. Neither building, which was the matter in *The Mayor of Ludlow v. Charlton*, 6 M. & W. 815; nor litigation, which was the matter in *Arnold v. The Mayor of Poole*, 4 Man. & G. 860, were incidental directly to the purposes for which the corporations of those towns were constituted. The other cases to which I adverted, were corporations for trading purposes, and it is difficult to reconcile them. In *Lamprell v. The Guardians of the Billericay Union*, 3 Exch. 283, the action related to the building of a work-house, with which the defendants were, as a corporation, connected. *Diggle v. The London and Blackwall Railway*, 5 Exch. 442, is that which to the greatest degree conflicts, unless it can be distinguished, or explained on the ground that it was a unique contract; if it cannot, I do not agree to it; and in this conflict of authorities, I adhere to those which oppose it. The notion that a set of contracts shall have their validity depending on the frequency and insignificance of the subject-matter, is of such extreme perniciousness, that I do not think that it can be adhered to, and must be considered as applicable only to municipal corporations. It has been so held as to contracts for servants, but I do not think that it was meant to be said, that the contract was valid if the matter was of small importance, and invalid if the matter was of great importance; and indeed, in the case of trading companies, which it is allowed may draw and accept bills of exchange not under seal, it is obvious that insignificance is no element; neither is the frequency or rarity of the contract an element. The nature of the contract and the subject-matter of it, must be the principle which governs the question whether it is valid, though not under seal. It would be pernicious to the law of the country, that under the semblance of a contract parties should obtain goods or services, and not be compellable to pay for them. The Court of Exchequer had an opinion that it would be important that the rule should be certain; but their resort to the rule, that the contract in all cases, with the above-mentioned exceptions, should be under seal, cannot be acted upon.”.]

It is very certain, that no such distinction between contracts made by municipal corporations and other corporations, exists in America; but the general rule, as laid down in the text, is generally, if not universally established. Indeed, in New England, our municipal corporations rarely, if ever, use any corporate seal; and all their multifarious business is transacted by the town officers, who are annually chosen by the votes of the inhabitants, and who act, *virtute officii*, as agents of the town, and in almost all cases, except of the conveyance of the real

¹ See *Smith on Merc. Law*, 106, (3d edit.) 1848; *Dows v. Green*, 16 Barbour, 72; *Chidsey v. Porter*, 9 Harris, (Penn.) R. 390.

§ 56. And the nature and extent of the authority of the servant or agent, are often wholly deduced from the nature and extent of his usual employment. Hence it is, (as we shall presently more fully see,¹) that the master is bound by the acts of the servant, within the scope of the usual business confided to him; for the master is presumed to authorize and approve the known acts, that are incident to such an employment. Thus, if a master usually intrusts his servant to buy goods upon credit, he will be bound by his acts of this sort even when he has prohibited him specially from buying upon credit; for the other party trusts to him, on account of the general habit of his employment, and the presumed assent of the master, who has held him out as having a competent authority for this purpose.² And it is a general rule, which will be abundantly illustrated in the course of these Commentaries, that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by the misconduct of a third person, that party shall suffer, who, by his own acts and conduct, has enabled such third person, by giving him credit, to practice a fraud or imposition upon the other party.³ And this is in perfect coincidence with the rule of the civil law, wherein it is said; *Semper, qui non prohibet pro se intervenire, mandare creditur*⁴ *Qui patitur ab alio mandari, ut sibi credatur, mandare intelligitur*.⁵ But of this more will be said under the next head.

estate of the town, act by unsealed instruments and contract, either verbally, or by unsealed writings, on behalf of the town. See Angell & Ames on Corporations, ch. 8, p. 162 to 209, (2d edit.)

¹ Post, § 94 to 106.

² 1 Livermore on Agency, p. 37 to 41, (edit. 1818); 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 614, 615, 626, 627, (4th edit.); Anon. 1 Shower, 95; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, Pt. 1, ch. 3, § 2, p. 161 to 175; Nickson v. Brohan, 10 Mod 109-111; Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38; Barber v. Gingel, 3 Esp. Rep. 60; Rusby v. Scarlett, 5 Esp. R. 76, 77. See Wayland's case, 3 Salk 284; Bolton v. Hillersden, 1 Ld. Raym. 225; Hazard v. Treadwell, 1 Str. R. 506; Williams v. Mitchell, 17 Mass. R. 98.

³ Baring v. Corrie, 2 B. & Ald. 148; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, (3d edit.) p. 201. See Hazard v. Treadwell, 1 Str. R. 506; Post, § 264.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 60; Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 5; Post, § 89; 2 Kent, Comm., Lect. 41, p. 614 to 616, (4th edit.); Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 19.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 18; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 19; Post, § 89.

CHAPTER VI.

NATURE AND EXTENT OF AUTHORITY.

§ 57. LET us next consider the nature and extent of the authority conferred on an agent. It may, as we have already seen, be a general authority, or it may be a special authority. It may be express, or it may be implied. In regard both to a general and to a special express authority, it may be conferred by a formal instrument, as by a letter of attorney under seal; or it may be by a writing of an informal and loose character, such as a letter, or a memorandum, or it may be by parol or oral declarations.¹

§ 58. But whether it is conferred in the one way, or in the other, it is, unless the contrary manifestly appears to be the intent of the party, always construed to include all the necessary and usual means of executing it with effect.² Thus, for example, if a general authority is given to collect, receive, and pay all the debts due by, or to, the principal, it will occur to every one, who reflects upon the nature of such a trust, that numberless arrangements may be required fully to accomplish the end proposed; such as settling accounts, adjusting disputed claims, resisting unjust claims, answering or defending suits; and these subordinate powers, (or, as they are sometimes called, mediate powers), are, therefore, although not expressly given, understood to be included in, and a part of, or incident to, the primary power.³ So, an authority given to recover and receive a debt, will authorize the attorney to arrest the debtor.⁴ So, an authority given to a broker to effect a policy, will authorize him to adjust a loss under the policy, and adopt all the means necessary to

¹ Ante, § 46 to 56.

² *Howard v. Baillie*, 2 H. Bl. 618; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 200, 201; *Withington v. Herring*, 5 Bing. R. 442; 1 Bell, Comm. 387, art. 412, (4th edit.); *Rogers v. Kneeland*, 10 Wend. 218; *Peck v. Harriott*, 6 Serg. & R. 146; *Denman v. Bloomer*, 11 Ill. 177; *Barnett v. Lambert*, 15 M. & W. 489; Post, § 97, 101 to 106.

³ *Howard v. Baillie*, 2 H. B. 618-620; Com. Dig. *Attorney*, C. 15, citing *Palm-er*, R. 394; *Sprague v. Gillett*, 9 Metcalf, R. 91; *Fowler v. Bledoe*, 8 Humphreys, R. 509; Post, § 101 to 106.

⁴ *Ibid.*; Post, § 103 and note.

procure an adjustment.¹ So, an authority to settle losses on a policy, will include a power to refer the matter to arbitration.² So, an authority to sell and convey lands for cash, includes an authority to receive the purchase-money.³ So, an authority to make and enter into contracts for the purchase of grain, has been held to include the power to modify or waive a contract made by the agent in respect to grain.⁴ So, an authority given by vote to the treasurer of a corporation to hire money, not exceeding a fixed sum, and for a term not less than eight or more than twelve months "on such terms and conditions as he may think most conducive to the interests of the company," for the purpose of meeting certain drafts of the company as they shall fall due, has been held to authorize the treasurer to raise money by drafts on one of the directors, payable to his own order, and indorsed by him, and to be charged by the acceptor to the company.⁵ So, an authority to make contracts for the sale of lands, will authorize the agent [to make a deed,⁶ and] to receive so much of the purchase-money as is to be paid in hand on the sale, as an incident to the power to sell.⁷ [So, a power to an agent to sell lands, on such terms in all respects as he might deem most advantageous, and to execute deeds of conveyance necessary for the full and perfect transfer of the title, authorizes the agent to insert in the deed the usual covenants of warranty.⁸]

§ 59. Upon the same ground, an agent, who is employed to

¹ Richardson v. Anderson, 1 Camp R. 43, note; 1 Emerig. Assur. ch 5, § 4, p. 141; Post, §§ 103, 109, 191.

² Goodson v. Brooke, 4 Camp. R. 163. But see *contra*, Huber v. Zimmerman, 21 Ala. 488.

³ Peck v. Harriot, 6 Serg. & Rawle, 149; Hoskins v. Johnson, 5 Sneed, 469.

⁴ Anderson v. Coonley, 21 Wend. R. 279.

⁵ Belknap v. Davis, 1 Appleton, R. 455.

⁶ Valentine v. Piper, 22 Pick. 55.

⁷ Johnson v. McGruder, 15 Miss. 365; Yerby v. Grisby, 9 Leigh, Virg. R. 387; Higgins v. Moore, 6 Bosw. 344; Goodale v. Wheeler, 11 N. H. R. 424. See Lathrop v. Blake, 3 Foster, 46.

⁸ Le Roy v. Beard, 8 Howard, 451. Woodbury, J, said: "This power of attorney is given *in extenso* in the case. It appears from its contents, that Le Roy, after authorizing Starr, (the agent,) to invest certain moneys in lands and real estate in some of the Western States and Territories of the United States, at the discretion of the said Starr, empowered him to contract for the sale of,

procure a note or bill to be discounted, may, unless expressly restricted, indorse it in the name of his employer, and bind him

and to sell, either in whole or in part, the lands and real estate so purchased by the said Starr,' and 'on such terms in all respects as the said Starr shall deem most advantageous.' Again, he was authorized to execute deeds of conveyance necessary for the full and perfect transfer of all our respective right, title, &c. 'as sufficiently in all respects as we ourselves could do personally in the premises,' and generally, as the agent and attorney of the said Jacob Lee Roy, 'to sell 'on such terms in all respects as he may deem most eligible.' It would be difficult to select language stronger than this to justify the making of covenants without specifying them *eo nomine*. When this last is done, no question as to the extent of the power can arise, to be settled by any court. But when, as here, this last is not done, the extent of the power is to be settled by the language employed in the whole instrument, (4 Moore, 448,) aided by the situation of the parties and of the property, the usages of the country on such subjects, the acts of the parties themselves, and any other circumstance having a legal bearing and throwing light on the question. That the language above quoted from the power of attorney is sufficient to cover the execution of such a covenant would seem naturally to be inferred, first, from its leaving the terms of the sale to be in all respects as Starr shall deem most advantageous. 'Terms' is an expression applicable to the conveyances and covenants to be given, as much as to the amount of, and the time of paying, the consideration. *Roger v. Kneeland*, 10 Wendell, 218. To prevent misconception, this wide discretion is reiterated. The covenants, or security as to the title, would be likely to be among the terms agreed on, as they would influence the trade essentially, and in a new and unsettled country must be the chief reliance of the purchaser. To strengthen this view, the agent was also enabled to execute conveyances to transfer the title 'as sufficiently in all respects as we ourselves could do personally in the premises.' And it is manifest, that inserting certain covenants which would run with the land might transfer the title in some events more perfectly than it would pass without them; and that, if present 'personally,' he could make such covenants, and would be likely to if requested, unless an intention existed to sell a defective title for a good one, and for the price of a good one. It is hardly to be presumed that anything so censurable as this was contemplated. Again, his authority to sell, 'on such terms in all respects as he may deem most eligible,' might well be meant to extend to a term or condition to make covenants of seisin or warranty, as without such he might not be able to make an eligible sale and obtain nearly so large a price. Now all these expressions, united in the same instrument, would, *primâ facie*, in common acceptation, seem designed to convey full powers to make covenants like these. And although a grant of powers is sometimes to be construed strictly, (Com. Dig. *Pouar*, B. 1, and c. 6; 1 Bl. R. 283,) yet it does not seem fit to fritter it away in a case like this, by very nice and metaphysical distinctions, when the general tenor of the whole instrument is in favor of what was done under the power, and when the grantor has reaped the benefit of it, by receiving a large price that otherwise would probably never have been paid. *Nind v. Marshall*, 1 Brod. & Bingh. 319; 10 Wendell, 219, 252. This he

by that indorsement; for he may well be deemed as incidentally clothed with this authority, as a means to effectuate the discount.¹ So, an agent, employed to procure a bill or note to be

must refund when the title fails, or be accessory to what seems fraudulent. 1 J. Marsh. 292. Another circumstance in support of the intent of the parties to the power of attorney to make it broad enough to cover warranties, is their position or situation as disclosed in the instrument itself. *Solly v. Forbes*, 4 Moore, 448. Le Roy resided in New York, and Starr was to act as attorney in buying and selling lands in the 'Western States and Territories,' and this very sale was as remote as Milwaukee, in Wisconsin. For aught which appears, Le Roy, Beard, and Starr, were all strangers there, and the true title to the soil little known to them, and hence they would expect to be required to give warranties when selling, and would be likely to demand them when buying. The usages of this country are believed, also, to be very uniform to insert covenants in deeds. In the case of *The Lessee of Clarke v. Courtney*, 5 Peters, 349, Justice Story says: 'This is the common course of conveyances;' and that in them 'covenants of title are usually inserted.' See also, 6 Hill, 338. Now, if in this power of attorney no expression had been employed beyond giving an authority to sell and convey this land, saying nothing more extensive or more restrictive, there are cases which strongly sustain the doctrine, that, from usage as well as otherwise, a warranty by the agent was proper, and would be binding on the principal. It is true, that some of these cases relate to personal estate, and some perhaps should be confined to agents who have been long employed in a particular business, and derive their authority by parol, no less than by usage; and consequently may not be decisive by analogy to the present case. 3 D. and E. 757; *Helyear v. Hawke*, 5 Esp. Ca. 72, note; *Pickering v. Busk*, 15 East, 45; 2 Camp. N. P. 555; 6 Hill, 338; 4 D. and E. 177. So of some cases which relate to the quality and not the title of the property. *Andrews v. Kneeland*, 6 Cowen, 354; *The Monte Allegre*, 9 Wheat. 648; 6 Hill, 338. But where a power to sell or convey is given in writing, and not aided, as here, by language conferring a wide discretion, it still must be construed as intending to confer all the usual means, or sanction the usual manner of performing what is intrusted to the agent. 10 Wendell, 218; *Howard v. Baillie*, 2 H. Bl. 618; Story on Agency, p. 58; *Dawson v. Lawly*, 5 Esp. Ca. 65; *Ekins v. Maclish*, Ambler, 186; Salk. 283; *Jeffrey v. Bigelow*, 13 Wendell, 521; 6 Cowen, 359. Nor is the power confined merely to 'usual modes and means,' but, whether the agency be special or general, the attorney may use appropriate modes and reasonable modes; such are considered within the scope of his authority. 6 Hill, 338; 2 Pick. 345; Bell on Com. L. 410; 2 Kent's Comm. 618; *Vanada v. Hopkins*, 1 J. J. Marsh. 287; *Sandford v. Handy*, 23 Wendell, 268. We have already shown, that, under all the circumstances, a covenant or warranty here was not only usual, but appropriate and reasonable."]

Wynn v. Harrison, 4 T. R. 177; *Nickson v. Brohan*, 10 Mod. 109; *Hicks v. Hickin*, 1 Esp. R. 116; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 209, 210, (3d edit.); *Marshall v. Bank v. Central Bank*, 1 Kelly, 418.

discounted for his principal, may, if it be necessary or proper to accomplish the end, indorse the same in his own name, although not indorsed by his principal; and in such a case he will be entitled to be indemnified by his employer.¹ [But an agent authorized to draw and indorse bills *in the name of his principal*, has no power to draw or indorse a bill in his own name, or in the joint name of himself and his principal.²] So, a servant, intrusted to sell a horse, is clothed by implication (unless expressly forbidden) to make a warranty on the sale.³ [But this has been said to apply only to a servant of a professed horse dealer.⁴] So, an agent or broker, having power to sell goods without any express restriction as to the mode, may sell by sample or with warranty.⁵

§ 60. And not only are the means necessary and proper for the accomplishment of the end included in the authority, but also all the various means which are justified or allowed by the usages of trade.⁶ Thus, if an agent is authorized to sell goods, this will

¹ Ex parte Robinson, 1 Buck, R. 113, Bayley on Bills, (5th edit.) ch. 2, § 7.

² Stambark v Read, 11 Grattan, 281.

³ Post, § 132 Fenn v Harrison, 3 T R. 757; Helyer v Hawke, 5 Esp. R. 72, 3 Clitty, Comm. and Manuf 200, 201; Alexander v Gibson 2 Camp. R. 555, Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 209, 210, (3d edit.), 1 Bell, Comm 387, art. 412, (4th edit.); Id. p. 477 to 479, (5th edit.), Nelson v Cowing, 6 Hill, 386; Hunter v Jameson, 6 Hedell, 252, Woodford v McClenahan, 4 Gilman, 85; Skinner v Gunn, 9 Porter, 305, Bradford v Bush, 10 Ala. 356, Cocke v. Campbell, 13 Ala. 286; Ezell v Franklin, 2 Sneed, 236, Franklin v. Ezell, 1 Sneed, 497. But see Signor & Walmer's case, Godbolt's R. 360, Post, § 421, note. Whether a power to sell land includes an authority to convey it with covenants of general warranty, is a point upon which there are contradictory decisions. In *Vanada v Hopkins*, (1 J. J. Marsh. R. 293,) the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held the affirmative. See also *Peters v. Farnsworth*, 15 Vermont, 155; *Taggart v. Stanberry*, 2 McLean, 543; *Le Roy v Beard*, 8 Ilw. 441. In *Nixon v. Hyserott*, (3 John. R. 58,) the Supreme Court of New York decided in the negative. The same Court in *Gibson v. Colt*, (7 John. R. 390,) held, that a power to sell does not include a power to warrant the title; and that a master of a ship, authorized to sell the ship, had no authority to represent that she was a registered ship. [This last case was overruled in 6 Hill, 386.]

⁴ See *Coleman v. Riches*, 29 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 326.

⁵ *Andrews v. Kneeland*, 6 Cowen, R. 354. But see *Nixon v. Hyserott*, 5 John. R. 58; *Gibson v. Colt*, 7 John. R. 390.

⁶ *Elkins v. Macklish*, Ambler, R. 184-186; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, (3d edit.) 198, note; 1 *Livermore on Agency*, 103, 104, (edit. 1818), Post, §§ 77, 98, 101-106.

be construed to authorize the sale to be made upon credit, as well as for cash, if this course is justified by the usages of trade, and the credit is not beyond the usual period; for it is presumed, that the principal intends to clothe his agent with the power of resorting to all the customary means to accomplish the sale, unless he expressly restricts him.¹ In other words, he is presumed to authorize him to sell in the usual manner, and only in the usual manner, in which goods or things of that sort are sold.² [Thus, a general selling agent has no implied authority to bind his principals by a warranty that flour sold by him on their account will keep sweet during a sea voyage, in the absence of any usage of business to that effect.³]

¹ Anon. 12 Mod. R. 514; *Scott v. Surinan*, Willes, R. 407; *Houghton v. Matthews*, 3 Bos. & Pull 499; *Newsome v. Thornton*, 6 East, 17; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 26, 198, 212-214, (3d edit.); 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 622, 623, (4th edit.); *McKinstry v. Pearsall*, 3 John. R. 319; *Van Allen v. Vanderpool*, 6 John. R. 69; *Goodenow v. Tyler*, 7 Mass. R. 36; *Clark v. Van Northwick*, 1 Pick. 343; *Laussatt v. Lippincott*, 6 Serg. & Rawl. 386; *Geibier v. Limery*, 2 Wash. Cir. R. 413, Post, §§ 108, 226; *Greeley v. Bartlett*, 1 Greenl. R. 172; *Forrester v. Boardman*, 1 Story, R. 43.

² *Wiltshire v. Sims*, 1 Camp. R. 258; *James v. McCredie*, 1 Bay, 294; *Delafield v. Illinois*, 26 Wend. 223; *Ives v. Davenport*, 3 Hill, 374; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 622, 623, (4th edit.); 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 205; *Laussatt v. Lippincott*, 6 Serg. & R. 386, Post, § 110; *Fisk v. Oslit*, 15 Martin, R. 555; *Reano v. Magee*, 11 Martin R. 637.

³ *Upton v. Suffolk County Mills*, 11 Cush. 586. Metcalf, J., there said "The single question which we have examined is, what is the extent of the implied authority of a general selling agent? The answer is, it is the same as that of other general agents. And it is an elementary principle that an agent, employed generally to do any act, is authorized to do it only in the usual way of business. *Smith's Merc. Law* (Am. ed. 1847), 105, (5th ed.) 129; *Woolrich on Com. & Merc. Law*, 319; *Jones v. Warner*, 11 Conn. 48. A general agent is not, by virtue of his commission, permitted to depart from the usual manner of effecting what he is employed to effect. 3 Chit. Law of Com. & Man. 199. When one authorizes another to sell goods, he is presumed to authorize him to sell in the usual manner, and only in the usual manner, in which goods or things of that sort are sold. *Story on Agency*, § 60. See also *Shaw v. Stone*, 1 Cush. 228. The usage of the business in which a general agent is employed furnishes the rule by which his authority is measured. Hence, a general selling agent has authority to sell on credit, and to warrant the soundness of the article sold, when such is the usage. *Goodenow v. Tyler*, 7 Mass. 36; *Alexander v. Gibson*, 2 Camp. 555; *Nelson v. Cowing*, 6 Hill, 336; 2 Kent, Comm. (6th ed.) 623; *Russell on Factors*, 58; *Smith on Master & Servant*, 128, 129. But as stocks and goods sent to auction are not usually sold on credit, a stock

§ 61. The same doctrine is recognized in the civil law; for by that law agents might do whatsoever is comprehended within their letter of procuration and the intentions of the principal, deducible therefrom, and whatever naturally follows from the authority given to them, or is necessary for the execution of it.¹ And this, especially, was deemed to belong to a Procurator, having what was called a liberal administration. *Procurator, cui generaliter libera administratio rerum commissa est, potest exigere, aliud pro alio permutare.*² Thus, an agent appointed to demand personal property, might institute an action therefor. *Ad rem mobilem petendam datus Procurator, ad exhibendum recte agit.*³ Domat has expounded the true doctrine of the civil law in expressive, but at the same time, in exact terms. "If," says he, "the order or power given marks precisely what is to be done, he, who accepts and executes it, ought to keep close to what is prescribed in it. And if the order or power be indefinite, he may set such bounds to it, or give to it such extent, as may reasonably be presumed to be agreeable to the intention of the person, who makes the order, or bestows the power; whether it be with regard to the thing itself, which is to be done, or the way of doing it."⁴ *Igitur commodissime illa forma in mandatis servanda est, ut quotiens certum mandatum sit, recedi a formâ non debeat; at quotiens incertum vel plurimum causarum, tunc licet aliis præstationibus exsoluta sit causa mandati, quam quæ ipso mandato inerant, si tamen hoc mandatori expedit, mandati erit actio.*⁵

broker or auctioneer has no authority so to sell them, unless he has the owner's express direction or consent. *Wiltshire v. Sims*, 1 Camp. 258; 3 Chit. Law of Com. & Man. 205; 1 Bell, Comm. 388. And it was said by Mr. Justice Thompson, (9 Wheat. 647,) that auctioneers have only authority to sell, and are not to warrant unless specially instructed so to do.

As there is no evidence nor suggestion of a usage to sell flour with the hazardous warranty that it shall keep sweet during a sea voyage, in which it must twice cross the equator, we deem it quite clear that nothing short of an express authority, conferred on the agent by the defendants, would empower him to bind them by such a warranty. See *Cox v. Midland Counties Railway Company*, 3 Welsb. Hurlst. & Gord. 278.]

¹ Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 3, art. 10, by Strahan.

² Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 3, l. 58; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, n. 8.

³ Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 3, l. 56, 57; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, n. 29

⁴ 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 3, art. 3, by Strahan.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 46; Pothier, Panc. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 45.

§ 62. On the other hand, language, however general in its form, when used in connection with a particular subject-matter, will be presumed (as we have already seen¹) to be used in subordination to that matter; and therefore it is to be construed and limited accordingly. And it will make no difference in the construction, that this general language is found in very formal instruments, such as a letter of attorney. Thus, where a power of attorney authorized an agent "to ask, demand, and receive from the East India Company, or whom it should, or might concern, all money that might become due to the principal, on any account whatsoever, and to transact all business,"² and, on non-payment, to use all lawful means for the recovery, and, on payment, to give proper receipts and discharges, with power to appoint substitutes, and giving him (the principal's) full power and authority in the premises, with the usual clause of ratification; it was held, that the words "to transact all business," did not authorize the agent to indorse an East India bill, received under the letter of attorney in the name of the principal, and to procure a discount thereon, on such indorsement; for the words "all business" must be construed to be limited to all business necessary for the receipt of the money.

§ 63. So, a letter of attorney to receive from the Commissioners of the Navy, or whom it may concern, all salary, wages, &c., and all other money due to the principal, with a general power to receive all demands from all other persons, to appoint substitutes, and to make due acquittances and discharges, has been held not to authorize the agent to negotiate any bills received in payment, or to indorse them in his own name, even although there was evidence of a usage among agents of the like sort to negotiate such bills; for the authority conferred did not include any such power of negotiation; and parol evidence is not admissible to control or enlarge the language of a written instrument.³

¹ Ante, § 21.

² *Hay v. Goldsmidt*, cited 1 Taunt. R. 349, 350, *Murray v. East India Co.* 5 B. Ald. 204, 210, 211; *Edale v. La Nauze*, 1 Y. & Coll. 394.

³ *Hogg Snaith*, 1 Taunt. 347; *Murray v. East India Company*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 204, 210, 211. See *Ekins v. Macklish*, Ambler, R. 184, 185. It is said by Mr. Lloyd, in his notes to Paley on Agency, (3d edit.) p. 198, that "the construction

§ 63 *a.* So, a letter of attorney empowering an agent to negotiate, compromise, adjust, determine, settle, and arrange all differences and disputes between the principal and all persons whatever, and to execute and sign in the name of the principal any release, covenant, or conveyance of any part of the principal's estate, and to give and receive discharges, receipts, &c., has been held not to "authorize the agent to confess a judgment in the name of the principal."¹ [So a letter of attorney authorizing an agent to "collect a debt," does not empower him to give a discharge upon receipt of the debtor's note.² Nor can an agent authorized to settle a claim against a carrier for the loss of goods give a discharge without receiving any consideration.³]

§ 64. So, a letter of attorney given by an executrix, authorizing an agent to receive all sums of money due to the testator, or to her as executrix, to adjust all accounts and differences, to submit the same to arbitration, to execute assignments, receipts, and releases, to pay all debts due by her as executrix, in due course of law, and generally to do all acts for receiving debts, and discharging the powers given by the letter of attorney, with full power "to do and act touching and concerning all or any of the premises, as effectually to all intents, constructions, and purposes whatsoever, as she as executrix could," has been held not to authorize the agent to accept bills of exchange to charge her in her own right for debts of the testator.⁴

§ 65. So, a power of attorney to secure, demand, and sue for

of a written instrument, whether mercantile or otherwise, is for the court, and not for the jury. The court, however, may, where the construction is doubtful, receive evidence in aid of its judgment." Lord Hardwicke, in *Ekins v. Maclish*, Ambler, R. 184, 185,) thought that the evidence of the custom among merchants was admissible, to explain a letter, at least, if it could not be well otherwise understood, in courts of equity, even if not admissible in courts of law. See also *Mechanics' Bank v. Bank of Columbia*, 5 Wheat. R. 326; *Morrell v. Frith*, 3 Mees. & Wels. 402; *Neilson v. Harford*, 8 Mees. & Wels. 806, 823; *Kean v. Davis*, Spencer, R. 426.

¹ *Lagow v. Patterson*, 1 Blackford, 252.

² *Corning v. Strong*, 1 Carter, 329; *Kirk v. Hyatt*, 2 Carter, 322; *Ward v. Evans*, 2 Ld. Raym. 928; *Sykes v. Giles*, 5 Mees. & Wels. 645, *Miller v. Edmonston*, 8 Blackford, 291.

³ *Patterson v. Moore*, 85 Penn. St. R. 69.

⁴ *Gardner v. Baillie*, 6 T. R. 591. But see *Howard v. Baillie*, 2 H. Bl. 623, which seems contra.

all sums of money then due, or thereafter to become due to the principal in certain countries, and to discharge and compound the same, to execute deeds of land then, or thereafter, owned by the principal, in a particular State, "and to accomplish, at his discretion, a complete adjustment of all the concerns of the principal, in the State of New York, and to do any and every act in his name, which he would do in person," has been held not to authorize the agent to give a promissory note in the name of the principal, upon the ground, that making an adjustment of his concerns did not include any incidental authority to give the note, for the authority, notwithstanding these general words, was to be construed to be limited to the business referred to in the preceding clauses, and not include a general authority to adjust all the other concerns of the principal.¹

§ 66. So, a letter of attorney, given to certain persons, jointly and severally, to sue for and get in moneys and goods, to take proceedings and bring actions, to enforce payment of moneys due, to defend actions, settle accounts, submit disputes to arbitration, sign receipts for money, accept compositions, "indorse, negotiate, and discount, or acquit and discharge bills of exchange, promissory notes, or other negotiable securities, which were or should be payable to the principal, and should need and require his indorsement;" to sell his ships, execute bills of sale, hire on freight, effect insurances, "buy, sell, barter, exchange, and import all goods, wares, and merchandise; and to trade and deal in the same, in such manner as should be deemed most for his interest; and generally to make, do, execute, transact, perform, and accomplish all and singular such further, and other acts, deeds, matters, and things, as should be requisite, expedient, and advisable to be done in and about the premises, and all other his affairs and concerns, as he might or could do, if personally acting therein;" has been held not to authorize the agent to accept a bill in the name of the principal; especially if drawn in relation to concerns in which he had a partnership interest only. The language of the

¹ *Rossiter v. Rossiter*, 8 Wend. R. 494. This case certainly stands upon very nice principles of construction; for giving the note might be the only effectual means of adjusting the principal's concerns if the power was applicable to all the principal's concerns in the State of New York, instead of being limited to the preceding special authorizations. See *Taylor v. Robinson*, 14 Cal. 399; *Hefferman v. Adams*, 7 Watts, 716; *Wood v. McCain*, 7 Ala. 800.

instrument, although general, was thought rather to import a power to take for the defendant, than to bind him; and the acts were to be done for the defendant singly. An express power was given to indorse, but none to accept bills; so that if any inference was to be drawn from the omission, it was an inference against, and not in favor of, any intention to confer the latter. Such instruments do not give general powers, speaking at large; but only where they are necessary to carry the purposes of the special powers into effect.¹

§ 67. For the same reason, a power of attorney by a principal to another person "for him, and on his behalf, to pay and accept such bill or bills of exchange as should be drawn or charged on him by his agents or correspondents, as occasion should require; and generally to do, negotiate, and transact the affairs and business of him (the principal) during his absence, as fully and effectually as if he were present and acting therein," has been held not to authorize the agent to accept bills drawn on him upon account of a partnership, in which the principal was a partner; but only to accept bills drawn on him upon his individual account. The language of the instrument conferred an authority to accept bills for the principal, and on his behalf. No such power was requisite, as to partnership transactions; for the other partners might bind the firm by their acceptance; and, therefore, the words of the instrument might well be confined to their obvious meaning, namely, an authority to accept in those cases where it was right for the principal to accept in his individual capacity.²

¹ *Atwood v. Munnings*, 7 Barn. & Cressw. 278.

² *Atwood v. Munnings*, 7 Barn. & Cressw. 278, 283, 284. The authority conferred by written instruments of Agency of this sort, is to be carefully distinguished from a class of cases closely resembling them, that is, powers of appointment created by deeds, or last wills. In this class of cases, courts of equity have indulged themselves in a very liberal interpretation of the words, and have held many executions of such powers valid which would, perhaps, scarcely be allowed in the construction of letters of attorney. Thus, a power to appoint land has been held to include a power to charge it with a sum of money for the same objects as the appointment. *Roberts v. Dixall*, 2 Eq. Cas. Abridg. 668; *Thwaytes v. Dye*, 2 Vern. 80. So a power to charge has been held to authorize a sale, and appointing the money to the objects of the charge. *Long v. Long*, 5 Ves. 445; *Kenworthy v. Bate*, 6 Ves. 793. So a power to raise money out of an estate, has been

§ 68. Indeed, formal instruments of this sort are ordinarily subjected to a strict interpretation, and the authority is never extended beyond that, which is given in terms, or which is necessary and proper for carrying the authority so given into full effect.¹ Thus, a power of attorney to sell, assign, and transfer stock, will not include a power to pledge it for the agent's own debt.² So, a power of attorney, given by a mill company to their agent to manufacture logs into lumber at their mills, and transport them to market, and sell and dispose thereof for the company's benefit, will not authorize the agent, without the knowledge of the directors of the company, to deliver over the lumber at the company's mills in payment of securities given by the agent, on behalf of the company, in the course of his agency.³ So, a power to bargain and sell land will not include an authority [to mortgage the same,⁴ nor] to grant a license to the purchaser, previous to a conveyance, to enter and cut timber on the land, although done *bonâ fide* with a view to effect the sale.⁵

§ 69. In written instruments also of a less formal character, the like rule of interpretation generally prevails; and they are never interpreted to authorize acts not obviously within the scope of the particular matter to which they refer. Thus, where, upon the dissolution of a partnership, notice was published by the partners, that all demands upon the firm would be paid by a particular partner, "who is empowered to receive and discharge all

held to authorize a sale thereof. *Bateman v. Bateman*, 1 Atk. 421; 2 Story, Eq. Jurisp §§ 1063, 1064. So a power to pay debts out of rents and profits, has been held to authorize a sale or mortgage of the estate *Bootle v. Blundell*, 1 Meriv. 193, 282; 2 Story, Eq. Jurisp §§ 1064, 1064 a. In *Williams v. Woodward*, 2 Wend. R. 487, it was held that a power of attorney to sell an estate included a power to make a lease for life, which was a lesser estate. And the court greatly relied on cases arising under powers of appointment. It may, however, deserve consideration, whether the analogy can be safely relied on. See *Hubbard v. Elmer*, 7 Wend. R. 446.

¹ *Atwood v. Munnings*, 7 Barn. & Cressw. 278, 283, 284; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, (3d edit.) 192; *Ducarrey v. Gill*, 1 Mood. & Malk. 450; *Withington v. Herring*, 5 Bing. R. 442; *Wood v. Goodridge*, 6 Cush. 117.

² *De Bouchout v. Goldsmid*, 5 Ves. jr. 211; Post, § 78.

³ *Lombard v. Winslow*, 1 Kerr, (New Bruns.) Rep. 327. And see *Hazeltine v. Miller*, 44 Maine, 177.

⁴ *Wood v. Goodridge*, 6 Cush. 117.

⁵ *Hubbard & Elmer*, 7 Wend. R. 446.

debts due to the said copartnership; it was held, that this did not authorize the partner, after the dissolution, to indorse a bill of exchange in the name of the firm, although drawn by him in that name, and accepted by a debtor to the firm.¹ So, the resident agent of a mining company, who is appointed by the directors to manage the mine, has not in virtue of such an agency, an implied authority from the shareholders to borrow money upon their credit in order to pay the arrearages of wages due to the laborers, however urgent the necessity may be, in order to avoid a distress upon the materials of the mine therefor.² [So also,

¹ Kilgour v. Finlason, 1 II Bl. 156, Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 192.

² Hawtayne v. Bourne, 7 Mees. & Wels 595. Mr. Baron Parke, in delivering his opinion on the case, said: "This is an action brought by the plaintiffs, who are bankers, to recover from the defendant, as one of the proprietors of the Tre-wolves Mine, (a mine carried on in the ordinary way,) the balance of a sum of £400, advanced by them to the agent appointed by the company of proprietors for the management of the mine. Now, the extent of the authority conferred upon the agent by his appointment was this only,—that he should conduct and carry on the affairs of the mine in the usual manner. There is no proof of express authority to borrow money from bankers for that purpose, or that it was necessary in the ordinary course of the undertaking: and certainly no such authority could be assumed. There are two grounds, on which it is said the defendant may be made responsible, first, on that of a special authority given to the agent to borrow money; and, secondly, on the assumed principle, that every owner, who appoints an agent for the management of his property, must be taken to have given him authority to borrow money in cases of absolute necessity. There certainly was, in the present case, some evidence, from which a jury might have inferred that a power to borrow money, for the purposes of the mine, had been expressly given to the agent; but that evidence does not appear to have been left to the jury, and therefore the verdict cannot be supported on the first ground. Then, as to the second ground, it appears that the learned Judge told the jury, that they might infer an authority in the agent, not only to conduct the general business of the mine, but also, in cases of necessity, to raise money for that purpose. I am not aware, that any authority is to be found in our law to support this proposition. No such power exists, except in the cases alluded to in the argument of the master of a ship, and of the acceptor of a bill of exchange for the honor of the drawer. The latter derives its existence from the law of merchants; and in the former case the law, which generally provides for ordinary events, and not for cases which are of a rare occurrence, considers, how likely and frequent are accidents at sea, when it may be necessary, in order to have the vessel repaired, or to provide the means of continuing the voyage, to pledge the credit of her owners; and therefore it is, that the law invests the master with power to raise money, and, by an instrument of hypothecation, to pledge the ship itself if necessary. If that case be analogous to this, it follows, that the agent had

the station-master and the other servants of a railway company cannot, without express authority, bind the company by contracts for surgical attendance upon injured passengers.¹ And an agent who is specially authorized to obtain surgical aid for a passenger injured by the upsetting of a stage-coach, is not thereby empowered to employ a physician to attend to one who acted as coachman without the knowledge of the company, and who was injured by the same accident.² So, an agent, who is authorized to draw and indorse notes, and to draw, indorse, and accept bills of exchange, can act under such authority only to the extent of his principal's business, and is not authorized to draw, indorse, or accept them for the accommodation of [himself³ or] mere strangers.⁴ [So a general agent authorized to transact all the mercantile business of his principal, has not authority to bind his principal as surety on mercantile paper.⁵]

§ 70. Principles very similar may be traced back to the Roman law; for in that law, where the authority was express or special, the agent was bound to act within it; and where it was of a more general nature, still the agent could not bind the principal beyond the manifest scope of the objects to be accomplished by it: *Igitur commodissime illa forma in mandatis servanda est, ut quotiens certum mandatum sit, recedi a forma non debeat.*⁶ *Diligenter fines mandati custodiendi sunt; nam qui excessit, aliud quid facere videtur.*⁷ *Conditio autem præpositionis servanda est.*⁸

power not only to borrow money, but in the event of security being required, to mortgage the mine itself. The authority of the master of a ship rests upon the peculiar character of his office, and affords no analogy to the case of an ordinary agent. I am therefore of opinion, that the agent of this mine had not the authority contended for." Mr. Baron Alderson used language equally expressive.

¹ Cox v. Midland Counties Railway Co. 3 Welsby, Hurlstone, & Gordon, 268.

² Shrive v. Stephens, 12 Penn. St. R. 258.

³ Staiback v. Bank of Virginia, 11 Grattan, 269.

⁴ Wallace v. Branch Bank of Mobile, 1 Alabama R. 565, N. S.; North River Bank v. Aymur, 8 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 262; Stainer v. Tysen, 8 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 379; Post, § 78.

⁵ Bank of Hamburg v. Johnson, 8 Rich. 42.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 46; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 1, art. 8.

⁷ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 5; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 41; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 5, art. 3; Ante, § 48; Post, §§ 87, 88, 174.

⁸ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 11, § 5; Ante, § 48.

§ 71. The same principles were applied to the interpretation of words, conferring a general authority as to one thing, or as to many things. Thus, where a general authority of simple administration or management of the property of the principal was conferred upon an agent, it was held not to entitle the agent to alienate any property, except that, which was of a perishable nature: *Procurator totorum bonorum, cui res administrandæ mandata sunt, res domini neque mobiles vel immobiles, neque servus sine speciali domini mandato alienare potest; nisi fructus aut alias res, quæ facile corrumpi possunt.*¹ So, where a person was appointed as an agent to superintend a farm, he was held to possess no power to sell it, or the things belonging to it: *Procuratorem vel actorem prædii, si non specialiter distrahendi mandatum accepit, jus rerum domini vendendi non habere, certum ac manifestum est.*² So, a general mandate was construed not to authorize a final settlement of an agreement by compromise: *Mandato generali non contineri etiam transactionem decidendi causa interpositam.*³ Where, however, a liberal or absolute administration of the affairs of the principal was conferred generally on the agent, a more liberal rule of construction prevailed; for in such cases he was authorized to collect and to pay debts, and to exchange one thing for another: *Procurator, cui generaliter libera administratio rerum commissa est, potest exigere; aliud pro alio permutare. Sed et id quoque ei mandari videtur ut solvat creditoribus.*⁴ The same doctrine is pithily expressed in the Scottish Law, by Lord Stair, who says: "Where in general mandates some things are specially expressed, the generality is not extended to cases of greater importance than those expressed."⁵

§ 72. Wherever an authority purports to be derived from a written instrument, or the agent expressly signs the contract, or other paper, introduced with the words "by procuration;" as,

¹ Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 3, l. 63; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, n. 4; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 3, art. 10, 11.

² Cod. Lib. 2, tit. 18, l. 16; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, n. 4.

³ Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 3, l. 60; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, n. 5; 1 Stair, Inst. B. 1, tit. 12, § 12, by Brodie; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 39; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 3, art. 10, 11.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 3, l. 58, 59; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, n. 8; 1 Stair, Inst. B. 1, tit. 12, § 15, by Brodie.

⁵ Stair, Instit. by Brodie, B. 1, tit. 12, § 15; Ersk. Instit. B. 3, tit. 3, § 39.

§ 73. We are, however, in all such cases, carefully to distinguish between the authority given to the agent, and the private

case of *Atwood v. Munnings*, was mentioned by Park, J., and he, like Judge Story, understood it, not as imposing the duty to inquire into the state of the principal's affairs, but only as to the character of the drawers. Indeed, there is hardly any rule better settled or of more universal application, than that the appointee need not inquire as to matters in their own nature private and confidential between the agent and principal. It may be doubted, says Mr. Justice Story, if upon this subject there is any solid distinction between a special authority to do a particular act, and a general authority to do all acts in a particular business. Each includes the usual and appropriate means to accomplish the end. (Story on Agency, 70.) Is it among those means, that the appointee shall lose his money, because the attorney happens to betray the interests of his principal? Would not such a rule rather be a means to make the power utterly unavailable? No prudent man would advance his money under such a responsibility. The rule supposes a degree of capacity to look into the affairs and even the private intentions of others, which no human being possesses." Mr. Ch. J. Nelson dissented, and gave the substance of his views as follows: "It is insisted, the bank was not bound to inquire further than to ascertain that the attorney was empowered to make and indorse notes for his principal. But the same instrument which conferred this power also contained the special limitation, and it was therefore as material for them to bring the case within that, as within any other part of the authority. The one qualified the other, and both must be regarded in ascertaining the sum of the whole. Mr. Lloyd, in his valuable edition of Paley on Agency, (p. 192, 3d ed.) observes, that all written powers, such as letters of attorney, or letters of instruction, receive a strict interpretation; the authority never being extended beyond that, which is given in terms, or is absolutely necessary for carrying the authority so given into effect. He refers to *Atwood v. Munnings*, 7 Barn. & Cressw. 278, which, in principle, is decisive in favor of the judgment of the Court below. There, the power was given to the wife of the defendant, 'for him and on his behalf to pay and accept such bill or bills of exchange as should be drawn or charged on him by his agents, &c., and generally to do, negotiate, and transact the affairs and business of him (*Munnings*) during his absence,' &c. She accepted four bills drawn by one of the partners of *Munnings*, the proceeds of which were applied in payment of partnership debts. Another bill was afterwards drawn in order to raise money to take up the former ones, which was accepted by *Munnings'* wife and discounted by the plaintiffs. The question was, whether the wife had authority to bind her husband by the acceptance. The Court of K. B. held that she had not; that as the bill was accepted by procuration, the party taking it should, in the exercise of a reasonable prudence and caution, have required the production of the power, when he would have seen, that it only gave authority to accept bills for the defendant and on his behalf; that no such power was requisite as to the partnership transactions, for the other partners might have bound him by their acceptance; and that the words must be confined to their obvious meaning, namely,

instructions given to him, as to his mode of executing that authority.¹ For, although where a written authority is known to exist, or is, by the very nature of the transaction, presupposed, it is the duty of persons dealing with the agent, to make inquiries as to the nature and extent of such authority, and to examine it; yet no such duty exists to make inquiries, as to any private letter of instructions from the principal to the agent; for such instructions may well be presumed to be of a secret and confidential nature, and not intended to be divulged to third persons.² In like manner, if the written authority apparently justifies the act, it is no objection that the agent has secretly applied his authority to other purposes than those for which it was given; as if, having an authority to make notes in the principal's name in managing his business, the agent should make such notes for secret purposes of a different nature, which could not be known to other persons dealing with him.³ Indeed, it may well be doubted, whether in these respects, there is any solid distinction between the case of a special authority to do a particular act, and a general authority to do all acts in a particular business.⁴ Each includes the usual and appropriate means to accomplish the end. In each case the agent is apparently clothed with full authority to use all such usual and appropriate means, unless upon the face of the instrument a more restrictive authority is given, or must be inferred to exist. In

an authority to accept in those cases where it was right for him to accept in his individual capacity."

¹ See *Johnson v. Jones*, 4 Barbour, 369; *Bryant v. Moore*, 26 Maine, 84.

² *Withington v. Herring*, 5 Bing. R. 442; *Allen v. Ogden*, 1 Wash. Cir. R. 174; *Munn v. Commission Company*, 15 John. R. 44; *Gibson v. Colt*, 7 John. R. 393; *Andrews v. Kneeland*, 6 Cowen, R. 354; *North River Bank v. Aymar*, 3 Hill, R. 362, 273; Ante, § 72, note; Post, §§ 97, 98, 105, 127, note, 128, note, 129-133. But see *Peters v. Ballestier*, 3 Pick. 495, and especially what is said by Mr. Justice Putnam, in pp. 502, 503; *Longworth v. Conwell*, 2 Blackf. Ind. R. 469; *Tomlinson v. Collett*, 3 Blackf. Ind. R. 436; *Walker v. Skipwith*, Meigs Tenn. R. 502.

³ *Ibid.*; Ante, § 69; *North River Bank v. Aymar*, 3 Hill, N. Y. R. 262, 270, 271; Ante, § 72, note. [If the instructions to an agent are to employ men by written agreements, and he employs them orally, the principal will be bound, if the persons so employed were ignorant of the agent's instructions. *Rourke v. Story*, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 54.]

⁴ Post, § 133, and note.

each case, therefore, as to third persons innocently dealing with his agent, the principal ought equally to be bound by the acts of the agent, executing such authority by any of those means, although he may have given to the agent separate, private, and secret instructions of a more limited nature, or the agent may be secretly acting in violation of his duty.¹

¹ See Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, p. 2; *Id.* 189, 197, 199, 200 to 260; *Hel-year v. Hawke*, 5 Esp. R. 73; *Runquist v. Ditchell*, 3 Esp. R. 64; *Hicks v. Hankin*, 4 Esp. R. 114; *Fenn v. Harrison*, 3 T. R. 757; S. C. 4 T. Rep. 177; *Smith v. McGuire*, 3 Hurl. & Nor. 553; *Alexander v. Gibson*, 2 Camp. R. 555; *Whitehead v. Tuckett*, 15 East, R. 400. See also *Pickering v. Busk*, 15 East, R. 38, 43; *Stamer v. Tysen*, 3 Hill, R. 279; *Munn v. Commission Company*, 15 John. R. 44; *Perkins v. Washington Insur. Company*, 4 Cowen, R. 659; *Andrews v. Kneeland*, 6 Cowen, R. 354; *Beals v. Allen*, 18 John. R. 363; *North River Bank v. Aymar*, 3 Hill, R. 262; *Rossiter v. Rossiter*, 8 Wend. R. 498, 499; Ante, § 72, note; 1 Bell, Comm. B. 3, Pt. 1, ch. 4, § 412; *Id.* p. 478 to 480, (5th edit.) The case, intended to be put in the text, is that of an authority distinct, and not derived, from the instructions, for if the original authority is restricted and qualified, the restrictions and qualifications constitute a part of the power itself, and govern its extent. Thus, if the owner of a horse should give a written authority to another person, in general terms, to sell the horse; and this paper should be communicated to the buyer, as proof of the authority to sell; and the seller should have given separate, private, written or verbal directions to the agent not to sell, except at a particular price, and the buyer should ignorantly buy at a less price, the question would then arise, whether the sale was valid. In such a case, the authority to sell would be unlimited upon the paper, and yet it would be limited by the instructions. In such a case, who ought to suffer, the buyer or the seller, by the wrongful act of the agent? In the case of a general agent, it is agreed, on all sides, that private instructions will not vary the right of the agent to bind the principal in dealings with third persons, ignorant of those instructions. In what respect does a general authority to do an act differ from a general authority to do all acts relative to a particular business or employment, in regard to this point? See Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, (3d edit.) p. 198 to 211; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 620, 621, 622, (4th edit.) Lord Ellenborough, in *Pickering v. Busk*, 15 East, 38, 43, said: "It cannot fairly be questioned in this case but that Swallow had the implied authority to sell. Strangers can only look to the acts of the parties, and to the external indicia of property, and not to the private communications which may pass between a principal and his broker, and if a person authorize another to assume the apparent right of disposing of property in the ordinary course of trade, it must be presumed that the apparent authority is the real authority. I cannot subscribe to the doctrine, that a broker's engagements are necessarily and in all cases limited to his actual authority, the reality of which is afterwards to be tried by the fact. It is clear that he may bind his principal within the limits of the authority, with which he has been apparently clothed by the principal in respect of the subject-matter;

§ 74. There is another consideration, highly important to be borne in mind in the interpretation of written instruments, and especially of those of a commercial nature, such as letters of instruction, or orders; and that is, that, if the instrument is not expressed in plain and unequivocal terms, free from ambiguity, but the language is fairly susceptible of different interpretations, and the agent, in fact, is misled, and adopts and follows one, when the principal intended the other, — there, the principal will be bound, and the agent will be exonerated. For, in such a case, the agent has acted in good faith, and within the supposed limits of his authority; and if one of two innocent parties must suffer, he ought to suffer in preference who has misled the confidence of the other into an unwary act.¹ In cases of doubt, the general rule is, that the words are to be construed most strongly against the writer: *Verba fortius accipiuntur contra Proferentem*.² There is no doubt, for example, that in letters of instructions of a commercial nature, a wish, expressed by the consignor of goods to his agent or factor, may, under particular circumstances, amount to a positive command;³ especially where the agent or factor has not any interest, and has not made any advances or incurred any liabilities touching the same; for in the

and there would be no safety in mercantile transactions if he could not. If the principal send his commodity to a place, where it is the ordinary business of the person, to whom it is confided, to sell, it must be intended that the commodity was sent thither for the purpose of sale. If the owner of a horse send it to a repository for sale, can it be implied that he sent it thither for any other purpose than that of sale? Or if one sends goods to an auction-room, can it be supposed that he sent them thither merely for safe custody? Where the commodity is sent in such a way and to such a place as to exhibit an apparent purpose of sale, the principal will be bound, and the purchaser safe." Post, § 94. See what is said by Lord Kenyon, in *Fenn v. Harrison*, 3 T. R. 760; and by Bayley, J., in *Pickering v. Busk*, 15 East, 45, 46; *Schimmelpennich v. Bayard*, 1 Peters, R. 264. See also *Whitehead v. Tootell*, 15 East, R. 400; *Smith v. East India Co.* 16 Simons, R. 76; Post, §§ 127, 130, 131, 133.

¹ See *Lorraine v. Cartwright*, 3 Wash. Cir. R. 151; *Dodge v. D'Wolf*, MSS. Cir. Ct. in Mass., 1833; *Coucier v. Ritter*, 4 Wash. Cir. R. 551; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 403, 404, (edit. 1818); *De Tastet v. Crousillat*, 2 Wash. Cir. R. 132; Post, §§ 82, 199.

² *Ibid.*; *Blackett v. Royal Exc. Ins. Co.* 2 Cromp. & Jerv. 244; *Branch's Maxims*, 232. See *Burrell v. Jones*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 47.

³ *Brown v. M'Gran*, 14 Peters, R. 480; *Marfield v. Douglas*, 1 Sandford, Superior Ct. R. (N. Y.) 360; *Wilson v. Wilson*, 26 Penn. St. R. 393.

AGENCY.

latter cases different considerations may arise. But ordinarily the mere expression of wishes will not amount to positive command, unless such is the fair and reasonable interpretation of the language in the connection in which it stands to the context.¹ [Where a principal wrote to his factor, giving his views

¹ Ibid. This subject was much considered in *Brown v. M'Gran*, 14 Peters, R. 480, where the Court said: "Here again the point is open, whether the language (of a letter) imports, that the defendants construed the wishes of, the plaintiff to be simply a strong expression of desire or opinion, or a positive order; and also, whether the words 'noted accordingly' import that the defendants took notice thereof, or took notice of and assented to obey, the wishes or order of the plaintiff. The language is susceptible of either interpretation, according to circumstances. If the case had been one of simple consignment, without any interest in the consignee, or any advance or liability incurred on account thereof, the wishes might fairly be presumed to be orders; and the noting the wishes, accordingly, an assent to follow them. But very different considerations might apply where the consignment should be, as the present is, one clothed with a special interest and a special property, founded upon advances and liabilities. We think, therefore, that this objection is not, under the circumstances of the case, maintainable. It would be quite another question, whether the Court might not, in its discretion, have assumed upon itself the right and duty of construing these letters. There is no novelty in this doctrine. It will be found recognized in *Ekins v. Macklish*, Ambler, Rep. 184, 185; *Lucas v. Groning*, 7 Taunt. Rep. 164, and *Rees v. Warwick*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 113, 115. But the main objection to the instruction is of a more broad and comprehensive character. The instruction in effect decides, that, in the case of a general consignment of goods to a factor for sale, in the exercise of his own discretion, as to the time and manner of sale, the consignor has a right, by subsequent orders, to suspend or postpone the sale at his pleasure; notwithstanding the factor has, in consideration of such general consignment, already made advances, or incurred liabilities for the consignor, at his request, trusting to the fund for his due reimbursement. We are of opinion, that this doctrine is not maintainable in point of law. We understand the true doctrine on this subject to be this. Wherever a consignment is made to a factor for sale, the consignor has a right generally to control the sale thereof, according to his own pleasure, from time to time, if no advances have been made or liabilities incurred on account thereof; and the factor is bound to obey his orders. This arises from the ordinary relation of principal and agent. If, however, the factor makes advances, or incurs liabilities on account of the consignment, by which he acquires a special property therein; then the factor has a right to sell so much of the consignment as may be necessary to reimburse such advances or meet such liabilities; unless there is some existing agreement between himself and the consignor, which controls or varies this right. Thus, for example, if, contemporaneous with the consignment and advances or liabilities, there are orders given by the consignor, which are assented to by the factor, that the goods shall not be sold until a fixed time, in such a case, the consignment is

of the probable supply of the article consigned, and stating facts which indicated a short supply, and in conclusion said: "I have thought it best for you to take my pork out of the market for the present, as thirty days will make an important change in the value of the article;" it was held that the letter constituted instructions to withhold the property from sale until the receipt of further directions.^{1]}

§ 75. In other respects, commercial instruments, such as orders and letters of instruction, are generally construed with great liberality, and free from technical rules, for the satisfactory reason, that they are generally drawn in a loose and inartificial manner, and are designed to subserve the common purposes of life and

presumed to be received by the factor subject to such orders; and he not at liberty to sell the goods to reimburse his advances or liabilities, until after that time has elapsed. The same rule will apply to orders not to sell below a fixed price; unless, indeed, the consignor shall, after due notice and request, refuse to provide any other means to reimburse the factor. And in no case will the factor be at liberty to sell the consignment contrary to the orders of the consignor, although he has made advances, or incurred liabilities thereon; if the consignor stands ready, and offers to reimburse and discharge such advances and liabilities. On the other hand, where the consignment is made generally without any specific orders as to the time or mode of sale, and the factor makes advances or incurs liabilities on the footing of such consignment, there the legal presumption is, that the factor is intended to be clothed with the ordinary rights of factors to sell in the exercise of a sound discretion, at such time and in such mode as the usage of trade and his general duty require; and to reimburse himself for his advances and liabilities, out of the proceeds of the sale; and the consignor has no right, by any subsequent orders, given after advances have been made or liabilities incurred by the factor, to suspend or control this right of sale, except so far as respects the surplus of the consignment, not necessary for the reimbursement of such advances or liabilities. Of course, this right of the factor to sell to reimburse himself for his advances and liabilities, applies with stronger force to cases where the consignor is insolvent, and where, therefore, the consignment constitutes the only fund for indemnity." [The case of *Brown v. M'Grann*, and the rights of factors, were much considered by the Superior Court of the city of New York in *Marfield v. Douglas*, 1 Sandford, Sup. Ct. R. 360. See also *Parker v. Branker*, 22 Pick. R. 40; *Blot v. Boiceau*, 1 Sandford, Sup. Ct. R. 111; 3 Comst. 78; *Frothingham v. Everton*, 12 New Hamp 239. But a recent English case, after considering *Brown v. M'Gran*, decides that the factor has no right to sell the goods contrary to the order of his principal, though the latter has neglected, on request, to repay the advances; *Smart v. Sanders*, 5 Manning, Granger & Scott, R. 395.]

¹ *Marfield v. Douglas*, 1 Sandford, Sup. Ct. R. (N. Y.) R. 360; 3 Comst. 70. *

business, and leave much to be gathered from the usages of trade, and the practice of employments.¹ Still, however, where, upon the whole, the true sense in which the language is used is plain, neither party will be allowed to escape from this sense by showing that another possible interpretation, of a different character, may be given to it, either more broad or more restricted. Thus, for example, where an agent was ordered to sell stock, "should they (the funds) be at eighty-five per cent., or above that price," it was held, that the agent was bound to sell, when the funds reached eighty-five per cent.; and that he had not a general authority to act for his employer, so that he might defer selling till the funds should reach a higher price than eighty-five per cent. He not having sold the stock, when it had arrived at that price, was accordingly held accountable for that price.² What is the true interpretation of mercantile phrases in such instructions or orders, is not always a question of law, but may, in in many cases, be properly left to a jury to decide, where the phrases admit of different meanings. Thus, for example, "it has been left to the jury to say, whether the words in a letter, referring to a bill of exchange enclosed "when duly honored," meant, in connection with the other language, duly accepted, or duly paid.³

§ 76. We have already seen, that, where the agency is created and conferred by a written instrument, the nature and extent of the authority must be ascertained from the instrument itself, and cannot be enlarged by parol evidence of the usage of other agents in like cases, or of an intention to confer additional powers; for that would be to contradict or to vary the terms of the written instrument.⁴ In connection with this doctrine, it is often stated, that an implied authority cannot, in general, take place, where there is an express authority in writing;⁵ for the maxim is, *Expressum facit cessare tacitum*. But we must take care that the

¹ Post, § 82; Grant v Ludlow, 8 Ohio St. R. 54.

² Bertram v Godfray, 1 Knapp, R. 381.

³ Lucas v Groning, 7 Taunt. 164; Mackbeath v. Haldimand, 1 T. Rep. 172; Ante, § 63, note, § 74, note; Morrell v. Frith, 3 Mees. & Welsb 402.

⁴ Ante, § 62, Hogg v. Snaith, 1 Taunt. R. 347, 352; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 176, n. (5), (3d edit.); Id. 198, and note; Murray v. East India Company, 5 Barn. & Ald. 204, 210, 211

⁵ Ibid.

doctrine, in each of these instances, is understood with the qualifications and limitations properly belonging to it; for, otherwise, one may be greatly misled in its just application, as we shall immediately see.

§ 77. In the first place, the usages of a particular trade or business, or of a particular class of agents, are properly admissible, not, indeed, for the purpose of enlarging the powers of the agents employed therein, but for the purpose of interpreting those powers which are actually given; for the means ordinarily used to execute the authority are included in the power, and may be resorted to by all agents, and especially by commercial agents.¹ An agent to sell (as we have seen,) may, if the usages of trade or if the particular business authorize it, sell on credit, not exceeding the usual credit.² But, without such usage, an authority to sell would be construed to be limited to a sale for money. Upon the same ground, an authority to buy goods will, or will not, authorize a purchase on the credit of the principal, and the giving of a negotiable security for the purchase-money, according as there exists, or does not exist, a usage to justify it. [For an authority to purchase for cash does not, of itself, give any authority to buy on credit.³ And it is well settled that a special agent, or an agent employed to make purchases for his principal, has no authority, in the absence of any general usage permitting it, to bind his principal by a negotiable promissory note, or bill of exchange,⁴ in payment for such goods as he was authorized to

¹ Ante, §§ 60, 73; Post, §§ 96, 190.

² Ante, § 59; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41. pp. 622, 623, (4th edit.); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, p. 26, (3d edit.); Id. 198, 212, and note; Mechanics' Bank v. Bank of Columbia, 5 Wheat. R. 326; 1 Bell, Comm. pp. 386-388, art. 410, 411, 412, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 477, 478, 482, (5th edit.); 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 622, 623, (4th edit.); May v. Mitchell, 5 Humph. 365.

³ Stoddard v. Mellwin, 7 Rich. 525.

⁴ [Taber v. Cannon, 8 Met. 458; Webber v. Williams College, 23 Pick. 302; Savage v. Rix, 9 N. H. R. 263; Paige v. Stone, 10 Met. 160; Denison v. Tyson, 17 Verm. 549; Hazeltine v. Miller, 44 Maine, 177. In Gould v. Norfolk Lead Co. 9 Cush. R. 343, Shaw, C. J., said: "The instruction of the Court, that the payment of a draft not accepted included its acceptance, and was evidence of an authority to accept drafts upon the company, was, in our opinion, incorrect in point of law. The acceptance of a draft is an executory undertaking to pay it at a future day, and the authority to make such an agreement is not incident even to the authority of an agent to purchase and pay for goods. The authority to

buy, unless the giving of such notes be indispensable to carry on the business in which he is employed.]

§ 78. We may further illustrate these principles by a few cases. An authority to an agent to sell goods, does not authorize him to exchange them in barter,² or to pledge them; [nor to rescind the sale and adjust a claim for breach of a warranty,³] for, there is no usage of trade to that extent.⁴ An authority to sell stock does not authorize a sale on credit, as sales of stock are always for ready money.⁵ An authority to sell and transfer

accept is one of a very high character, particularly in the case of a trading corporation, to whose business credit, and the use of that credit, is constantly necessary. It has been argued, that such authority may be inferred from the course of trade, and the payment of unaccepted drafts upon the company on other occasions. But this implication does not follow from such payments, for, either the agent had funds of the company for the purpose of paying such drafts, which does not imply that he had authority to pledge their credit, or he paid them from his own funds, relying on the credit of the company, and their previous undertaking and liability to reimburse him for all his advances, which implies no authority whatever to bind them to a future payment of money, by an acceptance. I shall not go into an examination of the cases on this subject, but will refer to that of *Webber v Williams College*, 23 Pick 302, where the question was much considered, and many cases were cited. The case of *Emerson v The Providence Hat Manuf Co* 12 Mass. 237, goes to the point that, constituting one a buying and selling agent of a trading company does not imply authority in him to give the negotiable note of the company"]

¹ *Temple v Pomroy*, 4 Gray, 128

² *Guerreiro v Pulec*, 3 Barn & Ald 616, *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 218.

³ *Bradford v Bush*, 10 Ala 386.

⁴ *Paterson v Tash*, 2 Str 1178, *Newsome v Thornton*, 6 East, R 17, *Martini v Coles*, 1 M & Selw 140, 146, *Urquhart v McIver*, 4 John R 103, *Lausatt v Lippincott*, 6 Serg & R 386, *Shipley v Kymer*, 1 M. & Selw 484, *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, (3d edit.) 213 to 222. The doctrine, as to the want of authority of a factor to pledge the goods of his principal, is now well settled, although it has been greatly doubted at different times. See *Paterson v Tash*, 2 Str. 1178, *Daubigny v Duval*, 5 T. R 604, *Pickering v Busk*, 15 East, 38, 44; *Martini v Coles*, 1 M & Selw 140, 146, *Duclos v Ryland*, cited 5 Moore, R. 518, n., *De Bouchout v Goldsmid*, 5 Ves. 211, *Kinder v Shaw*, 2 Mass. R. 398; *Urquhart v McIver*, 4 John. R 103, Ante, § 68. It is, perhaps, somewhat difficult, upon principle, to sustain it, as the factor is always enabled to hold himself out to the world as owner. See also *Story on Bailm* §§ 325, 326, 455, *Pickering v. Busk*, 15 East, 38, 43, 44, *Lausatt v Lippincott*, 6 Serg. & R. 386; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, (3d edit.) 220, 221, n. (3). But of this more will be said hereafter. Post, § 92.

⁵ *Wiltshire v Sims*, 1 Camp. R. 268; *State of Illinois v. Delafield*, 6 Paige, R. 527; 540.

stock for the principal does not authorize the agent to transfer it by way of security for his own private debt; for it is not an ordinary exercise of such an authority.¹ [An authority to sell at retail does not authorize a clerk to sell by wholesale, in payment of a debt due to the purchasers from the principal.²] An authority to adjust and collect an unliquidated demand does not authorize the agent to pledge the money when received, or a note taken for the amount.³

§ 79. In the next place, although, in general, the maxim is true, that where an express power is conferred by writing, it cannot be enlarged by parol evidence;⁴ yet the maxim is applicable only to cases where the whole authority grows solely out of the writing; and the parol evidence applies to the same subject-matter at the same point of time, and therefore, in effect, seeks to contradict, or vary, or control, the effect of the writing. When the parol evidence seeks to establish a subsequent enlargement of the original authority, or to give an authority for another object, or where the express power is engrafted on an existing agency, affecting it only *sub modo*, to a limited extent, the maxim loses its force and application.⁵

§ 80. Thus, for example, if an agent should be authorized in writing to purchase certain goods at a fixed price; there could be no question, that evidence of a subsequent verbal authority to purchase other goods at a different price, or the same goods at a different price, would be admissible to establish the right of the agent; for in no just sense would it contradict, or vary, or control the legal construction or effect of the original authority of the agent. It would be superinduced upon it, as a distinct and new authority. So, where an agency is of a general nature, and particular written instructions are given, applicable to certain things belonging to that agency, such instructions are understood in no manner to control the general agency, except in those very particulars. Thus, the master of a ship retains, by implication,

¹ *De Boughout v. Goldsmid*, 5 Ves. 211. See *Parsons v. Webb*, 8 Greenl. R. 88; Post, § 92.

² *Hampton v. Matthews*, 2 Harris, 105; *Lee v. Tinges*, 7 Md. R. 285.

³ *Jones v. Farley*, 6 Greenl. R. 226; *Hays v. Linn*, 7 Watts, R. 520; Post, § 99.

⁴ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 179, n.; *Id.* 198, n.

⁵ See *Williams v. Cochran*, 7 Richardson, 45.

all the general authority belonging to his station, notwithstanding any written instructions for the voyage; for these control his implied authority only *pro tanto*, to the extent which they are intended to reach.

§ 81. In the next place, although there is a written authority, under which an agent is transacting business for and on the credit of his principal, and therefore persons dealing with him, and knowing that he is acting under such written authority, are bound to know the extent of his authority, and to inquire into its limitations; yet if the principal, by his declarations or conduct to such persons, has authorized the opinion, that he had in fact given more extensive powers to his agent than were conferred, the principal will be bound by the acts of such agent, in their negotiations with such persons, to the extent of the authority which such declarations and conduct have fairly led them to believe to exist.¹ So, if an agent is appointed, and receives written orders limiting his authority, but, at the same time, he is referred by those orders to the verbal communications of another general agent of the principal, who declares, that he has authority to control and vary these written orders, and the agent acts in obedience to new orders given by the general agent, he will be fully justified in his deviation from the original orders.² And parol evidence would certainly be admissible, for the purpose of establishing such declarations and new orders of the general agent.³

§ 82. In the next place, it may be laid down as a general rule, that where an express authority is conferred by informal instruments, such as letters of advice, or instructions, or loosely drawn orders, especially where they are general in their terms, or confer a general authority, they are construed with more liberality than more formal and deliberate instruments.⁴ This rule is adopted for the convenience of merchants; and, indeed, seems indispensable to general confidence and security, in the ordinary operations of commerce and navigation and trade.⁵ The Roman law

¹ Schimmelpennich v. Bayard, 1 Peters, R. 264.

² Mannella v. Barry, 3 Cranch, R. 415; Ante, §§ 68, 72, 73.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ante, §§ 74, 75, 180.

⁵ 1 Bell, Comm. B. 3, Pt. 1, ch. 4, § 4, arts. 409, 410, p. 386, (4th edit.); Ante, §§ 74, 75.

inculcated an equally comprehensive doctrine. *Ideo per nuncium, quoque, vel per epistolam, mandatum suscipi potest.*¹ *Si quis alicui scripserit, ut debitorem suum liberet, sequi eam pecuniam, quam is debuerit, soluturum, mandati actione tenetur.*² *Item, sive rogo, sive volo, sive mando, sive alio quocunque verbo scripserit, mandati actio est.*³

§ 83. Subject to these reasonable qualifications and restrictions, the doctrine is unquestionably true, that an express written authority cannot be enlarged by parol evidence, or an authority be implied, where there exists an express one. The authority, too, is construed, as to its nature and extent, according to the force of the terms used, and the objects to be accomplished. If the authority is special, it is construed to include only the usual means appropriate to the end. If the authority is general, it is still construed to be limited to the usual means to accomplish the end. Even if a general discretion is vested in the agent, it is not deemed to be unlimited. But it must be exercised in a reasonable manner, and cannot be resorted to in order to justify acts which the principal could not be presumed to intend;⁴ or which would defeat, and not promote, the apparent end or purpose for which the power was given.

§ 84. Hitherto we have principally referred to cases of agency created by written instruments. But by far the most numerous cases of agency arise, not from formal or informal written instruments, but from verbal authorizations, or from implications, from the particular business or employment of the principal or agent, or from the usual dealings between them, or from the general usages of trade and commerce.⁵

¹ Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 19, Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 1, § 1.

² Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 19; Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 27, Introd.

³ Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 19, Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 1, § 2.

⁴ 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 617, 618, (4th edit.), Id. 620, 621; 1 Donat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 3, arts. 3, 10, 11; Mackbeath v. Haldimand, 1 T. R. 172, 182.

⁵ 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, 613-615, (4th edit.); 1 Liverm. on Agency, § 3, pp. 36, 37, (edit. 1818), Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, (3d edit.) p. 198; 1 Bell, Comm. B. 3, Pt. 1, ch. 4, § 4, art. 410, (4th edit.) Mr. Bell, in his Commentaries on Commercial Law, (1 Bell, Comm. B. 3, Pt. 1, ch. 4, § 4, art. 410, p. 386, (6th edit.); Id. p. 478, (5th edit.); has introduced some very appropriate remarks. "The power of a factor, or agent, or broker," (says he,) "is conferred, either, first, in writing; formally, by power of attorney, or more loosely, in correspondence; or, secondly, by parol agreement; or, thirdly, by mere employment. If

§ 85. In all such cases, whether the agency be of a special nature, or of a general nature, it may also be laid down as a universal principle, that it includes, unless the inference is expressly excluded by other circumstances, all the usual modes and means of accomplishing the objects and ends of the agency.¹ And even a deviation by the agent from the appropriate course, will not vitiate his act, if it be immaterial or circumstantial

the powers are special, they form the limits of the authority; if general, they will be more liberally construed, according to the necessities of the occasion, and the material, or ordinary, or reasonable course of the transaction

"(1.) In the management of the affairs of a foreign merchant, especially where there is occasion to discharge debts and receive money, or to carry on judicial proceedings, a power of attorney is the proper evidence of authority. It empowers the factor to represent the principal, and act as he might have done if present.

"(2.) But agents, or factors, or brokers, are generally appointed in mercantile affairs by letter. So, a confidential clerk is authorized to accept or indorse bills by a letter addressed to him, expressed in the simplest terms, and without either technical words or the solemnities of a formal deed. So, in the course of correspondence, goods are consigned from abroad, with directions to the consignee to sell them, and either to apply the proceeds in a particular way, or to place them to account; or, merchants or manufacturers, with an accumulation of goods on hand, place them with another, (ex. gr. a general agent or another merchant,) who agrees to manage the sales, and to advance a certain proportion to be reimbursed out of the sales; or one is desired to buy goods for another, and either intrusted with credit or money for that purpose, or left to make the purchases as he can, on his own or the principal's general credit; or goods are sent to the warehouse of a general agent, with particular directions as to their disposal, or to be sold at the ordinary rate of the market.

"(3.) In the course of mercantile dealings, goods are placed with general agents, or sent to public warehouses, and the power of disposal intrusted to brokers; and so an agency to this effect is constituted without writing of any kind. Many great merchants, in London and elsewhere, have neither goods nor warehouses in their possession; but, intrusting all their goods to brokers and agents, confine their own attention to the great lines of commercial intercourse.

"(4.) Mercantile agents have authority frequently conferred on them by mere implication. This generally is grounded on the sanction given by the employer to credit raised by a person acting in his name. Such is the power implied from giving sanction to the acts of a procurator; as where a clerk accepts or indorses bills for his master, which that master pays as legitimately accepted, or allows to, as well transferred, as if indorsed by himself."

Ante, §§ 57, 59, 60, 73, 74, 76, 77; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 3, art. 3; *Id.* tit. 16, § 3, art. 1; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, (8d edit.) 209, 210; Dawson v. Lawley, 4 Esp. R. 65, 66.

only, and does not, in substance, exceed his right and duty.¹ Indeed a literal adherence to the common course of business may sometimes, under peculiar circumstances, defeat the very objects of the agency; and new and unexpected emergencies and necessities of such a critical nature may arise, as, if one may use the expression, will expand the authority beyond its ordinary limits, and justify even a deviation from its ordinary limitations and import.²

§ 86. Whenever the authority given to an agent is to transact business for the principal in a foreign country, or in another State, it must, in the absence of all counter proof, be presumed to include the authority to transact it in the forms, and by the instruments, and according to the laws of the place where it is to be done.³ And each party, under such circumstances, is bound to know what such forms and instruments are, and what acts are required by those laws. For it would be unreasonable to presume, that the principal authorized the end, and refused the lawful means, or that he intended to violate the laws, or to mislead his agent in relation to his powers.⁴

§ 87. In cases of agency, arising by implication and presumption from any of the circumstances already alluded to, the nature and extent of the authority conferred upon the agent is to be ascertained and limited in the same manner, and by the same considerations, which govern in the exposition of an express authority conferred in general terms. If the agency arises by implication from numerous acts done by the agent, with the tacit consent or acquiescence of the principal, it is deemed to be limited to acts of the like nature.⁵ If it arises from the general

¹ Comm. Dig. *Attorney*, C. 15; *Parker v. Imley*, 15 Wend. R. 431; Post, 118, 141, 201.

² 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 614, (4th edit.); *Judson v. Sturges*, 5 Day, R. 556, 560; 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 218; Post, §§ 118, 141, 193, 237; *Liotard v. Graves*, 3 Caines, R. 226, *Lawler v. Keaquick*, 1 John. Cas. 174; *Drummond v. Wood*, 2 Caines, R. 310; *Forrestier v. Boardman*, 1 Story, R. 43.

³ *Owings v. Hull*, 9 Peters, R. 607; *Story on Conflict of Laws*, §§ 260, 262, 286, 318.

⁴ *Owings v. Hull*, 9 Peters, R. 607.

⁵ See *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 198, 199, 201 to 209; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 1; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 622, 623, (4th edit.)

habits of dealing between the particular parties, it is deemed to be limited to dealings of the same kind, and governed by the same habits. If it arises from the employment of the agent in a particular business, it is, in like manner, deemed to be limited to that particular business.¹ And the authority must be implied from facts which have occurred in the course of such employment, and not from mere argument as to the utility and propriety of the agent's possessing it.² If it arises from an authority to do a single or particular act, the agency is limited to the appropriate means to accomplish that very act and the required end, and the implied agency stops there.³ In short, an implied agency is never construed to extend beyond the obvious purposes for which it is apparently created.⁴ The intention of the parties, deduced from the nature and circumstances of the particular case, constitutes the true ground of every exposition of the extent of the authority; and when that intention cannot be clearly discerned, the agency ceases to be recognized, or implied. *Obligatio mandati consensu contrahentium consistit.*⁵ And hence the proper corollary of the Roman law: *Diligenter fines mandati custodiendi sunt; nam qui excessit, aliud quid facere videtur.*⁶

§ 88. Indeed the Roman law fully recognized the same doctrine, as to the nature and extent of limitations of an implied agency. Thus, in the case of a common shopman, or other person clothed with the institorial power,⁷ the party could not bind his principal, except within the limits of that power. *Non tamen omne, quod cum Institore geritur, obligat eum, qui præ-*

¹ 1 Domat, B 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 1, 2; *Odiorne v. Maxcy*, 13 Mass. R. 178; *Salem Bank v. Gloucester Bank*, 17 Mass. R. 1; *Williams v. Getty*, 31 Penn. St. R. 464.

² *Hawtayne v Bourne*, 7 Mees. & Wels. 595.

³ Ante, 50, 56, 71, 77, 78, 83, 85; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 36 to 40, (edit. 1818); Id. 94; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 161, 162, (3d edit.); 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 196; Smith on Mer. Law, p. 110, (3d edit) 1848.

⁴ See *Johnson v. Wingate*, 29 Maine, 404; *Jones v. Warner*, 11 Conn. 41; *Washington Bank v. Lewis*, 22 Pick. 24.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 57, tit. 1, l. 1; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 1, art 5; Id. B. 1, tit. 16, art. 1, 2; Ante, § 47.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 5; Arte, §§ 43, 70; *Kerns v. Piper*, 4 Watts, R. 222.

⁷ See ante, § 8, Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 3, 18.

*posuit; sed ita, si ejus rei gr̃atia, cui pr̃æpositus fuerit, contractum est, id est, duntaxat ad id, ad quod eum pr̃æposuit.*¹ Proinde, si pr̃æpositi ad mercium distractionem, tenebor nomine ejus ex empto actione. Item, si fortè ad emendum eum pr̃æposuero, tenebor duntaxat ex vendito. Sed neque, si ad emendum, et ille vendiderit, neque, si ad vendendum, et ille emerit, debedit teneri.² So, that we here see it laid down in positive terms, that an agent employed to buy, has no implied authority to sell; and an agent employed to sell, has no implied authority to buy.

§ 89. A few examples, besides those which have been already incidentally introduced, may serve further to illustrate these principles and deductions. And, first, of an authority resulting from the tacit consent or acquiescence of the principal. Where a man stands by knowingly, and suffers another person to do acts in his own name, without any opposition or objection, he is presumed to have given an authority to do those acts.³ *Semper, qui non prohibet pro se intervenire, mandare creditur.*⁴ *Si passus sim, atque pro me fidejubere, vel aliàs intervenire, mandati teneor.*⁵ Thus, if a shopman is allowed, with the knowledge and acquiescence of his master, to sell goods which are on sale in the shop, the master is presumed to have given him the requisite authority for that purpose. But such an exercise of the authority to sell will not, *per se*, justify the shopman in buying goods for his master; for (as we have seen) an authority to buy cannot properly be inferred from an authority to sell.⁶ They are acts distinct in their nature, and not dependent upon, or incidents of each other. But if the shopman has been accustomed to buy as well as to sell, then the presumption of a full authority equally applies to both.⁷

¹ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 5, § 11.

² Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 5, § 12, Ante, §§ 43, 70, 87; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 2.

³ 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 385-392.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 60; Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 18; Ante, § 56, 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41 (4th edit.) p. 614-616; 1 Bell, Comm. 486, art. 410 (4th edit.); Id p. 478-480 (5th edit.); 1 Story on Equity Jurisp. § 385-390.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 6, § 2; Id. l. 53; Ante, § 56; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 37, (edit. 1818.)

⁶ Ante, § 88; Post, §§ 255, 258.

⁷ See 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, (4th edit.) p. 614-616, 622; 1 Liverm on AGENCY.

§ 90. The case above supposed is that of a general authority to sell, or to buy, arising from the knowledge and acquiescence of the principal. But the same doctrine will govern in the case, where the act is a single one, if the acquiescence of the principal, with a full knowledge of the facts, is established.¹ Thus, if a person should, in the presence of the principal, sell a parcel of goods of the latter, without objection, as his agent, the tacit consent of the principal to the sale will be presumed, and it will bind him.² [So, if an agent applies a note belonging to his principal to satisfy a debt of the principal, the latter is presumed to have ratified the act, unless he disaffirm it within a reasonable time after it comes to his knowledge.³]

§ 91. Indeed, the doctrine of Courts of Equity goes further; for it clearly established, that if the true owner of property stands by, and knowingly suffers a stranger to sell the same in his own name, as his own property, without objection, the sale will be valid against the true owner.⁴ For under such circumstances, his silence and concealment of his title are treated as equivalent to an affirmation that he has no adverse title to the property; and it would be a gross fraud upon the purchaser, to allow the true owner thus to delude him into a purchase, and afterwards to defeat the supposed rights acquired under it.⁵ The same rule will apply to the case, where a person knowing the fact that a deed conveys his own interest in a particular estate, voluntarily subscribes the same deed, as a witness of the due execution thereof by the person who undertakes to convey it.⁶ Courts of law, also, as far as they may, in regard to personal property, where no technical formalities are necessary to a transfer, now

Agency, p. 36-40, (ed. 1818), Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 167, 168, (3d edit.), Pothier on Oblig. n. 454-456, 1 Domat, B. 1, tit 16, § 3, art. 1-3; Dig Lib. 14, tit. 8, l. 5, §§ 11, 12

¹ Liverm on Agency, 38, 40, (edit. 1818.)

² Heane v. Rogers, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 577, 586; Graves v Key, 3 Barn. & Adolph. 318, note (a); Pickard v. Sears, 6 Adolph & Ellis, R. 469, 474. See Forsyth v Day, 46 Maine, 196.

³ Brigham v. Peters, 1 Gray, 139.

⁴ 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 385 to 395.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Teasdale v. Teasdale, Sel Cas. in Ch. 59; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 4, note (m).

act upon the same enlightened principles of justice. Thus, where a man, without objection, suffered his own goods to be sold by an officer at public auction, to satisfy an execution against a third person, in whose possession they were at the time, it was held in favor of the purchaser at the sale, that his conduct might well authorize the conclusion that he had assented to the sale, or had ceased to be owner.¹

§ 92. The same rules apply to cases where a clerk accepts or indorses bills or notes for his master, which the master afterwards pays, as legitimately accepted or indorsed; for his acquiescence, under such circumstances, will be treated as equivalent to an affirmance of the authority of the clerk to do such acts.² But a clerk, so intrusted to accept or indorse bills or notes, would not thereby possess an authority to purchase, or to sell goods, for his principal.³ [So, an ordinary clerk in a store, has no authority, as such, to borrow money, or draw bills and notes in the name of his principal.⁴] So, payments made to an agent will be good or not, according to his presumed authority, arising from the course of his business. If he is usually intrusted to receive payments and give receipts therefor, the principal will be bound. But if his employment has been limited to other acts, he will not be bound.⁵

¹ *Pickard v. Sears*, 6 Adolph. & Ellis, 469, 174. On this occasion Lord Denman said: "The rule of law is clear, that where one, by his words or conduct, wilfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things, as existing at the same time; and the plaintiff, in this case, might have parted with his interest in the property, by verbal gift or sale, without any of those formalities that throw technical obstacles in the way of legal evidence. And we think his conduct, in standing by and giving a kind of sanction to the proceedings under the execution, was a fact of such a nature, that the opinion of the jury ought, in conformity to *Hearn v. Rodgers*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 586, and *Graves v. Key*, 3 Barn. & Adolph. 318, note, to have been taken, whether he had not, in point of fact, ceased to be the owner." *Forsyth v. Day*, 46 Maine, 176.

² Ante, §§ 55, 78, 87; Post, § 104; *Johnson v. Jones*, 4 Barbour, 369.

³ See 1 Bell, Comm. 386, 387, art. 410, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 478 to 482, (5th edit.);

³ *Chitty on Comm. & Manuf.* 196, 197; Ante, § 87.

⁴ *Kerns v. Piper*, 4 Watts, 222. See also, *Hampton v. Matthews*, 2 Harris, 105.

⁵ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 274 to 290.

§ 93. So, if a person should authorize another to assume the apparent ownership, or right of disposing of property, in the ordinary course of trade, it will be presumed that the apparent authority is the real authority. For, in such a case, strangers can look only to the acts of the parties, and to the external *indicia* of property, and ought not to be affected by any mere private communications, which pass between the principal and the agent.¹

§ 94. In like manner, an implied authority may be deduced from the nature and circumstances of the particular act done by the principal. If the principal sends his commodity to a place where it is the ordinary business of the person, to whom it is confided, to sell, it will be intended, that the commodity is sent thither for the purpose of sale. Thus, if the owner of a horse should send it to a repository of sale, it would be implied, that he sent it thither for the purpose of sale. So, if the owner should send goods to an auction room, it would be presumed, that he sent them thither for sale. For, in each of these cases, it could not be supposed, that any other purpose could be intended, such as safe custody, or mere deposit. And, therefore, it may be laid down as a general rule, that when a commodity is sent in such a way, and to such a place, as to exhibit an apparent purpose of sale, the principal will be bound, and the purchaser will be safe, although the agent may have acted wrongfully, and against his orders or duty, if the purchaser has no knowledge thereof.²

§ 95. In like manner, the tacit consent or acquiescence of the principal may be deduced from the usual habits of dealing between parties.³ Thus, if an agent has been in the habit of dealing for his principal, by buying and selling goods on his account on credit, and full knowledge thereof is brought home to the principal, and no objection is made; the principal is understood by his silence to assent to such purchases and sales on credit, although the usages of trade, or the general course of the busi-

¹ Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, R. 38, 43; Dyer v. Pearson, 3 Barn & Cresw. 38, 42; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 167, 168, 280 to 289, (3d. edit.), Morris v. Cleasby, 4 M. & Selw. 566; Blackburn v. Scholes, 2 Campb. 343; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 620, 621, (4th edit.)

² Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, R. 38, 43; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 621, (4th edit.); Ante, § 73, note.

³ Post, § 260.

ness, would not justify such a mode of purchase or sale on credit. For the parties are at liberty to dispense with such usages of trade or business at their pleasure; and the habits of dealing between them afford a full and satisfactory exposition of their intention to dispense with the general rule.¹

§ 96. In like manner, (as we have already seen,) ² the known usages of trade and business often become the true exponents of the nature and extent of an implied authority; ³ for, in all cases, where such usages exist, and an agency is to be exercised touching such matters, the natural presumption, in the absence of all countervailing proofs, is that the agency is to be conducted in the manner, and according to the practices, which are allowed and justified by such usages.⁴ Thus, for example, where a stockbroker is authorized to sell, and does sell stock, and it turns out, for want of a proper stamp, to be unmarketable, and in such cases the usage is for the broker to take it back, and repay the purchase-money, — the broker is warranted in so doing; and if he has, in the meantime, paid over the money to his employer, he may recover it back from him.⁵ So, a stockbroker, who has made a contract on behalf of his principal, which the latter cannot complete, is authorized to pay the money necessary and proper to make good the difference, and to meet the loss paid on account of his principal, when that is in accordance with the rules established at the Exchange, although these rules may not be known to the principal.⁶ Indeed, so true is this doctrine, that, under ordinary circumstances, a deviation from such usages will, if a loss should occur therefrom, exclusively fall upon the agent, even though he acted with an anxious desire to promote the interests of his principal thereby.⁷ And, on the other hand, if the

¹ 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 614–616, (4th edit.); 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 196; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 161, 162, (3d edit.); Id. 198. See *Eagle Bank v. Smith*, 5 Conn. 71.

² Ante, §§ 60, 73, 77.

³ *Grant v. Ludlow*, 8 Ohio St. R. 54.

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 4, 5, 9, 45, 204, 205, 209, (3d edit.); 1 Bell, Comm. 388, art. 412, (4th edit.); Id. p. 478 to 482, (5th edit.); Ante, §§ 60, 73, 77; Post, § 110.

⁵ *Young v. Cole*, 3 Bing. N. Cas. 724.

⁶ *Sutton v. Tatham*, 10 Adolph. & Ell. 27.

⁷ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 46, 47; *Russell v. Hankey*, 6 T.

agent conducts his business according to such usages, he will be exonerated from all responsibility, even if it could be shown, that by a deviation from them he might have acted more beneficially for his principal.¹

§ 97. In the next place, as to the incidents, which are implied by law from the direct or principal authority. We have already had occasion to state, that every such authority carries with it, or includes in it, as an incident, all the powers, which are necessary, or proper, or usual, as means to effectuate the purposes for which it was created.² In this respect, there is no distinction, whether the authority given to an agent is general or special, or whether it is express or implied. In each case it embraces the appropriate means to accomplish the desired end.³ Thus, (as we have seen,) where an agent is employed to procure a negotiable bill or note, belonging to his principal, to be discounted, he may, unless specially restricted, indorse it in the name of the principal, and bind him by the indorsement.⁴ So, an order to send goods to the principal from a foreign country, implies a power to ship them generally, so as to bind both the principal and the goods for the freight.⁵

§ 98. In some cases, the nature and extent of the incidental authority turn upon very nice considerations, either of actual usage, or of implications of law. Thus, an agent, employed to

R. 12; *Belchier v. Parsons*, Ambler, R. 219, 220; *Caffrey v. Darby*, 6 Ves. 496; *Massey v. Banner*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 241, 248, 249; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 197, 199.

¹ *Moore v. Mourgue*, Cowp. R. 480; *Smith v. Cologan*, 2 T. R. 188, note (a); *Russell v. Hankey*, 6 T. R. 12; *Belchier v. Parsons*, Ambler, R. 219, 220; *Warwick v. Noakes*, Peake, R. 68; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 9, 10, 21, (3d edit.); *Id.* 45-47; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 622 to 624, (4th edit.)

² Ante, §§ 58-60, 73, 85-88; *Williams v. Getty*, 31 Penn. St. R. 464.

³ 1 Bell, Comm. 387, art. 412, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 478 to 482, (5th edit.); Ante, § 58; *Howard v. Baillie*, 2 H. Bl. 618; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 189, (3d edit.); 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 198-200; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 3, art. 10; *Id.* B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 1, 2; *Damon v. Inhab. of Granby*, 2 Pick 345; Ante, §§ 58-60, 73, 85-88.

⁴ Ante, § 59; *Fenn v. Harrison*, 3 T. R. 757; S. C. 4 T. R. 177; 1 Bell, Comm. 387, art. 412, (4th edit.); *Id.* pp. 478-482, (5th edit.); *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 197, 198, (3d edit.) ♦

⁵ 1 Bell, Comm. 387, art. 412, (4th edit.); *Id.* pp. 478-482, (5th edit.); *Molloy de Jure Marit.* B. 3, ch. 8, § 9; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd. 241.

make, or negotiate, or conclude a contract, is not, as of course, to be treated as having an incidental authority to receive payments, which may become due under such contract.¹ An agent, authorized to take a bond, is not to be deemed, as of course, entitled to receive payment of the money due under that bond.² But, if he is intrusted with the continued possession of that bond, an implication of such authority may be deduced from that fact, in connection with the other.³ So, an agent, authorized to receive payment, has not an unlimited authority to receive it in any mode which he may choose; but he is ordinarily deemed intrusted with the power to receive it in money only.⁴ So, an agent, intrusted to receive payment of a negotiable or other instrument, is ordinarily deemed entitled to receive it only, when and after, it becomes due, and not before it becomes due.⁵ But if there be a known usage of trade, or course of business in a particular employment or habit of dealing between the parties, extending the ordinary reach of the authority, that may well be held to give full validity to the act.⁶

● Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 274-276; 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 207, 208; Whitlock v. Waltham, 1 Salk. 157; Peck v. Harriot, 6 Serg. & R. 149; Puttock v. Ware, 3 Hurl. & Norm. 979, (Am. edit.); Wostenholm v. Davies, 2 Freem. R. 289; Henn v. Conisby, 1 Ch. Cas. 93, Gerard v. Baker, 1 Ch. Cas. 94, note; Duchess of Cleveland v. Dashwood, 2 Eq. Ab. 709; Williams v. Walker, 2 Sandford, Ch. R. 225. ●

² See *The River Clyde Trustees v. Duncan*, 25 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 19.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 274-276; 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 207, 208; Whitlock v. Waltham, 1 Salk. 157; Peck v. Harriot, 6 Serg. & R. 149; Wostenholm v. Davies, 2 Freem. R. 289; Henn v. Conisby, 1 Ch. Cas. 93; Gerard v. Baker, 1 Ch. Cas. 94, note; Duchess of Cleveland v. Dashwood, 2 Eq. Abridg. 709; Williams v. Walker, 2 Sandford, Ch. R. 225. See also as to negotiable securities, *Mathews v. Haydon*, 2 Esp. 510.

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 278-280, 290, 291; Smith on Merc. Law, B. 1, ch. 5, § 4, pp. 124, 125 (3d edit. 1843); Favenc v. Bennet, 11 East, R. 38; Blackburn v. Scholes, 2 Camp. 343; Todd v. Reid, 4 B. & Ald. 210; Russell v. Bangley, 4 B. & Ald. 395; Bartlett v. Pentland, 10 B. & Cresw. 769; Scott v. Irving, 1 B. & Adolph. 605; Barker v. Greenwood, 2 Y. & Coll. R. 415; Post, §§ 181, 215, 413, 429, 430; Underwood v. Nicholls, 17 C. B. 239. See *Stewart v. Aberdein*, 4 M. & W. 211.

⁵ See Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 284, 290; Campbell v. Hassell, 1 Stark. R. 233; Parnter v. Gaitskell, 13 East, 437, per Bayley, J.

⁶ Ibid.; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 290, 291; 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 207, 208.

§ 99. Upon similar grounds, an agent employed to receive payment is not, unless some special authority beyond the ordinary reach is given to him, clothed with authority to commute the debt for another thing; or to compound the debt; or to release it upon a composition;¹ [or to receive the debtor's note for it,²] or to pledge a note received for the debt, or the money when received;³ or to submit the debt or demand to arbitration;⁴ unless, indeed, the particular employment of the agent, or the general usage of business, or the habits of dealing between the parties, should raise a presumption the other way. The same principles seem to have been fully recognized and acted on in the civil law.⁵

§ 100. Incidental powers are generally deduced either from the nature and objects of the particular act or agency, or from the particular business, employment, or character of the agent himself.⁶ In some cases, the deduction is, in the absence of all contrary proofs, a mere inference of law; in others it is a mere matter of fact, or an inference of fact; in others, again, it is a mixed question of law and fact.⁷ It may not be without use to give a few additional illustrations of these suggestions, although a thorough review of all the cases would necessarily occupy a disproportionate space in the present Commentaries.

§ 101. And, first, as to the incidental powers by inference or intendment of law.⁸ A bailiff of a manor (it is said) may make leases at will without any special authority; although he cannot make leases for years. The reason commonly assigned for this distinction is, that the appropriate business of such a bailiff is only to collect rents, gather fines, look after forfeitures, and to do

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 290-292; 3 Chitt^y on Comm. & Manuf. 207-209.

² McCulloch v. McKee, 4 Harris, 289.

³ Hays v. Lynn, 7 Watts, R. 524, Jones v. Farley, 6 Greenl. R. 226, Ante, § 78; Post, § 113, and note.

⁴ Caldwell on Arbitrations, 14, 15, 152, 153; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 191; Id. 291, n. (e); Goodson v. Brooke, 4 Camp. R. 168. And see Scarborough v. Reynolds, 12 Ala. 252.

⁵ Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 3, art. 11; Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 3, l. 60; Ante, § 70.

⁶ See Hearne v. Keene, 5 Bosw. 685.

⁷ Chitt^y on Comm. & Manuf. 198-201; Ante, 58-60, 83.

⁸ See Howard v. Bailie, 2 H. Bl. 618.

other acts of a like nature, for the lord. But he hath no estate or interest in the manor itself; and, therefore, he cannot contract for any certain interest thereout, but he must have a special power for that purpose. But he may make leases at will without any special authority; because being appointed to collect and answer the rents of the manor to his lord, if he could not make leases at will, the lord might sustain great prejudice in case of his own absence, sickness, or other incapacity to make leases, when any of the former leases were expired. And such leases at will are for the benefit of the lord, and can be no ways prejudicial to him; because he may determine his will, when he may think fit.¹ But the bailiff of an estate has no implied authority to pledge the credit of his principal by drawing or indorsing bills of exchange, although he is the party through whose hands all receipts and payments respecting the estate take place.²

§ 102. Upon a similar ground of incidental authority by operation of law, an authority to buy or sell goods includes the authority to execute the proper vouchers therefor; an authority "to do the needful," in respect to the fulfilment of an award, carries the incidental power to prepare a release, if required by the award;³ an authority to superintend the building of a meeting-house, to procure an architect, and to borrow money, if necessary, includes an authority to make the necessary contracts for the building of the meeting-house;⁴ an authority to sell a horse includes [it has been thought⁵] a power to warrant him;⁶

¹ Bac Abridg. *Leases and Terms for Years*, l. 8; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 189, 190. See Cro. Jac. 177, 178. It may deserve consideration, whether this doctrine is applicable to the modern cases of a lease at will, when construed to be a lease from year to year, or to any leases, except those which are strictly leases at will. In Rolle's Abridgment, title *Bailiffe*, l. 25, it is laid down, that a bailiff of a manor may make a lease of a piscary for years, for which he cites 3 H. 4, 12 b. But although the point arose in that case, it does not seem to have been decided by the Court, for the cause went off upon another issue. See Brook, Abridg. *Baillie*, pl. 40, 41.

² *Davidson v. Stanley*, 2 Mann. & Grang. 721; Ante, §§ 58, 59.

³ *Dawson v. Lawley*, 4 Esp. R. 66; Ante, §§ 58-60, 83.

⁴ *Damon v. Inhab. of Granby*, 2 Pick. 345.

⁵ But see *Scott v. McGrath*, 7 Barbour, 53^d; *Bryant v. Moore*, 26 Maine, 81; *Lipcomb v. Kitrell*, 11 Humph. 256.

⁶ *Ibid.*; Ante, §§ 58, 59; *Bradford v. Bush*, 10 Ald. 386; *Helyear v. Hawke*,

a power to sell goods includes a power to warrant them;¹ a power to buy a thing, without any statement at what price, includes the power to buy at any price;² [and if the agent be not furnished with funds, to buy on credit;³] a power to deliver seisin of lands includes the power to enter upon a lessee of the land, in order to make the livery;⁴ a power to sell goods includes a power to receive payment [at the same time⁵] on the sale;⁶ [but a simple power to sell does not authorize a sale at auction;⁷] a power to recover and receive a debt includes the power to sue for the debt, and upon payment to make a proper release or discharge of the debtor.⁸

§ 103. Upon grounds nearly similar, it has been held, that an

⁵ Esp. R. 73-75; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 617, 618, 621, (4th edit.);

³ Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 198-201.

¹ Andrews v. Kneeland, 6 Cowen, R. 354.

² Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 3, § 1.

³ Sprague v. Gillett, 9 Met. 91.

⁴ 1 Liverm. on Agency, 105, 106, (edit. 1818); Co Litt. 52 b.

[⁵ But not at a subsequent time, unless there be some other proof of authority than a mere power of sale. Seeple v. Irwin, 30 Penn. St. R. 513.]

⁶ Capel v. Thornton, 3 Carr. & Payne, 352; Peck v. Harriot, 6 S. & R. 146; Hoskins v. Johnson, 5 Sneed, 469. But see Mynn v. Joliffe, 1 Mood. & Rob. 326, cited post, § 108, note.

⁷ Towle v. Leavitt, 3 Foster, 360.

⁸ Ante, §§ 58-60; 1 Domat, B. 1 tit. 15, § 3, art. 10; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 290, 291; Com. Dig. Attorney, C. 15, citing Palmer, R. 394; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 105, 106, (edit. 1818.) The civil law (as we have seen) adopted the same doctrine. *Ad rem mobilem petendam datus Procurator, ad exhibendum recte aget.* Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 3, l. 56. Mr. Chitty (3, Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 210) has laid it down as a general proposition, that, where an agent has any beneficial interest in the performance of the contract for commissions, &c., he may bring an action on the contract in his own name, though the principal may also sue in the same case. And he illustrates his remark by stating the case of a factor, a broker, an auctioneer, a policy broker, whose name is on the policy, and a shipmaster for freight; in all which cases, he says, the agent may sue in his own name. The case of a broker, unless he is also a factor, or named in the contract, does not justify his position. And it is far from being generally true, that an agent, who has an interest in the contract for his commissions, may therefore sue. He can sue only when, in contemplation of law, he as well as his principal, is a party to the contract. Thus, if a factor should sell goods, and take a negotiable note in the name of the principal for the amount of the sales, he could not sue on the note so given in his own name, notwithstanding his commissions for the sale were included in the note. Ante, §§ 98, 101; Post, 391-404, 422, 450.

agent to insure, has an incidental authority to abandon the property insured to the underwriters, in the case of a total loss.¹ So, an agent to insure has, if the policy remains in his hands, an incidental authority to receive payment of losses thereon.² So, an agent, employed to subscribe a policy for the principal, has an implied authority to adjust the loss upon the same policy; and to receive payment in money; but not to receive payment in any other manner.³ So, an agent authorized to buy a cargo for his principal, if no other means or funds are provided, has an incidental authority to give notes, or draw and negotiate bills on his principal for the amount.⁴

§ 103 *a*. In like manner, wherever a payment, if made by or by an agent, would be a good payment, and bind the principal as being within the scope of the employment of the agent, or otherwise authorized by the principal, there a tender of payment by or to an agent will in like manner be deemed a good tender to or by the principal, and bind the parties accordingly.⁵

§ 104. In the next place, as to the cases of incidental authority, as a mere inference of fact from the peculiar circumstances of the case. Thus, if a merchant has been in the habit of allowing particular clerks in his counting-house to sign and indorse notes on his account, this will furnish an inference, that it is incidental to their authority as such clerks, although not otherwise properly pertaining to their duties.⁶ So, if an agent takes a bond

¹ *Chesapeake Insur. Co. v. Stark*, 6 Cranch, 268, 272; 1 Emerig. Assur. ch. 5, § 4, pp. 141, 142; Ante, § 58.

² *Bousfield v. Croswell*, 2 Camp. R. 545; Ante, § 58, Post, § 191.

³ *Richardson v. Anderson*, 1 Camp. R. 43 n.; *Todd v. Reed*, 4 Barn. & Ald. 210; Ante, § 58. The case of an insurance broker illustrates the general principle in a very clear manner. He has acquired, by usage, a known authority to adjust the loss, and receive payment thereof. But his authority to receive payment is, by the same usage, restricted to recovering payment in money; and he cannot receive it so as to bind his principal in any other manner. Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 278, 281-285; *Todd v. Reid*, 4 Barn. & Ald. 210; *Russell v. Bangley*, 4 B. & Ald. 395; *Bartlett v. Pentland*, 10 B. & Cressw. 760; *Scott v. Irving*, 1 B. & Adolph. 605; *Campbell v. Hassell*, 1 Stark. R. 233; Ante, § 58.

⁴ *Ferrotin v. Cucullu*, 6 Louis. R. 587; Ante, §§ 58, 59.

⁵ *Smith on Merc. Law*, pp. 124, 125, (3d edit.) 1843; *Moffat v. Parsons*, 5 Taunt. R. 807; *Goodland v. Blewith*, 1 Camp. R. 477; *Kirton v. Braithwaite*, 1 Mees. & Wels. 310; Post, § 413.

⁶ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 161-169, (3d edit.); *Id.* 198, 211; *Dyer v.*

for his principal, and is allowed to retain possession of it, it is presumed, that he possesses an incidental authority to receive the money which is due on it; [but this ceases whenever the bond is withdrawn.¹] And, generally, the possession of a negotiable instrument is deemed sufficient *prima facie* evidence of the title of the possessor to receive payment of it.²

§ 105. In the next place, as to cases where the question of incidental authority is a mixed question of law and fact. This most commonly arises where the point turns upon the consideration, whether the agent is a general or a special agent; or whether, if a general agent, his special instructions are known to the other party. In each of these cases, the ultimate decision must rest, partly upon principles of law, and partly upon facts, limiting or controlling the application of those principles. Thus, if a person be a general agent, his acts, as such, will bind his principal, although he may have received private instructions narrowing or withdrawing his authority.³ But, if those instructions are known to the other party, dealing with him, then those instructions become, as to such person, the sole guide and authority, by which to measure the extent of the rights and duties of the agent.⁴

§ 106. But, by far the largest portion of incidental powers is deduced from the particular business, employment, or character of the agents themselves. Whatever acts are usually done by such classes of agents; whatever rights are usually exercised by them; and whatever duties are usually attached to them; all such acts, rights, and duties are deemed to be incidents of the authority confided to them in their particular business, employ-

Pearson, 3 B. & Cressw. 38, 42; Whitehead v. Tuckett, 15 East, 409, 410; Thorold v. Smith, 11 Mod. R. 87, 88; 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 199, 200, Smith on Merc. Law, pp 124, 125, (3d edit. 1843); Ante, §§ 59, 92; Smith v. East India Co. 16 Simons, R. 76.

¹ Whitelocke v. Waltham, 1 Salk. 157; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 274, 275. See The River Clyde Trustees v. Duncan, 25 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 19; Williams v. Walker, 2 Sandford, Ch. R. 225.

² Owen v. Barrow, 4 Bos. & Pull. 101; Hatfield v. Reynolds, 34 Barbour, 612; Anon. 12 Mod. 564; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 276; 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 207, 208.

³ Ante, § 73; Post, §§ 127, 128, 443.

⁴ See ante, § 73; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 620, 621, (4th edit.) 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 198-200; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 169, 211, (3d edit.).

ment or character.¹ These, indeed, are in some cases so well known and so well defined in the common negotiations of commerce, and by the frequent recognitions of courts of justice, as to become matters of legal intendment and inference, and not to be open for inquiry or controversy. In other cases, indeed, they may be fairly open, as matters of fact, to be established by suitable proofs.² Thus, for example, the general incidental authorities, rights, and duties of auctioneers, of brokers, of factors, of cashiers of banks, of masters of ships, and of partners, are in general so well known and defined, as to be propounded as matters of law, not open to be discussed before a jury. Perhaps it may not be without use, even at the hazard of some repetition, to state some of the incidental powers of these classes of agents, which have been familiarly recognized in courts of justice, as they will, at the same time, suggest, some of the correspondent limitations upon these powers, and show their proper extent and determination.

§ 107. And, first, as to Auctioneers. We have already had occasion to consider the nature and character of this class of agents, and to refer to the fact, that for some purposes, an auctioneer is deemed the agent of both parties.³ Thus, he has an incidental authority, *virtute officii*, to bind both the seller and the purchaser, by his memorandum of the sale and purchase.⁴ He has also an incidental authority to sue the purchaser in his own name, as being in some sort, not merely an agent, but a contracting party.⁵ He has also a right to prescribe the rules of bidding, and the terms of sale.⁶ And his verbal declarations at the sale, at least where they do not contradict the written particulars of the sale, are admissible against

¹ Pothier on Obligations, by Evans, n. 454-456; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 1-3.

² 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 20; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 281-285.

³ Ante, § 27; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 281.

⁴ Ante, § 27; Williams v. Millington, 1 H. Bl. 85; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 292.

⁵ Ante, § 27; Williams v. Millington, 1 H. Bl. 81, 84, 85; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 210; Robinson v. Rutter, 30 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 401; 4 M. & Bl. 954; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 362, (3d edit.); Atkyns v. Amber, 2 Esp. R. 493; Post, § 397.

⁶ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 257; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 77, (edit. 1818.)

the principal and binding on him, as an incident to his authority to sell.¹

§ 108. On the other hand, an auctioneer is deemed the agent of the seller at the sale only; and, therefore, after the sale is made, he has no incidental authority to deal with the purchaser as to the terms, upon which a title is to be made, without some special authority for that purpose.² He cannot delegate his authority to another person; not even to his own clerk.³ He cannot sell on credit;⁴ neither can he sell at private sale.⁵

§ 109. Secondly, as to Brokers. These, as we have seen, have an incidental authority to sign the contract for, and as the agent of, both parties.⁶ A broker employed to effect a policy, has an incidental authority to adjust losses upon it; and, if employed to settle losses, he has authority to refer a disputed loss to arbitration.⁷ A broker, employed to buy or sell without limi-

¹ See Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 257, (3d edit.), *Gunnis v Exhart*, 1 H. Bl 289, *Howard v Braithwaite*, 1 Ves & B 209, 210, *Powell v Edmunds*, 12 East, R 6, *Ogilvie v Toljanbie*, 3 Meriv R 53. Whether an auctioneer has, *virtute officii*, a right to warrant the goods, does not seem to be perfectly clear upon the authorities. In the case of *The Monte Allegre*, 9 Wheat R 645, 647, it was laid down, that sales at auction in the usual mode are never understood to be accompanied by a warranty. And it was added, that auctioneers are special agents, and have only authority to sell, and not to warrant, unless specially instructed so to do. The authorities, cited in support of the text, seem to inculcate a more modified doctrine. But in cases of judicial sales by marshals, and other public officers, they have no authority to warrant. *The Monte Allegre*, 9 Wheat R 644 to 646, *Port v The United States*, 1 Dev. R. Court of Claims, *Puckett v. United States*, Id., *Yates v. Bond*, 2 McCord, 382, *Bashore v Whisler*, 3 Watts 490.

² *Seton v Slade*, 7 Ves 276, Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 208.

³ Ante §§ 13, 29, *Coles v Frecothick*, 9 Ves 234.

⁴ 3 Chitty on Comm and Manuf 218, and cases there cited. See ante, § 60.

⁵ Ante, § 27. Whether an auctioneer has authority to receive the whole purchase-money on a sale of real estate, or only the deposit, may admit of some question. It was said, in argument by counsel, in *Mynn v Joliffe*, 1 Mood & Rob 326, that he had only a right to receive the deposit. And it was held by Littledale, J., in the same case generally, that "an agent employed to sell [an estate] has no authority, as such, to receive payment." See, as to sale of personal chattels, *Capel v. Thornton*, 3 Carr & Payne, 352, and ante, §§ 27, 102.

⁶ Ante, § 28 to 32, Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 314, 315, and note. See, as to power of brokers to bind both parties, *Greaves v. Legg*, 34 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 489; 2 Hurl. & Norm. 210.

⁷ Ante, § 58, *Richardson v. Anderson*, 1 Camp. R 43, note; *Goodson v*

tation of price, has the incidental authority to bind his principal by any price, at which he honestly buys or sells.¹ So, a broker, authorized to sell goods without any express restriction as to the mode, may sell the same by sample or with warranty.² Ordinarily, he cannot make the contract in his own name; but ought to do it in the name of the principal.³ There are exceptions, however, by the usages of trade, as in cases of policies of insurance, which are usually made in the name of the policy broker, and he may then sue thereon.⁴ So, he cannot buy or sell on credit, except in cases justified by the usages of trade.⁵ So, a broker has ordinarily no authority *virtute officii*, to receive payment for property sold by him; and, if payment is made to him by the purchaser, it is at his own risk, unless from other circumstances the authority can be inferred.⁶ A broker also has no power to delegate his own authority to another person.⁷

§ 110. Thirdly, as to Factors. Factors, as we have seen, may sell in their own name the goods of their principal; and

Brooks, 4 Camp. R. 163; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 191, 192, 281; 1 Emerigon, ch. 5, § 4, p. 141, edit. Boulay Paty.

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 208, 209; East India Co. v. Hensley, 1 Esp. R. 111.

² Andrews v. Kneeland, 6 Cowen, R. 354; The Monte Allegre, 9 Wheat. 643, 644.

³ 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 17, § 1, art. 1; Ante, §§ 28 to 32.

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 362; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 210; Baring v. Corrie, 2 Barn. & Ald. 137; Post, §§ 161, 272, 394.

⁵ Ante, § 60; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 212; Henderson v. Barnwell, 1 Y. & Jerv. 387.

⁶ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 279, 280; Baring v. Corrie, 2 B. & Ald. 137; Campbell v. Hassell, 1 Stark. R. 233. [The contrary was held in Higgins v. Morse, 6 Bosworth, 344.] Insurance brokers are considered as having, by usage, an authority to adjust losses, and to receive payment of them. Ante, §§ 58, 103; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 281 to 285; Id. 291; Todd v. Reid, 4 B. & Ald. 210; Scott v. Irving, 1 B. & Adolph. 605; Bousfield v. Creswell, 2 Camp. R. 545; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 2, p. 356, (edit. 1818); Richardson v. Anderson, 1 Camp. R. 43, note; 1 Emerigon, ch. 5, § 4. But then, they are restricted to the receiving of money in payment; and are not at liberty to receive payment in any other manner, unless, indeed, there is a clear usage of trade governing the case. Ante, §§ 98, 103, and note; Post, §§ 181, 413, 430; Paley on Agency, 281 to 285; Todd v. Reid, ubi supra; Russell v. Bangle, Barn. & Ald. 395; Bartlett v. Pentland, 10 B. & Cressw. 760.

⁷ Ante, §§ 13, 29.

they may buy goods in the like manner for their principal; and in each case the principal will be bound by their acts, in the same way and to the same extent, as if his own name were used.¹ They have also an incidental authority to sell on credit, where the usage of trade justifies it.² So, factors, employed to ship goods, as well as to buy goods for their principal, have an incidental authority to bind the latter to the payment of the freight.³ And where they have a general authority to buy, or to sell, they are treated as general agents, and their acts bind their principal, even though they have violated their private and secret instructions.⁴ [Factors, however, like other agents, are bound to obey the directions of their employer, or they are responsible.⁵] But factors cannot ordinarily delegate their authority to other persons.⁶

§ 111. Factors have also a special property in the goods consigned to them; and for many, if not for most purposes, (except as between themselves and their principal,) they are treated as the owners of the goods.⁷ We have seen, that consignees for sale, such as commission merchants, are truly described as factors.⁸ The question has often been discussed, whether factors, or consignees for sale have an implied authority to insure for their principal; for there cannot be a doubt, that they may insure upon their own account to the extent of their own interest. The general doctrine now established is,

¹ Ante, § 34; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 207.

² Ante, § 60, Post, §§ 209, 226; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 1, 2; Byrne v. Schwing, 6 B. Monroe, 199; Greely v. Bartlett, 1 Greenl. R. 172; Forestier v. Bordman, 1 Story, R. 43.

³ Ante, § 98, Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 241.

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 206, 207; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 198, 199, 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 619, 620, (4th edit.) But see Day v. Crawford, 13 Georgia, 508.

⁵ Evans v. Root, 3 Seld. 186; Day v. Crawford, 13 Georgia, 508.

⁶ Ante, §§ 13, 14.

⁷ Ante, §§ 34, 102, note. The question as to the precise time when the property may be said to vest in a factor, who is consignee under liabilities in advance, properly falls under the Law of Shipping, and especially under that branch of it which respects the right of stoppage in *transitu*. See Abbott on Shipp. p. 3, ch. 9, § 4 to 25; Holbrook v. Wight, 24 Wend. R. 169; Hall v. Smith, 1 Bos. & Pull. 563.

⁸ Ante, §§ 33, 34; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 204, 205; Martini v. Coles, 1 M. & Selw. 140, 147.

that they may insure both for themselves and for their principal.¹ But they are not positively bound to insure, unless they have received orders to insure, or promise to insure, or the usage of trade, or the habit of dealing between them and their principals, raises an implied obligation to insure.² They may insure in their own names, or in the name and for the benefit of their principal. If they insure in their own name only, they may, in case of loss, recover the whole amount of the value of the property insured from the underwriters, and the surplus beyond their own interest, will be a resulting trust for the benefit of their principals.³ Whether, if they are mere naked consignees, to take possession of the goods only, without a power to sell, they have a right to insure for themselves, or for their principal, is perhaps more questionable; but the point has not as yet become the subject of direct adjudication.⁴

§ 112. It is to this consideration, that factors are to be treated as special owners of the property consigned to them, that we may refer many of the rights and powers attributed to them. They may sue in their own names for the prices of goods sold by them for their principal; and they are also liable to be sued for goods bought by them for their principal; and of course they have a right in their own names to receive payments, to give re-

¹ *Waters v. Monarch Life & Fire Ins. Co.* 34 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 116, 5 Ellis & Blackb. 870.

² *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 18-20; *Id.* 107, 108; *Post*, § 190; *Smith v. Lascelles*, 2 T. R. 189; *Crauford v. Hunter*, 8 T. R. 13; *French v. Backhouse*, 5 Burr. R. 2727; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 8, § 1, pp. 325, 326 (edit. 1818); *Morris v. Summerl*, 1 *Cundy's Marshall on Ins.* 301 a, note; *Randolph v. Ware*, 3 *Cranch, R.* 503; *S. C.* 2 *Wash.*; *Columbian Ins. Co. v. Lawrence*, 2 *Peters, R.* 49.

³ *Ibid*; *Post*, §§ 16, 274, 394.

⁴ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 207, 208; *Wolfe v. Horncastle*, 1 *Bos. & Pull.* 323; *Lucena v. Crawford*, 3 *Bos. & Pull.* 98; *Lucena v. Crawford*, 5 *Bos. & Pull.* 324, per Lord Eldon; *Cornwall v. Wilson*, 1 *Ves.* 509; *De Forest v. Fulton Ins. Co.* 1 *Hall, R.* 84, 106, 107, 134, 135. This whole subject underwent much examination in the case of *Lucena v. Crawford*, 3 *Bos. & Pull.* 75; *S. C.* 5 *Bos. & Pull.* 269. But the most ample and satisfactory discussion of it is to be found in the very elaborate opinions delivered by Mr. Ch. Justice Jones, and Mr. Justice Oakley, in the Superior Court of New York, in *De Forest v. The Fulton Ins. Co.* 1 *Hall, R.* 84, 100 to 136.

⁵ See *White v. Chouteau*, 10 *Barb.* 202.

ceipts for payments, and to discharge the debtors from their official transactions,¹ at least, unless notice is given to the contrary by their principal.² The circumstance, that factors are acting under a *del credere* commission, does not seem to make any difference as to the validity or extent of their authority.³

§ 113. On the other hand, factors have no incidental authority to barter the goods of their principal,⁴ or to pledge such goods for advances made to them on their own account, or for debts due by themselves;⁵ although they may certainly pledge them

¹ *Drinkwater v. Goodwin*, Cowp. R. 254; *Johnson v. Usborne*, 11 Adolph. & Ell. 549; Post, § 400.

² Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 278, 285, 286; Post, §§ 401, 401 a.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 285, 286; *Morris v. Cleasby*, 4 M. & Selw. 566, 574, 575; Ante, § 33, and note; *Thompson v. Perkins*, 3 Mason, R. 232, 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 624, (4th edit.), 2 Stair, Instit. by Brodie, §21, §22, note; Post, § 215; *Graham v. Ackroyd*, 19 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 659; 10 Hare, 192.

⁴ Ante, § 78; *Guernero v. Peile*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 616; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 625-628, (4th edit.)

⁵ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 213-232; Post, § 389; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 204, 205, *Rodriguez v. Heffernan*, 5 Johns. Ch. R. 429, *Benny v. Rhodes*, 18 Miss. 147; *Kelly v. Smith*, 1 Blatch. 290; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 625-627, (4th edit.); 1 Bell, Comm. B. 3, Pt. 1, ch. 4, art. 412, pp. 388-394, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 485-488, (5th edit.), *Boyson v. Coles*, 6 M. & Selw. 14; *Evans v. Potter*, 2 Gallison, R. 13, 14; *Van Amringe v. Peabody*, 1 Mason, R. 440. The point, whether a factor has an authority to pledge the goods of his principal, as has been already stated, (ante, § 78, note,) has undergone a good deal of discussion, and no small degree of doubt has been entertained upon it, until a recent period. The doctrine is now fully established in England, that he cannot pledge, although some of the Judges have lamented the establishment of it. The same doctrine seems now generally established in America. (*Rodriguez v. Heffernan*, 5 Johns. Ch. R. 429; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 625, 626, 4th edit.; Story on Bailm. §§ 325, 326.) In Scotland, as Mr. Bell informs us, (1 Bell, Comm. art. 412, p. 388, 4th edit.; Id. pp. 485-488, 5th edit.) the doctrine is directly the other way. The English doctrine is apparently founded upon the rule of the civil law, — *Nemo plus juris in alium transferre potest, quam ipse haberet*. (Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 54.) In the civil law, this rule was directly applied to the case of pledges. *Jure pignoris teneri non posse, nisi quæ obligantis in bonis fuerint; et per alium rem alienam invito dominio pignori obligari non posse, certissimum est*. (Cod. Lib. 8, tit. 16, l. 6.) The same rule has been generally applied in the law of the continental nations of Europe, as for example, in France, Holland, and Italy, and also in Scotland. Still, it is but a general rule; and therefore not absolutely superseding other considerations, growing out of the character of the parties, and the nature of the particular authority conferred upon the party who is in possession of the property. The question is

for advances lawfully made on account of their principal, or for advances made to themselves, to the extent of their own lien on the goods.¹ So, factors may pledge the goods of their principal for the payment of the duties and other charges due thereon; and, indeed, for any other charges and purposes, which are allowed or justified by the usages of trade.² [If a factor pledges

not, in many cases, whether a party can transfer that to another, which he does not in reality possess and own; but whether a party, ostensibly clothed with the ownership of property by the real owner, and thus acquiring an apparent authority to dispose of the whole interest, may not dispose of an interest in such property, less than the whole, to another innocent party. If one of two innocent persons must suffer by the wrongful act of a third person, it is certainly most conformable to equity and sound principles, that he should suffer, who has enabled such third person to hold himself out as competent to do the act. The very circumstance, that in England, the Parliament has interfered, and, by an express statute, (6 George 4, ch. 94,) amendatory of a prior act on the same subject, (4 George 4, ch. 83,) enabled factors and others, not owners, to pledge goods for advances made to them, as well as for preexisting debts, demonstrates the inconveniences of the old rule; and, the importance of relaxing it in commercial transactions. This statute, and the constructions put upon it, are given at large in Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, pp. 219-233, and Appendix, No 1, pp. 403-407. An additional statute on the same subject has since been passed. (5th & 6th Victoria, ch. 39.) See Smith on Merc. Law, pp. 112-122; Id. Appendix, lii.; Id. cexvi., (3d edit 1843) Mr. Bell, in his Commentaries, (1 Bell, Comm. B. 3, Pt. 1, ch. 4, § 4, art. 412, pp. 388-391, (4th edit); Id. pp. 405-488, (5th edit) has given his own views in favor of the doctrine that the factor has a right to pledge, with great clearness; and has also expounded, in his text and notes, the present state of the law on this point among the continental nations of Europe. See also Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 220, 221, note (3); Dan. & Lloyd's Mercantile Cases, 29, note to *Blandy v. Allen*; Story on Bailm. §§ 324, 326, 327; *Evans v. Potter*, 2 Gallis. R. 14; 3 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 625-628, (4th edit.); *Williams v. Barton*, 3 Bingham R. 139; *Queiroz v. Trueman*, 3 B. & Cressw. 342; *Laussatt v. Lippincott*, 6 Serg. & R. 386.

¹ Bell, Comm. B. 3, Pt. 1, ch. 4, art. 412, pp. 391, 392, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 385-389, (5th edit.); *Pultney v. Keymer*, 3 Esp. R. 182; *Urquhart v. McIver*, 4 John. R. 103; *McCombie v. Davis*, 7 East, R. 5; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 165, 217, (3d edit.); 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 625-628, (3d edit.) See *Mann v. Shiffner*, 2 East, R. 523, 529; *Solly v. Rathbone*, 2 M. & Selw. 298; Story on Bailm. §§ 325-327. Some of the American States, and particularly Rhode Island, New York, and Pennsylvania, have in substance, by positive enactments, adopted the statute of 6 Geo. 4, ch. 94, on the subject of factors. 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 628, note (a.) (4th edit.)

² *Evans v. Potter*, 2 Gallis. R. 13. See 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 627, 628, (4th edit.); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, p. 217; *Pultney v. Keymer*, 3 Esp. R. 182; *Laussatt v. Lippincott*, 6 Serg. & R. 386. This I conceive to be the true

goods of his principal without authority, he does not thereby lose his power to sell them; and a *bonâ fide* purchaser may maintain an action against the pledgee therefor.¹

§ 114. Fourthly, as to Cashiers of Banks. It may be stated,² as a general proposition, that the officers of a bank are held out to the public as having authority to act according to the general usage, practice, and course of business of such institutions, and that their acts, within the scope of such usage, practice, and course of business, bind the bank in favor of third persons, having no knowledge to the contrary.³ The cashier of a bank is

doctrine, notwithstanding the language used in some of the authorities. The case of *Pultney v. Keymer*, 3 Esp. R. 182, may be deemed overruled by the latter cases, and especially by the cases of *Shipley v. Kymer*, 1 M. & Selw. 484; *Solly v. Rathbone*, 2 M. & Selw. 298; *Cockran v. Irlam*, 2 M. & Selw. 301; *Martini v. Coles*, 1 M. & Selw. 140, and *Boyson v. Coles*, 6 M. & Selw. 14, as to the point of advances made to an agent on his own account. See also *Daubigny v. Duval*, 5 T. R. 604; *Queiroz v. Freeman*, 3 B. & Cresw. 342; *Mark v. Bowers*, 16 Martin, R. 95. In *Martini v. Coles*, 1 M. & Selw. 140, Lord Ellenborough and Mr. Justice Le Blanc recognized the right to pledge for advances and charges on account of the principal. The cases of *Solly v. Rathbone*, 2 M. & Selw. 298, and *Cockran v. Irlam*, 2 M. & Selw. 301, note, do, it must be admitted, seem to overturn the authority of *Pultney v. Keymer*, 3 Esp. R. 182, as to the point of advances and charges made on account of the principal. But in each of those cases, there was this ingredient, that it was not the case of a mere pledge for advances and charges on account of the principal, but a delegation also of authority to the pledgee, as sub-agent or co-agent, to sell the goods, which was held to be tortious; as an agent could not delegate his authority. *Pro tanto*, no doubt, the authority was void. But why should the pledge be held void, as to advances and charges made for the principal? The ground seems to have been, (whether it be satisfactory or not,) that the sale by the pledgee as co-agent or sub-agent, made the whole proceeding tortious *ab initio*. That doctrine would not apply to a mere pledge for advances and charges required to be made for the principal, where the original agent still retained his general authority. This whole subject is very accurately and clearly discussed, and the results stated, in Mr. Chancellor Kent's learned Commentaries. 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 625-628, (4th edit.) What circumstances will or will not amount to an implied authority to an agent, from whom advances are asked, to make a pledge for such advances, is a matter upon which the authorities leave much doubt; and especially the cases of *Graham v. Dyster*, 2 Stark. R. 21, and *Queiroz v. Freeman*, 3 B. & Cresw. 342; and *Laussatt v. Lippincott*, 6 Serg. & R. 386; *Newbold v. Wright*, 4 Rawle, R. 195.

¹ *Nowell v. Pratt*, 5 Cush. 111.

² *Minor v. Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria*, 1 Peters, R. 46, 70; *Fleckner v.*

usually intrusted with all the funds of the bank, in cash, notes, bills, and other choses in action, to be used from time to time for the ordinary and extraordinary exigencies of the bank. He is accustomed to receive directly, or through the subordinate officers, all moneys and notes of the bank; to deliver up all discounted notes, and other securities and property, when payment of the dues for which they are given have been made; and to draw checks from time to time for money, wherever the bank has deposits and pecuniary funds. In short, he is considered as the executive officer, through whom and by whom the whole moneyed transactions of the bank, in paying or receiving debts, and discharging or transferring securities, are to be conducted. It does not seem, therefore, too much to infer, in the absence of all positive and known restrictions, that he possesses the incidental authority, and, indeed, that it is his duty to apply the negotiable funds, as well as the moneyed capital of the bank, to discharge its debts and obligations.¹ Hence, it seems to be a natural conclusion, that, *prima facie*, the cashier of a bank possesses the incidental authority to indorse the negotiable securities held by the bank, in order to supply the wants and to promote the interests of the bank; and any restriction upon such authority must be established by competent proofs, and will not be presumed to exist.² So, also, he possesses authority to draw checks upon other banks, upon the deposits therein of the funds of his own bank. And whether a particular check is drawn by him in his official or in his private capacity, does not depend necessarily upon the form or face of the check, but, in case of doubt, the matter is open to explanation by parol evidence.³

§ 115. But the cashier of a bank possesses no incidental authority to make any declarations, binding upon the bank, in matters not within the scope of his ordinary duties. Thus, for

Bank of U. States, 3 Wheat R. 360, 361, Frankfort Bank v. Johnson, 24 Maine, R. 490

¹ Fleckner v. Bank of the United States, 8 Wheat. R. 360, 361.

² Wild v. Bank of Passamaquoddy, 3 Mason, R. 205. See also Folger v. Chase, 18 Pick. 63; Spear v. Ladd, 11 Mass. R. 94, Northampton Bank v. Payson, 11 Mass. R. 288; Corser v. Paul, 41 N. H. R. 24, Fay v. Noble, 12 Cush. 1, Elliot v. Abbott, 12 N. H. R. 549.

³ Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria v. Bank of Columbia, 5 Wheat. R. 326, 337.

example, he has no authority to bind the bank upon a note * being offered for discount, by his declaration to a person who is about to become an indorser, that he will incur no risk and no responsibility by becoming an indorser upon such discount.¹ So, if a cashier of a bank should promise to pay a debt which the corporation did not owe, and was not liable to pay, or if he should admit forged bills of the bank to be genuine, the bank would not be bound by such promise or admission, unless it had authorized or adopted the act.² But, if the cashier of a bank should pay to a *bonâ fide* holder a forged check drawn upon the bank, the payment could not be recalled, but would be obligatory; for it is within the duty of the cashier to answer drafts drawn on the bank; and the bank intrusts him with an implied authority to decide upon the genuineness of the handwriting of the drawer of the check, when presented for payment.³ The same rule will apply to the payment of forged bank bills of a bank, by the cashier, upon presentment by a *bonâ fide* holder. The payment cannot be recalled; for the cashier is bound to know the genuine paper of the bank.⁴ It may, however, be generally stated, that the cashier of a bank cannot, by his acts, bind the bank, unless in cases within the scope of his authority.⁵ [For this reason his declarations as to past transactions, as the payment of a note, have been said not to bind a bank.⁶]

§ 116. Fifthly, as to Masters of Ships. The master of a ship has various incidental powers, resulting from his official capacity, which have been long recognized in the maritime law, and are not now open to judicial controversy. Thus, for example, he has an incidental authority to make all contracts belonging to the ordinary employment of the ship; as, for example, to let the

¹ Bank of U. States v. Dunn, 6 Peters, R. 51; Bank of Metropolis v. Jones, 8 Peters, R. 12.

² Salem Bank v. Gloucester Bank, 17 Mass. R. 1; Merchants' Bank v. Marine Bank, 3 Gill, R. 97.

³ Levy v. Bank of U. States, 1 Binn. R. 27; Bank of U. States v. Bank of Georgia, 10 Wheat. R. 333.

⁴ Bank of U. States v. Bank of Georgia, 10 Wheat. R. 333; Salem Bank v. Gloucester Bank, 17 Mass. R. 1, 28.

⁵ Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. R. 479. See also 1 Bell, Comm. p. 480, (5th edit.); Frankfort Bank v. Johnson, 24 Maine R. 490.

⁶ Franklin Bank v. Stewart, 37 Maine R. 519.

ship on a charter-party, and to take shipments on freight, if such is the usual employment of the ship, but not otherwise;¹ to hire seamen for the voyage; to contract for necessary repairs and equipments for the voyage;² and to hypothecate the ship in foreign ports for moneys advanced to supply the necessities of the ship, if they cannot otherwise be supplied.³ In these cases,

¹ *Pickering v. Holt*, 6 Greenl. R. 160.

² [*Provost v. Patchin*, 5 Seld. 239. A master of a steamboat has no authority, as such, to bind the boat or owners by a promissory note given to the pilot for his services. *Gregg v. Robbins*, 28 Missouri, 347. See *Holcroft v. Halbert*, 16 Indiana, 257.]

³ Ante, § 36; Abbott on Shipp. P. 2. ch. 2, § 2-10; Id. ch. 3, § 1-34, p. 91-132, (Amer. edit. 1829); *Gratitudine*, 3 Rob. R. 255-278, 3 Kent, Comm. Lect. 46, p. 158-164, (4th edit.); *Boson v. Sandford*, 3 Mod. R. 321; S. C. 3 Lev. R. 258; 1 Shower, R. 29, 101; *Hussey v. Allen*, 6 Mass. R. 163; *James v. Bixby*, 11 Mass. R. 31; *Pickering v. Holt*, 6 Greenl. R. 160; *Runquist v. Ditchell*, cited in Abbott on Shipp. P. 2, ch. 2, § 8; S. C. 3 Esp. R. 64; 1 Lavern. on Agency, 35, 36; Id. 154-196, (edit. 1818); 1 Bell, Comm. § 434, p. 413 (4th edit.); Id. pp. 505, 506, (3th edit.); 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 3. [If the supplies could be obtained on the personal credit of the owner, the master has no right to pledge the ship in addition. *Stainbank v. Fenning*, 11 C. B. 51; 6 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 412. *Jervis, C. J.*, said: "It was conceded during the argument that this was not an instrument of hypothecation in the usual form, and it was not contended the master had authority to mortgage the ship, but it was said that an hypothecation may be good without making the repayment of the advances depend upon the arrival of the ship; and that, if the lender does choose to take upon himself the risk of the ship's return, and will be content not to demand maritime interest, the master may pledge both the ship and the personal credit of the owner.

"The cases of *The Tartar* and *The Nelson*, upon which the plaintiffs' counsel relied, do not support the latter part of this proposition, for which they were cited. Where the master professes to hypothecate the ship, and also to pledge the credit of his owners, the Court of Admiralty will reject that part of the instrument which is directed to the latter object, and proceed *in rem* against the ship; but the cases cited do not show that the Court of Admiralty will do this where the instrument is not in other respects in strictness an hypothecation, because in each of those cases the return of the money depended upon the completion of the voyage, and the lender took upon himself the risk of the ship's return.

"The case of *Samsun v. Bragginton* is, however, referred to, and although the report does not explain the grounds of the decision, nor very clearly disclose the circumstances of the case, yet, as it is cited with approbation in Abbott on Shipping, it acquires additional authority from the known accuracy and high reputation of the learned author of that work, and is said to be an authority in point. We have been furnished with a copy of the decree, from which the following appear to be the facts of that case: '*Bragginton and Pitman were part owners*

, and in others of the like nature, he often enters, (as he may well do,) into the contracts in his own name; and he may thus be

of the Dunsley galley, of which Pitman was master. On her homeward voyage, she was disabled and put into Jamaica, where Pitman applied to the plaintiff to advance the necessary funds for her repairs, 'for the use and on account of himself and Bragginton as owners,' and as a further inducement, engaged with the plaintiff, as additional security for the repayment of the money, to hypothecate the ship. The plaintiff repaired the ship, expended for that purpose £80, and at his request, Pitman drew upon Bragginton for that amount, and by way of additional security, as master of the ship, according to maritime usage in like cases, by deed poll, after taking notice of the damage and advance, did, for securing the payment of the said money, hypothecate to the plaintiff the ship, with the freight and cargo. The ship sailed from Jamaica, was captured and sold. Bragginton and Pitman received the insurance upon her loss, but Bragginton refused to accept the bills, and the plaintiff was not paid the amount which he had advanced for the repairs of the ship. Upon this statement, the plaintiff filed his bill against Bragginton and Nichols, the representative of Pitman, for repayment of the money advanced by him. Bragginton, by his answer, admitted the plaintiff's statement, but submitted that he was not liable to repay what Pitman might have paid for the repairs, because Pitman was indebted to him, and suggested that bottomry interest had been taken for the advance, and that, therefore, according to maritime custom, the lender took the risk of the voyage upon himself. There was no proof of this suggestion, and the Master of the Rolls decreed that the money advanced by the plaintiff in refitting the ship, ought to be established against Bragginton and Nichols, according to their respective interest. It is not very apparent how, upon the bill and answer so framed, the validity of the hypothecation could come directly in question. The plaintiff did not seek to establish his claim by that instrument, because it did not profess to charge the owners personally with the debt, and the defendant, Bragginton, failing to prove that bottomry interest had been taken, could not add to the deed, by implication, a condition that the repayment of the advances should depend upon the return of the ship. The decree seems to have proceeded on the ground that joint owners were liable for money advanced in a foreign country for necessary repairs. Whether the master had properly pledged the ship or not, the ship was lost, and the plaintiff was proceeding upon the present liability of the joint owners. The reporter states that his Honor took time to consider, and afterwards (as he was informed) determined that the ship was well hypothecated, and that the part-owners were liable. In Abbott on Shipping, the decree against the part-owners is stated positively; but the learned author adds, cautiously, 'It is said also, that the ship was *thought* (not determined) to be well hypothecated.' He does not give the full weight of his unqualified sanction to this proposition; and, upon examination, we think that this case is not to be considered as an authority conclusive against the more recent decisions to which reference has been made.

"The deed now in question only professes to give such an interest as can be

come personally liable, as well as his principal, to fulfil the

enforced in the Admiralty Court. In certain events, A. Gilmour & Co. may seize the vessel and cause her to be sold by process out of the admiralty of England, or any other court of vice-admiralty possessing jurisdiction; and further, they are to have all the right, &c., by process of the courts of admiralty or otherwise, which by law are given to the holders of bottomry bonds. The interest which they have in the ship is the right of proceeding in the Admiralty Court against the ship; but if, under similar circumstances, the Admiralty Court would not act because it has no jurisdiction, A. Gilmour & Co. have not an available interest. Now, the cases show that, under circumstances like the present, the Court of Admiralty would decline to act. In the case of *The Atlas*, Lord Stowell refused to entertain a suit of bottomry because the advance was payable within thirty days after the arrival of the ship, "*or in case of the loss of the ship, then within thirty days next after the account of such loss should have been received in Calcutta or London.*" Upon appeal, the delegates decided that the bond was void because there was no sea risk to justify the taking of maritime interest, and so it became unnecessary to determine the principal question; but upon the argument of the question of jurisdiction, Hullock. B., observed that the condition destroyed the whole instrument. The more recent case of *The Emancipation* is an express authority upon the same point. There, upon the face of the bond, and according to legal inference, the payment of the money advanced did not depend upon the safe arrival of the ship, and for that reason the Court pronounced against the bond. Upon these authorities, it is clear that, if *The Hartland* had arrived in this country, the plaintiffs could not have proceeded against her in the Admiralty Court; they had, therefore, no interest in the vessel; they have lost nothing, and upon this ground the defendant is entitled to succeed.

"But without reference to authority we are of opinion, upon principle, that the master has not by an instrument of this nature authority to pledge the ship. By the Roman law, and still in those nations which have adopted the civil law, every person who had repaired or fitted out a vessel, or had lent money for those purposes, had a claim upon the value of the ship, without a formal instrument of hypothecation; but by the law of England no such right can be acquired except by express agreement, and a master can only make such an agreement if he act within the scope of his authority. The right to raise money upon bottomry can only be justified by necessity. If the master in a foreign country wants money to repair or victual his vessel, or for other necessities, he must, in the first instance, endeavor to raise it upon the credit of the owners. If he can do so, he has no authority to hypothecate the vessel; but if he cannot otherwise obtain the money, then he may hypothecate the ship, not transferring the property in the ship, but giving the creditor a privilege or claim upon it, to be carried into effect by legal process upon the termination of the voyage. As incident to this transaction, the lender may, if he think fit, insist upon maritime interest; but whether he do so or not, the advance is made upon the credit of the ship, not upon the credit of the owners, and the owners are never personally responsible. There is no trace in our books, with the exception of *Samsun v. Bragginton*, of any case in which

same;¹ for he is treated, not as ordinary agent, but as, in some sort, and to some extent, clothed with the character of a special employer or owner of the ship, and representing, not merely the absolute owner, (*Dominus navis*),² but also the temporary owner, or charterer for the voyage, (*Exercitor Navis*).³ In short, our law treats him, as having a special property in the ship, and entitled to the possession of it, and not as having the mere charge of it, as a servant. On this account he may bring an action of trespass for a violation of that possession; and where the freight has been earned under a contract to which he is a party, or under a bill of lading signed by himself, he may bring a suit for the freight due on the delivery of the goods.⁴

§ 117. The civil law seems to have recognized similar rights

a master has been held to have authority to make a valid hypothecation of a ship, unless the payment of the money borrowed has been made to depend upon the arrival of the ship. There is, therefore, nothing to show that a master has authority to hypothecate in any other matter. Indeed, if the money be originally advanced upon the credit of the owner, and for any cause an hypothecation be made, even before the ship leaves the place where the advances were made, the bond will be void, and cannot be enforced. The *Augusta*. For these reasons, we are of opinion that the master had no authority to make an instrument like that in question, and that by the instrument the lender possesses no interest in the ship. The money advanced for repairs was a mere debt from the owners to the lender, and it being admitted that a mere debt from the owners to the assured for repairs and disbursements could not legally be made the subject of an insurance, it follows that the defendant is entitled to judgment."

¹ Post, §§ 161, 266-268, 294-299, 399.

² Ante, § 36; Post, §§ 294-297. See Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 3, note (g), (Amer. edit. 1829); Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, §§ 1, 2, 15; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 70, 71; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 267-269 (edit. 1818.)

³ 1 Liverm. on Agency, 35, 36, (edit. 1818); Id. 70, 71; Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 1, ch. 1, §§ 12, 13, and Story's note (i) to edit. 1829; Id. Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 2; *Valego v. Wheeler*, Cowp. R. 143; *Soares v. Thornton*, 7 Taunt. R. 627; *Marcadier v. Chesapeake Ins. Co.* 8 Cranch. 39; *Taggard v. Loring*, 16 Mass. R. 386; *Descadillas v. Harris*, 8 Greenl. R. 298; *The Ship Fortitude*, 3 Sumner, R. 228, 237-239; 1 Bell, Comm. p. 414, § 434, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 505, 522, &c., (5th edit.) *The Exercitor Navis* is (as we have already seen) the actual employer of the particular voyage, whether he be the absolute owner, or only the hirer of the ship for the voyage. Ante, § 36, note; Post, §§ 294, 295, 315; Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 3, (Amer. edit. 1829).

⁴ *Shields v. Davis*, 6 Taunt. 65, 67; 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 210. See also *Williams v. Millington*, 1 H. Bl. 81, 84.

and incidental authorities. The very definition of the master of the ship in that law indicated the nature and limits of his rights and authority. *Magistrum navis accipere debemus, cui totius navis cura mandata est*;¹ and this applied equally, whether he was appointed by, and acted under the general owner, or by and under the owner for the voyage. *Magistrum autem accipimus, non solum, quem exercitor præposuit, sed et eum, quem magister.*² *Omnium enim facta magistri debet præstare, qui eum præposuit; alioquin contrahentes decipientur; et facilius hoc in magistro quam instutore admittendum propter utilitatem.*³ *Non autem ex omni causa Prætor dat in exercitorem actionem; sed ejus rei nomine, cujus ibi præpositus fuerit; id est, si in eam rem præpositus sit; ut puta, si ad onus vehendum locatum sit; aut aliquas res emerit utilis naviganti; vel si quid reficiendæ navis causâ contractum vel impensum est; vel si quid nautæ, operarum nomine, petent.*⁴ And the authority of the master was also enlarged, according to the ordinary employment of the ship. *Magistri autem imponuntur locandis navibus, vel ad merces, vel vectoribus conducendis, armamentisve emendis; sed etiam si mercibus emendis vel vendendis fuerit præpositus, etiam hoc nomine obligat Exercitorem.*⁵ In these latter cases, however, the master acts rather as supercargo, or as factor, than in his original character as master.⁶

§ 118. The authority of the master of the ship over the cargo is, under ordinary circumstances, limited to the mere duty of the transportation and preservation of it. But he may, under circumstances of great emergency, acquire a superinduced authority to dispose of it, from the very nature and necessity of the case; and his acts will then become completely binding and obligatory upon the owners of the cargo, whether they are mere

¹ Dig. Lib. 14 tit. 1, l. 1, § 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 1.

² Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 5; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 1; Ante, § 36; Pothier on Oblig. n. 448.

³ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 5; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 3; Post, § 128.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 7; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 7; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 3; Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 3, p. 91, note (g), (Amer. edit. 1829).

⁵ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 3; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 7.

⁶ 1 Liverm. on Agency, 69, 70, 72 (edit. 1818); 1 Emerig. Assur. ch. 7, § 5, p. 193; Ante, § 36; Williams v. Perry, 13 Wend. 58; Freeman v. East India Co. 5 B. & Ald. 617.

shippers, or are also owners of the ship. It is true that, in the ordinary course of things, he is treated as a mere stranger to the cargo, beyond the purposes of safe custody and conveyance, as above stated; yet, in such cases of instant, and unforeseen and unprovided for necessity, the character of agent and supercargo is forced upon him, not by the immediate act and appointment of the owner, but by the general policy of the law.¹ Thus, for example, in the case of a jettison, becoming necessary in the course of a voyage, the master has a right to order any goods to be thrown overboard. He may select what articles he may please; he may determine the quantity, and he is limited to no proportion. Nay, in cases of extreme necessity, where the lives of the crew cannot otherwise be saved, he may throw the whole cargo overboard.² So, the master may, in like manner, sacrifice a part of the cargo for the ransom of the ship, or bind the ship and cargo for the ransom.³ So, if he is driven into a port of necessity, and the cargo is perishable, the master may sell it, as he may also sell the ship, in a case of urgent⁴ necessity.⁵ [But the sale of the vessel is not within the general authority of the master.⁶] So, he may sell a part of the cargo, or he may hypothecate the whole cargo and freight, as well as the ship, for repairs of the ship, to enable her to perform the voyage.⁷ In cases, also, of an abandonment by the owner of the ship or cargo to the underwriters, for a total loss during the voyage, the master be-

¹ Ante, §§ 116, 117; Post, § 164; Ibid. The *Gratitudine*, 3 Rob. R. 255, 257, 258; *Searle v. Scovell*, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 222, 1 Emerig Assur. ch 12, § 16, pp. 429-433; *Douglass v. Moody*, 9 Mass. R. 548. In cases of this sort, the master assumes very much the rights and responsibilities of the *Negotiorum Gestor* of the civil law, as to which see Story on Bailm. §§ 81-83, 189, 190; Pothier, *Contrat de Mandat*, ch. 2, art. 3, § 1, n. 51; *Ersk. Inst B tit 3, § 37*; 2 Kent, *Comm. Lect.* 41, pp 616, 617, and note (a), (4th edit); *Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 5, l. 2, 3.*

² The *Gratitudine*, 3 Rob. 255, 257, 258.

³ Ibid. 255, 258.

⁴ The *Eliza Cornish*, 26 Eng. Law. & Eq. R. 579; *Robertson v. Clarke*, 1 Bing. 445; *Hunter v. Parker*, 7 M. & W. 322.

⁵ The *Gratitudine*, 3 Rob. 255, 259.

⁶ *Johnson v. Wingate*, 29 Maine, 404.

⁷ The *Gratitudine*, 3 Rob. 255, 260-265; *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 2, ch. 3, §§ 17-33, and notes to Amer. edit. 1829; The *Packett*, 3 Mason, R. 205; *United Ins. Co. v. Scott*, 1 John. R. 106; *American Ins. Co. v. Coster*, 3 Paige, R. 323; 3 Kent, *Comm. Lect.* 46, pp. 271-175, (4th edit.)

comes the agent of the underwriters by operation of law, with the same general rights and authorities, as he would have in regard to the owner.¹

§ 119. The restrictions upon the incidental powers of the master are apparent from the preceding statements. Ordinarily, indeed, these incidental powers belong to the master only in the absence of the owner or employer of the ship; as, for example, when the ship is in a foreign port, and not in the home port. For, when the owner or employer is present, he is known to possess, and is presumed to exercise his own right of general superintendence over the conduct of the ship and its concerns, unless some presumption of a delegation of authority to the master can be implied, either from the usage of trade, or the particular employment of the ship, or the conduct and proceedings of the parties.² Even in the home port, however, there are many acts which are so invariably confided to the master, as to amount to a positive delegation of authority. Thus, the master is ordinarily intrusted with the authority of shipping the officers and crew;³ of superintending the ordinary outfits, equipments, repairs, and other preparations of the vessel for the voyage; of lading and unlading the cargo; and, in cases of a general ship, of receiving goods on board on freight, and of signing bills of lading for the same.⁴ [But he has no authority to sign bills of lading and bind his owners, for goods not actually received on board the vessel.⁵] These are such usual incidents of his official

¹ *Gen. Int. Ins. Co. v. Ruggles*, 12 Wheat. 408.

² *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 1-10, and notes, *ibid.* (Amer. edit. 1829); 1 *Bell, Comm.* pp. 412, 413, §§ 433, 434, (4th edit.); *Id.* pp. 506, 509, (5th edit.); 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 154-196, (edit. 1818); *James v. Bixby*, 11 Mass. R. 34, 36, 37.

³ *Blunt's Comm. Dig.* 152; 1 *Emerig. Assur.* ch. 7, § 5, p. 193; *Cleirac, Jugemens d'Oleoron*, 1 Valin, *Comm. Lib.* 2, tit. 1, art. 5, p. 384; *Consolato del Mare*, ch. 55, 195.

⁴ 1 *Bell, Comm.* pp. 413, 414, § 434, (4th edit.); *Id.* pp. 506, 507, (5th edit.); *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 1-11; *Id.* ch. 3, §§ 1-34, (Amer. edit. 1829,) and notes, *ibid.*; 3 *Kent, Comm. Lect.* 46, p. 158-176, (4th edit.) 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 157, 158, (edit. 1818); *James v. Bixby*, 11 Mass. R. 34, 36, 37.

⁵ [*Grant v. Norway*, 2 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 337; 10 Com. B. Rep. 365. *Jervis, C. J.*, said: "This case was argued before my brothers Cresswell, Williams, and myself: it arises on a special verdict, and presents a question of considerable importance, both to those who take bills of lading on the faith of their representing

character, that notice of a positive prohibition would seem indis-

property which passes by the transfer of them, and to the ship-owner, who is attempted to be bound by all bills of lading that a captain may think proper to sign. The point presented by the several pleas is substantially one and the same, namely, whether the master of a ship, signing a bill of lading for goods which have never been shipped, is to be considered as the agent of the owner in that behalf, so as to make the latter responsible. The authority of the master of a ship is large, and extends to all acts that are usual and necessary for the use and management of the vessel, but it is subject to several well-known limitations. He may make contracts for the hire of the ship for carrying, or he may vary that which the owner has made; he may take up moneys in foreign ports, and, under certain circumstances, at home, for necessary disbursements for repair, and bind the owners for repayment; but his authority is limited by the necessity of the case, and he cannot make them responsible for money not actually necessary for those purposes, although he may contend that it is. He may make contracts to carry goods on freight, but cannot bind the owner to carry freight free. So, with regard to goods put on board, he may sign the bill of lading, and acknowledge the nature, quality, and condition of the goods. Constant usage shows that the master has a general authority; and if a more limited authority is given, the party not informed of it is not affected by such limitation. The master is a general agent to perform all things relating to the usual employment of his ship, and his authority, as such agent, to perform all such things as are necessary in the line of business in which he is employed, cannot be limited by any private orders not known to the party in any way dealing with him. This general proposition is laid down by Mr. Smith in his *Mercantile Law*, p. 559. Is it, then, usual in the management of a ship carrying goods on freight, for the master to give a bill of lading for goods not put on board? All parties concerned have a right to assume that the agent has authority to do all that is necessary; but the very nature of the bill of lading shows that it ought not to be signed till the goods are on board, for it begins by describing them as 'shipped.' Indeed, it was not contended that such a general authority was usual. In *Lickbarrow v. Mason*, 2 T. R. 63, Buller, J., says: 'A bill of lading is an acknowledgment by the captain of having received the goods on board his ship; therefore it would be a fraud in the captain to sign such a bill of lading if he had not received goods on board, and the consignee would be entitled to his action against the captain for the fraud.' It is not contended, in this case, that the captain had any real authority to sign the bill of lading unless the goods had been shipped; nor can we discover any ground on which a party, taking a bill of lading by indorsement, could be justified in assuming he had authority to sign such bill, whether the goods were put on board or not. If, then, from usage and the general practice of shipmasters, it is generally known that the master derives no such authority from his position as master, the case must be considered as if the party taking the bill of lading had notice of the express limitation of authority, and in that case undoubtedly he could not claim to bind the owner by the bill of lading signed, when the goods therein mentioned were not on board. It resembles the case of goods or moneys taken up by the

pensable, in order to affect third persons with his want of due authority to do the acts.¹

§ 119 *a*. In respect to borrowing money, and obtaining supplies for the necessary use of the ship, upon the credit of the owner, the master has an implied authority so to do, not only in a foreign port, but also in the home port, provided the owner is absent, and no communication can be had with him without great delay and prejudice, and the necessity is pressing.² But if the means of communication with the owner are reasonably within the reach of the master, and the necessity is not pressing, and no injurious delay or prejudice will arise from waiting until such communication is had, the authority of the master to borrow money, or to procure supplies upon the credit of the owner,

master on the pretence that they were wanted for the ship, when in fact they were not; or a bill of exchange accepted or indorsed by procuration, when no such agency existed. *Alexander v. Mackenzie*, 13 Jur. 346; 6 C. B. 767, shows that the words 'by procuration' would give notice to all parties that the agent is acting with a special and limited authority; and, therefore, the party taking such a bill has to establish by evidence the authority. See *Smith v. McGuire*, 3 Hurl. & Nor. 554. It is not enough, for that purpose, to show that other bills, similarly accepted and indorsed, have been paid, although such evidence, if the acceptance was general by the agent in the name of the principal, would be evidence of a general authority to accept in the name of the principal. So, here, the general usage gives notice to all people, that the authority of the captain to give bills of lading is limited to such goods as have been put on board; and the party taking the bill of lading, either originally or by indorsement of the goods, which have never been put on board, is bound to show some particular authority to the master to sign the bill in that form. There is very little to be found in the books on this subject; it was discussed in the case of *Berkley v. Watling*, 7 Ad. & El. 29; but that case was decided on another point, although *Littledale, J.*, said, in his opinion the bill of lading was not conclusive, under similar circumstances, on the ship-owner. For these reasons, we are of opinion that the issue should be entered for the defendants, and that the defendants are entitled to the judgment of the court." See also *Hubbersty v. Ward*, 18 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 551; 8 Exch. R. 330; *Coleman v. Riches*, 29 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 323; 16 C. B. 104; *Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Butchers & Drovers Bank*, 16 N. Y. 151; 4 Kernan, 623.]

¹ 1 Bell, Comm. p. 414, § 434, (4th edit.); *Id* p. 506, 507, (5th edit.); 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 157, 158, (edit. 1818.)

² *Johns v. Simons*, 2 Adolph. & Ell. New Rep. 425, 430, *Arthur v. Barton*, 6 Mees. & Wels. 138; *Stonehouse v. Gent*, 2 Adolph. & Ell. New Rep. 431, note; *Hawtayne v. Bourne*, 7 Mees. & Wels. R. 595, 599, 600, by Mr. Baron Parke. See also *The Alexander*, cited 2 Park on Insur. by Hildyard, Append. 1057, 1061, (8th edit.) 1842.

will not be implied. [And in like manner, if the supplies have been procured or the repairs made, the master cannot afterwards borrow money on the owner's credit, to pay for them.¹]

[1 *Beldon v. Campbell*, 6 Exch. 886 ; 6 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 473. Parke, B. said : " This was a case tried before my brother Platt, in which the question for consideration is, whether the owner of a vessel, who resided at Newport, was liable to the plaintiff, who was a merchant at Newcastle, for a sum of money which had been borrowed, by the master of the defendant's ship at Newcastle, for the purpose of paying a debt contracted for towing the vessel by a steam-tug into port, and also for a sum paid to a master carpenter on a Saturday night, the master carpenter having been employed to do repairs upon the vessel. We are of opinion that, in this case, the rule must be absolute. There is no doubt of the power of the master by law (but some as to what extent it goes) to bind the owner. The master is appointed for the purpose of conducting the navigation of the ship to a favorable termination, and he has, as incident to that employment, a right to bind his owner as to all things necessary, that is, upon the legal maxim, *Quando aliquid mandatur et omni per quod percutitur ad illud*. So, therefore, the master has perfect authority to bind his principal, the owner, as to all repairs that are necessary for the purpose of bringing the ship to the port of destination, and he has also the power, as incidental to his employment, to borrow money, but only in a case where ready money is necessary, that is to say, where there are certain payments made in the course of the voyage, and for which ready money is required, and credit is never given. He has the power to borrow money for the purpose of making those payments. An instance of this is the payment of the port dues which are required to be paid down in cash, or lights or any dues which are also required to be immediate payments ; and so also there was a case referred to in the course of the argument, where a ship, being at the termination of a long voyage, and ordered to proceed on another, money borrowed to pay the wages of seamen who would not go on the second voyage without being paid, was held to be necessary. *Robinson v. Lyall*. But these cases of borrowing money do not apply to any case in which the owner of a vessel is near the spot, so as to be convenient to be communicated with ; and before the master has any right to make him debtor to a third person, he must consult his owner, to see whether he is willing to be made a debtor to a particular third person, or whether he will refuse to pay the money at all. In this case, it appears to us there are two objections to the plaintiff's recovering either one sum or the other. With respect to the sum of money borrowed for the purpose of paying the steam-tug, it appears that the vessel was off the port of Newcastle, which was its ultimate point of destination, at the time when the steam-tug was necessary in order to tow the vessel into the River Tyne, and the owner of the steam-tug did not object to tow the vessel in without any previous payment. If the owner of the steam-tug had said, ' I will not tow you in unless you will actually pay the money down,' then it would have been competent for the master to have borrowed the money for that purpose, in order to pay him. It could not be expected that he should wait at the mouth of the harbor, where it would have

§ 120. The master is also usually intrusted with the discharge, as well as the hiring, of the officers and seamen of the ship in the home port; and in foreign ports he possesses this incidental authority as a necessary discretion, to be exercised by him, in cases where the law does not prohibit the discharge for the general welfare of the voyage.¹ In a foreign port, also, he possesses the incidental authority, if he should be disabled by illness, or otherwise, to appoint a new master to serve in his stead, whose acts will, under such circumstances, become obligatory upon the owner.²

§ 121. The incidental powers of the master are, however, re-

been impossible for him to have communicated with the owner living at Newport, a great distance, in order to ascertain whether he should borrow the money or not; but in this case, the owner of the steam-tug did not make any such stipulation, but the vessel was towed into Newcastle, and the money was not paid to the owner of the steam-tug until after several days had elapsed, during which it was perfectly competent for the master to have written to Newport, which was only a day's post, (as it happened,) and to have got the owner's answer, to ascertain from whom he should borrow the money. Instead of that, he goes four or five days afterwards and borrows from the plaintiff a sum of money for the purpose of paying this debt to the owner of the steam-tug — a debt which the owner of the vessel was liable to, because it was within the power of the master to employ the steam-vessel for the owner; but we think he had no power, under these circumstances, to borrow money in order to pay a debt for which the owner of the vessel was already responsible by the original contract, and still less that he could borrow that money without consulting the owner, who was living at Newport, and was able to be communicated with before it was absolutely necessary to pay the money, even supposing the master had made a contract to pay it on a particular day. So that there are two objections to the plaintiff's right to recover that sum. And with regard to the other, which was a sum paid to a master shipwright, who wanted it to pay his workmen on a Saturday night, we also think it is impossible to say that was a payment of necessity, because the completion or progress of the work on Monday was not a necessity, for the vessel had arrived at her place of destination. It was perfectly competent for the master to have consulted the owner, and to have ascertained whether he would have the repairs gone on with, even supposing it were necessary to have paid the money down in order to accomplish that purpose. We think in neither of these cases are they payments of necessity, or fall within the authority the master has, by the general law, to bind his owner by the contracts that he enters into."]

¹ Blunt's Comm. Dig. 152; 3 Kent, Comm. Lect. 46, pp. 183, 184, (4th edit.); Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 6, and note (2); Id. § 15, and note (1) to American edit. 1824; Robinett v. Ship Exeter, 2 Rob 261.

² 1 Bell, Comm. § 434, p. 413, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 506, 507, (5th edit.); Rocco de Nav. n. 5; Pothier on Marit. Contr. by Cushing, p. 26, n. 48; Id. p. 142, note.

stricted to those which belong to the usual employment or business of the ship.¹ Thus, if the ordinary employment of the ship has been the carrying of cargoes on the sole account of the owner, the master has no implied authority to let the ship to freight, even in a foreign port. So, if the ordinary employment has been to take goods on board on freight, as a general ship, and common carrier, the master will not be presumed to possess authority to let the ship on a charter-party for a special and different business. So, if the ship has been accustomed to carry passengers only, the master will not be presumed to possess authority to take goods on board on freight. So, if the ship has been accustomed to the coasting trade, or the fisheries, or to river navigation only, the master will not be presumed to possess authority to divert the ship into another trade, or business, or voyage, on the high seas.²

§ 122. So, the authority of the master, as to repairs of the ship, even in a foreign port, is limited to those which are necessary repairs.³ But by necessary repairs we are not to understand such repairs only as are indispensable for the safety of the ship, or the due performance of the voyage, but such also as are reasonably fit and proper for the ship, or for the voyage, under all the circumstances of the case.⁴

§ 123. And this doctrine is conformable, also, to the rules laid down in the civil law. For, it is said in that law, that the nature of the appointment governs in respect to the contracts of the master. If the master is appointed solely to receive freight-money, but not to let the ship to freight, and he should let the

¹ See *Gen'l. Int. Ins. Co. v. Ruggles*, 12 Wheat. R. 408; *Peters v. Ballestier*, 3 Pick. R. 495.

² 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, pp. 155, 156, (edit. 1818); *Boucher v. Lawson*, Rep. Temp. Hard. 85, 194; *Abbott on Shipp* Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 7-10, and note (3), (Amer. edit. 1829); 1 *Bell, Comm.* § 434, p. 413, (4th edit.); *Id.* pp. 506, 507, (5th edit.); *Pothier on Marit. Contracts*, by Cushing, n. 48, p. 26. [An agent at a foreign port to whom a ship is addressed for loading under a charter-party, has no implied authority to vary the contract by substituting another and a distinct port of loading, or a different quality or description of cargo. *Sickens v. Irving*, 7 J. Scott, (N. S.) 165.]

³ *Ante*, §§ 119, 119 (a).

⁴ *Abbott on Shipp*. Pt. 2, ch. 3, § 3, (Amer. edit. 1829); *Webster v. Seekamp*, 4 *Barn. & Ald.* 352; *Arthur v. Barton*, 6 *Mees. & Wels.* 138, 143; *The Ship Fortitude*, 3 *Sumner*, R. 228.

ship to freight, the owner will not be bound. On the other hand, if he is appointed to let the ship to freight, but not to receive the freight-money, the owner will not be bound by his receipt of the freight-money. In like manner, if he is appointed to carry passengers, he is not at liberty to carry goods; and so conversely. And in all such cases, the owner will not be bound by his acts, when he exceeds his authority. So, if the master is appointed to let the ship to carry certain kinds of merchandise, which she is adapted to carry, such, for example, as grain, or hemp, and the master should let the ship to carry marble, or other materials, it will be an excess of authority not binding upon the owner.¹ Some of these cases may not appear as cogent in our law as they do in the Roman law; but they sufficiently illustrate the general principle.²

¹ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 12; Potnier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 7; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 155, 156. (edit. 1818); Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 3, (Amer. edit. 1829)

² The exact text of the Roman law is as follows. *Igitur præpositio certam legem dat contrahentibus. Quare, si eum præposuit navi ad hoc solum ut vecturas exigit, non ut locet; quod fortè ipse locaverat; non tenebitur exercitor, si magister locaverit: vel si ad locandum tantum, non ad exigendum, idem erit dicendum: aut, si ad hoc, ut vectoribus locet, non ut mercibus navem præstet, vel contra, modum egressus, non obligabit exercitorem. Sed, et si, ut certis mercibus eam locet præpositus est, puta legumini, cannabæ ille marmoribus, vel alia materia, locavit; dicendum erit non teneri. Quædam enim naves onerariæ, quædam (ut ipsi dicunt) *επιβαρητοι* (id est, vectorum ductrices) sunt. Et plerumque mandare scio, ne vectores recipiant. Et sic, ut certa regione, et certo Mari negotietur; ut ecce, sunt naves, quæ *Brundisium à Cassiopa*, vel à *Dyrracchio* vectores trajiciunt, ad onera inhabiles. Item quædam fluvii capaces, ad mare non sufficientes. D. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 12. I interpret this passage as Mr Abbott and Mr. Livermore do, as applicable to cases where the extent of the authority of the master is deduced from the general employment of the ship. 1 Liverm. on Agency, 155, 156, (edit. 1818); Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 3, p. 92, (Amer. edit. 1829.) The modern commercial code of France, (as indeed do the general principles of the maritime law of other nations,) recognizes distinctions as to the authority of the master of a ship in most cases coincident with those of the common law. Thus, the Commercial Code of France (art. 223,) gives authority to the master to engage the crew employed in the ship, in concert with the owner when the master is at his place of residence. The master (art. 232.) in the place of the residence of the owners or their agents, has no general authority to repair the vessel, or to buy sails, cordage or other things for her use, or to take up money on bottomry, or to let the ship on freight. See also 1 Bell, Comm, § 452-486, p. 412-414, (4th edit.); Id. p. 522-530, (5th edit.); Pothier on Marit.*

§ 123 *a.* Hitherto we have principally looked to the powers of masters of ships; but it may not be amiss here to glance at a general duty arising out of their employment, which indeed might equally apply to other agents under the like circumstances. It is, that the master of a ship is bound to employ his whole time and attention in the service of his employer; and it is even said that a custom, allowing such master to trade upon his private account during the voyage, cannot be maintained.¹ Perhaps this is laying down the rule somewhat too broadly, for if there be an express agreement between the master and owner that he shall be at liberty to trade upon his own account during the voyage, that would certainly be obligatory; and if there be a known usage in the particular trade to the same effect, that would seem to afford an equally conclusive presumption of an implied agreement to the same effect.

§ 124. Sixthly. Partners. It is not our design to enter upon any general examination of the rights, powers, and duties of partners at large. That would properly belong to a distinct treatise on partnership. But we shall here advert only to the general authorities deduced by law from the very nature and character of partnership. Every partner is, (as we have seen,) in contemplation of law, the general and accredited agent of the partnership;² or, as it is sometimes expressed, each partner is *Præpositus negotiis societatis*; and may consequently bind all the other partners by his acts in all matters, which are within

Contracts, by Cushing, n. 48, 49, p. 26-28; Id. n. 163, pp. 98, 99, Jacobsen's Sea Laws, by Frick, ch. 1, p. 32-91; 3 Kent, Comm. Lect. 45, p. 158-176, (4th edit.); 2 Stair, Inst. by Brodie, Supp. pp. 953, 969, 970, 971, 973, 980, 981; Ante, §§ 117, 119, 121, 122.

¹ Gardner v. McCutcheon, 4 Beavan, R. 534.

² Ante, § 37; 2 Bell, Comm. § 1230, p. 615, (4th edit.); Id. p. 615, (5th edit.) Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, n. 83; Story on Partnership, ch. 7, § 101-103. How far one partner could bind the firm by his acts under the Roman law, is a matter, which has been much discussed by the civilians. That each partner could bind all the others, when there was an express or implied authority for this purpose, is not doubted. But in the absence of an express authority, the difficulty has been to ascertain what circumstances should afford a just presumption of authority. The mere relations of partnership did not, as it should seem, in the Roman law, create such an implied authority as it does in our law. See Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 20; 1 Stair, Inst. B. 1, tit. 16, § 6; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 8, § 4, art. 16; Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 2, l. 68; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 2, n. 26.

the scope and objects of the partnership. Hence, if the partnership be of a general commercial nature, he may pledge or sell the partnership property; he may buy goods on account of the partnership; he may borrow money, contract debts, and pay debts on account of the partnership; he may draw, make, sign, endorse, accept, transfer, negotiate, and procure to be discounted, promissory notes, bills of exchange, checks, and other negotiable paper, in the name and on account of the partnership.¹

§ 125. The restrictions of this implied authority of partners to bind the partnership, are apparent from what has been already stated. Each partner is an agent only in and for the business of the firm; and therefore his acts beyond that business will not bind the firm.² Neither will his acts, done in violation of his duty to the firm, bind it, when the other party to the transaction is cognizant of, or coöperates in such breach of duty.³ And upon the principle already suggested, as to agents executing sealed instruments, one partner cannot execute an instrument, under seal, which shall bind the other partners, in virtue of his general authority; but he must have a special authority under seal;⁴ or the deed must be executed by him in the presence of the other partners.⁵

¹ Ante, § 37; see Collyer on Partnership, B 3, ch 1, § 1 and 2, p 215-230, 3 Kent, Comm. Lect. 43, p. 40-45, (4th edit.), Story on Partnership, ch. 7, § 101-125; Bayley on Bills, ch 2, § 6, (5th edit.), Id. ch. 6, § 1; 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 236-238; South Carolina Bank v. Case, 8 Barn. & Cressw 427; Vere v. Ashby, 10 Barn. & Cressw 258; Ex parte Bondonus, 8 Ves 540; Ex parte Agace, 2 Cox, R. 312; U. S. Bank v. Binney and Windship, 5 Mason, R. 176, S. C. 5 Peters, R. 529, 1 Domat, B 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 7, Ersk. Inst. B 3, tit. 3, § 20, 2 Bell, Comm § 120, p 615-618, (4th edit.), Id. p. 615-617, (5th edit.); 1 Stan. Inst. by Brodie, B. 1, tit 16, §§ 4, 6, Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, n. 83.

² Hasleman v. Young, 5 Adolph & Ell. 833.

³ 3 Kent, Comm. Lect. 43, pp. 46, 47, (4th edit.), Collyer on Partn. B. 3, ch. 1, p. 212, and § 1, p. 215; Id. ch 2, § 1, p. 256-286; 2 Bell, Comm § 1203, p. 615-618, (4th edit.); Id. p. 615-618, (5th edit.); Ex parte Agace, 2 Cox, R. 312, 316; Sandilands v. Marsh, 2 Barn. & Ald. 673.

⁴ Ante, § 37; Ante, § 51; Post, §§ 242, 252; 3 Kent, Comm. Lect. 43, pp. 47, 48, (4th edit.); Harrison v. Jackson, 7 T. R. 207; Collyer on Partn. B. 3, ch 2, § 1, pp. 256, 257. Contra, Cady v. Shepherd, 11 Pick. 400, referred to ante, § 49, and note, § 51; Post, §§ 242, 252; Story on Partn § 117-123. In conse-

⁵ Ante, §§ 49, 51; Story on Partn. § 117-123.

§ 126. Before quitting this subject of the nature and extent of the authority of agents, it seems proper to refer again to what has been already incidentally stated, the distinction commonly taken between the case of a general agent and that of a special agent, the former being appointed to act in his principal's affairs generally, and the latter to act concerning some particular object.¹ In the former case, the principal will be bound by the acts of his agent within the scope of the general authority conferred on him, although he violates by those acts his private instructions and directions, which are given to him by the principal, limiting, qualifying, suspending, or prohibiting the exercise of such authority under particular circumstances.² In the latter case, if the agent exceeds the special and limited authority conferred on him, the principal is not bound by his acts, but they become mere nullities, so far as he is concerned; unless, indeed, he has held him out as possessing a more enlarged authority.³

quence of this doctrine, or, at least, to clear away all doubts on the subject, a statute has been passed by Congress (Act of 1823, ch. 149, § 25; 3 U. S. Laws, p. 1889, Story's edit.) by which one partner is authorized to bind the firm in bonds given to the Custom-House for duties.

¹ Ante, § 17-20; Id. § 73; Post, § 131-133; *Pomlinson v. Collett*, 3 Blackf. Ind. R. 436; *Walker v. Skipwith*, Meigs's Tenn. R. 502.

² Ante, § 73; Post, § 127-133, *Allen v. Ogden*, 1 Wash. Cir. R. 174; *Bryant v. Moore*, 26 Maine R. 84; *Fitzsimmons v. Joslin*, 21 Vermont R. 129.

³ Post, § 127, and note, § 128-133, 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 620, 621, (4th edit.); 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 198, *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 198, 199, 207, 208, (3d edit.); *Smith on Mercantile Law*, 58-62, (2d edit.); Id. ch. 5, § 4, pp. 107, 108, (3d edit. 1843); 1 *Liverm on Agency*, 94, 95, (edit. 1818); Id. p. 107-119; *Fenn v. Harrison*, 3 T. R. 757; *Howard v. Braithwaite*, 1 Ves. & B. 209, 210, *Whitehead v. Tuckett*, 15 East, 408; *Pickering v. Busk*, 15 East, R. 38, 43, 44; 1 Bell, Comm. § 412, p. 387, (4th edit.); Id. p. 478, (5th edit.); *Munn v. Commission Co.* 15 Johns. R. 44, 51; *Rossifer v. Rossiter*, 8 Wend. R. 494; *Andrews v. Kneeland*, 6 Cowen, R. 354; *Waters v. Brogden*, 1 Young & Jerv. 457; *Brown v. Trautum*, 6 Mill. (Louis.) R. 47; *Beals v. Allen*, 18 Johns. R. 363; *Herbert v. Kneeland*, 24 Boston Law Rep. 495; 32 Verm. 316; *Hatch v. Taylor*, 10 N. H. R. 538; *Allen v. Ogden*, 1 Wash. Cir. R. 174. The same principle is applied in the case of partnership. Each partner is held out to the public as the general agent of the partnership; and, consequently, his acts will bind it, notwithstanding he may have violated his private instructions or the express terms of the secret articles of partnership. *Sandilands v. Marsh*, 2 B. & Ald. 673; *U. S. Bank v. Binney*, 5 Mason, R. 176; *S. C. 5 Peters*, R. 529; *Collyer on Partn.* by Phillips, ch. 1, p. 212-215, and note; 3 Kent, Comm. Lect. 48, p. 40-50, (4th edit.); 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. ch. 4, p. 236-241. Mr.

[Thus, if an agent entrusted with money to invest at *legal* interest exact a bonus for himself, without the knowledge or assent of his principal, it does not constitute usury in the latter so as to affect the security in his hands.¹]

§127. The ground of this distinction is the public policy of preventing frauds upon innocent persons, and the encouragement of confidence in dealings with agents. If a person is held out to third persons, or to the public at large, by the principal, as having a general authority to act for and to bind him in a particular business, or employment, it would be the height of injustice, and lead to the grossest frauds, to allow him to set up his own secret and private instructions to the agent, limiting that authority; and thus to defeat his acts and transactions under the agency, when the party dealing with him had, and could have, no notice of such instructions. In such cases, good faith requires that the principal should be held bound by the acts of the agent, within the scope of his general authority; for he has held him out to the public as competent to do the acts, and to bind him thereby. The maxim of natural justice here applies with its full force; that he, who, without intentional fraud, has enabled any person to do an act, which must be injurious to himself, or to another innocent party, shall himself suffer the in-

Smith, in his work on *Mercantile Law*, p. 59, (2d edit.) has stated the distinction between general and special agents very perspicuously. "A general agent is a person," says he, "whom a man puts in his place, to transact all his business of a particular kind; thus, a man usually retains a factor to buy and sell all goods, and a broker to negotiate all contracts of a certain description, an attorney to transact all his legal business, a master to perform all things relating to the usual employment of his ship, and so in other instances. The authority of such agent to perform all things usual in the line of business in which he is employed, cannot be limited by any private order or direction, not known to the party dealing with him. But the rule is directly the reverse concerning a particular agent, that is an agent employed specially in one single transaction; for it is the duty of the party dealing with such a one, to ascertain the extent of his authority; and if he do not, he must abide the consequences." S. P. Smith on *Merc. Law*, ch. 5, § 4, pp. 107, 108, (3d edit. 1843.) This is true, if the agent is not held out as possessing a more enlarged authority. See also *Woodin v. Burford*, 2 *Crompt. & Mees.* 391; *Jordan v. Norton*, 4 *Mees. & Wels.* 155; *Sykes v. Giles*, 5 *Mees. & Wels.* 645; *Post*, § 127, note, § 128, note. *Smith v. East India Co.*, 16 *Sims. & R.* 76.

¹ [*Condit v. Baldwin*, 7 *Smith*, (N. Y.) 219. And commencing a suit on the note was held no ratification of such act of the agent.]

jury rather than the innocent party, who has placed confidence in him.¹ The maxim is founded in the soundest ethics, and is enforced to a large extent by Courts of Equity.² Of course the

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 194, 200, 201, (3d edit.); *Whitehead v. Tuckett*, 15 East, 401, 409. 3 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 620, 621, (4th edit.); 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 202; *Carmichael v. Buck*, 10 Rich. 332; *Guerreiro v. Peile*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 616; Ante, § 73. See *North River Bank v. Aymer*, 3 Hill, R. 262; *Commercial Bank of Buffalo v. Kortright*, 22 Wend. R. 848, 361; Post, § 470; *Locke v. Stearns*, 1 Mete. R. 560. The general ground, on which this distinction is taken, is well stated in a note to Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, (Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, p. 199, note.) "A general authority," says Mr. Lloyd, "arises from a general employment in a specific capacity; such as factor, broker, attorney, &c. When we can say of any one, that he is A's broker, or A's factor, or A's attorney, he has then a general authority, in the sense in which it is used in the text. But of course, this does not imply that he has an unlimited or unrestrained authority. A. may give his broker, or his factor, or his attorney, any instructions that he pleases; and the effect will be this. As between himself and his broker, &c., any deviation from these instructions will render the latter accountable to him for any loss he may sustain thereby. But, as regards himself and third parties, who may have dealt with the broker, &c., any limitation of the authority not communicated to them, can have no effect. A third person has a right to assume, without notice to the contrary, that the person, whom A. employs generally as his broker, &c., has also an unqualified authority to act for his principal in all matters which come within the scope of that employment. In the case of a particular agent, that is, one whom A. may have employed specially in that single instance, no such assumption can reasonably be made. It then becomes the duty of the party dealing with one whom he knows to be acting for another in the transaction, to ascertain by inquiry the nature and extent of the authority; and if it be departed from or exceeded, he must be content to abide the consequences. The distinction thus pointed out is perfectly consonant with right reason; and if duly attended to will satisfactorily explain all the cases which follow in the text." In *Fitzherbert v. Mather*, 1 Term Rep. 12, 16, Mr. Justice Buller said: "It is the common question every day at Guildhall, when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the fraud or negligence of a third, which of the two gave credit?" See also *Hern v. Nichols*, 1 Salk. 289.

² 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 384-394; *Fitzherbert v. Mather*, 1 Term Rep. 12, 16. *Duke of Beaufort v. Neeld*, 12 Clark & Finnelly, R. 290. It has been already suggested, ante, § 73, that the same general principle pervades all cases of agency, whether the party be a general or a special agent. But, nevertheless, the distinction between general and special agents is not unfounded or useless. It is sufficient to solve many cases. But the difficulty is, that from the general language in the books, and the general contrast made between general and special agents, there is great danger in applying the distinction to solve cases to which it does not properly apply. The principle, which pervades all

maxim fails in its application, when the party dealing with the

cases of agency, whether it be a general or a special agency, is this: The principal is bound by all acts of his agent, within the scope of the authority which he hold him out to the world to possess; although he may have given him more limited private instructions, unknown to the persons dealing with him. And this is founded on the doctrine, that where one of two persons must suffer by the act of a third person, he, who has held the person out as worthy of trust and confidence, and having authority in that matter, shall be bound by it. It will at once be perceived, this doctrine is equally applicable to all cases of agency, whether it be the case of a general, or of a special agency. When I hold out to the public a person as my agent in all my business and employment, he is deemed my general agent; and all acts done within the scope of that business bind me, notwithstanding I have privately limited his authority by special instructions. Why? Because he is externally clothed with an unlimited authority over the subject-matter, and third persons might otherwise be defrauded by his acts. In such a case, he is not less a general agent as to third persons, than if he had received no private limitations of his authority. As between himself and his principal, his authority is not general, but *quoad hoc*, is limited. In the same case, if the principal had privately revoked his whole authority, he would still be bound. So, if he had privately limited the authority to a single act in the same business (and he would accordingly be, between himself and his principal, a special agent,) still the principal would be bound. Precisely the same rule applies to a special agency. If A. authorizes B. to purchase ten bales of cotton for him, and holds out to all the public, that B. has full and unlimited authority to purchase that cotton, every person, dealing with that agent, has a right to deal with him as a person having a general authority as to that purchase; and the principal will be bound by his acts, notwithstanding he may have privately limited the agent as to price, quality, &c. In the case of a general agency, the principal holds out the agent to the public as having unlimited authority as to all his business. In the case of a special agency, like that above stated, the principal holds out the agent to the public as having unlimited authority as to a particular act, subject, or purchase. In each case, therefore, the same general principle applies. If the principal hold out to the public his agent, as having a general authority to bind him in one case, or in all cases, he who deals with any such agent innocently, ought to be protected, and the principal to be bound. The cases of special agency to which the rule, founded upon the distinction between general agency and special agency, properly applies, are where the principal does not hold out the agent as possessing any particular authority; and, of course, where the nature and extent of the real authority, conferred on him, furnish the only rule to govern the case; and the party, dealing with the agent, must act at his own peril. We do not, in legal language, or common parlance, call an agent a general agent, merely because there are no limitations on his authority; nor do we call a man a special agent, because he is limited by special orders, *quoad* that agency. Neither do we call a man a general agent, who is appointed to do one act, or to make one purchase, although he has unlimited authority to do that act. There would be no

agent, has a full knowledge of the private instructions of the agent, or that he is exceeding his authority.¹

§ 128. The same rule was also fully recognized, and applied with rigorous exactness in the Roman Law, even in cases otherwise highly favored. Even a creditor, having a pledge, was bound, if he suffered the owner to hold himself out as competent to dispose of the pledge, with the consent of the creditor. *Creditor, qui permutet rem veniri, pignus dimittit.*² *Si consensit venditioni creditor, liberatur hypotheca.*³ So, the acts of a ship-master, as a general agent within the scope of his authority, (as we have seen,) were, for the like reason, deemed binding on his employer, although he had disobeyed his private instructions.⁴ *Omnia enim facta Magistri debet præstare, qui eum præposuit; alioquin, contrahentes decipientur; et facilius hoc in Magistro, quam Institore, admittendum propter utilitatem.*⁵ Here, we see, that the same grounds of the rule are given, as in the common law, to prevent any deception upon the innocent and unwary, and also to further and sustain the public policy of inviting confidence in all matters of navigation, trade, and business.⁶

§ 129. The same distinction was familiarly exemplified in the civil law, by the case of an authority, even to buy a single thing for the principal. If the agent was authorized to buy generally, without fixing any price for the thing, the principal was bound by his purchase, at any price whatsoever. But, if the agent was limited as to price, then he could not bind the principal beyond that price. The former was a general, the latter a limited authority. *Et quidem, si mandavi tibi, ut aliquam rem mihi emereres, nec de pretio quidquam statui, tuque emisti; utrinque actio nascitur. Quod, si pretium statuit, tuque pluris emisti; quidam negaverunt, te mandati habere actionem, etiamsi paratus*

just logical objection to such distinctions; but the cases in the books do not make them. And if they did, the distinctions would not meet to solve the difficulties in the authorities. Ante, §§ 73, 127, note; Post, §§ 129, 133.

¹ *Howard v. Brathwaite*, 1 Ves. & B. 209; *Stainer v. Tysen*, 3 Hull, R. 279; *Barnard v. Wheeler*, 24 Maine R. 412.

² Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 158; 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 394.

³ Dig. Lib. 20, tit. 6, l. 7, 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 394.

⁴ Ante, §§ 119, 120.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 5; Ante, § 117; 1 Domat. B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 3.

⁶ Ante, §§ 126, 127.

*esses, id, quod excedit, remittere; nam iniquum est, non esse mihi cum illò actionem, si nolit; illi vero, si velit, mecum esse. Sed Proculus recte eum, usque ad pretium statutum, acturum existimat; Quæ sententia sane benignior est.*¹

§ 130. Pothier has laid down the general rule in a very satisfactory manner, and says: "But the contract made by my agent, in my name, would be obligatory upon me, if he did not exceed the power with which he was ostensibly invested; and I could not avail myself of having given him any secret instructions, which he had not pursued. His deviation from these instructions might give me a right of action against himself, but could not exonerate me in respect of the third person, with whom he had contracted conformably to his apparent authority; otherwise, no one could be safe in contracting with the agent of an absent person."²

§ 131. The illustrations in our law of the same distinction between general agents, and limited or special agents, may be familiarly seen in the common case of factors, known to be such. They possess a general authority to sell; and if in selling they violate their private instructions, the principal is nevertheless bound.³ And it makes no difference, in a case of this kind, whether the factor, (if known to be such,) has been ordinarily employed by the principal to sell, or whether it is the first and only instance of his being so employed by the principal; for still, being a known factor, he is held out by the principal as possessing, in effect, all the ordinary general authority of a factor, in relation to the particular sale.⁴ But if a common person, not

¹ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 3, §§ 1, 2; Id. l. 4; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 42-44; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 5, § 1, pp. 96-99, (edit. 1818.) See 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 199; Hicks v. Hankin, 4 Esp. R. 111.

² § Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, n. 79. See also Id. n. 447, 448; Ante, § 73, 127-129.

³ Fenn v. Harrison, 3 Term R. 757, 762; S. C. 4 Term R. 177, Ante, §§ 73, 127, 128; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 199, note, (3d edit.); Id. 207, 208; Whitehead v. Tuckett, 15 East, R. 408; 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 198, 199; Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, R. 38, 43; Smith on Merc. Law, 57-60, (2d edit.); Id. ch. 5, § 4, pp. 107, 108, (3d edit. 1843); Daniel v. Adams, Amb. 495, 498; Johnson v. Jones, 4 Barbour, Ch. R. (N. Y.) 369.

⁴ Ibid.; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 199, and note, (3d edit.); Ante, §§ 73, 81, 127, 128: *

being a factor, should be authorized to make a like sale, and he should violate his private instructions, and deviate from his authority in the sale, the principal would not be bound. In such a case, no general authority is presumed, and he who deals with such an agent deals with him at his own peril; for, in such a case, the principal has not held the agent out as a general agent.¹

§ 132. So, (it has been said,) if a person keeping a livery-stable, and having a horse to sell, intrusts a servant with power to sell the horse, and directs him not to warrant the horse; and the servant, nevertheless, upon the sale, should warrant him, the master would be bound by the warranty; because the servant was acting within the general scope of his authority, and the public cannot be supposed to be cognizant of any private conversation between the master and the servant.² But if the owner of a horse should send the horse to a fair by a stranger, with express directions not to warrant him; and the latter should, on the sale, contrary to his orders, warrant him, the owner would not be bound by the warranty.³

¹ Ante, §§ 73, 127-129, *Penn v Harrison*, 3 Term Rep 757, 762, 8 C. 4 Term Rep 177, 1 Larceny on Agency, 103, 104, 111-113, (edit 1815); *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 167, 199-205, *Id* 207, 208, *East India Co v Hunsley*, 1 Esp R. 112, 3 Kent, Comm Lect 11, pp 620, 621, (4th edit), *Pickering v Busk*, 15 East, R 33, 43, *Gibson v Colt*, 7 John R 390, *Munn v Commission Company*, 15 John R 44, 54, *Rossiter v Rossiter*, 8 Wend R 494; *Tradesmen's Bank v Astor*, 11 Wend R. 87, Ante, § 127, note; § 128, note, *Loddell v Baker*, 1 Met R 193

² Ante, § 59, Post, § 120, note

³ Per Ashurst, J, in *Penn v Harrison*, 3 Term R. 760, 761, *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 203, (3d edit) But see *Seignior and Walmer's case*, *Godbolt*, R. 360, cited in *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, p 323, and post, § 421, note The principle of these cases is clear, but the whole distinction turns upon this, as to the livery-stable keeper, whether the servant had, from the nature of his employment or the business of his master, a general authority. In America, livery stable-keepers are not understood to give their servants any general authority to sell their horses Mr Justice Bayley, in *Pickering v Busk*, 15 East, 43, has put the case in its true light, as being that of a horse-dealer. "If," said he, "the servant of a horse-dealer, with express directions not to warrant, do warrant, the master is bound; because the servant having a general authority to sell, is in a condition to warrant; and the master has not notified to the world that the general authority is circumscribed." See also *Helyear v Hawke*, 6 Esp. R. 72, 75; *Coleman v. Riches*, 29 Eng. Law & Eq R 326.

§ 133. This distinction, between cases of general agency and those of special agency, may seem, at first view, to import a difference of doctrine founded more in arbitrary rules, than in just reasoning. But properly considered, the same principle pervades and governs each of the cases. So far as the agent, whether he is a general, or a special agent, is in any case held out to the public at large, or to third persons dealing with him, as competent to contract for, and to bind the principal, the latter will be bound by the acts of the agent notwithstanding he may have deviated from his secret instructions and orders; for otherwise such secret instructions and orders would operate as a fraud upon the unsuspecting confidence and conduct of the other party.¹ Thus, for example, if a merchant should appoint a special agent *pro hac vice*, to buy or sell a cargo of cotton for him, in his discretion; and he should, by an open letter state that he had so authorized the agent to buy or sell on his account, and that he would ratify and confirm his acts in the premises; a person, who should deal with the agent upon the faith of that letter, and buy or sell the cargo of cotton accordingly, would be entitled to hold the principal bound by the acts of the agent, although the latter might have violated his secret instructions, as to the price of the cotton purchased or sold. The law, in such a case, would hold the authority to purchase to be general upon the face of the letter, and the agent to possess authority to bind his principal, in regard to such purchase or sale, as much as if he had been a general agent, accustomed to make purchases, in numerous cases of the same sort for the principal.² But where

¹ *Jeffrey v. Bigelow*, 13 Wend. R. 514; *Ante*, §§ 73, 127-182, *Anderson v. Coonley*, 21 Wend. R. 279; *Munn v. Commission Co* 15 John. R. 14, 51; *Andrews v. Kneeland*, 6 Cowen, R. 354.

² See *Schummelpennich v. Byard*, 1 Peters, R. 264; 1 *Liverm on Agency*, ch. 5, § 2, pp. 107, 108, (edit. 1818); *Ante*, §§ 73, 127, note, *Withington v. Herring*, 5 Bing. R. 442. The whole difficulty, in considering this doctrine, arises from confounding two things with each other, which are essentially distinct, namely, the extent of the authority given to an agent, whether it be limited or unlimited, with the nature of the agency, in which he is employed, whether it be general or special. A person may be a general agent, that is, he may be employed in the general business of his principal; and yet he may be privately limited, in the exercise of his agency, by certain instructions given by his principal, far within the general scope of that business. *Ante*, § 73. On the other hand, he may be a special agent, that is, he may be employed for a particular

the agency is not held out by the principal, by any acts, or declarations, or implications, to be general in regard to the particular act or business, it must from necessity be construed according to its real nature and extent; and the other party must act at his own peril, and is bound to inquire into the nature and extent of the authority actually conferred.¹ In such a case, there is no ground to contend, that the principal ought to be bound by the acts of the agent, beyond what he has apparently authorized; because he has not misled the confidence of the other party who has dealt with the agent. Each party is equally innocent; and, in a just sense, it cannot be said, that the principal has enabled the agent to practise any deception upon the other party. The duty of inquiring, then, is incumbent on such party, since the principal has never held the agent out, as having any general authority whatsoever in the premises. And, if he trusts without inquiry, he trusts to the good faith of the agent, and not to that of the principal.² This distinction between the effects

object only; and yet he may have an unlimited authority to act within the scope of his agency in that particular affair, or he may be limited therein by like instructions. Ante, §§ 17, 18, 127, note. In each case, so far as he is held out to persons dealing with him, as having general power to act in the premises, that is, as having unlimited authority to act within the scope of his agency, whether general or special, his acts bind his principal notwithstanding his private and limited instructions. In each case, if the instructions and limitations upon his authority are known to persons dealing with him, and the agent exceeds them, the principal will not be bound. Mr. Smith, in his excellent Compendium of Mercantile Law, pp. 46, 47, (2d edit.) has stated the distinction with clearness and brevity. "The appointment (of the agent) is his only authority. It may be *general*, to act in all his principal's affairs, or *special*, concerning some particular object. It may be limited by certain instructions, as to the conduct he is to pursue, or unlimited, leaving his conduct to his own discretion." S. P. Smith on Merc. Law, ch. 5, § 2, p. 91, (3d edit. 1843.) See also the reasoning of Mr. Chief Justice Savage, in *Jeffrey v. Bigelow*, 13 Wend. R. 518; Ante, § 127, note, § 128, note, § 129, note; *Andrews v. Kneeland*, 6 Cowen, R. 354.

¹ Ante, § 127, note, § 128, note; *Snow v. Perry*, 9 Pick. 542; *Rossiter v. Rossiter*, 8 Wend. 494; *Denning v. Smith*, 3 Johns. Ch. R. 344; *Lobdell v. Baker*, 1 Mete. R. 193.

² This doctrine has been already adverted to in another place; Ante, § 127, note, § 128, note. But I have ventured to repeat it in the text, knowing how often it is misunderstood. The case of *Withington v. Herring*, 5 Bing. R. 442, recognizes the true point of the distinction; and does, as I think, fully bear out the deductions in the text, as does the doctrine of Lord Kenyon in *Fenn v. Harrison*, 3 T. R. 757, and of Lord Ellenborough in *Pickering v. Busk*, 15 East, 88,

of a general and a special agency seems (as we shall hereafter see) to be limited to cases of private agency; and to be inapplicable to the case of public agents, who can bind the government, or the public authorities, only to the extent of the powers actually conferred on them.¹

§ 134. We have already seen to what extent, and under what circumstances, the acts of an agent will bind his principal. It remains to consider, to what extent and under what circumstances, the representations, declarations, and admissions of an agent will also bind his principal. And here it may be laid down generally, that no representations, declarations, or admissions of an agent, will bind his principal, except in cases within the scope of the authority confided to him; subject, however, to the same distinction of which notice has been already taken, between general agents and limited or special agents.² For, where the acts of the agent will bind the principal, there his representations, declarations, and admissions, respecting the subject-matter, will also bind him, if made at the same time, and constituting a part of the *res gesta*.³ [In a suit against a railroad company by a passenger for the loss of his trunk, the admissions of the con-

43, and of the Supreme Court of the United States in *Schimmelpennich v. Bayard*, 1 Peters, R. 261, 290; *Ante*, § 81; *Id.* § 73. See also *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 197-199, and note; *Helyear v. Hawke*, 5 Esp. R. 72; *East India Company v. Hensley*, 1 Esp. R. 112; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 107-119, (edit. 1818); *Andrews v. Kneeland*, 6 Cowen, R. 354; *Reitz v. Martin*, 12 Ind. 308.

¹ See post, § 307 *a*; *Lee v. Munroe*, 7 Cranch, R. 366.

² *Ante*, § 126-133; *Fuller v. Wilson*, 2 Gale & Dav. R. 460; Post, § 307 *a*; *Graham v. Schmidt*, 1 Sandford, Sup. Ct. N. Y. R. 74; *N. Y. Life & Trust Co. v. Boebe*, 3 Selden, 364; *Doe v. Robinson*, 24 Missis. 688; *Demerit v. Meserve*, 39 N. H. R. 521; *Pritchett v. Sessions*, 10 Rich. 298.

³ 1 *aloy on Agency*, by Lloyd, p. 255-274; 3 *Chitty on Comm. & Manuf.* 208, 209; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 67, (2d edit.); *Id.* pp. 123, 121, (3d edit. 1843); *Fairlie v. Hastings*, 10 Ves. 125; 2 *Starkie on Evid. Agent*, p. 54; *Marshall on Inst. R. B. 1*, ch. 10, § 1, p. 453; *Dawson v. Atty*, 7 East, R. 367; *Bree v. Holbeck*, Doug. R. 654, 657; *American Fur Company v. United States*, 2 Peters, R. 358, 361; *Fitzherbert v. Mather*, 1 Term Rep. 12, 15; 2 *Pothier on Oblig. by Evans*; App'x. No. 16, pp. 287, 288; *North River Bank v. Aymar*, 3 Hill, R. 262; *Sandford v. Handy*, 23 Wend. R. 260; *Lobdell v. Baker*, 1 Metc. R. 193; *Thalhimer v. Brinckerhoff*, 4 Wend. R. 394; *Lee v. Munroe*, 7 Cranch, R. 366; *Stewartson v. Watts*, 8 Watts, R. 392; *Carpenter v. American Insur. Co.* 1 Story, Rep. 67; *Randall v. Ches. & Del. Canal Co.* 1 Harring. Delaw. R. 234; Post, § 307 *a*; *Bank of United States v. Davis*, 2 Hill, N. Y. R. 451, 461, 464.

ductor, baggage master, or station master, as to the manner of the loss, made the next morning in answer to inquiries for the trunk, are competent against the company, it being part of the duties of such agents to deliver the baggage of passengers, and to account for the same, if missing and inquiry is made within a reasonable time.^{1]}

§ 135. Indeed, for most practical purposes, a party dealing with an agent, who is acting within the scope of his authority and employment, is to be considered as dealing with the principal himself. If it is a case of contract, it is the contract of the principal. If the agent, at the time of the contract, makes any representation, declaration, or admission, touching the matter of the contract, it is treated as the representation, declaration, or admission of the principal himself.² But the qualifications above stated are also most important to be attended to. The representation, declaration, or admission of the agent, does not bind the principal, if it is not made at the very time of the contract, but upon another occasion; or if it does not concern the subject-matter of the contract, but some other matter, in no degree belonging to the *res gesta*.³ [Thus the declarations of an agent while performing a contract of labor and service for his principal, as a son for his father, are not admissible to prove the terms of his contract.⁴ So the declarations of a driver of a car which

¹ [Morse v. Conn. River Railroad, 6 Gray, 450. See Robinson v. Fitchburg Railroad, 7 Gray, 92, where it was held that in an action against a railroad company for damages by a collision through the negligence of the engineer, his statements as to the accident, made a few days afterwards, were not competent against the company.]

² 2 Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, App'x. No. 16, pp. 287, 288; 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 207, 208; Thallimer v. Brinckerhoff, 4 Wend. 394; Hubbard v. Elmer, 7 Wend. R. 446, Ante, §§ 67, 68.

³ Peto v. Hagne, 5 Esp. R. 135; Helyear v. Hawke, 5 Esp. R. 72, 74; Alexander v. Gibson, 2 Camp. 556; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 256, 257; Fairlie v. Hastings, 10 Ves. 125; Dawson v. Atty, 7 East, R. 367; 2 Starkie on Evid. Agent, p. 60; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 238, 239, (edit. 1818); 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 208, 209; 2 Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, App'x. No. 16, pp. 287, 288; Thallimer v. Brinckerhoff, 4 Wend. R. 395; Stewartson v. Watts, 8 Watts, R. 392; Hubbard v. Elmer, 7 Wend. R. 446.

⁴ Corbin v. Adams, 6 Cush. 93. See also Royall v. Sprinkle, 1 Jones, (N. C.) 405; Byers v. Fowler, 14 Ark. 87. [The declarations of a father as to injuries to his minor son are not admissible in an action subsequently brought by the son,

has run against and injured a person, made after the accident had occurred and the car had been stopped, but before the driver had left it, that he could not stop the car because the brakes were out of order, is not competent against the company.^{1]}

§ 136. The reasoning, upon which this distinction proceeds, has been very well explained by a late learned Judge.² "As a general proposition," (said he,) "what one man says, not upon oath, cannot be evidence against another man. The exception must arise out of some peculiarity of situation, coupled with the declarations made by one. An agent may undoubtedly, within the scope of his authority, bind his principal by his agreement; and in many cases by his acts. What the agent has said may be what constitutes the agreement of the principal; or the representations or statements may be the foundation of, or the inducement to, the agreement. Therefore, if writing is not necessary by law, evidence must be admitted, to prove the agent did make that statement or representation. So, with regard to acts done, the words, with which those acts are accompanied, frequently tend to determine their quality. The party, therefore, to be bound by the act, must be affected by the words. But, except in one or the other of those ways, I do not know, how, what is said by an agent, can be evidence against his principal. The mere assertion of a fact cannot amount to proof of it; though it may have some relation to the business, in which the person making that assertion was employed as agent. For instance, if it was a material fact, that there was the bond of the defendant in the hands of [the principal,] that fact would not be proved by the assertion that [the agent,] supposing him an agent, had said there was; for that is no fact, that is, no part of any agreement, which [the agent] is making, or of any statement he is making, as inducement to an agreement. It is mere narration; communication to the witness in the course of conversation; and, therefore, could not be evidence of the existence of the fact. The

in his father's name, as *prochien ami*, without proof that the father was agent of the son at the time when the statements were made, which agency must be proved by other evidence than the mere declarations of the father himself. *Harvey v. Donelly*, 22 Boston Law Rep. 317.]

¹ *Luby v. Hudson River Railroad*, 3 Smith, (N. Y.) 131.

² Sir William Grant.

admission of an agent cannot be assimilated to the admission of the principal. A party is bound by his own admission; and is not permitted to contradict it. But it is impossible to say, [that] a man is precluded from questioning or contradicting anything any person has asserted as to him, as to his conduct or his agreement, merely because that person has been an agent of his. If any fact, material to the interest of either party, rests in the knowledge of an agent, it is to be proved by his testimony, not by his mere assertion."¹ [Thus the fact of agency, or the extent of the authority, cannot be proved by the declarations of the alleged agent, although accompanied by his acts as agent.²]

§ 137. Thus, for example, what an agent has said, or represented, at the time of the sale of a horse, which sale was authorized by his master, whether it be a representation or a warranty of soundness, or of any other quality, will be binding upon the master. But, what he has said upon the subject at another time, or upon another occasion, will not be binding upon him; for it is no part of the *res gestæ*; and did not attach, as an incident or

¹ Fairlie v. Hastings, 10 Ves. 126, 127; Garth v. Howard, 8 Bing. R. 451. The same doctrine is fully expounded by Mr. Justice Kennedy, in delivering the opinion of the Court, in Hannay v. Stewart, 6 Watts, R. 489. "In order to determine," (says he,) "whether the declarations or representations of an agent are admissible, as evidence against his principal, it may be proper, first, to state the grounds upon which they have been deemed to be so. The statements of an agent, generally, though made of the business of his principal, are not to be taken as equivalent to the admissions of the principal; for then the latter would be bound by them, whether true or false, which would render the situation of every principal truly perilous. Every man has a right to make such representations of what he has done, as he pleases, and to bind himself to abide by them, whether true or otherwise; and they, of course, may be given in evidence against him afterwards, when relevant to the issue trying; not, however, because the facts therein stated are true; but because he has the right to pledge himself in the same manner as if they were true; and if true, justice naturally requires that he should be bound by them; or if not, it is no more than the infliction of a just penalty for his disregard of truth. But it would not be reasonable to hold him responsible, upon the same principle, for the declarations of his agent; nor upon any principle, except that of truth, and the protection of those against loss or injury, that might otherwise arise, from their having confided in the representations of the agent, made by him at the time of entering into the agreement, or of transacting the business, under the authority of his principal."

² Brigham v. Peters, 1 Gray, 139.

inducement to the sale.¹ For such purposes the agent is no longer acting as agent of the master; and his declarations are not to be used as proofs against the master; but the facts contained in those declarations must be proved *aliunde*.² Indeed, in such cases, the agent himself may be properly called as a witness; and, hence, it has been said, that his declarations are not the best evidence of the facts.³

¹ *Helyear v. Hawke*, 5 Esp. R. 72, 73; *Lobdell v. Baker*, 1 Metc. R. 193; *North River Bank v. Aymar*, 3 Hill, R. 262; *Hubbard v. Elmer*, 7 Wend. R. 446.

² *Starkie, Evid. Agent*, 60, 61; *Cooley v. Norton*, 4 Cush. 93; *Langhorne v. Allnutt*, 4 Taunt. R. 511; *Betham v. Benson*, 1 Gow, R. 45; *Fairlie v. Hastings*, 10 Ves. 123; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 257, 268, 269; *Masters v. Abraham*, 1 Esp. R. 375; *Hannay v. Stewart*, 6 Watts, R. 489; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 66, 67, (2d edit.); *Id.* ch. 5, § 4, p. 123, (3d edit. 1843); *Hubbard v. Elmer*, 7 Wend. 446. Questions of a different nature may arise; as, for example, whether the verbal declarations of an auctioneer, at a sale, shall be permitted to counter-vail or vary the printed particulars of the sale; and also, whether parol declarations of an agent, during the negotiation of a contract, afterwards reduced to writing, shall be admitted to control or vary that writing. But these are questions which more properly belong to the general law of evidence, than to the doctrines of agency; since they may equally arise in the case of the principal himself, if he is the immediate party to the transaction. As to the case of the auctioneer, see *Gunnis v. Erhart*, 1 H. Bl. 289; *Powell v. Edmunds*, 12 East, R. 6; *Howard v. Braithwaite*, 1 Ves. & B. 210; *Jones v. Edney*, 3 Camp. R. 285; *Ogilvie v. Foljambe*, 3 Meriv. R. 53. As to the other case, see *Pickering v. Dowson*, 4 Taunt. R. 779; *Kain v. Old*, 2 Barn. & Cressw. 634.

³ This suggestion does not show the true foundation of the rule, which admits or excludes the declarations and admissions of the agent: for, in all such cases, the agent may be examined under oath. But, notwithstanding that, his declarations and admissions are clearly evidence, when a part of the *res gestæ*. In *Garth v. Howard*, 8 Bing. R. 451, Lord Chief Justice Tindal said: "If the transaction, out of which this suit arises, had been one in the ordinary trade or business of the defendant, as a pawnbroker, in which trade the shopman was agent, or servant to the defendant, a declaration of such agent, that his master had received the goods, might probably have been evidence against the master, as it might be held within the scope of such agent's authority to give an answer to such an inquiry, made by any person interested in the goods deposited with the pawnbroker. In that case, the rule laid down by the Master of the Rolls, in the case of *Fairlie v. Hastings*, which may be regarded as the leading case on this head of evidence, directly applies. But the transaction with Fleming appears to us not a transaction in his business as a pawnbroker, but was a loan by him, as by any other lender of money, at five per cent. And there is no evidence to show the agency of the shopman in private transactions, unconnected with the business of

§ 138. Upon this ground it is, that, where an agent is authorized to pay money for work done for his principal, or where he is referred to, to settle and adjust any account or business, his admissions of the existence of the debt, and of its validity, will be sufficient to take the case out of the statute of limitations; for it is connected with, and a part of, the very business of his agency.¹ So, an acknowledgment by an agent authorized to buy goods for his principal, that he has received the goods will, if made while he is transacting the business, but not otherwise, be good evidence of the delivery of them to him, as against his principal.²

§ 139. And not only will the positive acts, representations, declarations, and admissions of an agent, when part of the *res gestæ*, be binding upon the principal; but even his fraudulent or negligent statements, misrepresentations, and concealments, will, in many cases, have the same effect.³ Thus, for example, if an agent authorized to procure insurance, should conceal from the

the shop. I doubted much, at the time, whether it could be received, and intimated such doubt, by reserving the point; and now, upon consideration with the Court, am satisfied, that it is not admissible. It is dangerous to open the door to declarations of agents, beyond what the cases have already done. The declaration itself is evidence against the principal, not given upon oath; it is made in his absence, when he has no opportunity to set it aside, if incorrectly made, by any observation, or any question put to the agent; and it is brought before the Court and jury, frequently, after a long interval of time. It is liable, therefore, to suspicion originally, from carelessness or misapprehension in the original hearer; and again, to further suspicion, from the faithlessness of memory in the reporter, and the facility with which he may give an untrue account. Evidence, therefore, of such a nature, ought always to be kept within the strictest limits to which the cases have confined it; and as that which was admitted in this case, appears to us to exceed those limits, we think there ought to be a new trial."

¹ *Burt v. Palmer*, 5 Esp. R. 145; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 267; *Palethorp v. Furnish*, 2 Esp. R. 511, n.; *Anderson v. Sanderson*, 2 Stark. R. 204; S. C. Holt, R. 591.

² *Biggs v. Lawrence*, 3 Term R. 454. But see *Bauerman v. Radenius*, 7 Term R. 663, and *Betham v. Benson*, 1 Gow, R. 45; *Drake v. Marryatt*, 1 Barn. & Cressw. 473; *Clifford v. Burton*, 1 Bing. R. 199; *Gregory v. Parker*, 1 Camp. R. 394; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 270, 272, 273; 2 Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, App'x. No. 16, pp. 287, 288; *Bingham v. Cabot*, 3 Dall. 19; *Garth v. Howard*, 8 Bing. R. 451; *New England Mar. Ins. Company v. De Wolf*, 8 Pick' 56; *Van Rensselaer v. Morris*, 1 Paige, R. 13.

³ Ante, §§ 126, 127; *Bennett v. Judson*, 7 Smith, (N. Y.) 238.

underwriters a material fact within his own knowledge, it will be equally as potent to invalidate the insurance, as if it were concealed by the principal himself.¹ [But it has been held in England, that where A., a principal, knowing a material objection to the letting of a tenement, as that an adjoining house was a house of ill-fame, employs B., an agent, to let the property, who is ignorant of such objection, and B. innocently makes a misrepresentation to C. concerning such estate, and thereby induces C. to hire the tenement, the misrepresentation of the agent will not be held to support an allegation of fraud and covin in the principal, since he had made no misrepresentation, not even to his agent, and his agent had made no misrepresentation, since he had no knowledge of any such objection.² Neither was there any proof that the principal had purposely employed an innocent agent that he might ignorantly make such misrepresentation. But this case may not be inconsistent with the sound and perfectly well-settled principle, that if a principal seeks to enforce a contract made by his agent, he is as much bound by any material misrepresentation made therein by the agent, as if made by himself. Thus, if A. obtains credit upon the recommendation of B., which is so far a fraudulent misrepresentation, that, if

¹ Marshall on Insur. B. 1, ch. 11, § 1, p. 466; *Fillis v. Brutton*, Marsh. on Insur. B. 1, ch. 11, § 1, p. 467; *Stewart v. Dunlop*, 4 Bro. Parl. Cas. 483; S. C. Marsh. on Insur. B. 1, ch. 11, § 1, p. 468; *Willes v. Glover*, 4 Bos. & Pull. 14; *Shirley v. Wilkinson*, Doug. R. 306, n.; *Roberts v. Fonnereau*, Park on Insur. ch. 1, p. 285, (7th edit.); *Seaman v. Fonnereau*, 2 Str. R. 1183; *Ruggles v. Gen. Mut. Ins. Company*, 4 Mason, R. 74; S. C. 12 Wheat. R. 408; 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 208, 209; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, pp. 256-262; *Carpenter v. Amer. Ins. Company*, 1 Story, R. 57; *Bank of U. States v. Davis*, 2 Hill, N. Y. R. 451, 461, 462.

² *Cornfoot v. Fowke*, 6 Mees. & Welsb. 358. [This case has sometimes been doubted, and sometimes sharply criticised; see *Fitzsimmons v. Joslin*, 21 Verm. 129-141; but when understood in its true light seems not open to the objections made. The jury at the trial found a verdict for the defendant, which was set aside by the Court of Exchequer *solely upon the ground* that the allegation of fraud in the plaintiff, upon which the defence proceeded, was not proved by the evidence. But if there had been no allegation of fraud in the case, and the lessee had relied, not upon positive fraud in the plaintiff, but upon a misrepresentation merely, it was not denied by the Court, but that the contract might have been avoided for that cause, and the principal would have been bound by the misrepresentation of his agent. See *National Exchange Company v. Drew*, 32 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 1, 14, 15.]

made by A. himself would avoid the sale, it will have the same effect, if its falsity was known by A., and he claims to hold the goods purchased by means of this fraudulent representation.¹ So, where the directors of a joint stock company, by fraudulent reports of the standing and conditions of the company, induced third persons to contract with the company, and the latter was benefited by the transaction, it was held that the company would be bound by the misrepresentation.² So, where an auctioneer pretended to have received bids, not actually made, and thus ran

[¹ *Fitzsimmons v. Joslin*, 21 Verm. 129. "In this case the creditors of a trader, who was insolvent, but who wished to purchase goods, being unwilling to extend to him further credit, told him, that they did not like to sell to him, if he could buy elsewhere, and gave him the name of another merchant, and authorized him to refer to them. He attempted to purchase of this merchant, and, being asked for references, gave the names of his original creditors, and was told to call again in half an hour. He did call again in the course of the day, and the purchase was effected. No inquiry was made by the vendor of the purchaser, as to his circumstances, nor did he give any assurances whatever relative thereto. On the same day, and after the purchase was effected, the purchaser met one of his original creditors, who told him that he had been called upon by the vendor, and that 'he had given as good an account of him as he could and not make himself liable,'—'that he had told him, that he, (the purchaser,) was a clever fellow, and was doing a thriving business in Vergennes, and that he (the creditor) had sold him goods, and he paid well, and he was ready to sell him more.' At the time of this transaction the purchaser was in arrears to these same original creditors, to the amount of several hundred dollars each, and their demands had actually been placed in the hands of their attorney at Vergennes, where the purchaser resided, for collection; and, as soon as they learned, that this last purchase had been effected, they sent instructions to the attorney to attach the goods, as the property of the purchaser, upon their arrival at the place of destination. This was done; and, as soon as the vendor was informed of the insolvency of the purchaser, which was within a week after the attachment, he demanded the goods of the sheriff, offering to pay freight; but the sheriff refused to surrender them. The attachment was made upon suits in favor of the several original creditors; and it did not appear that either of these creditors, except the one above mentioned, had made any representation whatever in relation to the matter. And it was held, that the purchaser was responsible for the representations made by his creditor, and that the vendor, having been cheated and deceived by means for which the purchaser was legally responsible, might sustain trover against the sheriff to recover the value of the goods so attached."]

² *National Exchange Company v. Drew*, 32 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 1. See also *Burnes v. Pennell*, 2 House of Lords Cases, 497; *Ranger v. Great Western Railway*, 5 Id. 72; 27 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 35; *Wontner v. Shairp*, 4 Railw. Cas. 542.

up the price of the property from \$20,000, the last real bid, to \$40,000, at which it was struck off to the plaintiff, who had no knowledge of the fraud, it was held that the owners of the property were bound by this fraud, although they did not direct it, but still claimed to hold the whole \$40,000 paid.¹ The reason seems to be, that, where one of two innocent persons must suffer, he ought to suffer, who has misled the other into a false confidence in his agent, by clothing him with apparent authority to act and speak in the premises, and who otherwise might receive an injury, for which he might have no adequate redress.

§ 139 *a*. The question has been made in cases of joint agency, (not of joint and several agency,) how far the acts, or admissions, or representations, or concealment, or negligences of one agent in the common concern, intrusted to them, unknown to the others, will affect their principal. It would seem clear upon principle, that, where the authority given is joint, neither of the agents can act, so as to bind the principal by his act without the coöperation of all the others in the same act.² If, then, the act of one joint agent alone will not bind the principal, upon what ground can his admissions, or representations, or concealments, or negligences have a more conclusive and comprehensive effect? Yet it seems sometimes to have been thought, that, in cases of mere joint agency, the act of one of the several joint agents would bind the principal; and certainly, if that be correct, the conclusion seems irresistible, that the admissions, representations, concealments, and negligences of one of several joint agents ought equally to bind the principal.³

§ 140. Upon a similar ground, notice of facts to an agent is constructive notice thereof to the principal himself, where it arises from, or is at the time connected with, the subject-matter of his agency; for, upon general principles of public policy, it is presumed that the agent has communicated such facts to the

¹ *Veazie v. Williams*, 8 Howard, 124.

² *Ante*, § 42-44.

³ See *Bank of the U. States v. Davis*, 2 Hill, N. Y. R. 451, 463, 464, where the doctrine is maintained, that in cases of joint agency, the principal is responsible for the conduct of each and all of his agents, while acting within the limits of the power conferred on them, that is, on all of them jointly. It deserves consideration, whether this doctrine is maintainable except in cases where the power is joint and several. *Post*, §§ 140, 140 *a*, 140 *b*, and note.

principal; and if he has not, still the principal, having intrusted the agent with the particular business, the other party has a right to deem his acts and knowledge obligatory upon the principal; otherwise, the neglect of the agent, whether designed or undesigned, might operate most injuriously to the rights and interests of such party.¹ But, unless notice of the facts come to the agent, while he is concerned for the principal, and in the course of the very transaction, or so near before it that the agent must be presumed to recollect it, it is not notice thereof to the principal, for otherwise the agent might have forgotten it; and then the principal would be affected by his want of memory, at the time of undertaking the agency.² Notice, therefore, to the agent, before the agency is begun or after it has terminated, will not, ordinarily, affect the principal.³

§ 140 *a*. We have already had occasion to consider how far, in cases of joint agency, the act, admission, representation, or concealment of one, without the knowledge or assent of the others, would or ought to bind the principal.⁴ Probably, the same rule would be held applicable to notice in cases of joint agency. In cases of corporations, who act through the instrumentality of agents, the same rule, as to notice, would seem properly to apply to their regular agents, as applies to the agents of a mere private person. But a nice question may arise, in cases where corporations act through the instrumentality of a

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, pp. 262-266; *Fitzherbert v. Mather*, 1 Term R. 12, 16; *Le Neve v. Le Neve*, 1 Ves. pp. 64-69; *Hiern v. Mill*, 13 Ves. 114; *Id.* 120; 3 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 208, 209; 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 408; *Astor v. Wells*, 4 Wheat. R. 466; 2 Liverm. on Agency, pp. 235-238, (edit. 1818); *Cowen v. Simpson*, 1 Esp. R. 290; *Toulmin v. Steere*, 3 Meriv. R. 210; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 67, (2d edit.); *Id.* ch. 5, § 4, p. 123, (3d edit. 1843); *Berkeley v. Watling*, 7 Adolph. & Ell. 29; *Fulton Bank v. New York and Sharon Canal Company*, 4 Paige, R. 127, 136, 137; *Bank of United States v. Davis*, 2 Hill, R. 451, 461, 464; *Hovey v. Blanchard*, 13 N. Hamp. R. 145; *Sutton v. Dil-laye*, 3 Barbour, Sup. Ct. R. (N. Y.) 529; *Ross v. Houston*, 25 Mississippi, 591.

² *Hiern v. Mill*, 13 Ves. 120; 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 408; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 235, 237, (edit. 1818); *Hargreaves v. Rothwell*, 1 Keen, R. 159; *Bracken v. Miller*, 4 Watts & Serg. R. 102; *Hood v. Fahnestock*, 8 Watts, R. 489, 490; *Lawrence v. Tucker*, 7 Greenl. 195; *Boyd v. Vanderkemp*, 1 Barbour, Ch. R. 287; *Fuller v. Bennett*, 2 Hare, 402, where the subject is fully discussed:

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Ante, §§ 42, 139 *a*.

Board of Directors or Trustees, or other official agents, how far notice to one of the directors, or trustees, or other official agents, is to be deemed notice to all, and binding upon the corporation. Thus, for example, suppose, in the case of a bank, one of the directors should have notice that a note offered for discount was invalid or void, from extrinsic facts, unknown to the other directors, and he should conceal those facts, and the note should be discounted by the Board; the question would arise, whether notice to one director, and unknown to the others, was notice to, and obligatory upon, the corporation, so as to let in the proof as a defence against a suit on the note for nonpayment. Upon this question, it is not easy to affirm what is the prevailing rule, since the authorities are not entirely agreed. On the one hand, it has been thought reasonable, that nothing but an official notice of the facts to the Board, or to the majority of the Board, acting as such in the particular discount, ought to bind the bank.¹ On the other hand, it has been insisted, that notice of the facts to any one of the directors, who acts in the discount, (but not unless he acts,) is sufficient to bind the corporation, although the other directors at the Board had no knowledge thereof.² [So, in another case, it was held, that notice to the president of a banking corporation, that stock, standing upon the books of the bank in the name of one person, is held by him in trust for another, should be considered as notice to the corporation. And it is not necessary, in order to affect the corporation with notice of such trust, that there should have been a full communication of all the circumstances connected with it.³]

¹ See *Louisiana State Bank v. Senecal*, 13 Louis. R. 525, 527; *Housatonic and Lee Bank v. Martin*, 1 Metc. R. 294, 308; *Commercial Bank v. Cunningham*, 24 Pick. R. 274, 276. On this occasion, the Court said: "The knowledge of Parker, although he was one of the directors of the Commercial Bank, is no proof of notice to that corporation, especially as he was a party to all these contracts, whose interest might be opposed to that of the corporation. To admit the stockholders or directors of a bank to subject it to liability, or to affect its interests, unless they have authority so to do expressly by its charter, would be attended with the most dangerous consequences, and is certainly not sanctioned by any authority. *Hallowell & Augusta Bank v. Hamlin*, 14 Mass. R. 180."

² *Bank of United States v. Davis*, 2 Hill, R. 451; *North River Bank v. Aymar*, 3 Hill, R. 262, 274, 275.

³ *Porter v. Bank of Rutland*, 19 Verm. 410.

§ 140 *b*. If we examine the subject upon general principles, and with reference to practical convenience in the administration of banks, it might seem, that, to bind the bank, the notice ought to be given to the proper agents of the bank, legally intrusted with the particular business, to which the notice relates. If the business be legally confided to the cashier, notice to him ought to bind the bank. If it is to be done by a Board of Directors, as, for example, in the discounting of notes, they ought to have official notice of any illegality or informality affecting the notes. And notice to one director only, unknown to the others of the Board, ought not to bind the bank.¹ But in one of the authorities, a distinction is taken between notice given to a director privately, and notice given to him officially, for the purpose of being communicated to the Board, although it should not be communicated to the Board. In the latter case it is said, that the bank is bound by the notice to the one director only, although it may not be in the former.² In another case a distinction is taken between notice to a director, who acts at the Board, in discounting a note, of whose illegality or infirmity he alone has notice, and not the Board, and notice to a director, who does not act at the time of the discount at the Board. In the former case, it is said, that the bank is bound; in the latter it is not.³

¹ *Louisiana State Bank v. Senechal*, 13 Louis. R. 525, 527. See also *National Bank v. Norton*, 1 Hill, N. Y. R. 572, 578; *Bank of United States v. Davis*, 2 Hill, R. 451, 463; *Fulton Bank v. New York & Sharon Canal Company*, 4 Paige, R. 127, 136, 137.

² *National Bank v. Norton*, 1 Hill, N. Y. R. 575, 578; *Fulton Bank v. New York & Sharon Canal Company*, 4 Paige, R. 127, 129.

³ *Bank of United States v. Davis*, 2 Hill, R. 451, 464; *North River Bank v. Aymar*, 3 Hill, N. Y. R. 262, 274, 275. In the case of *Bank of United States v. Davis*, 2 Hill, N. Y. R. 451, 463, Mr. Chief Justice Nelson, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: "I agree, that notice to a director, or knowledge derived by him, while not engaged officially in the business of the bank, cannot and should not operate to the prejudice of the latter. This is clear, from the ground and reason upon which the doctrine of notice to the principal, through the agent, rests. The principal is chargeable with this knowledge for the reason that the agent is substituted in his place, and represents him in the particular transaction; and as this relation, strictly speaking, exists only while the agent is acting in the business thus delegated to him, it is proper to limit it to such occasions. But in this case, as has been already observed, Williams was a member of the Board, participating at the time in the discounting of bills and notes, as one of the directors of the bank; and as such procured the discount of the

Perhaps it will be found, that, if either of these distinctions is to prevail, it will sap the foundations, on which the security

paper in question, avowedly for his own benefit, but knowing at the time that it belonged to Davis, one of the defendants. So far, therefore, as he may be regarded as representing the bank in transacting its business at the Board, the institution must be considered as having knowledge of the fraudulent perversion of the bills from the object for which they were drawn. To this extent, his acts and knowledge concerning the object and ownership of the paper, are to be deemed the acts and knowledge of the institution itself. It is said, however, that Williams was but one of the five empowered by the bank to represent it in this transaction; that the bank is not therefore to be held responsible for his individual fraud at the time, nor can it be chargeable with his knowledge of the facts, under which the paper in question was discounted; and that such knowledge is chargeable only when the agent has full power to act for the principal in the particular case. It is not to be denied, that if a principal employs several agents to transact jointly a particular piece of business, he is equally responsible for the conduct of each and all of them while acting within the limit and scope of their power, as completely so as he would be for the conduct of a single agent upon whom the whole authority has been conferred. He cannot shift or avoid this responsibility by the multiplication of his agents. It is also clear, that the corresponding responsibility of each of the several joint agents to the principal for the faithful discharge of their duties, is as complete and perfect as in the case of a single agency; and any prejudice to the principal, arising from fraud, misconduct, or negligence of either of them, would afford ground for redress from the party guilty of the wrong. These are general conceded principles, for which no authority need be cited. One of the grounds for charging the principal with the knowledge possessed by the agent is, because the latter is bound to communicate the fact to the former, and is liable for any prejudice that may arise from a neglect in this respect; and hence the law presumes that the principal has had actual notice. Now the duty of any one of the joint agents is as obligatory on him in this respect, as if he had possessed the sole power in the matter of the agency, and any prejudice resulting from the neglect would afford a like redress. Again, so completely is the principal represented by the agent while acting within the scope of his authority and employment, that the third party, for most purposes, is considered as dealing with the principal himself. In the case of a contract, it is deemed the contract of the principal, and if the agent at the time of the contract make any representation or declaration touching the subject-matter, it is the representation and declaration of the principal. *Sandford v. Handy*, 23 Wend. 260, and cases there cited. Upon these views it seems to me consistently and reasonably to follow, that in case of a joint agency by several persons, — as of the directors of a bank, — notice to any one, or the acts of any one, while engaged in the business of the principal, is notice to the bank itself. The corporation is acting and speaking through the several directors, who jointly represent it in the particular transaction. In judgment of law it is present, conducting the business of the institution itself; the acts of the

of all banking and other moneyed corporations, if not of all corporations, have been hitherto supposed to rest, to wit, that

several directors are the acts of the bank; their knowledge the knowledge of the bank, and notice to them, notice to the bank." In *North River Bank v. Aymar*, 3 Ill. N. Y. R. 262, 274, the Supreme Court of New York recognized the authority of this case. In *Fulton Bank v. New York and Sharon Canal Company*, 4 Paige, R. 127, 136, 137, Mr. Chancellor Walworth said: "There can be no actual notice to a corporation aggregate, except through its agents or officers. The directors or trustees, when assembled as a Board, are the general agents, upon whom a notice may be served; and which will be binding upon their successors and the corporation. But notice to an individual director, who has no duty to perform in relation to such notice, cannot be considered a notice to the corporation. The notice, which Brown and Cheeseborough had of what took place at the house of the former, on the evening of the 7th of September, was not of itself legal notice to the bank that the fund was placed under the control of the finance committee; and that Brown, although he left his signature, and apparently had the control of the money the next morning, was not in fact authorized to draw it from the bank. But if Cheeseborough had been authorized by the bank, as their president and agent, to agree to receive the money on deposit, the agreement made with him as such agent, would have been notice to the corporation; although he neglected to communicate the facts to the other officers of the bank, or to the board of directors. It is well settled, that notice to an agent of a party, whose duty it is, as such agent, to act upon the notice, or to communicate the information to his principal, in the proper discharge of his trust as such agent, is legal notice to the principal. And this rule applies to the agents of corporations as well as others." On the other hand, in *Louisiana State Bank v. Senecal*, 13 Louis. R. 525, 527, Mr. Justice Rost, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: "It was proved at the trial, that the note was given in payment of land sold by Mrs. Peychaud, and was delivered to her husband, Anatole Peychaud, who had signed with her the deed of sale. That deed contains a clause, that the note, upon which this action is brought, shall not be negotiated, nor the payment thereof exacted, until the property sold shall be fully released from all liabilities resulting, or to result, from certain general mortgages then existing upon it. Peychaud, being at that time a director of the Louisiana State Bank, offered the note for discount, before the mortgages were raised; was present at the Board when it was acted upon; took no part in the discount of it, and gave no information to the Board in relation to the restrictions contained in the act of sale. The note was discounted for his benefit, and the defendant now contends, that he was the agent of the bank, and that the knowledge of the agent being the knowledge of the principal, the plaintiffs are to be considered as having received notice, and ought not to recover. If the knowledge of those facts had been brought home to the president or cashier, we would unhesitatingly say, that the plaintiffs were bound by it, they being the executive officers of the bank, upon whom all notices and process may be served. But directors are not officers of the bank, in the proper sense of the word, nor have they individually any

no act, or representation, or knowledge of any agent thereof, unless officially done, made, or acquired, is to be deemed the act, representation, or knowledge of the corporation itself. If it is once promulgated, that the mere private knowledge of any director of a bank, or of any member of an official Board, is binding upon the bank, although unknown to the other members of the Board, whenever he acts officially at the Board, or whenever it is his duty to communicate that knowledge to the Board, it will be found difficult to circumscribe the doctrine practically within any bounds short of binding the corporation in all cases, where any director has such private knowledge. It may, perhaps, be correctly said, that, in all cases, it is the duty of every director to communicate all facts within his knowledge or notice, which are material to the interests of the bank. Whenever, therefore, the question shall again directly arise in judgment, it will well deserve the profound consideration of those who shall be called upon to decide it, what, in a conflict of authority, ought, upon principle, to be the true rule to govern, with reference to the rights, and claims, and securities, not only of the members of corporations, but also of the public at large dealing with corporations. It may here be said in respect to both, *Una salus, ambobus periculum.*

§ 140 c. If notice to any director, be notice to the corporation, although never communicated to the other proper functionaries of the corporation, notice by any director ought equally to prevail in favor of the corporation, although not authorized by any act of the appropriate Board, superintending its concerns. Questions may easily be put upon this subject, which would involve considerations of a very delicate and important nature. Would notice to a single director of a bank, of the dishonor of a bill or note indorsed by or on behalf of the bank, be notice to bind the bank, although the other directors never had any knowledge

power or control in the management of its concerns. They act collectively, and at stated times, and have otherwise no more to do with the general management of the institution than the other stockholders. The director, in this instance, had a direct interest in suppressing the information he possessed; and it would be extending constructive notices beyond all reasonable bounds to say, that the plaintiffs must be held cognizant of facts which are proved to have been intentionally concealed from them, by a person who, individually, was neither their officer nor their agent."

thereof? Would notice of the dishonor of a bill or note indorsed to, and held by the bank, given by one of the directors, be good to bind the indorsers, although unknown to the Board of Directors, and never adopted by it? Would a bank, holding bills or notes indorsed to it by one of its directors, be affected with all infirmities, or illegalities, or frauds, which might attach to it in his own hands, upon the notion of constructive notice thereof? Would a mortgage, made to a bank by one of its directors, or by a third person, be affected by prior unregistered incumbrances or other equities, attaching to it, which were known at the time to such directors? Would a mortgagor be permitted to avoid a mortgage given by him to the bank, for a valuable consideration, without notice by the Board of Directors of any defect in the title, merely because one of the directors had, at the time, secret knowledge of facts which would avoid it? These questions are put merely to show the extent to which the doctrine of constructive notice may be carried in regard to corporations which are compellable, by their charters, to act through the instrumentality of a Board of Directors.

§ 140 *d.* On the other hand, notice of facts to the principal is ordinarily notice thereof to the agent; for it is the duty of the principal to communicate to his agent notice of the facts which come to his knowledge, touching the matter of the agency; and if the principal suffers any loss or injury by want of such notice, he suffers by his own fault; and if the other party is injured thereby, he ought to have correspondent redress.¹ The law, therefore, imputes the knowledge of the principal to be the knowledge of the agent, either upon the presumption, that the principal has done his duty, or to avoid all circuitry and difficulty, as to the mode and extent of the remedy.

§ 141. We have already had occasion to remark, that, although the powers of agents are, ordinarily, limited to particular acts; yet, that extraordinary emergencies may arise, in which a person, who is an agent, may, from the very necessities of the case, be justified in assuming extraordinary powers; and that his acts, fairly done, under such circumstances, will be binding upon his

¹ *Mayhew v. Eames*, 8 Barn. & Cressw. 601; *Willis v. Bank of England*, 4 Adolph. & Ell. 21, 39.

principal.¹ Thus, for example, a factor will be justified in deviating from his orders directing him to sell at a stipulated price, if the goods are of a perishable nature, and the sale is indispensable to prevent a total loss, or a greater loss.² The master of a ship acquires in the same way, as we have seen, a superinduced authority over the cargo of the ship in cases of necessity, which does not belong to his ordinary agency.³ Upon the same ground, perhaps, an agent, not generally authorized to insure, might, in unforeseen exigencies, to prevent an irreparable loss to his principal, acquire a right to insure for his principal.⁴ So an agent, who is directed by his principal to place his funds in a certain place, may be justified or excused in sending them to another place, if there be reasonable ground of alarm and danger, which prevents him from obeying his orders.⁵

§ 142. The same doctrine would seem to apply to the case of a mere stranger, acting for the principal without any authority, under circumstances of positive necessity; as, for example, in the case of a stranger interfering to prevent irreparable injury to perishable property, occasioned by fire, shipwreck, inundation, or other casualties, or found without any known owner or agent, in order to its due protection or preservation.⁶ In such cases, he performs the functions of the *Negotiorum Gestor* of the civil law; and seems justified in doing what is indispensable for the preservation of the property, or to prevent its total destruction.⁷

¹ Ante, § 85; Post, 118, 193, 194, 237; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 614, (4th ed.); 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 218; Liotard v. Graves, 3 Caines, R. 226; Lawler v. Keaquick, 1 John. Cas. 174; Drummond v. Wood, 2 Caines, R. 310; Forrester v. Bordman, 1 Story, R. 43.

² 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 218; 1 Comyn on Contr. 236. But see Anon. 2 Mod. 100; Story on Bailments, § 455; Ante, § 85; Chapman v. Morton, 11 Mees. & Wels. 540.

³ Ante, §§ 85, 118; The Gratitude, 3 Rob. 255 to 258.

⁴ See Wolf v. Horncastle, 1 Bos. & Pull. 323; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 107, 108; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 123, 124.

⁵ Perez v. Miranda, 19 Martin, R. 494.

⁶ Story on Bailments, § 83.

⁷ Story on Bailments, § 189; Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 5, l. 10, § 1; Id. l. 45; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 5, n. 1 to 14; Pothier, App'x. *De Quasi Contrat Negot. Gestorum*; 1 Pothier on Oblig. n. 113 to 115; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 616, (4th edit.); Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 52; 1 Stair, Inst. B. 1, tit. 8, § 3 to 6, by Brodie.

Salvors, on land, equally with those at sea, in cases of this sort, are understood to be clothed with authority to dispose of the property saved for the interests of all concerned, if it be of a perishable nature, or unfit to await the regular determination of a court of justice.¹

§ 143. Cases bearing a strong analogy have also come under the cognizance of Courts of Equity. Thus, for example, where a foreign factor deviated from his orders, as to the price of goods to be shipped by him to his principal; and the goods arrived; and the principal refused to receive them; the question arose, whether the principal was bound to return them, at all events to the factor, by a reshipment; or, whether he was at liberty to act as an agent from necessity, for the benefit of the original factor; and, whether, if it was for the interest of the latter, he might sell them on the spot; and it was thought that he might. And, even supposing that at law, under such circumstances, the principal would not be protected in such a sale, a Court of Equity would deal with it as a matter of equitable agency.²

¹ Story on Bailm. §§ 53, 53 *a*, 54, 121 *a*, 189, 189 *a*, 190, 621 *a*, 622 to 625.

² Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 25 to 30, and note (*m*), *Id* 32, *Kemp v Pryor*, 7 Ves. jr. 240, *Cornwall v. Wilson*, 1 Ves 509; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 52, 53, (2d edit.); *Id*. ch. 5, § 2, p. 99, (3d edit 1843), — *Lord Eldon*, on one occasion, said: "But I doubt, whether it may not be held, and whether it has not been held, by special juries before me, that in such a case as this, of goods exported, and where the person receiving them abroad cannot return them, the vendee is authorized to sell them for the benefit of the vendor, and may hold him liable in an action for damages, to the amount of the difference; giving him the benefit of the sale in the foreign market." Again, — "I go upon these particular circumstances; that, where there is a contract of sale and delivery, and the goods might, from the nature of the contract, be re-delivered; if under the circumstances they cannot be re-delivered, an equity arises from this, that the party cannot protect himself at law, as he cannot re-deliver; and he was led into that by the misrepresentation of the other. The vendee, therefore, has a right to the extent of his loss; the vendor to an account of the sales in the foreign market; and whether the most was made of them; which can only be made out by an account under the particular circumstances." Again, — "I have a strong conviction, upon sound principles, confirmed by my short experience at Guildhall, that, if a man under a contract to supply one article supplies another, under such circumstances, that the party to whom it is supplied must remain in utter ignorance of the change, until the goods are under circumstances in which it would be against the interest of the other to return or reject them, instead of doing what is best

CHAPTER VII.

DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF AGENTS IN EXECUTING AUTHORITY.

§ 144. LET us, in the next place, proceed to the consideration of the duties, obligations, and responsibilities of agents. The latter, so far as their principals are concerned, naturally grow out of the former. So far as third persons are concerned, they may, in some measure, depend upon, or arise from, collateral inquiries.

§ 145. And first, in relation to the duties and obligations of agents to their principals. These may admit of various considerations: (1.) What is the proper mode of executing the authority; and what will be held a good execution thereof. (2.) What is the degree of diligence required of agents, in the proper exercise of their functions. (3.) What are the other incidental acts, which are required of them by law, in order to fulfil their duties and obligations.

§ 146. First. As to the proper mode of execution of their authority by agents. We have already seen that an agent cannot ordinarily delegate his authority, and, consequently, the act must be done by him in person, as it is a matter of personal con-

for him, selling them immediately, — a jury would have no hesitation in saying, he ought to be considered, if he pleased, not as a purchaser, but as placed by the vendor in a situation, in which, acting prudently for him, he was an agent. The consequence then, is, that he would be liable to account for the money received, subject to freight and other charges; though, while the goods were in transitu, he had considered himself owner." *Kemp v. Pryor*, 7 Ves. jr. 240 to 242, 247. See also *Cornwall v. Wilson*, 1 Ves. 509, where the same doctrine is affirmed by Lord Hardwicke, who said: "But, though I could incline to that, yet the present case turns on the latter part of the transaction, what defendant himself has done by taking these goods to himself, treating them as his own, not as factor for plaintiff, as he would have himself considered by the custom of merchants; as to which it is sworn, (and it is very true and reasonable,) that a merchant here, refusing the goods sent over by his factor in a foreign country, who exceeded the authority, having advanced and paid his money on these goods, may be considered as having an interest in the goods as a pledge, and may act thereon as a factor for that person, who broke his orders, and may therefore insure these goods, as he has done; which might be reasonable, as it was war time."

fidence.¹ Hence it follows, that if he is authorized to make a contract for his principal in writing, it must, in general, be personally signed by him, and it cannot be signed by his clerk, either in his own name, as agent, or in the name of the principal, so as to bind the latter.² We have also already seen how a joint authority is to be executed; and therefore it is unnecessary to recur to that subject in this place.³

§ 147. But a most material consideration is, as to the particular form in which the agent, when he acts personally, is to execute the authority, so as to bind his principal. And as to this, the rule usually laid down in cases of written contracts, (subject, however, to the qualifications and exceptions hereafter stated,) is, that in order to bind the principal, and to make it his contract, the instrument must purport on its face to be the contract of the principal, and his name must be inserted in it, and signed to it, and not merely the name of the agent, even though the latter be described as agent in the instrument; or at least the terms of the instrument should clearly show, that the principal is intended to be positively bound thereby, and that the agent acts plainly as his agent in executing it.⁵ Indeed, the rule has been laid

¹ Ante, §§ 13 and 14; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, pp. 175-177, *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 236, 251, 252; *Henderson v. Barnwall*, 1 Y. & Jarv. 387; *Colly v. Rathbone*, 2 M. & Selw. 299; *Catlin v. Bell*, 4 Camp. R. 184; *Coombe's case*, 9 Co. R. 75, 76; *Ex parte Sutton*, 2 Cox, 84.

² *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 235, 251, 252, *Blore v. Sutton*, 3 Meriv. R. 237; *Henderson v. Barnwell*, 1 Y. & Jerv. 387. But see *Ex parte Sutton*, 2 Cox, R. 84.

³ Ante, §§ 42, 44; *Com. Dig. Attorney*, C. 11.

⁴ Post, §§ 161, 162, 269, 270.

⁵ *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. R. 27, 29; *Bedford Commercial Ins. Co. v. Covell*, 8 Met. 442. Mr. Justice Parker, in delivering the opinion of the Court in the first case, said: "It might be sufficient for the decision of this cause to state that no person, in making a contract, is considered to be the agent of another, unless he stipulates for his principal by name, stating his agency in the instrument which he signs. This principle has been long settled, and has been frequently recognized; nor do I know of an instance in the books of an attempt to charge a person as the maker of any written contract, appearing to be signed by another, unless the signer professed to act by procuration or authority, and stated the name of the principal, on whose behalf he gave his signature. It is also held, that whatever authority the signer may have to bind another, if he does not sign as agent or attorney, he binds himself and no other person." [*But see Lindus v. Bradwell*, 5 Com. B. Rep. 583.] The same doctrine was affirmed

down in broader terms; and it has been said to be an ancient rule of the law, that, when any one has authority, as attorney, to do any act, he ought to do it in his name who gives the authority; for he appoints the attorney to be in his place, and to represent his person; and, therefore, the attorney cannot do it in his own name, nor as his proper act; but in the name and as the act of him who gives the authority.¹ [It has therefore some-

in *Bradlee v. Boston Glass Manufactory*, 16 Pick. R. 347, 350. See also *Arfridson v. Ladd*, 12 Mass. R. 173 to 175; *Savage v. Rix*, 9 New Hamp. R. 263, 269, 270; *Rice v. Gove*, 22 Pick. 158, 161; *Minard v. Reed*, 7 Wend. R. 68; *Pentz v. Stanton*, 10 Wend. R. 271; *Spencer v. Field*, 10 Wend. R. 87. And such is now the well-settled law of Massachusetts as applied to bills of exchange and promissory notes. See *Bank of British North America v. Hooper*, 9 Boston Law R., May, 1856, p. 42; 5 Gray, R. We shall presently see that the doctrine here stated, if maintainable at all in respect to contracts not under seal, must be received with many qualifications and limitations. It seems directly opposed to the decision in *Higgins v. Senior*, 8 Mees. & Wels. 834, 844, and many other well-considered authorities. See post, §§ 154, 155, 160, 160 a, 161, 162, 269, 270, 275, 276, 391 to 400; *Taintor v. Prendergast*, 3 Hill, R. 72; Post, § 268. Indeed, in the case of the *New England Mar. Insur. Comp. v. De Wolf*, 8 Pick. R. 56, 61, Mr. Chief Justice Parker laid down the doctrine in a manner which qualifies the conclusion from the general language of the case of *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. R. 27, 29, restraining it to cases of sealed instruments. He there said: "If Clapp had authority to make the guarantee for the defendant, and the words are such as not clearly to bind himself alone, and it can be ascertained that he intended to act for De Wolf, the latter will be bound. The authorities cited to maintain the position, that the name of the principal must be signed by the agent, are of deeds only, instruments under seal; and it is not desirable that the rigid doctrine of the common law should be extended to mercantile transactions of this nature, which are usually managed with more attention to the substance than to the form of contracts." See also *Andrews v. Estes*, 2 Fairf. R. 267, where the rule in *Coombe's case* is affirmed to apply only to contracts under seal. 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 631 note (a), (4th edit.); Post, §§ 160, 161. See also *Daniells v. Burnham*, 2 Louis. R. 243; *American Jurist* for January, 1830, vol. 3. p. 78, 79; Post, §§ 269, 270; *Stetson v. Patten*, 2 Greenl. 358; *Stanton v. Camp*, 4 Barbour, Sup. Ct. R. (N. Y.) 274; *Taber v. Cannon*, 8 Metcalf, R. 456; *Dyer v. Burnham*, 35 Maine, 10; *Burnham v. Williams*, 7 Queen's Bench, 103.

¹ *Coombe's case*, 9 Co. R. 75, 77; Comm. Dig. *Attorney*, C. 14; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 180 to 182; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 629 to 631, (4th edit.); *Clark v. Courtney*, 5 Peters, R. 319, 349, 350; *Shack v. Anthony*, 1 M. & Selw. 573; *Parker v. Kett*, 1 Salk. 95; S. C. 2 Mod. R. 466; *Lynch v. Postlethwaite*, 7 Miller, Louis. R. 293; *New Eng. Mar. Insur. Comp. v. De Wolf*, 8 Pick. 56, 61; *Andrews v. Estes*, 2 Fairf. R. 267; *Abbot on Shipp*, P. 2, ch. 2, § 5,

times been thought not a sufficient execution for an agent to sign merely his principal's name, as if it were his own personal act, but that he ought to add some words indicating that the signature was signed by an agent, and not by the principal. The propriety of such a mode of execution may be easily seen,¹

(edit. 1829); Abbott on Shipp. P. 3, ch. 1, § 2; Harper v. Hampton, 1 Harr. & John. R. 622, American Jurist for January, 1830, vol. 3, p. 52 to 86; Wilks v. Back, 2 East, R. 142; Stinchfield v. Little, 1 Greenl. R. 231; Elwell v. Shaw, 1 Greenl. 339; Heffernan v. Addams, 7 Watts, R. 121; Mears v. Morrison, 1 Breese, Illinois R. 172; Sheldon v. Dunlap, 1 Harr. N. J. Rep. 246.

[¹ In Wood v. Goodridge, 6 Cush. 120, Fletcher, J., said: "The first question, as to the plaintiff's title to the land, is, whether the form of executing the mortgage and note by the attorney was a legal execution of his power as such; whether signing the name of the principal, Benjamin Goodridge, as if it were his own personal act and signature, (it not appearing upon the instruments to be done by Levi as attorney,) was a good execution of the instruments under the power, so as to make them valid as the deed and note of Benjamin, and thus effectually to convey the land to Sewall Goodridge by the mortgage, under which the plaintiff's title is derived.

When one writes the name of another to a deed, in his presence, at his request, and by his direction, the act of writing is regarded as the party's personal act, as much as if he had held the pen, and signed and sealed the instrument with his own hand. Story, Ag. § 51; Bull v. Dunsterville, 4 T. R. 313; Lovelace's case, W. Jones, 268; Hibblewhite v. M'Morine, 6 M. & W. 200, 214, 215; Gardner v. Gardner, 5 Cush. 483.

In the present instance, the deed and note were not executed by Benjamin personally; nor in his presence, but in his absence; and, so far as appears, without his knowledge. But, upon the face of the papers, they appear to have been signed by him personally and with his own hand. In fact, they were signed by Levi; but it does not appear, upon the face of the papers, that in signing the name of Benjamin, Levi acted as his agent, or intended to act under the power of attorney from Benjamin, or meant to execute the authority given by that power.

The deed and note, which thus appear to be signed by Benjamin personally, when, in fact, they were signed by Levi, are not such instruments as Levi was authorized to make. He was authorized to make instruments in the name of Benjamin; not as made by Benjamin personally; but by Levi, in his name, as his attorney. It should appear upon the face of the instruments, that they were executed by the attorney, and in virtue of the authority delegated to him for this purpose. It is not enough, that an attorney in fact has authority, but it must appear, by the instruments themselves which he executes, that he intends to execute this authority. The instruments should be made by the attorney expressly as such attorney; and the exercise of his delegated authority should be distinctly avowed upon the instruments themselves. Whatever may be the secret intent and purpose of the attorney, or whatever may be his oral declaration or profes-

but it cannot positively¹ be said, upon the authorities, to be absolutely necessary to the validity of the instrument.¹]

sion, at the time, he does not in fact execute the instruments as attorney, and in the exercise of his power as attorney, unless it is so expressed in the instruments. The instruments must speak for themselves. Though the attorney should intend a deed to be the deed of his principal, yet it will not be the deed of the principal, unless the instrument purports on its face to be his deed. The authority given clearly is, that the attorney shall execute the deed as attorney, but in the name of the principal.

There is much learning and much discussion, in the books of the law, as to the proper mode of executing authority by agents. In what form the agent should execute his authority, so as to bind his principal, and not bind himself, has been a subject largely considered in elementary works, and much discussed in numerous adjudged cases. The rule commonly laid down by all the authorities is, that to bind the principal, the instrument must purport, on its face, to be the instrument of the principal, and executed in his name; or, at least, that the tenor of the instrument should clearly show, that the principal is intended to be bound thereby, and that the agent acts merely as his agent in executing it.

But it is contended, that it is nowhere laid down in any work of authority, or established by any adjudged case, that the agent may put the name of the principal, as his own personal act and signature, the execution of the agent, as agent, not being in any way disclosed. Such an execution does not appear to be warranted by the power delegated to execute the instrument as attorney, but in the name of the principal.

If such a mode of execution is proper and legal, it seems most remarkable that it is nowhere stated or suggested in any work of authority. The execution of instruments by agents, in this way, would certainly be attended with great difficulties and dangers. If the agent might execute instruments in this mode, the principal, if he found his name signed to an instrument, would have no means of knowing by whom it had been signed, or whether he was bound or not bound by such signature; and other persons might be greatly deceived and defrauded, by relying upon such signature as the personal act and signature of the principal, when the event might prove, that it was put there by an agent who had mistaken his authority, and consequently that the principal was not bound. When it should be discovered that the name of the principal was not written by him, as it purports to be, it might be wholly impossible to prove the execution by attorney, as there would be nothing on the note to indicate such an execution. For authorities as to the form of execution of the mortgage and note, see Story, Ag. §§ 147, 148, 153, notes, and cases cited; Hoffman's opinion, in 3 Am. Jur. 71-85; *Wilks v. Back*, 2 East, 142; Story, Notes §§ 11, 66, 71. In the case of *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. 27, 29, Parker, C. J., said: "No person, in making a contract, is considered to be the agent of another, unless he stipulates for his principal by name, stating his agency in the instrument which he signs. This

¹ See *Forsyth v. Day*, 41 Maine, 382, 11 Cush. 597.

§ 148. This rule, thus laid down, is regularly true in regard to all solemn instruments under seal,¹ although not, as we shall presently see, as to instruments not under seal.² Therefore, if a person is authorized by a power of attorney to make a conveyance under seal of the lands of his principal; and he makes the conveyance by a deed in his own name, it will be a void conveyance.³ And it will make no difference in the case, that, in the deed, the agent describes himself as such; as if he says, "Know all men by these presents, that I, A. B., as agent of C. D., do hereby grant, sell, convey, &c.;" or if he signs and seals it, "A. B., for C. D.;" for, in such a case, it is still his own deed, and not the deed of his principal.⁴ For the same reason,

principle has been long settled, and has been frequently recognized; nor do I know an instance in the books of an attempt to charge a person as the maker of any written contract, appearing to be signed by another, unless the signer professed to act by procuration or authority, and stated the name of the principal on whose behalf he gave his signature."

There is a *dictum* of Lawrence, J., in the case of *Wilks v. Back*, 2 East, 142-143, which would seem to import, that an agent might put his principal's name, without stating it to be by attorney. But it is but a *dictum*, the import of which is not entirely clear and certain.

Though there is no direct authority to the point, the court are inclined to think, that the execution of the mortgage and note, in the present case, were not such as the attorney was authorized to make, and not such as to make them valid and binding.]

¹ *Ibid.*

² Post, §§ 154, 155, 275 to 279.

³ *Coombe's case*, 9 Co. R. 77 a; 1 Roll. Abridg. *Authority*, p. 330, l. 37; Com. Dig. *Attorney*, C. 14; *Frontin v. Small*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1418; S. C. 2 Str. R. 705; *Wilks v. Back*, 2 East, R. 142; *Fowler v. Shearer*, 7 Mass. R. 14; *Elwell v. Shaw*, 16 Mass. R. 12; S. C. 1 Greenl. R. 339; *Copeland v. Merch. Insur. Co.* 6 Pick. 198; *Lutz v. Lanthicum*, 8 Peters, R. 165; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 631, 632; (4th edit.); *Stone v. Wood*, 7 Cowen, 453; *Clarke v. Courtney*, 5 Peters, R. 319, 349, 350; *American Jurist* for January, 1830, vol. 3, p. 71 to 85, where the leading cases are collected in a learned argument of Mr. Professor David Hoffman, of Baltimore; *Stinchfield v. Little*, 1 Greenl. R. 231; *Sheldon v. Dunlap*, 1 Harr. N. J. R. 245; *Townsend v. Hubbard*, 4 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 351, 357, 358.

⁴ *Frontin v. Small*, 2 Lord Raym. 1418; S. C. 2 Str. 705; *Wilks v. Back*, 2 East, R. 142; *Bacon v. Dubary*, 1 Lord Raym. 246; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 181 to 183; Bac. Abridg. *Leases*, I. § 10; Com. Dig. *Attorney*, C. 14; *Spencer v. Field*, 10 Wend. R. 87; *White v. Cuyler*, 6 Term R. 176; *Appleton v. Binks*, 5 East, 148; *Cayhill v. Fitzgerald*, 1 Wils. R. 28, 58; *D'Abridgecourt v. Ashley*,

if a person be authorized by a power of attorney to make a release, and he draws and executes the same in his own name, it will not bind his principal, or be the release of the latter.¹ A Court of Equity, might, indeed, if the release were for a valuable consideration, compel the principal to make a release in his own name, or compel the agent to execute a proper release, or grant other relief adapted to the circumstances.²

§ 149. Upon the same ground, where an agent of the king is, by letters-patent, authorized to execute a deed of lease for the king, the deed must be drawn and executed in the name of the king, and the king's seal must be affixed thereto; for if the agent affixes his own seal, and says, "In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my seal," the execution will be bad; for unless it be the king's seal, it cannot be his deed of lease.³ The same principle will apply to the case of a power of attorney given by a corporation to execute a deed. To bind the corporation, the deed must be under the seal of the corporation, and

Moore, 818, pl. 1106; *Bogart v. De Bussey*, 6 Johns. R. 94; *Taft v. Brewster*, 9 Johns. R. 334; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 631, (4th edit.); *Tippetts v. Walker*, 4 Mass. R. 595; *Fowler v. Shearer*, 7 Mass. R. 14; *Elwell v. Shaw*, 16 Mass. R. 42; *Fetter v. Field*, 1 Louis. Ann. R. 80; *Clarke v. Courtney*, 5 Peters, R. 349 to 351; *Martin v. Flowers*, 8 Leigh, Virg. R. 158; *Hall v. Bainbridge*, 1 Mann. & Grang. 42; *Townsend v. Hubbard*, 4 Hill, N. Y. R. 351; *Skinner v. Gunn*, 9 Porter, 805.

¹ Com. Dig. *Attorney*, C. 14; Moore, R. 818, pl. 1106; *Wells v. Evans*, 20 Wend. R. 251. The statute of Maine, of 1823, ch. 220, (vol. 3, p. 49,) provides, that deeds made by an agent, in his own name, shall be valid, provided the agent had authority, and it appears on the face of the deed that he meant to execute the authority.

² See *Yerby v. Grisby*, 9 Leigh, Virg. R. 387; *McNaughten v. Partridge*, 11 Ohio R. 223.

³ Bac. Abridg. *Leases*, I, § 10; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 181; Anonymous, Moore, R. 70, pl. 191. The anonymous case in Moore, R. 70, pl. 191, is very strong in point. There the king, by his letters-patent, had authorized his surveyor to make leases; and the surveyor made a lease beginning, "This Indenture, made between our Lord the King of the one part, and J. S. of the other part, witnesseth, &c. That our Lord the King, demiseth, &c." But at the end, the words were, "In testimony whereof, the said (the surveyor) hath hereunto set his seal;" and it was held, that the lease was void; for the seal of the surveyor was not the seal of the king; and so the lease was not the lease of the king. See also *Clarke v. Courtney*, 5 Peters, R. 349 to 351; *Townsend v. Hubbard*, 4 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 351, 358.

not under the seal of an attorney.¹ And in a late American case, a deed by a corporation, in which the formal part was, "Know all men, &c., that the New England Silk Co., a corporation, by C. C. their treasurer, &c., do hereby grant, &c.," and signed thus, "In witness whereof, I, the said C. C., in behalf of said company, and as their treasurer, do hereto set my hand and seal. C. C., Treasurer of New England Silk Co.," — was held not properly executed, and not the deed of the corporation.²

¹ *Bank of Columbia v. Patterson's Adm'r*, 7 Cranch, 299, 308; *Damon v. Inhab. of Granby*, 2 Pick. 345; *Tippetts v. Walker*, 4 Mass. R. 595, 597; *Hatch v. Barr*, 1 Ohio R. 390; *Brinley v. Mann*, 2 Cushing, 337, a strong case on this point. *Savings Bank v. Davis*, 8 Conn. 192; *Flint v. Clinton Company & Trustee*, 12 N. H. R. 433. There is a distinction between doing an act by an agent, and doing an act by a deputy, whom the law deems such. An agent can only bind his principal, when he does the act in the name of his principal. But a deputy may do the act, and sign his own name; and it binds his principal; for the deputy in law has the whole power of his principal. *Parker v. Kett*, Salk. 95; *Craig v. Radford*, 3 Wheat. R. 594.

[² *Brinley v. Mann*, 2 Cush. 337. Metcalf, J., said: "It is a rule of conveyancing, long established, that deeds which are executed by an attorney or agent must be executed in the name of the constituent or principal. In *Coombes's* case, 9 Co. 76 b, it was resolved 'that when any has authority, as attorney, to do any act, he ought to do it in his name who gives the authority; for he appoints the attorney to be in his place, and to represent his person; and therefore the attorney cannot do it in his own name, nor as his proper act, but in the name and as the act of him who gives the authority.' And in *Fowler v. Shearer*, 7 Mass. 19, *Parsons, C. J.*, says, 'It is not enough for the attorney, in the form of the conveyance, to declare that he does it as attorney; for he being in the place of the principal, it must be the act and deed of the principal, done and executed by the attorney in his name.' This doctrine, which was applied in *Elwell v. Shaw*, 16 Mass. 42, and in other cases cited by the demandants' counsel and also in *Berkeley v. Hardy*, 8 Dowl. & Ry. 102, must be applied to the deeds now before us. Both of these deeds were executed by C. Colt, Jr., in his own name, were sealed with his seal, and were acknowledged by him as his acts and deeds. In one of them, it is true, he declared that he acted in behalf of the company, and as their treasurer; and in the other he declared himself to be their treasurer and to be duly authorized for the purpose of executing it. But this, as we have seen, was 'not enough.' He should have executed the deeds in the name of the company. He should also have affixed to them the seal of the company, and have acknowledged them to be the deeds of the company." 1 *Crabb on Real Property*, §§ 703, 705; 4 *Kent, Com.* (3d edit.) 451; *Stinchfield v. Little*, 1 Greenl. 231; *Savings Bank v. Davis*, 8 Connect. 191; 3 *Stewart on Conveyancing*, 109. If the deeds had been rightly executed in other respects,

§ 410. The reason of this doctrine, although at first view it may seem somewhat artificial, is not wholly technical, but seems founded in good sense. Where an interest is to pass by an instrument, it must in terms purport to be conveyed by him, in whom alone that interest is vested. A power of attorney to convey is but a naked power, and transfers no interest to the attorney; and, consequently, as no interest is vested thereby in the agent, his own conveyance can pass none to his grantee. It cannot pass the interest of the principal; for he is not a party thereto, or the grantor thereof; and it is not the instrument which he has authorized to be executed.¹ In this respect, the

the seal which C. Colt, Jr., affixed to each of them (namely, a wafer and a paper, without any stamp or impression) might have been regarded as the seal of the company, according to the decisions in *Mill Dam Foundry v Hovey*, 21 Pick 417, and *Reynolds v Glasgow Academy*, 6 Dana, 37. The case of *Warner v. Mower*, 4 Verm. 385, cited by the tenant's counsel, was decided upon a statute of Vermont, which authorizes certain corporations to convey real estate by a deed of their president, sealed with his seal. The Court, in that case, admitted that "the form of the deed, at common law, would not, probably, be considered good."

¹ Paley on Agency, 181-183, Bac. Abridg. *Leases*, I. § 10; Coombe's case, 9 Co. R. 77; *Lutz v. Linthicum*, 8 Peters, R. 165. The reasoning of Lord Ch. Baron Gilbert on this subject in Bac. Abridg. *Leases*, I. § 10, (4 Gwillim's Bac. Abridg. 140,) is very full on this point. "If one hath power" (says he) "by virtue of a letter of attorney, to make leases for years generally by indenture, the attorney ought to make them in the name and style of his master, and not in his own name. For the letter of attorney gives him no interest or estate in the lands, but only an authority to supply the absence of his master by standing in his stead, which he can no otherwise do than by using his name, and making them just in the same manner and style as his master would do if he were present. For if he should make them in his own name, though he added also, by virtue of the letter of attorney to him made for that purpose; yet such leases seem to be void, because the indenture, being made in his name, must pass the interest and lease from him, or it can pass it from nobody. It cannot pass it from the master immediately, because he is no party; and it cannot pass it from the attorney at all, because he has nothing in the lands. And then his adding by virtue of the letter of attorney, will not help it; because that letter of attorney made over no estate or interest in the land to him, and consequently, he cannot, by virtue thereof, convey over any to another. Neither can such interest pass from the master immediately, or through the attorney; for then the same indenture must have this strange effect at one and the same instant, to draw out the interest from the master to the attorney, and from the attorney to the lessee, which certainly it cannot do. And therefore all such leases made in that man-

case differs from that of a power coupled with an interest in the property; for, there, the deed of the agent may convey the interest vested in him in connection with the power.¹

§ 151. The same doctrine will apply to cases, where a deed is to be made to a person through the instrumentality of his agent. The deed must be made to, and in the name of, the principal; for if it be made to, and in the name of, the agent, although it describes him as agent of the principal, as if it be a grant "to A. B. for, and as agent of, C. D.," the deed will convey nothing to the principal; but it will take effect as a conveyance only to the agent himself, although it may be a trust for his principal.² So, if an agent should in a sealed instrument describe himself as an agent, and covenant that he himself, or that his principal will do a certain thing, and the deed is executed in his own name, he alone will be liable thereon, and the term "agent," will be deemed a mere *descriptio personæ*.³

§ 152. But where an act is to be done *in pais*, or in any other manner than by a written instrument, under seal, there, the act will be so construed, if it may be, as most effectually to accomplish the end required by the principal;⁴ for, where the act may take effect, if construed one way, and will be defeated, if construed another way, *Ut res magis valeat, quam pereat*, it will, to accomplish the intention of the parties, be construed so as to give it validity.⁵ Thus, if a power of attorney should authorize an agent to make a surrender of a copyhold, or to make livery of seisin; and the agent should, in making the surrender or livery, say, I, A. B., as attorney of C. D., or by virtue of a letter of

ner seem to be absolutely void, and not good, even by estoppel, against the attorney; because they pretend to be made, not in his own name absolutely, but in the name of another, by virtue of an authority, which is not pursued. See also *Clarke v. Courtney*, 5 Peters, 349, 350.

¹ *Hunt v. Rouamaniere's Adm'r*, 2 Mason, R. 244; S. C. 3 Mason, R. 294; S. C. 8 Wheat. R. 174, 202, 203; S. C. 1 Peters, R. 1; Post, § 164.

² See 1 Stair, Inst. by Brodie, B. 1, tit. 12, § 16; *Clarke v. Courtney*, 5 Peters, R. 319, 349, 350. See *Fox v. Frith*, 10 Mees. & Wels. 136.

³ *Deming v. Bullitt*, 1 Blackf. Ind. R. 241; *Hall v. Bainbridge*, 1 Mann. & Grang. R. 42; Post, § 450.

⁴ [See *Ish v. Crane*, 8 Ohio St. R. 535.]

⁵ *Paley of Agency*, by Lloyd, 181; *Parker v. Kett*, 1 Salk. 95; S. C. 12 Mod. R. 467; *Anderson v. Highland Turnpike Co.* 16 John. R. 86.

attorney from C. D., do surrender, &c., or do deliver to you seisin of such lands (naming them); such an act will be held valid and binding upon the principal, as his own act; because (it is said) such acts are only ministerial or transitory acts *in pais*, the first to be done by holding the court-rod, and the last by delivering a turf or twig; and when the agent does them as an attorney, or by virtue of a letter of attorney from the principal, the law pronounces them to be done by the principal himself, and carries the possession accordingly.¹ So, the delivery of a deed by an agent for the principal, after its due execution, as the deed of the principal, is governed by the same rule; for the delivery is an act *in pais*.² The better reason in all such cases seems to be, that as the agent, doing the act, intends it to be done as the act of his principal, his act shall be construed accordingly, and not as his own personal act, upon the maxim already stated.

§ 153. And even in the case of deeds, if the name of the principal be properly stated therein, as the grantor, and the seal and signature of the principal are affixed thereto, the form of the words used in the execution and subscription of the deed by the agent will not be material. The true and best mode in such cases undoubtedly is, to sign the name of the principal ("A. B.") and to add, "by his attorney, C. D." But it will be sufficient, if the signature in such case be, "For A. B." (the principal) "C. D." (the agent); for, under such circumstances, the order of the words is not material,³ as the deed purports on its face to be the deed of the principal; and the intention is to execute it in his name, and as his deed.⁴ Indeed, in all cases, where the instru-

¹ Bac. Abridg. *Leases for Years*, 1, § 10, (4 Bac. Abridg. by Gwillim, 140; Com. Dig. *Attorney*, C. 14; Coombe's case, 9 Co. R. 77, *Parker v. Kett*, 1 Salk. 95; S. C. 12 Mod. R. 467; *Clarke v. Courtney*, 5 Peters, R. 319, 350, 351.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Mussey v. Scott*, 7 Cush. 216; *Hunter v. Miller*, 6 B. Monroe, 612; *Wilburn v. Larkin*, 3 Blackf. 50; *Martin v. Almond*, 25 Missouri, 313, *Deming v. Bullitt*, 1 Blackf. 242.

⁴ *Wicks v. Back*, 2 East, R. 142; *Abbott on Shipp*. Part III. ch. 1, § 2, note (c). In this case, the deed purported to be the deed of M. W. & J. B., and it was executed, having two seals thus, "M. W." (L. S.) "for J. B. M. W. (L. S.);" and it was held to be the deed of J. B. Mr. Justice Grose said: "Whether the attorney put his name first or last, cannot affect the validity of the act done."

ment purports on its face to be intended to be the deed of the principal, and the mode of execution of it by the agent, however irregular and informal, is not repugnant to that purport, it would probably be construed to be the deed of the principal, especially where the *In testimonium* clause is, that the principal has thereto affixed his seal.¹

§ 154. But although the rule is thus strict in relation to the mode of executing sealed instruments, where, from the objects of the instruments, as well as the due technical and legal operation of the same, it is essential, that they should be in the name of the principal, and under his seal; yet a more liberal exposition is allowed in cases of unsolemn instruments, and especially of commercial and maritime contracts, which are usually drawn up in a loose and inartificial manner.² In such cases, in furtherance of the public policy of encouraging trade, if it can, upon the whole instrument, be collected, that the true object and intent of it

Mr. Justice Lawrence said: "Here the bond was executed by W. for, and in the name of his principal, and this is distinctly shown by the manner of making the signature. Not that even this was necessary to be shown, for if W. had sealed and delivered it in the name of B, that would have been enough without stating that he had so done. There is no particular form of words required to be used, provided the act be done in the name of the principal." Mr. Justice Le Blanc said: "I cannot see what difference it can make as to the order in which the names stand. But if, in this case, W., instead of putting the name of his principal (B.) had made the execution in his own name only, as 'W. (L. S.)', the case might have been different." Query, what would have been the effect, if the *In testimonium* clause had been, "In testimony whereof the said J. B. (the principal), hath hereunto set his seal; and the signature had been 'W. (L. S.)'?" The whole subject has been discussed with a good deal of learning by Mr. Professor Hoffman, in an article in No. 5, of the *American Jurist*, p. 71-81; *Mears v. Morrison*, 1 Breese, Illinois R. 172; *Deming v. Bullitt*, 1 Black. R. 241, 242. It is to be remarked, that this doctrine, as to the manner of the execution of a sealed instrument in order to bind the principal, is to be applied to the mere liability of the principal at law on the instrument; for there are many cases, where, in equity, the principal might be bound to fulfil the contract, notwithstanding he was not bound by it at law. *Van Reimsdyk v. Kane*, 1 Gallis. R. 680; *S. C.* 9 Cranch, 153; *Devinney v. Reynolds*, 1 Watts & Serg. 328; *McNaughten v. Partridge*, 11 Ohio R. 232; Ante, § 148; Post, § 162.

¹ Ibid. and supra, note; Post, § 150. See also *Angon v. Moore*, R. 70, pl. 191; *Devinney v. Reynolds*, 1 Watts & Serg. 328; *Stanton v. Camp*, 4 Barbour, Sup. Ct. R. 274.

² *N. E. Mar. Insur. Co. v. De Wolf*, 8 Pick. 56, Ante, § 147, note; *Bel v. Bruen*, 1 Howard, Sup. Ct. R. 169; *S. C.* 17 Peters, R. 161.

are to bind the principal and not to bind the agent, courts of justice will adopt that construction of it, however informally it may be expressed.¹ Thus, where an agent duly authorized, made a promissory note thus: "I promise to pay J. S. or order, &c.," and signed the note, "Pro C. D. A. B.;" it was held to be the note of the principal, and not of the agent, although the words were, "I promise."² So, where A and B wrote a note in these words, "We jointly and severally promise," and signed it A and B for C, it was held to be the note of C, and not of A and B the agents.³ So, where the note was, "I promise," &c., and it was signed by the agent, "For the Providence Hat Manufacturing Company," A. B. (the agent); it was held to be a note of the company, and not of the agent.⁴ So a promissory note of a like tenor, signed by the agent in this manner, "A. B., agent for C. D.," has been held to be the note of the principal, and not of the agent.⁵ So, where a promissory note was in these words: "I, the subscriber, treasurer of the Dorchester Turnpike Corporation, for value received promise, &c.;" and it was signed "A. B., Treasurer of the Dorchester Turnpike Corporation;" it was held to be the note of the corporation, and not of the treasurer.⁶ So, where a note purported to be a promise by "The President and Directors" of a particular corporation, and was signed "A. B., President," [or J. W., Cashier,⁷] it was held to be the note, not of A. B., but of the corporation.⁸ But

¹ *Ibid.*; *Pentz v. Stanton*, 10 Wend. R. 271; *Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria v. Bank of Columbia*, 5 Wheat. R. 326; *Post*, 269, 270, 275, 276, 395-400; *Townsend v. Hubbard*, 4 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 351; *Alexander v. Bank of Rutland*, 24 Verm. 227.

² *Long v. Coburn*, 11 Mass. R. 57.

³ *Pice v. Gove*, 22 Pick. R. 158; *Post*, §§ 275, 276, 395.

⁴ *Emerson v. Prov. Hat Manuf. Co.* 12 Miss. R. 237.

⁵ *Ballou v. Talbot*, 16 Mass. R. 461; *Despatch Line of Packets v. Bellamy Manuf. Co.* 12 New Hamp. R. 229; *Roberts v. Button*, 14 Verm. 195; *Robertson v. Pope*, 1 Richardson, 501; *Campbell v. Baker*, 2 Watts, 83. But see, *contra*, *DeWitt v. Walton*, 5 Selden, 571.

⁶ *Mann v. Chandler*, 9 Mass. R. 335. See *Hills v. Bannister*, 8 Cowen. R. 31; *Post*, § 276; *Barker v. Mechan. Fire Ins. Co.* 3 Wend. R. 94; *Mott v. Hicks*, 1 Cowen, R. 513; *Brockway v. Allen*, 17 Wend. R. 40.

⁷ *Farmers' Bank v. Troy City Bank*, 1 Douglass, 107.

⁸ *Mott v. Hicks*, 1 Cowen, R. 513. See also *Bowen v. Morris*, 2 Taunt. 374; *Shelton v. Darling*, 2 Conn. R. 435; *Brockway v. Allen*, 17 Wend. R. 40; *Post*, § 278 and note, § 279.

if the note had been, "I, A. B., President of the Corporation (naming it) promise to pay, &c.," it would (it seems) have been deemed to be the personal note of A. B., and not of the corporation.¹ [And where the note read "I promise to pay," &c., signed "C. N., Pres't of the Dorchester Avenue Railroad," it was held to bind C. N. personally, although given by authority for the benefit of the company.²] So, where the agent of a corporation drew a bill of exchange upon the president of the corporation, styling him such, and the latter accepted the bill, it was held, that he was not personally liable, if he had authority to accept the bill; but the corporation was alone liable.³ So, where the agents of

¹ *Barker v. Mechan. Fire Ins. Co.* 3 Wend. R. 94. But see *Brockway v. Allen*, 17 Wend. R. 40; *Hills v. Bannister*, 8 Cowen, R. 31; Post, § 276; *Mann v. Chandler*, 9 Mass. R. 335. It is not easy to reconcile all the cases in the books on this subject; although I cannot but think, that the true principle to be deduced from them is that stated in the text. See *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, p. 378-385, and *Bayley on Bills*, (2d Amer. edit. from 5th London edit.) by Phillips & Sewall, ch. 2, § 7, p. 68-76, (editd 1836,) and notes, *ibid*; *Bowen v. Morris*, 2 Taunt. 374; *Kennedy v. Gouveia*, 3 Dowl. & Ryl. 503; *Dubois v. Del. & Hudson Canal Co.* 4 Wend. R. 285. In *Pentz v. Stanton*, 10 Wend. R. 271, where an agent drew a bill for a purchase of goods, on account of his principal, and signed the bill A. B., agent, not stating the name of his principal, it was held that he, and not his principal, was personally bound by the bill, as drawer. But the principal was held liable for the goods, on a count for goods sold and delivered, as the form of the bill showed that exclusive credit was not given to the agent. There is a curious case cited in the Digest, Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 20, where the question, whether an agent, who wrote a letter to a creditor, stating himself to be agent of his principal, was personally liable on the contract stated in the letter; and it was held that he was not, as he wrote confessedly as an agent. *Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 2*; 1 *Domat*, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 8. In *Dubois v. Del. & Hudson Canal Co.* 4 Wend. R. 285, an agent signed and sealed a contract, "M. W., agent for the Del. & Hudson Canal Co.;" and it was held, that he was not personally liable thereon, as he was authorized to make the contract, although it was not under the seal of the corporation. *S. P. Randall v. Van Vechten*, 9 Johns. R. 60. But see *Hopkins v. Mehaffey*, 11 Serg. & Rawle, 129; *Kean v. Davis*, Spencer, R. 426. See post, § 274-278.

² *Haverhill Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Newhall*, 1 Allen, (Mass.) 130.

³ *Lazarus v. Shearer*, 2 Alabama R. 718, N. S. See also *Robertson v. Pope*, 1 Rich. 501; *Wyman v. Gray*, 7 Harris & Johns. 409; *Lyman v. Sherwood*, 20 Verm. 42. [A charter-party expressed to be "between P., of the good ship C., and W., agent for E. W. & Son," to whom the ship was to be addressed, and signed by W. without any restriction, binds W. personally. *Parker v. New*, 7 El. & Bl. 944.]

a corporation, being duly authorized, made a written contract as follows: "We hereby agree to sell," &c., and signed it as agents of the corporation, it was held, that they were not personally bound thereby; but the corporation was.¹ So, where A, an agent duly authorized, wrote on a note, "by authority from B, I hereby guaranty the payment of this note," and signed in his own name, A; it was held to be the guaranty of the principal, and not of the agent.² So where A, an agent, entered into and signed an agreement "as agent for and on behalf of B," and B shortly afterwards wrote on it the words, "I hereby sanction this agreement, and approve of A's having signed it on my behalf;" it was held to be the agreement of B, and that A was not personally responsible thereon.³ So, where on a sale of real property by a corporation, a memorandum of the sale was signed by the parties, on which it was stated, that the sale was made to A. B., the purchaser, and that he and C. D., "mayor of the corporation, on behalf of himself and the rest of the burgesses and commonalty of the borough of Caermarthen, do mutually agree to perform and fulfil, on each of their parts respectively, the conditions of sale," and then came the signature of the purchaser, and of "C. D., mayor;" it was held, that the agreement was that of the corporation, and not that of the mayor personally; and that, consequently, the mayor could not sue thereon.⁴ So, where in articles of agreement the covenants were in the name of a corporation without mention of any agent, but the instrument was signed by the president of the corporation by his private name on behalf of the corporation, and sealed with his private seal, it was held, that he was not personally liable thereon.⁵ On the other hand, unless some agency is apparent on the face of the instrument, it has been not unfrequently held, that the principal is not bound, although the agent had full authority to make the con-

¹ *Marny v. Beekman Iron Company*, 9 Paige, R. 188, *Evans v. Wells*, 22 Wend. R. 325.

² *N. E. Mar. Ins. Co. v. De Wolf*, 8 Pick. 56. See *Passmore v. Mott*, 2 Binn. R. 201; Post, §§ 160 a, 161, 269, 270, 275, 276, 395-400.

³ *Spittle v. Lavender*, 2 Brod. & Bing. R. 452.

⁴ *Bowen v. Morris*, 2 Taunt. 374, 387. See *Kennedy v. Gouveia*, 3 Dow. & Ry. 503; *Hopkins v. Mehaffey*, 11 Serg. & Rawle, 129; *Meyer v. Barker*, 6 Binn. 228, 231. See *Woods v. Dennett*, 9 N. Hamp. R. 55; Post, §§ 275, 276.

⁵ *Hopkins v. Mehaffey*, 11 Serg. & Rawle, 129, Post, § 273, note.

tract.¹ Thus, where a wife had full authority to sign notes for her husband, and she made a note in her own name, not referring to her husband, either in the body of the note, or in the signature, it was held, that the husband was not bound.² [So where a bill of exchange is drawn by an agent in his own name, it does not render his principal liable thereon, although drawn for his benefit, and containing a direction to the drawee to charge the amount to the account of the principal.³] So, where A, B, and C made

¹ Ante, § 147, note.

² *Minard v. Reed*, 7 Wend. R. 68. [But the contrary has recently been held in England. *Lindus v. Bradwell*, 5 Com. B. Rep. 583.]

³ *Bank of North America v. Hooper*, 5 Gray, 567. Dewey, J., there said: "The consideration of the questions arising in the case of *Eastern Railroad v. Benedict*, 5 Gray, 561, has led to a full examination of the adjudicated cases upon the question of the right of the principal, or real party in interest, to sue in his own name on a written promise made to his agent; and, as connected therewith, the liability of the principal to be sued and charged in damages for the breach of a contract made by his agent.

"To a certain extent, we have found the law to authorize the introduction of oral evidence as to the parties in interest, and for the purpose of showing from whom the consideration moved, or for whose benefit the promise was made. The cases cited, and particularly the English cases, are very decisive in favor of the exercise of this right in cases of ordinary simple contracts, extending it perhaps somewhat further than we should feel authorized to do, without modifying some of the views stated in *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. 27; unless those remarks are to be considered as made peculiarly with reference to bills of exchange or negotiable promissory notes. While the recent English cases are found to be very strong in favor of the right to charge an unknown principal upon contracts made by his agent, upon oral proof of who is the real party, yet there will be found to be a leading distinction taken between cases of commercial paper in the form of bills of exchange and negotiable promissory notes, and other simple contracts — holding that no one but a party to such negotiable paper can be sued for the non-payment thereof. *Bytes on Bills*, (5th edit.) 26. Such is the doctrine of *Emly v. Lye*, 15 East, 7, where it was held that in the case of a bill of exchange drawn by one only, it was not competent to charge others as parties in interest, but that the liability was confined to the party who signed the instrument. In *Beckham v. Drake*, 9 M & W. 92, where upon a written contract it was held that the real party in interest might be shown by oral evidence, the court distinctly except negotiable instruments from the application of the rule, Lord Abinger saying: 'Cases of bills of exchange are quite different in principle.' 'By the law merchant, a chose in action is passed by indorsement, and each party who receives the bill is making a contract with the parties upon the face of it, and with no other party whatever.'

"The American cases will, we think, be found to maintain the same doctrine.

a note as follows: "We, the subscribers, jointly and severally, promise to pay D, or order, for the Boston Glass Manufactory,

Pentz v Stanton, 10 Wend. 276, is strong to this point. Our own case of *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. 27, was a direct application of this principle. That was a suit upon a negotiable note, and the defendant's name was not on the paper; 5 Gray, 565. The oral evidence offered was however full to the point, that the person who signed the note was in fact the agent of the defendant, and that the note was given for the defendant's debt. But the court held that no action could be maintained on the note against the defendant. That case has ever been recognized, certainly to the extent of its application to negotiable paper, as the law of Massachusetts. *Bedford Commercial Ins Co v Covell* 8 Met 443, *Taber v Cannon*, 8 Met 460. If sound, it meets the present case, and discharges the private estate of Horace Gray from all liability on the draft.

"It is urged, for the appellants, that that case must be considered as overruled by the late case of *Huntington v Knox*, 7 Cush. 371 and especially that it was in conflict with the principles stated by the court in the opinion given in that case. It is true that the court do there recognize and apparently fully endorse the case of *Higgins v Senior* 8 M & W 834, and taking the remarks of the court without reference to the case to which they were applied they might seem to be somewhat at variance with the decision in *Stackpole v Arnold*. But the case of *Huntington v Knox* was the case of a simple contract in writing, in reference to the sale of goods. The agent of the plaintiff, in making a memorandum of the contract, and giving a receipt for money paid on account of the same, had used his own name exclusively, but his agency being fully proved by oral evidence, and the interest of the plaintiff shown as the owner of the article sold the question was, whether the principal could maintain an action in his own name, and the court decided that he could, citing the case of *Higgins v Senior* as a direct authority, as it was, for the case of *Huntington v Knox* for, like that, it was an action upon a contract not negotiable. The adoption of the language of the court in the case of *Higgins v Senior*, as sound law, was certainly warranted for the purposes to which it was applied, but it ought not to be held as going further, much less as overruling *Stackpole v Arnold* without any reference to it, or suggestion of that kind. It seems to us that the two cases may well stand together, applying the law, as stated in each, to its own peculiar facts.

"We then recur to the contract in the present case, and find it to be a negotiable draft, drawn by Joseph Barrell, in his own name, without any indication that he is not the principal, and payable to a third person, who indorsed it to the appellants. There is nothing in the margin or the heading of the draft, that indicates any other principal than Barrell. There is no single circumstance on the face of the paper, which in any way connects Horace Gray or the Pembroke Iron Works with the draft, unless it be the direction to the drawees, to 'charge the same to the account of the Pembroke Iron Works'. It has been argued that this direction indicates that the Pembroke Iron Works are the real drawers. But no such inference can properly be drawn from that circumstance. Bills are often drawn by parties on funds of others distinct from the drawer, but with whom arrangements have been made to discharge such drafts."

the sum of —," and signed the note in their own names, without saying "as agents," it was held, that they were personally bound, and not the corporation.¹ So where A, (an agent,) made a promise in the following terms: "I undertake on behalf of Messrs. E. & Co., to pay," it was held on the face of the paper to be the promise of A as agent of the principals, and not as himself a principal; and that A was not liable on the promise personally, unless it was proved that he had no authority to make the contract, or that he exceeded the authority.²

[§ 154 *a*. So, where a written contract, for the building of a church edifice was entered into by the defendants as the "committee" of a religious society, and was subscribed by them as such, the intent being clearly to bind the corporation as principal and not the defendants as agents, and the name of the principal and the fact of the agency, as well as the want of individual interest by the defendants in the subject-matter of the contract, all appeared on the face of the contract; it was held, that these facts might be pleaded in bar of an action upon such contract against the members of the committee individually.³]

§ 155. The same principles of construction will apply to cases where bills are drawn, or accepted, or indorsed by agents. If, from the nature and terms of the instrument, it clearly appears not only that the party is an agent, but that he means to bind his principal, and to act for him, and not to draw, accept, or indorse the bill on his own account, that construction will be adopted, however inartificial may be the language, in "furtherance of the actual intention of the instrument. But, if the terms of the instrument are not thus explicit, although it may appear that the party is an agent, he will be deemed to have contracted in his personal capacity.⁴ And there is no differ-

¹ *Bradlee v. The Boston Glass Manufactory*, 16 Pick. 347. This case seems distinguishable from that of *Rice v. Gove*, 22 Pick. R. 158, principally in the circumstance, that the signatures of A, B, C, did not purport to be as agents. See also *Savage v. Rix*, 9 N Hamp. R. 268; *Trask v. Roberts*, 1 B. Monroe, 201, as to the effect of the words jointly and severally. Post, §§ 275, 276; Ante, 147, and note.

² *Downman v. Jones*, 7 Queen's Bench, 108.

³ *Stanton v. Camp*, 4 Barbour, Sup. Ct. R. (N Y.) 274.

⁴ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, ch. 6, § 1, p. 378-402; *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. R. 27, 29; *Bedford Com. Ins. Co. v. Covel*, 8 Met. 442; *Leadbitter v.*

ence on this point, whether the instrument be a deed or an unsealed contract.¹ Thus, if an agent should execute a deed in his own name, and should thereby, "for and on behalf" of his principal, covenant, &c.; he would be personally bound thereby, and not his principal.² So, if an unsealed instrument should purport to be a memorandum of agreement between A. B. on behalf of C. D., of the one part, and E. F. of the other part, to execute a lease of certain premises of the principal, it would be held to be the contract of the agent, and binding on him personally.³ *A fortiori*, an agent will be held to be personally bound, if the name or character of the principal should not appear on the instrument; or, if it should appear that no other person than himself could be legally bound by it, although he should sign his name thereto as agent, or as acting in an official capacity.⁴

§ 156. We shall have occasion, hereafter, to consider somewhat more at large the cases, in which an agent incurs a per-

Farrow, 5 M & Selw 345; Kennedy v. Gouveia, 3 Dowl & Ryl 503; Stevens v. Hill, 5 Esp. R. 247; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 630, 631, (4th edit.); Tipple v. Walker, 4 Mass. R. 595; White v. Skinner, 13 John. R. 307; Ante, § 184; Post, §§ 269, 275, 276; Dusenbury v. Ellis, 3 Johns. Cas. 70; Hastings v. Lovering, 2 Pick. R. 211, 221; Mills v. Hunt, 20 Wend R. 431; Newhall v. Dunlap, 2 Shepley, R. 280; Higgins v. Senior, 8 Mees & Wels 834, 844; Aikin v. Bedford, 17 Martin, R. 502; Pentz v. Stanton, 10 Wend R. 271; Eaton v. Bell, 5 Barn. & Ald. 34. A similar doctrine seems to pervade the Scottish law, and in its application to particular cases, has given rise to no small diversity of opinion. See Thompson on Bills of Exchange, pp. 218, 219, (2d edit.) 1836; Post, § 275 a.

¹ Burrell v. Jones, 3 Barn & Ald 47; Iveson v. Conington, 1 B & Cressw. 160. Post, §§ 269, 273-276, 290, Ante, § 154; Pentz v. Stanton, 10 Wend. R. 270, 271.

² Appleton v. Binks, 5 East, R. 148; Cayhill v. Fitzgerald, 1 Wilson, 28, 58; Case v. Ruddle, 2 Vern. 280; Norton v. Herron, Ryan & Mood. R. 229; S. C. 1 Car. & Payne, 648; Tanner v. Christian, 4 Ell & Bl. 591, 29 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 103; Kennedy v. Gouveia, 3 Dowl & Ryl. 503; Duvall v. Craig, 2 Wheat. R. 45; 8 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. 211, 212; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 361, 362, (4th edit.); Post, § 269.

³ Norton v. Herron, 1 Car. & Payne, 648; S. C. 1 Ryan & Mood. R. 229; Tanner v. Christian, 4 Ell. & Bl. 591, 29 Eng. Law & Eq. 103; Cooke v. Wilson, 33 Id. 361; 1 J. Scott, N. S. 153; Hopkins v. Mehafee, 11 Serg. & R. 129; Post, §§ 269, 270, 274, note.

⁴ Norton v. Herron, 1 Car. & Payne, 648; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 386-388; Bayley on Bills, by Phillips & Sewall, from 5th London edit., ch. 2, § 7, pp. 72, 73, and notes; Pentz v. Stanton, 10 Wend. R. 271; Post, §§ 280-287.

liability, on contracts made by himself;¹ and therefore, we content ourselves, in this place, with a few other illustrations, founded upon written instruments, to justify the foregoing statements. Thus, if a broker should sell goods, and draw upon the buyer for the amount, in his own name, in favor of his principal, if the bill should be dishonored, he would be personally liable, unless some special words were used in the bill to prevent it; and this liability would not only extend to third persons, but even to his principal, although he was known to be a mere agent. For, in such a case, the bill imports, on its face, a personal liability, as drawer, in favor of all persons, who are, or become parties to the bill; and there is nothing in the character of an agent, which excludes such personal liability, if he chooses voluntarily to incur it in favor of his principal, as well as in favor of third persons.² So, if a known agent should draw a bill on a third person, in favor of the payee, and direct the drawee to place the amount to the *debit* of his principal, he would be personally liable on the bill to the payee, unless he use other words to exclude it.³

§ 157. Precisely the same personal liability will attach to an agent, who, in his own name, signs a note as maker, or a bill as drawer, or accepts a bill, or indorses a bill or note generally; for, in such a case, although he is a known agent, the making, or accepting, or indorsing of the instrument, is treated as an admission that it is his personal act, not only in respect to third persons, but also in respect to his principal.⁴ [In a recent case

¹ Post, 260, 270, 272-276; Ante, §§ 154, 155.

² Bayley on Bills, (5th edit.) ch. 2, § 7, p. 68; Post, § 269; *Le Fevre v. Lloyd*, 5 Taunt. 749; *Mayhew v. Prince*, 11 Mass. R. 54; *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. R. 27, 29; *Thompson on Bills of Exchange*, pp. 218, 227, 228, (2d edit. 1836); Post, § 269. But see *Sharp v. Emmett*, 5 Whart. 288.

³ *Leadbitter v. Farrow*, 5 M. & Selw. 345; Bayley on Bills, (5th edit.) ch. 2, § 7, n. 46; *Eaton v. Bell*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 34; Post § 269.

⁴ *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. R. 27, 29; *Goupy v. Harden*, 7 Taunt. R. 159; *Leadbitter v. Farrow*, 5 M. & Selw. 345; *Maber v. Massias*, 2 W. Bl. 1072; *Le Fevre v. Lloyd*, 5 Taunt. R. 749; *Heuback v. Mollman*, 2 Duer, 260; *Stevens v. Hill*, 5 Esp. R. 247. But see *Kidson v. Dilworth*, 5 Price, R. 564. In respect to the principal, the doctrine may, in many cases, require to be qualified; for, as between him and the agent, there was no intention to create a personal liability; it will not arise; *Castrique v. Buttigieg*, 10 E. F. Moore, 94, before the Privy Council, where it was said that in *Goupy v. Harden*, 7 Taunt. 159, there is an

before the Privy Council, the facts were that B, acting as agent in Malta for C, for the purpose of buying and remitting to C, in England, bills on England, on account of money received by B in Malta. In the course of such agency B purchased bills in Malta and indorsed them to C without any reservation in the indorsement. It was held, that in the absence of any special circumstances showing that any liability was intended by B, he was not liable to C upon the dishonor of the bills, by the general principles of the law merchant.^{1]}

§ 158. Upon the same ground, where A, the consignee and agent of a ship, entered into an agreement of charter-party with the master of the ship; and the agreement stated, that it was agreed between the master, of the one part, and A, consignee and agent of the ship and cargo, on behalf of B, the principal, on the other part; and A signed the agreement in his own name, and not as agent; it was held, that the agent, A, was personally bound by the instrument; for the agent and master only were parties to it.² So, where an agent, by a writing, acknowledged himself to have received goods for his principal, and, by the same writing, bound himself to pay for the same at a day certain, he was held personally liable.³

§ 159. The doctrine has been carried constructively a step farther; for, it has been held, that a bill, drawn by the principal upon an agent, with the description of his office or agency annexed, and directed to be placed to the account of the principal, will, if he accepts it generally, bind him personally; and the description will be treated as a mere designation of the person, and not as a qualification of his personal liability.⁴ [So, where

intention to make the agent liable. See *Miles v O'Hara*, 1 Serg & R. 32, *Kidson v Dilworth*, 5 Price, R. 664, *Post*, § 269, *Sharp v Emmett*, 5 Whart R. 288. In this last case it was held, that if an agent remits a bill in payment, for goods sold on account of his principal, and indorses the bill, he does not thereby become responsible thereon to his principal, if he received no consideration for guaranteeing the bill, and does not expressly undertake to do so.

¹ *Castrique v. Buttigieg*, 10 E. F. Moore, P. C. 94.

² *Kennedy v. Gouveia*, 3 Dow & Ryl. 503; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 381, 382; *Meyer v. Barker*, 6 Binn R. 228, 234. See *Thompson on Bills of Exchange*, 218, 227, 228, (2d edit 1836).

³ *Dyer*, R. 230 b; *Post*, § 269-273.

⁴ *Thomas v. Bishop*, 2 Str. R. 955, S. C. Cas. Temp. Hard. 1; *Bayley on Bills*, (5th edit.) ch. 2, § 7, note 48, *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, ch. 6, § 1, pp 378,

a bill of exchange, purporting to be "for value received in machinery supplied to the adventurers in Hayter and Holne Moore Mines," was directed to the defendant as an individual, and he wrote across the bill the words "Accepted for the Company, W. C., Purser," he was held personally liable as acceptor, although he was not a member of the company, and had authority as purser to accept the bill.^{1]}

379. This case seems to press the doctrine to the utmost limit of the law, if, indeed, upon principle, it is sustainable at all. Post, § 269, note. In *Mott v. Hicks*, 1 Cowen, R. 513, where the principal made a note payable to an agent, (in his, the agent's, own name,) or order, and the payee indorsed the note "A. B., agent;" it was held, that the indorsee could not recover personally against A. B. on this indorsement, he well knowing all the facts, and that the instrument was merely to give currency to the note. See also *Rheinhold v. Dertzell*, 1 Yeates, R. 39; *Miles v. O'Hara*, 1 Serg. & Rawle, 32; *Kidson v. Dilworth*, 5 Price, R. 564, 572, 573. See also Bayley on Bills, 2d Amer. from the 5th English edit. by Phillips & Sewall, in notes to p. 73, (edit. 1836) See Thompson on Bills, pp. 218, 227, 228, (2d edit. 1836).

[¹ *Mare v. Charles*, 34 Eng. Law & Eq. 138. Lord Campbell said: "I am of opinion that the defendant is personally liable as acceptor of these bills, and I come to this conclusion on principle and authority. The bills are drawn on him as an individual. In the body of them, to be sure, the consideration is stated to be for 'machinery supplied the adventurers in Hayter and Holne Moore Mines.' The defendant accepts the bills in these words, 'Accepted for the companies. William Charles, purser.' Now, I think that this will bear the interpretation that the defendant makes himself personally liable as acceptor; and we ought to put such a construction on the words as will not make the acceptancer void, *ut res magis valeat quam pereat*. The defendant must be supposed to have known that the bills would be entirely void unless he made himself personally liable on them. There is nothing like a disclaimer of personal liability, as might have been the case if the words "*per proc.*" had been used. It seems to me to make no difference that the consideration is for goods supplied to the company. This only shows that the company are the parties ultimately indebted, and that as between the defendant and them there was an arrangement that he was to be repaid what he might have paid. In that sense he accepts for the company. This case falls within the principle of *Thomas v. Bishop*, which may have been doubted on the other side of the Atlantic, but has always been looked upon as good law here. It is not necessary to say whether we agree with all the observations in *Nicholls v. Diamond*. The acceptance was there "*per proc.*," which might have amounted to a disclaimer of personal liability, if the defendant had not been a member of the company. We need not decide whether, if such words had been used here, the defendant would have been liable." See also *Nicholls v. Diamond*, 9 Exch. R. 184; 24 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 408; *Owen v. Van Uster*, 1 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 36; 10 Com. & Rep. 313.]

§ 160. As, on the one hand, we have seen, that agents cannot, ordinarily, bind their principals by a written contract under seal, executed in the agent's own name,¹ and thus give a title to an action against them; so on the other hand, the principal cannot, ordinarily, avail himself of such a contract under seal, and sue the other contracting party thereon; for it is treated as a contract merely between the parties named in it, although one is known to be acting in the character of an agent.² But even in cases of contracts so made under seal by an agent, there are exceptions to the rule; and it does not universally follow, that, although no action lies by, or against, the principal thereon, therefore no obligations are created thereby between the principal and the other contracting party; for, in many cases, such a contract will be collaterally binding on the principal, and create an implied obligation on his part to fulfil its stipulations, and entitle him also to corresponding rights against the other contracting party, although the direct remedy for a breach of the original contract may be, or must be, exclusively sought by, or against the immediate parties thereto.³ The learned author of a very valuable work on Shipping, speaking on this subject, says: "I apprehend, the owners of the ship may be made responsible, either by a special action on the case, or by a suit in equity for the faithful performance of the stipulations of a charter-party, made by the master under the circumstances before mentioned;"⁴ that is, in cases, where the owners have authorized the master to enter in the charter-party. If this be so, there can be no reason, why the owners should not reciprocally have an action on the case, or a bill in equity, to compel the charterer to fulfil his obligations, under the charter-party.⁵

¹ Ante, § 147-154.

² *United States v. Parmele*, 1 Paine, Cir. R. 252; *Clarke's Executors v. Wilson*, 3 Wash. Cir. R. 560; *New England Marine Ins. Company v. De Wolf*, 8 Pick. 61, 61; *Andrews v. Estes*, 2 Farr. R. 267; *Clark v. Courtney*, 5 Peters R. 319, 349, 350; Ante, § 147-154.

³ Post, §§ 161, 162, note, §§ 278, 422; *Abbott on Shipping*, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 5-8, (edit. 1829); *Id.* Pt. 3, ch. 1, § 2; *Id.* Pt. 4, ch. 1, § 5, (6th edit. by Mr. Sergt. Shee, 1840.)

⁴ *Abbott on Shipping*, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 5.

⁵ Post, §§ 422, 460, note; 1 Bell, Comm. B. 3, Pt. 1, ch. 4, § 1, pp. 506, 507, (5th edit.); *Id.* § 2, pp. 538-547; *Dubois v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Com-*

§ 160 *a*. In respect to written contracts, not under seal, a far more liberal doctrine has been established. It is very clear from the authorities, that it is not indispensable, in order to bind the principal, that such a contract should be executed in the name, and as the act, of the principal. It will be sufficient, if, upon the whole instrument, it can be gathered, from the terms thereof, that the party describes himself and acts as agent, and intends thereby to bind the principal, and not to bind himself.¹ Indeed, the doctrine, maintained in the more recent authorities, is of a far more comprehensive extent. It is, that if the agent possesses due authority to make a written contract, not under seal, and he makes it in his own name, whether he describes himself to be an agent, or not, or, whether the principal be known, or unknown, he, the agent, will be liable to be sued, and be entitled to sue thereon, and his principal also will be liable to be sued,² and be entitled to sue thereon in all cases,³ unless from the attendant circumstances, it is clearly manifested, that an exclusive credit is given to the agent, and it is intended by both parties, that no resort shall in any event be had by or against the principal upon

pany, 4 Wend. R. 285. But see *Schack v. Anthony*, 1 M. & Selw. 573. This case seems at variance with the doctrine maintained in *Abbott on Shipping*, and the case of *Randall v. Van Vechten*, 19 Johns. R. 60, and that of *Dubois v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Company*, 4 Wend. R. 285. It seems to me difficult to support the doctrine, if the principal is not a party to the sealed instrument, executed by the agent, and yet is bound by its obligations, that an action of assumpsit is not maintainable against him for a breach of his implied promise to perform the obligations thereof; and, *e converso*, that he may not maintain a like suit against the other contracting party for any breach of the implied obligations on his part. The decision in *Schack v. Anthony*, 1 Maule & Selw. 573, is but a dry declaration of the rule, promulgated by the Court without any reasoning in its support, and founded on no antecedent authorities. See also *Moorsom v. Kymar*, 2 Maule & Selw. 303; Post, §§ 273, 277, 278, 294, 422, 450 and note. See also *Hall v. Bainbridge*, 1 Mann. & Grang. 42.

¹ Ante, § 147, *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. R. 27, 29. See also other cases, where the doctrine is laid down in this qualified manner, cited ante, § 147, note; *Rice v. Gove*, 22 Pick. R. 158; *Daniels v. Burnham*, 2 Mill. Louis. R. 214; *Minard v. Reed*, 7 Wend. R. 68; *Pentz v. Stanton*, 10 Wend. R. 271, *Spencer v. Field*, 10 Wend. R. 87.

² See *Lindus v. Bradwell*, 5 Com. B. Rep. 583.

³ See *Phelps v. Prothero*, 32 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 474; *Huntington v. Knox*, 7 Cush. 374; *Fuller v. Hooper*, 3 Gray, 334.

it.¹ The doctrine thus asserted, has this title to commendation and support, that it not only furnishes a sound rule for the exposition of contracts, but that it proceeds upon a principle of reciprocity, and gives to the other contracting party, the same rights and remedies, against the agent and principal, which they possess against him.

§ 161. Admitting, then, the rule, usually laid down, to be generally true, that, in order to bind the principal and to make him personally liable upon a written contract made by his agent, or to enable the principal to sue or to be sued thereon, it should be executed in his own name, and appear to be his own contract; yet, it must be equally admitted, that there are many qualifica-

¹ See *Dupont v. Mount Pleasant Ferry Company*, 9 Richardson, 258. This more comprehensive doctrine is very fully stated and expounded in *Higgins v. Senior*, 8 Mees. & Wels. 834, 845, which will be cited more at large hereafter, (sect. 270:) It is there said. "There is no doubt, that where such an agreement is made, it is competent to show, that one or both of the contracting parties were agents for other persons, and acted as such agents in making the contract, so as to give the benefit of the contract on the one hand to, and charge with liability on the other, the unnamed principals; and thus, whether the agreement be or be not required to be in writing by the Statute of Frauds. And this evidence in no way contradicts the written agreement. It does not deny that it is binding on those, whom, on the face of it, it purports to bind, but shows, that it also binds another, by reason that the act of the agent, in signing the agreement, in pursuance of his authority, is in law the act of the principal." See *Ford v. Williams*, 21 How. U. S. R. 248, *Trueman v. Loder*, 11 Adolph. & Ellis, 589; *Fos*, §§ 268, 270, 272, 273-280, 395-400; *Nelson v. Powell*, 3 Doug. R. 410; *Thomson v. Davenport*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 75; *Cothay v. Fennell*, 10 Barn. & Cressw. 671; *Garrett v. Handley*, 4 Barn. & Cressw. 664; *Batemen v. Phillips*, 15 East R. 272; *Higgins v. Senior*, 8 Mees. & Wels. 834, 844; *Jones v. Little-dale*, 6 Adolph. & Ell 486; *Beebee v. Roberts*, 12 Wend. R. 418; *Taintor v. Prendergast*, 3 Hill, R. 72, 73; *Inhabitants of Garland v. Reynolds*, 2 Applet. R. 45; *Taunton & South Boston Turnpike v. Whiting*, 10 Mass. R. 327; *Commercial Bank v. French*, 21 Pick. 486, 491; *Fisher v. Ellis*, 3 Pick. 322; *Fairfield v. Adams*, 16 Pick. 381; *New England Marine Ins. Company v. De Wolf*, 8 Pick. R. 56, 61, 62. See also 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 631, 632. (4th edit.) and note (a); *Hopkins v. Lacouture*, 4 Mill. Louis. R. 66; *Williams v. Winchester*, 19 Martin, R. 24; *Hyde v. Wolf*, 4 Mill. Louis. R. 236; *Muldon v. Whitlock*, 1 Cowen, R. 290; *Porter v. Talcott*, 1 Cowen, R. 359; *Collins v. Butts*, 10 Wend. R. 399; *Sullivan v. Campbell*, 2 Hall, R. 271; *American Jurist* for January, 1830, vol. 3, p. 78-80; *Edmond v. Caldwell*, 3 Shepléy, R. 340; *Smith on Merc. Law*, pp. 134-136, (3d edit. 1843); *Hicks v. Whitmore*, 2 Wend. R. 518; *Hay v. Lynn*, 7 Watts, R. 524; *Small v. Attwood*, 1 Younge, 407, 457.

ions of it and exceptions to it, as well established as the rule itself.¹ A few cases may be sufficient in this place, (as the subject will necessarily occur in other connections hereafter)² to illustrate, not only the qualifications and exceptions to the general rule as to sealed instruments, but also the more liberal doctrine applicable to unsealed instruments. Thus, for example, a written contract made by a factor in his own name, for the purchase or sale of goods for his principal, will bind the principal, and he may sue and be sued thereon, exactly as if he were named in it; for it is treated as the contract of the principal, as well as that of the agent.³ [So on a written order to deliver property to "D. A. N., president of the Eastern Railroad Company," accepted by the drawee, the company may maintain an action in their own name, the consideration moving from them.]

¹ Post, 392-402.

² Post, 269, 270, 275, 276, 395-400.

³ Ante, § 110; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 207, 208; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 193, 210, 211; 1 Beal. Comm. §§ 212, 385, 386, 408, 409, 416, (4th edit.); Id. 490, 491, 494, 537, 558, (5th edit.); 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 622, 624, 630, (4th edit.); 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 5, § 1, pp. 214, 217; Atkyns v. Amber, 2 Esp. R. 393; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, ch. 2, § 2, p. 111, note (3), ch. 4, § 1, p. 324; Snee v. Prescott, 1 Atk. 248; Morris v. Cleasby, 4 M. & Selw. 566; Allen v. Ayers, 3 Pick. 298; Taintor v. Prendergast, 3 Hill, R. 72; Commercial Bank v. French, 21 Pick. R. 486; Higgins v. Senior, 8 Mees. & Wels. 844; Post, § 269-275, 392-402.

[⁴ Eastern Railroad v. Benedict, 5 Gray, 561. Dewey, J., there said: "The only ground of objection to maintaining the present action is, that the acceptance of this order by the defendants created a liability on the same solely in favor of D. A. Neale, and one that could be enforced only by an action in his name. This is said to result from the nature of the draft accepted by the defendants. It is said that the name of the plaintiffs does not appear on the face of the paper, as the payees thereof; and that no oral evidence can be properly admitted to show that they were the real party in interest, and that D. A. Neale was merely their agent, contracting in their behalf.

"To a certain extent, and under some circumstances, the adjudicated cases seem to furnish abundant authority to the point, that where a contract is made with an agent, the principal may sue thereon in his own name. Thus in Skinner v. Stocks, 4 Barn. & Ald. 437, it was held that an action might be maintained either in the name of the person with whom the contract was made, or in the name of the party really in interest. In Sims v. Bond, 5 Barn. & Ad. 393, and 2 Nev. & Man. 614, Lord Chief Justice Denman says: 'It is a well established rule of law, that where a contract, not under seal, is made with an agent in his own name, for an undisclosed principal, either the agent or the principal may sue

So, if an agent should procure a policy of insurance in his own name, for the benefit of his principal, the agent, as well as the

upon it; the defendant, in the latter case, being entitled to be placed in the same situation, at the time of the disclosure of the real principal, as if the agent had been the contracting party.' In *Paley on Agency*, (3d Amer. ed.) § 224, we find the same principle stated, that the principal may sue in his own name to enforce rights acquired by his agent in a course of dealing in his behalf. *Angell & Ames on Corp.* § 316, is to the same effect.

"We may assume it to be quite clear and well supported by authority, that in the case of oral contracts the principal may sue in his own name upon a contract made with his agent. It is equally well settled that the same rule applies to cases of sales by written bills, or other memoranda made by the agent, using his own name, and disclosing no principal. *Huntington v. Knox*, 7 Cush. 371; *Edwards v. Golding*, 20 Vern. 30; *Hubbert v. Borden*, 6 Whart. 79, *Salmon Falls Manuf. Co. v. Goddard*, 14 How. 454, 455. In *Wilson v. Hart*, 7 Taunt. 260, Park, J., says, 'It is the constant course to show by parole evidence whether a contracting party is agent or principal.' In *Potter v. Yale College*, 4 Conn. 60, Chief Justice Hosmer says, 'I admit the principle, that where an agreement is made with an agent, for the sole and exclusive benefit of his principal, the principal has the legal interest.'

"In the case of *Beckham v. Drake*, 9 M. & W. 79, this subject was much considered in the very full arguments of the counsel, as well as in the several opinions given by the members of the court; and the result was, that it was held, that the parties really contracting are the parties to sue in a court of justice, although the contract be in the name of another, and that this rule was to be applied not only to oral contracts, but to cases of ordinary mercantile contracts in writing. Parke, B., says: 'The case of bills of exchange is an exception, which stands upon the law merchant; and promissory notes another, for they are placed on the same footing by the statute of Anne.' 9 M. & W. 96.

"It is unnecessary, in the present case, to decide whether, upon a mere naked written promise, made with one person, without any reference in the instrument to an agency, the action, upon proof of such agency in fact, might be maintained in the name of the principal. We are aware that it is contended that the promise is directly and exclusively a promise to D. A. Neale, and that the addition of 'president of the Eastern Railroad Company' must be rejected as merely *descriptio personæ*. But this position, we think, is not maintainable. This written instrument may properly be held to disclose an agency, and to indicate enough to authorize an action in behalf of the railroad company, upon actual proof that the bargain was made on their account.

"The case of *Commercial Bank v. French*, 21 Pick. 486, strongly illustrates and sustains this view. That was an action on a promise to pay 'the cashier of the Commercial Bank;' and the objection taken was, that the action could only be maintained in the name of the cashier. But it was held, that such description sufficiently indicated the contract to be one in which the bank was the party in interest and authorized to maintain the action in its own name. It is true that

principal,¹ may sue thereon ; for it is treated properly as a con-

the promise was there made 'to the cashier,' and not to 'A. B., cashier of the Commercial Bank;' and some importance was given, in the opinion, to that circumstance; but the principle upon which the opinion was based would equally have applied to the case of a promise to 'A. B., cashier,' &c. It was said by the court: 'The principle is, that the promise must be understood according to the intention of the parties. If in truth it be an undertaking to the corporation, whether by a right or a wrong name, whether the name of the corporation or some of its officers be used, it should be declared on and treated as a promise to the corporation.' 21 Pick. 490, 491.

"In *Pigott v. Thompson*, 3 Bos. & Pul. 141, where commissioners for draining certain lands were authorized to receive tolls, and the defendant had agreed in writing to pay 'to the treasurer of the commissioners' certain tolls, it was held, that the action was properly brought in the name of the commissioners.

"In the case of *Trustees of Ministerial & School Fund v. Parks*, 1 Fairf. 441, it was held, that a note of hand, made payable to an individual as treasurer of a corporation, might properly be sued in the name of the corporation; and in *State v. Boies*, 2 Fairf. 474, it was held, the action was properly brought in the name of the State of Maine upon a note given 'to James Irish, land-agent of Maine.' In the case of *Garland v. Reynolds*, 20 Maine, 45, which was an action brought upon a note given 'to Enoch Huntington, treasurer of the committee of the surplus revenue,' it was held, that the action might be maintained in the name of the town for which the committee were acting.

"In *Vermont Central Railroad v. Claves*, 21 Verm. 30, an action upon a note of hand, payable to 'the Commissioners of the Vermont Central Railroad Company,' the consideration of which was a subscription for shares in that company, was maintained in the name of the company, to whom the note had been delivered by the commissioners. And in *Rutland & Burlington Railroad v. Cole*, 24 Verm. 33, upon a note of hand payable 'to the order of Samuel Henshaw, treasurer,' &c., it appearing by other evidence that Henshaw was treasurer of the corporation, and that the consideration of the promise proceeded from the corporation, the action was held well brought by them.

"The defendants have referred to the case of *Moss v. Livingston*, 4 Comst. 208, as adverse to the maintenance of the present action. That was an action brought by an indorsee of a bill of exchange accepted by 'John R. Livingston, president of Rosendale Manufacturing Company,' and he was held personally liable. Many cases will be found of that character; and in reference to negotiable instruments, the doctrine seems to be maintained by numerous adjudications, that, in such cases, for the purpose of charging the party who has thus signed his own name, the addition of 'treasurer' may be rejected as mere *descriptio persona*. That case is not however a parallel one with the present; as here no third party is sought to be charged, and the only inquiry is, whether enough appears upon the face of the instrument to authorize the real party in interest, upon fully showing that interest, to sue in his own name.

¹ But see *Finney v. Bedford Commercial Ins. Co.* 8 Met. 348.

tract, to which the principal as well as the agent is a party.¹

"That the corporation may be held liable upon a note signed by 'G. L. Chandler, treasurer of the Dorchester Turnpike Corporation,' upon its appearing that it was the real contract of the corporation, was the doctrine of our own case of *Mann v. Chandler*, 9 Mass. 336; The cases of *Gilmore v. Pope*, 5 Mass. 491, and *Taunton & South Boston Turnpike v. Whiting*, 10 Mass. 327, in both of which this court held that an action might be maintained by a corporation upon a written contract promising to pay their agent, are more directly in point: as they are cases where the question arose upon the right of the plaintiffs to sue upon the contract, which is the present case.

"More reliance was placed by the defendants upon the case of *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. 27. The notes, the subject of that action, were signed by Zebedee Cook, some by his own name, and one by the name of Cook & Foster, a house in which he was a partner; and contained on their face no allusion to John Arnold, the defendant, as a principal, nor anything indicating an agency in his behalf. They were negotiable notes, as appears by a recurrence to the files in that case, although not so stated in the printed report. It was an attempt to charge a third party whose name did not appear in the instrument. The question was as to the competency of oral evidence to show that the notes were given for premiums on policies of insurance, procured at the request and for the use of the defendant, on property belonging to him, and that the party signing the notes acted as agent of the defendant merely. The objection taken, and sustained by the court, was, that oral testimony could not be received to control and vary the written contract, so as to make them the notes of Arnold. The rule of law was stated to be that 'no person, in making a contract, is considered to be the agent of another, unless he stipulates for his principal by name, stating his agency in

¹ Ante, §§ 109, 111; Post, §§ 272, 392-402; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 201 *Wolff v. Horncastle*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 323; *Lucena v. Crawford*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 98; *De Vignier v. Swanson*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 346, n.; *Bell v. Gibson*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 345; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 630, 631, (4th edit.); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 21, 22; Marsh. on Insur. B. 1, ch. 8, § 3, pp. 311, 312, (2d edit.); Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, p. 212. In the case of the *United States v. Parmele*, 1 Paine's Cir. R. 252, Mr. Justice Livingston admitted, that the principal might sue, in case of a written contract of his factor. But, *arguendo*, he expressed a doubt, whether he could sue on the instrument itself, as one to which he was a party. His language was: "But the court does not know, that such suit, (by the principal,) was ever sustained on the contract itself, when one in writing took place between the factor and vendor, in which the name of the principal did not appear. What use might be made of such a paper as evidence, is one thing. But, that a suit can be brought upon it in the name of any but a party to it, has not been shown; nor is it believed, that such is the law." The doctrine, however, which is here doubted by the learned Judge, is now very firmly established, as may be abundantly seen in the authorities cited; Ante, § 160 a, note, and post, § 270, note, § 278. And see *Huntington v. Knox*, 7 Cush. 375; *McDonald v. Bear River Co.* 13 California, 235.

So, if the master of a ship, by a written contract in his own name, should contract for or order repairs, the owner may be sued therefor, as well as the master; and the contract will be treated as the several contract of each.¹ So, a bottomry bond, properly entered into by the master of the ship, in his own name, will bind the owner; and a charter-party, made by the master in his own name, or a bill of lading, signed in his own name, in the usual course of the employment of the ship, will bind the owner.² It is true, that, from a technical principle of the common law, the owner cannot be sued directly on a bottomry bond or a charter-party executed by the master under seal; because it is not the deed of the owner.³ But, the owner is, nevertheless,

the instrument which he signs.' It was further stated that no person could be charged as the maker of any written contract signed by another, unless the signer professed to act by procuration or authority, and stated the name of the principal on whose behalf he made his signature, 11 Mass. 29. This last position must be taken with some qualification

"But the doctrine of Stackpole & Arnold is not to be applied to this case, for two reasons. 1st. Because that was a case of a naked signature of the name of the party signing, without any, even the slightest, indication that it was made in behalf of another person. 2. It was a negotiable promissory note, as to which a distinction prevails in the introduction of oral evidence to show a party in interest whose name is not disclosed on the face of the note. We have no reason to suppose that the court, in the opinion given in that case, intended to overrule their own previous decisions in the cases of *Gilmore v. Pope*, and *Taunton & South Boston Turnpike v. Whiting*, above referred to

"Looking at the present case in reference to the weight of judicial authority, and fully conceding that there has not been an entire uniformity of the authorities as to the point now in issue, we have come to the opinion that, in a case like the present, of an instrument not negotiable, given in the form in which this is, the plaintiffs, the real parties in interest, may maintain an action thereon in their own name"]

¹ *Abbott on Shipp* Pt. 2, ch. 3, § 1-3, (edit 1829); *Ante*, § 116; *Post*, § 294; *James v. Bixby*, 11 Mass. 36, 37; *Ingersoll v. Van Bokkelen*, 7 Cowen, R. 670

² *Abbott on Shipp* Pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 1, 2, 3, 5-8, (edit 1829), *Ante*, § 116-119; 3 *Kent, Comm. Law* 46, p. 161-163, (4th edit.), 1 *Bell, Comm* § 446-466, (4th edit.), 1 *Bell, Comm B* 3, Pt. 1, ch. 4, § 1, pp. 506, 507, (5th edit.)

³ *Ante*, § 116; *Abbott on Shipp* Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 5, *Blood v. Goodrich*, 9 Wend. R. 68; 1 *Liverin on Agency* ch. 2, § 3, pp. 35, 36, (edit. 1818); 3 *Kent, Comm. Lect.* 46, pp. 162, 163, (4th edit.), 1 *Bell, Comm* § 482, (4th edit.), *Id.* p. 559, (5th edit.), *Gardner v. Lachlan*, 8 Sim. R. 126, 128; *Meyer v. Barker*, 6 Binn. 234; *Pickering v. Holt*, 6 Greenl. R. 160.

bound by it; and all the obligations and covenants contained in it are binding on him, although the form of the remedy against him may be different from what it is against the master.¹ It is not improbable that this liability of the principal was suggested by, if not derived from, the Edicts of the Roman Prætor, respecting the exercitorial action and institorial action, which we have already had occasion to consider.²

§ 162. The true principle, however, upon which all these cases stand, undoubtedly is, that the principal authorizes the agent to contract in his own name, and thereby to bind the principal also; and then the common law acting upon the intention of the parties, makes the party who would be ultimately liable, immediately liable to the other, whenever its forms of proceeding will enable it to do so.³ In this respect, there is a strong analogy to the jurisdiction exercised by Courts of Equity, in cases of assignment of choses in action, where the debtor is made directly liable to the assignee, although he might not be so at law. The general interests of trade and commerce require this expansion of the law of agency; and the Edicts of the Prætor, were unquestionably founded on this, as a matter of public policy: *Facilius hoc in Magistro, quam Institore, admittendum propter utilitatem; Dicendum tamen erit eo usque producendum utilitatem navigantium*.⁴ Indeed, it may be asserted, as a general rule, that in all cases, where an agent has contracted within the sphere of his agency, and the principal is not by the form of the contract bound at law, a Court of Equity will enforce it against the principal, upon principles *ex æquo et bono*.⁵

¹ Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 5. (edit. 1829). Id. Pt. 3, ch. 1, § 2. But see 1 Liverm. on Agency, 294-296, (edit. 1818), Schalk v. Anthony, 1 M & Selw. 573; Leslie v. Wilson, 3 Brod. & Bing. R. 171; 1 Bell, Comm. B. 3, Pt. 1, ch. 4, § 1, pp. 506, 507, (5th edit.); Ante, § 160; Post, §§ 162, 278, 294, 422, 450, note.

² Ante, §§ 36; 116, 117, 122; Post, § 163; Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 3, 11; Id. Pt. 3, ch. 1, § 2, (edit. 1829); Dubois v. Del. & Hudson Canal Co. 4 Wend. R. 285; Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 Johns. R. 30.

³ See Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 5-8, (edit. 1829); Id. Pt. 3, ch. 1, § 2; Higgins v. Senior, 8 Mees. & Wels. R. 834, 844; Ante, § 160 a, and note, Post, § 270 and note.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 5.

⁵ Clark's Ex'ors v. Van Reimsdyk, 9 Cranch, R. 153; Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2,

§ 163. The Roman law seems, however, in some of its juridical regulations, to have proceeded upon principles somewhat different from ours, as to actions by and against parties contracting through the instrumentality of agents. In general, the principal, although bound by the act of his agent, was not personally and directly liable to the other contracting party, nor could he enforce the contract against the latter.¹ The only direct remedy (*Actio Directa*) was between the immediate parties to the contract; that is, the agent and the other contractor. Thus Pothier states it as the undoubted rule (and he is confirmed by other civilians); *Ex contractu procuratoris, actio regulariter procuratori et adversus procuratorem queritur; non autem Domino, aut adversus Dominum.*² There were exceptions to the rule, as has been before intimated; but they were principally introduced by the Prætor, as a matter of equity, and hence called *Actiones Utiles*, in which the contract of an agent would be enforced against his principal; as, for example, in cases of exercitors or owners of ships, by the *Actio Exercitoria*, and in other agencies of a common nature in trade, such as the *Actio Institoria* against shop-keepers, and others acting through agents, (*Institores* or *Pro-*

ch. 2, § 5, (edit. 1829); Id. Pt. 3, ch. 1, § 2; Ante, § 160, note; Dubois v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Comp. 4 Wend R. 285. It seems, that in Louisiana, a power executed by the agent in his own name, will bind his principal, when he acts in the business intrusted to him, and according to the power conferred; for in that law the liability of the principal depends upon the act done, not upon the form in which it has been executed. The only difference in that law is, that where the agent contracts in his own name he adds his own personal responsibility to that of the person who has empowered him. Hopkins v. Lacouture, 4 Louisiana R. 64; Hyde v. Wolff, 4 Louisiana R. 234. This seems also to be the rule of the foreign continental law; and Pothier lays it down as clearly the law of France. Pothier on Oblig. n. 82, 448; 2 Emerig. on Assur. ch. 4, § 12, p. 465-467. It was also clearly the doctrine of the Roman law, in which, in such cases, the *Actio Utilis Institoria* was allowed against the principal, and the *Actio Exercitoria*, against the owner, which are analogous to our suits in Equity. Pothier on Oblig. n. 82, 447, 448; Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 3, § 17; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 17, 18; Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 7-9 and 12; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 9-18; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 680, note (d.) (4th edit.); Ante, § 160; Post, § 163, note, §§ 278, 422, 450.

¹ Post, §§ 261, 271, 425, 426.

² Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 6, n. 9, 10; 1 Stair, Inst. by Brodie, B. 1, tit. 12, § 16; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 48.

ratores.) in favor of commerce.¹ And it would seem, that in the modern nations recognizing the civil law as the basis of their jurisprudence, the like action (*Actio Utilis*) will generally lie by or against the principal upon the contract of his agent; and that it is competent for the agent to contract in his own name directly, or in the name of his principal only. Such, certainly, is the law in Scotland and in France.² In cases of this sort, where the agent contracts in the name of his principal, having due authority, the principal is directly bound, and the agent is not (in general) personally liable. But if the agent makes the contract for his principal in his own name, he incurs a personal responsibility, although there is an accessorial obligation on the part of the principal.³

§ 164. Hitherto, for the most part we have been considering cases of pure agency, where the authority is unclothed with any real or apparent interest in the property itself. But where the authority is coupled with an interest in the property itself, there (as we have seen)⁴ the authority over it may be, and, in general, properly is, executed in the name of the agent himself, and

¹ Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, §§ 43, 46; 1 Stan. Inst. B. 1, tit. 12, §§ 16, 18, 19. Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, n. 1, 2, 6, 9, and 10, and note *ibid.* (3); Pothier on Oblig. n. 82, 448-450. Ante, § 117.

² 1 Stair, Inst. by Brodie, B. 1, tit. 12, § 16; Pothier on Oblig. n. 447, 448; *Id.* : 71, 82. Pothier on Oblig. (by Evans.) n. 82, speaking on this subject, says: "We contract through the ministry of another, not only when a person merely lends us his ministry, by contracting in our name, and not in his own, as when we contract by the ministry of a tutor, curator, agent, &c., in their quality as such. We are also deemed to contract by the ministry of another, though he contracts himself in his own name, when he contracts in relation to the affairs which we have committed to his management; for we are supposed to have adopted and approved, beforehand, of all the contracts which he may make respecting the affairs committed to him, as if we had contracted ourselves, and are held to have acceded to all the obligations resulting therefrom. Upon this principle is founded the *Actio Exercitoria*, which those, who have contracted with the master of a ship for matters relative to the conduct of such ship, have against the proprietor, who has appointed the master. Upon the same principle is founded the *Actio Institoria*, which those, who have contracted with the manager of a commercial concern, or a manufactory, have against the employer, (le commettant,) and the *Actio Utilis Institoria*, which relates to contracts made with a manager of any other kind." Post, § 271.

³ Pothier on Oblig. n. 447-449

⁴ Ante, § 150; Post, §§ 399, 400.

not in that of the principal. Perhaps some of the cases of factors, and masters of ships, and insurance agents, may be explained upon this broad principle; for they are in some cases clothed with a legal interest in the property, or the contract.¹ Thus, if the principal has clothed a factor with the legal title to the property, subject to his own equitable ownership, or has authorized the factor to sell it in his own name, there cannot be a doubt that he may so sell it; and the legal title will pass to the purchaser.² The master of a ship, too, who sells the ship or cargo, or a part thereof, in a case of necessity, generally sells it in his own name, and is presumed to be clothed with this superinduced authority in such extremities, by virtue of his office.³ But the more common cases in which the principle is applied, are, where there is an authority coupled with an interest in mortgages and other conveyances of real or personal property to the grantee, in which is also contained an authority to the grantee to sell the property under certain circumstances. In such cases, the legal estate in the property being in the grantee, he is at liberty to sell it in his own name, and to confer thereby, under the circumstances contemplated by the conveyance, an absolute title to the purchaser.⁴ But, where no interest whatever in the property is conveyed to the grantee of the authority, although the instrument is designed to be a security for debts due to him, the sale by the grantee, to bind the principal, must be in his name, and not in that of the grantee.⁵

§ 165. In the next place, let us consider, what in other respects will be held to be a good execution of the authority. And here it may be laid down as a general rule, that, in order to bind the principal, (supposing the instrument to be in other respects prop-

¹ Ante, §§ 116, 150, 161; Post, §§ 278, 298, 299, 399-401.

² Post, §§ 397, 400, 401; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, Pt. 1, ch. 3, § 5, pp. 207, 208; Pt. 2, ch. 3, § 5, pp. 288, 289; *Coates v. Lewes*, 1 Camp. R. 444; *Baring v. Corrie*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 137; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, pp. 205, 206; *Martini v. Coles*, 1 M. & Selw. 140, 147; *Pickering v. Busk*, 15 East, 38.

³ *The Gratitude*, 3 Rob. 257-263; *The Schr. Tilton*, 5 Mason, R. 481; Ante, 116-118.

⁴ See *Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Adm'or*, 2 Mason, R. 244; S. C. 3 Mason, R. 294; 8 Wheat. R. 174; S. C. 1 Peters, R. 1, 18; Ante, § 150; Post, §§ 399, 400.

⁵ *Ibid.*

erly executed,) the act done must be within the scope of the authority committed to the agent.¹ In other words, his authority or commission must be punctiliously and properly pursued; and its limitations and extent duly observed, although a circumstantial variance in its execution will not defeat it.² If the act varies substantially (and not merely in form) from the authority or commission in its nature, or extent, or degree, it is void, as to the principal, and does not bind him.³ [And where the agent of a corporation was authorized to borrow money from a bank, and to execute the *note* of the corporation therefor, and he borrowed the money accordingly, but executed a *bond* therefor under the seal of the corporation, it was held that he did not pursue his authority, and that his act was not binding on his principal.⁴] Of course, this doctrine is to be taken with an exception of the cases of a general authority, where there are secret instructions limiting it, to which our attention has been already directed.⁵ Thus, for example, if an agent is authorized to do an act upon condition, and he does it absolutely; or, *vice versa*, if he is authorized to do an act absolutely, and he executes it upon condition,—in such cases the act will not bind the principal.⁶ On the other hand, if a general discretion is reposed, the act of the agent, however indiscreet, becomes obligatory, unless, indeed, there is such gross misconduct, as amounts to a fraud upon the principal, and that misconduct is known to the person contracting with the agent.⁷

166. But the question may often arise, whether an act is wholly void, or not, when the agent does more than he is authorized to do, or less than he is authorized to do. There are some

¹ Ante, § 126-133.

² Com. Dig. *Attorney*, C. 15; North River Bank v. Aymer, 3 Hill, R. 262; Nixon v. Hyserott, 5 John. R. 58; Batty v. Carswell, 2 John. R. 48.

³ Com. Dig. *Attorney*, C. 11, 14, 15; North River Bank v. Aymer, 3 Hill, R. 262; Nixon v. Hyserott, 5 John. R. 58; Batty v. Carswell, 2 John. R. 48.

⁴ Mayor and Aldermen of Little Rock v. State Bank, 3 Arkansas R. 227.

⁵ Ante, §§ 73, 126-133; Pothier on Oblig. n. 79; Tradesman's Bank v. Astor, 11 Wend. R. 87.

⁶ Co. Litt. 258 b; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 29; Com. Dig. *Attorney*, C. 13, 14; Howard v. Baillie, 2 H. Bl. 623.

⁷ 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 5, § 1, pp. 96, 97, (edit. 1818); Ante, §§ 73, 127-133.

distinctions on this subject, which deserve to be examined, not because they present any diversity in the general principle, but because they present some diversity in the application of it. Lord Coke has laid down the rule in the following terms: "Regularly, it is true that, where a man doth less than the commandment or authority committed unto him, there, the commandment or authority being not pursued, the act is void. And, where a man doeth that, which he is authorized to do, and more, there it is good for that, which is warranted, and void for the rest. Yet both these rules have divers exceptions and limitations."¹ And Lord Coke is well warranted in suggesting, that there are exceptions and limitations. Where there is a complete execution of the authority, and something *ex abundanti* is added, which is improper, there the execution is good, and the excess only is void. But where there is not a complete execution of a power, or where the boundaries between the excess and the rightful execution are not distinguishable, there the whole will be void.²

§ 167. Some illustrations of this doctrine may, perhaps, be useful. Thus, if a man has a power to settle a jointure upon his wife for life, and he should execute it by an appointment for ninety-nine years, if she should so long live, even if it would be a void execution of the power at law, it would be upheld in equity *pro tanto*. For in such a case he has done less than his power, and the boundaries are clear and distinguishable; for if the wife should outlive the ninety-nine years, the estate, for the residue of her life, would be undisposed of.³ So, if the power were to lease for twenty-one years, and the party should make a lease for forty years, it would be a good execution of the power in equity, although not at law, for the twenty-one years, and void

¹ Co Litt 205 a, Com Dig Attorney, C 1, Palkin on Agency, by Lloyd 179, and note (n) 1 Livin on Agency, ch 5, § 1, pp 98, 101, 102 (edit 1818)

² Harg note (202) to Co Litt 208 a, Alexander v Alexander, 2 Ves 644, Com Dig Attorney, C 1, 1 Livin on Agency, ch 5, § 1, pp 101, 102, (edit 1818) Mr Sugden, in his work on Powers, has considered this subject at large, with reference to powers of appointment and the execution of powers under the Statute of Uses. See Sugden on Powers, (3d edit) ch 5, per tot, and especially §§ 7 and 8 of the same chapter. Id ch 6, §§ 7 and 8, (6th edit) p 373-456.

³ Alexander v Alexander, 2 Ves 644, Post, § 173

as to the residue; for it distinctly appears how much he has exceeded it.¹ So, if a power of appointment is executed in definite proportions among persons who are objects of the power, and others who are mere strangers, it will, in many cases, be good as to the proper objects, and void as to the strangers, because the excess is clearly ascertained; and the donee of the power shall not be allowed, by his own wrongful act, to defeat the rightful execution *pro tanto*.² And where a distinct limitation or appointment is made according to the power, and another distinct limitation or appointment is made in the same instrument, exceeding the power, the former will be good even at law, and the latter will be held void.³

§ 168. Upon the same ground, if a warrant of attorney is given to make livery to one person, and the attorney make livery to two; or if the authority is to make livery of Blackacre, and the attorney makes livery of Blackacre and Whiteacre, the execution is good, so far as it is authorized by the power, and void as to the residue;⁴ for the excess is clearly ascertainable. So, if a letter of attorney be to make livery absolutely, and the attorney make it upon condition, this is a good execution of the power, and amounts to a sufficient livery, and the condition is void.⁵ But the contrary would be true, if the livery were to be made upon condition, and the attorney were to make it absolute;⁶ or, if it were to make livery to two, and he made it to one only.⁷

¹ *Alexander v. Alexander*, 2 Ves 644; Sugden on Powers, ch. 5, § 8, p. 549, 550, (3d edit.); *Id.* ch. 9, § 1, vol. 2, p. 59-79, (6th edit.); *Campbell v. Leach*, Ambler R. 740; *Jenkins v. Kemishe*, Hardres, R. 395; *Roe v. Prideaux*, 10 East, 158; Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 33.

² Sugden on Powers, (3d edit.) ch. 5, § 8, p. 546-549; *Id.* ch. 9, § 1, vol. 2, p. 59-79, (6th edit.); *Adams v. Adams*, Cowp. R. 651.

³ Sugden on Powers, (3d edit.) ch. 5, § 8, p. 550-556; *Id.* ch. 9, § 1, vol. 2, p. 69-79, (6th edit.); *Commons v. Marshall*, 6 Bro. Parl. R. 168.

⁴ *Perkins on Convey.* n. 189; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 5, § 1, pp. 101, 102, (edit. 1818.)

⁵ 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 102, (edit. 1818); *Perkins on Convey.* n. 188, 189.

⁶ *Perkins on Convey.* n. 188; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 5, § 1, p. 102, (edit. 1818); *Co. Lit.* 258 a.

⁷ 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 5, § 1, p. 103, (edit. 1818); 2 *Roll. Abridg. Feoffment*, p. 9, l. 50. See also Dig. Lib. 45, tit. 1, l. 1, § 5. A case somewhat analogous to some of the foregoing is put in the Roman law. *Si mihi Pamphi-*

169. Upon the same ground, if an agent were authorized to procure insurance upon a ship for two thousand dollars, and he should procure a policy for two thousand dollars on the ship, and two thousand dollars on the cargo, the policy would be held good as to the ship, and void as to the cargo, at least unless under special circumstances.¹ On the other hand, if an agent were authorized to sign a note for his principal, payable in six months, and he should sign one payable in sixty days, it would be utterly void.² [So, if being authorized to draw a bill at four months, he draws one payable in less than four months from the time it is drawn, but antedates it, making it apparently drawn according to his authority.³] So, if an agent were authorized to purchase goods on a credit of three and six months, and to give notes accordingly in the name of the principal; and he were to purchase the goods and give notes payable at four and five months, it would be utterly void, since in neither respect is it in conformity to the authority, as to the time of credit given to the principal, although the credit may possibly be equally beneficial to him; for, as to that, the agent has no right to judge.⁴

§ 170. The general principle, which pervades all these cases, is the same; that the principal is not bound by the unauthorized acts of his agent, but is bound where the authority is substantially pursued, or so far as it is distinctly pursued. But the question may often arise, whether, in fact, the agent has exceeded what may be deemed the substance of his authority. Thus, if a man should authorize an agent to buy one hundred bales of cotton for him, and he should buy fifty at one time of one person, and fifty at another time of a different person; or if he should buy fifty only, being unable to purchase more at any price, or at the price limited; the question might arise, whether the authority was well executed. In general, it may be answered that it was;

lum stipulanti, tu Pamphilum et Stichum spondens, Stichi abjectionem pro supervacuo haberi mihi puto. Nam si tot sunt stipulationes quot corpora, duæ sunt quodammodo stipulationes, una utilis, alia inutilis. Neque vitiatur utilis per hanc inutilem. Dig. Lib. 45, tit. 1, l. 1, § 5; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 5, § 1, p. 102, note, (edit. 1818)

¹ Liverm. on Agency, ch. 5, § 1, pp. 101, 102, (edit. 1818)

² Batty v. Carrswell, 2 John. R. 48, Dig. Lib. 45, tit. 1, l. 1, § 4.

³ Tate v. Evans, 7 Missouri, 419.

⁴ Post, § 175-178; Instit. Lib. 3, tit. 27, § 8.*

because, in such a case, it would ordinarily be implied, that the purchase might be made at different times, of different persons; or that it might be made of a part only, if the whole could not be bought at all, or not within the limits prescribed.¹ So, if a commission to an agent were to purchase fifty shares of the stock of a bank, and the agent should contract with one person, who is the owner of thirty shares, for the purchase of that number, intending to buy the remaining twenty shares from some other person, the principal would be bound by that contract, although the agent should afterwards fail in his attempts to buy the remaining twenty.² So, if a merchant should direct his correspondent to procure insurance for him of two thousand dollars upon a particular voyage, for a particular ship, and, after one underwriter had subscribed one thousand dollars, the others should decline the risk; in such a case, the authority would be well executed for the one thousand dollars, and the principal would be bound to pay the premium.³ So, if the principal should authorize his agent to become surety in a certain sum for him, and he should become surety in a less sum, it has been thought that the principal would be bound by the stipulation; and such, indeed, is the rule of the Roman law.⁴

§ 171. But cases may arise, in which it would be as manifest from the objects of the purchase, that the whole or no part of the property was to be bought, and even bought of the same person. A for example, if a person should authorize his agent to buy a ship, it would be presumed that a purchase of the whole, and not of a part, was intended; for the convenient use of a ship may be most materially impaired by a divided ownership; and, perhaps, the whole objects of the purchase would thereby be defeated.⁵ The same rule would apply to the case of a commis-

¹ 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 5, § 1, pp. 99, 100, (edit. 1818); Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 33.

² 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 5, § 1, pp. 99, 100, (edit. 1818); 2 Kent. Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 618, 619, (4th edit.)

³ 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 5, § 1, p. 100, (edit. 1818); Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 33.

⁴ Post, § 174; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 5, § 1, p. 100, (edit. 1818); Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 33; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 46. See also Gordon v. Buchanan, 5 Yerger, 811; Lathrop v. Harlow, 23 Missouri, 213.

⁵ Post, § 180.

sion or authority to buy a plantation. It would not be a good execution of the commission to buy a part thereof only, or to buy an undivided share of it, or any interest in it less than the fee. In all such cases, it would generally be presumed, that the entirety of the property constituted an essential element in the purchase.¹ But of this more hereafter.²

§ 172. The true inquiry, therefore, in all such cases, is, what, under all the circumstances, is the true nature and limits of the authority. If it is exceeded in any substantial manner, it will not be obligatory on the principal.³ Let us suppose a case, where A should authorize B to purchase ten bales of Cotton at ten cents per pound; and B should purchase the ten bales at eight cents per pound; no one would doubt, that the purchase would be binding upon the principal; because the meaning of the parties is presumed to be, that the price should not exceed the ten cents. In such a case, the maxim may well apply, *Omne majus in se continet minus. Majori summa minor inest.*⁴ But if B should, in such a case, purchase at twelve cents, the purchase would not be binding on the principal, or at least, not binding unless B should offer the bales of cotton to A for the price of ten cents.⁵ In the former case, the bargain would be advantageous to the principal; in the latter case it would be injurious; and the law will construe the intention favorably in the case, where the less price is given, because it is for the advantage of the principal, and must be presumed to have been within the scope of the authority; but it will never construe it to have been the intention of the principal to allow the agent to exceed the authority given to him, when it is to his disadvantage.⁶

§ 173. Upon somewhat similar grounds of the apparent intention, an agent, who has not a mere authority, but has an author-

¹ 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 5, § 1, p. 100, (edit. 1818), Post, 176, 177.

² Post, § 175-178.

³ Ante, § 165.

⁴ 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 5, § 1, p. 96-98, (edit. 1818), Instit. Lib. 3, tit. 27, § 8; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, 617, 618, (4th edit.), Post, §§ 174, 176.

⁵ Pothier on Oblig. n. 77, 78, Co. Lit. 258 (a), 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 5, § 1, p. 97-99; Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 33; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 3. arts. 6, 7; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 617-619, (4th edit.), Just. Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 27, §§ 8, 9.

⁶ Ibid.; Post, § 175.

ity coupled with an interest, may do less than the terms of his authority seem directly to warrant, and yet bind his principal.¹ Thus, if in England a copyholder for life has a license to lease for five years, he may lease for three years; for it will be presumed; that the authority was limited in its extent to the duration of five years, and comprehended any immediate period.² So, a license to a copyholder for life to lease for five years, if he should so long live, will be well executed by a lease for five years, omitting, if he should so long live; for the law will imply the limitation in such a case.³

§ 174. The Roman law adopted similar distinctions. The general rule in that law was, (as we have already seen,) that the limits of the authority must be strictly observed.⁴ If an authority was given to buy at a limited price, that price could not lawfully be exceeded. *Diligenter igitur fines mandati custodiendi sunt. Nam qui excessit, aliud quid facere videtur.*⁵ *Præterea in causa mandati etiam illud retitur, ut interim nec melior causa mandantis fieri possit: interdum melior: deterior vero nunquam.*⁶ *Melior autem causa mandantis fieri potest, si, cum, tibi mandassem, ut Stichum decem emeris, tu eum minoris emeris: vel tantidem, ut aliud quicquam servo accederet: utroque enim casu, aut non ultra pretium, aut intra pretium fecisti.*⁷ *Et quidem si mandavi tibi, ut aliquam rem mihi emeris nec de pretio quidquam statui, tuque emisti, utrinque actio nascitur.*⁸ But the Roman lawyers were divided in opinion, whether, if the stipulated price was exceeded, the principal was bound if the agent offered to remit the excess. However, the better opinion was that maintained by Proculus,

¹ See ante, § 164; Post, § 489.

² Com. Dig. Attorney, C. 12, 15; 1 Roll. Abridg. Authority, G. 1, l. 47; Ante, § 167.

³ 1 Roll. Abridg. Authority, G. 2, l. 50; Com. Dig. Attorney, C. 15; Ante, § 167.

⁴ Ante, §§ 43, 70.

⁵ Ante, § 70; Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 5; Pothier. Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1. n. 41. The Institutes say, (Lib. 3, tit. 27, § 8,) *Is, qui exequitur mandatum, non debet excedere fines mandati.* Ante, §§ 43, 70.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 3; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 49; Just. Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 27, §§ 8, 9.

⁷ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 5. § 5; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 48; Just. Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 27, § 8; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 3, art. 6.

⁸ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 3, § 1.

that, in such case, the principal was bound.¹ *Quod, si pretium statui, tuque pluris emisti, quidam negaverunt, te mandati habere actionem, etiam si paratus esses, id, quod exedit, remittere; namque iniquum est, non esse mihi cum illo actionem, si nolit; illi vero, si velit, mecum esse.*² *Sed Proculus recte eum, usque ad pretium statutum, acturum existimat; quæ sententia sane benignior est.*³ Again; *Rogatus, ut fidejuberet; si in minorem, summam se obligavit, recte tenetur. Si in majorem, Julianus verius putat, quod a plerisque responsum est, eum, qui majorem summam; quam rogatus erat, fidejussisset, hactenus mandati actionem habere, quatenus rogatus esset; quia id fecisset, quod mandatum ei est; nam usque ad eam summam in quam rogatus erat, fidem ejus spectasse videtur, qui rogavit.*⁴

§ 175. But the mere fact, that the bargain, which is made, will be more beneficial for the principal, will not avail the agent if it be different from the substance of the authority.⁵ Thus, if A authorizes B to purchase a particular house at a certain price, and B purchases another house at a lower price, which is really

¹ 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 618, (4th edit.); 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 5, § 1, pp. 98, 99, (edit. 1818); Just. Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 27, § 8. Mr. Livermore thinks that the same rule prevails in our law; and he puts the case thus: "If I have directed my agent to cause insurance to be effected for me, and he pays a higher premium than that prescribed by the order, the commission will be well executed, the excess being a charge upon him." Ibid. And he cites a case from Valin, Comm. tome 2, liv. 3, tit. 6, *Des Assur.* art. 3, to that effect. Perhaps it may not be quite certain that our law would decide this case in the same way, although the decision is full of equity. It might be difficult to say, that the principal could insist upon his right to adopt the policy, made contrary to his orders, without ratifying it *in toto*. And, on the other hand, it might be difficult to say, that the agent could compel the principal to adopt any indivisible contract of this nature, made contrary to his orders, by a remission of part of the premium. See *Pindley v. Breedlove*, 16 Martin, R. 105. Mr. Chancellor Kent, however, is of opinion, (and his opinion is deservedly of very great authority,) that the decree of the French Court was right, and that the defence was unjust. 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 618, (4th edit.)

² Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 3, § 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 45; 1 Stair, Inst. by Brodie, B. 1, tit. 12, § 9.

³ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 4, and l. 5, § 3, l. 33; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 45, 46; Just. Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 27, § 8; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 5, § 1, pp. 97, 98, (edit. 1818); 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 3, art. 7.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 33; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 46.

⁵ Ante, § 170.

a better house, still A is not bound thereby; for the estate is not that which was authorized to be bought. *Si mandavero tibi, ut domum Sejanam centum emeris, tuque Titianam emeris longè majoris pretii, centum tamen, aut etiam minoris non videris implese mandatum.*¹

§ 176. Upon a broader ground, any deviation from the authority which would defeat the manifest inducements of the principal to make the purchase, would be void, whether the bargain were beneficial or not. Therefore, if an authority is given to purchase a house with an adjoining wharf and store, and the agent should buy the house only, although at an advantageous bargain, the principal would not be bound to take the house, especially if the wharf and store constituted an apparent inducement to the purchase.² So, if an agent were authorized to purchase a certain farm in fee, and he should purchase an interest for life, or for years, or an undivided right or share of one tenant in common therein, the principal would not be bound thereby; for it would be presumed, that the main inducement to the purchase was the purchase of the entirety of the estate and title.³ It would be an abuse of the meaning of the maxim, *Majori summæ minor inest*, to apply it to such cases.⁴ So, if the principal should authorize the agent to purchase a house for him, it would not be a proper execution of the authority to purchase a part of the house only, for, it must be presumed, unless the contrary should appear, that the principal intended the purchase of the whole house, and not of a part only.⁵ But if the whole house were purchased, it would not make any difference as to binding the principal, that it was purchased in parts of the different owners.⁶

§ 177. However, in the case of an authority to purchase a farm, or tract of land, owned and sold in parts, it seems, that

¹ Dig. Lib. 19, tit. 1, l. 5, § 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 43; Pothier on Oblig. n. 78; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 103, (edit. 1818.)

² 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 618, 619, (4th edit.)

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ante, § 172.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 36, § 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 44; Pothier, Traité de Mandat, n. 95; Ante, § 171.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 35, 36, §§ 1, 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 44; Post, § 177.

by the Roman law a purchase of a part would be within the authority, unless there was a plain restriction, that the whole should be purchased or none. At least, so the Digest seems to import; *Quod si fundum, qui per partes venit, emendum tibi mandassem, sed ita, ut non aliter mandato teneat, quam si totum fundum emeret, si totum emere non potueris, in partibus emendis tibi negotium gesseris; sive habueris in eo fundo partem, sive non; et eveniet, ut is, cui tale mandatum datum est, periculo suo interim partes emat; et nisi totum emerit, ingratus, eas retineat.*¹ *Quod si mandassem tibi, ut fundum mihi emeret, non addito eo, ut non aliter mandato teneat, quam si totum emeret; et tu partem, vel quasdam partes ejus emeris; tum habebimus sine dubio invicem mandati actionem, quamvis aliquas partes emere non potuisses.*²

§ 178. The ground of this distinction is not very apparent. But it probably may have rested upon the presumption, that where the house or land is owned and to be sold in parts, the authority ought, in the absence of all controlling restrictions, to be treated as an authority to purchase the parts in severalty, as far as the agent can. In our law, it is most probable, that

¹ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 36, § 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 44; Pothier, *Traité de Mandat*, n. 95; Liverm. on Agency, ch. 5, § 1, pp. 100, 101, (edit. 1818); 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 618, 619, (4th edit.)

² Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 36, § 3; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 44. Mr. Livermore has stated the whole of this doctrine with singular clearness and accuracy, and supposes it to be coincident with our law. "Therefore," says he, "if I have commissioned you to buy for me a certain plantation, and you have bought a part of it only, this purchase, which you have made in my name, will not be obligatory upon me; for this business is of an entire nature; and although I might have a desire to be the owner of the entire plantation, yet its value may be very much lessened, or in my estimation lost, by a division of it. If, however, when I employed you to purchase this plantation, I knew, that it was owned by several tenants in common, who proposed to sell their interests separately, I shall be bound by your contracts if you have purchased the estate of some of the tenants in common, but have not been able to purchase of the others; unless there were an express provision, that I should be obliged only in case of all the estates being purchased. It is the same thing, if the estate, which the agent has obtained, is less than that which he was authorized to purchase. As, if I have given you an authority to purchase for me the estate of J. S. in a certain dwelling-house, of which he has the fee-simple, and you procure me a lease for life, or a term of years; this will not be in pursuance of your authority." 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 5, § 1, pp. 100, 101, (edit. 1818.)

the construction would ordinarily be the other way, unless under peculiar circumstances; as, where the purchaser was already a part-owner of the house or land; and the object might fairly be presumed to be to enlarge his interest in it, by purchasing the shares of the other part-owners, as he might be able, from time to time.

§ 179. Similar considerations would apply to the converse case, where an agent is authorized to sell the land of his principal; for a sale of a part at one time, and a sale of another part at another time, might, in some cases be deemed good, and in others be deemed bad, according to the just presumption of intent, and the consideration, whether a partial sale would be injurious, or not, to the sale of the residue. Thus, for example, if A should, by his will, devise all his lands to be sold, it might be a good execution of the authority, to sell a part at one time, and a part at another.¹ So, if there be a feoffment of different parcels of land, with a letter of attorney to make livery thereof, the attorney may make livery of a part thereof at one time, and for a part thereof at another time.² So, if A should authorize

¹ Comm. Dig. *Attorney*, C. 15; Co. Litt. 113 a.

² Comm. Dig. *Attorney*, C. 15; *Attorney v. Trevellion*, Moore, R. 278, 280. It was held, in *Corlies v. Widdifield*, 6 Cowen, R. 181, that, if a factor has the goods of different principals for sale on credit, he may sell the whole to one purchaser, and take his note, payable to himself, for the aggregate amount, and it will not be a violation of his duty. But that case had some peculiarities in it, affecting the general doctrine so laid down. And it may deserve much consideration, whether uniting in one note the claims of different principals might not materially affect the rights of each. The Court in that very case, seemed to be of opinion, that, at least under some circumstances, the act might have been a violation of duty. See *Jackson v. Baker*, 1 Wash. Cir. R. 395, 415; *Ante*, § 38, note. In *Johnson v. O'Hara*, 5 Leigh, Virg. R. 456, it was proved to be the usage in Petersburg, (Virginia,) for a commission merchant, not only to sell on credit, but to take one note for the goods sold for different persons, payable to himself or order, and that he might procure such note to be discounted in his own name. But in so procuring the note to be discounted, the Court held that he made it his own, and was liable for the proceeds to his principal, although the maker of the note had failed. *Post*, § 204 a, 205. [In the case of *Clarke v. Tappin*, 9 Beavan, R. 284, it is said, that among the most important duties of a factor are those which require him to give to his principal the free and unbiased use of his own discretion and judgment, to keep and render just and true accounts, and to keep the property of his principal unmixed with his own, or the property of other persons.]

his agent to sell all his houses and lands in a particular place, where he owned divers distinct houses and tracts of land in severalty, a sale of one house or tract at one time, and the sale of another house or tract at another, would, or at least might be good. But a sale of an undivided portion of any one house, or tract of land, would hardly be deemed justified by the power, from its apparent tendency to injure the sale of the residue, and to diminish the value of the residue, even to the owner himself.

§ 180. In cases of mercantile sales of personal property, a very liberal construction of the authority would, undoubtedly, be generally, although, perhaps, not universally adopted.¹ Thus, if A should consign a cargo of goods to B for sale; there could be no doubt that B might sell different parcels thereof to different persons, and at different times; and the sales would be held, by implication, fairly within the scope of the authority. This is the known usage of trade; and it would probably be adopted as a just rule of interpretation of the authority, independent of any known usage in the particular place of sale. But, if an agent were authorized to sell a ship, it would, upon grounds of inconvenience, be presumed that a sale of the whole, and not of a part only, was authorized; because the use of the ship for beneficial purposes might, (as has been already intimated,) be greatly embarrassed by a divided ownership.²

§ 181. Where an agent has a general authority to receive payment of a debt, he is ordinarily bound to receive the whole of it in money only; for that is the only way which will enable him completely to discharge his duty to his principal.³ But circumstances may vary this duty. As, for example, if he is a creditor of his principal, and the latter has authorized him to deduct from

¹ Ante, §§ 60, 73, 74, 82.

² See 1 *Livern. on Agency*, ch. 5, § 1, pp. 99, 100, (edit. 1818); Ante, § 171. Mr. Lloyd, in his edition of *Paley on Agency*, has, in his note to pp. 179, 180, (note n.) said, that inquiries as to the due execution of powers on this point, (of doing more or less than the power directs,) "can have little place in mercantile questions, where the act done is, for the most part, indivisible." It is apparent, from what is said in the text, that this remark, in its general latitude, is incorrect, if unfounded.

³ Ante, §§ 98, 103, 109, and note; Post, §§ 215, 413, 429, 430, and note.

the sum received the amount due to himself, it will be sufficient for the agent to receive the balance in cash, which will remain due to the principal after deducting the sum due to himself; and as to the other part of the debt, he may settle it with the debtor as he pleases, provided he gives credit therefor to the principal; since it can make no difference to his principal how it is received, or whether it is ever received by the agent or not.¹

• § 182. Secondly. What is the degree of diligence required of agents, in the proper exercise of their functions? The doctrine, upon this subject, is often laid down in very loose and indeterminate terms. It is often said, that an agent is bound to use the utmost care and diligence in the execution of his trust.² So, in the Roman law, terms equally indeterminate are often used. Thus, it is said, in the Digest, that some contracts make the party liable for deceit only; some both for deceit and neglect. Nothing more than responsibility for deceit is demanded in deposits, and precarious possessions, or possessions at will. Both deceit and neglect are inhibited in mandates, lending for use, custody after sale, taking in pledge, hiring, also in portions, guardianships, and voluntary services.³ Among these some require (even more than ordinary) diligence. *Contractus quidam dolum malum duntaxat recipiunt; quidam, et dolum et culpam. Dolum tantum, depositum et precarium; dolum et culpam, mandatum, commodatum, venditum, pignori acceptum, locatum, item dotis datus, tutela negotia gesta. In his quidam et diligentiam.*⁴ And, again, it is said, after enumerating other contracts; *Sed ubi utriusque utilitas vertitur, ut in empto, ut in locato, ut in dote, ut*

¹ Barker v. Greenwood. ² Younge & Coll. 419, 420; Stewart v. Aberdein, 4 Mees. & Wels. R. 211, 228; Post, § 413, note.

² Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 4, 5; Madeira v. Townsley, 12 Martin, R. 84. Lord Holt, in applying the doctrine to the analogous cases of hiring, says, "That if goods are let out for a reward, the hirer is bound to the utmost diligence, such as the most diligent father of a family uses." Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Lord Raym. 916; Jones on Bailm. 86. And in Buller's Nisi Prius, 72, it is laid down, that "The hirer is to take all imaginable care of the goods delivered for hire." Jones on Bailm. 6; Id. 86. See also 1 Bell, Comm. § 324, pp. 367-370, (4th edit.)

³ Jones on Bailm. 15, 16.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 23. The Florentine copy has *quidem*; the Vulgate editions, *quidam*. Jones on Bailm. 18-20.

*in pignore, ut in societate, et dolus et culpa præstatur.*¹ Upon the true meaning of these passages commentators have been greatly divided.² Even in case of mere gratuitous mandates, the Code is supposed to have required very exact diligence, and to have made the mandatary liable for slight neglect.³ *A procuratore dolum et omnem culpam, non etiam improvisum casum, præstandum esse, juris auctoritate manifeste declaritur.*⁴

§ 183. The true rule undoubtedly is, that as the contract of agency is one for the benefit of both parties, the agent is understood to contract for reasonable skill and ordinary diligence, and he is consequently liable for injuries to his employer, occasioned by the want of reasonable skill, and also for ordinary negligence;⁵ [but not for injuries caused by his mistake in a doubtful matter of law.⁶] By reasonable skill, we are to understand, such as is, and no more than is, ordinarily possessed and employed by persons of common capacity, engaged in the same trade, business, or employment.⁷ By ordinary diligence, we are to understand, that degree of diligence which persons of common prudence are accustomed to use about their own business and affairs.⁸

¹ Dig. Lib. 13, tit. 6, l. 5, § 2.

² Jones on Bailm. 14, 17, 18-29; Ersk. Inst. B. 1, tit. 1, § 21; Id. tit. 3, § 36; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 2, pp. 337, 338, (edit. 1818.)

³ 1 Stair, Inst. B. 1, tit. 12, § 10; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 36; Story on Bailm. § 173; Heinecc. Elem. Jur. Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 14, § 788; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 3, art. 4.

⁴ Cod. Lib. 4, tit. 35, l. 13; Heinecc. Elem. Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, § 233; Heinecc. Elem. Jur. Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 14, § 788.

⁵ Jones on Bailm. 9, 10, 23; Id. 86, 119; Story on Bailm. §§ 23, 455; 1 Bell, Comm. § 389, p. 364; Id. § 411, p. 387, (4th edit.); Molloy, B. 3, ch. 8, § 10; Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 215; Chapman v. Walton, 10 Bing. R. 57; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 331-341, (edit. 1818); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 77, 78; Madeira v. Townsley, 12 Martin, R. 84; Leverick v. Meigs, 1 Cowen, R. 645; Broussard v. Declouet, 18 Martin, R. 260; Lawler v. Keaquick, 1 John. Cas. 174; Savage v. Birkhead, 20 Pick. R. 167.

⁶ Mechanics' Bank v. Merchants' Bank, 6 Metc. 13.

⁷ Story on Bailm. § 431-434; Jones on Bailm. 94, 98, 99; Denew v. Daverell, 3 Camp. R. 451; Learre v. Prentice, 8 East, 348; 1 Stair, Inst. by Brodie, B. 1, tit. 12, § 10, and note; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 2, pp. 337-341, (edit. 1818); Id. 352; Simpson v. Swan, 3 Camp. R. 291; Madeira v. Townsley, 12 Martin, R. 84; Dartnall v. Howard, 4 Barn. & Cressw. 345; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 2, p. 352-354, (edit. 1818); Park v. Hammond, 6 Taunt. R. 495; Cheviot v. Brooks, 1 John. R. 364; Chapman v. Walton, 10 Bing. R. 57.

⁸ Jones on Bailm. 5-7; Id. 121; Story on Bailm. § 11.

184. This seems, also, to have been the rule of the Roman law, where *Culpa* or *Levis Culpa*, is deemed to be equivalent to ordinary neglect, or the want of ordinary diligence.¹ And in regard to skill, although the language of the Roman lawyers is, *Imperitia culpæ adnumeratur; spondet peritiam artis; spondet diligentiam gerendo negotio parem*;² yet, this is to be understood with the proper qualification, that the agent contracts for the reasonable skill belonging to persons in general, engaged in the like business or employment. *In negotio gerendo opus sit diligentia atque industria; et is, qui mandat, diligentiam rei gerendæ convenientem exigere; et qui suscipit mandatum, hoc ipso industriam et diligentiam ad rem exequendam necessariam in se futuram, recipere videtur*;³ which words seem to import no more than reasonable diligence and skill, adequate to the ordinary performance of the task required. In another place it is added: *Nihil enim amplius, quam bonam fidem præstare cum oportet, qui procurat*.⁴ However, the civilians are not agreed upon this point; and therefore, what is here propounded must be deemed open to much doubt and discussion.⁵ The same rule, at least in regard to diligence, prevails in the Scotch law,⁶ in that of France, and, indeed, in all the continental nations of Europe, which derive their jurisprudence from the Roman law.⁷

¹ Jones on Bailm. 21-23; Heinecc. Elem. Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 14, § 788; Id. Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, § 233; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, §§ 36, 37; Pothier, Observ. Générale at the end of his Treatise on Obligations; 1 Pothier, Œuv. (edit. 1781.) 4to. p. 455; Story on Bailm. § 24; 1 Bell. Comm. § 389, p. 364, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 481, 482 (5th edit.)

² Jones on Bailm. 23, note (m); Id. 63, note (w); Id. 99, note (l); Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 132.

³ Vinn. ad Inst. Lib. 4, tit. 27, § 11, n. 2. See Pothier, Traité de Mandat. n. 46, 48; Id. Louage, n. 425; Story on Bailm. § 431-435; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 4, § 8, n. 1, art. 1; Id. B. 1, tit. 15, § 3, art. 4, 5; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8; § 3, pp. 336, 337; Id. 352; 1 Bell. Comm. § 394, pp. 367-370, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 481, 482, (5th edit.)

⁴ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 10, Introductio.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 1, § 21; Id. tit. 3, § 36; 1 Bell. Comm. § 411, p. 387, (4th edit.); Id. § 389, p. 364; Id. pp. 481, 482, (5th edit.)

⁷ Pothier, Oblig. n. 141, 142; Pothier on Oblig. App'x. Observ. Générale; 1 Pothier, Œuv. 455, (2d edit. 4to. 1781); Story on Bailm. §§ 24, 430-435; Jones on Bailm. 30, 31.

§ 185. Whether the proper degree of diligence and skill, which the law requires of agents in performing their duties, has been applied in a particular trade, employment, or business, is for the most part a matter of fact, open for inquiry, and sometimes involving points of great delicacy and difficulty. The general usages of trade, the common habits of the particular business, and the special mode of dealing between the principal and agent, will often explain and expound the duties, required of the agent, as to diligence and skill.¹

• § 186. The case of a factor, employed to make sale of goods on consignment, may furnish a fit illustration of the general doctrine. He is bound not only to good faith, but to reasonable diligence. It is not sufficient, that he has been guilty of no fraud, or of no such gross negligence, as would carry with it the insignia of fraud. He is required to act with reasonable care and prudence in his employment, and to exercise his judgment after proper inquiries and precautions. If he shut his eyes against the light, or sell to a person without inquiry, when ordinary diligence would have enabled him to learn the discredit or insolvency of the party, he will not be discharged from responsibility to his principal. [He is also bound in absence of any special directions as to price, to sell for the fair market value.²] So, also, he will not be permitted to sell his own goods to a purchaser, and take security for the price, and at the same time to sell the goods of his principal to the same party without any security. For, he is bound to exercise at least as much diligence and care, as to his factorage transactions, as he does as to his own private concerns. And, in the supposed case, it would afford ground for presumption that the factor had knowledge of some latent defect of credit, although in the commercial world in general the purchaser stood with a fair character. But this presumption would not ordinarily arise from the mere fact of the factor's taking security for advances made to the same purchaser in money, or even receiving a premium for such advances. He may well refuse to lend his own money without security, or a

¹ Ante, §§ 95 and 96; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 2, p. 336-341, (edit. 1818); Nichols v. House, 2 Louisiana R. 382; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 215-218.

² Bingley v. Walker, 24 Verm. 149.

premium upon grounds altogether distinct from any doubt of the solvency of the party. In order to affect the factor with the imputation of negligence, it is sufficient, if he have notice of facts which ought to put a person of ordinary prudence on his guard. For the same rule prevails here as in equity, that the factor will be held affected with the notice, if the facts be such as ought to have put him upon further inquiry before he sold the goods.¹

§ 187. Another illustration may be derived from the case of insurance brokers, or agents employed to procure insurance. Their duty is to take care that the policy is procured in such a manner, and in such terms, as to cover the contemplated voyage and risks; and they are bound to possess reasonable skill on this subject. So, they are to take care that the underwriters are persons in good credit at the time of the insurance, otherwise, they must bear the loss arising from their insolvency.² But if the underwriters are in good credit at the time, their subsequent insolvency will not make the broker responsible to his employer.³

§ 188. But new cases and new exigencies are perpetually arising, in which it is not easy to say that there is any established general rule; or that, if a general rule is established, it can with propriety govern such new cases, under all their circumstances. Resort must then be had to the general principle of law on the subject, aided by a search into those kindred doctrines, which may furnish analogies to guide or instruct us in arriving at the proper conclusion. It may, however, be generally stated, that where an agent has used reasonable diligence and skill he is not liable for accidents, or losses, or damage, happening without his default, such, for example, as for losses by robbery, by fire, or by other accident, either at sea or on the land.⁴ There are special exceptions; such, for example, as the case of common

¹ *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 8, § 2, p. 354-356, (edit. 1818); *Burrill v. Phillips*, 1 *Gallis. R.* 361; *Molloy, B. 3*, ch. 8, § 5; *Leverick v. Meigs*, 1 *Cowen, R.* 645; *Clarke v. Tipping*, 9 *Beavan, R.* 284.

² *Post*, §§ 191, 218.

³ 1 *Valin, Comm. Lib. 3*, tit. 6, art. 3, p. 33; *Post*, § 191.

⁴ *Paley on Agency*, by *Lloyd*, 4, 5, 15-17; 1 *Domat, B. 1*, tit. 15, § 3, art. 4; *Ersk. Inst. B. 3*, tit. 1, § 21; *Coggs v. Bernard*, 2 *Ld. Raym.* 917; *Story on Bailm.* §§ 23, 25-31; *Jones on Bailm.* 44, 119-122; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 8, § 2, pp. 357, 358, (edit. 1818); *Molloy, B. 3*, ch. 8, § 7.

carriers; and other exceptions may arise, from the particular contract or dealing between the parties, which may enlarge, or narrow the duty and responsibility of the agent.¹ In this last particular our law adopts the rule of the civil law: *Nisi si quid nominatim convenit, vel plus, vel minus, in singulis, contractibus; nam hoc servabitur, quod initio convenit; legem enim contractus dedit.*² However, an agreement, that the agent should not be liable for his own frauds, would be held utterly void, as inconsistent with morals and public policy. *Legem enim contractus dedit; excepto eo, quod Celsus putat, non valere, si convenerit, ne dolus præstetur. Hoc enim bonæ fidei iudicio contrarium est; et itur utimur.*³ *Illud nullâ pactione effici potest, ne dolus præstetur.*⁴

§ 189. It is in this connection, that we are most commonly called upon to consider, when an agent is bound to act upon the instructions of his principal; or, in other words, when he is bound to execute the orders sent or delivered to him. And the doctrine under this head, subject to the qualifications hereinafter stated,⁵ may be reduced to one general principle; which is, that every agent is bound to execute the orders of his principal, whenever, for a valuable consideration, (for we are not treating of mere gratuitous agency,) he has undertaken to perform them.⁶ This duty may arise in various ways; either by express agreement, or by clear implication. The former requires no explanation. The latter may arise either from the common usages of the particular agency; or from the general modes of dealing between the particular parties; or from the natural implications, arising from the nature and objects of a single transaction.

§ 190. The most familiar illustrations of this doctrine will be

¹ Jones on Bailm. 120-122; Story on Bailm. § 25-38; Nicholson v. Willan, 5 East, R. 513; Bridge v. Austin, 4 Mass. R. 114; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 2, pp. 357, 358, (edit. 1818); Post, § 194.

² Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 23; Story on Bailm. §§ 34, 35; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 2, p. 358-360, (edit. 1818.)

³ Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 23.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 2, tit. 14, l. 27, § 23; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 2, p. 360, (edit. 1818.)

⁵ Post, § 194-196.

⁶ Le Guen v. Gouverneur, 1 John. Cas. 437, n.; Bell v. Palmer, 6 Cowen, R. 128; La Farge v. Kneeland, 7 Cowen, R. 456; Allen v. Suydam, 20 Wend. R. 321.

found in the cases, where an agent is called upon by orders to procure insurance for his principal. We have already seen in what cases an agent may, in his discretion, insure for his principal;¹ we are now to consider when he is absolutely bound to insure. And it is now clearly settled, that there are several cases, in which an agent is bound to obey an order to insure. One is, where the agent has expressly contracted to procure insurance.² Another is, where a merchant abroad has effects in the hands of his correspondents here, and he has a right to expect that he will obey an order to insure; because he is entitled to call his money out of the other's hands, when, and in what manner, he pleases. Another is, where the merchant has no effects in the hands of his correspondent: yet, the course of dealing between them has been such, that the one has been used to send orders for insurance, and the other to comply with them; in such a case the former has a right to expect, that his orders for insurance will still be obeyed, unless the latter gives him notice to discontinue that course of dealing.³ Another is, where the merchant abroad sends bills of lading to his correspondent here, and ingrafts on them an order to insure, as the implied condition, on which the bills of lading are to be accepted; in such a case the agent is bound to obey, if he accepts them; for it is one entire transaction.⁴ Another may be added, which is, where the general usage of trade requires the agent to insure. And, here we may remark, that it seems to be the duty of an agent who is ordered or bound to procure insurance, to give notice to his principal, if he is unable to effect it; for, other-

¹ Ante, § 111; *Lucena v. Crawford*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 75; S. C. 5 Bos. & Pull. 269; *De Forrest v. Fulton Ins. Co.* 1 Hall, R. 84, 100-136.

² *Tekel v. Short*, 2 Ves. 239; *Marsh on Insur. B. 1, ch. 8, § 2*, pp. 296, 297.

³ *Ralston v. Barclay*, 6 Mill. Louis. R. 653; *Berthoud v. Gordon*, 6 Mill. Louis. R. 583.

⁴ *Smith v. Lascelles*, 2 T. Rep. 189; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 8, § 1, pp. 323, 325, 326, (edit. 1818); 2 *Molloy*, B. 2, ch. 8, § 9; *Morris v. Summerl.* 2 Wash. Cir. R. 203; S. C. *Marsh. on Insur. by Condly*, note to p. 301; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 18; *Wallace v. Telfair*, 2 T. Rep. 188, note; *Smith on Mere. Law*, 51, (2d edit.); *Id.* ch. 5, p. 91-93, (3d edit. 1843); *D. Tastet v. Crousillat*, 2 Wash. Cir. R. 132; *French v. Reed*, 6 Binn. 308; *Berthoud v. Gordon*, 6 Louis. R. 579; *Marsh. on Insur. B. 1, ch. 8, § 2*, pp. 296, 297; 1 *Phillips on Insur.* ch. 22, p. 519-524.

wise, the principal may be subjected to a loss, which he could have provided against, by procuring insurance to be made elsewhere. If, in any of the foregoing cases, the agent negligently or wilfully omits his duty, he becomes responsible to his principal for all losses sustained by the want of the insurance. And this rule is promulgated by the general sense of foreign maritime writers, as well as by our own law. The rule, being, *Mandato dato de assicurandis mercibus, si non est ad impletum mandatum, tenetur manulatus de casu sinistro*.¹

§ 191. What is the proper exercise of due diligence and skill, in obtaining insurance, is, in some cases, a matter of great nicety and difficulty. On the one hand, an agent who acts *bonâ fide* in effecting an insurance for his principal, using reasonable skill and diligence, is not liable to be called upon because the insurance might possibly have been procured from other persons upon better terms, or to include additional risks, by which the principal might, in the event of loss by those risks, have been indemnified.² On the other hand, an agent, in a like case, is bound to have inserted in the policy all the ordinary risks and chances which are usual and proper, to secure the principal for the contemplated voyage.³ And if he omits to have them inserted, when a reasonable attention to the facts stated in his orders, or the nature of the voyage, or the state of the property, or the objects intended, would have induced other insurance agents, of reasonable skill and diligence, to have had them inserted, he will be liable, in case of any loss, for his negligence.⁴ The same rule will apply, if such an agent negligently or wilfully conceals a material fact, or affirms a false fact, whereby the policy is avoided; for his duty in each case is violated.⁵ So, (as we have

¹ Emerigon Des Assur. Tom. 1, ch. 5, 8, p. 148; Casaregis, Discourses, 1, n. 26.

² Moore v. Morgue, Cowp. R. 479; Comber v. Anderson, 1 Camp. R. 523;

1 Liverm. on Agency, 344-347, (edit. 1818.)

³ Post, §§ 200, 218.

⁴ Post, § 200; Park v. Hammond, 6 Taunt. 495; S. C. 4 Camp. R. 344; Mal-
lough v. Barber, 4 Camp. R. 150; Farren v. Oswell, 3 Camp. R. 359; 1 Liverm.
on Agency, 352, 353, 372-374, (edit. 1818); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 18.

⁵ Mayhew v. Forrester, 5 Taunt. 615. See Wake v. Atty, 4 Taunt. 493;
1 Liverm. on Agency, 335, (edit. 1818); Sellar v. Work, 1 Marsh. on Insur.
B. 1, ch. 8, § 2, p. 300; Id. ch. 11, § 1, p. 466; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd,
257-260.

seen,) it is the duty of an agent, procuring insurance, to ascertain whether the underwriters are in good credit or not, at the time of procuring the policy;¹ and if he negligently omits this duty, and a loss occurs from the insolvency of the underwriters at the time of subscribing the policy, he will be liable to pay it.² So, if an agent has procured a policy, and it remains in his hands, he is bound to apply to the underwriters for payment of it within a reasonable time; and if a loss occurs by his neglect, he will become responsible therefor.³

§ 192. Thirdly. The remarks, which have been already made, naturally conduct us to the next head of inquiry, and that is, what are the incidental acts which the law requires of agents, in the discharge of their duties and obligations? And here, in the first place, it may be stated to be the primary obligation of an agent, whose authority is limited by instructions, to adhere faithfully to those instructions, in all cases to which they ought properly to be applied.⁴ If he unnecessarily exceeds his commission, or risks the property of his principal, he thereby renders himself responsible to his principal for all losses and damage, which are the natural consequences of his act. And it will constitute no defence for him, that he intended the act to be a benefit to the principal.⁵ [Thus, where the principal directed his agent to remit him \$300 in bills of \$50 or \$100 each, and the agent sent the amount in bills of \$5, \$10 and \$20, which never reached the principal, the agent was held to have deviated

¹ Ante, § 187; Post, § 218.

² 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 354. (edit. 1818;) *Valin. Comm.* Tom. 1 Liv. 3, tit. 6, art. 3, pp. 32, 33; Ante, § 187.

³ 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 459-466, (edit. 1818); *Smith on Merc. Law*, 198. (2d edit.): *Id.* B. 3, ch. 4, § 1, p. 322, (3d edit. 1843); *Power v. Butcher*, 10 *Barn. & Cressw.* 329; Ante, §§ 58, 103, 109, note.

⁴ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, p. 3; *Id.* 28; *Rundle v. Moore*, 3 *John. Cas.* 36; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 8, § 2, p. 341-338, (edit. 1818:) *Idem.* p. 368-374, (edit. 1818); 3 *Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* ch. 3, pp. 215, 216, 220; *Malynes, Lex. Merc.* ch. 16, p. 81; *Blot v. Boiceau*, 1 *Sandford, Superior Court R.* (N. Y.) 111; *Marfield v. Douglas*, *Ibid.* 361; *Wilson v. Wilson*, 26 *Penn. St. R.* 394; *Johnson v. New York Central Railroad*, 31 *Barbour*, 198.

⁵ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 3, 9, 10, 25, 26; 3 *Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* ch. 3, pp. 215, 218; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 8, § 2, p. 368-374, (edit. 1818); 1 *Beawes, Lex. Merc.* 44, 46; *Ure v. Currell*, 16 *Martin, R.* 502; *Manella v. Barry*, 3 *Cranch*, 415; Post, § 199.

from his instructions, and to be liable for the loss.¹] Indeed, in all such cases, the question is not whether the party has acted from

[¹ *Wilson v. Wilson*, 26 Penn. St. R. 394. Lewis, C. J. said: "The primary obligation of an agent, whose authority is limited by instructions, is to adhere faithfully to those instructions, in all cases to which they ought properly to apply. Story on Agency, § 192. He is in general bound to obey the orders of his principal *exactly*, if they be imperative and not discretionary; and, in order to make it the duty of a factor to obey an order, it is not necessary that it should be given in the form of a command. The expression of a wish by the consignor may fairly be presumed to be an order. Story on Contracts, § 359; *Brown v. McGran*, 14 Peters, 494. It is true that instructions may be disregarded in cases of extreme necessity arising from unforeseen emergencies, or if performance becomes impossible, or if they require a breach of law or morals. Story on Agency, § 194. These are, however, exceptional cases. There may, perhaps, be others which have been sanctioned by adjudications, founded on the principle that the departure complained of was not material. But the general rule is as indicated in what has been said, and the case before the Court is not brought within any of the exceptions. To justify a departure from instructions, where a loss has resulted from such deviation, the case must be brought within some of the recognized exceptions. It is not sufficient that the deviation was not material if it appear that the party giving the instructions regarded them as material, unless it be shown affirmatively that the deviation in no manner contributed to the loss. This may be a difficult task, in a case like the present; but the defendant voluntarily assumed it when he substituted his own plan for that prescribed by the plaintiff. To force a man to perform an executory contract after substituting for the consideration other terms than those provided for in the bargain, is to deprive him of the right to manage his own business in his own way. To do this on the ground that the departure is not material, when it is manifest that the party considered it otherwise, is a violation of private right, which leads to uncertainty and litigation without necessity or excuse. In *Nesbit v. Burry*, 1 Casey, 210, this Court refused to compel a man to give up his oxen although he had sold them and received part of the purchase-money, because it was a part of the contract that they were sold by weight, and the weight was to be ascertained by 'the scales at Mount Jackson.' The scales designated were so out of repair that the weight could not be ascertained by them, and it was held that no others could be substituted against his consent so as to divest his right of property. Whether an action for damages could have been sustained was not the question there, nor is it the question here. As between vendor and vendee, the right of property and the consequent risk vests on delivery of the goods purchased to the designated carrier, packed, and directed according to usage or instructions. But if a different method of packing and directing, or a different carrier than the one designated, be adopted by the vendor, he assumes the risk in case of loss, unless it be shown that his deviation in no way contributed to the loss. Where the goods are stolen, how can this be shown? In sending bank-notes by mail, it is manifest that while a large package would attract the

good motives and without fraud, but whether he has done his duty, and acted according to the confidence reposed in him; for the rule is: *Grave est fidem fallere*; ¹ *Fides servanda est*; *Simplicitas juris gentium praevalat*.² On the other hand, if, by the violation of his instructions, he obtains a profit or advantage, he is not allowed to retain it; but the principal is entitled to the full benefit of it.³ So, an agent, by his misconduct, must bear the whole risk of failure and loss, and is not entitled to any indemnity for his unauthorized act or speculation.⁴ The law never holds out a premium for any violation of duty. What will be the effect of a subsequent ratification by the principal, will come under review in our subsequent pages.⁵

§ 193. In regard to instructions, there are two qualifications, which are naturally, and perhaps necessarily, implied in every case of mercantile agency. The first is, that they are applicable only to the ordinary course of things: and the agent will be justified, in cases of extreme necessity and unforeseen emergency, in deviating from them.⁶ Thus, for example, if goods are perishable and perishing, the agent may deviate from his instructions, as to the time, or price, at which they are to be sold.⁷ So, if they are accidentally injured, and must be sold

attention and care of honest agents on the route, it might tempt the cupidity of dishonest ones. The party who proposes to take the risk of this method or remittance has a right to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the various methods of enclosing the notes; and if he directs the money to be remitted in notes of \$100 or \$50, the debtor has no right to increase the size of the package by remitting in notes of \$10 and \$5. There was error in permitting the jury to find that the departure from instructions was immaterial.”]

¹ Dig. Lib. 13, tit. 5, Introit.

² 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 1, p. 323, (edit. 1818); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 9, 10; Manella v. Barry, 3 Cranch, R. 415.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 51; Malync, Lex. Mer. 82; Massey v. Davies, 2 Ves. jr. 317; Beaumont v. Boulton, 7 Ves. 608, 617; Post, §§ 207, 214, 340.

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 3, 4; Id. 49-51; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, pp. 216, 218, 221; Williams v. Littlefield, 12 Wend. R. 362.

⁵ Post, § 239-260, 439, 445.

⁶ Ante, §§ 85, 118, 141; Post, § 237; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 2, p. 368-370, (edit. 1818); 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, p. 218; Duns v. Perit, 4 Binn. R. 361.

⁷ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, p. 218; Anor. 2 Mod. R. 100; Story on Bailm. § 455; Ante, §§ 85, 118, 141; Post, § 237; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 368, 369, (edit. 1818.)

to prevent further loss. So, if they are in imminent peril of being lost by the capture of the port, they may for safety, in a case of necessity, and not otherwise, be transported to another port.¹ [Where the instructions of an American owner of flour to his factor at Liverpool were to withhold it from sale until an expected act of Parliament had produced its results upon the market, the latter is not chargeable with a breach of instructions in selling prematurely, if he wait a considerable time after the passage of the act and then sell in good faith and with reasonable prudence. Under such instructions, the factor has a discretion, after the market has remained a considerable time under the influence of the new law, to judge whether the measure has produced its full effect upon the market; and he is not liable for an error in judgment in that respect.²]

§ 194. It is a proper corollary from this principle, that any unavoidable calamity, or overwhelming force or accident, without any default of the agent, will excuse him from a strict performance of the duties of his agency; for all such cases are deemed exceptions to the general rule.³ *A fortiori*, if the strict performance becomes impossible, without any default of the agent, he is excused.⁴ The Roman law was even more indulgent in cases of mandataries, excusing them for non-performance in cases of sickness; or of capital enmities; or of an action becoming fruitless against the principal (as where he had directed goods to be purchased, and became insolvent); and for other causes deemed just. *Sane, si valetudinis adversæ, vel capitalium inimicitiarum, seu ob inanes rei actiones, seu ob aliam, justam causam, excusationes allegat; audiendus est.*⁵

§ 195: The second qualification is, that, if the instructions require the agent to do an illegal or immoral act, he may violate his instructions with impunity; for the law will not tolerate either party in violating any moral or legal duties.⁶ *Rei turpis*

¹ See *Catlin v. Bell*, 4 Camp. R. 183.

² *Milbank v. Dennistoun*, 21 N. Y. Rep. (1860); 1 Bosworth.

³ Ante, §§ 85, 118, 141; Post, §§ 200, 208, 237; *Wilson v. Wilson*, 26 Penn. St. R. 394.

⁴ 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 8, § 1, pp. 310, 311; *Id.* 328, 357, 358, (edit. 1818); *Smith v. Calogan*, 2 T. Rep. 188 n.; Ante, §§ 85, 118, 141, 188; Post, § 237.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 23-25; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 80.

⁶ *Catlin v. Bell*, 4 Camp. R. 183; *Bexwell v. Christie*, Cowd. R. 395; *Paley*

*nullum mandatum est ; et ideo hac actione non agetur.*¹ *Illud quoque mandatum non est obligatorium, quod contra bonos mores est. Velyti, si Titius de furto, aut de damno faciendo, aut de injuria facienda, mandat tibi ; licet enim pœnam istius facti nomine præstiteris, non tamen ullum habes adversus Titium actionem.*² *Pacta, quæ contra leges constitutionesque, vel contra bonos mores sunt, nullum vim habere, indubitati juris est,* is the strong language of the Roman law ;³ and it is more strongly dictated by the sound morals inculcated by Christianity.⁴ Thus, for example, if goods are bought or sold by an agent, to be smuggled in violation of the laws of the country, no recovery or account can be had by either party of the same ; for the law, in such a case, refuses to interfere on either side, upon the principle, *Ex turpi causa non oritur actio.*⁵ And where the fault is mutual, the law will leave the case, as it finds it ; *In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.*⁶ So, if a person is employed, and money is advanced to him for the purchase of libellous books, or indecent pictures, he will not be compelled to account. And, on the other hand, if he has advanced the money for such immoral purposes, at the request of his employer, he cannot recover these advances, or compel the employer to take the books, or the pictures, and to pay for them.⁷ Nay, the principle is carried further : and if the main object, for which the agent is employed, is legal ; yet if, by the terms of the contract, and as a part of it, the agent is to act in an illegal character or manner in another part of the transaction, the whole contract will be contaminated thereby ; and the agent can recover no compensation even for his legal acts under

on Agency, by Lloyd, 8, 25, 26 ; Webster v. De Tastet, 7 T. R. 157 ; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 216.

¹ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 6, § 3.

² Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 27, § 7.

³ Cod. Lib. 2, tit. 3, l. 1 ; Story on Conflict of Laws, § 245.

⁴ 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 1, § 2, p. 14-16, (edit. 1818) ; Holman v. Johnson, Cowper, R. 343 ; 1 Story on Equity Jurisp. § 296 ; Story on Conflict of Laws, § 244-260.

⁵ 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 14, 15, (edit. 1818) ; Holman v. Johnson, Cowper, R. 343 ; Story on Conflict of Laws, § 244-258 ; Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. R. 258, 260.

⁶ 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 19, 20, (edit. 1818.)

⁷ Ibid.

the contract. Neither can the principal enforce any of its obligations.¹

§ 196. This doctrine is founded in the principles of eternal justice; and it is greatly to be lamented, that it has not been followed out in our intercourse with foreign nations, to the extent of refusing to interfere in contracts, even between our own citizens, which are made in violation of the laws of trade and the public policy of foreign nations. Pothier, with the deep feelings of a moralist and universal jurist, has inculcated and enforced, in a persuasive manner, this enlarged doctrine.² But the general practice of nations is the other way; and that practice is sustained by the common law, as well as by the authority of Valin and Emerigon.³

§ 197. However; it will not be presumed, that an agent is authorized to violate the laws of a foreign country, (as, for example, by smuggling); and, therefore, either an express authority must be shown, or an implied authority from the known habits of the particular trade, or the general dealings between the parties in similar enterprises.⁴ We hope that the time may arrive, when the general cultivation of international law, enlightened and reformed by Christian morals, will introduce a better system, which shall declare, that the common interests of all nations are best promoted by a steady support of all the municipal laws of each, which are not inconsistent with justice, rational liberty, and liberal intercourse.

§ 198. In regard to instructions, they must often leave much to the discretion of the agent; and, under such circumstances, his proper duty must be ascertained by the considerations already mentioned, as well as by those, which will be hereinafter stated.⁵

¹ 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 1, § 2, p. 19-21, (edit. 1818); Story on Conflict of Laws, (246-248); The Vanguard, 6 Rob. 207.

² Pothier v. d'Assur. n. 58, and note of Estrangin. ad locum, (edit. 1810,) pp. 86, 89.

³ 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 1, § 2, p. 15-19, (edit. 1818); Story on Conflict of Laws, §§ 245, 246, 257; 1 Emerig. d'Assur. ch. 8, § 5, pp. 212, 215; edit. by Boulay Paty, p. 215-218; 2 Valin, Comm. art. 49, p. 127; 1 Marsh. on Insur. ch. 3, § 1, p. 59-61; Planche v. Fletcher, Doug. R. 251, 254; 1 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 83, 84.

⁴ 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 2, p. 361-368, (edit. 1818); *Wellman v. Nutting, 4 Mass. R. 434; Molloy, B. 3, ch. 8, § 6.

⁵ Anfré, §§ 189, 192, 199, 237.

Thus, (to suggest a rule in a general form,) where an agent has general orders to dispose of goods for his principal to the best advantage, (a very common mode of expression to be found in written orders,) he is bound to execute them with that degree of diligence and skill, which prudent men usually exercise in similar affairs;¹ and, consequently, he may dispose of the goods according to the best terms, which can be obtained at the time; and if he does so, his principal will be bound thereby, although the sale may turn out in the event to be disadvantageous.² And sometimes even a literal deviation from the terms of the orders may be excused, and the act bind the owner, if the conditions and objects of the order are substantially obtained, without any increase of expense or risk to the principal. Thus, if an agent should exceed the limited price in a purchase of goods in a small degree, and yet he should be able to effect an equal saving in some other part of the same business, such as in the expense of shipping them, he would, at least in equity, be deemed excused, and the principal be bound.³

§ 199. In the next place, it may be laid down as a general rule, in the absence of instructions, that if there be a known usage of trade, or a mode of transacting business, applicable to the particular agency, or analogous to it, in such a case it will be the duty of the agent to conform to it; and any departure from it, not required by necessity, will be at the peril of the agent, and involve him in full responsibility for any loss occasioned thereby.⁴ This is not an arbitrary doctrine, but it is founded upon an implied authority on one side, involving an implied confidence and obligation on the other side.⁵ We have already seen, that if an agent acts according to the customary mode of business, and settled usages of trade, he will be pro-

¹ *Kingston v. Kincaid*, 1 Wash. Cir. R. 453; *Ante*, §§ 182, 183.

² *3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* ch. 3, pp. 217, 218; *2 Molloy*, B. 3. ch. 8, §§ 2, 5; *Malyna*, *Lex. Merc.* ch. 16, p. 81-83; *Evans v. Potter*, 2 *Gallis. R.* 13; *Burrill v. Phillipps*, 1 *Gallis. R.* 360.

³ *Cornwall v. Wilson*, 1 *Ves.* 510; *3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* ch. 3, p. 219, note (1); *Smith on Merc. Law*, 53, 54, (2d edit.); *Id.* ch. 5, § 2, p. 99, (3d edit. 1843); *Ante*, § 85.

⁴ *3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* 215, 216; *Ante*, §§ 85, 96, 118, 141, 185, 194; *Post*, §§ 208, 237.

⁵ *Ante*, §§ 60, 73, 77.

ted, although a loss should, without his default, happen thereby, because his authority embraces, by implication, that extent.¹ And it is equally true, that the agent impliedly agrees to act according to such modes of business and usages of trade, and that he is trusted, in the confidence that he will not violate them.² It will not, therefore, as we have seen, constitute any defence to the agent, that he intended a benefit to his employer, if he acted in violation of his duty.³ And, on the other hand, even the usage of trade may not, under all circumstances, excuse an agent for acting in conformity to it, if, by following it, he knowingly and advisedly and wilfully does an injury to his employer thereby; for the very notion of an usage is, that it is to be a guide to his judgment and discretion in common cases, when it is presumed not necessarily to work a sacrifice of the interests of the employer.⁴

§ 200. Illustrations might be easily multiplied, to establish this doctrine in its various aspects. Thus, for example, if a agent, intrusted with the sale of goods, should negligently allow them to remain in an improper place of deposit, contrary to the usual habits of the business, and the goods should be destroyed by fire, he would be responsible for the loss, although the fire arose from an accidental cause; for the loss, although not in a strict sense immediately caused by his negligence, may fairly be attributed to it.⁵ So, if an agent should, improperly and con-

¹ Ante, §§ 96, 185; 1 Gallis. R. 360; *Reano v. Mager*, 11 Martin, R. 636.

² Ibid. We have already seen, that if the construction of the terms of written instructions be doubtful, and the agent has acted in good faith under a mistaken interpretation of their purport, he will not be responsible to his principal for damages or losses occasioned thereby. And, in cases of doubt, the rule is, that the words are to be construed most strongly against the principal. Ante, 74-76, 82. See also *Vianna v. Barclay*, 3 Cowen, R. 281; *Mackbeath v. Haldimand*, 1 T. R. 182, per Buller, J.; *Lucas v. Groning*, 7 Taunt. R. 164; *Morrell v. Frith*, 3 Mees. & Wels. 402.

³ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, pp. 215, 216, 218; Ante, § 192.

⁴ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, pp. 215, 216, 218, note (1.) See *Sadock v. Burton*, Yelv. R. 202; *Malynes*, Lex Merc. 83; *Rex v. Lee*, 12 Mod. 514; 2 *Molloy*, B. 3, ch. 8, § 5; *Malynes*, Lex Merc. ch. 16, pp. 81, 83.

⁵ Post, § 218; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 10; *Caffrey v. Darby*, 6 Ves. 496. This is one of the cases, in which the maxim, *Causa proxima non remota, spectatur*, does not apply, although it is not perhaps easy to state the exact grounds of the distinction. The loss is not, indeed, directly caused by the negligence;

trary to his known duty, or the habits of business, deposit the money of his principal in his own name, and on his own account, with a banker, who should fail, the agent would be responsible to his principal for the money lost by the failure.¹ So, if an agent, authorized to procure insurance for his principal, should, by his negligence, omit to have inserted in the policy the common and usual clauses in the like policies, and a loss should occur, which would have been covered by such clauses, the agent would be responsible for the loss.² So, if an agent should sell goods on credit, when there was no usage of trade to justify it; or if he should sell on a longer credit than the usage should justify; or if he should omit to demand payment, when the credit had expired; or if he should sell to persons of doubtful credit, or actually insolvent; in all such cases, he would be personally responsible for the loss to his principal.³ So, if he should give time for payment after the money became due, or should omit to use the common diligence to collect it, the loss would be his own.⁴ So, if an agent, authorized to purchase goods, should

but the latter may properly be said to be the occasion of it. See *Davis v. Garrett*, 6 Bing. R. 716. The case of a policy-agent stands on a similar ground; for the loss cannot be correctly said to be immediately caused by his neglect, as it may be directly attributable to the peril of the sea. See *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 15-17. In *Caffrey v. Darby*, 6 Ves. 496, the Master of the Rolls, in his judgment speaking of loss, where there had been negligence by trustees, said: "If they have already been guilty of negligence, they must be responsible for any loss in any way to that property; for, whatever may be the immediate cause, the property would not have been in a situation to sustain that loss, if it had not been for the negligence." See *ante*, § 192.

¹ *Massey v. Banner*, 1 Jack. & Walk. 245, 248; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, p. 215; *Wren v. Kirton*, 11 Ves. 378; Post, §§ 203, 208, 218.

² *Ante*, § 191; *Mallough v. Barber*, 4 Camp. R. 150. See also *Comber v. Anderson*, 1 Camp. R. 523; *Park v. Hammond*, 4 Camp. R. 344; S. C. 6 Taunt. R. 495; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 8, § 1, p. 341-354, (edit. 1818); *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 18-21.

³ *Ante*, §§ 60, 109, 209, 220; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 8, § 2, p. 368, (edit. 1818); *Id.* 354; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 26, 27; *Molloy, B.* 3, ch. 8, § 3; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 205, 206, 216, 218; *Littlejohn v. Ramsay*, 16 Martin, R. 655; *Gilly v. Logan*, 14 Martin, R. 196; *Hosmer v. Beebe*, 14 Martin, R. 363; *Richardson v. Weston*, 16 Martin, R. 244; *Leverick v. Meigs*, 1 Cowen, R. 645; *Forrester v. Boardman*, 1 Story, R. 43.

⁴ *Caffrey v. Darby*, 6 Ves. 494, 495; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 39, 40; *Malyne, Lex Merc.* ch. 16, pp. 81, 82; *Childs v. Corp.*, 1 Paine, R. 286.

deviate from his orders as to price, quality, or kind, or otherwise, the principal would not be bound.¹ [And if an attorney at law undertakes the collection of a debt, and by gross negligence, puts it in such a situation as to embarrass the creditor in obtaining payment, and to render the debt less valuable, he is liable to his employer.²]

§ 201. The employment of sub-agents or substitutes is often expressly provided for in letters of attorney, and other formal instruments. In such cases it is clear, that the original attorney or agent will not be liable for the acts or omissions of the substitute, appointed or employed by him, unless, indeed, in the appointment or substitution he is guilty of fraud, or gross negligence, or improperly coöperates in the acts or omissions.³ In many other cases a similar authority arises, by implication, from the conduct of the parties, or from the usage of trade. Thus, for example, it is very common, in certain classes of business, to employ a sub-agent to transact the business of the agency; such as the employment of a broker to buy or sell goods.⁴ In all cases of this sort, the agent will not ordinarily be responsible for the negligence or misconduct of the sub-agent, if the employment of the sub-agent is authorized by the principal either expressly or impliedly, by the usage of trade, or the usual dealings between himself and his principal, and he has used reasonable diligence in his choice as to the skill and ability of the sub-agent.⁵ The same rule will apply, where the employment, although not so authorized, arises from unforeseen exigencies or emergencies, imposing upon the agent the necessity of employing a sub-

¹ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, pp. 218, 219; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 2, p. 368, (edit. 1818.)

² Wilson v. Coffin, 2 Cush. 316.

³ Foster v. Preston, 8 Cowen, R. 198; Taber v. Perrott, 2 Gallis. R. 565; Post, §§ 217 a, 232, 333.

⁴ Ante, §§ 14, 15; Post, 217.

⁵ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 17, 20; Goswell v. Dunkley, 1 Str. R. 680; Cochran v. Irlam, 2 M. & Selw. 301, note; Commercial Bank of New Orleans v. Martin, 1 Louisiana Annual R. 344; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 18. See, also, as to who is to be deemed the principal, and who the agent, and who the sub-agent. Rapson v. Cubitt, 9 Mees. & Welsb. 710; Quarman v. Burnett, 6 Mees. & Welsb. R. 499; Milligan v. Wedge, 12 Adolph. & Ellis, R. 737; Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mees. & Welsb. R. 109, 111; Post, §§ 453 a, 453 b, 453 c, 454 a; Story on Bailments, § 403 a.

agent.¹ But the sub-agent will, under such circumstances, be himself directly responsible to the principal for his own negligence or misconduct; for wherever any such express or implied authority to appoint a sub-agent is allowed or given by the principal, a privity is created between them.² Under other circumstances, as no privity would exist between them, the sub-agent would be directly responsible only to his immediate employer, the original agent.³ If, therefore, the agent has actually become responsible to the principal, by the negligence or misconduct of his own sub-agent, and has been compelled to pay damages therefor to the principal, he may recover all that he has been thus compelled to pay, from the sub-agent.⁴ We shall hereafter see, that an agent may also, by his own conduct, sometimes render himself responsible for the acts of his sub-agent, and become, in effect, a guarantor for him, and incur an absolute responsibility to his principal for money received by his sub-agent.⁵

* § 202. On the other hand, where the agent has given only the usual credit, or has conducted himself according to the usual course of business, and has employed the usual diligence in his agency, he will not be responsible for any loss occasioned by the subsequent insolvency or fraud of the persons whom he has trusted, or to whom he has sold the property, if, at the time of

¹ *Bromley v. Coxwell*, 2 Bos. & Pull. 438; *Goswell v. Dunkley*, 1 Str. R. 680; *Callin v. Bell*, 4 Camp. R. 183; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 17; *Ante*, §§ 85, 118, 141.

² *Ibid.*; *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 2, § 1, p. 56-59; *Id.* p. 64-67, (edit. 1818.) But see *Lockwood v. Abdy*, 9 Jurist, 1845, p. 267.

³ *Cleaves v. Stockwell*, 33 Maine, 341; *Cobb v. Beeke*, 6 Q. B. 930; *Robbins v. Fennell*, 11 Q. B. 248; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 5, 16, 17, 32, 79; *Id.* pp. 396, 397. See *Bromley v. Coxwell*, 2 Bos. & Pull. 438; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 2, § 4, p. 56-59, *Id.* 64, 65, 67, (edit. 1818); *Post*, §§ 203, note, 217 a, 308; *Cochran v. Irlam*, 2 M. & Selw. 301, n. The text contains what I cannot but deem the true doctrine on this point. But there is something in the circumstances of the case of *Bromley v. Coxwell*, 2 Bos. & Pull. 438, which may, perhaps, create a doubt in some minds. See also Lord North's case, *Dyer*, R. 161; *Solly v. Rathbone*, 2 M. & Selw. 298; *Cull v. Backhouse*, cited 6 Taunt. R. 148; *Schmalzing v. Tomlinson*, 6 Taunt. 147; *Lane v. Cotton*, 12 Mod. R. 488; 1 Black. Comm. 90. * See *Lockwood v. Abdy*, 9 Jurist, (1845.) p. 267.

⁴ *Mainwaring v. Brandon*, 8 Taunt. R. 202, 204, 205; *Post*, § 308.

⁵ *Taber v. Perrott*, 2 Gallis. R. 565; *Post*, § 231 a.

the sale, they were in good credit.¹ So, if payment is received in the usual manner of conducting the like business transactions, as by receiving a check on a bank from a person in good credit, who should become insolvent, before the check could be duly presented; or, by receiving the common currency of the country, which should afterwards become depreciated; in each of these cases the loss would be the loss of the principal, and not that of the agent.² So, if an agent, who is authorized to purchase goods, uses reasonable diligence in the choice and purchase of them, and afterwards they are found to be, or should become, damaged without his default, the loss must be borne by the principal.³ So, if the goods of the principal are deposited for safety in a proper place, according to the usage of trade, and they are there destroyed by fire or other casualty, the agent is discharged.⁴ So, if the money of the principal is deposited in his name in the hands of a banker of good credit, and such a deposit is according to the common usage of the place, or of that business, the agent will not be responsible for any loss arising from the failure of the banker.⁵ And this is in conformity to the rule of the Roman law. *Si res pupillaris incurso latronum pereat, vel argentarius, cui tutor pecuniam dedit, cum fuisset celeberrimus, solidum reddere non possit; nihil eo nomine tutor præstare cogitur.*⁶

§ 203. In the next place, it is the duty of an agent, where the business in which he is employed admits of it, or requires it, to keep regular accounts of all his transactions on behalf of his

¹ Ante, §§ 187, 191; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 9, 26, 27, 45-47; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 204, 205, 215, 218; Scott v. Surman, Willes, R. 406, 407; Smith on Mercantile Law, p. 99, (3d edit. 1843.)

² Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 9, 27, 28; Molloy, B. 3, ch. 8, § 7; Russell v. Hankey, 6 T. R. 12; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 2, p. 356, (edit. 1818); Ante, §§ 98, 103, 109 and note, 181.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 32 and note (2); Mainwaring v. Brandon, 8 Taunt. 202.

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 17; Goswell v. Dunkley, 1 Str. R. 680, 681. See Bromley v. Coxwell, 2 Bos. & Pull. 438; Ante, § 194.

⁵ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 45, 46; Knight v. Ld. Plymouth, 3 Atk. 480; Ex parte Parsons, Ambler, R. 219; Ante, § 200; Post, 208; Hammon v. Cottle, 6 Serg. & Rawle, R. 290.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 26, tit. 7, l. 50.

principal, not only of his payments and disbursements, but also of his receipts; and to render such accounts to his principal at all reasonable times, without any suppression, concealment, or overcharge.¹ The Roman law, in the like manner, required mandataries and agents to render an account of their doings to their principals, and to pay over to them all the property and proceeds in their hands. *Procurator, ut in ceteris quoque negotiis gerendis, ita et in litibus, ex bonâ fide rationem reddere debet. Itaque, quod ex lite consecutus erit, sive principaliter ipsius rei nomine, sive extrinsecus ob eam rem, debet mandati judicio restituere.*²

§ 204. This duty is strictly enforced in Courts of Equity; and if, by the neglect or omission of this duty, the principal suffers a loss, that loss must be ultimately borne by the agent. When an agent omits to render his account of sales, when reasonably required after the sales are made, he will be presumed to have received the money, and will be accountable therefor; and, in all cases of unreasonable delay, he is generally charged with interest, whether he has made interest or not.³ But this is properly applicable only to cases where there has been no credit, or the credit has expired; for the agent is not in any default for not paying over the money, until he has received it.⁴

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 48, 49. *White v. Lady Lincoln*, 8 Ves. 369, 370; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, p. 219. *Smith on Merc. Law*, 47-49, (2d edit.); *Id.* pp. 94, 95, (3d edit. 1843); *Chedworth v. Edwards*, 8 Ves. 49; *Eaton v. Welton*, 32 N. H. R. 352; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 8, § 7, p. 434-436; 1 *Story on Eq. Jurisp.* §§ 468, 623. A sub-agent, employed by an agent, is, in general, only accountable to the agent, and not to the principal; for there is no privity between them. *Ante*, § 201; *Post*, § 217; *Cartwright v. Hateley*, 1 Ves. jr. 292; *Pinto v. Santos*, 5 Taunt. 417; *Stephens v. Badcock*, 3 Barn. & Adolph. 354; *Myler v. Fitzpatrick*, 6 Madd. R. 360.

² *Dig. Lib.* 3, tit. 3, l. 46, § 4; *Pothier, Pand. Lib.* 3, tit. 3, n. 55; 1 *Domat*, B. 1. tit. 15, § 3, art. 8.

³ 3 *Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* ch. 3, p. 220; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 49, 50; *Dodge v. Perkins*, 9 Pick. R. 368; — *v. Jolland*, 8 Ves. 72. See *Reid v. Van Rensselaer Glass Factory*, 3 Cowen, R. 393; *S. C.* 5 Cowen, R. 587. See also *Mr. Cowen's note to 3 Cowen, R. 87*; *Pope v. Barrat*, 1 Mason, R. 117; *Smith's Compendium of Merc. Law*, pp. 94, 95, (3d edit. 1843).

⁴ See 3 *Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* ch. 3, p. 220; *Bird's Syndic v. Dix's Estate*, 16 Martin, R. 254; *Treverick v. Meigs*, 1 Cowen, R. 645. In *Varden v. Parker*, 2 Esp. Rep. 710, Mr. Justice Buller seems to have thought, that if part of the purchase-money only had been received by the agent, the principal could

§ 204 *a*. In the next place, it would seem in general to be the duty of an agent, employed to sell the goods of different persons, such, for example, as a factor, to keep distinct accounts of the sales made for each of them; and, if he should sell on credit and take notes for the payment, to take separate notes for the amount due to each principal; for otherwise the rights of each might be essentially changed in case of a failure of due payment, and a difficulty might arise in ascertaining the exact amount of property of each in the respective notes so taken.¹ Without doubt, the usage of trade, or the mode of dealing between the parties, may vary the application of this rule; but it seems in itself equally convenient and equitable, as applied to ordinary cases.²

§ 205. So, it is, in many cases, the duty of an agent to keep the property of his principal separate from his own, and not to mix it with the latter; and if he does not keep it separate from his own, in cases where it is properly his duty, and afterwards he is unable to distinguish between the one and the other, the whole will, as a sort of penalty for his negligence, be adjudged to belong to his principal.³ It is also the duty of an agent, in some cases, to invest the money of his principal, which comes to his hands, so as to yield an interest; in other cases, it is equally his duty to abstain from making any investment. If, in either case, he should violate his proper duty, he would become responsible to his principal. As, for example, if he has omitted to invest, in the former case, he will be made responsible

not recover that until the whole transaction was closed, unless the rest was not received by the default of the agent. The doctrine does not seem to have been called for by the facts of the case, and therefore will deserve further consideration. See 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, p. 220; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 39, 40, and note (a.)

¹ Ante, § 179, note; *Clark v. Tipping*, 9 Beavan, R. 284.

² See ante, 179, note, *Corlies v. Widdifield*, 6 Cowen, R. 181; *Jackson v. Baker*, 1 Wash. Cir. R. 395, 415; *Johnson v. O'Hara*, 5 Leigh, Virg. R. 456.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 48, 49, 51; *Wren v. Kirton*, 11 Ves. 377, 382; *Fletcher v. Walker*, 3 Madd. R. 73; *Lupton v. White*, 15 Ves. 432, *Greene v. Haskell*, 5 Rhode I. land, 447; 1 Beawes, *Lex Merc. Factors*, pp. 44, 46; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, pp. 215, 220; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 48-50, (2d edit.); *Id.* ch. 5, § 2, pp. 97, 96, (3d edit. 1843); *Chedworth v. Edwards*, 8 Ves. 49, 50; 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. §§ 468, 623; *Ersk. Inst. B.* 3, tit. 3, § 34; Ante, 179, n., 204 *a*.

for interest; in the latter case, the principal will be at liberty to reject the investment, and to hold the loss, if any, on the investment, to be the loss of the agent.¹ The duty of investing is sometimes dependent upon the general usage of trade; sometimes upon the particular course of business between the parties; and sometimes upon what may be deemed the law of particular tribunals.²

§ 206. In many cases, also, agents become depositaries or stake-holders of property, as well as agents; and in such cases, the ordinary duties of depositaries of the same nature and character belong to them. Thus, (as we have seen,) factors are depositaries of the goods, which they are employed to sell; and therefore they are bound to reasonable skill and diligence in the preservation of them.³ Auctioneers are also depositaries or stake-holders of both parties of money, paid upon purchases, to remain in their hands, until all the conditions of the sale are fulfilled. Of course they are bound to keep it until that period, as a mutual pledge; and it, before the conditions are fulfilled, it is given up to either party, without the consent of both, they will be responsible for any loss occasioned thereby.⁴

§ 207. It may also be stated, as generally true, that all profits, which are made by an agent in the course of the business of his principal, belong to the latter.⁵ Indeed, this doctrine is so firmly established upon principles of public policy, that no agent will be permitted to take beyond a reasonable compensation for

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 18, 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, p. 218.

² Paley on Agency, by Lloyd ch. 50, Brown & Southouse, cited 3 Bro. Ch. R. 107. The question, whether interest is to be allowed, in cases of agency against the agent, or not, is dependent upon a great variety of circumstances. Mr. Cowen, in his learned note to 3 Cowen's Reports, p. 87, has collected many of the authorities. In general, it may be stated, that interest is allowed wherever it has been, or it might properly have been, made by the agent, and also where, by gross misconduct, he has withheld, or grossly misapplied the moneys of his principal.

³ Ante, §§ 33, 110, 186.

⁴ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, p. 219, Burrough v. Skinner, 5 Burr. R. 2639, Prevost v. Gratz, 1 Peters, Cir. R. 364.

⁵ Ante, § 192, Post, §§ 214, 310.

his services, or to hold any profits incidentally obtained in the execution of his duty, even if it be sanctioned by usage.¹ Such a usage has been severely stigmatized, as a usage of fraud and plunder.² Where the profits are made by a violation of duty, it would be obviously unjust to allow the agent to reap the fruits of his own misconduct; and where the profits are made in the ordinary course of the business of the agency, it must be presumed, that the parties intended, that the principal should have the benefit thereof.³

§ 208. Besides the particular duties of agents, which have been already incidentally stated, there are others, which seem to be the proper result of law; and a deviation from them can only be justified by some clear usage of business, or by the sanction of the principal, or by an overruling necessity.⁴ Thus, in regard to agents receiving money for their principals, it seems, (as has been already suggested,) a clear duty, if they deposit the money in the hands of bankers, to deposit it in the name of their principals, and not in their own names; and if they adopt the latter course, and the bankers should become insolvent, the agents would become personally responsible for the loss.⁵ So, it is the duty of agents to keep their principals apprised of their doings, and to give them notice, within a reasonable time, of all such facts and circumstances, as may be important to their interests; and if, by neglect of the agent, the principal suffers a loss, he is entitled to be indemnified by the agent.⁶

¹ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, pp. 216; 221; Diplock v. Blackburn, 3 Camp. R. 43, 44; Smith on Merc. Law, 49, (2d edit.); Id. ch. 5, § 2, pp. 91, 92, (3d edit. 1848); Massey v. Davis, 2 Ves. Jr. 317; ——— v. Jolland, 8 Ves. 72; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 3, 4; Ante, § 192.

² Diplock v. Blackburn, 3 Camp. R. 44.

³ Ante, § 192; Post, §§ 210, 211.

⁴ Ante, §§ 85, 118, 141, 194, 201, 237.

⁵ Ante, § 202; Post, 218; Caffrey v. Darby, 6 Ves. 496; Massey v. Banner, 1 Jac. & Walk. 241; 4 Madd. R. 413; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 3, pp. 9, 10; Wren v. Kirton, 11 Ves. 377, 382; Fletcher v. Walker, 3 Madd. R. 78; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, p. 215; Macdonnell v. Harding, 7 Sim. R. 178; Hammon v. Cottle, 6 Serg. & Rawle, 290.

⁶ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 27, 38, 39; Malyne, Lex Merc. 82; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, pp. 219, 220; Arrott v. Brown, 6 Wharton, R. 2; Devall v. Burbridge, 4 Watts & Serg. R. 305; Harvey v. Turner, 4 Rawls, R. 229; Forrestier v. Bordman, 1 Story, R. 43, 56.

Thus, for example, it is the duty of an agent, to whom a bill of exchange is remitted for acceptance, to give notice to his employer of the acceptance or non-acceptance of the bill by the earliest reasonable opportunity.¹ So, an agent employed to purchase goods abroad, or goods to be shipped abroad, is bound to transmit the bill of lading to his employer as soon as possible, or at least within a reasonable time.² It has also been laid down, as the duty of a bill-broker, or other person, to whom a bill is remitted on commission, first, to endeavor to procure acceptance; secondly, on refusal, to protest the bill for non-acceptance; thirdly, to advise the remitter of the receipt, acceptance, or protest; and in case of the latter, to send the protest to him; and fourthly, to advise any third person that is concerned, and all this is to be done without delay; or, as Beawes expresses it, by the post's return without further delay. But it is far from being clear, that all these are strictly his duties in all cases; and it is certain, that there are others equally imperative. Indeed, the duties properly belonging to such agencies are most naturally affected and qualified by the usages of trade, and the particular dealings between the parties. Thus, for example, unless there be a clear usage of trade, it seems hardly to be a part of such an agent's duty, to give advice to third persons of the receipt, or acceptance, or refusal of acceptance of a bill, although it is his duty to give such advice to his employer.⁴ And it seems quite as much the duty of such an agent to present the bill for payment, if accepted, and to give notice of the payment, or non-payment, and in the latter case, to protest the bill, as it is to perform the other duties already enumerated.⁵

§ 209. And this leads us to the remark, which, indeed, has

¹ Beawes, *Lex. Merc. tit. Bills of Exchange*, p. 430, § 117; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, p. 5; *Id.* 39; *Crawford v. Louisiana State Bank*, 13 Martin, R. 214, 706; *Montillat v. Bank of United States*, 13 Martin, R. 365; *Miranda v. City Bank of New Orleans*, 6 Miller, Louis. R. 740; *Pritchard v. Louisiana State Bank*, 2 Miller, Louis. R. 415; *Durnford v. Patterson*, 7 Miller, Louis. R. 464; *Canonge v. Louisiana State Bank*, 15 Martin, R. 344.

² *Barker v. Taylor*, 5 Mees. & Wels. 527.

³ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 5, 39; Beawes, *Lex. Merc.* p. 430, § 117; *Arrott v. Brown*, 6 Whart. R. 9.

⁴ See ante, §§ 199, 200.

⁵ Ante, § 200.

been already anticipated in the preceding pages, that there are certain duties appropriate, and belonging to certain classes of agencies, resulting either from the general usages of business, or the habits of dealing between the parties, or the special functions to be performed, which cannot be deemed of universal application or obligation. Thus, for example, there are peculiar duties, and peculiar functions, belonging to auctioneers, to brokers, to factors, to masters of ships, to ships-husbands, and even to particular agents, arranged under the same general denomination, such as ship-brokers, bill-brokers, stock-brokers, insurance-brokers, supercargoes, and commission-merchants, with or without a *del credere* commission.¹ In some of these cases, the law, (as we have already seen,) has prescribed, or recognized, particular duties as positively obligatory; in other cases, they are to be gathered from analogous principles, or are dependent upon the usages and habits of trade, to be ascertained as matters of fact.² Thus, for example, it is now settled, as a matter of law, that auctioneers can sell goods only for ready money; but that factors may sell upon credit.³ In the first case, the general rule of law is strictly adhered to, that all sales must be for cash, unless there is a usage of trade, which relaxes the rule, and governs the sale. In the latter case, the right of a factor to sell upon credit, although formerly a matter of fact and usage, and to be ascertained as such, is now treated as an undeniable principle of law, and incidental to the agency, in the absence of all contradictory proofs.⁴ A minute enumeration of the particular duties of all classes of agents would not be of any great utility, even if it were a practicable task. But in the present state of the law, it must necessarily be very imperfect, and derived mainly from general principles, which must, of course, undergo many modifications, to adapt them to the exigencies of each agency.⁵

¹ See 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 3, p. 57-77; Beawes, Lex Merc. Vol. 1, p. 44-49, 4to. (6th edit.)

² Ante, § 26-37.

³ 3 Chitty on Com. and Manuf. 199; Ante, §§ 27, 60, 108, 110; Post, § 226.

⁴ Ante, §§ 108, 110.

⁵ The learned reader will find in Malyne's Lex Mercatoria, ch. 16; p. 81-86, much information as to the practical duties of factors; and in 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 3, p. 67-78, (edit. 1818,) in Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, p. 18-28,

§ 210. In this connection, also, it seems proper to state another rule, in regard to the duties of agents, which is of general application, and that is, that, in matters touching the agency, agents cannot act, so as to bind their principals, where they have an adverse interest in themselves.¹ This rule is founded upon the plain and obvious consideration, that the principal bargains, in the employment, for the exercise of the disinterested skill, diligence, and zeal of the agent, for his own exclusive benefit.² [Thus, where an agent, having a sum of money in his hands belonging to his principal, is authorized to remit it by purchasing a bill of exchange, he should purchase the bill with such money, and not by using his own credit.³] It is a confidence necessarily reposed in the agent, that he will act with a sole regard to the interests of his principal, as far as he lawfully may; and, even if impartiality could possibly be presumed on the part of an agent, where his own interests were concerned, that is not what the principal bargains for; and, in many cases, it is the very last thing, which would advance his interests.⁴ The seller

and in Beawes, *Lex Mercatoria*, p. 44-49, (6th edit.) the like information, as to these and other mercantile agencies. But, as a specimen, how little can be attained in practical utility by any general statements, we select the following passage from Mr. Livermore, as to the general duty of a factor: "The general duty of a factor is to procure the best intelligence of the state of trade at his place of residence; of the course of exchange; of the quantity and quality of goods at market; their present price, and the probability that it may rise or fall; to pay exact obedience to the orders of his employers; to consult their advantage in matters referred to his discretion; to execute their business with all the despatch that circumstances will admit; to be early in his intelligence, distinct in his accounts, and punctual in his correspondence." 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 3, p. 69, (edit. 1818.) See also 1 *Bell, Comm.* § 407-418; *Id.* § 432-436, (4th edit.); *Id.* pp. 477, 478, 481, 482, (5th edit.); *Clarke v. Tipping*, 9 *Beavan*, R. 284.

¹ *Stone v. Hayes*, 3 *Denio*, R. 575.

² *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 10, 11, 33, 37; 3 *Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* 216, 217; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 8, § 6, p. 416-433, (edit. 1818); *Church v. Marine Insur. Co.* 1 *Mason*, R. 341; *Shepherd v. Percy*, 16 *Martin*, R. 267; *Parkhurst v. Alexander*, 1 *John. Ch.* R. 394; *Beale v. McKiernan*, 6 *Miller, Louis. R.* 407; 1 *Story, Eq. Jurisp.* §§ 315, 316, 316 a; *Copeland v. Merchants' Insur. Co.* 6 *Pick.* 198, 204; *Ante*, § 10.

³ *Stone v. Hayes*, 3 *Denio*, R. 575.

⁴ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 10-12; 3 *Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* 216, 217; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 8, § 6, p. 416-433, (edit. 1818); *Beale v. McKiernan*, 6 *Louis. R.* 407; *Gillett v. Peppercorne*, 3 *Beavan*, R. 78, 83, 84; *Ante*, § 10.

of an estate must be presumed to be desirous of obtaining as high a price as can fairly be obtained therefor; and the purchaser must equally be presumed to desire to buy it for as low a price as he may. It has been said by Cujacius; *Hæc scilicet est natura contractus emptionis et venditionis, ut vendat unus quanto pluris, emat alter quanto minoris potest*;¹ or, more briefly, in another place; *Ut emptor votum gerat emendi minoris, et venditor pluris vendendi*;² or more pointedly still; *Emptor emit, quam minimo potest; venditor vendit, quam maximo potest*.³ Without going to the full length of the statement of Pomponius, as adopted in the Pandects, that, in regard to price, the parties may lawfully circumvent each other, if that word is to be understood in its offensive sense; *In pretio emptionis et venditionis naturaliter licere contrahentibus se circumvenire*;⁴ it may be correctly said, with reference to Christian morals, that no man can faithfully serve two masters, whose interests are in conflict. If, then, the seller were permitted, as the agent of another, to become the purchaser, his duty to his principal and his own interest would stand in direct opposition to each other; and thus a temptation, perhaps, in many cases, too strong for resistance by men of flexible morals, or hackneyed in the common devices of worldly business, would be held out, which would betray them into gross misconduct, and even into crime. It is to interpose a preventive check against such temptations and seductions, that a positive prohibition has been found to be the soundest policy, encouraged, by the purest precepts of Christianity. This doctrine is well settled at law;⁵ but it is acted upon in Courts of Equity to a much larger extent, not only in cases of persons, confidentially intrusted with the management of the property of others; but,

¹ Cujac. Opera, Tom. 4, col. 963, ad Lib. 3, Resp. Pap. (edit. Neap. 1758); Ante, § 10, note.

² Cujac. Opera, Tom 10, col. 1005, in IV. Lib. Prior. Cod. Lib. 4, tit. 44, § 8, (edit. Neap. 1759).

³ Cujac. ad Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 4, l. 16, § 4; Dq Minor. Vig. Quin. Ann. (Tom. 2, col. 998,) cited 1 L. verm. on Agency, 417, (edit. 1818.) I have not found the very passage, after some search. But there is a passage to the same effect in Cujac. Comm. in Lib. 3, Resp. Pap. ad § — Cum inter. Dig. Lib. 46, tit. 1, l. 1, § 1, § 4; Cujac. Oper. Tom. 4, p. 963, (edit. Neap. 1758); Ante, § 10, note.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 4, l. 16, § 4; Ante, § 10; Post, § 213.

⁵ Taylor v. Salmon, 4 Mylne & Craig, R. 139.

in cases of other relations of a confidential nature, involving the rights and interests of the employer.¹ And it is by no means necessary, in cases of this sort, that the agent should have made any advantage by the bargain. Whether he has so or not, the bargain is equally without any obligation to bind the principal.² Of course, it is to be understood, as a proper qualification of the doctrine, that the principal has an election to adopt the act of the agent, or not; and that, if, after a full knowledge of all the circumstances, he deliberately and freely ratifies the act of the agent, or acquiesces in it for a great length of time, it will become obligatory upon him; not by its own intrinsic force, but from the consideration, that he thereby waives the protection, intended by the law for his own interests, and deals with his agent, as a person, *quoad hoc*, discharged of his agency.³

§ 211. Hence, it is well settled, (to illustrate the general rule,) that an agent, employed to sell, cannot himself become the purchaser; and an agent employed to buy, cannot himself be the seller.⁴ [And upon the same principle it is held that a contract made by one who acts as the agent of both parties, may be avoided by either principal.⁵] So, an agent employed to pur-

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 10-12, 33-36; 1 Story on Equity Jurisp. § 308-328; Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 290; Baker v. Whiting, 3 Sumner, R. 476; Poillon v. Martin, 1 Sandford Ch. R. 569; Ante, § 10; Post, § 211-213.

² Campbell v. Walker, 5 Ves. 680; Ex parte James, 8 Ves. 348; Ex parte Bennett, 10 Ves. 385; Cane v. Allen, 2 Dow. R. 289; Ex parte Lacey, 6 Ves. 625; 1 Story, Equity Jurisp. §§ 315, 316, 316 a.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 33-36, and note; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 6, p. 427-433, (edit. 1818); 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, pp. 216, 312; Woodhouse v. Meredith, 1 Jac. & Walk. 204, 224; Morse v. Royal, 12 Ves. 355; Lowther v. Lowther, 13 Ves. 95, 103; Saunderson v. Walker, 13 Ves. 601.

⁴ Ante, § 10; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 33, 34, 37; 1 Story, Eq. Jurisp. §§ 315, 316, 316 a; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. ch. 3, pp. 216, 217; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 6, p. 416-433, (edit. 1818); Lees v. Nuttall, 1 Russ. & Myle, 53; S. C. 2 Myle & Keen, 819; Copeland v. Merc. Ins. Company, 6 Pick. 198; Reed v. Warner, 5 Paige, R. 650; Lowther v. Lowther, 13 Ves. 103; Reed v. Norris, 2 M. & Craig, 374; Beal v. McKiernan, 6 Miller, Louis. R. 407; Bartholomew v. Leach, 7 Watts, 472; Conkey v. Bond, 34 Barbour, 276; 4 Kernan, 85.

⁵ N. Y. Central Ins. Co. v. National Protection Ins. Co. 20 Barbour, 470. Mason, J., said: "This is an action upon a policy of reinsurance for \$2,000, executed by the defendants to the plaintiffs through the agent, G. W. Stevens, who was also the agent of the plaintiffs in making the contract of insurance. The

chase, cannot purchase for himself.¹ So, a trustee cannot, ordinarily, become the purchaser of the estate of his *cestui que trust*.²

risk was selected and the rates of insurance fixed by Stevens, and the question is, whether this action can be maintained upon the policy. It becomes important to inquire whether such a contract, made by an agent who acts as the agent of both parties in making the contract, is absolutely void at common law, or whether it is voidable in a court of law; or whether it is only voidable in a court of equity. The rule is well settled, both in England and this country, that such a contract is voidable in a court of equity at the election of the principal. The principle is illustrated in the case of an agent employed to sell. If such agent become himself the purchaser or the agent of another; or if he be an agent to buy, and he become himself the seller, or the agent of another in making the sale, the principal may avoid the sale or the purchase, in equity. If he come to the Court upon a timely application, upon the fact being alleged and proved, the Court will presume the transaction was injurious and consequently fraudulent; and this presumption cannot be overcome unless it can be shown that the principal, furnished with all the knowledge the agent possessed, gave him previous authority to become purchaser or seller, or afterwards assented to such purchase or sale. (Campbell v. Walker, 5 Ves. 678; 1 Ves. Jr. 287; Massey v. Davies, 2 id. 317; 1 Russ. & Mylne, 53; 2 Myl. & K. 819; Story on Agency, §§ 9, 192, 210, 211, 214; Dunl. Paley on Agency, 33, 34; 1 Mason, 341; 6 Pick. 198; 2 John. Ch. 252; 5 id. 388; Hopk. Ch. 515; 9 Paige, 237; 4 Conn. R. 717; 5 Lond. Jurist, 18; Smith's Merc. Law, 101; 13 Ves. 103; 8 id. 502; 9 id. 234; 12 id. 355; 3 Bro. C. C. 119; 5 Paige, 650; 2 Mylne & Cr. 374; Liverm. on Agency, 423; 4 Mylne & Cr. 134; 6 Ves. 625; 1 Story's Eq. Jurisp. §§ 315, 316; 2 Mason, 369; 1 Jac. & Walk. 294; 1 John. Ch. 27; 2 id. 394; 3 Ves. 740; 4 Denio, 575; Angell on Fire and Life Ins. 454, 455; Parsons on Contracts, 74, 75.) The rule seems to be founded on the danger of imposition in such cases, and the presumption which a court of equity indulges of the existence of fraud which is inaccessible to the eye of the Court, and consequently in equity such agreements are regarded as constructively fraudulent. (9 Paige, 242; 4 Kent's Comm. 438, 3d edit.) The rule is a well-settled one, and the presumption is not an unreasonable one in a Court governed by the principles of equity. The principal in fact has gained for the exercise of all the skill, ability, and industry of his agent, and he is entitled to demand the exertion of this in his own favor. (Parsons on Cont. 74, 75.) Where the agent, unbeknown to his principal, is acting equally in behalf of the other party, the presumption is not an unreasonable one. This principle, however, like the one that a trustee cannot be the purchaser of an estate, is a mere rule of equity. If the proper forms have been observed, the conveyance is good at law, and the title passes. The contract is not void, but only voidable. (5 Metcalf, 467; 5 John. 43, 48; 1 Bing. 396, 400, 401; 5 Ves. 678; 13 id. 603; 7 Moore, 815; 5 Pick. 521; 3 Ves. 740, 751; 2 John. Ch. 740, 751; 9 Ves. 248; 10 id. 381; 14 John. 414, 415; 2 Gill & John. 227; 4 id. 376; 3 Harr. & John. 38;

* 1 Taylor v. Salmon, 4 Mylne & C. 139.

2 Ante, § 210; Baker v. Whiting, 3 Sumner, R. 476.

And it will make no difference, whether he is sole trustee, or joined with others in the trust.¹ So, the assignee of a bankrupt cannot become a purchaser of the debts or estate of the bankrupt on his own account.² And, if he does purchase, it will be a trust for the benefit of the creditors; for he is treated as an agent for the creditors, in all matters touching the estate of the bankrupt.³ So, an executor or administrator cannot buy any of the debts of the deceased for his own benefit; but the benefit will belong to those interested in the estate.⁴ So, a surety, purchasing the debt, cannot avail himself of the purchase, against his principal, for more than he has paid; but he will be held as a *quasi* trustee.⁵ So, the master of a ship, purchasing the ship at a sale by public authority, cannot purchase for himself, unless the owner afterwards elects to allow him the right.⁶ So, an

Parsons on Cont. 75, 75, note j; 1 Peters' C. C. R. 368; 6 Halst. 585; 8 Cowen, 361.) No case, I apprehend, can be found where a court of law has pronounced such a conveyance absolutely void. (14 John. 418, 5 id. 48; Mackintosh v. Barber, 1 Bing. 50; 7 Moore, 315; 5 Pick. 519, 521; 5 Mete. 167.) The rule of which we have been speaking is applicable to all persons placed in situations of trust or confidence with reference to the subject-matter of the contract, and embraces trustees, executors, administrators, guardians, agents and factors, attorneys, solicitors, &c. It embraces all who come within the principle. (9 Paige, 241.) There is no such rule, in equity even, as that a person standing in such trust relation, cannot himself buy at his own sale. He may purchase and take the title, subject however to the option of the *cestui que trust*, if he come in a reasonable time, to have the sale declared invalid. (Campbell v. Walker, 5 Ves. 678, and cases, note a; Lister v. Lister, 6 id. 631. Ex parte Lacey, 6 id. 625; 15 Pick. 31; 7 id. 1; 10 id. 77; 2 John. Ch. 252, 261, 266; 4 Gill & John. 376; Parsons on Cont. 76.)]

¹ Paley on Agency, 10, 11, 34, 35, note; 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. §§ 314, 316, 321, 322; Parkhurst v. Alexander, 1 John. Ch. R. 394; Cane v. Allen, 2 Dow, R. 289; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 6, p. 116-433, (edit. 1818); Campbell v. Walker, 5 Ves. 680; Ex parte James, 8 Ves. 348; Ex parte Bennett, 10 Ves. 385; Ex parte Lacey, 6 Ves. 625; Whicheote v. Lawrence, 3 Ves. 740; Davoue v. Fanning, 2 John. Ch. R. 251, 260; Green v. Winter, 1 John. Ch. R. 27.

² But it seems this may be done if there be no fraud. Fisk v. Barber, 6 Watts & Serg. 8. So of a guardian buying the estate of his ward at a public sale. Chorpening's appeal, 8 Casey, 316.

³ Ex parte Lacey, 6 Ves. 625, 628; 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. §§ 321, 322.

⁴ Ex parte Lacey, 6 Ves. 625, 628, 629; 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. §§ 321, 322. But see Fisher's appeal, 34 Penn. St. R. 29.

⁵ Reed v. Norris, 2 M. & Craig, 374; 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. §§ 321, 322, 324.

⁶ Chamberlain v. Harrod, 5 Greenl. R. 420; Church v. Marine Ins. Co. 1 Mason,

agent employed to settle a debt, cannot purchase it upon his own account; for he is bound to purchase it upon the best terms which he can, for the benefit of his principal; and it would hold out a temptation to him to violate his duty, if he were permitted to purchase for himself.¹ For the like reason, an agent of the seller cannot become the agent of the purchaser in the same transaction.² So, an agent, who discovers a defect in the title of his principal to lands, cannot misuse it to acquire a title for himself, but will be held a trustee for his principal.³ [So, an agent, or director of a corporation, who is employed to examine and ascertain how much, and what part of his principal's land can be sold without inconvenience, and to report his proceedings to his principal, cannot purchase such part and take a conveyance to himself; nor can he act for another in making such purchase.⁴] Indeed, it may be laid down as a general principle,

R. 341; *Barker v. Marine Ins. Co.* 2 Mason, R. 369; *The Schooner Tilton*, 5 Mason, R. 465, 480; *Copeland v. Merch. Ins. Co.* 6 Pick. R. 198.

¹ *Reed v. Norris*, 2 M. & Craig, 361, 374; 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. §§ 321, 322.

² Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 33, note (3). See *Wright v. Dannah*, 2 Camp. 203; *Dixon v. Bromfield*, 2 Chitty, R. 205; Ante, § 207.

³ *Ringo v. Binns*, 10 Peters, R. 269. Mr. Smith, in his *Compendium of Mercantile Law*, has summed up the doctrine on this matter in a very exact manner: "It has been already said, in the chapter on Partnership, that, from a person standing in a situation of confidence with regard to another, the strictest good faith is required. This maxim applies in full force to agents, of whose morals the law is so careful, that it will not suffer them even to incur temptation; thus, an agent employed to sell is not allowed to be the purchaser, at least not unless he make known that he intends to become such, and furnish his employer with all the knowledge he himself possesses, or unless the Court, perceiving that the principal would lose by a re-sale, think fit on that account to uphold the transaction; so neither can an agent, employed to purchase, be himself the seller, unless there was a plain understanding between him and his principal to that effect. And if an agent, who is employed to purchase, purchase for himself, he will be considered a trustee for his principal. This is in accordance with the rule of the Civilians. Tutor rem pupilli emere non potest; Idemque porrigendum est ad similia, id est, ad curatores, procuratores, et qui negotia aliena gerunt. Dig. l. 18, tit. 1," — p. 93, (3d edit. 1843.)

⁴ *Cumberland Coal Co. v. Sherman*, 30 Barbour, 553. Davies there said in an elaborate judgment: "The cases relating to the dealings of an agent or trustee with the property, in reference to which his agency or trust exists, may be arranged into two classes: *First*. Cases in which a trustee buys or contracts with himself, or several trustees of which he is one, or a board of trustees of which

that, in all cases where a person is, either actually or constructively, an agent for other persons, all profits and advantages,

he is one; and it will be seen by reference to the authorities hereinafter cited, that the incapacity to purchase applies to all these cases. *Second.* Cases in which a trustee buys of, or contracts with his *cestui que trust* who is *sui juris*, and is competent to deal independently of the trustee, in respect to the trust estate.

"As to the first class of cases, the purchase or contract is voidable at the option of the *cestui que trust*, without reference to the fairness or unfairness of the purchase or contract. For the reasons before given, the disqualification of the party purchasing or contracting is a conclusion of law, and is absolute. The leading case in this State, and which has been followed without qualification, so far as I have been able to ascertain, is that of *Davoue v. Fanning*, (2 John. Ch. Rep. 252.) In that case, an executor, on making sale of the real estate of his testator, caused the same to be purchased for his wife, and conveyed to her. The sale was made at public auction and for a fair price, and was *boni fide*. Yet the sale was set aside at the instance of the *cestui que trust*; and it will be observed that the trustee was not the purchaser, but a third person, for the benefit of his wife. Chancellor Kent says, 'whether a trustee buys in for himself or his wife, the temptation to abuse is nearly the same. Though the money he was raising was to go to his wife, it was no reason why he should be permitted to buy in for her the estate itself. His interest interfered with his duty. . . . The case, therefore, falls clearly within the spirit of the principle, that if a trustee, acting for others, sells an estate, and becomes himself interested in the purchase, the *cestui que trust* is entitled to come here, *as of course*, and set aside that purchase, and have the property re-exposed to sale.' Chancellor Kent then proceeds to review the cases bearing on this point, commencing with that of *Holt v. Holt*, in the time of 22 Car. II. where it was held that if an executor renew a lease in his own name on its expiration, the renewed lease is to be for the benefit of the *cestui que trust*.

"And in *Davison v. Gardner*, in 1743, Lord Hardwicke observed, that the Court always looks with a jealous eye at a trustee purchasing of his *cestui que trust*; and in *Whelpdale v. Cookson*, in 1847, (1 Vesey, 9; S. C. 5 Id. 682,) the Chancellor would not permit a purchase at auction to stand, as he said he knew the dangerous consequence of sanctioning dealings of a trustee with the property of the *cestui que trust*. In *Campbell v. Walker*, (5 Ves. 678,) the master of the rolls says, 'I will lay down the rule as broad as this, and I wish trustees to understand it, that any trustee purchasing trust property is liable to have the purchase set aside, if, in any reasonable time, the *cestui que trust* chooses to say he is not satisfied with it.' He adds, 'They must buy with that clog.'

"The numerous cases cited by Chancellor Kent show the uniformity of the rule, not only in the English courts, but in our own and those of our sister States. The rule in this State has been settled by the highest Court therein. In *Munro v. Allaire*, (2 *Caines' Cases in Error*, 183,) Benson, Justice, in delivering the opinion of the Court, says: 'It is a principle that a trustee can never be a pur-

made by him in the business, beyond his ordinary compensation, are to be for the benefit of his employers.

chaser, and I assume it as not requiring proof that this principle must be admitted, not only as established by adjudication, but also as founded in indispensable necessity, to prevent that great inlet of fraud, and those dangerous consequences which would ensue if trustees might themselves become purchasers, or if they were not in every respect kept within compass. Although it may, however, seem hard that the trustees should be the only persons of all mankind who may purchase, yet, for the very obvious consequences, it is proper that the rule should be strictly pursued and not in the least relaxed.' Chancellor Kent says that he cannot but notice the precision and accuracy with which the rule and the reason of it are here stated.

"Chancellor Kent says that there is one more important case, that of *The York Building Company v. Mackenzie*, decided in the House of Lords in 1795, on appeal from the Court of Session in Scotland. It had then only appeared in 8 Bro. P. C. by Tom., in App. but has since been reported in 3 Paton, 378. He says of this case, that it is a complete vindication of the doctrine he was there applying; and he remarks that, considering the eminent character of the counsel who were concerned, and who had since filled the highest judicial stations, and the ability and learning which they displayed in the discussion, it is, perhaps, one of the most interesting cases, on a mere technical rule of law, that is to be met with in the annals of our jurisprudence. He says the reasons of the House of Lords for setting aside the sale are not given, and we are left to infer them from the arguments upon which the appeal was founded. They have now appeared in the eloquent and learned opinions of Lord Thurlow and Lord Chancellor Loughborough. The perusal of these opinions would have satisfied the learned Chancellor that his views of the case, as one of high authority and great interest, were eminently correct. The appellants were an insolvent company, and their estate was sold by the order of the Court of Session, at a public judicial sale, to satisfy creditors. The course, at such sales, is to set up the property at a value fixed upon by the Court, which is called the up-set price, and which is founded on information procured by the common agent of the Court, who has the management of all the out-door business of the cause. The respondent in the case was the common agent, and he purchased for himself at the up-set price, no person appearing to bid more, and the sale was confirmed by the Court; and in the course of eleven years' possession he had expended large sums for building improvements. There was no question as to the fairness or integrity of the purchase. The object of the appellant was to set aside the sale, on the ground that the purchaser was the common agent in behalf of all parties to procure information and attend the sale, and was in the nature of a trustee, and so disabled to

1 Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 37, 38, 49; *East India Co. v. Henchman*, 1 Ves. Jr. 289; *Massy v. Davies*, 2 Ves. Jr. 317; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 221; *Campbell v. Penns. Life Insur. Co.* 2 Wharton, R. 64; *Bartholomew v. Leach*, Watts, R. 472.

§ 212. With a view to provide effectually against the abuse of professional confidence, even a purchase of an estate by an

purchase. On the part of the appellants, it was contended that the sale in question was *ipso jure* void and null, because the respondent, from his office of common agent, was under a disability and incapacity, which precluded him from being a purchaser. The office of common agent, in a ranking and sale, infers a natural disability, which, *ex vi termini*, imparts the highest legal disability, because a law which flows from nature, being founded on the reason and nature of the thing, is paramount to all positive law. The principle is obvious. He cannot be both judge and party. He cannot be both seller at a roup and buyer; he cannot serve two masters. These views were not controverted by the counsel on the other side, but they insisted the sale could be maintained upon other grounds. After an argument of sixteen days, the case was decided in the House of Lords, opinions being given by Lord Thurlow and Lord Chancellor Loughborough. Lord Thurlow said, on this point, that all the gentlemen admit that it was the duty of the agent to carry on the sale to the utmost advantage, for the benefit of the creditors, and those interested in the residue; and, taking it to be so, one side said, that being your situation, it is utterly impossible for you to perform that duty in such a manner as to derive an advantage to yourself. This seems to be a principle so exceedingly plain, that it is in its own nature indisputable, for there can be no confidence placed unless men will do the duty they owe to their constituents, or be considered to be faithfully executing it, if you apply an arbitrary rule. In these views the Lord Chancellor concurred, and the sale was set aside. Lord Eldon and Sir W. Grant designate this as the great case, and repeatedly refer to it. In *Jeffrey v. Aitken*, decided in June, 1826, the lord ordinary observed, it is impossible to hold that the seller can also be the buyer of the subject, after the judgment of the House of Lords in the case of the *York Building Company v. Mackenzie*, decided May 13, 1795.

"In *Taylor v. Watson*, decided in Scotland, January 20, 1846, the same rule as laid down in *Mackenzie's* case was reiterated and adhered to. Lord Jeffrey said, 'The principle involved in this case is a very familiar and general one in our laws—that no person can be actor in *rem suam*. The stringency of the maxim has been ruled and held settled by the House of Lords, in the case of *Mackenzie*. . . . It is now *presumptio juris et de jure*, that where a person stands in these inconsistent relations of both buyer and seller, there are dangers, and it is not relevant to say that it is impossible there could be any in the particular case. I should be sorry to think that any doubts were thrown on this rigorous principle which has been established both here and in the other end of the island.'

"In the case of the *Aberdeen Railway Company v. Blaikie*, July 20, 1854, (1 *McQueen's Rep.* 461,) the House of Lords, reversing the judgment of the Court below, held that a contract entered into by a manufacturer, for the supply of iron furnishings to a railway company of which he was a director, or the chairman at the date of the contract, was invalid and not enforceable against the company. Lord Cranworth, in delivering the opinion of the Court, says: 'A

attorney from his client is treated with severe jealousy by Courts of Equity. The presumption is *primâ facie* so far against its

corporate body can only act by agents, and it is of course the duty of those agents so to act as best to promote the interests of the corporation, whose affairs they are conducting. Such an agent has duties to discharge, of a fiduciary character toward his principal; and it is a rule of universal application, that no one having such duties to discharge shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has or can have a personal interest conflicting, or which possibly may conflict with the interests of those whom he is bound to protect. So strictly is this principle adhered to, that no question is allowed to be raised as to the fairness or unfairness of a contract so entered into. It obviously is or may be impossible to demonstrate how far, in any particular case, the terms of such a contract have been the best for the *cestui que trust*, which it was possible to obtain. It may sometimes happen that the terms on which a trustee has dealt, or attempted to deal with the estate or interests of those for whom he is a trustee, have been as good as could have been obtained from any other person; they may even, at the time, have been better. But still so inflexible is the rule, that no inquiry on that subject is permitted. The English authorities on this subject are numerous and uniform.

"The same subject has had a full and careful discussion and examination in the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of *Michoud v. Girod*, cited *supra*. The opinion of the Court, by Mr. Justice Wayne, is distinguished for its clear analysis and elaborate review of all the cases bearing on the point. He says, 'The rule, as expressed, embraces every relation in which there may arise a conflict between the duty which the vendor or purchaser owes to the persons with whom he is dealing, or on whose account he is acting, and his own individual interest.' The same rule obtains in the civil law, with some modifications not necessary to notice.

"The language of Pothier is distinct and unequivocal: '*Nous ne pouvons acheter, ni par nous-mêmes, ni par personnes interposées, les choses que font partie des biens dont nous avons l'administration.*' (Tr. du Contrat de Vente, part 1, p. 13.) The rule of the civil law, without qualification, is adopted in Holland: '*Quae vero de tutoribus cautâ, ea quoque in curatoribus pro curatoribus, testamentorum, executoribus, aliis similibus, qui aliena gerunt negotia, probanda sunt.*' In Spain the rule is enforced without relaxation, and with stern uniformity. Judge Wayne, in the case of *Michoud*, in his opinion, cited the rule from the *Novissima Recopilacion*, in these words, 'No man who is testamentary executor, a guardian of minors, nor any other man or woman, can purchase the property which they administer, and whether they purchase publicly or privately, the act is invalid, and on proof being made of the fact, the sale must be set aside.' It is thus seen that the rule by which agents or trustees are prohibited and rendered incapable of purchasing or dealing with the property of their *cestuis que trust*, is one of universal application, justified by a current of strong and high authorities, and is enforced with stern and inflexible integrity; and the consequence of such dealing and purchasing is, that the agent or trustee is liable at any time, on the

validity, that the burden of proof is thrown on the attorney, to establish its entire good faith for an adequate and fair considera-

application of the *cestui que trust*, and as a matter of course, and without reference to the fairness or unfairness of the transaction, the adequacy or inadequacy of the price paid, or any other equities of the agent or trustee, to have the sale set aside; such has been the uniform administration of the law in England, and where the civil law prevails, and in this country. No reason is suggested why rules thus founded on the soundest morals, which have been maintained with such uniformity and steadiness, should now be relaxed. On the contrary, it is seen that every consideration arising from circumstances surrounding us, and the unparalleled multiplicity of corporations, who can only act by trustees or agents, and the very large proportion of the wealth of the country invested in them, and placed under the control and management of agents and trustees, forcibly demands of courts of justice a firm adherence to these principles, and a stern application of them to every case coming within the sphere of their action.

"Nay, the rule, as applicable to managers of corporations, should in no particular be relaxed. Those who assume the position of directors and trustees, assume also the obligations which the law imposes on such a relation. The stockholders confide to their integrity, to their faithfulness, and to their watchfulness, the protection of their interests. This duty they have assumed, this the law imposes on them, and this those for whom they act have a right to expect. The principals are not present to watch over their own interests; they cannot speak in their own behalf; they must trust to the fidelity of their agents. If they discharge these important duties and trusts faithfully, the law interposes its shield for their protection and defence; if they depart from the line of their duty, and waste, or take themselves, instead of protecting, the property and interests confided to them, the law, on the application of those thus wronged or despoiled, promptly steps in to apply the corrective, and restores to the injured what has been lost by the unfaithfulness of the agent. This right of the *cestui que trust* to have the sale vacated and set aside, where his trustee is the purchaser, is not impaired or defeated by the circumstance that the trustee purchases for another. This point is fully discussed by Lord Eldon in *Ex parte Bennett*, (10 Vesey, 381.) In this case he held, that as the solicitor to a commission of bankruptcy could not purchase at a sale of the bankrupt's effects, for the reasons above stated, so a sale made to a person who had requested the solicitor to employ another at the sale to bid for him, was set aside. He said, 'If the principle be that the solicitor cannot buy for his own benefit, I agree when he buys for another, the temptation to act wrong is less; yet if he could not use the information he has for his own benefit, it is too delicate to hold that the temptation to misuse that information for another person is so much weaker, that he should be at liberty to bid for another.' He adds: 'Upon the general rule, both the solicitor and commissioner have duties imposed on them that prevent their buying for themselves; and if that is the general rule, it follows of necessity that neither of them can be permitted to buy for a third person, for the Court can, with as little effect, examine whether that was done by making an undue use of the information received in

tion.¹ In this respect, it is said to differ from the case of a pure agency in particular transactions, for in those transactions the

the course of their duty, in the one case as in the other. No court of justice could institute investigation to that point effectually, in all cases, and therefore the safest rule is that a transaction which, under the circumstances, should not be permitted, shall not take effect upon the general principle, as, if ever permitted, the inquiry into the truth of the circumstances may fail in a great proportion of cases. And the sale for this reason was set aside. This case is carried to with approbation by Chancellor Kent, in *Davoue v. Fanning*, (*supra*). It follows, therefore, that if the defendant Sherman was incapacitated to purchase for himself, he was equally incapacitated to act for the defendant Dean, or any other person, to make the purchase; and on the authority of this case, if Dean was the sole purchaser, the same would be set aside.

"There can be no question, I think, at the present time, that a director of a corporation is the agent or trustee of the stockholders, and as such has duties to discharge of a fiduciary nature, towards his principal, and is subject to the obligations and disabilities incidental to that relation. (*Robinson v. Smith*, 3 Paige, 222; *Angell & Ames on Corp.* 258, 260; *Percy v. Milladon*, 3 Louis. R. 568; *Hodges v. New England Screw Co* 1 R I Rep. 321; *Verplanck v. Merc Ins. Co.* 1 Edw. Ch. 84; *Redfield on Railways*, 494; *Benson v. Hawthorne*, 6 Young & Collyer, 326; *The York and North Midland Railway Co v. Hudson*, 16 Beav. 485; *Aberdeen Railway Co v. Blaikie*, 1 McQueen's Rep. 461.) In the latter case, Lord Cranworth said 'The directors are a body to whom is delegated the duty of managing the general affairs of the company. A corporate body can only act by agents, and it is, of course, the duty of those agents so to act as best to promote the interests of the corporation whose affairs they are conducting.' Says Vice-Chancellor McCoun, in the case of *Verplanck*, (*supra*). 'But when a corporation aggregate is formed, and the persons composing it, either in virtue of the compact or by the express terms of the charter, place the management and control of its affairs in the hands of a select few, so that life and animation may be given to the body, then such directors become the agents and trustees of the corporation, and a relation is created, not between the stockholders and the body corporate, but between the stockholders and those directors, who, in their character of trustees, become accountable for any wilful dereliction of duty, or violation of the trust reposed in them. I see no objection to the exercising of an equity power over such persons, in the same manner as it would be exercised over any other trustees.'

"Neither are the duties or obligations of a director or trustee altered from the circumstance that he is one of a number of directors or trustees, and that this circumstance diminishes his responsibility, or relieves him from any incapacity to deal with the property of his *cestui que trust*. The same principles apply to him

¹ 1 Paley on Agency, 10, 11, 33-36; 1 Story, Equity Jurisp. § 310-316; Cane & Allen, 2 Dow, R. 209, 299; Poillon v. Martin, 1 Sandford, Ch. R. 569; Howell & Ransom, 11 Paige, R. 538; Evans v. Ellis, 5 Denio, R. 640.

purchase of the agent has no validity whatever, independent of the ratification of the principal; whereas, in the case of attorney and client, the purchase is valid, if it can be shown to have been made *uberrimâ fide*, and without any advantage, taken from professional confidence on one side, or pressing necessity on the other.¹

§ 213. The Roman law asserted principles in most respects equally comprehensive. Thus it is said in the Pandects: *Tutor rem pupilli emere non potest. Idemque porrigendum est ad similia, id est, ad curatores, procuratores, et qui negotia aliena gerunt.*² The same doctrine has been incorporated into the French law,³ and into that of other nations, deriving their jurisprudence from the Roman law.⁴ In one respect, the Roman law seems to have stopped short of the principles of our equity jurisprudence; for,

as one of a number, as if he was acting as a sole trustee. It is not doubted that it has been shown, that the relation of the director to the stockholders is the same as that of the agent to his principal the trustee to his *cestui que trust* and out of the identity of these relations necessarily spring the same duties the same danger and the same policy of the law.

"In the language of the plaintiff's counsel, it is justly said 'Whether it be a director dealing with the board of which he is a member, or a trustee dealing with his co-trustees and himself, the real party in interest, the principal is absent—the watchful and effective self-interest of the director or trustee seeking a bargain, is not counteracted by the equally watchful and effective self-interest of the other party, who is there only by his representatives, and the wise policy of the law treat all such cases as that of a trustee dealing with himself.'

"The number of directors or trustees does not lessen the danger or insure security, that the interests of the *cestui que trust* will be protected. The moment the directors permit one or more of their number to deal with the property of the stockholders, they surrender their own independence and self-control. If five directors permit the sixth to purchase the property intrusted to their care, the same thing must be done with the others if they desire it. Increase of the number of the agents in no degree diminishes the danger of unfaithfulness. Whichcote v. Lawrence, (3 Vesey, 740,) was a case of several trustees. In this case Lord Loughborough says. 'There was more opportunity for that species of management, which does not betray itself much in the conduct and language of the party, when several trustees are acting together. I am sorry to say there is greater negligence where there is a number of trustees.'"]

¹ 1 Story on Equity Jurisp. § 310 to 313.

² Dig. Lib. 18, tit. 1, l. 34, § 7; Dig. Lib. 26, tit. 8, l. 5, §§ 2, 3, 1 Lavern. on Agency, ch. 8, § 6, pp. 417, 418, (edit. 1818); Ante, §§ 10, 210.

³ Pothier, Traité de Vente, n. 13.

⁴ Ersk. Inst. B. 1, tit. 7, § 19; 1 Voet, ad Pand. Lib. 18, tit. 1, 9, p. 766.

by our law, (as we have seen,) it is immaterial, whether the purchase or sale be by a single trustee, or agent, acting alone, or by him acting in connection with other joint trustees or agents; for in each case, the purchase or sale will be invalid.¹ But according to the Pandects, although a tutor cannot, at the same time, be both buyer and seller; yet, if he has a co-tutor, who has also authority to buy or sell, he may become the buyer or seller, unless there is some fraud. *Item, ipse Tutor et emptoris et venditoris officio fungi non potest. Sed enim, si contutorem habeat, cujus auctoritas sufficit, procul dubio emere potest. Sed si malâ fide emptio intercesserit, nullus erit momenti.*² The Roman law seems to have proceeded upon the notion, that the vigilance of the co-tutor, or co-agent, would sufficiently protect the interests of the pupil, or principal; whereas, our law has proceeded upon the wiser policy of deeming both equally guardians of his interests.

§ 214. The doctrine which we have been considering, is capable of a great variety of applications. But in all the cases, it is founded upon the same beneficial and enlightened policy, the protection of the principal, and the advancement of his interests. Thus, for example, if an agent, authorized to buy, should buy of himself, and the bargain is advantageous to the principal, (as has been already hinted,) the latter has his election to ratify it, or not; if disadvantageous, he may affirm it, or repudiate it, at his pleasure.³ On the other hand, if the agent makes any profits in the care of his agency by any concealed management, either in buying, or selling, or in other transactions on account of his principal, the profits will belong exclusively to the latter.⁴

§ 215. Besides the duties and obligations, thus arising from the general relations of principal and agent, there are others, again, which may arise from an express contract, or from an implied contract. The former requires no explanation; the latter, ordinarily, arises from the usages of particular trades, or

¹ Ante, §§ 210, 211, 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch 8, § 6, pp. 426, 427, (edit. 1818.)

² Dig. Lib 26, tit 8, l 5, § 2.

³ Ante, 192, 207, 210.

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 37, 38; East India Co. v. Henchman, 1 Ves. Jr. 289; Massey v. Davis, 2 Ves. Jr. 317; Prevost v. Gratz, 1 Peters, Cir. R. 364; Ante, §§ 210, 211.

the habits and special dealings between the particular parties. The most important, in a practical view, to be here taken notice of, is the contract of guaranty by a factor, arising from the receipt of what is commonly called a *del credere* commission, (the nature whereof has been already stated,¹) by which he, in effect, becomes liable, in the case of a sale of goods, to pay to his principal the amount of the purchase-money, if the buyer fails to pay it, when it becomes due. It has been sometimes suggested, that this contract makes the factor the primary debtor to his principal, on the sale. But this doctrine is unmaintainable, both upon principle and authority.² The true engagement of the factor, in such cases, is merely to pay the debt, if it is not punctually discharged by the buyer. In legal effect, he warrants or guarantees the debt; and thus he stands more in the character of a surety for the debt, than as a debtor. Hence it is well established, that he is not liable to pay the debt, until there has been a default by the buyer.³ [Still his undertaking is not so far collateral, as to be required to be in writing under the statute of frauds, as a promise to pay the debt of another.] The receipt of acceptances from the buyer, although transmitted to the principal, will not discharge the agent; but, there must be an absolute payment in money; or some other mode of payment, authorized by the principal.⁴ But, if the money is once received from the buyer, and the dealings between the parties require the agent to remit to his principal, he does not become a guarantor of the

¹ Ante, §§ 33, 112; Post, §§ 231, 328, 1 Liversm. on Agency, 408, (edit. 1818); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 41, Smith on Merc. Law, 52, (2d edit.); Id. ch. 5, § 2, p. 98, (3d edit. 1813), Leverick v. Mugs, 1 Cowen, R. 645; 3 Chitty on Com. and Manuf. 220, 221.

² Ante, § 33; 2 Kent Comm. Lect. 11, pp. 621, 625, (11th edit.), Thompson v. Perkins, 3 Mason, R. 232; Gall v. Comber, 7 Taunt. R. 358; Peele v. Northcote, 7 Taunt. R. 478; Morris v. Cleasby, 4 M. & Selw. 566, 574; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 41, note (d); Id. 111, note; Leverick v. Meigs, 1 Cowen, R. 645.

³ Morris v. Cleasby, 4 M. & Selw. 574.

⁴ Couturier v. Hastie, 16 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 562; 8 Exch. 40; Swan v. Nesmith, 7 Pick. 220; Wolff v. Koppell, 5 Hill, 458; 2 Demo, 368; Bradley v. Richardson, 23 Verm. 720.

⁵ Ante, § 98; Post, § 418; McKenzie v. Scott, 6 Bro. Parl. Cas. 280, (Tomlin's edit.); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 41, 42; Muller v. Rohleus, 2 Wash. Cir. R. 378.

payment of such remittance; but he is deemed an ordinary factor, liable only for due diligence in purchasing the remittance.¹

§ 216. Hitherto we have been chiefly considering the duties and obligations of agents to their principals. There are, however, certain duties and obligations, which they may incur in their dealings with third persons, for the breach of which they become personally responsible to the latter. But these will be more properly and conveniently discussed in some of the succeeding chapters, as they are of a more limited extent, and fall naturally within the topics embraced therein.²

§ 217. The duty of thus guarding the interests of the principal is not confined to cases where the agent may sacrifice his interests by attempts to further his own; but the same protective policy extends to cases where the interests of strangers are sought to be asserted by the agent, adversely to those of the principal. Therefore it is, that an agent is not, ordinarily, permitted to set up the adverse title of a third person, to defeat the rights of his principal, against his own manifest obligations to him; or to dispute the title of his principal.³ If, therefore, he has received goods from his principal, and has agreed to hold them, subject to his order, or to sell them for him, and to account for the proceeds, he will not be allowed to set up the adverse title of a third person to the same goods, to defeat his obligations.⁴ And if he should agree by a receipt to hold them for such third person, such conduct would amount to a conversion of the property of his principal, for which an action would lie.⁵ An excep-

¹ *Leverick v. Meigs*, 1 Cowen, R. 645. But see *McKenzie v. Scott*, 6 Bro. Parl. Cas. by Tomlins, 286; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 408-411, (edit 1818), *Lucas v. Groning*, 7 Taunt. 164, *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 41, 42, and note, *Smith on Merc. Law*, 52, (2d edit.); *Id.* ch. 5, § 2, p. 98, (3d edit. 1843.)

² *Post*, ch. 10, 260-301, ch. 12, § 308-322.

³ *Kieran v. Sandars*, 6 Adol. & Ellis, 515, *Nicholson v. Knowles*, 5 Madd. R. 47; *Collins v. Tillon*, 26 Conn. 368.

⁴ *Holl v. Griffin*, 10 Bing. R. 246, *Harman v. Anderson*, 2 Camp. R. 243; *Steward v. Duncan*, 2 Camp. R. 344; *Dixon v. Diamond*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 310; *Goshin v. Burnie*, 7 Bing. R. 339; *White v. Bartlett*, 9 Bing. R. 378, *Roberts v. Ogilby*, 9 Price, R. 269, *Hardman v. Wilcock*, 9 Bing. R. 382, note; *Kieran v. Sandars*, 6 Adolph. & Ellis, 515; *Hawes v. Watson*, 2 B. & Cressw. 540, *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 80, 81; *Id.* 53; *Story on Bailments*, § 110; *Smith's Compendium of Merc. Law*, ch. 5, § 2, p. 94, (3d edit. 1843).

⁵ *Holbrook v. Wight*, 24 Wend. R. 169. See *Witman v. Felton*, 28 Missouri, 602.

tion, however, is allowed, where the principal has obtained the goods fraudulently, or tortiously, from such third person.¹ The same principle is upheld, as well in equity, as at law; and therefore, if an agent receives money for his principal, he is bound to pay it over to him, and he cannot be converted into a trustee for a third person, by a mere notice of his claim.²

§ 217 *a*. It is upon a somewhat analogous principle, connected with the want of privity, that an agent employed by a trustee is accountable only to him, and not to the *cestui que trust*;³ and a sub-agent ordinarily is accountable only to the superior agent, who has employed him, and not, generally, to the principal.⁴ But where, by the usage of trade, or otherwise, a sub-agent is employed, with the express or implied consent of the principal, there the original agent will not be responsible for the conduct of the sub-agent; but the appropriate remedy of the principal for the misconduct or negligence of the sub-agent is directly against the latter,⁵ since a privity will, under such cir-

¹ *Hardman v. Wilcock*, 9 Bing. R. 352, note; *Taylor v. Plumer*, 3 M. & Selw. 562. We are carefully to distinguish those cases, where the suit is brought by the principal, from those, where the suit is brought by a third person, claiming the property against the agent. The rights of the latter to maintain the suit are not affected by anything that has passed between the principal and agent. If such third person has a good title to the goods, he may recover them, notwithstanding the bailment. See *Ogle v. Atkinson*, 5 Taunt. R. 759; *Wilson v. Anderton*, 1 Barn. & Adolph. 450; *Story on Bailm* §§ 102, 103. There is a dictum in *Ogle v. Atkinson*, by Lord Chief Justice Gibbs, which contradicts the text, in which he refers to a point made, that the defendants (the agents) cannot refuse to deliver up the goods to the plaintiff, (the principal,) from whom they received them; and he then says: "But, if the property is in others, I think that they may set up this defence." This dictum has been since treated as untenable. See *Goslin v. Birnie*, 7 Bing. R. 339; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 80, 81, and note; *Id.* 53.

² *Nicholson v. Knowles*, 5 Madd. R. 47; *Story on Bailm.* §§ 102, 103; 2 *Story, Eq. Jurisp.* § 317.

³ *Myler v. Fitzpatrick*, 6 Madd. R. 360; *Ante*, 201.

⁴ *Cartwright v. Hately*, 1 Ves. Jr. 292; *Pinto v. Santos*, 5 Taunt. R. 447; *Stephens v. Badcock*, 3 Barn. & Adolph. 354; *Ante*, § 13-15 note; *Tickel v. Short*, 2 Ves. 239; *Ex parte Sutton*, 2 Cox, 81; *Soley v. Rathbone*, 2 M. & Selw. 298; *Cockran v. Irlan*, 2 M. & Selw. 301, 303, note; *Myler v. Fitzpatrick*, 6 Madd. R. 360; *Ante*, § 201; *Post*, §§ 321, 322.

⁵ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 16, 17; *Goswell v. Dunkley*, 1 Str. R. 680. See *Branby v. Coxwell*, 2 Bos. & Pull. 438; *Cockran v. Irlan*, 2 M. & Selw.

cumstances, exist between them. In many cases of this sort, however, the agent may by his own conduct render himself responsible to his principal for the acts of the sub-agent, and for money received by him on account of his principal;¹ as, for example, if he has participated or coöperated with the sub-agent in his improper acts, or misconduct, or deviation from duty.

CHAPTER VIII.

LIABILITIES OF AGENTS TO THEIR PRINCIPALS.

§ 217 *b*. HAVING thus considered the nature and extent of the duties and obligations of agents, we are, in the next place, led to the consideration of the correlative topic of the liabilities of agents. These are naturally divisible into two general heads: (1.) Their liabilities to their principals; and (2.) Their liabilities to third persons.

§ 217 *c*. And first, their liabilities to their principals. From what has been already said it is sufficiently clear, that wherever an agent violates his duties or obligations to his principal, whether it be by exceeding his authority or by positive misconduct, or by mere negligence or omission in the proper functions

301, note, 303; *Merrick v. Barnard*, 1 Wash. Cir. R. 479; Ante, §§ 14, 15, 201; *Foster v. Preston*, 8 Cowen, R. 198. In *Cockran v. Irlam*, (3 M. & Selw. 303, note,) Lord Ellenborough said: "A principal employs a broker from the opinion he entertains of his personal skill and integrity; and a broker has no right, without notice, to turn his principal over to another, of whom he knows nothing. It appears to me, therefore, that there is no privity, either expressed or implied, between Campbell and Orr, and Hutchinson. There certainly was not any express privity; neither can any be implied, unless the case had found, that the usage of trade was such as to authorize one broker to put the goods of his employer into the hands of a sub-broker to sell, and to divide the commission with him. It is said, however, that Campbell and Orr drew bills on their broker for these goods, and that afterwards they received value for them; but the case fails in establishing that point." See also Post, §§ 308, 313, 322, 453 *a*, 453 *b*, 453 *c*, 454 *a*.

¹ *Tabor v. Perrott*, 2 Gallis. R. 565; Ante, § 201; Post, §§ 231 *a*, 313, 322.

of his agency, or in any other manner, and any loss or damage thereby falls on his principal, he is responsible therefor, and bound to make a full indemnity¹ In such cases, it is wholly immaterial whether the loss or damage be direct to the property of the principal, or whether it arise from the compensation or reparation, which he has been obliged to make to third persons in discharge of his liability to them, for the acts or omissions of his agent² The loss or damage need not be directly or immediately caused by the act which is done, or is omitted to be done. It will be sufficient if it be fairly attributable to it, as a natural result, or a just consequence. But it will not be sufficient if it be merely a remote consequence or an accidental mischance; for in such a case, as in many others, the maxim applies, *Causa proxima, non remota spectatur*⁴ It must be a real loss, or actual damage, and not merely a probable or possible one.⁵ Where the breach of duty is clear it will in the absence of all

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd 7, 71, 74, and note (2); Muzette v Williams, 1 Barn & Adolph 415; 1 Liverm on Agency ch 8 § 3 p 328 (4th ed 1815); Dodge v Fileston 12 Pick 325; Savage v Burkhart 20 Pick 10; Attorney-General v Corporation of Leicester & Belvan R 16; Watson v Short, 6 Hare, R 366. See Grant v Judlow 8 Ohio State R 1.

² Paley on Agency, by Lloyd 7, 11, 201, 201. Ante §§ 200, 201. Arrott v Brown (Whart R 9); Harvey v Turner 4 Rawle R 223; Woodward v Sudwin 1 Ohio (Stanton) Rep 363; 1 Liverm on Agency 36 (4th ed 1818); Pothier on Oblig by Evans, note 423. In Louisiana the Civil Code restricts the liability of principals for the delinquency and acts of their agents in the functions in which they have employed them to cases where the principal might have prevented the act, which caused the damage and has not done it. Code Civil of Louisiana, art 2209. Stawbridge v Turner 8 Mill Louis Rep 537. This is different, however, from the civil law, which creates a general liability for all the delinquencies and acts of agents, in matters within their authority. Pothier on Oblig by Evans, note, 423.

³ Caffrey v Darby, 6 Ves 490; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 9, 10, 16, 17; Jeffrey v Bigelow, 13 Wend R 318.

⁴ Story on Bailm §§ 15, 524; Smith v Condit 1 Howard, Sup Ct R 28, S C 17 Peters, R 20; Vears v Willocks, 8 East R 1, 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 300, and note, (2d edit), 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 132, note, (2d edit).

⁵ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd 7, 8, 9, 10, 74, 75, Ante, § 200, and note, Post §§ 217, 221; Webster v De Tastet, 7 1 Rep 157; Bell v Cunningham, 3 Peters, R 69, 85. See Harvey v Turner, 4 Rawle, R 223; Arrott v Brown, 6 Wharton, R 9.

evidence of other damage, be presumed that the party has sustained a nominal damage.¹

§ 218. We may illustrate these remarks by some of the cases already cited in the foregoing pages. And first, in relation to the point that the loss or damage need not be directly or immediately caused by the act or omission of the agent. Thus, if an agent should knowingly deposit goods in an improper place, and a fire should accidentally take place, by which they are destroyed, he will be responsible for the loss ;² for, although the loss is not the immediate and direct consequence of the negligence, but of the fire ; yet it may be truly said, that it would not have occurred, except from such negligence. The negligence, then, was the occasion, although not strictly the cause of the loss ; and the loss may be fairly attributed to it.' So, if an agent should so negligently execute his duty in procuring a policy of insurance, as that the risk (as, for example, a peril of the seas, by which a loss was caused) should not be included in it ; the principal might, nevertheless, recover the amount of the loss against the agent, although the loss was directly caused by the peril of the seas.⁴ So, if an agent, who is bound to procure insurance for his principal, neglects to procure any, and a loss occurs to his principal from a peril ordinarily insured against, the agent will be bound to pay the principal the full amount of the loss occasioned by his negligence.⁵ So, if an agent to procure insurance should procure the policy to be underwritten by insurers notoriously in bad credit, or insolvent, and a loss should occur therefrom, he would be bound to indemnify his employer against the loss.⁶ So, if an agent should improperly deposit the money of his principal in his

¹ *Marzetti v. Williams*, 1 Barn. & Adolph. 415.

² Ante, § 200, and note, *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 9, 10, 16, 17.

³ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 9, 10, 16, 17, Ante, § 200.

⁴ *Mallough v. Barber*, 4 Camp. R. 150 ; *Park v. Hammond*, 4 Camp. R. 344 ; *S. C.* 6 Taunt. R. 495, 1 Laverin on Agency, ch. 8, § 1, p. 311-354 (edit. 1818) ; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 18-21, 1 Phillips on Insur. ch. 22, p. 519-524 ; *Marsh. on Insur. B.* 1, ch. 8 § 2, p. 297-301 ; Ante, § 191.

⁵ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 18-20, *Wallace v. Felfair*, 2 T. Rep. 188, note ; *Smith v. Lascelles*, 2 T. Rep. 187, *Delancy v. Stoddart*, 1 T. Rep. 24 ; *Morris v. Summerl.*, 2 Wash. Cir. R. 203 ; *De Tastet v. Crousillat*, 2 Wash. Cir. R. 132, 136 ; Ante, §§ 190, 191, 200.

⁶ 2 Valin, Comm. Lib. 3, tit. 6, art. 3, p. 33 ; Ante, §§ 187, 191.

own name in the hands of a banker, who should afterwards become insolvent, the loss must be ultimately borne by the agent.¹ So, if a carrier-master of a ship should unnecessarily deviate from the proper course of the voyage, and the goods shipped should afterwards be injured by a tempest, or should be lost by capture, or other peril, the shipper would be entitled to a full indemnity from the the shipmaster and ship-owner.²

§ 219. In all these cases, although the misconduct or negligence of the agent is not the direct and immediate cause of the loss; yet it is held to be sufficiently proximate, to entitle the principal to recover for the loss or damage; for, otherwise, the principal would ordinarily be without remedy for such loss or damage; since the same objection would apply in almost all cases of this sort. It is true, that, in many cases of this sort, it may be said that it is not certain that the loss or damage might not have occurred, if there had been no such misconduct or negligence; but this furnishes no objection to the recovery. Thus, if an agent has improperly sold goods on a credit, to a person not in good credit, it may be said, that he might have sold the goods to another person, apparently in good credit, who might have failed before the expiration of the credit.³ So, in the above case of a loss by tempest, or capture, or other peril after a deviation, it may be said, that the like loss might have occurred, if the vessel had continued on the voyage. But the law disregards such subtleties and niceties, as to causes and possibilities, and it acts upon the intelligible ground, that, where there has been misconduct or negligence in the agent, all losses and damages occurring afterwards, to which the property would not have been exposed, but for such misconduct or negligence, are fairly attributable to it, as a sufficiently proximate cause, although not necessarily the immediate or nearest cause of the loss or damage. The doctrine, too, may be vindicated upon the broader ground of public policy, that no wrongdoer ought to be allowed to apportion or qualify his own wrong; and that, as a loss has

¹ *Caffrey v. Darby*, 6 Ves. 496; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 46, 47; *Wren v. Kirton*, 11 Ves. 382; *Ante*, §§ 200, 208.

² *Davis v. Garrett*, 6 Bing. R. 716; *Parker v. James*, 4 Cam. R. 112; *Dale v. Hall*, 1 Wils. R. 281; *Max v. Roberts*, 12 East, R. 89; *Story on Bailments*, §§ 413, 509.

³ See *ante*, § 202.

actually happened, whilst his wrongful act was in operation and force, which is fairly attributable to his wrongful act, he ought not to be permitted to set up, as a defence, that there was a more immediate cause of the loss, acting upon the subject-matter at the same time, or a bare possibility of loss, if his wrongful act had not been done.¹

§ 220. In the next place, as to the point of the loss or damage being merely a remote consequence, or accidental mischief, from the negligence or omission of the agent. Thus, if an agent, who is bound to render an account, and to pay over moneys to his principal, at a particular time, should omit so to do, whereby the principal should be unable to pay his debts, or to fulfil his other contracts, and should stop payment and fail in business, or be injured in his general credit thereby, the agent would not be liable for such injury; for it is but a remote or accidental consequence of the negligence.² So, if an agent having funds in his hands, should improperly neglect to ship goods by a particular ship, according to the orders of his principal; and the ship should duly arrive; and, if the goods had been on board, the principal might, by future re-shipments and speculations, have made great profits thereon; the agent will not be bound to pay for the loss of such possible profits; for it is a mere contingent damage, or an accidental mischief.³ So, if an agent, bound to make a shipment to his principal from a foreign port, not being limited to any particular ship, should wholly neglect so to do; and it should appear, that, if the shipment had been made, and had safely arrived in due season, the principal would have made great profits; the agent would not be liable for such loss of profits; for, as it could not, under such circumstances, be absolutely ascertained, whether the shipment would have arrived at the port, or in what ship, or at what particular time, the loss or damage would be merely contingent and possible.⁴ The same reasoning would apply to a case, where, by

¹ Davis v. Garrett, 6 Bing. R. 716; Caffrey v. Darby, 6 Ves. 496.

² Short v. Skipwith 1 Brock. Cir. R. 103, 104. See Arrott v. Brown, 6 Whar-
ton, R. 9.

³ Bell v. Cunningham, 3 Peters, R. 69, 84, 85; S. C. 5 Mason, R. 161; Ante,
§ 217; Post, § 221.

⁴ See The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. R. 560, 561; Ante, § 217; Post, § 221;
Smith v. Condry, 1 Howard, Sup. Ct. R. 28; S. C. 17 Peters, R. 20.

the neglect of an agent to remit money, the principal has been prevented from engaging in a profitable speculation in some other business by his want of funds.

§ 221. In all cases of this sort, the law contents itself with rules, as to damages, derived from sources, having more certainty and universality of application; and founded upon the ordinary results of human transactions. Thus, if an agent improperly withholds the money of his principal, he is made liable for the ordinary interest of the country, where it ought to be paid, and the incidental expense of remitting it, if it ought to be remitted.¹ So, if the goods of the principal are negligently lost, or tortiously disposed of, by the agent, he is made liable for the actual value of the goods at the time of the loss or the conversion.² So in the case above supposed, of a non-shipment of goods by an agent, where the ship, by which they were ordered to be sent, has safely arrived, the principal would be entitled to recover the actual value of the goods at the port of arrival; for, as the ship has safely arrived, that is the actual loss sustained by the principal, by the non-shipment, although that value may be greatly enhanced by the state of the market, beyond what the prime cost would have been at the port, where the shipment ought to have been made.³ So, if an agent is directed to invest the funds of his principal in a particular stock, and he neglects so to do, and the stock thereupon rises, the principal is entitled to recover the enhanced value, as if the stock had been purchased.⁴ But possible or probable future profits, or contingent and speculative gains, would constitute no just ingredients in the estimate of such loss or damage from the uncertainty of their nature, the fluctuating and changeable elements on which they depend, and their utter inadequacy and unfitness, as a rule, in a great variety of cases, where a wrong has been done to the principal.⁵

¹ *Short v. Skipwith*, 1 Brock. Cir. R. 103, 104.

² *The Amiable Nancy*, 3 Wheat. R. 560, 561; *Pope v. Barrett*, 1 Mason, R. 117; *Woodward v. Suydam*, 11 Ohio (Stanton) R. 363.

³ *Cunningham v. Bell*, 3 Peters, R. 84, 85; *Ante*, § 220.

⁴ *Short v. Skipwith*, 1 Brock. Cir. R. 103.

⁵ *Bell v. Cunningham*, 3 Peters, R. 69, 84, 85; *S. C.* 5 Mason, R. 161; *The Amiable Nancy*, 3 Wheat. R. 560, 561; *Tide-water Canal Co. v. Arche*, 9 Gill & John. R. 479, 535; *Smith v. Condry*, 1 Howard, Sup. Ct. R. 28; *S. C.* 17 Peters, R. 20; *Ante*, § 220.

§ 222. In the next place, there must be a real loss, or actual damage, and not merely a probable or a possible one. Therefore, if an agent is ordered to procure a policy of insurance for his principal, and neglects to do it; and yet the policy, if procured, would not have entitled the principal, in the events which happened, to recover the loss or damage, the agent may avail himself of that, as a complete matter of defence.¹ Thus, if the ship to be insured, has deviated from the voyage; or the voyage, or the insurance, is illegal; or the principal had no insurable interest; or the voyage, as described in the order, would not have covered the risk; in all such cases, the agent, although he has not fulfilled his orders, will not be responsible; for the principal cannot have sustained any real loss or actual injury by the neglect.² And, in such cases, it will make no difference, that, if the insurance had been made, the underwriters might probably have paid the loss or damage without objection; for the right to recover is still an essential ingredient in the case against the agent.³ So, if the principal would have sustained a loss or damage, if his orders had been complied with, that would be an answer to a suit for the breach of them; for there must not only be a wrong done, but a damage resulting therefrom.⁴ However, as has been already stated, it will be presumed, unless the contrary clearly appears, that the principal, by the breach of his orders, has sustained some damages, and, if none other are established in evidence, he will be entitled to nominal damages.⁵

§ 223. It will be no excuse for an agent who has rendered himself responsible by his negligence, or his deviation from

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 19-21, 74, 75, Marshall on Insur. B. 1, ch. 8, § 2, p. 297-305, 1 Phillips on Insur. ch. 22, p. 519-524; 2 Phillips on Insur. ch. 22, p. 363; Post, §§ 235, 238

² Post, §§ 235, 238, Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 19-21, 75, 76; Marshall on Insur. B. 1, ch. 8, § 2, p. 300; Delaney v. Stoddart, 1 T. Rep. 22; Webster v. De Tastet, 7 T. Rep. 157; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 3, p. 386-390, (edit. 1818)

³ Webster v. De Tastet, 7 T. Rep. 157; Formin v. Oswell, 3 Camp. R. 359; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 74-76. See De Tastet v. Crousillar, 2 Wash. Cir. R. 132; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 3, pp. 386, 388, (edit. 1818.)

⁴ Post, § 236.

⁵ Ante, § 217; Marzetti v. Williams, 1 Barn. & Adolph. 415.

orders, that he has, in other transactions, conducted himself so well, that his principal has derived greater advantages therein from his uncommon-care, skill, and diligence. For it is his duty in all cases, to manage the business of his principal to the best advantage, and to his best ability. In this respect, as has been very properly said, the case of an agent does not differ from that of a partner under the Roman law, who was not permitted to set off the profits, which the partnership had derived from his superior skill, attention, and diligence in one instance, against losses sustained by his negligence in other instances¹ *Non ob eam rem minus ad periculum socii pertinet, quod negligentia ejus periisset, quod in plerisque aliis industria ejus socius aucta fuisset. Et hoc ex appellatione Imperator pronunciarit.*²

§ 224. And not only will an action lie against an agent for losses and damages occasioned by any violation or neglect of his duty; but, in many cases, where it touches the property of the principal, the latter will be entitled to proceed *in rem*, and reassert his rights thereto; a remedy, which may sometimes be the only effectual means (as, for example, in case of the insolvency of the agent) to secure to the principal an adequate redress.³ When, therefore, the property of the principal is intrusted to the agent for a special purpose, as for example, for sale or exchange, if a transfer is made by him within the scope of the authority confided to him, a good title will be conveyed to the transferee. But when the transfer is made in a mode which is not within the scope of the authority confided to the agent, or with which the agent is not apparently clothed, or held out to the public to be clothed, no title to the property will be passed, and it may be reclaimed by the owner.⁴ We have already seen, that, in the case of a general agent, his acts are valid to bind

¹ 1 Liverm. on Agency, p. 384, (edit. 1818).

² Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 2, l. 25, S. P. Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 2, l. 26.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 335, 337, 338, 340-342. The particular remedies, which are to be pursued, either *in personam*, or *in rem*, are more proper for a treatise on pleading, than for one, like the present, which seeks only to expound the general rights and duties incident to agency. See 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 8, § 3, p. 375-386, (edit. 1816); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, Pt. 2, § 1-4, p. 55-59.

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 78, 79, 325, 340, 341; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 204; Boyson v. Coles, 6 M. & Selw. 14.

the principal within the scope of the general authority, with which his agency apparently invests him, notwithstanding any private secret instructions, which restrict or vary that authority.¹ But, if the person, dealing with such an agent, has notice of such instructions or variations, he cannot acquire any title to the property, which is transferred in violation of them.²

§ 225. Similar considerations will apply to cases of general agency, where from the usage of trade, or otherwise, persons, dealing with the agent, have knowledge, that he is transcending the ordinary and accustomed modes of transacting the like business; for they are presumed to understand the restrictions and limitations, thus imposed upon the general agency, and are bound by them.³ Thus, a person, dealing with a factor, or broker, is bound to know, that, by law, a factor, or broker, although a general agent, is not clothed with authority to pledge, deposit, or transfer the property of his principal for his own debts; and, if he receives such a deposit, or pledge, the title is invalid, and, the property may be reclaimed by the principal.⁴ And in such a case, it is wholly immaterial, whether the pledgee knew that the party, with whom he was dealing, was a factor, or broker, or not. If he knew the fact, he was also bound to know the law applicable to it. If he did not know the fact, his own ignorance would not, ordinarily, enlarge his rights against the principal; since the latter has not held him out to the public as having such an authority.⁵

§ 226. The same principle applies, where the act of the agent is not justified by the usage of trade. Thus, for example, by the usage of trade, a sale of goods may, ordinarily, be made by a

¹ Ante, § 70-73, 126-133.

² Ibid.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 340, 341.*

⁴ Post, §§ 227, 389; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 340-342; Id. 218, 219; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 129, 130-149, (edit. 1818); Ante, § 113; *Bouchout v. Goldsmid*, 5 Ves. 211, 213; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 204, 205; *Van Amringe v. Peabody*, 1 Mason, R. 440; *Boyson v. Coles*, 6 M. & Selw. 14.

⁵ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 213-216, 218-220, 340, 341; *Newson v. Thornton*, 6 East, 17; *Jackson v. Clarke*, 1 Young & Jerv. 216; *Glyn v. Baker*, 13 East, 509; *Barton v. Williams*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 395; S. C. 3 Bing. R. 189; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 204, 205; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 625, 626, (4th edit.)

factor on credit; but, by the like usage of trade, a sale of stock by a broker is always understood to be a sale for ready money.¹ Hence, if a broker should sell stock on a credit, the sale would be invalid; and the principal would be entitled to recover it back.²

§ 227. Cases, indeed, may arise, in which the principal may be bound; as, if he has clothed the agent with all the apparent muniments of an absolute title, and authorized him to dispose of the property, as sole owner, and the pledgee has notice of the agency.³ Thus, although a broker, employed to purchase, has, ordinarily, no authority to sell; still, if the principal invests him with the apparent legal ownership, he will be bound by a sale made by the broker.⁴ [So, where a principal accepted bills of exchange, drawn on him by his agent, payable to the order of the agent, who agreed to have them discounted for the benefit of the principal; and the agent, assuming to be the owner of the bills, pledged them to a *bonâ fide* holder, to secure money borrowed for his own use; it was held, that the principal, having enabled the agent to hold himself out as owner, was bound by the pledge.⁵]

§ 228. This latter principle lies at the foundation of the well-established doctrine, that if an agent is intrusted with the dis-

¹ Ante, c. 60, 108, 110.

² Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 212-213; *Wiltshire v. Sims*, 1 Camp. R. 258; Post, § 229.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 218-220, 325; *Boyson v. Coles*, 6 M. & Selw. 14; Post, § 44. This constitutes the very difficulty, as to the doctrine of the non-existence of a right to pledge by a factor. As a new question, there might be great reason to contend, that a factor, being clothed with the apparent possession and ownership, has a right to pledge, as the exercise of a minor right, than that of selling. But the point has been too firmly established by adjudication to admit of further judicial controversy. See ante, §§ 73, 113, 126-133; Post, § 419-421; and Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 218-221, note (3), 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 149, (edit. 1818).

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 218-220; *Baring v. Corrie*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 137, 145, 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 626, 627, (4th edit.); 3 Chit'y on Comm. and Manuf. 202; *Pickering v. Bask*, 15 East, 38; *Whitehead v. Tuckett*, 15 East, 400; *Boyson v. Coles*, 6 M. & Selw. 14; *Martini v. Coles*, 1 M. & Selw. 140; *Lausatt v. Mappincott*, 6 Serg. & R. 386; *Moore v. Clementson*, 2 Camp. R. 22; *Story on Bailments*, § 324-326.

⁵ *Clement v. Leverett*, 12 New Hamp. 317.

possession of negotiable securities or instruments, and he disposes of them by sale, or pledge, or otherwise, contrary to the orders of his principal, to a *bonâ fide* holder without notice, the principal cannot reclaim them; for it is said, that the title of the holder, in cases of negotiable instruments, is derived from the instrument itself, and not from the title, which the party has, from whom he received them.¹ But the better reason is, that the principal, in all such cases, holds out the agent, as having an unlimited authority to dispose of and use such instruments, as he may please. And, indeed, negotiable instruments, when indorsed in blank, or payable to bearer, are treated as a sort of currency, and pass in the market without inquiry as to the title of the holder;² and the negotiability of all instruments would be greatly impaired, if not wholly destroyed, by a different doctrine.³ Of course, the doctrine does not apply to cases, where,

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 90-95, 233-236; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 304 305, (edit. 1818), Coddington v. Bay, 5 Johns. Ch. R. 54; S. C. 20 Johns. R. 637.

² Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452; Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. R. 1516; Pearcock v. Rhodes, Doug. R. 633; Bolton v. Puller, 1 Bos. & Pull. 539; Collins v. Martin, 1 Bos. & Pull. 643.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 233, 234. Questions under this head most commonly arise, where negotiable instruments have come into the hands of bankers. The leading principles on this subject have been collected by Mr. Lloyd, in a note to Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, p. 91, note, which, as of general practical utility, is here transcribed. "As the subject," (says he,) "here treated of, is one of great importance to all persons engaged in trade, it may be well to state, concisely, what is conceived to be the present state of the law affecting it. And (1.) A banker is to be considered as the agent of his customer. If property of the customer come into his hands, to be dealt with in a particular manner, he is, as to that property, the factor of the customer, having the rights and liabilities belonging to that character. (2.) Bills not due, paid in by a customer to his banker, are, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, presumed to be placed with him as an agent to procure the payment of them when due, and in such cases the property remains in the customer. Giles v. Perkins, 9 East, 12. (3.) If they are indorsed by the customer, the legal property in them is changed. Lang v. Smyth, 7 Bing. 284. (4.) And, if they are also discounted by the banker for the customer, they become the absolute property of the banker, and of course pass to his assignees, as part of his estate; Carstairs v. Bates, 3 Camp. 301; and the indorsement is *prima facie* evidence of discounting. Ex parte Twogood, 19 Ves. 229. (5.) The taking of the banker's acceptances, in exchange for bills paid in and indorsed, is tantamount to a discounting, and, even

upon the face of the instrument, there is a restricted authority; or, where the holder has knowledge, or notice, of the validity of

though the banker's acceptances be dishonored, the bills will, nevertheless, pass to his assignees. *Hornblower v. Proud*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 327. (6.) But bills may be indorsed by the customer, (and so the legal property be changed,) and may yet remain in the hands of the banker, clothed with a trust for the customer; in which case, as has been already said, they do not pass to the assignees of the banker upon his bankruptcy. And the difficulty in most cases is, to determine whether such a trust exists or not. (7.) When the bills are entered short by the banker, that is to say, when they are entered as bills not yet available, and not carried to the general cash account, there is no doubt that they do not pass to the assignees, but must be given up to the customer. 1 Rose, 154. (8.) And even though the banker have entered them in his own books as cash, and allowed his customer credit in account generally upon them, this will not, of itself, affect the customer, as the banker's books can be no evidence for himself or his assignees. 1 Rose, 239. (9.) Much less, if the customer have expressly directed the banker to get payment of them when due, or forbidden him to negotiate them; or the course of dealing between them raise an inference of such direction or prohibition. 1 Rose, 243. (10.) If the customer have given the banker a limited authority to negotiate them under certain circumstances, as in reduction of the cash balance, when unfavorable, or the like; this will, of course, not extend to other circumstances, or to more bills, than are sufficient for the purpose, and indeed will, of itself, negative any general authority to dispose of them. *Ibid.* (11.) But if a general authority to negotiate them had been either expressly given, or is to be inferred from the course of dealing known and assented to by the customer, then, it seems, the customer is to be considered as having abandoned all property in the bills, which, consequently, pass to the assignees. (12.) What circumstances are sufficient to raise the inference of such a general authority, is a question of some nicety. Lord Eldon seems to have been of opinion, that if the bills were entered as cash, with the knowledge of the customer, and he drew, or was entitled to draw, upon the banker, as having that credit in cash, he would thereby be precluded from recurring to the bills specifically. *Ex parte Sargeant*, 1 Rose, 153; *Ex parte Sollers*, *Ibid.* 155; *Ex parte Pease*, *Ibid.* 232; *Ex parte The Wakefield Bank*, *Ibid.* 243; *Ex parte The Leeds Bank*, *Ibid.* 251, and see 18 Ves. 229, 233; 19 Ves. 25, S. C. However, in all these cases his lordship held the assignees to very strict proof of such a course of dealing; and, in the absence of such proof, decided that there was no such general authority. The opinion of Lord Eldon, as conveyed in this *dictum*, has been adopted and acted upon by the present Vice-Chancellor, in a recent case of *Ex parte Thompson*, 1 Mont. & McArthur, 312, which was certainly a strong case; for there, in an account of four years, there were but three entries of actual cash paid, — the rest of the entries being entirely of bills, against which the remitters had been in the habit of drawing very extensively. On the other hand, it is said that it is immaterial whether such a general authority exists, either expressly or from the course of dealing, if, at the time of the bankruptcy, the bills, in fact, remained in specie in the hands of the bankers, and the cash

the title;¹ or where he has acquired his title by fraud.² This

balance were in favor of the customer. And, at all events, it is insisted the circumstance of the customer taking credit for the bills, and drawing, or considering himself entitled to draw against them, does not make them the bills of the banker; because, in the actual course of trade, such a privilege is a consequence of paying in bills. The former part of this proposition is the opinion of Mr. Deacon, and is not without the support of good reasoning, although it must be considered as doubtful. *Law and Practice of Bankruptcy*, vol. 1, p. 432. The latter part is borne out by the case of *Thompson v. Giles*, 2 Barn. & Cressw. 422; and *Ex parte Armistead*, 2 G. & J. 371. (13.) The right to reclaim extends not only to the specific bill, or securities, but to the substitutes for, or proceeds of them, so long as they continue in the same hands and are specifically ascertainable. *Vuliamy v. Noble*, 3 Mer. 593. (14.) But if the proceeds cannot be distinguished from the general stock of the banker, the right of the general creditors prevails, and the customer must come in ratably with the rest. And herein consists, principally, the evil of the indorsing of the bills by the customer, as it gives the banker the opportunity of negotiating them. (15.) Neither can the customer follow them into the hands of third parties, who have obtained them *bona fide*, and for value, although negotiated by the banker against good faith. *Ex parte Pease*, 1 Rose, 232; *Collins v. Martin*, 1 B. & P. 648; *Ibid.* 546. (16.) The banker, like a factor, has a general lien for advances made, and a right to be indemnified for liabilities contracted on account of his principal, and the claim of the customer will consequently be modified by the state of the account. Therefore, if the cash balance is against the customer, or if the banker has advanced money specifically upon the bills remitted, or has accepted other bills for the accommodation of the customer, the assignees will have a right to retain the bills, and even to put them in suit, until those sums are repaid, and those liabilities discharged; that is to say, they will be entitled to a deduction of the amount in the first case, and to an indemnity in the second. *Jourdaine v. Lefevre*, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 66; *Davis v. Bowsher*, 5 T. R. 488; *Scott v. Franklin*, 15 East, 428; *Bosanquet v. Hudman*, 1 Stark N. C. P. 1; *Rolland v. Bygrave*, R. & M. 271; *Ex parte Warring*, 2 G. & J. 403, and the cases before cited. (17.) It is a consequence of the right to an indemnity, that, although the holder of the banker's acceptances in favor of the customer cannot directly come in, and claim in his place as against the assignees of the banker; yet, if the customer also become bankrupt, while these acceptances are outstanding, as the holders must be satisfied before the assignees of the customers can be entitled to the bills, the Court of Bankruptcy will order such an arrangement between the two estates, as to render the claim of the bill-holders indirectly available. *Ex parte Waring*, 2 Rose, 182; *Ex parte Ingham*, 19 Ves. 345; *Ex parte Parr*, Buck, 191." See also *Clark v. Merchants' Bank*, 1 Sandford, Superior Ct. (N. Y.) R. 498.

¹ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 236-238; *Treutell v. Barandon*, 8 Taunt. 100; *Collins v. Martin*, 1 B. & Pull. 648; *Sigourney v. Lloyd*, 8 B. & Cressw. 622; *Post*, § 231.

² *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 238, 239; *Solomons v. Bank of England*, 18 East, R. 135, n.; *Goodman v. Harvey*, 4 Adolph. & Ellis, 870. What will

subject will hereafter occur in other connections; and, therefore, may now be passed over without further comment.¹

§ 229. And not only may the principal, in many cases, follow his own property into the hands of third persons, where it has been transferred or disposed of by an agent, contrary to his instructions, or duty, but the principle is still more extensive in its reach; for, if it has been converted into, or invested in other property, and can be distinctly traced, the principal may follow it, wherever he can find it, and as far as it can be thus traced, subject, however, to the rights of a *bonâ fide* purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, in all cases where the latter is entitled to protection.² It will make no difference, in law, as, indeed, it does not in reason, what change of form, different from the original, the property may have undergone, whether it be changed into promissory notes or other securities, or into merchandise, or into stock, or into money.³ For the product of the substitute for the original thing still follows the nature of the thing itself, as long as it can be ascertained to be such; and the right only ceases, when the means of ascertainment fail; which is the case, when the subject, being goods, is turned into

amount to notice, or fraud, is in some cases a matter of great nicety. At one time, it was thought that receiving a negotiable instrument, under circumstances which might excite some suspicion, or amount to gross negligence in the holder, was sufficient to invalidate his title. But it is now settled, that the conduct of the holder must amount to *malâ fide*, and even gross negligence will not avoid his title. *Goodman v. Harvey*, 4 Adolph. & Ellis, 870; *Arbounin v. Anderson*, 1 Adolph. & Ellis, New R. 498, 504. In this last case, Lord Denman said: "Acting upon the case of *Goodman v. Harvey*, which gives the law now prevailing on this subject, we must hold that the owner of a bill is entitled to recover upon it, if he has come by it honestly; that that fact is implied *primâ facie* by possession; and that, to meet the inference so raised, fraud, felony, or some such matter, must be proved. Here is a possession not so accounted for; and I think the replication entitles the plaintiff to recover." *Story on Bills of Exchange*, §§ 193, 194, 415, 416.

¹ Post, §§ 231, 404-406, 419-421.

² Ante, §§ 227, 228; Post, § 231; *Taylor v. Plumer*, 3 M. & Selw. 562; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 275-280; Ante, §§ 225, 226; Post, § 436-439.

³ Ibid.; *Scott v. Surman*, Willes, R. 400; *Whitecomb v. Jacob*, 1 Salk. 160; *Ryall v. Rolfe*, 1 Atk. 172; *Lane v. Dighton*, Ambler, R. 409; *Greene v. Haskell*, 5 Rhode Island, 447; *Thompson v. Perkins*, 3 Mason, R. 232; *Houquebie v. Gerard*, 2 Wash. Cir. R. 212; *Chedworth v. Edwards*, 8 Ves. 49; *Lench v. Lench*, 10 Ves. 511; *Jackson v. Clarke*, 1 Younge & Jerv. 216.

money, which is mixed and confounded in a general mass of the same description; or when the subject, being money, has been converted into specific property of another kind, having before that time lost, as it were, its ear-mark and identity, and become incapable of being distinguished from the mass of the common moneys of the agent.¹ But money in a bag, or otherwise kept apart from other money, or guineas, or other coin, marked or otherwise specially designated, for the purpose of being distinguished, is treated as so far ear-marked, as to fall within the rule already stated, while it remains in the hands of the agent, or of his general personal representatives.²

§ 230. The same doctrine is still more fully acted upon in Courts of Equity; for, if an agent or trustee has wrongfully invested the money or trust property of the principal, or *cestui que trust*, in land, and it can be distinctly traced, equity will follow it into the land, and hold the legal owner to be a trustee thereof for the benefit of the party, whose money or trust property has been so invested.³

¹ Ibid., *Conard v. Atlantic Insur. Company*, 1 Peters, Sup. Ct. R. 386. [If the owners of property have intrusted it to an agent for a special purpose, and the agent, in violation of his duty, has unlawfully consigned the same to be sold, with directions to remit the proceeds to a private creditor of his own, and such creditor, upon being informed by a letter from the consignee of the consignment of the property and directions in reference to the same, manifests his assent thereto by unequivocal acts, and the property is sold by the consignee, and bills of exchange, payable to the agent's creditor or his order, are purchased with the proceeds, and remitted in a letter addressed to him, in compliance with the directions, and the creditor, after receiving notice of the intended remittance, and after manifesting his assent thereto, and after the remittance is actually made, but before it is received, learns for the first time of the manner in which the agent became possessed of the property, and of his wrongful acts in reference to it, the original owners of the property cannot maintain an action for money had and received against such creditor, to recover the amount collected by him upon the bills of exchange. *Le Breton v. Peirce*, 2 Allen, 8.]

² *Taylor v. Plumer*, 3 M. & Selw. 562, 576; *Whitcomb v. Jacob*, 1 Salk. 161; *Scott v. Surman*, Willes, R. 400; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 90-95; *Godfrey v. Furzo*, 3 P. Will. 185; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 278, 279, 287. The judgment of Lord Ellenborough, in *Taylor v. Plumer*, 3 M. & Selw. 562, on this whole subject, is very masterly, and contains a thorough review of all the authorities on the subject-matter of the text. See also *Jackson v. Clarke*, 1 Younge & Jerv. 216.

³ *Lane v. Dighton*, Ambler, R. 409; *Lench v. Lench*, 10 Ves. 517; *Boyd v. McLean*, 1 John. Ch. R. 582.

§ 231. The foregoing cases turn upon the wrongful conduct of the agent in the discharge of his appropriate duties. But the remedy of the principal, to recover back his own property, is not confined to cases where there has been some tortious conversion of it. On the contrary, if there has been no misconduct in the agent, the principal is entitled, in all cases, where he can trace his property, whether it be in the hands of the agent, or of his representatives or assignees, or of third persons, to reclaim it, unless it has been transferred *bonâ fide* to a purchaser without notice; subject, however, to the lien and other rights of the agent.¹ And, in such cases, it is wholly immaterial, whether the property be in its original state, or has been converted into money, or securities, or negotiable instruments, or other property, so only that it is distinguishable and separable from the other property and assets of the agent, and has an ear-mark or other appropriate identity.² Upon this same ground, if an agent purchases property for his principal, and takes a bill of sale in his own name, paying the money of his principal therefor, the latter may compel the agent to transfer the property to him.³ This is a very important right, especially in cases of the bankruptcy, insolvency, or death of the agent.

§ 231 *a*. Cases may also arise, where agents will be responsible to their principals for money of the latter, received by sub-agents, although the money has never reached the hands of the agents. Thus, for example, if an agent is employed to collect and receive payment of bills of exchange, due to the principal, and the agent transmits them to his own private agent to recover the money on the same bills, and orders such sub-agent to place the amount, when received, to his (the agent's) credit, payment to such sub-agent is payment to the original agent; and the principal will be entitled to recover the amount from the agent, although the same may be lost by the failure and insolvency of the sub-agent; for in such case, the loss properly falls on the

¹ 1 Liverm. on Agency, 275-277, (edit. 1818); Ante, §§ 227, 229.

² Taylor v. Plumer, 3 M. & Selw. 562; Veil v. Mitchell's Adm'rs, 4 Wash. Cir. R. 105; Thompson v. Perkins, 3 Mason, R. 232, Scott v. Surman, Willes, R. 400; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 90-95; Jackson v. Clarke, 1 Y. & Jerv. 216; Ante, §§ 228, 229.

³ Hall v. Sprigg, 7 Mill. Louis. R. 245.

agent, and not on the principal.¹ *A fortiori*, this doctrine will apply, where the amount in the hands of the sub-agent is drawn for by the agent, by a bill in favor of a third person, and the bill has been accepted by the sub-agent before his failure and insolvency.²

§ 232. The remarks, which have been already made, as to the responsibility of agents to their principals, apply not only to cases of a sole agency, but also to those of a joint agency. Where joint agents are employed, who have a common interest, they are liable for the acts, misconduct, and omissions of each other, in violation of their duty. Thus, for example, joint factors are liable for each other's doings and omissions; and it will be no discharge of one, that the business has been, in fact, wholly transacted by the other, with the knowledge of the principal; for in such cases, the principal still trusts to the joint responsibility.³ And if the joint agents are to receive a joint commission, or to share in the profits of their business, it will make no difference in their responsibility to the principal, that it is privately agreed between themselves, that neither shall be liable for the acts or losses of the other, but each is to be liable only for his own.⁴

§ 233. The Roman law adopted a similar doctrine, as founded in a most persuasive equity. Thus, in the Digest, the language of Scævola is approved; *Duobus quis mandavit negotiorum administrationem; quæsitum est, an unusquisque mandati iudicio in solidum teneatur? Respondi; unumquemque pro solido conveniri debere; dummodo et utroque non amplius debito exigatur.*⁵

§ 234. The liabilities of agents, which we have been thus far considering, are those which arise by the general principles of law, independent of any special contracts made by the particular parties. It is, of course, competent for the parties to vary, or restrict, or enlarge, these general liabilities, by contract, ac-

¹ Taber v. Perrott, 2 Gallis. R. 565; Ante, § 201; Post, § 429.

² Ibid.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 52, 53; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 4, § 1, p. 79-84, (edit. 1818), Wells v. Ross, 7 Taunt 403.

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 52, 53; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 4, § 1, p. 80-87, (edit. 1818); Godfrey v. Saunders, 3 Wils. R. 94; Waugh v. Carver, 2 H. Bl. 297.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 60, § 2; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 3, art. 13.

according to their pleasure, with the exception, that no contract can be valid, which stipulates to exempt agents from responsibility for their own fraudulent acts. Such a stipulation would be against good morals and public policy, and would be treated therefore as utterly void.¹ In a treatise, like the present, it is not necessary to consider, what would be the true interpretation or result of particular stipulations of this sort. Contracts for a *del credere* commission, which amount to a guaranty of debts contracted on sales by factors, and others, are, however, of so common and general a character, that they may be properly taken notice of, as an appropriate illustration of the enlarged responsibility of agents, resulting from contract. The nature and effect of this species of contract has been already considered.²

CHAPTER IX.

DEFENCES OF AGENTS AGAINST PRINCIPALS.

§ 235. IN this connection, the consideration naturally arises of those matters, which may properly be urged by agents, by way of defence or excuse, to repel the actions and claims brought against them by their principals, for violations or omissions of duty, or other delinquencies, touching their agencies. Some of these have been already incidentally mentioned; but a short recapitulation, in this place, may not be without use. In the first place, the agent may insist, as a matter of defence, that the subject-matter of the agency is an illegal, or an immoral transaction, or is founded in fraud, or against public policy; in all which cases, the principal will not be allowed to maintain any suit for redress of any sort against the agent, touching that transaction.³ And this doctrine not only applies to suits founded

¹ Story on Bailm. § 32; Dig. Lib 50, tit. 17, l 23, Jones on Bailm. 11, 48, Heinecc. Elem. Jurist Inst. Ps. 3, Lib. 3, tit. 14, § 785.

² Ante, §§ 83, 112, 215.

³ Ante, §§ 195, 222; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 8, 20, 74, 75; Baxwell v Christie, Cowp. R. 395; Webster v. De Tastet, 7 T. R. 167; Simpson v. Nicholas,

upon matters of account, or receipts of money, or non-fulfilment of contracts by the agent in the course of such illegal transactions, or flowing therefrom; but it applies equally to the recovery back of the property, which has been intrusted to him, when it has been actually employed in such illegal, fraudulent, or immoral purposes. Thus, if goods are intrusted to an agent, to be smuggled into a country, and sold there against its laws, the principal will be equally disabled to maintain a suit against the agent in the courts of that country for the goods themselves, as he will be to maintain a suit for the proceeds of the goods, if sold.¹ The rule, in all such cases, is, *Melior est conditio possidentis*.²

3 Mees. & Welsb. 240; Story on Conflict of Laws, § 243-262; 1 Story on Equity Jurisp. § 296-308; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 1, § 2, p. 14-22; Thomson v. Thomson, 7 Ves. 470; Canaan v. Bryce, 3 Barn. & Ald. 179; Langton v. Hughes, 1 M. & Selw. 593; Le Guen v. Gouverneur, 1 John. Cases, 436.

¹ Ibid.; Post, § 344-347.

² Edgar v. Fowler, 3 East, R. 222. The doctrine in the text is (I conceive) the true doctrine, notwithstanding some apparent discrepancies in the authorities. Perhaps, where moneys or goods, are deposited with an agent, to effect an illegal object, and before anything is done, the principal repents, and revokes the order, he may recover back the money; for he may have, until there is some part execution of the authority, a locus penitentis. See Ex parte Bulmer, 13 Ves. 313; Taylor v. Lendey, 9 East, R. 49; Hastelow v. Jackson, 8 Barn. & Cressw. 222. But, if the moneys, or goods, have been actually put into a course of execution of the illegal purpose, it will be otherwise. Thus, if goods have been delivered to an agent, to be smuggled into the country, and they have been actually shipped and smuggled into the country, the principal cannot recover them from the agent who withholds them from him. So, if moneys are invested in goods for a like purpose, the money, or goods, cannot afterwards be recovered by the principal from the agent. In such cases the right to recover is necessarily founded upon the very contract for illegal purposes. But, where the recovery from an agent is not sought through, or upon, the illegal contract, but upon a new collateral contract, not illegal, there it may be recovered. Thus, if an agent has received money from third persons for his principal by his authority, which money accrued from an illegal transaction between the principal and such third persons, who had no connection with the agent, the principal may recover it from his agent, for, as between them, the receipt of the money for the principal is upon a legal contract, although the money itself accrued under a former illegal transaction. It is upon some ground of this sort, that we are to understand the cases of Faikney v. R. & nous, 4 Burr. R. 2069, and Petrie v. Hanney, 8 T. Rep. 418, 419; Thomson v. Thomson, 7 Ves. 470; Farmer v. Russell, 1 Bos. & Pull. 296; Tenant v. Elliot, 1 Bos. & Pull. 3. See Ex parte Bulmer, 13 Ves. 313; Steers v. Lashley, 6 T. R. 61; Booth v. Hodgson, 6 T. R. 405; Sullivan v.

§ 236. In the next place, as we have seen, it is a good defence, or rather a good excuse, that the misconduct of the agent has been followed by no loss or damage whatsoever to the principal, for then the rule applies, that although it is a wrong, yet it is without any damage; and, to maintain an action, both must concur; for *Damnum absque injuriâ*, and *Injuria absque damno*, are, in general, equally objections to any recovery¹

§ 237. In the next place, the agent may defend himself by showing, that, although he has violated his instructions or orders, or he has not otherwise performed his undertaking, yet, he has acted under an overwhelming necessity, or has been prevented from acting by a like calamity, or, that what he has done has been from an unexpected or unforeseen emergency, to which the instructions or orders did not, or could not apply, or if they did apply, that he was compelled to act in order to prevent a greater loss, or absolute ruin, to his principal -

§ 238. In the next place, it is a good matter of defence to an action, brought by the principal against his agent for negligence in the performance of his duty, that, if the act had been properly done, the principal could have derived no benefit from it, but it would have been merely void, upon grounds of public

Greaves, 6 T R 406 n., Paley on Agency, by Lloyd pp 125-126. 1 Liverm on Agency, ch 4 § 7, p 467-470 (edit 1818). Indeed some of the cases have been greatly doubted, and especially *Lukner v Reynous*, 4 Barn R 200, and *Petrie v Hanney*, 3 T R 418. See *Aubert v Muz*, 2 Bos & Pull 371. *Canaan v Bryce*, 3 Barn & Ald 17. *Benley v Bignold* 3 Bun & Ald 335, *Ex parte Daniels*, 14 Ves 101. In *Canaan v Bryce*, 3 Bun & Ald 179, it was held, that money, lent to a party to be applied by the borrower to settle illegal transactions, could not be recovered from the borrower. So in *McKinnell v Robinson*, 3 Mees & Wels 434, it was held, that money, lent for gaming to the borrower, could not be recovered from the latter. Indeed, it seems difficult to perceive, how either money, or goods, placed in the hands of an agent for illegal purposes, can be recovered back by the principal, as the delivery of the money, or goods, is in part execution of such purposes, and the possession of the agent is a direct result of the agreement to execute such purposes. But see Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 64-66.

¹ Antc, § 222, Post, § 238.

² Ante, §§ 85, 118, 193-197, 208, 3 Chitty on Comm and Manuf ch 3, p 218; *The Gratitude*, 1 Rob R 257, 340, 1 Liverm on Agency, ch 8, § 2, pp 368, 369, (edit. 1818), *Dusar v Perit*, 4 Bun R 361, *Forrester v Boardman*, 1 Story, R. 48.

policy.¹ Upon this ground it was formerly held, that, if an agent sells goods to be delivered at a future day, and, at the time, the principal neither has the goods, nor has entered into any prior contract to buy them, nor has any reasonable expectation of receiving them on consignment, but he means to go into the market and buy the goods, which the agent has contracted to deliver, no action will lie against the agent for any negligence in such sale; because the principal himself cannot maintain an action upon such a contract of sale made by himself; since such a contract amounts, on the part of the vendor, to a wager on the price of the commodity, and is attended with such mischievous consequences, as to be prohibited by public policy.² This case has been since overruled;³ but, although it can no longer be relied on, as a fit illustration of the doctrine above stated; yet there can be no doubt, that the principle, on which it is founded, is entirely correct, that the principal cannot avail himself of a right of action against his agent for negligence

¹ Ante, §§ 222, 235.

² *Bryan v. Lewis*, 1 Ryan & Mood. R. 386.

³ *Hibblewhite v. McMorine*, 6 Mees & Welsb 202. In this case Mr. Baron Parke said. "I have always entertained considerable doubt and suspicion as to the correctness of Lord Tenterden's doctrine in *Bryan v. Lewis*; it excited a good deal of surprise in my mind at the time; and, when examined, I think it is untenable. I cannot see what principle of law is at all affected by a man's being allowed to contract for the sale of goods, of which he has not possession at the time of the bargain, and has no reasonable expectation of receiving. Such a contract does not amount to a wager, inasmuch as both the contracting parties are not cognizant of the fact, that the goods are not in the vendor's possession; and, even if it were a wager, it is not illegal, because it has no necessary tendency to injure third parties. The dictum of Lord Tenterden certainly was not a hasty observation, thrown out by him, because it appears from the case of *Lorymer v. Smith*, that he had entertained and expressed similar notions four years before. He did not, indeed, in that case, say that such a contract was void, but only, that it was of a kind not to be encouraged; and the strong opinion he afterwards expressed appears to have gradually formed in his mind during the interval, and was, no doubt, confirmed by the effects of the unfortunate mercantile speculations throughout the country about that time. 'There is no indication in any of the books of such a doctrine having ever been promulgated from the Bench, until the case of *Lorymer v. Smith*, in the year 1822; and there is no case, which has since been decided on that authority. Not only, then, was the doubt expressed by Bosanquet, J., in *Wells v. Porter*, well founded, but the doctrine is clearly contrary to law." Mr. Baron Alderson and Mr. Baron Maule fully supported the same doctrine. Ante, § 49, note.

or misconduct in a contract between them, which is against public policy. Supposing, however, the case really to be, in the understanding and contemplation of both parties, a mere wager on the future state of the markets, although in the form of a contract of sale, there can be little doubt, that it ought to be deemed a gaming speculation, which no Court should enforce or encourage, and which, at least in States where mere wagers are held to be void at the common law, as against public policy, would be held incapable of sustaining any action for any breach of the contract.¹

¹ By the civil law, things not in existence, or possession, or ownership, might be sold. Thus, for example, fruits, which shall be gathered and are not yet in existence, animals not yet born, the next grapes of a vineyard, the wine of the next vintage may be sold. *Nec emptio nec venditio sine re, quæ veniat, potest intelligi. Et tamen fructus, et partus futuri recte ementur; ut, cum editus esset partus, jam tunc, cum contractum esset negotium, venditio facta intelligitur.* Dig. Lib. 18, tit. 1, l. 8; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 18, tit. 1, n. 4-6. Here, the distinction is clearly taken between an executed sale, and a contract of sale, or executory sale. Each is good. Sed, si delegerit venditor, ne nascatur, aut fiant, ex empto agi posse. Dig. Lib. 18, tit. 1, l. 8; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 18, tit. 1, n. 6; Pothier, Contrat de Vente, n. 5-7. So, a mere hope, or expectation in a thing, could be sold; as for example, the next draught of a fish net, or capture by a bird-trap, or bird shot. Aliquando tamen, et sine re, venditio intelligitur, veluti, cum quasi alea emitur; quod fit, cum captus piscium, vel asinum, vel missilium emitur; emptio enim contrahitur, etiamsi nihil incidit, quia spes emptio est. Dig. Lib. 18, tit. 1, l. 8, § 1. See also Pothier, Pand. Lib. 18, tit. 1, n. 8, 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 2, § 4, art. 3, 4; Hein. Elem. Jur. Instit. Lib. 3, tit. 24, § 905; Pothier, Contrat de Vente, n. 5-7. See Mr. Cushing's valuable translation of Pothier on Sale, n. 5-7, pp. 4, 5. So, by the civil law, a sale, and a contract of sale, could be made by a person who was not owner, even without the consent the owner. *Rem alienam distrahere quem posse, nulla dubitatio est; nam emptio est et venditio. Sed res emptori auferri potest.* Dig. Lib. 18, tit. 1, l. 28; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 18, tit. 1, n. 18; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 2, § 4, art. 13. Pothier, Contrat de Vente, n. 7; Pothier on Oblig. n. 133, 136. Contracts for the sale of things, which the seller has not, at the time, are very common in stock-jobbing transactions; and, if the doctrine in the case of Bryant v. Lewis, (1 Ryan & Mood. R. 386, ante, § 238) be correct, then, it would seem, that upon the principles of the common law, no action could be maintained by the seller for the price, upon a sale of stock, deliverable at a future day, which the seller did not then own, or had not a title to; but which he meant to buy in the market at or before the day of delivery. And, if the buyer also knew the facts, he could not maintain an action for the non-delivery under the same contract. It would seem, from the case of Cud v. Rutter, 1 P. Will. 570; S. C. 5 Vin. Abridg. p. 388, pl. 21, that such stock contracts were not properly the subjects of an immediate sale,

§ 239. But the most important point of defence, usually occurring in practice to suits for breaches of duty by agents, is that, which involves the question of a ratification by the principal, of the acts, or doings, or omissions of his agent. Where the principal, upon a full knowledge of all the circumstances of the case,¹ deliberately ratifies the acts, doings or omissions of his agent, he will be bound thereby, as fully to all intents and purposes,² as if he had originally given him direct authority in the premises, to the extent, which such acts, doings, or omissions reach. The maxim of the common law is, and it has been fully adopted into maritime and commercial jurisprudence; *Omnis ratihibitio retrahitur, et mandato priori equiparatur.*³ This most useful and convenient rule was as fully recognized in the Roman law; *Si quis ratum habuerit, quod gestum est, obstringitur mandati actione.*⁴ *Rati enim habitio mandato comparatur.*⁵ And the same rule was applied, (as Cujacius informs us,) even to the case of an unauthorized person, (*negotiorum gestor*;) who interfered in the concerns of another party; *Ratihabito tamen facit, ut videatur negotium meum gestum, et crit mutua actio negotiorum gestorum. Verum est, esse negotiorum gestorum actionem, si ratum habuero; sed tentari potest, esse etiam mandati actionem. Nam ratihibitio duplicem vim habet,*

since no sale can be without a present thing, on which it can operate. But they might properly constitute the subject of a contract of sale, to operate and take effect in futuro. See 2 Black. Comm. 446.

[¹ This is essential. *Hardeman v. Ford*, 12 Georgia, 205; *Billings v. Morrow*, 7 Calif. 171; *Pittsburgh Railroad v. Garzam*, 32 Penn St. R. 340.]

² *Frixione v. Tagliaferro*, 10 E. F. Moore, P. C. 174.

³ Post, § 445, Co. Litt. 207, *Wolf v. Horneastle*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 316; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 2, § 4, pp 44, 47, (ed. 1818;) 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 197, 198; *Armstrong v. Gilchrist*, 2 Johns. Cas. 424; 4 Coke, Ins. 317; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 324, *Smith on Merc. Law*, 47, 60; *Odiorne v. Maxcy*, 18 Mass. R. 178; *Conn v. Penn*, 1 Peters, Cir. R. 496; *Pratt v. Putnam*, 13 Mass. R. 361; *Fisher v. Willard*, 18 Mass. R. 379; *Boynton v. Turner*, 18 Mass. R. 391; *Copeland v. Merchants' Insur. Co.* 6 Pick. 198, *Prince v. Clark*, 1 Barn. & Cressw. R. 186, *Horsley v. Bell*, 1 Brown, Ch. R. 101, note; *S. C. Ambler*, R. 770; *Dén v. Wright*, 1 Peters, Cir. R. 72; *Breedlove v. Wamack*, 14 Martin, R. 181; *Buchanan v. Upshaw*, 1 Howard, Sup Ct. R. 56; *S. C.* 17 Peters, R. 40.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 60; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 2, § 4, p. 44; *Pothier*, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 19.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 48, tit. 3, l. 12, § 4.

*ut alienum negotium meum faciat, et habeat etiam vim mandati.*¹ Pothier has commented on this doctrine in the following terms; *Et negotiorum gestorum actionibus locus est, quia sine mandato gestum est; et mandati etiam agi potest propter ratihabitionem, quæ æquipollet mandato. Electio est utriusque actionis.*² Pothier has added: *Quinetiam et ratihabito mandato æquipollet.*³ The modern nations of continental Europe, following the civil law, have adopted the same enlarged policy.⁴

§ 240. At the common law, however, there is a distinction between the ratification of acts, which are void, and the ratification of acts, which are voidable. In the former case, the ratification is inoperative for any purpose whatsoever; in the latter, full validity is given to the acts.⁵ The groundwork of this distinction seems to be, that a ratification of a void act only confirms it in its invalidity; which is a subtlety in reasoning, more dependent upon artificial and technical rules, than expressive of the real intent of the parties.⁶

§ 241. The principle is applied with far more justice and propriety to cases of contracts, and acts, which are illegal, or immoral, or against public policy; for, in such cases, the original contracts, or acts, being void, ought not to be allowed to acquire any validity from their being subsequently confirmed; since the same noxious qualities adhere to the ratification, as existed in the original transaction; and, therefore, the maxim

¹ Cujac ad. L. 60, de Reg. Juris (Lab. 50. tit. 17, l. 60.) Tome 8, col. 784, (Neap. edit. 1758.)

² Pothier, Land. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 19, note, (2); Pothier on Oblig. n. 75; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 2, § 4, pp. 44, 45, 50-52, and note, (edit 1818)

³ Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 19, Id. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 18.

⁴ Pothier on Oblig. n. 76. See the effect of a ratification of the acts of a sub-agent, post, § 389.

⁵ Co. Litt. 295 b, 306 b; and Ibid. Harg. and Butler's note (1); Gilb. on Tenures, 75; Dyer, Rep. 263, pl. 37, 1 Story on Equity Jurisp. § 307; Com. Dig. Confirmation, D. 1.

⁶ Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters, R. 661, 662. In deeds of confirmation, the distinction turns upon the legal effect of the words, "ratify, approve and confirm;" for if the words, "give and grant" be also in the deed, it will take effect, not as a confirmation, but as a grant. See Co. Litt. 295 b, 307 a. Lord Coke says: "A confirmation doth not strengthen a void estate; for a confirmation may make a voidable or defeasible estate good, but it cannot work upon an estate that is void in law." Co. Litt. 295 b; Com. Dig. Confirmation, D. 1.

may well be applied; *Quod ab initio non valet, tractu temporis non convalescit*.¹

§ 242. But, whatever may be the force of this distinction in the former class of cases, (that is to say, in cases not illegal, immoral, or against public policy,) when understood in its true meaning, and with its true limitations, it is not applicable to cases of agency, where a party assumes to act, not for himself, but for another, without any authority whatsoever, or by an excess of the authority delegated to him.² In all such cases, if the principal subsequently ratifies the act, he is bound by it, whether it be for his detriment, or for his advantage; and whether it be founded upon a tort, or upon a contract.³ And a ratification, once deliberately made, with a full knowledge of all the material circumstances, cannot be recalled.⁴ Of course, this doctrine is to be understood with the qualification, that if the act of the agent be in the name of his principal, by an instrument [necessarily]⁵ under seal, without authority, the ratification must be under seal also; since (as we have seen) the principal is not bound by any act of his agent under seal, unless the authority of the principal has also been originally given to the agent under his seal.⁶ A

¹ 1 Story on Equity Jurisp. § 307.

² See *Merrifield v. Parritt*, 11 Cush. 598.

³ 7 H. 4, p. 35, 4 Inst. 317; *Hagedorn v. Oliverson*, 2 M. & Selw. 485; *Lucena v. Craufurd*, 5 Bos. & Pull. 269; *Routh v. Thompson*, 13 East, 274; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 112-115, 171, 172, 324, and note; *Wilson v. Poulter*, 2 Str. R. 859; *Taylor v. Plumer*, 3 M. & Selw. 562, 580; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 44-52, Id. 391-396, (edit. 1818); *Rogers v. Kneeland*, 10 Wend. R. 218; *Lench v. Lench*, 10 Ves. 517, *Kelly v. Munson*, 7 Mass. R. 319. This point arose as long ago as in the Year Book, 7 Henry 4, p. 35. There a party justified, as bailiff, taking a heriot, for services due to the lord; and the issue was on the point, that he was not bailiff, and it was held, that, if he took the heriot, claiming property therein for himself, the subsequent agreement of the lord would not amount to a ratification, making him bailiff at the time. But, if he took at the time, as bailiff of the lord, and not for himself, without command of the lord, yet the subsequent ratification made good his act, and made him bailiff at the time. The same point was held by Anderson, C. J., in *Godbolt*, 109, and was cited by Taddy, as counsel, and not denied in *Hagedorn v. Oliverson*, 2 Maul. & Selw. 487, 488. See also *Moore v. Hush*, 11 Rob. R. 63; Post, § 246, note.

⁴ Post, § 250; *Breck v. Jones*, 16 Texas, 461.

⁵ If the act of the agent was unnecessarily under seal, it might be ratified by parol.

⁶ Ante, § 40; *Wells v. Evans*, 20 Wend. R. 251; *Blood v. Goodrich*, 12 Wend.

ratification cannot, in this respect, stand upon a higher ground, than an original authority.¹ [And, generally, if the adoption of any particular form or mode is necessary to confer the authority in the first instance, there can be no valid ratification except in the same manner.²]

§ 243. Hence it follows, that, if an agent has, by a deviation from his orders, or by any other misconduct, or omission of duty, become responsible to his principal for damages, he will be discharged therefrom by the ratification of his acts, or omissions, by the principal, if made with a full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances.³ This latter is a most important qualification of the doctrine, and indispensable to its legal, as well as its equitable operation.⁴ For, if the ratification by the principal be without such knowledge, it will not be obligatory upon him, whether his want of knowledge arise from the designed, or the undesigned, concealment or misrepresentation of the agent, or from his mere innocent inadvertence.⁵

R. 525; *Hunter v. Parker*, 7 Mees. & Welsb. 322, 343; Story on Partn. § 117-122; *Contrà*, *Cady v. Shepherd*, 11 Pick. R. 400; Ante, § 49; Post, § 252. *Skinner v. Dayton*, 19 John. R. 513; *Gram v. Seton*, 1 Hall, 262; Story on Partn. §§ 121, 122.

¹ Ante, § 49; *Blood v. Goodrich*, 9 Wend. R. 65; S. C. 12 Wend. R. 525; *Hanford v. McNair*, 9 Wend. R. 54; *Wells v. Evans*, 20 Wend. R. 251; *Hunter v. Parker*, 7 Mees. & Welsb. 322, 343; Story on Partn. § 117-122; *Hibblewhite v. McMorine*, 6 Mees. & Welsb. 200, 214, 215; Story on Partn. §§ 121, 122, note; *McNaughton v. Partridge*, 11 Ohio R. 223. But see *contrà*, *Cady v. Shepherd*, 11 Pick. 400; *Skinner v. Dayton*, 19 John. R. 513; *Gram v. Seton*, 1 Hall, R. 262; Ante, § 49; Post, § 252.

² *Despatch Line of Packets v. Bellamy Manuf. Co.* 12 New Hamp. 232.

³ 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 41, 50, 328, 329, 391, 392, 394, (edit. 1818); *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 31, 114, 171, 329; *Smith v. Cologan*, 2 T. R. 188, note; *Towle v. Jackson*, 1 John. Cas. 110; *Codwise v. Hacker*, 1 Can. R. 526; *Cairnes v. Blecker*, 12 John. R. 300; *Owings v. Hull*, 9 Peters, R. 607; *Thorndike v. Godfrey*, 3 Greenl. R. 429.

⁴ *Nixon v. Palmer*, 4 Seld. 401.

⁵ See *Copeland v. Merchants' Ins. Co.* 6 Pick. 202, 204; *Bell v. Cunningham*, 3 Peters, R. 69, 81; *Horsfall v. Fauntleroy*, 10 Barn. & Cressw. 755; *Owings v. Hull*, 9 Peters, R. 607; *Thorndike v. Godfrey*, 3 Greenl. 429. Upon the same ground, in *Horsfall v. Fauntleroy*, 10 Barn. & Cressw. 755, Mr. Justice Parke held, that, where an agent has stated to his principal, and the latter has *bonâ fide* adopted, a contract, different from that, under which the purchase was actually made, the seller cannot call upon the principal for payment; because the seller

§ 244. A ratification, also, when fairly made, will have the same effect as an original authority has, to bind the principal, not only in regard to the agent himself, but in regard to third persons.¹ Therefore, a tortious act, done by an agent, which would, if authorized, give an action for damages to a third person against the principal, will, if subsequently ratified by the principal, give the same right to damages against him; as much so, as if the action were founded on a ratified contract of the agent.² In short, the act is treated throughout, as if it were originally authorized by the principal; for the ratification relates back to the time of the inception of the transaction, and has a complete retroactive efficacy; or, as the maxim above cited expresses it, *Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur*. Hence it is, that, if the agent has made a contract without authority from his principal, or beyond his authority, and it is afterwards ratified, the principal may generally sue, and be sued thereon, in the same manner, and with the same effect, as if he had originally given the authority. Therefore, if a person, without authority, has made a purchase of goods for his principal, and has signed a bought note therefor, if the principal, after full knowledge of the transaction, ratifies it, that will make the signing a good signing within the statute of frauds, so as to bind both the parties to the contract.³ In like manner, the agent will be entitled to the same

sues on the contract, under which the goods were really sold; and he is, therefore, bound to show, that the principal authorized, or ratified the contract, and not a different one, substituted by the agent.

¹ Smith on Merc. Law, 60, (2d edit.); Id. ch. 5, § 4, p. 108, (2d edit. 1843); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 171, 172, 211; Frothingham v. Haley, 3 Mass. R. 68, 70; Lent v. Padelford, 10 Mass. R. 230, McClean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. R. 722; Soames v. Spencer, 1 Dowl. & Ry. 32; Spittle v. Lavender, 2 Brod. & Bing. 452, Rogers v. Kneeland, 10 Wend. R. 218. How far, and when, a ratification by the principal of the unauthorized acts of his agent will operate to give him rights against third persons, we shall hereafter have occasion to consider. See, on the point, Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 343-347; Id. 191, note (c); Post, § 245; Stainer v. Tysen, 3 Hill, R. 279; Marr v. Plumer, 3 Greenl. R. 73, Buchanan v. Upshaw, 1 Howard, Sup. Ct. R. 56; S. C. 17 Peters, R. 70.

² Rogers v. Kneeland, 10 Wend. R. 218.

³ Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. R. 722; Kinnitz v. Surry, cited Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 171, note, Soames v. Spencer, 1 Dowl. & Ry. 32. Lord Chief Justice Best, in delivering the opinion of the Court, in Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. R. 722, said: "It has been argued that the subsequent adoption of the contract by Dunn

rights and remedies, and to the same compensations, and will be subject to the same duties and responsibilities, as if he had been acting within the scope of an acknowledged original authority.¹

§ 246. But, although the ratification of an unauthorized act of an agent, acting without any authority, or beyond his authority, will thus, in general, bind the principal, not only as to his agent, but as to third persons, and give the ordinary rights and remedies, both for and against him; yet this doctrine is to be received with some qualifications, or, rather, it is not universally applicable.² Where an act is beneficial to the principal, and does not create an immediate right to have some other act or duty performed by a third person, but amounts simply to the assertion of a right on the part of the principal, there the rule seems generally applicable. Thus, for example, if a continual claim, or an entry

will not take this case out of the operation of the statute of frauds, and it has been insisted, that the agent should have his authority at the time the contract is entered into. If such had been the intention of the legislature, it would have been expressed more clearly. But the statute only requires some note or memorandum in writing, to be signed by the party to be charged, or his agent, thereunto lawfully authorized, leaving us to the rules of common law, as to the mode in which the agent is to receive his authority. Now, in all other cases, a subsequent sanction is considered the same thing in effect as assent at the time. *Omnis ratihabito retrotrahitur, et mandato aequiparatur.* And, in my opinion, the subsequent sanction of a contract, signed by an agent, takes it out of the operation of the statute more satisfactorily than an authority given beforehand. Where the authority is given beforehand, the party must trust to his agent, if it be given subsequently to the contract, the party knows that all has been done according to his wishes. But in *Kinnitz v. Surry*, where the broker, who signed the broker's note upon a sale of corn, was the seller's agent, Lord Ellenborough held, that, if the buyer acted upon the note, that was such an adoption of his agency as made his note sufficient within the statute of frauds. And in *Soames v. Spencer*, where, A and B, being jointly interested in a quantity of oil, A entered into a contract for the sale of it, without the authority or knowledge of B, who, upon receiving information of the circumstance, refused to be bound, but afterwards assented by parol, and samples were delivered to the vendees, it was held, in an action against the vendees, that B's subsequent ratification of the contract rendered it binding; and that it was to be considered as a contract in writing within the statute of frauds. That is an express decision on the point, that under the statute of frauds the ratification of the principal relates back to the time when the agent made the contract."

¹ See *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 31; *Cornwall v. Wilson*, 1 Ves. 509; *Hopkins v. Molineux*, 4 Wend. R. 465.

² Post, § 246.

to avoid a fine, or an entry for condition broken, is made by a person having no present authority, the principal may bring an action upon any of these acts, and his ratification or adoption of them will supply the want of an original authority.¹

§ 246. On the other hand, if the act done by such person would, if authorized, create a right to have some act or duty performed by a third person, so as to subject him to damages or losses, for the non-performance of that act or duty, or would defeat a right or an estate already vested in the latter, there the subsequent ratification or adoption of the unauthorized act by the principal will not give validity to it, so as to bind such third person to the consequences. Thus, if a lease contains a condition, that it may be determined by either party upon six months' notice; such notice, given by an unauthorized person for the landlord, although subsequently ratified and adopted by the latter, will not be a valid notice to determine the lease.² The ground of this decision is, that it is a notice to defeat an estate, and the tenant is entitled to such notice as he can act upon with certainty at the time when he receives it, so that he may deliver up the possession at the end of the six months, without being liable to further claims in respect to the remainder of the term.³ The case is distinguishable from that of an entry without authority, for a condition broken; because, in the latter case, the third person's act is not to depend upon the validity of the entry at the time when it is made. The rule, *Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur, et mandato priori æquiparatur*, seems applicable only to cases, where the conduct of the parties, on whom it is to operate, not being referable to any agreement, cannot, in the meantime, depend on the fact, whether there be a ratification or not.⁴

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 345, Co. Litt. 258 a, *Fitchett v. Adams*, 2 Strange, R. 1128, *Goodtitle v. Woodward*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 689. See note to § 246.

² *Buron v. Denman*, 2 Exch. R. 167.

³ *Right d. Fisher v. Cuthell*, 5 East, 491, *Doe d. Mann v. Walters*, 10 Barn. & Cressw. 626; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 190, note, (c); *Id.* 343-347. The same point was expressly held in *Doe d. Lyster v. Goldwin*, 2 Adolph. & Ell. New R. 148.

⁴ *Right d. Fisher v. Cuthell*, 5 East, 498-500; *Doe d. Mann v. Walters*, 10

§ 247. Upon similar grounds, a demand upon a debtor, and refusal by him to pay a debt made by an unauthorized agent, will not take away the right of the debtor to plead a prior tender of the debt to the principal; for, as the agent had no authority to make the demand, payment to him would not have discharged the debtor from the debt. The subsequent adoption of the act by the principal would not vary the right of the debtor in such a case, since he could not safely pay to one, who was without authority at the time to receive the money, and to give a discharge.¹ So, a demand of goods, made by an unauthorized person, will not, although subsequently adopted by the principal, be evidence to support an action of trover for a conversion against the party in whose possession the goods were, and of whom they were demanded.² So, a demand made by a person not authorized, of payment of a promissory note or of a bill of exchange, will not, even though afterwards ratified by the holder, constitute a good demand upon the party, so as to make him liable for damages

Barn & Cressw 626. *S P Doe d Lyster v Goldwin*, 2 Adolph & Ell New R. 143. The cases on this subject are not entirely in harmony with each other. Thus, in *Roe v Pierce*, 2 Camp R 96 a verbal notice to quit by a steward of a corporation, was held ratified and binding by the corporation's bringing a suit, founded upon that notice. And in *Goodtitle v Woodward* 3 Barn & Ald 689, a notice to quit, given by an agent for several trustees jointly interested, but acting by a written authority, signed by some only of the trustees, was held good by the adoption of all the trustees, by bringing a suit thereon. And the Court held, that the maxim, *Omnis ratihabito retrotrahitur*, applied to the case. This last case may, however be now supported on another distinct ground, that the notice by some of the trustees was good originally for all. *Doe v. Summersett*, 1 Barn. & Adolph R. 135. But the ground of the decision, as stated in 3 Barn. & Ald. 689, is certainly inconsistent with the cases of *Right v Cuthell*, 5 East, 491, and *Doe v. Walters*, 10 Barn. & Cressw 626, and *Doe d Lyster v Goldwin*, 2 Adolph. & Ell. New R. 113. See Mr Lloyd's note to Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 190, note (c). It must be admitted, that the distinction between the effect of a ratification enforcing the right of the principal, as, for example, an entry to avoid a fine, or for condition broken, and the effect of a ratification in a case where the other party is to do some act, or to suffer some loss thereby, is one of considerable nicety, and stands upon reasoning not very satisfactory or very clear. See ante, § 242, note.

¹ *Coore v. Callaway*, 1 Esp R 115; *Coles v. Bell*, 1 Camp R 478, note. Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 345, 346.

² *Solomons v. Dawes*, 1 Esp. Rep 83, Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 343, 345, 346.

for his default in payment.¹ So, notice of the dishonor of a promissory note, or of a bill of exchange, by a mere stranger, not a party to the same bill, or authorized thereto, will not be a good notice to bind an indorser or drawer.² So, also, where A does an act as agent for B, without any communication with C, C cannot, by afterwards adopting that act, make A his agent, and thereby incur any liability, or take any benefit under the act of A.³ Let us now return to the effect of a ratification by the principal in ordinary cases.

§ 248. As, from what has been already said, the principal thus acquires a right to elect, whether he will adopt the unauthorized act, or not, it must be admitted, that the parties do not generally stand upon equal terms; since the principal may always elect to ratify the act, if it is for his benefit, and to disavow it, if it is to his injury. But this consequence has never been allowed to overcome the force of the general doctrine. Thus, for example, where an unauthorized agent procured an insurance to be made upon a certain ship for the benefit of the owner thereof; and the ship was lost during the voyage; and long after the loss the owner ratified the insurance, and a suit was brought against the underwriters; it was held to be no objection to the recovery, that the ratification was not until long after the loss, and that the owner would not have been bound to pay the premium, if the ship had safely arrived. For the agent had still a right to effect the insurance, and to take the chance of its being adopted; and he could not have recovered back the premium, paid by him to the underwriters, upon the ground, that he had no authority, and that, therefore, there was no interest insured; because the underwriters would have borne the risk, until there had been a disavowal by the principal.⁴

¹ *Freeman v Boynton*, 7 Mass. R. 483; *Bank of Utica v. Smith*, 18 Johns. 230; *Chitty on Bills*, ch. 9, p. 398, (8th edit 1833)

² *Tindal v Brown*, 1 T. R. 167, *Stanton v Blossom*, 14 Mass. R. 116, *Stewart v. Kennet*, 2 Camp. R. 177, Ex parte Barclay, 7 Ves. 597, *Chitty on Bills*, ch. 8, p. 368, (8th edit 1833), *Story on Bills of Exchange*, §§ 303, 304.

³ *Wilson v. Tufanjan*, 6 Mann. & Grang. 286.

⁴ *Hagedorn v. Oliverson*, 2 M. & Selw. 485, *Routh v. Thompson*, 13 East, R. 279; 1 *Liverm on Agency*, 49, 395, 396, (edit. 1818) See also *Emerigon*, Tome 1, ch. 5, § 6, p. 142-146; 3 *Kent, Comm. Lect.* 48, pp. 260, 261, (4th edit.); 1 *Phillips on Insur.* ch. 22, p. 519; 2 *Phillips on Insur.* ch. 22, p. 357-359; *Barlow v. Leckie*, 4 J. B. Moore, R. 8.

§ 249. And not only will the principal be bound by a ratification of the unauthorized act of his agent; but if the latter has improperly substituted another agent under him, the ratification by the principal of the acts of the sub-agent will, to all intents and purposes, bind him, in the same manner, as if he had originally given to the agent a power of substitution.¹ The Roman law recognized the same doctrine. *Sed et in ipsum procuratorem, si omnium rerum procurator est, dari debet institoria. Sed et si quis, meam rem gerens, præposuerit, et ratum habuerit, idem erit dicendum.*² (*Id est, dari debet institoria actio.*)

§ 250. Another consideration, very important in cases of this sort, is, that the principal cannot, of his own mere authority, ratify a transaction in part, and repudiate it as to the rest. He must either adopt the whole, or none. And hence the general rule is deduced, that, where a ratification is established, as to a part, it operates as a confirmation of the whole of that particular transaction of the agent.³ It may be added, that a ratification, once deliberately made, upon full knowledge of all the material circumstances, becomes, *eo instanti*, obligatory, and cannot afterwards be revoked or recalled.⁴

§ 251. Where a contract, which has been originally made by an agent without authority, is afterwards ratified by the principal, that ratification will, in general, relieve the agent from all

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 171, and note, *Id* 175, 176, *Blair v. Sutton*, 3 Meriv. 216; *Soames v. Spencer*, 1 Dowl. & Ry. 32; *Henderson v. Barnwall*, 1 Y. & Jerv. 387; *Kinnitz v. Sutley*, cited Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 171, note; *Smith v. Cologan*, 2 T. R. 188, n., 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 206; *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 253, 251, 252.

² Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 6, 7, Pothier Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 18.

³ *Smith on Merc. Law*, 60, (3d edit.), *Id* ch. 5, § 1, p. 108, (3d edit. 1843); *Wilson v. Fulter*, 2 Str. 859; *Billon v. Hyde*, 1 Atk. 128, *Smith v. Hodson*, 4 T. R. 211; *Hovil v. Pack*, 7 East, R. 164; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 31, *Id*. 113, 114, 171, 172, 325, *Indley v. Breedlove*, 16 Martin, R. 105, 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 197, 198; *Cornwall v. Wilson*, 1 Ves. 509, *Newall v. Hurlbert*, 2 Vermont R. 351, *Benedict v. Smith*, 10 Paige, R. 126, *Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Walworth*, 1 Comstock, 434, *Menkens v. Watson*, 27 Missouri, 163.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Ferguson v. Carrington*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 59, *Corning v. Southland*, 3 Hill, R. 552; *Menkens v. Watson*, 27 Missouri, 163.

⁵ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 197, 198, *Smith v. Cologan*, 2 T. R. 188, note; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 171, 172; *Clarke's Executors v. Van Reimsdyk*, 9 Cranch, R. 158; *Ante*, § 242.

responsibility on the contract, if it purports to be executed by him merely as an agent, although without such ratification he would be liable to the other contracting party for his misrepresentation or mistake of authority. Thus, if a person should in his own name, but in the character of agent of the owner, sign a written agreement for the sale of an estate, without any authority from the owner, and the latter should afterwards sign the same agreement, and declare thereon, that he sanctioned and approved of the agent's having signed it in his behalf, the agent will no longer be personally liable on the contract; but his principal only will be liable, even although the agent without such ratification, might have been liable thereon.¹

§ 251 *a*. One other consideration is important to be borne in mind. It is, that a ratification can only be effectual between the parties, when the act is done by the agent avowedly for, or on account of the principal, and not when it is done for, or on account of the agent himself, or of some third person. This would seem to be an obvious deduction from the very nature of a ratification, which presupposes the act to be done for another, but without competent authority from him; and therefore gives the same effect to the act as if it had been done by the authority of the party for whom it purported to have been done and as his own act. Hence it has been laid down as a maxim of the canon law, *Ratum quis habere non potest, quod ipsius nomine non est gestum*.² The same rule was early recognized in the common

¹ *Spittle v. Lavender*, 2 Brod. & Bing. 452; *Post*, § 278, note. See *Collins v. Butts*, 10 Wend. 399; *Lucas v. Barrett*, 1 Greene, (Iowa,) Rep. 511. Whether a person who has signed an instrument, as agent, but without authority, will be responsible, either on the instrument itself, or by a special action on the case, to the other party, if his principal afterwards ratifies his act, has been a matter of some diversity of judicial opinion. In *Hallou v. Talbot*, 16 Mass. R. 461, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held incidentally, that he will not be liable after such a ratification. In *Rossiter v. Rossiter*, 8 Wend. R. 494, the Supreme Court of New York intimated a different opinion. See also *Palmer v. Stephens*, 1 Denio, R. 472. Upon principle, it would seem, that the ratification will make the instrument binding on the principal, in the same manner, and to the same extent, as if he had originally authorized it; and, of course, the agent will not, under such circumstances, render himself personally liable, unless, by the form of the instrument, he has included a personal liability. *Post*, § 264, note.

² See the learned note of the Reporter to the case of *Wilson v. Tumman*, 6 Mann. & Grang. 239, note (a).

law, and has been recently explained in the most satisfactory manner.¹

§ 252. Having stated the general nature and effect of a ratification, it remains to consider, what acts of the principal will amount to a ratification. Whenever there is an express assent to, or an express confirmation of, the transaction, there can be but little difficulty in applying the doctrine. If the act of the agent purports to be under seal, and in the name of the principal, so as to be his deed, the ratification also must, as we have seen, be by an instrument under seal.² But, in other cases, however informal the instrument may be in its structure and language, if it can be gathered from the contents, that an express ratification is intended, that will suffice.

§ 253. But by far the largest class of cases of ratifications of unsealed contracts arises by implication from the acts and proceedings of the principal *in pais*: for it is by no means necessary, that there should be any positive or direct confirmation.³ And,

¹ *Wilson v. Tuman*, 6 Mann & Grang 236. On this occasion Lord Chief Justice Tindall said: "That an act done, for another, by a person, not assuming to act for himself, but for such other person, though without any precedent authority whatever, becomes the act of the principal if subsequently ratified by him, is the known and well-established rule of law. In that case the principal is bound by the act, whether it be for his detriment or his advantage, and whether it be founded on a tort or a contract, to the same extent as by, and with all the consequences which follow from, the same act done by his previous authority. Such was the precise distinction taken in the Year-Book, 7 Hen. 4, fo. 35, — that if the bailiff took the heriot, claiming property in it himself, the subsequent agreement of the lord would not amount to a ratification of his authority, as bailiff at the time; but if he took it, at the time, as bailiff of the lord, the subsequent ratification by the lord made him bailiff at the time. The same distinction is also laid down by Anderson, C. J., in Godbolt's Reports, 109. 'If one have cause to distrain my goods, and a stranger, of his own wrong, without any warrant or authority given him by the other, takes my goods, not as bailiff or servant to the other, and I bring an action of trespass against him, can he excuse himself by saying that he did it as his bailiff or servant? can he also father his misdemeanor upon another? He cannot; for once he was a trespasser, and his intent was manifest.'"

² Ante, §§ 49, 242; *Blood v. Goodrich*, 9 Wend. 68; S. C. 12 Wend. R. 565; *Hanford v. McNair*, 9 Wend. R. 57. But see contra, *McNaughten v. Partridge*, 11 Ohio R. 223; *Cady v. Shepherd*, 11 Pick. 400; Ante, §§ 49, 51, 125, 242; *Story on Partnership*, § 122, note.

³ *3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* 197, 198; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 45, (edit. 1818.)

for this purpose, the acts and conduct of the principal are construed liberally in favor of the agent.¹ Where the evidence is doubtful, and may admit of different interpretations, there it seems proper to submit the question for the decision of the jury. But, where they can justly lead to no safe or satisfactory conclusion, a ratification ought not to be presumed.² Slight circumstances and small matters will sometimes suffice to raise the presumption of a ratification.³ [Thus, where a principal, on being informed of a purchase by his agent, in the name of the principal, did not deny the agent's authority to make the purchase, but merely complained of the manner in which it had been exercised, he was held to have admitted the right of the agent to bind him.⁴] But, whenever the acts and conduct of the principal are inconsistent with any other supposition, the presumption of a ratification becomes, of course, far more violent and conclusive. Thus, for example, if an agent who is employed to purchase goods at a limited price should exceed that limit, and the principal, after full knowledge of the facts, should receive them on his own account, without objection, it would be presumed, that he intended to ratify the transaction.⁵ And, *a fortiori*, if the principal should not only receive, but should sell them on his own account.⁶ The same conclusion would arise, under similar circumstances, if the agent had no authority whatsoever to make any purchase. So, if an agent should sell goods contrary to his

¹ Terril v. Flower, 6 Martin, R. 584; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 394; (edit 1818); Codwise v. Hacker, 1 Caines, R. 526; Loraine v. Cartwright, 3 Wash. Cir. R. 151; Bryne v. Doughty, 13 Georgia, 46.

² See Penn. &c. Steam Navigation Co. v. Dandridge, 8 Gill & Johns. R. 248; Horton v. Townes, 6 Leigh, Virg. R. 47; Crooker v. Appleton, 25 Maine R. 131; Barnard v. Wheeler, 24 Maine R. 412; Bryant v. Moore, 26 Maine R. 84.

³ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf 197, 198; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 171, 172; Ward v. Evans, Salk. R. 142; S. C. 2 Ld. Raym. 928; Thorold v. Smith, 11 Mod. R. 87; Conn v Penn, 1 Peters, Cir. R. 496; Loraine v. Cartwright, 3 Wash. Cir. R. 151; Richmond Manuf'g Co. v. Starks, 4 Mason, R. 296, Bank of Columbia v. Paterson's Adm'rs, 7 Cranch, 299; Terril v. Flower, 6 Martin, R. 584; Rogers v. Kuecland, 13 Wend. 114; Codwise v. Hacker, 1 Caines, R. 526.

⁴ Johnson v. Jones, 4 Barbour, Sup. Ct. R. (N. Y.) 369.

⁵ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 113-115; Odiorne v. Maxcy, 13 Mass. R. 178; Clark's Ex'rs v. Van Reimsdyk, 9 Cranch, R. 153.

⁶ See Willinks v. Hollingsworth, 6 Wheat. R. 241, 259.

instructions, and the principal should afterwards receive the proceeds without objection, it would amount to a ratification of the sale.¹ So, if a person should sign or indorse a note, as agent for another, without authority, and the principal should afterwards, upon a full knowledge, promise to pay it accordingly, that would amount to a ratification of the act,² [without any new consideration.³

§ 254. So, if a party should receive a note for collection, and should improperly convert it to his own use, and afterwards the principal, upon notice of all the facts, should take the agent's own note for the amount, he would be bound thereby; and he could not afterwards recover the money from a third person, to whom the converted note had been paid.⁴ So, if a person should, without authority, make a contract to borrow money for a corporation, and the money should be applied to the benefit of the corporation, which should afterwards recognize it as a debt, by paying interest thereon, and passing accounts relative thereto, it would amount to a ratification of the borrowing of the money, on the part of the corporation.⁵

§ 255. Long acquiescence, also, without objection, and even the silence of the principal, will, in many cases, amount to a conclusive presumption of the ratification of an unauthorized act; especially, where such acquiescence is otherwise not to be accounted for; or such silence is either contrary to the duty of the principal, or it has a tendency to mislead the agent.⁶ Thus, for example, if an agent, without authority, should compromise

¹ *Forrester v. Boardman*, 1 Story, R. 43, *Palmerston v. Huxford*, 4 Denio, R. 166.

² *Fenn v. Harrison*, 4 T. R. 177; *Fitzpatrick v. School Commissioners*, 7 Humphreys, 224, *Long v. Coburn*, 11 Mass. R. 98; *Dow v. Spenny*, 29 Missouri, 387.

³ *Commercial Bank v. Warren* 15 N. Y. Rep. (1 Smith.) 577.

⁴ 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 47, 48, (edit 1818), *Cushman v. Loker*, 2 Mass. R. 106.

⁵ *Episcopal Chant Society v. Episcopal Church in Dedham*, 1 Pick. R. 372.

⁶ *Courcier v. Ritter*, 4 Wash. Cir. R. 549; *Erick v. Johnson*, 6 Mass. R. 193; *Amory v. Hamilton*, 17 Mass. R. 103; *Towle v. Stevenson*, 1 Johns. Cas. 110; *Armstrong v. Gilchrist*, 2 Johns. Cas. 124; *Pitts v. Shubert*, 11 Louis. Rep. 288; *Kingston v. Kincaid*, 1 Wash. Cir. R. 153; *Forrestier v. Boardman*, 1 Story, R. 43; *Ante*, § 90; *Norris v. Cook*, 1 Curtis, 464; *Owsley v. Woolhopter*, 14 Georgia, 124; *Wright v. Boynton*, 37 N. H. R. 9.

a debt of his principal, who, after knowledge of the fact, should make no objection, but acquiesce, for a length of time, in the act, he would be held bound by it.¹ [But it has been said that if an agent has a special and limited authority to sell his principal's property, and sells it in violation of that authority, it is not the duty of the principal to seek the purchaser and notify him of his claim; and his mere omission to do so will not ordinarily be a ratification of the sale.²]

[§ 255 *a*. So, where an agent took a demand for collection, and received in payment bills of a bank, the solvency of which he did not know, and took the guaranty of the debtor, with surety, that the bills were good, and, upon making his conduct known to his principal, the latter received the money and guaranty, saying he would see what could be done with the money, and he kept it two or three months before he ascertained its value, when the bills proved to have been worth but twenty cents on the dollar, at the time they were received by the agent; it was held, in an action of account for the deficiency, that the principal had acquiesced, by his conduct, in the doings of the agent.³]

§ 256. Where an agency actually exists, the mere acquiescence of the principal may well give rise to the presumption of an intentional ratification of the act.⁴ The presumption is far less strong, and the mere fact of acquiescence may be deemed far less cogent, where no such relation of agency exists, at the time, between the parties. However, if there are peculiar relations of a different sort between the parties, such as that of father and son, the presumption of a ratification will become more vehement, and the duty of disavowal on the part of the principal more urgent, when the facts are brought to his knowledge.

§ 257. The Roman law, which upon this subject, seems to have proceeded upon the same principles as our law, puts the

¹ 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 45-47, (edit. 1818); *Armstrong v. Gilchrist*, 2 *Johns. Cas.* 424; *Crane v. Bedwell*, 25 *Missis.* 507; *Abbe v. Rood*, 6 *McLean*, 109.

² *White v. Langdon*, 30 *Verm.* 599.

³ *Pickett v. Pierson*, 17 *Vermont R.* 470.

⁴ *Courcier v. Ritter*, 4 *Wash. Cir. R.* 549; *Amory v. Hamilton*, 17 *Mass R.* 103; *Erick v. Johnson*, 6 *Mass. R.* 193; *Fitzsimmons v. Joslin*, 21 *Vermont, R.* 129; *Johnson v. Jones*, 4 *Barbour, Sup. Ct. R. (N. Y.)* 369.

case of a son, who should borrow money in the absence of his father, as if by the authority of the father, and should write to him to pay the money to the lender; and it declares, that, if the father does not approve of the loan, he ought immediately to make known his dissent to the lender, otherwise he will be deemed tacitly to have ratified it.¹ *A fortiori*, the father will be deemed to have ratified the act of borrowing, if he has commenced paying the debt. *Hoc amplius cessabit Senatus-consultum, si pater solvere cepit, quod filiusfamilias mutuum sumpserit, quasi ratum habuerit.*²

§ 258. In respect to silence, whether it operates as a presumptive proof of ratification, may essentially depend upon the particular relations between the parties, and the habits of business, and the usages of trade. In the ordinary course of business between merchants and their correspondents, it is understood to be the duty of the one party, receiving a letter from the

¹ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 6, l. 16, Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 6, n. 6, 1 Liverm. on Agency, 48, 49, (edit. 1818.) The passage is from Paulus, and is as follows: Si Filiusfamilias, absente patre, quasi ex mandato ejus pecuniam acceperit, cavisset, et ad Patrem literas emisit, ut eam pecuniam in provinciam solveret; debet Pater, si actum filii sui improbat, continuo testationem interponere contrariæ voluntatis. Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 6, l. 16. Pothier adds: Alioquin videtur tacite ratum habere. Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 6, n. 6, n. The cases cited in the text, as put in the Roman law, arose under the Macedonian Decree, (so called,) made to prevent young heirs from running into extravagance, by secretly borrowing money during the lives of their fathers, upon a similar policy to that which governs in our law in relation to post-obit bonds. But still they illustrate the general principle. The near relationship between the parties in such cases furnishes a presumption of approbation unless there is a dissent. Emerigon, sur Assur. Tom. 2, ch. 5, § 6, n. 2, pp. 144, 145. Gothofredus, in his commentary on the text of the Digest, says: Literas qui recipit conjunctionis favore, presumitur probare ea omnia, quæ in literis comprehensa sunt, nisi continuo, seu illico, contradicat. Gothofred. ad Senatus Consul. Maced. Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 6, l. 16. Cujacius puts the case expressly upon the ground of an implied ratification, from the silence of the father. Verum, non tam epistola ipsa habetur pro ratihabitione, quam tacitus consensus patris accipientis epistolam missam a filio, qui certe pro ratihabitione est. Cujac. ad L. 59, penult ff. mandati, (Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 59, § 5.) Cujacii Opera, Tom. 6, col. 530, E; Cujac. ad L. 6 ff. ad Sen. Consult. Maced. (Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 6, l. 16.) Cujac. Opera, Tom. 6, col. 226, E; 1 Emerigon, Assur. ch. 5, § 6, p. 145; 1 Liverm. on Agency, p. 48, and notes, (edit. 1818.)

² Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 6, n. 6; Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 6, l. 7, § 15.

other, to answer the same within a reasonable time; and if he does not, it is presumed that he admits the propriety of the acts of his correspondent, and confirms and adopts them. This presumption seems now, in favor of commerce, to be universally acted upon. And, therefore, if the principal having received information, by a letter from his agent, of his acts, touching the business of his principal, does not, within a reasonable time, express his dissent to the agent, he is deemed to approve his acts, and his silence amounts to a ratification of them.¹ Nor is this a principle peculiar to our jurisprudence. It has received the sanction of the Roman law;² and has also been fully recognized by modern commercial jurists on the continent of Europe.³ Even if no such prior relation of principal and agent has existed between the parties, yet, if a party, who has acted for another, gives notice thereof to the principal, and the latter makes no reply, or no objection, it will, in many cases, afford a presumption, that he ratifies the act.⁴

¹ *Liverm. on Agency*, pp. 49, 50, 396, (edit. 1818); *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 31; *Prince v. Clarke*, 1 Barn. & Cressw. 186; *Bell v. Cunningham*, 3 Peters, R. 69, 81; *Cairnes v. Bleecker*, 12 Johns. R. 300; *Courcier v. Ritter*, 4 Wash. Cir. R. 549; *Vianna v. Barclay*, 3 Cowen, R. 281; *Norris v. Cook*, 1 Curtis, Ct. 464; *Predin v. Dubarry*, 14 Serg. & Rawle, 30; *Richmond Manuf. Co. v. Starks*, 4 Mason, 296.

² *Ante*, § 257, and note.

³ 1 *Emerigon, Assur.* ch. 5, § 6, p. 145; *Straccha. De Asecur.* gil. 11, n. 47; *Casaregis, Disc.* 30, n. 63; *Disc.* 102, n. 54; *Disc.* 131, n. 7; *Disc.* 225, n. 64; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 49, and note, (edit. 1818); *Id.* 396, and note.

⁴ Mr. Livermore seems to doubt this. His language is, (1 *Liverm. on Agency*, p. 50, edit. 1818): "When the relation of principal and agent does in fact exist, although in the particular transaction the agent has exceeded his authority, an intention to ratify will always be presumed from the silence of the principal, who has received a letter, informing him what has been done on his account. But, where the person doing the business, is a mere volunteer, who has officiously interfered in the affairs of another person, and has effected an insurance, or made a purchase for him, without any color of authority, I do not conceive that the other person is bound to answer a letter from the intermeddler, informing him of the contracts so made in his name, nor that his silence can be construed into a ratification. Certainly no case has gone this length, and the opinion of the great Cujas is, that this is no ratification." The citation from Cujas, above referred to in § 257, note, is probably that on which the learned author relied; and if it is, it does not fully support his own position. Perhaps, in the cases of the intermeddling of mere strangers, it would be difficult to find

§ 259. In many cases, also, a ratification will be inferred from other collateral circumstances. Thus, if the principal, whose goods have been sold without his authority, should sue the purchaser for the debt due therefor, that would amount to a ratification of the sale; for the suit would not, upon any other ground, be maintainable in that form.¹ So, if a factor should sell goods for a price below his limits, and should send an account of sales to his principal, who should make no objection, but should draw for the balance, admitted to be due on the account, it would amount to a ratification of the sale.² So, if the principal should sue the agent for the money received by him upon such sale, that would also amount to a ratification.³ So, if a factor should pur-

any complete authority for so broad a position, as that the principal would, in all cases, be bound to answer the person, who assumed to be his agent, and, if he did not, his silence should be construed into a ratification, and the doctrine of the Roman law, as to a *Negotiorum Gestor*, is unfavorable to it. But, on the other hand, it would be difficult to say, that his silence ought in no case to be construed as a ratification. See 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 14, 952, (edit. 1818); *Ante*, § 239. If the act is *bona fide* done for the apparent benefit of the principal, it would be harsh to say, that its being done by a stranger does not entitle him to the benefit of the silence of the principal, as a presumptive ratification, when he has had full notice of the act, and has done nothing to repudiate it.

¹ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 122 and note; *Id.* 172, 173, *Wilson v. Poulter*, 2 Str. 859, *Smith v. Hodson*, 4 T. R. 211, *Ferguson v. Carrington*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 301, *Peters v. Ballestier*, 3 Pick. 195, 505, 506, *Copland v. The Merc. Ins. Co.* 6 Pick. 198; *Hunt v. Boody*, 20 N. Hamp. R. 411, *Dodge v. Lambert*, 2 Bosw. 570.

² *Richmond Manuf. Co. v. Starks*, 4 Mason, R. 296.

³ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 172, 173; *Wilson v. Poulter*, 2 Str. 859; *Bollen v. Hyde*, 1 Atk. 128; *Smith v. Hodson*, 4 T. R. 211, *Hoyd v. Pack*, 7 East, R. 161, 166, *Zino v. Vendelle*, 9 Louis. R. 51. But see *Hunter v. Prince*, 10 East, R. 378, 394; *Fenimore v. U. States*, 3 Dall. R. 357, *Kelley v. Munson*, 7 Mass. 319; *Woodward v. Suydam*, 11 Ohio R. 363. In *Peters v. Ballestier*, 3 Pick. R. 495, 505, the Court held, that the mere bringing of a suit in assumpsit, by the assignees, under a bill of lading, for the proceeds of a cargo wrongfully sold by the master to creditors of the assignor, who had deducted their debt therefrom, for which sum the suit was brought against the creditors, but which suit was discontinued before a trial, and trover brought for the goods against the creditors, was not an affirmation of the sale; it appearing, that, before the suit in assumpsit was brought, the assignees had written to the creditors, saying, that the whole cargo belonged to them, and that the money was paid wrongfully, and claiming to have it repaid. The assignees, therefore, had full knowledge of all the facts; but seem to have brought the action of assumpsit under a mistake of the law.

chase goods contrary to his orders; and the principal should, by letter, refuse to accept the contract; but yet, having received the goods, he should afterwards sell them, not on his factor's account, but on his own account; that would amount to a ratification of the purchase.¹ [And if the act of one professing to be authorized

Perhaps it may be thought, that the doctrine of this case, upon this point, may require further consideration, since the action of *assumpsit* may be treated as a waiver of the tort. But then, upon the authority of *Hunter v. Prinsep*, 10 East, R. 378, 394, ought it so to be treated?

1 *Cornwall v. Wilson*, 1 Ves. 509; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 395, 396, (edit. 1818); *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 28, 29, 31. The case of *Hunter v. Prinsep*, 10 East, R. 378, 394, seems to present an apparent exception to the rule, although it may be distinguished from the other cases. There, the master of a ship, which was wrecked in a foreign port, sold the cargo, and remitted the proceeds to the owners of the ship; and the owner of the cargo brought an action for money had and received to his use. It was contended, that, by this form of action, the plaintiff had affirmed the master's act in selling the goods; and that, consequently, the owners of the ship had a right to retain for the freight, *pro rata*; for the sale so affirmed had dispensed with the prosecution of the voyage. But it was held, that the plaintiff might recover without any deduction for freight; and that the only effect of this form of action was to waive any complaint, with a view to damages, of the tortious act, by which the goods were converted into money; and to confine the plaintiff's right to recover the net proceeds of the sale. On that occasion, Lord Ellenborough said: "The fallacy of the argument, on the part of the defendants, appears to us to consist in attributing more effect to the mere form of this action, than really belongs to it. In bringing an action for money had and received, instead of *trover*, the plaintiff does no more than waive any complaint, with a view to damages, of the tortious act, by which the goods were converted into money; and takes to the net proceeds of the sale, as the value of the goods; subject, of course, to all the consequences of considering the demand in question as a debt, and, amongst others, to that of the defendants having a right of set-off, if they should happen to have any counter demand against the plaintiff." See also *Taylor v. Plumer*, 3 M. & Selw. 562, 579, 580, where the doctrine is established, that the owner is entitled to pursue his property, in whosever hands he may find it, and into whatever other form it may have been converted. Upon this ground the action in *Hunter v. Prinsep*, 10 East, R. 378, was maintainable, although the goods had been illegally converted into money, as the money was the money of the plaintiff. Whether the doctrine in these cases is reconcilable with the decision in *Wilson v. Poulter*, 2 Str. 859, and *Bollon v. Hyde*, 1 Atk. 128, may admit of some doubt; for in each of these cases, the property, for which the assignees sued, was their own, according to the principles established in *Taylor v. Plumer*, 3 M. & Selw. 562; and, consequently, they might sue for it in the very form which they adopted, without confirming the conversion. See *post*, § 389; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 173, 174, and notes, *ibid.*; *Jackson v. Clarke*, 1 Y. & Jerv. 216; *Peters v. Ballestier*, 3 Pick. 495, 505, 506; *Fenemore v. U.*

as agent of a corporation, in the sale or mortgage of property, be such as will admit of a ratification without any formal instrument or express vote, and the consideration come to the use of the corporation, and is retained, that will be evidence of a ratification.^{1]}

§ 260. In many cases, also, a ratification will be inferred from the mere habits of dealing between the parties, even where the course of dealing between them may not amount to satisfactory proof of an original authority.² Thus, if a broker has been accustomed in some instances to settle losses on policies for his principal in a particular manner, without any objection being made, or with the subsequent acquiescence of his principal, and he should afterwards settle other policies in the same manner, to which no objection should be made within a reasonable time, a presumption would arise of an implied ratification, even though the principal might, in some other cases, have expressed a disapprobation of that mode of settlement.³

CHAPTER X.

LIABILITIES OF AGENTS TO THIRD PERSONS, ON CONTRACTS.

§ 261. LET us, in the next place, proceed to the consideration of the liabilities of agents to third persons. This may be either on contracts, or on torts. And first, on contracts. In general, when a man is known to be acting and contracting merely as the agent of another, who is also known as the principal, his acts and contracts, if he possesses full authority for the purpose, will be deemed the acts and contracts of the principal only, and will involve no personal responsibility on the part of the agent,

States, § Dall. R. 357; *Vernon v. Hankey*, 2 Term R. 113, 121; *Kelley v. Munson*, 7 Mass. R. 319; *Willinks v. Hollingsworth*, 6 Wheat. R. 240; 2 *Smith's Leading Cases*, 81, and note, (2d edit.).

¹ *Despatch Line of Packets v. Bellamy Manuf. Co.* 12 N. Hamp. R. 237.

² *Ante*, § 95.

³ See *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 280-282.

unless the other circumstances of the case lead to the conclusion, that he has either expressly or impliedly incurred, or intended to incur, such personal responsibility.¹ If a different rule were to prevail, it would greatly embarrass all the transactions of parties, and especially those of a commercial nature through the instrumentality of agents; since the latter could never escape a personal responsibility, in the execution of a mere authority, by any precautions whatsoever. This was one of the embarrassments growing out of the strict rule of the Roman civil law, whereby acts done, and contracts made, through the instrumentality of agents, did not, ordinarily, bind the principals, *ex directo*, to each other, so as to create mutual obligations and rights of action by and between them.² The remedy was limited to the immediate

¹ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 211, 212; Post, § 263; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 368, 369; Paterson v. Gaudesqui, 15 East, 62; Ex parte Hartop, 12 Ves. 352; Owen v. Gooch, 2 Esp. R. 567; Mauri v. Heffernan, 13 Johns. R. 58, 77; Smith on Merc. Law, 78, 79; Johnson v. Ogilby, 3 P. Will. 277; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 629, 630, (3d edit.): Rathbone v. Budlong, 15 Johns. R. 1; Meyer v. Barker, 6 Binn. 234; Waring v. Cox, 1 Miller, Louis. R. 198; Thomson v. Davenport, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 78. See also Mr. Smith's able note to this case, in his Leading Cases, Vol. 2, p. 222-227; Thomas's Ex'or v. Edwards, 2 Mees. & Welsb. 215; Haight v. Sohler, 30 Barbour, 224; Krumbhaar v. Ludeling, 3 Miller, Louis. R. 642; La Farge v. Ripley, 16 Martin, R. 308; Zacharie v. Nash, 13 Louis. R. 21; Smith on Merc. Law, p. 140, (3d edit. 1843); Campbell v. Baker, 2 Watts, R. 83. Mr. Chancellor Kent, in his learned Commentaries, uses the following language: "It is a general rule, standing on strong foundations, and pervading every system of jurisprudence, that, where an agent is duly constituted, and names his principal, and contracts in his name, the principal is responsible, and not the agent." 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 629, 630, (4th edit.); Ante, § 154, 155; Post, § 263-270.

² Ante, § 163; Post, §§ 271, 425, 426. Mr. Livermore has remarked, 2 Liverm. on Agency, pp. 253, 254 (edit. 1818), upon this peculiarity of the Roman law. He says: "The Roman lawyers made a distinction between a promise, made in the name of a third person, that such third person should do a particular act, and an engagement to procure him to do it. In the first case they held, that the agent was not bound; in the last, that he was. It is a principle of the Roman law, that no person can stipulate, or promise, except for himself. If, therefore, John had promised Peter, that Paul should give him a sum of money, or do for him any particular act, neither John nor Paul would, by that law, have incurred any obligation. But, if the promise had been, to procure Paul to give the money, or to do the act, this would have been a valid undertaking on the part of John, which would have made him responsible to Peter. In the first case, it is said, that it does not appear to have been the intention of the party, who made the promise,

parties to the act, or contract. The agent (and not his principal) had a direct remedy against the person, with whom he acted, or contracted; and the latter had a direct remedy, upon the same act, or contract, against the agent personally, and against him

to bind himself; that there is no consent from him to give, or to do; or if there were, that he has not expressed it; and, therefore, there can be no obligation. From the nature of the act to be done, however, the presumption was often admitted, that the person promising did not promise simply for another, but that he had engaged himself for the performance, although not so expressed; as, if a person promised, that another would be his surety; or if, the agent's authority being doubted, he promised, that his principal should ratify his act. Vinnius says, that in Holland, and in most parts of Europe, he, who promises for the performance of another, is understood to engage himself for that performance." The texts of the Roman law, which he cites, are as follows: "Si quis alium daturum facturumve quid promiserit, non obligabitur; veluti, si spondeat Titium quinque aureos daturum. Quod si, effecturum se, ut Titius daret, sponderit, obligatur. Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 20, § 3. Itaque alius, pro alio, promittens daturum facturumve eum, non obligatur; nam de se quemque promittere oportet. D. Lib. 45, tit. 1, l. 83, Introd. Nemo autem alienum factum promittendo obligatur. D. Lib. 45, tit. 1, l. 38, Introd. Sicut reus principalis non alias, quam si de sua persona promittat, obligatur: Ita fidejussores non alias tenentur, quam si se quid daturum vel facturos promittant. Nam reum principalem daturum vel facturum aliquid frustra promittunt; quia factum alienum inutiliter promittitur. D. Lib. 46, tit. 1, l. 65." "Quotiens quis alium sibi promittit, nec adjicit penam, (puta, vel servum suum, vel hominem liberum,) queritur, an committatur stipulatio? Et Celsus ait, etsi non est huic stipulationi additum, nisi steterit, penam dari; in id, quanti interest sibi, contineri. Et verum est, quod Celsus ait: nam qui alium sibi promittit, hoc promittit, ut se acturum, ut stet. D. 45, tit. 1, l. 81. Et vide D. Lib. 13, tit. 5, l. 14, § 2, c. D. Lib. 45, tit. 1, l. 38." The language of the Code on this very point is very direct; Certissimum enim, est, ex alterius contractu neminem obligari. Cod. Lib. 4, tit. 12, l. 3. Vinnius, in his commentary on the passage, in 3 Instit. Lib. 3, tit. 20, § 3, n. 1, states the reasoning, on which the distinction is founded, in the following words: "Qui alium daturum aut facturum promittit, neque ipse obligator, neque alium obligat. Cur alium non obliget, ratio manifesta est, quia nemo ex contractu alterius obligari potest, l. 3, C. ne ux. pro mar. Cur ipse non obligetur, duæ causæ sunt: una, quia non consentit, ut det aut faciat: altera, quia, etsi proponamus, eum dare aut facere velle, tamen verbis id non promittit; quorum utrumque per se solum ex regulis communibus stipulationum satis est ad impediendam verborum obligationem. De se igitur quemque promittere oportet, si eum obligari volumus. D. l. inter. 83, in pr. de verb. obl. Sed an non saltem hactenus eum, qui alium daturum aut facturum promisit, obligari dicimus, ut curare debeat, ut ille alius det, aut faciat? Dicendum est, ne hactenus quidem eum obligari; aliqui stipulatio hæc non esset inutilis; sed factum alienum utiliter promitteretur, contra quam in universum definit Hermogen. L. sicut 65, de fidejuss. & Ulpian. l. stipulatio, 38, in pr. de verb. obl."

only.¹ It was to cure this defect in the administration of justice in commercial transactions, that the Prætor interfered, and, in the case of shopkeepers, and owners and employers of ships, or other persons engaged in trade, made them (as we have seen) directly liable for the acts done, and for the contracts made by the clerks, ship-masters, and other agents, (called *Institutores*,) employed by them, within the scope of their ordinary business.² However, in cases where the principal was so bound, the agent, acting as Institor, was not, ordinarily, deemed to be personally bound, when he openly acted in the name of his principal, and not in his own.³

¹ Ante, § 163; 1 Stair, Instit. by Brodie, B. 1, tit. 12, §§ 16, 86; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, §§ 43, 46; 2 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 11, pp. 353, 354 (edit. 1818). The only remedy, by the agent, in such cases, was against his principal, to compel him to a personal and strict performance of what the agent, in his behalf, had undertaken should be done. See 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 2, art. 1, § 6; Id. § 1, art. 11; Id. tit. 17, § 2, art. 1.

² Ante, §§ 8, 88, 128; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 1-3; Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 9, 10, 17, 18; Id. tit. 3, n. 1-4; Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 1, 3, 4; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, §§ 43, 46; 1 Stair, Inst. B. 1, tit. 12, §§ 16, 18, 19. The language of the Digest on this subject is: *Æquum Prætori visum est, sicut commoda sentimus ex actu Institorum, ita etiam obligari nos ex contractibus ipsorum, et conveniri.* Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 1; Id. tit. 1, n. 1, 2. In these cases, although the Prætor gave an action against the principal, in favor of third persons dealing with his agent, institor, or shipmaster, yet his edict did not give a reciprocal action by the principal against such third person, and the remedy was doubted. Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 18; Id. tit. 3, l. 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 18; Id. tit. 3, n. 4, and Pothier's note, (3.) who suggests that the equity is reciprocal.

³ 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 8; Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 20; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 9, 10, 17, 18; Id. tit. 3, n. 2; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 46; Pothier on Oblig. n. 74, 447-449; 1 Emerigon, Assur. ch. 5, § 3, pp. 137, 138. The case put in the Digest is that of a banker, whose agent wrote a letter, as agent of his principal, informing another person of a sum of money put to his credit; for which it was held, that the agent was not personally responsible therefor. *Lucius Titius mense nummularia, quam exercebat, habuit libertum præpositum. Is Gaio Seio cavit hæc verba. "Octavius Terminalis, rem agens Octavii Felicis, Donitio Felici, Salutem. Habes penes mensam patroni mei denarios mille, quos denarios vobis numerare debeo pridie kalendas Maias." Quæsitum est, Lucio Titio defuncto sine hærede, bonis ejus venditis, an ex epistola jure conveniri Terminalis possit? Respondit, nec jure his verbis obligatum, nec æquitatem conveniendi eum superesse; quum id Institoris officio, ad fidem mense protestandam, scripsisset.* Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 20; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 2; 2 Emerigon, Assur. ch. 4, § 12, pp. 465, 466; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3,

§ 262. The rule of our law, which ordinarily exempts agents who are acting within the scope of their authority, from all liability, is certainly founded in general convenience and sound policy.¹ And it has, accordingly, been generally adopted by the modern commercial nations of Europe.² But our law does not, any more than the law of those nations, exempt the agent from personal responsibility, where he chooses, by his own act or contract, voluntarily to incur it, or where, from his own conduct, or the form of the act or contract, it is necessarily implied, or created, by operation of law.³ Perhaps, after all, the Roman law did not, in this respect, differ so essentially in principle from ours, as at first view it would seem to differ. That law held the agent (as we have seen)⁴ to be personally liable, in cases where he was the sole immediate party to the contract; but if he was named and acted solely as agent for a known principal, he was ordinarily exempted from liability.⁵ The principal difference between

§ 46; 1 Domat. B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 8; 2 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 11, p. 247, and note. And again it is said. Item: si procuratori tuo matram pecuniam dedero tui contemplatione, ut creditorem tuum, vel pignus tuum liberet, adversus te negotiorum gestorum habebis actionem; adversus eum, cum quo contraxi, nullam. Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 5, l. 6, § 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 5, n. 4.

¹ 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 629, 630, (11th edit.)

² 1 Stair, Inst. by Brodie, B. 1, tit. 12, §§ 16, 18, 19; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, §§ 45, 46; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 8; Pothier on Oblig. n. 74, 447-449; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 8; 1 Emerigon, Assur. ch. 5, § 3, pp. 137, 138; 2 Emerigon, Assur. ch. 4, § 12, p. 465; Pothier, Traité de Assur. n. 96. Emerigon lays down (2 Emerigon, Assur. ch. 4, § 12, p. 465) the general rule, in these words: En règle générale, le commissionnaire, qui promet, qui stipule, qui agit en sa qualité de préposé, ne s'oblige pas en son nom propre. Il est simple ministre et exécuteur. Il est tenu à rien de plus qu'à exhiber son mandat. Mais le commissionnaire, qui contracte en son nom, s'oblige sans distinction vis-à-vis du tiers avec qui il contracte, parce qu'on ignore sa qualité, et qu'il est censé plutôt agir pour soi, que pour autrui. Potius meo nomine, quam pro alio. Post, § 271.

³ Pothier on Oblig. n. 74, 447, 448; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd. 368, 369; Ante, § 261; Post, § 263-270.

⁴ Ante, § 261 and note; Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 20; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 2; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 8; Pothier on Oblig. n. 74, 447, 448; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 248, 249, note, (edit. 1818.)

⁵ Domat has laid down the doctrine in the following terms: "Factors and agents, who treat only in this quality, (i. e. as agents,) are not bound in their own names by the engagements which they contract on account of the business which is intrusted to them, and in the name of their masters." 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16,

our law and the Roman law seems to have been, that ordinarily, and independently of the Prætor's Edict, the agent could contract only in his own name, and not in that of his principal, and the latter was not directly bound thereby.¹

§ 263. In regard to the liability of agents to third persons, it may, then, be laid down as a general rule, subject to the exceptions hereafter stated; (1) That, when an agent executes a deed, or other instrument, in the name of his principal, he is not personally bound thereby; (2) That when he makes an oral or verbal contract, as agent for another, and at the same time he names his principal, he is not personally bound thereby;² (3) And as a corollary from the preceding propositions, or, rather, as a generalization of them, that, when, in making a contract, no credit is given to himself, as agent, but credit is exclusively given to his principal, he is not personally liable thereon.³ Indeed, in most cases of purchases, and sales, and

§ 3, art. 8, by Strahan. See also 1 Emerigon, Assur. ch. 5, § 3, p. 137-139, who lays down the same rule as that in the text, that the agent is not personally bound, where he contracts in the name of his principal. His language is, (as we have seen,) that, by the general rule, the agent, (le commissionnaire,) who acts in this quality, is not held in his own proper name. Ante, § 262, note. It is also a rule, that he who acts on account of a friend, or for a person to be named, is not bound personally, and acquires nothing for himself, when he names the person for whom he has acted, or whom he has pointed out. This designation (nomination) has a retroactive effect to the time of the contract, which is considered as if it had been made by the person named. He admits, however, that in cases of insurance, usage has overborne the theory, and made the agent personally liable. But in such cases the agent for the insurance, although he contracts on account of another, becomes himself a party to the contract. Ibid. Our law on this very point conforms to the usage stated by Emerigon; and the like doctrine is supported by Valin and Pothier. 2 Valin, Comm. Liv. 3, tit. 6, art. 3, pp. 33, 34; Pothier, Assur. n. 96; 2 Emerigon, Assur. ch. 4, § 12, pp. 465, 467.

¹ 2 Valin, Comm. Liv. 3, tit. 6, art. 3, pp. 33, 34; Pothier, Assur. n. 96; 2 Emerigon, Assur. ch. 4, § 12, pp. 465, 467.

² [But see Lord Campbell, C. J., in *Parker v. Winlow*, 7 El. & Bl. 946, that the qualification of Lord Erskine was that the agent must name his principal, "as the person to be responsible."]

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 368, 369; Goodbaylie's case, Dyer, R. 280, b. Marg.; Owen v. Gough, 2 Esp. R. 567; 3 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 11, pp. 245, 246, (edit. 1818); 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 211, 212; Meyer v. Barker, 6 Binn. 234; Johnson v. Ogilby, 3 P. Will. 277; Dubois v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. 4 Wend. R. 285; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 631, 632, (4th edit.);

contracts for labor and services, through the instrumentality of an agent, the great question is, to whom credit is given, whether to the principal alone, or to the agent alone, or to both.¹

§ 264. Let us proceed, then, to the important inquiry, in what cases an agent is personally responsible to third persons for acts done, or for contracts made with them, in the name, or on behalf of his principal. And, in the first place, it may be stated, that, wherever a party undertakes to do any act, as the agent of another, if he does not possess any authority from the principal therefor, or if he exceeds the authority delegated to him, he will [in some form of action] be personally responsible therefor to the person, with whom he is dealing for or on account of his principal,² [both for the amount of the contract, and for the costs

Hall v. Huntton, 17 Vermont R. 244; Colvin v. Holbrook, 2 Comstock, Appeal Cases, (N. Y.) 126. In *Ex parte Hartop*, 12 Ves. 352, Lord Chancellor Erskine said: "No rule of law is better ascertained, or stands upon a stronger foundation, than this; that where an agent names his principal, the principal is responsible, not the agent. But, for the application of that rule, the agent must name his principal, as the person to be responsible. In the common case of an upholsterer, employed to furnish a house; dealing himself in only one branch of business, he applies to other persons to furnish those articles in which he does not deal. Those persons know the house is mine. That is expressly stated to them. But it does not follow, that I, though the person to have the enjoyment of the articles furnished, am responsible. Suppose another case. A person instructs an attorney to bring an action, who employs his own stationer, generally employed by him. The client has nothing to do with the stationer, if the attorney becomes insolvent. The client pays the attorney. The stationer, therefore, has no remedy against the client." Upon a similar ground, where goods were consigned to A. B. for the London Gas Company, or his assigns, he or they paying freight, and the goods were delivered to A. B., it was held, that he was not liable for the freight. *Anos v. Temperley*, 8 Mees. & Welsb. 798, 805. See the English Jurist, March 11, 1843, p. 75. See Post, §§ 274, 395. See also 2 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 11, p. 247, note, (edit. 1818.)

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 367, 370; *Graham v. Stamper*, 2 Vern. 146; Post, §§ 266-270, 279; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 632, 633, (4th edit.)

² Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 386, 387; *Polhill v. Walter*, 3 Barn. & Adolph. 113; *Parrott v. Wells*, 2 Vern. R. 127; *Bayley on Bills*, ch. 2, § 7, (5th edit.); 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 212; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 255, 256, (edit. 1818); *Sumner v. Williams*, 8 Mass. R. 178; *Bowen v. Morris*, 2 Taunt. 385, 386; *East India Co. v. Hensley*, 1 Esp. R. 112; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 79, 80, (2d edit.); 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 629-632, (4th edit.); *Johnson v. Ogilby*, 3 P. Will. 278, 279; *Meech v. Smith*, 7 Wend. R. 315; *Dusenbury v. Ellis*,

incurred, if any, by the other party in a fruitless suit against the supposed principal.¹ There can be no doubt, that this is, and ought to be, the rule of law in the case of a fraudulent representation made by the agent, that he has due authority to act for the principal; for it is an intentional deceit. The same rule may justly apply, where the agent has no such authority, and he knows it, and he nevertheless undertakes to act for the principal, although he intends no fraud.² But another case may be put, which may seem to admit of more doubt; and that is, where the party undertakes to act, as an agent, for the principal, *bonâ fide*, believing that he has due authority; but, in point of fact, he has no authority, and, therefore, he acts under an innocent mistake. In this last case, however, the agent is held by law to be equally as responsible, as he is in the two former cases, although he is guilty of no intentional fraud or moral turpitude.³ This whole doctrine proceeds upon a plain principle of justice; for every person, so acting for another, by a natural, ~~and~~ not by a necessary, implication, holds himself out, as having competent authority to do the act; and he thereby draws the other party into a reciprocal engagement. In short, the signature of the agent amounts to an affirmation, that he has authority to do the particular act; or, at all events, that he *bonâ fide* believes himself to have that authority.⁴ If he has no such authority, and acts

3 John. Cas. 70; per Lord Holt, in Holt's Rep. 309. See *Woodes v. Dennett*, 9 N. Hamp. R. 55; *Jones v. Downman*, 4 Adolph. & Ell. N. S. 237, note; *Downman v. Jones*, 9 Jurist, p. 454-458, (1845); *Palmer v. Stephens*, 1 Denio, R. 471; *Pitman v. Kintner*, 5 Blackford, R. 250.

¹ [*Randell v. Trimen*, 38 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 276; 18 Com. Bench R. 786. And see *Collen v. Wright*, 8 El. & Bl. 648.]

² *Downman v. Jones*, 9 Jurist, p. 454-458, (1845.)

³ *Randell v. Trimen*, 37 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 280; 18 Com. B. 786; *Smout v. Ilbery*, 10 Mees. & Welsb. 1, 9, 10. See *Downman v. Jones*, 9 Jurist, p. 454-458, (1845.)

⁴ Post, § 265; *Layng v. Stewart*, 1 Watts & Serg. R. 222; *Polhill v. Walter*, 3 Barn. & Adolph. 114; *Long v. Colburn*, 11 Mass. R. 97; *Dusenbury v. Ellis*, 3 John. Cas. 70; *Ballou v. Talbot*, 16 Mass. R. 461; *Meech v. Smith*, 7 Wend. R. 315; *Feeter v. Heath*, 11 Wend. R. 477; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 386, 387. There is no doubt of the personal liability of the agent in all cases, where he falsely affirms, that he has authority; as he does, when he signs the instrument, as agent of his principal, and knows that he has no authority. But, another question (as we see by the text) has been made, whether he is liable, when he

bonâ fide, still he does a wrong to the other party; and if that wrong produces an injury to the latter, owing to his confidence in the truth of an express or implied assertion of authority by the agent, it is perfectly just, that he, who makes such an assertion, should be personally responsible for the consequences, rather than that the injury should be borne by the other party, who has been misled by it.¹ Indeed, it is a plain principle of equity, as well as of law, that where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss, he ought to bear it, who has been the sole means of producing it, by inducing the other to place a false confidence in his acts, and to repose upon the truth of his statements.²

§ 264 *a*. But although an agent, who undertakes to act for a principal without authority, or exceeds his authority, is responsible [in some way] to the other contracting party therefor; yet it may sometimes, under such circumstances, become a nice ques-

supposes that he has authority, and he has none; as, for example, where he misconstrues the instrument, conferring authority on him; or, where the instrument, conferring the authority, turns out to be a forgery, and he supposed it to be genuine. In *Polhill v. Walter*, 3 Barn. & Adolph. 111, Lord Tenterden, in delivering the opinion of the Court, seems to have thought, that the right of action was founded solely upon there being an affirmation of authority, when the party knew it to be false; and that, therefore, if the party acted under the authority of a forged instrument, supposing it to be genuine, he would not be responsible. But, there is great reason to doubt this doctrine; for, if a person represents himself as having authority to do an act when he has not, and the other side is drawn into a contract with him, and the contract becomes void for want of such authority, the damage is the same to the party who confided in such representation, whether the party making it, acted with a knowledge of its falsity or not. In short, he undertakes for the truth of his representation. No such distinction was relied on in *Dusenbury v. Ellis*, 3 John. Cas. 70; *Rossiter v. Rossiter*, 8 Wend. R. 494; *Ballou v. Talbot*, 16 Mass. R. 461; in all which cases the note was signed, or indorsed, without authority from the principal. The Court there put the liability of the agent upon the general ground, that he acted without authority. The distinction of Lord Tenterden is now entirely overthrown in the recent case of *Smout v. Ilbery*, 10 Mees. & Welsb. 1, 9, 10. See also the very able note of Mr. Smith, to the case of *Thomson v. Davenport*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 78, in his "Leading Cases," Vol. 2, p. 222-227; Post, § 265 *a*, note. As to what would be the effect of a subsequent ratification by the principal, and whether it would take away any right of action against the agent, see ante, § 244, and note.

¹ *Smout v. Ilbery*, 10 Mees. & Welsb. 1, 9, 10; Post, § 265 *a*.

² Ante, § 56. See *Campbell v. Hillman*, 15 B. Mouroe, 515.

tion, in cases of contracts made by him as agent, and in the name of his principal, in what manner the remedy is to be sought against him, whether by an action *ex directo* against him upon the contract itself, or by a special action on the case, for the wrong done thereby to the other contracting party. It seems clear, that in no case can an agent be sued on the very instrument itself, as a contracting party, unless there are apt words therein, so to charge him. Thus, if a person, acting as agent for another, should without authority, or exceeding his authority, make and execute a deed in the name of his principal, and not in his own name, the agent would not be liable thereon, although it would not bind the principal.¹ But, suppose there are apt

¹ Stetson v. Patten, 2 Greenl. R. 358; Post, 274 a, 277, 278; Ante, § 49, note; Wells v. Evans, 20 Wend. R. 251; Ante, § 49, note. [See Abbey v. Chase, 6 Cush. 54, where the defendant signed his name as agent to a sealed instrument, the body of the covenant being in the name of the principal "by their agent, &c.," Metcalf, J. said: "It does not appear whether the defendant had authority to bind the Hadley Falls Company, by deed or otherwise. But in the view which we take of the case, that question is immaterial. We deem it very manifest, on inspection of the instrument in suit, that it was the intention of the defendant to bind the company and not to bind himself; and that the plaintiff must have so understood the contract. And if this had been a simple contract, executed by an authorized agent, the law would have given effect to that intention. The company, and not the defendant, would have been bound. The authorities on this point are numerous and decisive. Northampton Bank v. Pepon, 11 Mass. 292; Andrews v. Estes, 2 Fairf. 270; New England Ins. Co. v. DeWolf, 8 Pick. 56; Rice v. Gove, 22 Pick. 161; Bayley on Bills, (2d Am. ed.) 72, 73. But when a sealed instrument is executed by an agent or attorney, for the principal, the strict technical rule of the common law, which has never been relaxed in England or in this commonwealth, requires that it be executed in the name of the principal, in order to make it his deed. Brinley v. Mann, 2 Cush. 337. In such cases, says Story, J., 'the law looks not to the intent alone, but to the fact, whether that intent has been executed in such a manner as to possess a legal validity.' 5 Peters, 350. See also Locke v. Alexander, 1 Hawks, 416. The plaintiff's counsel, in applying this strict rule to the instrument in suit, contends that it does not bind the Hadley Falls Company, and that, as the defendant has not bound the company, he has bound himself. But in deciding whether the defendant has or has not bound himself, we need not decide whether he has or has not bound the company. For it does not necessarily follow, that a contract, made by an authorized agent, which does not bind the principal, becomes the agent's contract, and makes him answerable if it is not performed. This depends upon the legal effect of the terms of the contract. If the agent employs such terms as legally import an undertaking by the principal

words in the instrument, which may charge him personally, and yet he signs the same in his own name as agent of another,

only, the contract is the principal's, and he alone is bound by it. But if the terms of the contract legally import a personal undertaking of the agent, and not of the principal, then it is the contract of the agent, and he alone is answerable for a breach of it. So when one who has no authority to act as another's agent, assumes so to act, and makes either a deed or a simple contract, in the name of the other, he is not personally liable on the covenants in the deed, or on the promise in the simple contract, unless it contains apt words to bind him personally. *Stetson v. Patten*, 2 Greenl. 358; *Ballou v. Talbot*, 16 Mass. 461; *Delius v. Cawthorn*, 2 Dev. 90. The only remedy against him, in this Commonwealth, is an action on the case for falsely assuming authority to act as agent. See also 13 Ad. & EL N. R. 744.

"These principles lead us to the conclusion that the ruling at the trial of this case was wrong, and that the defendant is not chargeable in the present action. The instrument sued on purports to be, and was intended to be, a deed *inter partes*, namely, the Hadley Falls Company and the plaintiff. The defendant, as agent of the company, signed his own name, merely adding thereto the word 'agent,' and affixed his own seal; the plaintiff signed his name and affixed his seal; and these acts were done as the acts of the parties before named. It seems to us impossible to charge the defendant, on this instrument, as on a contract made by him with the plaintiff. If any words had been inserted in the instrument, expressing the defendant's personal undertaking to fulfil the contract on behalf of the company, he would have been personally bound, although the instrument was prepared as a deed *inter partes*. *Salter v. Kingly*, Carth. 76, and Holt, 210. But no such words are found in the instrument.

"We cannot distinguish this case, in principle, from that of *Hopkins v. Mehaffey*, 11 S. & R. 126. In that case, articles of agreement were made between an incorporated turnpike company, of the one part, and Hopkins, of the other part, by which Hopkins agreed to finish the mason-work of a certain bridge, and find all the materials; and the corporation agreed to pay him a certain sum for said work and materials. The conclusion of the agreement was thus: 'For the true and faithful performance of the covenants, agreements, and stipulations in these presents contained, the parties hereto bind themselves, each to the other, in the penal sum of two thousand dollars. In witness whereof, the said parties to these presents have hereunto interchangeably set their hands, and affixed their seals. James Mehaffey, [seal]. Joseph Hopkins, [seal]. Signed by the president in behalf of the president, managers, and company of the Manchester Turnpike-road, and by Joseph Hopkins, on his part, in presence of William Child.' An action of covenant broken was brought by Hopkins, against Mehaffey, the president; but it was decided that he was not liable. Gibson, C. J., said: 'The paper is not the defendant's deed. He sealed and delivered it undoubtedly; but there is something more than sealing and delivery necessary to a deed. It ought to contain the proper parts of a contract; and in this instrument there are no obligatory words applicable to the person of the defendant. Even the sealing and delivery

the question may be presented under a different aspect. Thus, for example, if an agent should, without due authority, make a promissory note, saying in it, "I promise to pay," &c., and sign it "C. D. by A. B. his agent," or "A. B. agent of C. D."; in such a case, may the words as to the agency, be rejected, and the agent be held personally answerable as the promisee of the note? Upon this point the authorities do not seem to be entirely agreed.¹

were as the president, and in behalf of the corporation. If the defendant had authority to contract for the corporation, although he has done so informally, there cannot be a doubt, that as the work has been done, the plaintiff may have an action of some sort against it. But he never treated on the basis of the defendant being personally answerable; and to permit him to maintain this action would permit him to have, what was not in the contemplation of either party, recourse to the person of the agent.' See also *Townsend v. Corning*, 23 Wend. 435, and *Townsend v. Hubbard*, 4 Hill, 351."

¹ See *Downman v. Jones*, 4 Q. B. Rep. 235, note. In cases where a person executes an instrument in the name of another without authority, there is some diversity of judicial opinion, as to the form of action in which the agent is to be made liable for the breach of duty. In England, it has been intimated that the suit must be by a special action on the case. *Polhill v. Walter*, 3 Barn. & Adolph. 114; *Lewis v. Nicholson*, 18 Q. B. 503; 12 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 430, and *Bennett's* note. The same doctrine has been asserted in Massachusetts. *Long v. Colburn*, 11 Mass. R. 97; *Ballou v. Talbot*, 16 Mass. R. 461; *Jefts v. York*, 4 Cush. 371, an important case on this subject; S. C. 10 Cush. R. 392; and in Pennsylvania, in *Hopkins v. Mehaffey*, 11 Serg. & R. 129. And see *Moor v. Wilson*, 6 Foster, 332. [But more recently it has been adjudged in the Exchequer Chamber, that the agent is liable upon an implied contract that he has authority to bind his principal. *Collen v. Wright*, 8 El. & Bl. 646; 7 Id. 301. But see the very able dissenting opinion of Cockburn, C. J., in that case. It seems now well settled, that an agent is not liable on a written contract itself, made by him in the name of his principal, merely because he had no authority to execute such a contract. *Jenkins v. Hutchinson*, 13 Q. B. Rep. 744; *Lewis v. Nicholson*, 18 Id. 503.] In New York, [and some other States,] it has been held, that an action may, under such circumstances, be maintained upon the instrument, as if it were executed by the agent personally. Thus, if an agent, without authority, should sign a note in the name of another, it has been held that he may be sued thereon, as if it were his own note. *Dusenbury v. Ellis*, 3 Johns. Cas. 70; *Roberts v. Button*, 14 Verm. 195; *Royce v. Allen*, 28 Id. 236; Ante, § 251, note. See also *White v. Skinner*, 13 Johns. R. 307; *Meech v. Smith*, 7 Wend. R. 315; *Palmer v. Stevens*, 1 Denio, 471. [But in New York this rule is limited to cases where there was a want of authority in fact to execute the contract. *Walker v. Bank of New York*, 5 Seld. 582.] See further, *Byarr v. Doores*, 20 Misso. R. 284; *Coffman v. Harrison*, 24 Id. 524 *Cunningham v. Soules*, 7 Wend. R. 106; *Stetson*

§ 265. This doctrine, however, as to the liability of the agent, where he contracts in the name, and for the benefit of the principal, without having due authority, is founded upon the supposition, that the want of authority is unknown to the other party, or, if known, that the agent undertakes to guarantee a ratification of the act by the principal. But circumstances may arise, in which the agent would not, or might not, be held to be personally liable, if he acted without authority, if that want of authority was known to both parties, or unknown to both parties. Thus, if, at the time of the contract, the agent should declare that he had no authority, but that he thought his principal would ratify the act, as being for his benefit; and, at the same time, he should declare that he only acted as expressive of his opinion and belief, and did not intend to bind himself personally, if the principal should not ratify it, and this was fully understood and agreed to on the other side; in such a case, there would not seem to be any legal ground upon which, in case of a non-ratification by the principal, the agent, thus acting *bonâ fide*, could be held personally responsible.

§ 265 a. But let us suppose another case, where an agent contracts in the name of his principal, having an original authority so to do; and it turns out that, unknown to both parties, the authority has been revoked by the death of the principal, so that, in contemplation of law, there exists no principal; the question will then arise, whether, inasmuch as neither the principal, nor his legal representative, is bound by the contract,¹ the agent who has acted *bonâ fide*, will, under such circumstances, be responsible to the other contracting party for any loss or damage sustained

v. Patten, 2 Greenl. R. 358; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 631, 632, (4th edit.); *Chitty on Contr.* 211. See also *Woodes v. Dennett*, 9 N. Hamp. R. 55; *Royer v. Allen*, 2 Wms. (Verm.) 236; *Bank of Hamburg v. Wray*, 4 Strobb. 87; *Pettingell v. McGregor*, 12 N. Hamp. R. 180; *Grafton Bank v. Flanders*, 4 Id. 239; *Mahew v. Prince*, 11 Mass. R. 54; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 531, 632, (4th edit.); *Clay v. Oakley*, 17 Martin, R. 138; *Perkins v. Washington Ins. Co.* 4 Cowen, R. 469, 645; *Feeter v. Heath*, 11 Wend. R. 477; *Harper v. Little*, 2 Greenl. R. 14; *Lazards v. Shearer*, 2 Ala. R. 452, 718, N. S. However, if an agent, in purchasing goods, should exceed his authority, he may be properly treated as the purchaser, since no other person would be liable. *Hampton v. Speckenagle*, 9 Serg. & R. 212.

¹ *Blades v. Free*, 9 Barn. & Cress. 167.

thereby. It has been recently held, upon very full consideration, and upon reasoning entirely satisfactory, that the agent will not, under such circumstances, be responsible; upon the ground, that the continuance of the life of the principal must be deemed to be a fact equally within the contemplation of both parties, as the basis of the contract; and, consequently, neither is deceived or misled by the other, as to the conditions essential to give it validity. In short, each understands that the contract proceeds upon the presumption, that the principal is still living, and capable of being bound by the contract, and that the agent only stipulates for good faith, and the existence of an original authority to make the contract. If, at the time, the agent should *bonâ fide* say to the other party, I know not whether my principal is dead or living; but, if living, I warrant him bound by the contract; no doubt could be entertained, that, if the principal were dead at the time, and his death were unknown to both parties, the agent would be absolved from all responsibility; for the other party, in such a case, takes the contract *sub modo*, and conditionally. Now, in legal contemplation, there is no distinction between such an express undertaking, and an implied engagement to the same effect, virtually understood at the time by both parties, from the very circumstances of the case.¹

¹ *Smout v. Ilbery*, 10 Mees. & Welsb R. 1. [See *Randell v. Trimen*, 38 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 280; 5 C. 18 Com Bench Rep 786; *Carriger v. Whittington*, 26 Missouri, 313.] In this case, a man, who was in the habit of dealing with the plaintiff, for meal supplied to his house, went abroad, leaving his wife and family resident in England, and died abroad. The action was brought against the wife, for meal supplied after the death of the husband, which was unknown to both parties; and it was held, that the wife was not liable. **Mr. Baron Alderson**, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: "We took time to consider this question, and to examine the authorities on this subject, which is one of some difficulty. The point, how far an agent is personally liable who, having in fact no authority, professes to bind his principal, has on various occasions been discussed. There is no doubt, that, in the case of a fraudulent misrepresentation of his authority, with an intention to deceive, the agent would be personally responsible. But, independently of this, which is perfectly free from doubt, there seem to be still two other classes of cases, in which an agent who, without actual authority, makes a contract in the name of his principal, is personally liable, even where no proof of such fraudulent intention can be given. First, where he has no authority, and knows it, but nevertheless makes the contract, as having such authority. In that case, on the plainest principles of justice, he is liable. For he induces the other party to enter into the contract, on what

§ 266. In the next place, a person contracting as agent, will be personally responsible, where at the time of making the

amounts to a misrepresentation of a fact peculiarly within his own knowledge; and it is but just, that he who does so should be considered as holding himself out as one having competent authority to contract, and as guaranteeing the consequences arising from any want of such authority. But there is a third class, in which the Courts have held, that, where a party, making the contract as agent, *bonâ fide* believes that such authority is vested in him, but he has in fact no such authority, he is still personally liable. In these cases, it is true, the agent is not actuated by any fraudulent motives; nor has he made any statement which he knows to be untrue. But still his liability depends on the same principles as before. It is a wrong, differing only in degree, but not in its essence, from the former case, to state as true what the individual making such statement does not know to be true, even though he does not know it to be false, but believes, without sufficient grounds, that the statement will ultimately turn out to be correct. And, if that wrong produces injury to a third person, who is wholly ignorant of the grounds on which such belief of the supposed agent is founded, and who has relied on the correctness of his assertion, it is equally just that he who makes such assertion, should be personally liable for its consequences. On examination of the authorities, we are satisfied that all the cases in which the agent has been held personally responsible, will be found to arrange themselves under one or other of these three classes. In all of them it will be found, that he has either been guilty of some fraud, has made some statement which he knew to be false, or has stated to be true what he did not know to be true; omitting, at the same time, to give such information to the other contracting party as would enable him, equally with himself, to judge as to the authority under which he proposed to act. Of the first, it is not necessary to cite any instance. *Polhill v. Walter* is an instance of the second; and the cases where the agent never had any authority to contract at all, but believed that he had, as when he acted on a forged warrant of attorney, which he thought to be genuine, and the like, are instances of the third class. To these may be added those cited by Mr. Justice Story, in his book on Agency, p. 261, note 3, (§ 264, n. 2.) The present case seems to us to be distinguishable from all these authorities. Here the agent had, in fact, full authority originally to contract, and did contract in the name of the principal. There is no ground for saying, that in representing her authority as continuing, she did any wrong whatever. There was no *mala fides* on her part; no want of due diligence in acquiring knowledge of the revocation; no omission to state any fact within her knowledge relating to it; and the revocation itself was by the act of God. The continuance of the life of the principal was, under these circumstances, a fact equally within the knowledge of both contracting parties. If, then, the true principle derivable from the cases is, that there must be some wrong or omission of right on the part of the agent, in order to make him personally liable on a contract made in the name of his principal, it will follow, that the agent is not responsible in such a case as the present. And to this conclusion we have come. We were, in the course of the argument, pressed with the difficulty, that, if the defendant be not personally liable, there is no one

contract, he does not disclose the fact of his agency; but he treats with the other party, as being himself the principal; for, in such a case, it follows irresistibly, that credit is given to him on account of the contract.¹ Thus, if a factor, or broker, or other agent, buying goods in his own name for his principal, will be responsible to the seller therefor in every case, where his agency is not disclosed.² But we are not, therefore, to infer,

liable on this contract at all; for *Blades v. Free* has decided, that in such a case the executors of the husband are not liable. This may be so; but we do not think, that, if it be so, it affords to us a sufficient ground for holding the defendant liable. In the ordinary case of a wife, who makes a contract in her husband's lifetime, for which the husband is not liable, the same consequence follows. In that case, as here, no one is liable upon the contract so made. Our judgment, on the present occasion, is founded on general principles, applicable to all agents. But we think it right also to advert to the circumstance that this is the case of a married woman, whose situation as a contracting party, is of a peculiar nature. A person, who, contracts with an ordinary agent, contracts with one capable of contracting in his own name; but he who contracts with a married woman knows, that she is in general incapable of making any contract, by which she is personally bound. The contract, therefore, made with the husband by her instrumentality, may be considered as equivalent to one made by the husband exclusively of the agent. Now, if a contract were made on the terms that the agent, having a determinable authority, bound his principal, but expressly stipulated, that he should not be personally liable himself, it seems quite reasonable, that, in the absence of all *mala fides* on the part of the agent, no responsibility should rest upon him. And, as it appears to us, a married woman, situated as the defendant was in this case, may fairly be considered as an agent so stipulating for herself; and on this limited ground, therefore, we think she would not be liable, under such circumstances as these." See post, § 495.

¹ *Winsor v. Griggs*, 5 Cush. 210; *Owen v. Gooch*, 2 Esp. R. 567; Post, § 291; *Ex parte Hartop*, 12 Ves. 352; *Paterson v. Gandasequi*, 15 East, 62, 68; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 211; *Mauri v. Heffernan*, 13 John. R. 58, 77; 2 Liverm., on Agency, 245-247, 257, (edit. 1816), 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 630, 631, (4th edit.); *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. R. 27; *James v. Bixby*, 11 Mass. R. 34, 37, 38; *Bedford v. Jacobs*, 16 Martin, R. 530; *Brockway v. Allen*, 17 Wend. R. 40, 43; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 629-631, (4th edit.); *Hyde v. Wolf*, 4 Miller, Louis. R. 234; *Taintor v. Prendergast*, 3 Hill, R. 72; *Corlies v. Cumming*, 6 Cowen, R. 181; *Rathbon v. Budlong*, 15 John. R. 1; *Waring v. Mason*, 18 Wend. R. 425; *Mills v. Hunt*, 20 Wend. R. 431; *Bedford v. Jacobs*, 4 Miller, Louis. R. 528; *Beebe v. Roberts*, 12 Wend. R. 413; *Raymond v. Crown & Eagle Mills*, 2 Metcalf, R. 319; *Smith on Merc. Law*, pp. 134, 136, 140, 141, (3d edit. 1848); *Upton v. Gray*, 2 Greenl. R. 373; *Keen v. Sprague*, 3 Greenl. R. 77; *Parker v. Donaldson*, 2 Watts & Serg. 9; *McClellan v. Parker*, 27 Missouri, 162.

² *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 371; 2; *Morgan v. Cadar*, cited *ibid.* note; .

that the principal may not also, when he is afterwards discovered, be liable for the payment of the price of the same goods; for, in many cases of this sort, as we shall hereafter abundantly see, the principal and agent may both be severally liable upon the same contract.¹

§ 267. The same principle will apply to contracts made by agents, where they are known to be agents, and acting in that character, but the name of their principal is not disclosed; for, until such disclosure, it is impossible to suppose, that the other contracting party is willing to enter into a contract, exonerating the agent, and trusting to an unknown principal, who may be insolvent, or incapable of binding himself.² Thus where a contract is made with an auctioneer for the purchase of goods at a public sale, and no disclosure is made of the principal on whose behalf the commodity is sold, the auctioneer will be liable to the purchaser to complete the contract, although from the nature of public sales, it is plain that he acts as agent only.³

¹ 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 606, 631, (4th edit.), See *Dale v. Huntrey*, 1 Ellis, Bl. & Ellis, 1004; *Gillett v. Offor*, 18 C. B. 913, 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 211; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 7b, 79, (2d edit.); *Id.* ch. 5, § 5, p. 134-136; 140, 141, (3d edit. 1843.)

² *Paterson v. Gandasequi*, 15 East, R. 62, 68, 69; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 78, 79, (2d edit.); *Id.* ch. 5, § 5, p. 134-136; 140, 141, (3d edit. 1843); *Thompson v. Davenport*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 78, 88; *Jones v. Littledale*, 6 Adolph. & Ellis, 486; *Pentz v. Stanton*, 10 Wend. R. 271. In *Jones v. Littledale*, 6 Adolph. & Ellis, 486, Lord Denman, speaking on this point, said: "There is no doubt, that evidence is admissible on behalf of one of the contracting parties, to show, that the other was agent only, though contracting in his own name, and so to fix the real principal. But it is clear, that, if the agent contracts in such a form as to make himself personally responsible, he cannot afterwards, whether his principal were, or were not, known at the time of the contract, relieve himself from that responsibility." *Taintor v. Prendergast*, 3 Hill, R. 72; *Higgins v. Senior*, 8 Mees. & Welsb. 834; *Ante*, § 264; *Post*, §§ 269, 270; *Kymer v. Suwercroft*, 1 Camp. R. 109; *Raymond v. Crown & Eagle Mills*, 2 Metcalf, R. 319; *Post*, §§ 269, 270, 275; *Hastings v. Lovering*, 2 Pick. R. 221; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 630, (4th edit.); *Paise v. Stone*, 10 Metcalf, R. 160.

³ *Winsor v. Griggs*, 5 Cush. 210; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 372, 375; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 211; *Paterson v. Gandasequi*, 15 East, R. 62, 68, 69; *Ex parte Hartop*, 12 Ves. 352; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 78, 79, (2d edit.); *Id.* ch. 4, § 5, p. 134-136, 140, 141, (3d edit. 1843); *Thompson v. Davenport*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 78, 88; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 629-631, (4th edit.)

⁴ *Hanson v. Robérdeau*, Peake, Rep. 120; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 372,

So, if the agent should, at the time of the purchase of the goods, acknowledge that he is purchasing for another person, but should not then name him; in such a case he would be held personally liable, although the principal, when discovered, might also be liable for the debt.¹ [So where a person signed a receipt for

373; *Jones v. Littledale*, 6 Adolph. & Ellis, R. 486. [See *Gillett v. Offor*, 18 C. B. 913.]

¹ *Thompson v. Davenport*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 78, 88; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 66, 78, 79, (2d edit.); *Id.* ch. 5, § 5, p. 134-136, 140, 141, (3d edit. 1843.) *Thompson v. Davenport*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 78, 86, 87, *Lord Tenterden*. "I take it to be a general rule, that if a person sells goods, (supposing, at the time of the contract, he is dealing with a principal,) but afterwards discovers that the person with whom he has been dealing is not the principal in the transaction, but agent for a third person, though he may in the meantime have debited the agent with it, he may afterwards recover the amount from the real principal, subject, however, to this qualification, that the state of the account between the principal and the agent is not altered to the prejudice of the principal. On the other hand, if, at the time of the sale, the seller knows, not only that the person who is nominally dealing with him, is not principal, but agent, and also knows who the principal really is, and, notwithstanding all that knowledge, chooses to make the agent his debtor, dealing with him and him alone, then, according to the cases of *Addison v. Gandasequi*, and *Paterson v. Gandasequi*, the seller cannot afterwards, on the failure of the agent, turn round and charge the principal, having once made his election, at the time when he had the power of choosing between the one and the other. The present is a middle case. At the time of the dealing for the goods, the plaintiffs were informed that M'Kune, who came to them to buy the goods, was dealing for another, that is, that he was an agent, but they were not informed who the principal was. They had not, therefore, at that time, the means of making their election. It is true, that they might, perhaps, have obtained those means, if they had made further inquiry; but they made no further inquiry. Not knowing who the principal really was, they had not the power, at that instant, of making their election. That being so, it seems to me that this middle case falls, in substance and effect, within the first proposition which I have mentioned, the case of a person not known to be an agent; and not within the second, where the buyer is not merely known to be agent, but the name of his principal is also known." Mr. Justice Bayley added: "Where a purchase is made by an agent, the agent does not, of necessity, so contract as to make himself personally liable; but he may do so. If he does make himself personally liable, it does not follow that the principal may not be liable also, subject to this qualification, that the principal shall not be prejudiced by being made personally liable, if the justice of the case is, that he should not be personally liable. If the principal has paid the agent, or if the state of accounts between the agent here and the principal would make it unjust that the seller should call on the principal, the fact of payment, or such a state of accounts, would be an answer to the action brought by the seller, where he had looked to the responsibility of the agent. But the seller who knows

goods to be forwarded over several railroad lines, but he did not disclose for what corporations he acted, nor did the other party know, and there were several routes and companies which would satisfy the description given in the receipt, which was signed "G. W. for the corporations," G. W. was held not liable on said receipt, for the loss of the goods, although he was not agent for one of the companies over whose road he sent the goods, and although after their loss he verbally promised to pay for them.¹]

who the principal is, and, instead of debiting that principal, debits the agent, is considered, according to the authorities which have been referred to, as consenting to look to the agent only, and is thereby precluded from looking to the principal. But there are cases which establish this position, that, although he debits the agent, who has contracted in such a way as to make himself personally liable, yet, unless the seller does something to exonerate the principal, and to say that he will look to the agent only, he is at liberty to look to the principal, when that principal is discovered. • In the present case, the seller knew that there was a principal; but there is no authority to show, that mere knowledge that there is a principal destroys the right of the seller to look to that principal, as soon as he knows who that principal is, provided he did not know who he was at the time when the purchase was originally made. It is said, that the seller ought to have asked the name of the principal, and charged him with the price of the goods. By omitting to do so, he might have lost his right to claim payment from the principal had the latter paid the agent, or had the state of the accounts between the principal and the agent been such, as to make it unjust that the former should be called upon to make the payment. But, in a case circumstanced as this case is, where it does not appear but that the man who has had the goods, has not paid for them, what is the justice of the case? That he should pay for them to the seller, or to the solvent agent, or to the estate of the insolvent agent, who has made no payment in respect of these goods. The justice of the case is, as it seems to me, all on one side, namely, that the seller shall be paid, and that the buyer, (the principal,) shall be the person to pay him, provided he has not paid anybody else. Now, upon the evidence, it appears that the defendant had the goods, and has not paid for them, either to M'Kune, or to the present plaintiffs, or to anybody else." See *Paige v. Stone*, 10 Metcalf, R. 160.

¹ [*Lyon v. Williams*, 5 Gray, 557. Dewey, J., said: "The case stated is clearly a case of agency, and that agency disclosed upon the face of the contract. Such being the case, the action for any breach of the contract should be brought against the principal.

"No doubt, in many cases, the agent, by the recitals in the contract, and by the form of his signature to the contract, imposes upon himself the responsibility of the performance of the contract. But here the written contract is in direct terms that of others, and not of the defendant. 'The several railroad companies between Boston and Zanesville agree,' and the defendant signs 'for the corporations.' The contract also limits the extent of the liability of each of the railroad corporations to its own line.

§ 268. It is partly upon this ground, and partly upon the ground of general convenience, and the usage of trade, that the general rule obtains, that agents or factors, acting for merchants resident in a foreign country, (as, for example, in France or Germany,) are held personally liable upon all contracts made by them for their employers; and this [it is sometimes said] without any distinction, whether they describe themselves in the contract as agents, or not. In such cases, the ordinary presumption is, that credit is given to the agents or factors;¹ and not only, that credit

"But it is said that the names of these corporations are not stated. This is true; but they are capable of being made certain by proper inquiry, and the plaintiff was content to take a contract thus generally designating the parties with whom the liability was to rest for the safe and proper conveyance of the goods. If we are correct in the view we have taken as to who are the parties to the contract, no difficulty arises as to the other points taken by the plaintiff. If the defendant, as servant of the railroad corporation which first received the goods, and whose duty it was to carry them safely to the line of the next railroad company on the route and properly deliver them, has been guilty of any negligence in that respect, and has sent them forward on a wrong route, the proper party to be resorted to, in an action for damages for such negligence, is the principal, and not the agent.

"There is no legal ground for charging the defendant upon any subsequent promise by him to pay the damages claimed by the plaintiff. There was no consideration for such promise; and the statute of frauds also precludes any such action, the promise not being in writing. Nor is it open to the plaintiff to show in the present action that of one of the railroad corporations, whose road composed a part of the route on which these goods were to be forwarded, the defendant was not a legally authorized agent. If any injury had resulted to the plaintiff from that cause, the proper remedy would be by an action of tort for false representation, or for acting without lawful authority from such railroad corporation in making the contract."

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 248, 373, 382; Buller, N. P. 130; De Gaillon v. L'Aigle, 1 Bos. & Pull. 358; Paterson v. Gandasequi, 15 East, R. 62; Thompson v. Davenport, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 78; Smith on Merc. Law, 76, 78, (2d edit.); Id. ch. 5, § 5, p. 134-136, 140, 141, (3d edit. 1843); Peterson v. Ayre, 13 Com. B. Rep. 353; 24 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 382; Smyth v. Anderson, 7 Com. B. Rep. 21; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 249, (edit. 1818.) In Thompson v. Davenport, Lord Tenterden said: "There may be another case, and that is, where a British merchant is buying for a foreigner. According to the universal understanding of merchants, and of all persons in trade, the credit is then considered to the British buyer, and not to the foreigner. In this case, the buyers lived at Dumfries; and a question might have been raised for the consideration of the jury, whether, in consequence of their living at Dumfries, it may not have been understood among all persons at Liverpool, where there are great dealings with Scotch houses, that the

is given to the agents or factors, but that it is exclusively given them, to the exoneration of their employers.¹ Still, however, this

plaintiffs had given credit to M'Kune only, and not to a person living, though not in a foreign country, yet in that part of the king's dominions, which rendered him not amenable to any process of our Courts? But, instead of directing the attention of the Recorder to any matter of that nature, the point insisted upon by the learned counsel at the trial was, that it ought to have been part of the direction to the jury, that, if they were satisfied the plaintiffs, at the time of the order being given, knew that M'Kune was buying goods for another, even though his principal might not be made known to them, they, by afterwards debiting M'Kune, had elected him for their debtor. The point, made by the defendant's counsel therefore, was, that if the plaintiffs knew that M'Kune was dealing with them as agent, though they did not know the name of the principal, they could not turn round on him. The Recorder thought otherwise; he thought that, though they did know that M'Kune was buying as agent, yet, if they did not know who his principal really was, so as to be able to write him down as their debtor, the defendant was liable, and so he left the question to the jury; and I think he did right in so doing." Bayley, J., added: "There may be a course of trade, by which the seller will be confined to the agent, who is buying, and not be at liberty at all to look to the principal. Generally speaking, that is the case, where an agent here buys for a house abroad. There may also have been evidence of a course of trade, applicable to an agent living here, acting for a firm resident in Scotland. But that does not appear to have been made a point in this case, and it is not included in the objection which is now made to the charge of the Recorder." See *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. R. 27; *Bradlee v. Boston Glass Manufactory*, 16 Pick. 347, 350. In *Taintor v. Prendergast*, 3 Hill, R. 72, 73, Mr. Justice Cowen, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: "It may be admitted, as was urged in the argument, that, whether the principal be considered a foreigner or not, his agent, omitting to disclose his name, would be personally liable to an action. Even in case of a foreign principal, however, I apprehend, it would be too strong to say, that, when discovered, he would not be liable for the price of the commodity purchased by his agent. This may indeed be said, when a clear intent is shown to give an exclusive credit to the agent. I admit, that such intent may be inferred from the custom of trade, where the purchaser is known to live in a foreign country. No custom was shown or pretended in the case at bar; and, where the parties reside in different States under the same confederation, this has been held essentially to exonerate the principal. *Thompson v. Davenport*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 78. It will be seen, by this case and others referred to by it, that the usual and decisive indication of an exclusive credit is, where the creditor knows there is a foreign principal, but makes his charge in account against the agent. If the seller be kept in ignorance, that he is selling to an agent or factor, I am not aware of a case, which denies a concurrent remedy. On the other hand, I am still in want of an authority, that, where an agent acquires rights in a course of dealing for his

¹ *Ibid.*; Post, § 400; *Wilson v. Zulueta*, 14 Q. B. Rep. 405; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 680, 681, note (b.) See *Gillett v. Offor*, 18 C. B. 917.

presumption is liable to be rebutted, either by proofs, that credit was given to both principal and agent, or to the principal

principal, whether the latter be foreign or domestic, and his name is kept secret, the principal may not sue to enforce those rights. I admit, that the defendant is not, by such form of action, to be cut off from any equities he may have against the agent. So far, the latter is considered as the exclusive principal; but no further. As a general rule, the latter cannot maintain an action in his own name at all; and the exception will be found to arise from cases where he has the rights of bailee, or some other rights; not the mere powers of a naked agent." But see 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 631, note (b.) (4th edit.); Ante, § 155; Kirkpatrick v. Stainer, 22 Wend. R. 244. In this last case, it seems to have been thought by Mr. Senator Verplanck, in the Court of Errors, that the doctrine was stated too strongly in the text of the first edition of this work. I confess myself not satisfied that there was any error in the original text, which propounds the credit, in case of foreigners, to be an exclusive credit to the agent, as a matter of presumption, liable, indeed, to be rebutted; but still a presumption, which is to prevail in the absence of proof of any usage, or contract, to the contrary; and the opinion of the learned Chancellor (Walworth,) in the same case, fully sustains the position. The very case before the Court of Errors seems to have proceeded, in the Court below, upon grounds certainly not very satisfactory; for, assuming the foreign principal, in that case, to have been liable on the contract, it is very difficult to avoid the conclusion, that the agent had, by his mode of making the contract, also incurred a personal liability. Indeed, the case seems irreconcilable with the doctrine laid down in Higgins v. Senior, 8 Mees. & Welsb. R. 834, 844; Post, § 270, and note. See also Smith on Merc. Law, ch. 5, § 4, p. 103-133, Id. § 7, pp 140, 146, (3d edit. 1843); Post, § 270. In Taintor v. Prendergast, 3 Hill, R. 72, the Supreme Court of New York seems to have acted upon the doctrine, that if an agent of a foreigner makes a contract in his own name, without disclosing the name of his principal, the latter will be bound thereby, and liable thereon, although the agent may also be personally liable. In that case, the contract was made in New York, on behalf of the principal living in Connecticut; and it was said, that in such a case, there was no usage or custom of trade to deem it an exclusive credit to the agent. That circumstance may, perhaps, properly distinguish the case from that of a contract made on behalf of a known or unknown principal living in England, or France, or Germany. The same distinction was recognized in Thompson v. Davenport, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 78; and by Mr. Chancellor Walworth, in Kirkpatrick v. Stainer, 22 Wend. R. 254, 255. He there says: "Upon a careful examination of the law on this subject, I have therefore arrived at the conclusion, that there is a well-settled distinction between the personal liability of an agent who contracts for the benefit of a domestic principal, and one who contracts for a principal who is domiciled in a foreign country. I do not think that, by our commercial usage, it is applicable to the case of a principal who is domiciled in another State of the Union, as the interests of trade do not seem to require it. Besides, it does not appear to have been applied in England to the case of a principal residing in Scotland; although in the case of Thompson v. Davenport, before

only;¹ or that the usage of trade does not extend to the particular case.² [And probably the better rule is that the agent of a foreign principal is not, as a question of law, personally liable on every contract made for his principal. It is rather a question of fact in each case, a question of intention; to be ascertained by the terms of the particular contract and the surrounding circumstances.³ This is understood to be the rule now adopted in the United States Court.⁴]

referred to, Lord Tenterden supposed it might have been a proper subject of inquiry for the jury, whether there was not a usage of trade at Liverpool, to give the credit to the agent where the principal resided in Scotland. So far as the law is settled on the subject, however, it only applies to a principal domiciled in a foreign country, or, in the language of the common law, 'beyond the seas.' And again: "I see no difficulty in the form of the contract in this case, to bind the principals, and to relieve the agent from personal liability, if they had not been domiciled abroad. It is well settled, that in a commercial contract, not under seal, no particular form of words is necessary to bind the principal. Where the principal is known to the other party, and the contract is formally drawn up and signed by the parties, it should probably appear in some part of the contract that the agent is acting for some person other than himself; as he will be personally liable if he expressly contracts in his own name, without any reference to his character as agent, either in his signature, or in the body of the contract, although he was duly authorized to contract on behalf of his principal. The true rule on this subject, I apprehend to be this, that where it appears from a contract, made by the agent for a domestic principal, that he was such agent, the presumption is that he meant to bind his principal only; unless there is something in the contract from which it can be legally inferred that he meant to bind himself solely, or both himself and his principal, for the performance of the contract. On the contrary, if the contract is made on behalf of his foreign correspondent, who is domiciled abroad, the legal presumption is, that the agent meant to hold himself personally liable for the performance of the contract, unless from the terms of the contract it appears, that he meant to contract upon the credit of his foreign principal exclusively; for the agent, in such a case, may be personally liable on the contract, although the principal is also bound." Mr. Senator Verplanck seems, in his opinion in the same case, (p. 262-264,) to have recognized the distinction between foreigners resident in England or France, and citizens resident in another State of this Union. Post, § 400. Where credit is given to a foreign principal, who is known, and the agent represents him alone, there is no doubt that the presumption of an exclusive credit to the agent is repelled. *Trueman v. Loder*, 11 Adolph. & Ell. 589.

¹ *Ibid.*; Post, §§ 290, 350, 400, 423, 448; *Trueman v. Loder*, 11 Adolph. & Ell. 589, 594, 595.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Green v. Kopke*, 86 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 396; 18 C. B. 549. And see *Mathony v. Kekulé*, 14 C. B. 390; *Wilson v. De Zulueta*, 14 Q. B. 405.

⁴ *Oelricks v. Ford*, 23 How. U. S. R. 49.

[§ 268 *a*. This presumption of credit being given alone to the agent, and not to the foreign principal, applies with the most force to purchases made by an agent for a foreign principal; but where a written contract is made, and expressed to be with the foreign principal, and not with the agent, the latter is not liable, although the contract be signed by him, "for, and on account of," the foreign principal.¹ So, where the contract is signed "A. B., by C. D., agent," it does not bind the agent personally, although the principal resides beyond seas.²]

[¹ *Mahony v. Kekulé*, 14 C. B. 390; 25 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 278. In that case the contract read thus: "Contract between Messrs. Vacher & Tilly, Morlaix, (France,) and Matthew Mahony, London. Matthew Mahony engages himself herewith with Messrs. Vacher & Tilly, Morlaix, from the 1st of October, 1852; till the 31st of March, 1853, for the proper and merchantable cutting, messing, and preparing of French provisions at Morlaix, as pork, beef, and bacon, on receiving a free passage out to Morlaix from London and back again, and wages of 30s. sterling per week.

"Messrs. Vacher & Tilly finding the requisite tools.

"Should any differences arise on account of Matthew Mahony's inability or improper conduct, this contract is to be considered null and void, and Matthew Mahony has no claim for further wages nor free passage back to London.

(Signed) for Vacher & Tilly,

"CHARLES KEKULÉ.

"MATTHEW MAHONY."

The contract may stipulate that the agent shall not be bound, although the principal be not disclosed; in which case he will not be liable. *Oglesby v. Yglesoas*, 1 Ellis Bl. & El. 930; *Perderson v. Lotinga*, 28 Law Times Rep. 267.]

[² *Bray v. Kettell*, 1 Allen, (Mass) 80, (1861). In that case, Bigelow, C. J., said: "This action is brought to recover damages for a breach of a written contract of affreightment entered into by the defendants in behalf of one Charles D. Archibald, doing business under the name and style of the 'Albert Freestone Quarries,' and executed by signing the same with the business name of their principal by themselves as agents. The only question in the case is, whether the defendants can be held liable on this contract.

"The plaintiff does not controvert the general rule of law, that an agent is not personally responsible upon an instrument executed in the name of his principal. But he rests his claim against the defendants upon the ground that the present case falls within a recognized exception to the rule, because the defendants acted, in making the contract, in behalf of a foreign principal, resident 'beyond seas.' It is certainly true that some of the earlier English cases seem to sanction the doctrine, that where an agent acts for a foreign principal, the presumption is that credit is given exclusively to the agent, and he only is liable on contracts entered into in the name and on behalf of his principal. *Gonzales v. Sladen*, Bul. N. P. 130; *De Gaillon v. L'Aigle*, 1 B. & P. 368; *Thompson v.*

§ 269. In the next place, a person, contracting as agent, will be personally liable, whether he is known to be an agent or not,

Davenport, 9 B. & C. 87; *Smyth v. Anderson*, 7 C. B. 21. The same doctrine is stated in *Paley on Agency*, (4th Amer. edit.) 248; 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, 249, and especially in *Story on Agency*, §§ 268, 290, where it is enunciated as a general rule that agents acting for merchants residing in a foreign country are held personally liable on all contracts made by them for their employers, and this without any distinction whether they describe themselves in the contract as agents or not. We are inclined to think that a careful examination of the cases which are cited in support of this supposed rule will show that this statement is altogether too broad and comprehensive. Certain it is, that if it ever was received as a correct exposition of the law, it has been essentially modified by the more recently adjudged cases. It doubtless had its origin in a custom or usage of trade existing in England, by which the domestic factor or agent was deemed to be the contracting party to whom credit was exclusively given; and it was confined to cases where the claim against the agent was for goods sold, and was not extended to written instruments. But it is going quite too far to say that this usage or custom is so ingrafted into the common law as to become a fixed and established rule, creating a presumption in all cases that the agent is exclusively liable, to the entire exoneration of his employer. The more reasonable and correct doctrine is that, when goods are sold to a domestic agent or a contract is made by him, the fact that he acts for a foreign principal is evidence only that the agent and not the principal is liable. It is in reality, in all cases, a question to whom the credit was in fact given. Where goods are sold, it is certainly reasonable to suppose that the vendor trusted to the credit of a person residing in the same country with himself, subject to laws with which he is familiar, and to process for the immediate enforcement of a debt, rather than to a principal residing abroad, under a different system of laws, and beyond the jurisdiction of the domestic forum. But even in such a case, the fact that the principal is resident in a foreign country is only one circumstance entering into the question of credit and is liable to be controlled by other facts. So in the case of a written contract; it depends on the intention of the parties. But this, as in all other cases of written instruments, must be determined mainly by the terms of the contract. There may be cases where the language of the contract is ambiguous, and it is doubtful to whom the parties intended to give credit, in which the circumstance that the principal is resident abroad may be taken into consideration in determining the question of the liability of the agent. But where the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous, it must be deemed the final repository of the intention of the parties; and its construction and legal effect cannot be varied or changed by any reference to facts or circumstances affecting the convenience of the parties or the reasonableness of the contract into which they have entered. In such a case, therefore, it makes no difference whether the principal is a foreigner or not. If by the language of the contract the agent and not the principal is bound, such must be its construction; and on the other hand, if it clearly binds the principal, and is in form a contract with him only, the

in all cases where he makes the contract in his own name, or voluntarily incurs a personal responsibility, either express or implied.¹ Thus, for example, if an agent should buy goods for his principal, and by a written memorandum should acknowledge, that the purchase was for his principal, and should promise to pay for them, he would be personally liable.² So, if an agent, selling goods, should make out the memorandum of the sale, and the invoice of the goods, as bought of him, the agent, he

agent must be exonerated, without regard to the fact that the principal is resident in a foreign country. This rule can work no hardship, because parties can in all cases make their contracts in such form as to bind those to whom they intended to give credit. *Mahony v. Kekule*, 14 C. B. 390; *Green v. Kopke*, 18 C. B. 549; *Lennard v. Robinson*, 5 El. & Bl. 125; *Kirkpatrick v. Stainer*, 22 Wend. 244; 2 Kent, Comm (6th edit.) 631, note; *Paley on Agency*, (4th Amer. edit.) 248, note.

"These principles are decisive of the case at bar. The written contract on which the plaintiff relies contains no words from which any intent to bind the defendants can be inferred. On the contrary, it is executed in the precise form required by law to bind the principal only and to exonerate the agent. The name under which the principal conducted his business is signed by the defendants as his agents. It would have been open to more question if the defendants had signed their own names for their principal; but the contract is executed by the agents in the precise and technical form in which, by the strictest rule of law, it should be signed in order to bind the principal only. *Story on Agency*, § 153. There can be no doubt that if the principal resided in this country, he alone could have been sued on the contract. In like manner he only is responsible, although a foreigner, because he is the sole party to it, and there is nothing to control the intent manifested by this mode of executing the contract. The defendants are in no sense parties to it, and are not liable in this action for damages occasioned by the neglect of their principal to comply with its terms."

¹ Ante, §§ 147, 154, 156-159; 1 Stair, Inst. by Brodie, B. 1, tit. 12, § 16; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 211; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 630, (4th edit.); Id. 631; *Jones v. Littledale*, 6 Adolph. & Ellis, 486, 490; *Hopkins v. Mehaffey*, 11 Serg. & Rawle, 129; *Burrell v. Jones*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 47; *Iveson v. Conington*, 1 Barn. & Cressw. 160; *Magee v. Atkinson*, 2 Mees. & Welsb. 440; *Seaber v. Hawkes*, 5 Moore & Payne, 549; *Kirkpatrick v. Stainer*, 22 Wend. R. 244, 254, 255; *Tantor v. Prendergast*, 3 Hill, R. 72; *Simonds v. Heard*, 23 Pick. 121; *Higgins v. Senior*, 8 Mees. & Welb. 835, 845; *Mills v. Hunt*, 20 Wend. R. 481; *Newhall v. Dunlap*, 2 Shepley, R. 180; *Waring v. Mason*, 18 Wend. R. 425; *Collins v. Butts*, 10 Wend. 399; Post, § 400.

² *Alford v. Eggesfield*, Dyer, R. 280 a; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 378, 379; *Talbot v. Godbolt*, Yelv. R. 137; 2 Liverm on Agency, 249-251, (edit. 1818); 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 629-631, (4th edit.); *Story on Bills of Exchange*, § 76.

would be personally liable for a failure to deliver the goods.¹ So, if an agent should retain an attorney for his principal, and should promise to pay him his fees, he would be personally liable.² So, if an agent should, in his own name, but on behalf of his principal, enter into an agreement to execute a lease of lands of his principal, he would be held personally responsible for the execution thereof.³ So, if an agent should, in his own name, draw a bill of exchange on his principal for the debt of the latter, he would be personally responsible, as drawer, in case of the dishonor of the bill, although upon the face of it, the bill was drawn on account of his principal.⁴ So, if an agent should accept a bill in his own name, which is drawn on him on account of his principal, he would be personally liable on his acceptance.⁵ So, if an agent should sign a note in his own

¹ *Jones v. Littledale*, 6 Adolph. & Ellis, 486; *Higgins v. Senior*, 8 Mees. & Welsb. 834; Post, § 270.

² *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 378; *Harvey v. French*, Alleyn, R. 6.

³ *Norton v. Herron*, 1 Carr. & Payne, 648; S. C. 1 Ryan & Mood. R. 229; *Tanner v. Christian*, 4 El. & Bl. 591; 29 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 103; *Lennard v. Robinson*, 32 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 127; 5 El. & Bl. 125; *Cooke v. Wilson*, 38 Id. 362; 1 J. Scott, (N. S.) 153; Ante, § 155-158.

⁴ *Bayley on Bills*, ch. 2, § 7, (5th edit.); *Leadbitter v. Farrow*, cited *ibid.* and 5 M. & Selw. 345; *Lefevre v. Lloyd*, 5 Taunt. R. 749; *Mayhew v. Prince*, 11 Mass. R. 54; *Eaton v. Bell*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 34; *Goupy v. Harden*, 7 Taunt. R. 159; Ante, § 155-157; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 379, 380; [*Heubach v. Mollman*, 2 Duer, 260. There is perhaps an exception, where the agent, with the assent of his principal, indorses the bill for the sole purpose of facilitating its collection, on which ground probably the case of *Ridson v. Dilworth*, 5 Price, 564, proceeded; *ib.*] And it seems, that in such case, it would make no difference, if he signed his name "A. B. agent," if his principal was not named on the bill. *Pentz v. Stanton*, 10 Wend. R. 271; Ante, § 155. This also seems to be the rule in the law of the foreign continental nations. Emerigon lays it down that the agent, who contracts in his own name, is bound, notwithstanding his quality of agent is announced; and he cites the passage from the Novels: *Si autem dixerit fiet tibi satis aut a me, aut ab illo et illo, &c.; ipsum autem, qui hoc promiserit, integrum, quidem debitum cogi persolvere.* Novell. 115, cap. 6, § 4; 2 Emerigon, Assur. ch. 4, § 12, pp. 466, 467; Ante, § 262, note; Post, § 271.

⁵ *Bayley on Bills*, ch. 2, § 7, (5th edit.); *Thomas v. Bishop*, 2 Str. R. 955; Ante, § 155-157, note. The case of *Thomas v. Bishop*, 2 Str. R. 955, would make one pause, as to the extent to which the doctrine should be carried. There, a bill was drawn on the defendant as follows: "At thirty days' sight, pay to J. S. or order, £200, value received of him, and place the same to account of the York Buildings Company, as per advice from Charles Mildmay. To Mr.

name for the premium due upon a policy of insurance, underwritten for his principal, he would be personally responsible therefor.¹ So, if an agent, employed to sell goods for his principal, should draw a bill on the purchaser in favor of his principal for the amount of the sale, he would be held personally liable to the latter, as drawer, upon the dishonor of the bill.² So, in such a case, if the agent should remit his own note to the principal, for the amount of the sale, he would be liable not only to third persons, but to the principal, for the amount.³ So, if an agent, employed to purchase bills for his principal, should have them made payable to himself or order, and should then indorse them, and remit them to his principal, he would be liable thereon to his principal, as well as to third persons, as indorser.⁴ The reason of each of these cases is the same; that, from the form of the transaction, the agent has become a direct personal party to the contract, and his promise and liability are precisely the same,

Humphrey Bishop, cashier of the York Buildings Company, at their house, in Winchester-street, London." The defendant accepted it as follows: "Accepted, 13th June, 1832, per H Bishop." The bill being dishonored when due, an action was brought against Bishop, personally; and it was held, that he was personally liable on the acceptance. The only point of doubt is, whether a bill so drawn is not to be deemed as drawn on the cashier officially, and accepted by him officially, and therefore, as excluding a personal responsibility. Suppose a check, drawn on the cashier of a bank, as such, and accepted by him; would he be personally responsible on the acceptance, or would the bank be responsible? Drafts, drawn on, and accepted by, cashiers of banks, are usually treated as official transactions, and binding on the bank, and not merely on the cashier personally. Ante, §§ 155, 159, and note. In *Shelton v. Darling*, 2 Connect. R. 435, a bill was drawn on an agent, as follows: "A. B., agent of the Commission Company, ninety days after date, please to pay to our order, two thousand dollars, value received, and charge to account. Your obed't serv'ts, D. & C." On which there was an acceptance, as follows: "Accepted, A. B., agent, C. C." It was held, that A. B. was not personally liable thereon; although it was proved, that he procured the bill to be drawn, and to be discounted for his own use. See also *Mott v. Hicks*, 1 Cowen, R. 513, cited ante, § 159, note; *Thomson on Bills of Exchange*, p. 228-230, (2d edit. 1836.) And see *Fuller v. Hooper*, 3 Gray, 341.

¹ *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. R. 27.

² *Lefevre v. Lloyd*, 5 Taunt. 749; Ante, §§ 156, 157, note.

³ *Simpson v. Swan*, 3 Campb. R. 291. But see *Sharp v. Emmet*, 5 Wharton, 288; Ante, § 157 and note.

⁴ *Goupy v. Harden*, 7 Taunt. R. 159. See ante, §§ 156, 157; *Sharp v. Emmet*, 5 Wharton, R. 288.

as those of any other person, drawing, or indorsing, or accepting a bill, or signing a note. It is perfectly competent, in point of law, for an agent, in any case, to make himself personally responsible for his principal, or to his principal; and upon the just interpretation of the terms of the foregoing contract, and others of a like nature, such a responsibility is naturally, if not necessarily implied.¹ But it by no means is to be taken, as a natural or necessary conclusion, that, because the agent is personally bound, therefore the principal is exonerated; for we shall presently see, that both may in many cases be equally bound, if not in form, at least in substance, by the contract, so that a suit may be brought by or against either of them.²

§ 270. The general doctrine, as to the liability of agents, may be further illustrated in cases, where there is a written contract, purporting to be made between one person, as buyer, and another as seller. Thus, for example, if an invoice, or a sold note, should describe the goods sold, as "bought of A. B.," the agent, as seller, and it should be signed by him, he would be held to be an immediate party to the contract, and liable as such, for the delivery of the goods to the buyer, notwithstanding he might

¹ *Lefevre v. Lloyd*, 5 Taunt. 749; *Lucas v. Groning*, 7 Taunt. 164; *Goupy v. Harden*, 7 Taunt. 159; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 43; *Simpson v. Swan*, 3 Campb. R. 291; Ante, §§ 155-158, 161, 162; *Thomson on Bills*, pp. 228, 270, (2d edit. 1836.)

² Ante, §§ 161, 162, note; Post, §§ 270, 272-280, 446; *Allen v. Coit*, 6 Hill, N. Y. R. 318; *Rogers v. Coit*, 6 Hill, N. Y. R. 322. It seems, however, to have been assumed, and in some instances actually decided, that where a contract is made with an agent acting and known as such, he cannot maintain any action thereon, although he is in terms the promisee, but that the suit must be brought in the name of the principal. *Gilmore v. Pope*, 5 Mass. R. 491; *Taunton and South Boston Turnpike v. Whiting*, 10 Mass. R. 327, 336, and the cases cited; Post, § 395. Indeed, it has been laid down as a general rule, that where the agent has no interest in the contract, he cannot sue thereon, although the promise is made to him; but that his principal alone can sue. *The Town of Garland v. Reynolds*, 2 Appleton, R. 45; *Irish v. Webster*, 5 Greenl. R. 171; *Tainton v. Prendergast*, 3 Hill, R. 72; *Piggott v. Thompson*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 147; *Gunn v. Cantine*, 10 Johns. R. 387. But it admits of the most serious question, whether this doctrine is maintainable upon principle, or is consistent with many other well-considered authorities. See Post, § 394-400; *Fisher v. Ellis*, 3 Pick. R. 321; *Fairfield v. Adams*, 16 Pick. R. 381. See also post, § 394, and cases there cited, and post, § 396, and cases there cited, which it seems difficult entirely to reconcile with each other.

He sold the goods, as the agent of the owner, and have made known that fact to the buyer before or at the time of the sale. For if the agent contracts in such a form as to make himself personally responsible, he cannot afterwards, whether his principal be, or be not known, at the time of the contract, relieve himself from that responsibility. And in the case put, by the very form of the contract, the agent represents himself to be the seller, and thereby, as between himself and the buyer, he binds himself by that representation, as a contracting party.² But, although the agent may thus bind himself personally; yet this by no means shows, that the principal may not also be bound, as a party to the contract, through his agent; for there is no doubt, that parol evidence is admissible, on behalf of one of the contracting parties, to show that the other was an agent only in the sale, although contracting in his own name, so as to fix the real principal.³ It has been well observed, that, in cases of this sort,

¹ Ante, § 269.

² *Jones v. Littledale*, 6 Adolph. & Ellis, 486; Ante, § 155-161; *Higgins v. Senior*, 8 Mees. & Welsb. 844, *Magee v. Atkinson*, 2 Mees. & Welsb. 440.

³ *Jones v. Littledale*, 6 Adolph. & Ellis, 486; *Kean v. Davis*, 1 Spencer, 426; *Wilson v. Bailey*, 1 Handy, (Ohio,) 177; *Moore v. Clementson*, 2 Campb. R. 22; Ante, § 161-163; Ante, § 269; Post, § 446; *Beebe v. Roberts*, 12 Wend. 413; *Higgins v. Dellinger*, 22 Missouri, 399; *Higgins v. Senior*, 8 Mees. & Welsb. 440. Mr. Baron Parke, in delivering the opinion of the Court in this last case, said: 'The question in this case, which was argued before us in the course of the last term, may be stated to be, whether, in an action or an agreement in writing, purporting on the face of it to be made by the defendant, and subscribed by him, or the sale and delivery by him of goods above the value of £10, it is competent for the defendant to discharge himself, on an issue on the plea of non-assumpsit, by proving, that the agreement was really made by him by the authority of, and as agent for, a third person, and that the plaintiff knew those facts, at the time when the agreement was made and signed. Upon consideration we think, that it was not; and that the rule for a new trial must be discharged. There is no doubt, that, where such an agreement is made, it is competent to show, that one or both of the contracting parties were agents for other persons, and acted as such agents in making the contract, so as to give the benefit of the contract, on the one hand, and charge with liability, on the other, the unnamed principals; and this, whether the agreement be or be not required to be in writing by the statute of frauds; and this evidence in no way contradicts the written agreement. It does not deny, that it is binding on those, whom, on the face of it, it purports to bind; but shows, that it also binds another, by reason, that the act of the agent, in signing the agreement, in pursuance of his authority, is, in law, the act of the principal.'

the liability of the principal depends upon the act done; and not merely upon the form in which it is executed. If the agent is

pal. But, on the other hand, to allow evidence to be given, that the party, who appears on the face of the instrument to be personally a contracting party, is not such, would be to allow parol evidence to contradict the written agreement; which cannot be done. And this view of the law accords with the decisions, not merely as to bills of exchange, signed by a person, without stating his agency on the face of the bill; but as to other written contracts, namely, the cases of *Jones v. Little-dale*, and *Magee v. Atkinson*. It is true, that the case of *Jones v. Little-dale* might be supported on the ground, that the agent really intended to contract as principal. But Lord Denman, in delivering the judgment of the Court, lays down this as a general proposition, 'that, if the agent contracts in such a form, as to make himself personally responsible, he cannot afterwards, whether his principal were or were not known at the time of the contract, relieve himself from that responsibility.' And this is also laid down in *Story on Agency*, § 269. *Magee v. Atkinson* is a direct authority, and cannot be distinguished from this case." *Trueman v. Loder*, 11 Adolph. & Ellis, 589. Mr. Smith, in his *Leading Cases*, Vol. 2, p. 226, note to the case of *Thomson v. Davenport*, says: "The next proposition, above submitted, is, that parol evidence, that the person who has signed as principal, was in reality an agent, ought not to be excluded, when the purpose, for which it is offered, is that of charging the principal with the contract. The principle, on which it is submitted, that this depends, is adverted to in the text of *Paterson v. Gandasequi*, which states, that 'it was moved to set aside the nonsuit, on the ground of assimilating this case of a dormant principal to that of a dormant partner, where, though the person, furnishing goods to the ostensible partners, intended, at the time, to give credit only to them, yet he may afterwards pursue his remedy against the dormant partner, when discovered.' And this, it is submitted, is the true principle. A dormant partner is sued on the ground of agency; he is liable on a contract relating to the firm, made in the ostensible partner's name alone, because he is taken to have adopted the name of the ostensible partner as his own, for the purpose of such contracts. So that, when the ostensible partner signs his name to such contracts, he signs a word, the meaning of which comprehends not himself alone, but his partner also. It is, in fact, a question of signification. A and B trade under the name of 'A'; the name 'A,' therefore, when used in a contract relating to such trade, means 'A & B'; and to show, that it has such meaning, parol evidence is admissible, but admissible only for the purpose of charging B; for *De Mautort v. Saunders*, 1 B. & Ad. 398, decides, that it cannot be admitted to discharge the ostensible partner. Now, if B may contract jointly with A, under the name of A, and employ A to sign it, there is no reason why he should not contract individually in the same way, and, if he may do so, then parol evidence must be admissible to show, that A, being his agent, so contracted for him. This view will be, it is submitted, borne out by an examination of the authorities. In *Paterson v. Gandasequi*, the order for the goods, for which the action was brought, was in writing, signed only by *Larrazabel & Co.*; no objection was made to the admissibility of the parol evidence. In *Thomson v.*

clothed with the proper authority, his acts bind the principal, although executed in his own name. The only difference is,

Davenport, Railton v. Peele, and Railton v. Hodson, the invoices, which appear to have contained the terms of the contracts, were made out to the respective agents. The case of *Short v. Spackman*, 2 Barn. & Adolph. 962, has considerable bearing on these points. The plaintiffs, being employed by Hudson to buy oils, employed one Bentley to effect a purchase for them; Bentley applied to the defendants, who refused to sell to the plaintiffs, but, being informed they had a principal, consented, and made out the bought and sold notes to the plaintiffs, as principals. Hudson refused to ratify the purchase, on which the plaintiffs took it for their own benefit, demanded the oils, and brought an action against the defendants for not delivering them. It was objected, that the defendants had expressly refused to deal with the plaintiffs as principals. The form of the written contract (the bought and sold notes) in which they appeared as principals, was, however, held to entitle them to sue; and Parke, J., in his judgment, says: 'It is found, that the plaintiffs were authorized by Hudson to buy oil of the defendant, and the contract was binding both on them, and, if the defendant chose to enforce it, on Hudson.' It is for the above dictum of Parke, J., that *Short v. Spackman* is cited; the decision of the case turns, as will be perceived, upon the right of the agent to sue upon the contract in his own name. That an agent, who has made a contract in his own name for an undisclosed principal, may sue on it in his own name, is established by several cases, particularly the late one of *Sims v. Bond*, 5 Barn. & Adolph. 393. 'It is,' said the Lord Chief Justice, delivering the judgment of the Court in that case, after a *cur. adv. vult.*, 'a well-established rule of law, that, where a contract not under seal is made by an agent in his own name for an undisclosed principal, either the agent, or the principal may sue on it; the defendant, in the latter case, being entitled to be placed in the same situation, at the time of the disclosure of the real principal, as if the agent had been the contracting party. This rule is most frequently acted on in sales by factors, agents, or partners, in which cases either the nominal or real contractor may sue. But it may be equally applied to other cases.' See also *Alexander v. Barker*, 2 Tyrwh. R. 146; *Sims v. Britain*, 4 B. & Ad. 375; *Bastable v. Poole*, 5 Tyrwh. 111. Now, as far as the admissibility of the parol evidence to qualify the written contract is concerned, there is as much objection to letting it in for the purpose of enabling the principal, not named in the contract itself, to sue, as for the purpose of rendering him liable to be sued. But the true rule, it is submitted, is, that the parol evidence is admissible for the purpose of introducing a new party, but never for that of discharging an apparent party to the contract. See this laid down in *Jones v. Littledale*, 5 Adolph. & Ell. 486, and, in the judgment of the Court of Exchequer, in *Simpson v. Higgins*, *ubi sup.* The point was mooted, but not decided, in *Graham v. Mussen*, 5 B. & C. 603, where the Court held, that the buyer did not, by requesting the seller's agent to write a note of the contract in his (the buyer's) book, constitute him his agent for the purpose of signing his name, so as to render the entry a note in writing within the statute of frauds." But see *Stackpole v. Arnold*,

that, where the agent contracts in his own name, he adds his own personal responsibility to that of the principal, who has employed him.¹

§ 271. The Roman law, as we have already seen, carried the responsibility of an agent, contracting in his own name, although for the benefit of his principal, somewhat further; for, in all such contracts, he was, ordinarily, deemed to be the primary and sole contracting party, until the Prætor gave the institorial and exercitorial actions.² But the modern nations of Europe, which have adopted the Roman law as the basis of their jurisprudence, have followed out the principles of our law, by exempting the agent from liability when he has contracted solely in the name of his principal; and by fixing a personal liability upon him, when, although known and described as an agent, he yet has contracted in his own name.³ Thus, Emerigon lays down the rule and the exception in the following broad terms "Accord-

11 Mass. R. 27, 29; *Bradlee v Boston Glass Co* 16 Pick. R. 347, Ante, §§ 147, 154, 155, 160, 161; Post, § 275-280. 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 630, 631, (4th edit.); *Hopkins v Laconture*, 4 Louis. R. 64, *Hays v Lynn*, 7 Watts, R. 524, *Muldon v Whitlock*, 1 Cow. R. 290, *Porter v Lalcott*, 1 Cowen, R. 309 *Waring v Mason*, 18 Wend. R. 425, *Mills v Hunt*, 20 Wend. R. 431, *Sullivan v Campbell*, 2 Hill, R. 271. It is difficult, if not impracticable, to reconcile the language of all the authorities on this subject, as may be seen in note to ante, § 147. For example, it was held, in *Minaid v Reed*, 7 Wend. R. 68, that a note, executed by a wife in her own name, will not bind her husband, if it does not purport to be made for him, either in the body of the note, or in the signature by her as agent, although she has authority from her husband to give notes to bind him. [But the contrary has since been held in England in *Lindus v Bradwell*, 5 Com. B. Rep. 553.] See also *Spencer v Field*, 10 Wend. R. 11.

¹ Per Mr Justice Porter, in *Hopkins v Laconture*, 4 Miller, Louis. R. 64; *Mechanics Bank v Bank of Columbia*, 5 Wheat. R. 326, *Hyde v Wolff*, 4 Miller, Louis. R. 234, *S. P. Pothier on Oblig.* by Evans, n. 82, 447, 448, *Bowen v Morris*, 2 Taunt. R. 374, 387, *Lisset v Reave*, 2 Atk. 394, *Beebe v. Roberts*, 12 Wend. 419, Ante, §§ 160, 161, *Higgins v Senior*, 8 Mees & Welsh 844.

² Ante, §§ 88, 161-163; Post, §§ 425, 426; Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, Id. tit. 3, l. 1; 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, 247, 248, Id. 253, 254, (edit. 1818), *Hopkins v Laconture*, 4 Miller, Louis. R. 64.

³ *Pothier on Oblig.* by Evans, n. 74, 75, 82, 447, 448, 1 *Emerig Assur.* ch. 5, § 8, p. 137; 1 *Stair, Inst. by Brodie*, B. 1, tit. 12, § 16, *Ersk. Inst. B. 3*, tit. 3, §§ 45, 46; 2 *Emerig. Assur.* ch. 4, § 12, p. 465, 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, 253, 254, (edit. 1818).

ing to the general rule, (says he,) the agent, who promises or stipulates, or acts in his quality or character, as agent, is not personally bound, (*en son nom propre.*) He is a simple agent of instrument, (*Il est simple ministre et exécuteur.*) He is held to nothing more than to exhibit his authority. But, if he contracts in his own name, he is bound, without distinction, to the third person with whom he contracts; because such third person is ignorant of his quality or character, as agent, and he is presumed rather to act for himself than for another. *Potius meo nomine, quam pro alio.*¹

§ 272. One of the most common instances of the application of this doctrine of the personal liability of agents who contract in their own name, and yet avowedly for their employers, is to be found in cases of policies of insurance, procured to be underwritten by agents for their principals. In the common form of such policies, the agent, (A. B.,) in his own name, causes himself to be insured for his principal, (C. D.,) or for whom it may concern, &c. In such cases, the agent is deemed an immediate party, although not the sole contracting party. He is liable for the premium; he may sue and be sued on the policy; and the underwriters and himself become reciprocally parties to the policy, and incur the mutual obligations consequent thereon.² Emerigon has doubted, whether, upon principle, the agent in such a case, if he acts in his quality of agent, ought to be personally liable. But he admits that the universal usage is the other way; and that it has the sanction of judicial decisions.³ It is certainly entirely well settled in the English and American law, and it seems to be a reasonable interpretation of the terms and objects of the instrument.⁴

¹ Emerigon Assur. tom. 2 ch. 4, § 12, p. 465, Ante, § 262, note, 269, note

² 1 Emerigon, Assur. ch. 5, § 4, pp. 139, 140, Marsh. on Insur. B. 1, ch. 8, § 2, p. 292-296, Id. B. 1, ch. 16, § 2, p. 683, 1 Phillips on Insur. ch. 22, pp. 519, 523, 524, Ante, §§ 109, 111, 161, Post, 894, 498. See Stackpole & Arnold, 11 Mass. R. 27, 2 Valin, Comm. Liv. 3, tit. 6, art. 3, p. 34, Pothier, Traité de l'Assur. n. 96, Gurett v. Handley, 4 Barn. & Cresw. 666, by Bayley, J.

³ 1 Emerigon ch. 5, § 3, pp. 137, 138, Id. § 4, p. 139-141; Pothier, Traité de l'Assur. n. 96, 2 Valin, Liv. 3, tit. 6, art. 3, pp. 132, 133; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 247, 248, 253, 255 (edit. 1818), Ante, § 269 and notes

⁴ Marsh. on Insur. B. 1, ch. 8, § 2, p. 292-296, Id. B. 1, ch. 16, § 2, p. 683; 1 Phillips on Insur. ch. 22, pp. 519, 523, 524, 1 Emerigon, Assur. ch. 5, § 3, pp. 137, 138, Id. § 4 pp. 139, 140; 2 Emerigon, Assur. ch. 4, § 12, p. 467.

§ 273. *A fortiori*, the same doctrine applies to cases, where the instrument is under seal, and purports to be, not the deed of the principal, but the deed of the agent.¹ In such cases, as we have already seen, although the party describes himself as agent of another; yet, as the instrument cannot be deemed the deed of the principal, it would be utterly without any legal effect, unless it was construed to be the deed of the agent;² and, therefore, *ut res magis valeat, quam pereat*, the interpretation is adopted, that it is the intention of the parties, that the agent shall be bound for the principal; for the law will not impute to the parties an intention to do a void act; much less will it, for such a purpose, allow the words of the instrument to be strained out of the ordinary meaning attached to them. The words, therefore, which touch the character of the agent, are treated as merely words of description, as a mere designation of the person, by whose authority and for whose benefit he is acting; and not as intended to exclude a personal responsibility. In this way the whole instrument may have a sensible effect according to the import of the words in their ordinary signification and connection.³

¹ Ante, § 147-150, 155-157, 161; Post, § 276-278, 422, 450; *Meyer v. Barker*, 6 Binn. 228, 231; *Stone v. Wood*, 7 Cowen, R. 453.

² Ante, § 147-150, 152, 154-156, Post, §§ 277, 278.

³ Ante, § 148-158, 161, 266-269, Post, §§ 280, 281, *Appleton v. Binks*, East, R. 148, Abt. on Shipp. Pt 3, ch 1, § 2, *Duvall v. Craig*, 2 Wheat. R. 45; 3 Chitt. on Comm. and Manuf. 211, 212, *Kennedy v. Gouveia*, 3 Dow. & Ry. 503, 2 Liverm. on Agency, 249-252, (edit. 1818), *White v. Skinner*, 13 John. R. 307, *Sumner v. Williams*, 8 Mass. R. 198, *Stone v. Wood*, 7 Cowen, R. 453; *Tippetts v. Waller*, 4 Mass. R. 595; *Hopkins v. Mehaffey*, 11 Serg. & Rawle, 126; *Meyer v. Barker* 6 Binn. R. 231. In *Hopkins v. Mehaffey*, 11 Serg. & Rawle, 126, 129, there was a sealed agreement, purporting to be between a corporation, by its corporate name, of the one part, and the plaintiff, of the other part; it was signed by the president of the corporation, with his own seal, and the president was afterwards sued thereon. The Court held him not personally liable on the instrument, even if he had not authority to execute it for the corporation. On that occasion Mr. Justice Gibson, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: "In general, it is true, that there is a distinction between contracts, that are entered into on the part of government by its agents, and those which are entered into on the part of individuals, or corporations, by those who represent them. In respect of the first, it may safely be asserted, that, whether the contract be by parol, or by deed, the public faith is exclusively relied on, whenever the agent does not specially render himself liable. In respect of

§ 274. In the preceding cases, the agent is held personally liable upon the contract, because he is a direct party to it, although

the second, where the contract is by parol, the agent is liable only where he had no authority to bind his principal, but the agent of an individual or corporation, covenanting, under his seal, for the act of his principal, although he describe himself as contracting for and on behalf of his principal, is liable on his express covenant, whether he had the authority of the person, whom he thus professes to bind, or not. The law is thus broadly laid down by Mr Chitty, in his *Treatise on Pleading*, page 21, and the authorities which he cites, fully bear him out; to which may be added *Pipetts v Walker*, 4 Miss R 595. It is somewhat remarkable that the distinction between a parol and a sealed contract was not taken in *Randall v Van Vechten* 19 Johns 60, and that the authorities, cited to prove, that an agent, who personally covenants in behalf of his principal, is liable only in the event of their being no recourse to the principal, directly prove the reverse. There is a class of cases referred to, which have nothing to do with the question. I mean those cases where the defendant undertakes to covenant for others, as well as himself, and there it is settled, that, if he has no authority to bind the others, he is nevertheless bound himself, not that he incurs an eventual liability in consequence of the others being discharged, but he remains bound as he was originally, the instrument being his several deed. It is unnecessary, therefore, to inquire whether the plaintiff might have an action of *assumpsit* against the principal, in consequence of the existence of a parol authority to the agent to enter into the contract, because, whether he may or not, the agent is liable on his express covenant. But there is a striking and substantial difference between the covenant of an agent, who describes himself as contracting for his principal, and the covenant of a principal, through the means and by the instrumentality of an agent. The first is the individual covenant of the agent, the second is the individual covenant of the principal, and, in this respect, the case at bar differs from *Randall v Van Vechten*, in which the distinction seems not to have been adverted to. No decision can be found in support of the position, that what appears on the face of the deed to be the proper covenant of the principal, but entered into through the agency of an attorney, (which, by the by, is the legitimate form of the instrument, where the attorney is not to be bound,) shall be taken to be the proper covenant of the attorney, wherever he had not authority to execute the deed. How could he be declared against? If, in the usual and proper manner of pleading it were alleged, that the agent had covenanted, it would appear by the production of the instrument, that he had not, but that his principal had covenanted through his means, which, on *non est factum* being pleaded, would be fatal. This is precisely the case before us, except that it is not quite so strong, In the body of the instrument the covenants are stated, as if they were made by the corporation directly with the plaintiff, without the agency of any one, the defendant not being named but merely signing and sealing it with his own seal, as the deed of the corporation which, I readily admit, it is not. Now, to avoid the difficulty, which I have just mentioned, the plaintiff, in declaring, does not, in the usual way, set forth the substance of the covenants, but alleges that, by certain articles

he is acting for his employer; and the contract is treated as his own express contract. But the liability of an agent may also arise, by implication, from his own acts, with reference to a written contract, to which he is not originally a party. By the common form of a bill of lading, the goods are deliverable to the consignee, or his assigns, or to the shipper, or his assigns, he or they paying freight therefor; and upon the construction of the instrument, it has been held, that whoever receives the goods under the bill of lading, as consignee, or assignee, contracts by implication to pay the freight due on them.¹ Therefore, if the shipper, or the consignee, in such a case, should indorse the bill of lading to his agent, whether known to be an agent or not, the latter would be liable to pay the freight, if he took the goods upon the consignment under the bill of lading,² unless, indeed, it should appear upon the face of the consignment or indorsement, that it was made to him as agent merely, or the other circumstances of the case should show, that no credit was given to him for the freight.³ [But a mere naked consignment to an

of agreement between the parties, it was covenanted "as follows", and then sets out the articles according to their tenor assigning for breach, that the defendant had not paid, &c. A demurrer would unquestionably have answered the purpose as well as the plea of *non est factum*, for the declaration sets forth no covenant of the defendant, and consequently no cause of action. But the paper is not the defendant's deed. He sealed and delivered it undoubtedly, but there is something more than sealing and delivery necessary to a deed. It ought to contain the proper parts of a contract, and in this instrument there are no obligatory words, applicable to the person of the defendant. Even the sealing and delivery were (by the party) as the president, and in behalf of the corporation. If the defendant had authority to contract for the corporation, although he has done so informally, there cannot be a doubt that, as the work has been done, the plaintiff may have an action of some sort against it. But he never acted on the basis of the defendant being personally answerable, and to permit him to maintain this action, would permit him to have, what was not in the contemplation of either party, recourse to the person of the agent. I am, therefore, of opinion, that the Judge who tried the cause, was right in directing the jury, that the paper, given in evidence, was not the deed of the defendant." Ante, § 154 and note.

¹ Cock & Taylor, 13 East, R 399, Dougal v Kemble, 3 Bing R 386; Abbott on Shipp Pt 3, ch 7, § 4, p 285, (edit 1829), Wilson v Keymer, 1 Maule & Selw. 157

² Ibid, Bell v Kymer, 5 Taunt R 477, Evans v Marlett, or Matel, 3 Salk. R 290, Post, § 395 and note

³ It is not easy, perhaps, to reconcile the language of all the cases on this point.

agent does not make him liable for the freight, when the agency

Cock v. Taylor, 18 East, R. 369, shows, that a purchaser, under the bill of lading from the consignee, is liable for the freight; and *Wilson v. Keymer*, 1 Maule & Selw. 157, and *Bell v. Kymer*, 5 Taunt. R. 477, and *Dougal v. Kemble*, 3 Bing. R. 383, that an agent, consignee, or indorsee, is also liable, if the bill of lading contains a consignment, or indorsement to him generally, without saying, that he is agent. In this last case, Mr. Chief Justice Best said: "It has been insisted on the part of the defendants, that the verdict of the plaintiff is inconsistent with the law of England, because the contract, on the bill of lading, is with the shipper, or Le Cointe & Co., and that the liability of these parties cannot be transferred to the defendants. But this argument is founded on an inaccurate statement of the terms of the bills of lading. Neither the shipper, nor Le Cointe & Co., agree by these instruments to pay the freight. These are receipts for the goods, with an undertaking, on the part of the captain, that he will deliver them to the legal holder of these bills, on such holder's paying the freight. The captain has a lien for the freight against whoever shall become the owner of the goods. The owner could not compel the captain to deliver the goods from his actual possession, without paying the freight. The act for regulating the West India Docks continues the lien for freight, whilst goods, delivered from a ship, and liable to freight, remain in those docks. Whoever obtains the delivery of goods, under such a bill of lading, contracts, by implication, to pay the freight due on them. There is no assignment of contract, no shifting of liability. The receiver of the goods, an original contractor to pay the freight on them. With respect to the alleged hardship on brokers, they know the terms of the bill under which they claim; they know what freight is due, and they need not make advances beyond the value of the goods, subject to freight. The hardship on the ship-owner would be much greater, if, after having brought the goods to England, he should not be entitled to recover freight from the parties who possess them under the bill of lading. *Cock v. Taylor* is expressly in point for the plaintiff. It has been attempted to distinguish that case from the present by the circumstance, that the plaintiff, in that case, had made no application to the consignee before applying to the defendant, and that the defendant was there a purchaser of the bill of lading. With respect to the application to the consignees, it was made, when the plaintiff supposed them to be the holders of the bills of lading. The moment the plaintiff discovered that the bills of lading had been transferred to the defendants, he applied also to them; and a man is not bound by what he does, in ignorance of the actual circumstances of his case. As to the circumstance of the defendant in *Cock v. Taylor* being a purchaser of the bill of lading, the effect of that is got rid of by *Bell v. Kymer*, in which the defendant was only a broker, and in which Gibbs, C. J., said, 'The holders of a bill of lading were bound to know that they were liable for the freight.' That decision is not touched by any subsequent case, for *Wilson v. Keymer* turned on a different point; and every Judge, in that case, confirmed the decision in *Cock v. Taylor*. In *Wilson v. Keymer* the defendants did not obtain the goods under the bill of lading, but under the order of the consignees. In *Moorsom v. Kymer*, the inference of an implied contract was repelled

as known, and there is no stipulation that the consignee shall pay freight."

by the existence of a special contract under a charter-party; and *Le Blanc, J.*, said, "The law will not raise an implied promise, where there is an express agreement between the parties." But he also said, "Where the ship is a general ship, and there is no other to whom the party can resort, the law will imply a promise to prevent a failure of justice." There would be a failure of justice if such a promise were not implied in the present instance." See also *Scaife v. Tobin*, 3 Barn. & Adolph R. 523, *Coleman v. Lambert*, 5 Mees & Welsb. 502, *Tobin v. Crawford*, Id. 235. In the case of *Amos v. Temperley*, 8 Mees & Welsb. 798, where, by the bill of lading, the goods were "deliverable to A, for the London Gas Company, or his assigns, *he or they paying freight* for the said goods," and A received the goods under the bill of lading, it was held that A was not personally liable for the freight, inasmuch as, on the face of the bill of lading, he was a mere agent to receive the goods for the company, the property vesting in them. On that occasion, Mr. Baron Parke, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said "The case of *Cock v. Taylor* established the proposition, that the receipt of goods by the indorsee of a bill of lading, by which they were made deliverable to the consignee or his assigns, he or they paying the freight, was evidence of a new contract between him and the ship-owner to pay the freight according to the terms of the bill of lading, and that case has been followed by many others. But here the defendant is, on the face of the bill of lading a mere agent to receive the goods, the London Gas Company being the consignee, and the property vesting in them, according to the rule laid down by Lord Holt, in the case of *Evaus v. Marlett*, and the promise to be inferred from the receipt of the goods, under such a bill of lading, is *prima facie* a promise by the defendant, as agent for the company, to pay the freight on their account, and not a promise to be personally responsible for it, and there was no sufficient evidence to the contrary." It is difficult to reconcile this decision with the language of Lord Tenderden, in *Drew v. Bird*, *Mood & Malk* 156, and *Renteria v. Ruding*, *Mood & Malk*. R. 511. The real question in *Amos v. Temperley*, 8 Mees & Welsb. 798, was, whether credit was given to A, the agent, or not, for the freight. Now the goods were deliverable to him, for the Gas Company, but *he*, or his assigns were to pay the freight, by the terms of the bill of lading. Why then was not A directly liable for freight, according to the terms of the bill of lading? He had not assigned it. It by no means followed, that, because the London Gas Company might be liable for the freight, therefore A was not. Both might be liable. Ante, § 270 and note. In *Abbott on Shipp* Pt. 3, ch. 7, § 4, it is said "If a person accepts anything, which he knows to be subject to a duty or charge, it is rational to conclude that he means to take the duty or charge on himself." See ante, § 263, note; Post, § 395. See, as to when a consignment vests the property in an agent, who is under liabilities or has made advances, *Holbrook v. Wmgh*, 24 Wend. R. 169; *Haille v. Smith*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 563, Ante, § 111, *Abbott on Shipp*. Pt. 3, ch. 2, § 4, note 1, p. 216, (Amer. edit. 1829); *Dunlap v. Lambert*, 6 Clark & Finnell, 600, 625, 627. See post, § 395 and note.

¹ [Boston & Maine Railroad v. Whitcher, 1 Allen, (Mass.) 497 (1861). Bige-

§ 274 *a*. But although, in general, an agent who contracts in writing in his own name, even avowedly as agent for another, is thus personally responsible upon the agreement so made by him, whether it be under seal or not; and it will be treated as his personal obligation and contract; yet it does not necessarily follow, that if the principal is not bound thereby, the covenant or contract can in all cases be enforced by or against the agent personally. For if, from the nature and objects of the agreement, whether under seal or not, it can be collected, that a reciprocal obligation is intended to be created, and yet, under the circumstances, it cannot be enforced; or if there is a total failure of the consideration on one side, and the other side cannot maintain any action thereon; there, the agreement will be treated as utterly void. Thus, for example, if an agent should in his own name, and as attorney of his principal, demise an estate of his principal for a term of years, at a specified rent, and the lessee should covenant to pay the rent; there, inasmuch as the demise would be utterly void, as the lease is not executed in the name of the principal, the agent could not maintain a suit for the rent on the covenant, because the whole instrument,

low, C J, there said "The cases in which an agent has been held liable to pay the freight of goods consigned to him proceed on the ground that, by the terms of bills of lading as usually drawn (especially in cases of transportation by water, the consignee is to pay the freight. In other words, the carrier undertakes to deliver the property to the consignee, 'he paying freight for the same.' Whoever accepts delivery under such a bill of lading, contracts, by implication, to pay the freight due on them, and if the name of the agent only is inserted in the bill, without any designation of the character or capacity as agent for another in which he receives the goods, he is liable individually for the freight, because he thereby becomes an original contractor to pay therefor. These cases rest on the principle, that he who accepts a thing which he knows to be subject to a duty or charge, for which he is expected to pay thereby contracts, by implication, to take the duty or charge on himself. *Cock v Taylor*, 13 East, 399, *Wilson v Kymer*, 1 Maule & Selw 157, *Dougal v Kemble*, 3 Bing 383, *Amos v Temperley*, 8 Mees & Welb 198. But no case can be found which goes the length of holding, that an agent is liable for the freight of goods sent to, and received by him, when his agency is known to the carrier at the time of the delivery of the goods, and when there is no stipulation in the contract of transportation by which the consignee is to pay the freight. In such a case, the essential elements of a contract are wanting. It is nothing from which an intent on the part of the shipper or carrier to charge the agent, or an agreement by the agent to pay the freight, can be inferred.]

including the covenant, would be deemed void, and the consideration for the covenant would totally fail.¹ Neither, for the like reason, could the lessee maintain a suit on any covenant in the lease in his own favor. The same rule has been applied to the case, where an agent made an agreement under seal, as attorney of his principal, whereby, in consideration of a certain sum, he agreed to execute a good and sufficient conveyance in the law, of a certain farm of his principal; and the agent brought a suit to recover the consideration-money; and it was held unmaintainable, because the agreement was considered as made by and with the agent in his own name, as attorney, and not in the name of his principal, and then the whole agreement deemed void, since the agent had no estate in the farm to convey.² If, however, the agreement had been by the agent, not that he would convey, but that his principal should convey, then it seems that the agreement would have been valid.³

§ 274 *b*. Another class of cases may readily be suggested, where, from the defective mode of executing the instrument, the principal is not bound, and yet, neither is the agent bound; and that is, where, although the agent is capable of acting for the principal, he or she is incapacitated from binding himself or herself by a personal contract. Thus, for example, if a husband should authorize his wife to sign notes on his account, it is indispensable, in order to bind him, that the notes should, either in the body thereof, or in the signature, purport to be his notes, or on his account; for notes, given in her own name, would not, in

¹ *Frontin v. Small*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1418; *S. C.* 2 Strange, R. 705; *Berkeley v. Hardy*, 5 Barn. & Cressw. 355; *Townsend v. Hubbard*, 4 Hill, N. Y. R. 351, 358.

² *Bogart v. De Bussy*, 6 Johns. R. 94.

³ *Spencer v. Field*, 10 Wend. R. 87. Some doubt may well be entertained, whether the case of *Bogart v. De Bussy*, 6 Johns. R. 94, was a correct application of the principle of the case of *Frontin v. Small*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1418. The latter was an executed lease in the name of the agent, and passed no estate. The former was an executory agreement, under seal, in which the covenant was, on the part of the agent, "to execute a good and sufficient conveyance in the law" of the farm of his principal, which covenant could properly be performed by a conveyance in the name of his principal, under due authority. The pleadings, upon which the case was decided, did not raise any question as to the form of the conveyance, which was to be made; but turned upon a collateral mortgage on the estate.

such a case, bind either the husband, or the wife.¹ [Although the contrary has been recently held in England.²] Similar considerations will apply to an agent, who is an infant. In short, in all cases, in order to bind the principal upon the instrument, there must be apt words to charge him; and in like manner, if the principal is not bound by the instrument, the agent will not be bound thereby, unless it contains apt words also to charge him; although, if he be of competent capacity to enter into a contract, he may be responsible in an action upon the case for his negligent performance of his duty, or his improper assumption of authority.³

§ 275. In a great variety of cases, even where the contract is in writing, it becomes a nice question, whether the agent is, or is not, personally bound.⁴ Some of the cases on this subject have been already cited; and it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to reconcile all the authorities, bearing on the point. Ordinarily, as we have seen, if the contract is made in such a manner as directly to bind the principal, the agent will not be bound personally.⁵ But the embarrassing question still remains, whether the form of the instrument does, or does not, import a personal liability on the part of the agent. Thus, if an agent should make a note, in which he should say, "I promise to pay," &c., and sign it "A. B., for C. D.," (the principal,) the question would arise, whether he was personally bound, or not, upon the instrument in that form.⁷ We have already seen, that it has been held, that in such a case, he is not personally bound, if he has authority to sign the note from C. D.⁸ The construction might, perhaps, be more doubtful, if the note were, "I, A. B., as

¹ *Minard v Mead* 7 Wend 68, Ante, § 264, note

² *Lindus v Bradwell*, 5 Com B Rep 583

³ *Stetson v Patten*, 2 Greenl R 358, Ante, § 264, note

⁴ *Smith on Merc Law*, 79, 80, (2d edit), Id p 140-143, (3d edit. 1843); *Bowen v Morris*, 9 Taunt R 374, *Denton v Rodie*, 3 Camp R 493, *Norton v Herron*, 1 Carr & Payn 648, S C 1 Ry & Mood 229, *Kendray v Hodgson*, 5 Esp R 228

⁵ Ante, §§ 154, 155, 158, 269, 270

⁶ Ante, §§ 263 and 269 *Mann v Chandler*, 9 Mass R 335.

⁷ See *Rue v Gove*, 7 Pick 158, *Woodes v Dennet*, 9 New Hamp. R. 55; Ante, §§ 154, 155, 161 Post, §§ 269, 270, 275-279

⁸ Ante, §§ 154, 155, *L. M. v Talbot*, 16 Mass R. 461.

agent of C. D., promise," &c., and it were signed, "A. B." And, if in the latter case the note were under seal, there would be strong ground to say, that it was the deed of the agent, and not of the principal.¹

§ 275 *a*. Similar difficulties have occurred in the application of the same doctrine in the Scottish Courts, although they are professedly governed by the same general principle, which regulates the doctrine maintained in England and America. Thus, in one case, where the agent of a company, having drawn bills in his own name, discounted them, when accepted, with a bank, (the acceptor, who happened to be debtor of the company, having also been informed in a letter to him from the drawer, that the bills in question would be placed to his credit with them,) the Court of Sessions found the company liable in an action on the bills, on the ground, that the drawer had drawn and discounted the bills as their agent and for their behoof. But the judgment has been reversed on appeal, and the reversal appears to be conformable with the doctrine now stated. The circumstance of the funds, raised by discounting the bills, being applied to the company's use, was a matter between them and their agents, with which the discounters had no concern. In a later case, certain trustees were found liable for the amount of a promissory note, which the manager of a coal-work, forming part of the trust, had granted in his own name. But this was found, not in an action on the bill, but in an action brought on the authority alleged to be given by the trustees, both directly and *rebus et factis*, to sign bills on their account in the business of the trust.²

§ 276. Other illustrations of the difficulties, growing out of the interpretations of particular instruments, may be derived from adjudged cases. Thus, where a contract under seal was made between A. B., as agent of C. D. of the one part, and E. F. of the other part, and it was signed and sealed A. B. and E. F.; it was held to be the deed of A. B., the agent; and that he was personally responsible on the covenant.³ So, where a

¹ See *Dubois v Delaware & Hudson Canal Co.* 4 Wend 285; Ante, § 147-155; *Appleton v. Binks*, 5 East, R. 148.

² *Thomson on Bills*, pp. 218, 219, (edit 1837).

³ *Stone v. Wood*, 7 Cowen, R. 453; *Taft v. Brewster*, 9 John. R. 384; *Hall*

sealed agreement purported to be by and between the plaintiffs, of the one part, and A. B., C. D., and E. F., directors of the Cotton Manufactory, of the other part, and it was signed, "for the directors, A. B.," it was held to be personally obligatory upon A. B., although he by plea averred, that it was made by himself and the other directors, as agents only of the company.¹ So, where A, B, and C, made a note as follows: "We, the subscribers, jointly and severally, promise to pay D, or order, for the Boston Glass Manufactory, and signed their names, not saying, as agents, it was held, that the note bound them personally, and not the corporation.² So, where two persons made a promissory note in this form, "We the subscribers, trustees for the proprietors of the new congregational meeting-house at A, promise to pay B the sum of, &c., and signed it C, D, E, F; it was held that the note bound them personally, and not the proprietors.³ So, where the committee of a town made a contract in the following words "Agreement between A, B, and C, committee of the town of N, of the one part, and D and E of the other part, and the said committee agree to pay," &c., signing their own names, A, B, and C, it was held, that they were personally liable on the contract.⁴ So, where a committee of the directors of a turnpike corporation entered into a contract under seal, describing themselves as such committee, on the one part, with the plaintiff, on the other part, and signed and sealed the contract in their own names, it was held, that they were personally responsible; for it was the deed of the committee, and not of the directors, or of the corporation.⁵ So, where certain persons signed a

v. Bunbridge 1 Mann & Grang. R. 42, Ante, §§ 158, 273, Post, § 278, and note.

¹ *White v. Skinner*, 10 John. R. 307, Ante, § 273.

² *Brill v. Boston Glass Manufactory*, 16 Pick. R. 347. In this case Mr. Chief Justice Shaw, said: "It is held in many cases, that, although the contract of one is given for the debt of another, and although it is understood, between the persons promising and the party for whom the contract is entered into, that the latter is to pay it, or to reimburse and indemnify the contracting party, if he should be required to pay it, it is still, as between the parties to it, the contract of the party making it." A leading and decisive case on this point is *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. R. 27. See ante, §§ 154, 155.

³ *Packard v. Nye*, 2 Mass. R. 47.

⁴ *Simonds v. Heard*, 9 Pick. R. 121. See *Savage v. Rix*, 9 N. H. R. 263.

⁵ *Tippetts v. Walker*, 4 Mass. R. 595.

note, describing themselves as "Trustees of Union Religious Society," it was held, that they were personally liable thereon, although it was proved, that the society was a corporation, and the note was given for a balance due from the society for a church bell.¹

§ 277. In the two last cases, it did not appear, that the agents executing the contract had due authority from the directors, or corporation, to execute the deeds. If such an authority had been proved, or admitted, it would still have remained a question, whether, as the deeds were executed in their own names, they would not have been personally bound. This last question has, however, arisen; and it has been decided in America, that the agents are not affected by any personal responsibility under such a contract, although it is made under their own seals, if the corporation itself has conferred on them a due authority to make the contract on their behalf. Thus, where a contract was made by certain persons, by name, purporting to be "a committee of the corporation of the city of Albany," on the one part, and the plaintiff, on the other part; and it was sealed by the committee with their own seals; it was held, that they were not personally bound by the contract, as it was authorized by the corporation, although not under its corporate seal; and that the corporation was alone liable on the contract in an action of assumpsit.² The ground of this decision seems to have been, that, although the corporation was not a direct party to the contract, yet, as the contract had been duly authorized by the corporation, the agents

¹ Hills v. Bannister 8 Cowen, R. 31; Ante, § 154, Shelton v. Darling, 2 Connecticut. R. 435, Barker v. Mechanic Fire Insur. Co 3 Wend. R. 94. Fogg v. Virgin, 19 Maine, 352, Cleveland v. Steward 3 Kelly, 283, Trask v. Roberts, 1 B. Monroe, 201, Webb v. Burke, 5 Id. 51. But see Mann v. Chandler, 9 Mass. R. 335, Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cowen. R. 513, Ante, § 151, Leach v. Blad, 6 Sm. & Marsh 221. See Cooch v. Goodman, 2 Adolph & Ell New Rep 580, 595, 596; Fiske v. Eldridge, 12 Gray, Haverhill Mut. Ins. Co. v. Newhall, 1 Allen, (Mass.), 130, (1861)

² Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 John. R. 60, Dubois v. The Delaware and Hudson Canal Co. 4 Wend. R. 285, Brockway v. Allen, 17 Wend. R. 40. But see Hopkins v. Mehaffey, 11 Serg. & Rawle, 123, 129; Ante, §§ 154, 159, note, § 273, note (1.) and post, § 278, and note. The case of Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 John. R. 60, was distinguished by the Court from the case of a public agent of the government, upon the ground that the city of Albany was a private, although a political, corporation. But see Hatch v. Barr, 1 Hamm. R. 390, § 94.

were not personally liable; for (it was said) the person who assumes to contract, as agent for an individual, or for a corporation, must see to it, that his principal is legally bound by his act. For, if he does not give a right of action against his principal, the law holds him personally liable.¹ But in this case, as the agents made the contract with due authority, the Court held, that, although no action lay upon the deed, as the deed of the corporation, yet an action of assumpsit would lie against the corporation, founded upon the obligations contained therein.

§ 278. But it deserves consideration, whether the doctrine can be generally maintained, that, because the principal may be indirectly liable on the contract, therefore the agent is exonerated from all personal responsibility. Besides; it is manifest, that the agents had here made a contract in their own names, although as a committee of the corporation, and the deed was their own deed, and not that of the corporation.² The corporation, confessedly, could not be sued, on that instrument, as their deed; and it would seem to be a general rule, that an agent, who executes an instrument, must execute it in the name of the principal, so as to give a right of action thereon against him, if he would avoid personal responsibility; and, if it be a contract by deed, then it must be in the name, and be the deed, of the principal; for, if it be the deed of the agent, he alone is responsible thereon, as the proper legal party to it.³ In the common case of a charter-party, executed by the master of the ship, according to his ordinary rights and duties, and authority in the proper employment of the ship, it is not doubted, that his owner is bound by the contract, in some form of action. But it is as little doubted, that the owner cannot be sued on that very instrument, as his deed; and that the master may be sued on it, as his own deed.⁴ In short, in such a case, the contract is treated as

¹ *Randall v. Van Vechten*, 19 John R. 60; *Dubois v. The Delaware and Hudson Canal Co.* 1 Wend. R. 285; *Brockway v. Allen*, 17 Wend. R. 40. But see *Hopkins v. Mahaffey*, 11 Serg. & Rawle, 128, 129, Ante, § 161, and note, 273, note (1.)

² See *Danop v. Inhabitants of Granby*, 2 Pick. 345; Ante, §§ 273, 276, 277.

³ *Stone v. Wood & Cowen*, R. 453, Ante, §§ 155, 156, 158, 264, note, 269, 270, 273, 274 a, 274 b.

⁴ Ante, §§ 155, 158, 161, 162, § 273 and note, 274 a, 274 b, 279; Post, § 294.

the direct contract of the master; and the owner is only secondarily liable, in another form of action, (an action on the case,) and not in an action on the deed itself.¹ Indeed, nothing is more common than for a contract to be made, by which the agent is personally bound, and which yet is *ex consequenti*, binding on the principal also, although the latter is not a direct and immediate party to the instrument.² This is true, not only in the commercial law of England and America, but also in that of the foreign nations of continental Europe.³ The more correct and satisfactory doctrine would seem to be, that, where the agent is a direct party of the instrument, and the principal is not, so that the latter is not, *ex directo*, suable thereon, there, the agent, although he describes himself as agent, is suable upon the covenants and agreements contained therein, as his own personal contract.⁴ Still, however, the doctrine is to be understood with

¹ Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 5, pp. 93, 94; Id. Pt. 3, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 163, 164, (edit. 1829); Stone v. Wood, 7 Cowen, 183; Ante, §§ 158, 160-162; Post, §§ 294, 422, 450, note.

² Ibid.

³ Post, § 294. See 1 Emerigon, Assur. ch. 5, § 3, pp. 137, 139; Id. § 4, pp. 139, 140; Pothier, Oblig. n. 418; 1 Stair, Instit. by Brodie, B. 1, tit. 12, § 17; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, §§ 43, 46; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 252-254, (edit. 1818); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 378-384.

⁴ Ante, §§ 160, 273, 275. The cases of *Randall v. Van Vechten*, 19 John. R. 60, and *Dulles v. Delaware and Hudson Canal Co.* 4 Wend. 285, are not easily reconcilable with many other authorities; and especially with *Appleton v. Binks*, 5 East, 148, *Kennedy v. Gouveia*, 3 Dowl. & Ry. 503, *Burrell v. Jones*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 47; *Norton v. Herron*, 1 Carr and Payne, 618; *S. C. Ryan & Mood*, 229. See also *Tanner v. Christian*, 29 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 103, *Popkins v. Mechaffey*, 11 Serg. & Rawle, 126, 128, 129; Ante, § 273, note (1); *Hall v. Bainbridge*, 1 Mann. & Grang. 42. The case of *Bowen v. Morris*, 2 Taunt. R. 374, is distinguishable; for the contract was there treated as the contract of the principal, as was suggested by Lord Chief Justice Abbott, in *Kennedy v. Gouveia*, 3 Dowl. & Ry. 503. See also *Tippetts v. Walker*, 4 Mass. R. 595; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 381-384; *Macbeath v. Hallmand*, 1 T. R. 172, 176, 180, 181. In *Spittle v. Lavender*, 2 Brod. & Bing. R. 452, where an agreement purported to be between A. B. "as agent for, and on the part and behalf of," C. D., of the one part, and E. F., the plaintiff, of the other part; and on the same day the principal, C. D., wrote below on the same paper, "I hereby sanction this agreement, and approve of A. B. having signed the same in my behalf;" it was held, that, by his signature and approval on the paper, the contract became the contract of the principal, and not of the agent, and was to be treated as one transaction; and so the agent was not liable thereon. Ante, § 251, and note. See *Kendray v.*

the qualification, that in the instrument there are apt words to charge the agent personally. For, if an agent should, without authority, execute a deed in the name of the principal, who is not bound thereby, the agent would not, in such a case, be liable to the other party on the instrument itself as his deed, unless there were apt words in it, importing a personal liability on his part.¹ The remedy for the misconduct of the agent must otherwise be by an action on the case.²

§ 279. But, in cases of unwritten contracts, also, the question may arise, whether the agent is liable, or the principal only, or both; and this, as a matter of fact, is generally left to the jury. In all cases of this sort, the question generally is, to whom credit is given, whether to the principal, or to the agent. If to the latter, then he is personally responsible, even although he may be known to be acting for his principal.³ Thus, for example, an agent, although known as such, may, by his express warranty of soundness, or of title, or of any other fact, in regard to the commodity sold by him for his principal, make himself personally liable, if the credit is clearly given to him on such war-

Hodgson, 5 Esp. R. 228, *Stone v. Wood*, 7 Cowen, R. 453; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 211, 212. In *Brockway v. Allen*, 17 Wend. R. 40, the defendants made a note, signed with their names, with the description added, "Trustees of the First Baptist Society of the village of Brockport." The defendants were trustees, and the society was incorporated by the name of the First Baptist Church and Society of the village of Brockport; and, by the laws of New York, where the note was made, and the society incorporated, the trustees, as such, are a corporation, having a common seal, and the note was for a debt due by the society. It was held on special pleading, that the defendants were not personally liable on the note, and that the society was. And see *Jefts v. York*, 10 Cush. R.; Ante, § 154. But see *Hills v. Hannister*, 8 Cowen, 31. In *Taft v. Brewster*, 9 John. R. 331, where the defendants executed a bond to the plaintiff, by which the defendants, by the name and description of A. B. C. D., and E. F., "Trustees of the Baptist Society of the town of Richfield," bound themselves in the form of, &c., &c., and the bond was signed A. B. C. D., and E. F., "Trustees of the Baptist Society of Richfield," it was held, that the defendants were personally bound on the bond. See *Fox v. Drake*, 8 Cowen, R. 191; *Osborne v. Kerr*, 12 Wend. R. 179; Ante, §§ 160, 160 a, 161, Post, §§ 422, 450.

¹ *Stetson v. Patton*, 2 Greenl. R. 358, Ante, § 274 b.

² Ante, § 160, note, § 264, note, § 270, note.

³ *Serace v. Whitcomb*, 2 Barn. & Cressw. 11; *Iveson v. Conington*, 1 Barn. & Cressw. 160, *Cunningham v. Soules*, 7 Wend. R. 106; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 211, 212; Ante, §§ 160, 160 a, 161.

ranty.¹ Indeed, if such warranty is made falsely and fraudulently by the agent, he will be personally liable thereon, as a matter of tort.²

§ 280. In the next place, persons, contracting as agents, are nevertheless, ordinarily, although, as we shall presently see,³ not universally, held personally responsible, where there is no other responsible principal, to whom resort can be had.⁴ Thus, for example, where a person signed a note, "as guardian of A. B.," he was held to be personally liable on the note; for he could not make his ward personally liable therefor, nor his ward's assets.⁵ So, where a person signed a note, "as trustee of A. B.," he was held personally liable on the note; for it was not primarily binding on his *cestui que trust*.⁶ So, where a person signed a note, "as executor of A. B.," or "as administrator of A. B.," [or as "solicitor of T. M. E.," &c.,⁷] it was held, that he was personally liable on the note; for such a note would not bind the estate of the deceased; and, to give it any validity, it must be construed to be a personal obligation of the maker.⁸ So, a bill of exchange, accepted by A, "as administrator of B," will bind A personally.⁹

§ 281. This whole doctrine proceeds upon the plain principle that he, who is capable of contracting, and does contract in his own name, although he is the agent of another, who is incapable of contracting, intends to bind himself; since in no other way can the contract possess any validity, but it would perish from its intrinsic infirmity.¹⁰ The Roman law fully recognized

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 365, 386, Fenn v Harrison, 4 T R 177.

² Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 386, Ante, § 310.

³ Post, § 297-290, Ante, § 274 a.

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd 371, 3 Chitty on Comm and Manuf. 211;

⁵ 2 Kent, Comm Lect 41, p 630, (4th edit), Ante, § 155

⁶ Thacher v. Dinsmore, 5 Mass. R. 299; Forster v Fuller, 6 Mass. R. 58.

⁷ Hills v. Bannister, 8 Cowen, R. 31; Ante, §§ 151, 276, Sumner v. Williams, 8 Mass. 162.

⁸ Burrell v. Jones, 3 Barn. & Ald 47; and see Roberts v Button, 14 Verm. 195.

⁹ Forster v. Fuller, 6 Mass. R. 58; Childs v Monins, 2 Brod & Bing 460. See also King v. Thorn, 1 T. R. 487; Ante, § 273.

¹⁰ Tassey v. Church, 4 Watts & Serg. 346.

¹⁰ Ante, § 273.

the propriety and justice of this doctrine, and applied it to the case of the master of a ship, who contracted with reference to the employment of the ship, for a slave, who was the employer of the ship, (*Exercitor navis.*) *Item, si servus meus navem exerceret; et cum magistro ejus contraxero, nihil obstat, quod minus adversus magistrum experiar actione, quæ mihi vel jure civili, vel honorario competit.*¹

§ 282. The same doctrine has been applied to cases where persons are acting in a public official character on behalf of irresponsible persons, (not on behalf of the government); upon the ground, that, unless these persons are liable on the contracts so made by them, the other party will be left without remedy; and such an understanding is not to be presumed to have been intended by either party. Therefore, where certain persons were, by an act of Parliament, appointed commissioners for making a river navigable, with power to raise and borrow money upon the tolls of navigation; and the acting commissioners gave orders, at their meetings, for work to be done, in furtherance of their duty in the premises; and, the work being done, the commissioners declined paying therefor, alleging, that they had no funds left; it was held, upon a bill in equity against them, that they were personally responsible on the contract, upon the ground, that credit was given to them personally, and not merely to the funds.²

§ 283. So, where commissioners under an enclosure act were authorized to make a rate to defray the expenses of passing and executing the act; and the act declared, that persons advancing money should be repaid out of the first money received by the commissioners; and the commissioners, to defray the expenses, from time to time drew drafts on the plaintiffs, as bankers, in the form following: "Fordham (the month,) A. D. (the year,) Messrs. E. H. & Son, pay to John Morgan, or bearer, — pounds, on account of the public drainage, and place the same to our account, as commissioners of the above enclosure;" it was put to the jury to say, whether credit was given to the defendants, the commissioners, personally, or to the fund; and the jury found for the plaintiffs. It was afterwards held, that

¹ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 5, § 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 17.

² Horsley v. Bell, 1 Brown, Ch. R. 101, note; S. C. Ambler, R. 770.

the verdict was right, and that the commissioners were personally responsible on the drafts.¹

§ 284. So, where the defendant, as chairman of the trustees of a turnpike road, signed a resolution of the trustees, that the plaintiff (the treasurer of the road) should be requested to make a temporary advance of money for the purposes of the road, it was left to the jury to say, whether the money had been advanced upon the security of the road, or upon the personal security of the defendant; and the jury found, that the money was lent upon the personal security of the defendant. It was afterwards held, that the verdict might well be supported, as it did not appear, that the trustees could give any security for a temporary loan upon the funds of the road; and, therefore, a personal security might well be presumed to have been intended.²

§ 285. Upon the same principle, where certain persons, on behalf of a parish in England, made an agreement with the plaintiff to pave the streets of the parish, and to pay him therefor; it was held, that the persons, so contracting, were personally liable; for the parishioners, as such, could not be sued therefor.³ So, where an overseer of the poor in England contracted with tradesmen upon account of the poor, and upon his own credit; it was held, that, as soon as he received so much of the poor's money, it became his own debt.⁴ So, where the committee of a voluntary society entered into an agreement with a tradesman, for business to be done on behalf of the society, it was held, that they were personally liable thereon; for the credit must fairly be presumed to be given to them, rather than to the subscribers at large.⁵ So, where the business of a voluntary eleemosynary society was conducted by a committee, it was held, that they were personally responsible to a baker, who supplied the establishment with bread at their request; for it might fairly be presumed, that he looked

¹ *Eaton v. Bell*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 34. See also *Higgins v. Livingstone*, 4 Dow, R. 355.

² *Parrott v. Eyre*, 10 Bing. R. 292; *Higgins v. Livingstone*, 4 Dow, R. 355.

³ *Meriel v. Wymondsold*, Hardres, R. 205.

⁴ *Anon.* 12 Mod. R. 559. See *Lambert v. Knott*, 6 Dowl. & Ryl. 122.

⁵ *Cullen v. Duke of Queensberry*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 101; S C 1 Bro. Parl. Cases, by Tomlins, 396; *Lanchester v. Tricker*, 1 Bing. R. 201. See *Hskins v. Slayton*, Cas. Temp. Hard. 376.

to the committee for payment, and not to the subscribers at large.¹

§ 286. So, where the defendants had become directors of a voluntary projected water company, for which an act of Parliament was to be obtained: and no act was obtained; but, in the mean time, the directors had published an advertisement for proposals for excavating and removing the earth and chalk for reservoirs; and the proposals of the plaintiff had been accepted; and the plaintiff had performed the labor and services upon a reservoir accordingly, for which the action was brought; and the whole scheme afterwards fell to the ground; it was held, that the defendants were personally liable for the amount.²

§ 286 *a*. So, where an indenture was made between A of the first part, B of the second part, and C, D, E and F of the third part, whereby A covenanted with C, D, E and F to do certain repairs to the parish church of Z.; and, in consideration of the covenant on A's part, C, D, E and F, "church-wardens and overseers of the poor of the parish of Z., for themselves and their successors, church-wardens and overseers of the said parish, and their assigns, did thereby covenant with A, his executors and administrators, that they, the said church-wardens and overseers of the poor, their successors or assigns, should well and truly pay or cause to be paid unto A," &c., the sum specified, by certain instalments: it was held, that C, D, E and F were personally liable on the covenant, notwithstanding there was an express proviso in the indenture, that nothing in the indenture "shall extend or be deemed, adjudged, construed, or taken to extend to any personal covenant or obligation upon the said persons, parties thereto, of the third part, or in anywise personally affect them, or any of them, their or any of their executors, administrators, goods, effects, or estates, in their private capacity, but shall be, and is intended to be binding and obligatory upon the church-wardens and overseers of the poor of the parish of Z., and their successors for the time being, as such church-wardens and overseers of the poor; but not further or otherwise."³ The ground of the decision seems to

¹ *Burl v. Smith*, 7 Bing. R. 705. See *Doubleday v. Muskett*, 7 Bing. R. 110; *Ridgely v. Dobson*. 3 Writts & Serg. 118.

² *Doubleday v. Muskett*, 7 Bing. R. 110.

³ *Furnjvall v. Coombes*, 5 Mann. & Grang. 736, 751, 752.

have been, that church-wardens and overseers, though they are by statute a corporate body for some purposes, cannot enter into such a covenant as this in a corporate character; and, if not, then the covenant must be a personal covenant; and that the proviso being repugnant to the covenant, must, according to the authorities, be rejected.¹

§ 287. But, although it is thus true that persons, contracting as agents, are ordinarily held personally responsible, where there is no other responsible principal to whom resort can be had; yet, the doctrine is not without some qualifications and exceptions, as indeed, the words "ordinarily held" would lead one naturally to infer.² For, independent of the cases already suggested, where the contract is, or may be treated as a nullity, on account of its inherent infirmity or defective mode of execution,³ other cases may exist, in which it is well known to both of the contracting parties, that there exists no authority in the agent to bind other persons for whom he is acting, or that there is no other responsible principal; and yet, the other contracting party may be content to deal with the agent, not upon his personal credit, or personal responsibility, but in the perfect faith and confidence, that such contracting party will be repaid and indemnified by the persons who feel the same interest in the subject-matter of the contract, even though there may be no legal obligation in the case.⁴ Thus, for example, if private persons should subscribe a sum towards some charitable object, and should request an agent to employ tradesmen, and others, to supply materials to carry it into effect; and it should be distinctly made known by the agent, that the tradesmen and others were not to look to him, or to the subscribers personally, for payment; but that they must solely depend upon the success of the charitable subscription, and the state of the funds; and the supplies should be furnished with this clear understanding; there could be no doubt that neither the subscribers, (at least, beyond their subscriptions,) nor the agent, would be personally responsible. Such occur-

¹ *Furnivall v. Coombes*, 5 Mann. & Grang 736, 751, 752.

² *Ante*, §§ 274 a, 274 b, 280.

³ *Ibid*.

⁴ *Smith on Merc. Law*, 79, (2d edit); *Id* B. 1, ch 5, § 7, p 141-143, (3d edit. 1848); 2 *Kent, Comm. Lect.* 41, pp. 630, 631, (4th edit)

rences often take place in cases of voluntary charitable societies; and especially in cases of such charities, conducted by females, some of whom are married and some unmarried; where the tradesmen, who furnish supplies, are understood to trust entirely to the state of the funds, and to rely for reimbursement solely upon the funds, which may, from time to time, be obtained from charitable and beneficent persons.¹ For it has been well remarked, that few persons would be willing to become members or committees of Bible societies, and other voluntary religious and eleemosynary institutions, if they were held to be personally bound, or personally liable to arrest for the Bibles, or other articles, furnished in furtherance of such meritorious objects.² So, if a literary society should sign a subscription paper, agreeing to give a certain sum annually for books, to be paid to the treasurer, and books are ordered, the book-seller furnishing them cannot sue the subscribers upon the subscription paper.³ Similar transactions may take place in relation to agents, acting for the public at large, or for particular public bodies, in cases avowedly beyond the scope of their authority, and yet, for the benefit of the public at large, or for particular public bodies, where the other contracting party may rely solely upon the public liberality and sense of justice to award him a suitable compensation, without in any manner giving credit to the agents, or looking to them for compensation.⁴

§ 288. The truth, however, is, that the same general principle prevails in all these cases, notwithstanding their apparent diversity of form and decision. They are all answered by the same general inquiry: To whom is the credit knowingly given, according to the understanding of both parties? This inquiry is sometimes a matter of fact, as where the contract is verbal and unwritten, and sometimes a matter of law, as where it depends upon the true construction of the terms of a particular written instrument. The law, in all these cases, pronounces the same decision; that he to whom the credit is knowingly and exclu-

¹ See *Burke v. Smith*, 7 Bing. R. 705

² *Ibid*

³ *Ridgely v. Dutton*, 1 Watts & Serg. 118

⁴ *Tobey v. Claflin*, 3 Sumner, 379, *Parrott v. Eyre*, 10 Bing. R. 288.

sively given, is the proper person, who incurs liability, whether he be the principal or the agent.¹

§ 289. Hence it is, that, although it is perfectly well known, that a person is acting for others, as an agent, as, for example, for a club, if articles are furnished for the club at his request, upon the exclusive credit of the agent, or of any other particular member, no other persons, composing the club, will be liable therefor.² But it will not necessarily be conclusive proof of such an exclusive credit, that the agent, or other member, is charged in the creditor's books, or that the account is made out in his name; for it is a mere matter of presumption, to which a jury may attach more or less weight, according to circumstan-

¹ Smith on Merc. Law, 79, (2d edit.). Id. ch. 5, § 7, pp. 140, 141, (3d edit. 1843); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 368, 370, 371, *Delauney v. Strickland*, 2 Stark. R. 416; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 211, 212, *Paterson v. Gandasequi*, 15 East, 62, 64, 66, 68, 69, Ex parte Hartop, 12 Ves. 352, *Thomson v. Davenport*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 78, 88, 90, *Addison v. Gandasequi*, 4 Taunt. R. 575; *Owen v. Gooch*, 2 Esp. R. 567, *Hyde v. Wolt*, 4 Miller, Louis. R. 234. See the language of Lord Diskine in Ex parte Hartop, 12 Ves. 352 cited ante, § 261, note (1). In *Owen v. Gooch*, 2 Esp. R. 568, Lord Kenyon said: "The goods are ordered by Gooch, but at the time it is not pretended, that they were for his own use; they were ordered for Tippell, and the entry is made in his name. We must keep distinct the cases of orders given by the parties themselves, and by others, as their agents. If the mere act of ordering goods was to make the party, who ordered them, liable, no man could give an order for a friend in the country, who might request him to do it, without risk to himself. If a party orders goods from a tradesman, though in fact they are for another, if the tradesman was not informed at the time, that they were for the use of another, he, who ordered them, is certainly liable, for the tradesman must be presumed to have looked to his credit only. So, if they were ordered for another person, and the tradesman refuses to deliver to such person's credit, but to his credit only, who orders them, there is, then, no pretext for charging such third person; or, if goods are ordered to be delivered on account of another, and, after delivery, the person, who gave the order, refuses to inform the tradesman who the person is, in order that he may sue him, under such circumstances he is himself liable; but, wherever an order is given by one person for another, and he informs the tradesman who that person is, for whose use the goods are ordered, he thereby declares himself to be merely an agent, and there is no foundation for holding him to be liable.

² *Delauney v. Strickland*, 2 Starkie, R. 416; *Paterson v. Gandasequi*, 15 East, R. 62, 64, 68. See *Todd v. Emly*, 7 Mees. & Welsb. 427; *Todd v. Emly*, 8 Mees. & Welsb. 505.

ces.¹ So, also, if a foreign merchant, not choosing to make himself personally liable, should go with his agent to tradesmen, and should buy goods in the agent's name, and credit should be given to the agent, although the principal is known, there cannot be the slightest doubt, that no recovery could be had for the goods against the principal.² Indeed, the doctrine may be stated in a more general form, that, wherever exclusive credit is given to an agent in any transaction for a known principal, there, the party must abide by his election; and he cannot afterwards hold the principal liable therefor.³

§ 290. There are cases, in which the presumption of an exclusive credit being given to an agent is so strong, as almost to amount to a conclusive presumption of law. Thus, for example, where a known factor buys or sells goods for his principal, who is resident in a foreign country, as, for example, in France or Germany; it will be presumed, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that credit is given exclusively to the factor in the whole transaction, and that he is dealt with as the principal.⁴

¹ *Ibid*

² *Paterson v Gandasequi*, 13 List, R 64, 66, 68, *Addison v. Gandasequi*, 5 Taunt 174

³ *Thomson v Divenport*, 9 Barn & Cressw 78, 86, 90, *Addison v Gandasequi* 4 Taunt 574, *Runken v DeForest*, 18 Barb 143

⁴ *Gonzales v Sladen*, Bull N P 130 2 Livers on Agency, 249, (edit. 1815), *Piley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 248, 373, *Paterson v Gandasequi*, 15 List, 68, 69, *Thomson v Divenport* 9 Barn & Cressw 78, 87, 88, 3 Chitty, Comm and Manuf 203 *Houghton v Mathews*, 3 Bos & Pull 489, 490, per Chamberl, J, *Smith on Merc Law*, 66, 78, (3d edit), *Id B. 1*, ch 5, § 7, pp 142, 143, (3d edit 1843), *Addison v Gandasequi*, 4 Launt R 575, 1 Bell, Comm § 418 p 378, (4th edit), *Id* pp 491, 492, (5th edit) In *De Gaillon v. L'Aigle* 1 Bos & Pull 379, Lord Chief Justice Lyre said "I am not aware, that I have ever concurred in any decision, in which it has been held, that, if a person, describing himself as agent for another residing abroad, enter into a contract here, he is not personally liable on the contract" Lord Tenterden, in *Thomson v Divenport*, 9 Barn & Cressw 87, said "There may be another case, and that is, where a British merchant is buying for a foreigner. According to the universal understanding of merchants, and of all persons in trade, the credit is then considered to be given to the British buyer, and not to the foreigner." Ante § 247 269 But see *Tainton v Prendergast*, 3 Hill, 72, 73; *Kirkpatrick v. Sturges* 13 Wend R 244, and ante, § 268, note, Post, § 291, note, 400; *Green v. K. H.* Poston Law Rep 229

This doctrine may be satisfactorily explained, in many cases, by the consideration already stated, that there is no other known responsible principal.¹ But it is founded upon a broader ground, namely, upon the presumption, that the party, dealing with the agent, intends to trust one, who is known to him, and resides in the same country, and is subject to the same laws as himself, rather than to one, who, if known, cannot, from his residence in a foreign country, be made² amenable to those laws, and whose liability may be affected by local institutions and local exemptions, which may put at hazard both his rights and his remedies.² *A fortiori*, the doctrine will apply to an agent acting for an unknown principal in a foreign country. [But this liability of an agent of a foreign principal seems to depend after all upon the question whether he intended to bind himself personally, as in other cases; a question of fact in each case.³ But whether the agent of a foreign principal, whose name is undisclosed, is or is not himself liable on the contract to the other contracting party, he is not liable to his principal who has advanced money to such other party on a contract for the sale of goods, but which cannot be delivered because they had been previously sold by the vendor; and the remedy of such principal to recover back the money so paid is against the vendor either in his own, or in his agent's name.⁴]

§ 291. In the cases, which have been already stated, the principal question discussed has been, To whom credit has been exclusively given. And this leads us to remark, that, although in general, where credit is given, either to the agent, or to the principal, a presumption will arise, that it is an exclusive credit; yet this doctrine is far from being universally true. The cases, to which it properly applies, are those, where the agent is acting for a known principal, and the party dealing with the agent, elects to credit one, and not the other.⁵ When, therefore, the agent acts, without disclosing that he is acting as an agent; or when, acting as a known agent, he does not disclose the name

¹ Ante, § 280; Post, §§ 400, 423, 448.

² Ante, § 268, and note; Post, § 400.

³ *Green v. Kopke*, 36 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 398, 18 C. B. 549.]

⁴ *Risbourg v. Bruckner*, 2 J. Scott, (N. S.) 812.] :

⁵ *Hyde v. Wolff*, 4 Miller, Louis, R. 231.

of his principal; there, although credit is given to the agent, yet it is not deemed to be an exclusive credit.¹ On the contrary, when the principal is discovered, he also will be deemed responsible, as well as the agent.² There is this qualification, how-

¹ *Ante* § 266 *note* Post, §§ 393, 396

² *Smith on Merc. Law*, 65, 66, 78 *Railton v Hodgson*, 4 Taunt. 576, *note*; *Wilson v Hunt* 7 Taunt. R. 295, *Thomson v Davenport*, 9 Barn. & Cressw 78; *Hyde v Wolff* 4 Miller, 1008 R. 234, 236, *Upton v Gray*, 2 Greenl 373; *Paley on Agency* by Lloyd, 245-250 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp 630, 631, (4th edit.) This whole doctrine, and its distinctions, are fully expounded by the Court in *Thomson v Davenport* 9 Barn. & Cressw 78 On that occasion, Lord Tenterden said pp 86, 87 "I take it to be a general rule, that if a person sells goods (supposing, at the time of the contract, he is dealing with a principal), but afterwards discovers that the person with whom he has been dealing, is not the principal in the transaction, but agent for a third person, though he may, in the mean time, have debited the agent with it, he may afterwards recover the amount from the real principal subject however, to this qualification, that the state of the account between the principal and the agent is not altered to the prejudice of the principal On the other hand, if, at the time of the sale, the seller knows, not only that the person, who is nominally dealing with him, is not principal, but agent and also knows who the principal really is, and, notwithstanding all that knowledge chooses to make the agent his debtor, dealing with him, and him alone then, according to the cases of *Addison v Gandasequi*, and *Peterson v Gandasequi*, the seller cannot afterwards, on the failure of the agent, turn round and charge the principal, having once made his election at the time, when he had the power of choosing between the one and the other. The present is a middle case At the time of the dealing for the goods, the plaintiffs were informed that McKane, who came to them to buy the goods, was dealing for another, that is that he was an agent, but they were not informed who the principal was They had not, therefore, at that time, the means of making their election It is true that they might, perhaps, have obtained those means if they had made further inquiry But they made no further inquiry Not knowing who the principal really was, they had not the power at that instant, of making their election That being so, it seems to me that this middle case falls in substance and effect within the first proposition, which I have mentioned the case of a person not known to be an agent, and not within the second where the buyer is not merely known to be an agent, but the name of his principal is also known In Mr Lloyd's edition of *Paley on Agency*, ch. 8, Pt 1, § 8, l 245-250, these distinctions are laid down with great clearness and accuracy He says Indeed, there are several ways in which the liability of the principal may be affected in purchases made by his agent, of which the following summary may be useful 1st The purchase may be made by the broker expressly for, and in the name of, his principal In that case, if the principal be debited by the seller, he only, and not the broker, will be liable. 2d. A broker

ever, annexed to such liability of the principal, that nothing has, in the mean time, passed between the principal and the agent to alter the state of their accounts, or otherwise to operate injuriously to the principal, if he has acted in the confidence, that inclusive credit was given to the agent, and, moreover, that there has been no laches on the part of the creditor¹

may purchase in his character of broker, for a known principal—but the seller may choose, nevertheless, to take him for his debtor, rather than the principal, in whose credit he may not have the same confidence—and after this deliberate election, the seller cannot afterwards turn round and charge the principal. 3d The broker may buy in his own name without disclosing his principal in which case the invoices will, of course, be made out to him and he will settle with the account. If now, before payment the seller discovers that the purchase was in fact, made for another, he may at his choice look for payment either to the broker or the principal, to the former upon his personal contract or to the latter upon the contract of his agent, and the adoption of the purchase by the principal will be evidence of the agent's authority. But 4th If after the disclosure to the principal, the seller elects by and suffer the principal to settle his account with his broker for the amount of the purchase he cannot afterwards charge the latter so as to make him a loser, but will be deemed to have elected the broker for his debtor. And 5th If the principal be a foreigner, it seems that by the usage of trade, the credit is to be considered as having been given to the English broker and that he only, and not the foreign buyer will be liable. That position however is for the jury. 6th There is still an intermediate case where upon a purchase by a broker, the seller, knowing that he is acting as broker in the transaction but not for whom, makes out the invoice to him and debits him with the price, and the seller afterwards, when the name of the principal is made known to him substitute him as the debtor, and call upon him for payment. On the one part, it is said, the principal, in debiting the broker, can have exercised no election, because election implies a preference and there can be no preference where the principal is not known. On the other part, it is answered that the seller might have known, by simply asking the question, and that the omission to make the inquiry is decisive evidence of a deliberate preference of the broker. The Court of King's Bench has decided that the principal, in such case, is not discharged, but the decision has not been considered very satisfactory, and is certainly not implicitly acquiesced in."

¹ Smith on Merc. Law, 66, 76, (2d edit), Id B. 1, ch 5, § 7, p 140-142, (3d edit 1843), Thomson & Davenport, 9 Barn & Cressw 75, Horsfall v Fauntleroy, 10 Barn & Cressw 75, 3 Chitty on Comm and Manuf 203, Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 215-250, Rathbone v Tucker, 10 Wend R 498. A tortion if the seller has furnished the agent with the means of misrepresenting the contract to his principal, and the latter has actually paid his agent for the goods purchased, according to the terms communicated to him, he will be discharged from all liability to the seller. Horsfall v Fauntleroy, 10 Barn & Cressw 753, Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 249, 250.

§ 292. The same doctrine, as to the liability of the principal, as well as of the agent, has been recognized in the law of many, if not of all, the nations of continental Europe.¹ Thus, Pothier lays it down as clear, that, where an agent contracts in his quality as agent, in his own name, his principal is bound, as well as the agent himself.² His language is, that in all such engagements, which an agent contracts for the affairs committed to his charge, although he contracts in his own name, he binds himself, as principal, and, at the same time, he binds his employer, as an accessory debtor; for the employer is considered as having consented beforehand, by the commission, which he has given, to all the engagements, which the agent might contract in the business, to which he is appointed, and to have rendered himself answerable for them.³ Undoubtedly, exceptions may exist, in regard to this general liability, in the foreign law, as they do in ours, whenever an exclusive credit is shown to be given, either to the employer, or to the agent.⁴

§ 293. There are some particular agencies, in which the presumption of a reciprocal credit between the principal and agent, and third persons, is generally understood to arise by the usages of trade, or by intendment of law. Such, for example, is the case in the ordinary dealings of home factors in buying and selling goods. So that, in case of a purchase by such a factor, he, as well as his principal, is deemed liable for the debt; and, in case of a sale by such a factor, the buyer is liable, both to the principal and to the factor, for the debt.⁵ This is the ordinary presumption, which, however, may be repelled, by any proofs of exclusive credit or contract with either, arising from the circumstances of the particular transaction.⁶

¹ See 1 Bell, Comm § 418, p. 398, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 492, 494, (5th edit.); Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, notes 82, 446, 447.

² Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, notes 82, 447-449; Hyde v. Wolff, 4 Miller, Louis. R. 231; Hopkins v. Lacouture, 4 Miller, Louis. R. 64, 66.

³ Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, n. 447; Id. n. 82.

⁴ Hyde v. Wolff, 4 Miller, Louis. R. 234; Hopkins v. Lacouture, 4 Miller, Louis. R. 64.

⁵ 1 Bell, Comm., 418 p. 398, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 494, 508, (5th edit.); Ante, § 269, 270; Post, §§ 400, 401.

⁶ Ante, §§ 267, 291 Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 243-245, 371, 372; Thomson v. Davenport, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 78, 88, 91; Paterson v. Gandasequi, 15 East, B. 62.

§ 294. But the most striking case of this sort is that of a master of a ship, contracting within the ordinary scope of his powers and duties. In such a case, he is, in general, personally responsible, as well as the owner, upon all contracts made by him, for the employment, and repairs, and supplies of the ship. This is the established rule of our maritime law; and it is said to have been introduced in favor of commerce, so that merchants may not be compelled to seek after the owners, to sue them; but that they may have a twofold remedy against the owners, and against the master.¹ Nor is this doctrine peculiar to our law; but it has been fully recognized and adopted by the commercial nations of continental Europe.² In truth, however, it has been derived, both to us and to them, from the Roman law, promulgated by the Prætor's edict, whereby the owners and employers of the ship are positively made responsible for the faults of the master and crew, and also for the contracts of the master, in matters within the scope of his authority.³ *Utilitatem hujus Edicti patere* (says the Digest) *nemo est, qui ignoret. Nam cum interdum ignari, cujus sint conditionis, et quales, cum magistris propter navigandi*

¹ Post, § 315; Abbott on Shipp Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 3, p. 90, (edit 1829); Id. § 3-5, p. 91-94; Id. ch. 3, § 2-9, p. 100-107, Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 245, 246, 388; Rich v. Coe, Cowp. R. 637, James v. Braxby, 11 Mass. R. 31, 1 Livers on Agency, 70, 71, Id. 51-197, (edit 1818), 2 Livers on Agency, 267-269, (edit. 1818); Ant., §§ 36, 116, 117, Hussy v. Christie, 9 East, R. 426, 432, 3 Kent, Comm. Lect. 46, p. 161, (4th edit.). The Nelson, 6 Rob. R. 227. The American authorities on this subject are in perfect coincidence with the English. Many of them are cited in the notes to the American edition of Abbott on Shipping, (edit. 1829), Pt. 2, cl. 2, § 2, note (1), and § 3. Id. ch. 3, § 2, note (1), Id. § 3, notes 1 and 2. Indeed, in many cases, there may be a threefold remedy, against the ship, the owner, and the master, as, for example, by seamen for their wages; and by material men, for repairs and supplies in foreign ports. See Abbott on Shipp Pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 2, 3, 10, and notes to the American edition of 1829, Id. Pt. 4, ch. 4, §§ 1, 2-10, and notes to the American edition of 1829, Rich v. Coe, Cowp. R. 637; 1 Bell, Comm. p. 508, (5th edit.)

² Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 8, p. 91, (edit. 1829), Id. § 4, p. 93; Id. § 5, p. 94; Id. ch. 3, §§ 2, 3-9, p. 100-107, Ante, §§ 116, 160, 161, 278; Pothier on Oblig. n. 82, 448; 2 Emerigon, Assur. ch. 4, § 10, p. 418, Id. ch. 4, § 12, p. 465-468; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 43; 1 Stam. Inst. by Brodie, B. 1, tit. 13, § 18; 1 Bell, Comm. § 434, p. 413, (4th edit.), Id. pp. 507, 508, Id. pp. 522, 523, (5th edit.)

³ Ibid.; Ante, §§ 116, 117; Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 9, l. 1; Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 3, and note (g), p. 91, (Amer. edit. 1829.)

*necessitatem contrahamus, æquum fuit, eum, qui magistrum navi imposuit, teneri; ut tenetur, qui instilorem, tabernæ, vel negotio, præposuit; cum sit major necessitas contrahendi cum magistro, quam instilore; quippe res statitur, ut de conditione quis institoris dispiciat, et sic contrahat. In navis magistro non ita; nam interdum locus, tempus non patitur plenius deliberandi consilium.*¹ And it is afterwards added: *Sed ex contrario, exercenti navem adversus eos, qui cum magistro contraxerant, actio non pollicetur; quia non eodem auxilio indigebat. Sed aut ex locato cum magistro, si mercede operam ei exhibet; aut si gratuitam, mandati agere potest.*² The exercitorial action, thus given against the owner, is merely accessorial, or supplemental, to that against the master, and does not supersede or extinguish it. *Hoc enim Edicto non transfertur actio; sed adjicitur.*³ The rule thus promulgated, and the reasoning, by which it is supported, are precisely the same, which, in modern times, have been adopted, as the just foundations of maritime jurisprudence; *Eo usque producendam utilitatem navigantium.*⁴

§ 295. There seems, however, to be one peculiarity in the Roman law on this subject; and that is, that, while it gives a right to proceed against the owner or employer, as well as against the master of the ship, for the amount of the repairs and supplies furnished for the ship, and for other contracts, made by him, within the scope of his employment; yet, if the creditor elects to proceed in a suit against either of them, he thereby discharges the other. *Est autem nobis electio, utrum Exeritorem, an Magistrum convenire velimus.*⁵ *Hæc actio ex personâ Magistri in Exeritorem dabitur. Et ideo, si cum utro eorum actum est, cum altero agi non potest.*⁶ Our law, on the other hand, while it gives an election to the creditor, to sue either the master, or the owner, in a distinct and separate action, does not preclude the creditor, by such an election, from maintaining another action against the party not sued, unless,

¹ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, Introd. and § 17; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 2.

² Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 18; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 18.

³ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 5, § 1.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 5.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 17; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 17.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 24; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 17.

in the first election, he has obtained a complete satisfaction of the claim.¹

§ 296. Such, then, as above stated, is the general doctrine of our law; but it prevails only in the absence of any satisfactory proof, that exclusive credit is given, either to the owner, or to the master; for it is perfectly competent for the parties to contract, so as to confine the responsibility, either to the master, or to the owner.² If, therefore, there is satisfactory proof, that exclusive credit has been given to the one, the other will be completely discharged. Nay, the principle has been carried further, and it has been held, that, if the party has so conducted himself in the particular transaction, as to lead to the conclusion, that an exclusive credit has been given, either to the master, or to the owner, severally, he will not be permitted afterwards to assert his claim, to the prejudice of the party, whom he has misled into the belief, that he is exonerated.³

§ 297. What will amount to satisfactory proof of an exclusive

¹ 2 Livers on Agency, 267, (edit 1815) — I mention understands the Roman law differently from what I have stated and supposes it to be exactly like our law, (2 Emerig Assur ch 4, § 10 pp 445, 446) and he cites Stypmannus and Daurenus also, as authorities in support of his opinion. It is with great diffidence, that I have ventured to differ from such authorities, in the interpretation of the words of the Roman text, and I am far from feeling certain, that I have not misunderstood that text although I am not satisfied that the language cited from Stypmannus, does support the proposition of I mention.

² 2 Livers on Agency, 167-168, (edit 1815), James v. Bixby, 11 Mass. R. 34, 36, 37.

³ Abbott on Shipp Pt 2, ch 3, § 2 p 100, (Amer edit 1822) and notes, *ibid*, Wyatt v. Marquis of Hertford, 5 East, R. 147. Hyde v. Wolff, 4 Miller, Louis. R. 234, Reed v. White, 5 Esp. R. 122, Scherhorn v. Jones, 7 John. R. 311, Muldon v. Whitlock, 1 Cowen, R. 299, 2 Livers on Agency, 267-269, (edit 1815). The same doctrine will apply to cases, where, after a contract has been made, binding both principal and agent, the seller gives an exclusive credit to the agent for the debt, and induces the principal to believe that the debt is settled by the agent; as, for example, if, after a sale to the agent, the seller takes the note, or other security of the agent, for the amount, or gives him a receipt, or other document, showing an apparent extinguishment of the debt, and thereby enables the agent to settle with the principal, as if the debt had been paid. Hyde v. Wolff, 4 Miller, Louis. R. 234, 236, 1 Bell, Comm § 418, p 398, (4th edit.), *Id* pp 494, 507, 522-521, 507, 538, (5th edit.), Reed v. White, 5 Esp. R. 122, Stewart v. Hall, 2 Dow, R. 29, Porter v. Talcott, 1 Cowen, R. 359.

credit, must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each particular case, and, of course, admits of no positive or universal averment. In general, it may be stated, that the mere fact, that the repairs are made, or the supplies furnished, either in the home port, or in a foreign country, at the request of the master, will be sufficient to charge him, but not to discharge the owner, as a personal and exclusive credit to the master, unless some positive contract, or other act, can be shown, which demonstrates an intention to discharge the owner.¹ Nor will a charge of the repairs or supplies in the books of the material-men, in such a case, against the master personally, be sufficient to discharge the owner; because such a charge is quite consistent with the intention still to hold the owner liable, whether he be then known, or unknown.² *A fortiori*, if the charge is made against the ship by her name, without charging either the master, or the owner, as the debtor, both will be liable; for, in such a case, the master and the owner may well be deemed as equally representatives of the ship.³

§ 298. It will make no difference in respect to the liability of the owner, in cases of repairs to ships, that by a private agreement, or charter-party, between the owner and the master, the latter is to have the entire ship to his own use for a specified period, and is to make all the repairs at his own expense; for such a private agreement cannot vary the rights of third persons.⁴ Neither will it make any difference, as to the liability of the owner, that the master has bound himself personally by a written contract, if such contract does not establish, that an

¹ Abbott on Shipp Pt 2, ch 3 §§ 2, 3; *Hussey v Allen*, 6 Mass. R. 163, 165; *Rich v Coc*, Cowp R 636; *Leonard v Huntington*, 15 John. R. 288; *Marquand v Webb*, 16 John. R. 59, 3 Chitty on Comm and Manuf. 212; *Garnham v Bennett*, 2 Str R 516, *James v. Bixby*, 11 Mass. R. 34, 36, *Hussey v. Christie*, 9 East, R. 432, 3 Kent, Comm. Lect 46, p. 161, (4th edit.), 1 Bell, Comm. § 434, p. 11, (4th edit.). *Id.* pp. 494, 507, 522-524, 537, 568. (5th edit.)

² See *Farmer v Davis*, 1 Term R. 108, 109; *Muldon v. Whitlock*, 1 Cowen, R. 299.

³ See *Farmer v Davis*, 1 Term R. 108, 109, *Muldon v. Whitlock*, 1 Cowen, R. 299, *Stewart v. Hall*, 2 Dow R. 29; *Abbott on Shipp* Pt 1, ch 3, § 7, note (1) (*Amer. edit.* 1824), *Id.* Pt. 2, ch 3, § 1, note (1); *Stewart v. Hall*, 2 Dow, R. 29.

⁴ *Rich v. Coc*, Cowp R. 636.

exclusive credit is given to the master; for, in many cases, (as, for example, in the common shipping-articles between the master and seamen for a voyage,)¹ the owner will be bound by the written contract of the master in his own name, especially where it is according to the common usage of the employment. Similar considerations apply to the execution of charter-parties, and of bills of lading, by the master, within the scope of his general authority.²

¹ Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 3, §§ 2, 3, Pt. 4, ch. 1, § 1; Id. ch. 4, §§ 1, 10, and notes, (Amer. edit. 1829); The Nelson, 6 Rob. R. 227, Ante, §§ 116, 161, 294.

² Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 5; ch. 3, §§ 2, 3, Pt. 3, ch. 1, § 2; *Cock v. Taylor*, 13 East, R. 399; Ante, §§ 116, 160, 161, 294. *Jones v. Littledale*, 6 Adolph. & Ellis, 186-490. Lord Mansfield fully expounded this whole doctrine in *Rich v. Coe*, Cowp. R. 636, 639. On that occasion, his Lordship said: "Whoever supplies a ship with necessities, has a treble security. 1. The person of the master. 2. The specific ship. 3. The personal security of the owners, whether they know of the supply or not. 1. The master is personally liable, as making the contract. 2. The owners are liable, in consequence of the master's act, because they choose him. They run the risk, and they say whom they will trust with the appointment and office of master. Suppose the owners, in this case, had delivered the value of the goods in question in specie to the master, with directions for him to pay it over to the creditors, and the master had embezzled the money, it would have been no concern of the creditors, for they trust specifically to the ship, and generally to the owners. In this case, the defendants are the owners, and there happens to be a private agreement between them and the master, by which he is to have the sole conduct and management of the ship, and to keep her in repair, &c. But how does that affect the creditors, who, it is expressly stated, were total strangers to the transaction? And that is an answer to the observation, that the plaintiff must have known the real situation of the master in this case, from the general usage and custom of the country in that respect. To be sure, if it appeared, that a tradesman had notice of such a contract, and, in consequence of it, gave credit to the captain individually, as the responsible person, particular circumstances of that sort might afford a ground to say, he meant to absolve the owners, and to look singly to the personal security of the master. But here it is stated, that the plaintiff had no notice whatever of the contract. The owners themselves are aware of their being liable at the time. They choose a master, to whom they agree to let the ship; and trust, for their security, to the covenants, which they oblige him to enter into. These covenants are, that he shall keep the ship in repair, and deliver her up, at the end of the term, in as good condition, as when delivered to him. This is not all; for they indemnify themselves against the private debts of the master; and against his being taken in execution; for if he does not perform all and every the covenants in the agreement, (except in case of the loss of the ship,) the con-

§ 299. On the other hand, if the ship is in the home port of the owner, and repairs are there made, or supplies furnished, at the request of the master, the mere fact of the presence of the owner in the home port will not exonerate the master from responsibility.¹ But, in such a case, if the contract for the repairs

sequence, besides their remedy against him upon the covenant, is, that the contract and agreement is to be absolutely at an end, and they are to take possession of the ship. Suppose the ship had been impounded in the Admiralty Court, and that had happened at the end of the term; or suppose the captain had then broken a covenant, which had put an end to the agreement; the defendants could never have taken the ship out of the court, without paying the debt, for which the ship was impounded. We are all of opinion, therefore, that under these circumstances, there is no color to say, that the creditors should be stripped of the general security, they are by law entitled to, against the owners." See also *Abbott on Shipp* Pt. 2, ch. 3, §§ 1, 3, 10; *Id.* Pt. 4, ch. 4, § 1, note, (Amer. edit. 1828); *Aspinwall v. Bartlett*, 8 Mass. R. 483; *Farmer v. Davis*, 1 Term R. 109. In this last case, Lord Mansfield said: "Where a captain contracts for the use of the ship, the credit is given to him in respect to his contract, it is given to the owners, because the contract is on their account; and the tradesman has likewise a specific lien on the ship itself. Therefore, in general, the tradesman, who gives that credit, debits both the captain and the owners. Now, what is this case? The captain made no contract personally. The owners contracted for their ship; the credit was given to them only, and there is not a shadow of color to charge the captain for any part of these goods."

¹ *Hussey v. Christie*, 9 East, R. 126, 432; *Hoskins v. Slayton*, Cas. Temp. Hard. 376; *Rich v. Coe*, Cowper, R. 636; *Abbott on Shipp*, Pt. 2, ch. 3, § 2-4; *James v. Bixby*, 11 Mass. R. 31, 36, 37; *Marquand v. Webb*, 16 John. R. 89; *Stewart v. Hall*, 2 Dow, R. 29; *Farmer v. Davis*, 1 Term R. 108. In *Hussey v. Christie*, 9 East, R. 432, Lord Ellenborough, in delivering the opinion of the Court said: "If the repairs be done here, the owners are liable; though the master may also become liable on his own contract, if he do not stipulate against his personal liability, and confine the credit to his owners. If the necessary repairs be done abroad, the master may hypothecate the ship for them; and it is his own fault, if he subjects himself to any personal responsibility, which he may renounce." In *Hoskins v. Slayton*, Cas. Temp. Hard. 377, which was the case of sales made for the ship at a home port, and ordered by the master, Lord Chief Justice Lee, said: "In general, if the master orders the goods, both are liable; the master, who gives the orders, and upon whose credit the work is done, and the owners, in respect of the work being done to their property; for if I, without having given orders, suffer a work to be done for me, I must pay for it. But yet, though both are liable in such a case, yet if it appears, that the credit was given to the owners only, and that the master, in giving orders, acted merely as their servant, he will not be liable; and he directed the jury, that, if, upon the evidence, they thought no credit was given to the master, but the owners alone, then they should find for defendant." The jury found a verdict for the defend-

or supplies, is directly with the owner, and not with the master, a strong presumption will arise, that credit is given exclusively to the owner, which it would require cogent proofs to rebut or overcome.¹ But the like presumption will not arise on a contract for seamen's wages, that exclusive credit is given to the owner by the crew, from the mere fact, that the owner shipped the crew in the home port; as the shipping-articles generally contemplate the contract to be made by and with the master, and the maritime law treats the master, from his direct relation to the crew, as incurring a personal responsibility to them for their wages. It will, of course, under such circumstances, require the most positive and satisfactory proof, *omni exceptione major*, to sustain a defence by the master, that exclusive credit is given by the crew to the owner for their wages.²

§ 300. The liability of agents to third persons, on contracts, may also arise from acts done, or refused to be done, by such agents. Thus, for example, if a party, who has paid money to an agent for the use of his principal, becomes entitled to recall it, he may upon notice to the agent, recall it, provided the agent has not paid it over to his principal, and also provided no change has taken place in the situation of the agent since the payment to him, before such notice. The mere fact, that the agent has

ant. See also 1 Bell, Comm. § 434, p. 413, § 435, p. 414, (4th edit.), Id. pp. 507, 519, 520, 521, (5th edit.)

¹ Farmer v. Davis, 1 Term R. 108; Ante, §§ 294, 296-298, note; Hoskins v. Slayton, Cas. Temp. Hard. 376, 377; 2 Liversm. on Agency, 267-269, (edit. 1818); Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 2-4; James v. Bixby, 11 Mass. R. 34, 36, 37.

² Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 4, ch. 4, § 1, and note, (2); Id. § 10, (Amer. edit. 1829.) See 2 Emerigon, Assur. ch. 4, § 12, p. 467. See 1 Bell, Comm. § 435, p. 414, (4th edit.); Id. § 418, p. 398, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 507, 508, 519-524, (5th edit.)

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 388-394; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 313; 2 Liversm. on Agency, 260, 261, (edit. 1818); Cox v. Prentice, 3 M. & Selw. 344; Hearsay v. Pruyn, 7 John. R. 179; Mowatt v. McLellan, 1 Wend. R. 173; Langley v. Warner, 1 Sandford, Superior Ct. (N. Y.) R. 209. In The Bank of U. States v. The Bank of Washington, 6 Peters, R. 8, it was held, that where a judgment had been recovered for the plaintiff, and the money had been received by the agent, notice to the agent to retain it, the other party intending to bring a writ of error to reverse the judgment, would not, in case of a reversal, justify an action against the agent. On that occasion, Mr. Justice Thompson, in delivering

passed such money in account with his principal, or that he has made a rest in his accounts, without any new credit being given to the principal, will not of itself be sufficient to entitle the agent to retain the money, when the party entitled to recall it demands it.¹ But if a new credit has been given to the principal since the payment, or if bills have been accepted, or if advances have been made, on the footing of it, the payment cannot be recalled.² *A fortiori*, if the money has been paid over to the principal before notice of the recall, the agent will not be liable, unless, indeed, the receipt of the money by the agent was obviously fraudulent and illegal, or his authority to receive it was known to himself to be utterly void.³

the opinion of the Court, said "When the money was paid, there was a legal obligation, on the part of the Bank of Washington, to pay it, and a legal right, on the part of Triplett and Neale to demand and receive it, or to enforce payment of it under the execution. And whatever was done under that execution, whilst the judgment was in full force, was valid and binding on the Bank of Washington, so far as the rights of strangers or third persons are concerned. The reversal of the judgment cannot have a retrospective operation and make void that which was lawful when done. The reversal of the judgment gives a new right, or cause of action, against the parties to the judgment, and creates a legal obligation on their part, to restore what the other party has lost by reason of the erroneous judgment. And as between the parties to the judgment there is all the privity necessary to sustain and enforce such right, but, as to strangers, there is no such privity, and, if no legal right existed, when the money was paid, to recover it back, no such right could be created by notice of an intention so to do. Where money is wrongfully and illegally exacted, it is received without any legal right or authority to receive it, and the law, at the very time of payment, creates the obligation to refund it. A notice of intention to recover back the money does not, even in such cases, create the right to recover it back, that results from the illegal exaction of it, and the notice may serve to rebut the inference that it was a voluntary payment, or made through mistake." But a prize agent, holding prize proceeds if he pay over the money after an appeal is entered, pays it over at his own peril, for the appeal suspends the former sentence. *Penhallow v. Doane*, 3 Dall. R. 54. See *Bamford v. Shuttleworth*, 11 Adolph & Ell 926.

¹ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 313, Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 388, 389; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 264 (edit 1818), *Buller v. Harrison*, Cowp. R. 565, *Cox v. Prentice*, 3 M. & Selw. 344, *Lingley v. Warner*, 1 Sandford, Superior Ct. (N. Y.) R. 209.

² Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 313, *Buller v. Harrison*, Cowp. 565; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 388, 389, 2 Liverm. on Agency, 264-266, (edit 1818); *Mowatt v. M'Lellan*, 1 Wend. R. 173.

³ Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 313, *Cary v. Webster*, 1 Str. 480, *Campbell*

§ 301. Various examples might be put to illustrate this doctrine. Thus, where money has been paid to an agent to avoid

v. Hall, Cowp. R. 204; *Edwards v. Hoddling*, 5 Taunt. 515; *Snowden v. Davis*, 1 Taunt. R. 359; *Ripley v. Gelston*, 9 Johns. R. 201, *Smith on Merc. Law*, 80-82, (2d edit.); *Id.* pp 143, 144, (3d edit. 1843), *Buller v. Harrison*, Cowp. R. 565; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 388-390; *Seidell v. Peckworth*, 10 Serg. & Rawle, 442; *Frye v. Lockwood*, 4 Cowen, R. 454. Mr. Smith (on *Merc. Law*, p 143-145, 3d edit. 1843,) on this subject, says "If the agent exceed his authority, so that his principal is not bound, he will himself be liable for the damage thus occasioned to the other contracting party, although he may have been innocent of any intention to defraud. The question, whether an agent is personally liable for money paid to him for the use of his principal, under circumstances which would entitle some person to recover it from that principal, involves much difficulty. In the first place, it is clear, that if the agent have without notice to act otherwise, paid over the money to his principal, he never can be called on to refund it. But in *Cox v. Prentice*, it was laid down by the Court on the authority of *Buller v. Harrison*, that an agent who receives money for his principal, is liable as a principal, so long as he stands in his original situation, and until there has been a change in circumstances by his having paid over the money to his principal, or done what is equivalent to it. In that case, the defendant received a bar of silver from his principal, and sold it to plaintiff at a price calculated with reference to the number of ounces which, on assay, it was thought to contain, it turned out afterwards that it contained fewer ounces than had been supposed, and the plaintiff was held entitled to recover the money overpaid from the defendant, who had not yet handed it to its principal, although he had forwarded an account to him in which he was credited with the full sum, but which was still unsettled. In *Buller v. Harrison*, the defendant was an insurance broker; and the money, sought to be recovered, was paid by the plaintiff, an underwriter, in discharge of a loss, which turned out to be foul. It will be observed that in neither of these cases could the principal himself, ever, by possibility, have claimed to retain the money for a single instant, had it reached his hands; the payment having been made by the plaintiff under pure mistake of facts, and being void, *ab initio*, as soon as that mistake was discovered, so that the agent would not have been estopped from denying his principal's title to the money any more than the factor of J. S., of Jamaica, who has received money paid to him under the supposition of his employer being J. S., of Trinidad, would be estopped from retaining that money against his employer, in order to return it to the person, who paid it to him. Besides which, in *Buller v. Harrison*, had the agent paid the money he received from the underwriter in discharge of the foul loss, over to his principal, he would have rendered himself an instrument of fraud, which, as we have already seen, no agent can be obliged to do. Except in such cases as these, the maxim, *respondeat superior*, has been applied, and the agent held responsible to no one but his principal. Thus in *Stephens v. Badcock*, the defendant, an attorney's clerk, having received by his master's orders, rents for the plaintiff, a client; it was held, that he was not responsible to the plaintiff,

an illegal distress, or an illegal claim; as to the bailiff of a sheriff, to avoid an illegal distress; or, where money has been paid to a collector for an illegal duty; and notice of the objection is given to the agent, or collector, before he pays it over; the party, paying it, may recover it back from the agent, or collector, notwithstanding he has since paid it over to the principal.¹ But, if

though his employer, the attorney, has since become a bankrupt, nor can an action for money had and received be brought against the agent who has received it on behalf of his principal, for the purpose of trying the existence of a right in that principal—thus the right of a lord of a manor cannot be tried in an action against his steward for quitrent voluntarily paid, and these decisions are but just, since, as the agent is stopped from questioning the title of his principal, he would but for this rule of *respondent superior*, be frequently exposed, without any defence, to two different suits in respect of the same subject matter. But an agent cannot defend himself even on the ground of payment over to his principal, if he receive money illegally from a party, who is not prevented from suing him by the rule, *pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis*. This was decided in *Miller v. Ains*, where the money was received by a jailer from a prisoner for rent for a room illegally let to him, and paid over by the jailer to his employers. Neither do the foregoing remarks extend to cases in which the money gets into the agent's hands, in consequence of a tort committed by him, under the directions of, or jointly with, his principal. Of course, if an agent pay money to his principal, which was not entrusted to him for that purpose, he will not be discharged, *ex gr*, if a stockholder pay over the deposit before the condition on which it was to become due is performed."

¹ Post, § 307, *Snowden v. Davis*, 1 Taunt. R. 359, *Edwards v. Hodding*, 5 Taunt. R. 815, *Ripley v. Grelston*, 9 Johns. R. 201, *Bank of U. States v. Bank of Washington*, 6 Peters. R. 8, 18, *Jones v. Swartwout*, 10 Peters. R. 80, *Elliot v. Swartwout*, 10 Peters. R. 137, *Five v. Lockwood*, 4 Cowen. R. 454, 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, 262-264, (edit 1818) *Smith on Merc. Law*, 82, (2d edit), *Id. Pt. 1*, ch. 5 § 7, p. 143-145 (edit 1843) *Bend v. Host*, 13 Peters. R. 263, *Allen v. McKen*, 1 Sumner. R. 277, 278, 317, *Miller v. Ains*, 3 Esp. R. 231, S. C., cited Selwyn's *Nisi Prius*, 93 (8th edit), *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 393, 394. Mr. Paley has remarked, in p. 359, "It seems, however, that the right to recover against the agent is to be understood with some qualification. For it has been held, that an action will not lie against a mere collector or receiver, for the purpose of trying a right in the principal, even though he have not paid over the money. It is said in one case, that if the defendant can show the least color of right in his principal, it is sufficient. And Lord Chief Justice Lee declared, that the right to an inheritance should not be tried in an action for money had and received, brought against the receiver. In a case where the question was much considered, it was held, that an action could not be supported against a steward for quitrent voluntarily paid, in order to bring the lord's right in question, but that it must be against the lord."

the illegality is unknown to the agent, and no objection of that sort is made before he has paid over the money, he will not be liable therefor.¹

CHAPTER XI.

LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC AGENTS ON CONTRACTS.

§ 302. HITHERTO we have been considering the personal liability of agents on contracts with third persons, in cases of mere private agency. But a very different rule, in general, prevails in regard to public agents; for, in the ordinary course of things, an agent, contracting in behalf of the government, or of the public, is not personally bound by such a contract, even though he would be by the terms of the contract, if it were an agency of a private nature.² The reason of the distinction is, that it is not to be presumed, either that the public agent means to bind himself personally, in acting as a functionary of the government, or that the party dealing with him in his public character means to rely upon his individual responsibility.³ On the contrary, the natural presumption in such cases is, that the contract was made upon the credit and responsibility of the government itself, as possessing an entire ability to fulfil all its just contracts, far beyond that

¹ *Ibid.* *Snowden v. Davis*, 1 Taunt. R. 359, *Edwards v. Hodding*, 5 Ib. 815.

² *Macbeath v. Haldimand*, 1 Term R. 172, *Bowen v. Morris*, 2 Taunt. R. 374, 387; *Unwin v. Woolseley*, 1 Term R. 674; *Brown v. Austin*, 1 Mass. R. 208; *Dawes v. Jackson*, 9 Mass. R. 490; *Walker v. Swaitwout*, 12 Johns. R. 444; 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, 269-280, (edit. 1818); *Ghent v. Adams*, 2 Kelly, 214; *Copes v. Matthews*, 10 Sm. & Mar. 398; *Parks v. Ross*, 11 Howard, 362; 3 *Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* 213, 214; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 376, 377; *Bainbridge v. Downie*, 6 Mass. R. 253; *Fox v. Drake*, 8 Cowen, R. 191; *Osborne v. Kerr*, 12 Wend. R. 17; *Jones v. La Tombe*, 3 Dall 384; *Rathbone v. Budlong*, 15 Johns. R. 1; *Mott v. Hicks*, 1 Cowen, R. 513; *Sheffield v. Watson*, 3 Caines, 69; *Bronson v. Woolsey*, 17 Johns. R. 46; *Hodgson v. Dexter*, 1 Cranch, R. 345, 363, 364; *Post*, § 306, note; *Bernard v. Torrance*, 5 Gill & Johns. R. 383; *Enloe v. Hall*, 1 Hump. Tenn. R. 303; *Tutt v. Hobbs*, 17 Misso. 486; *Miller v. Ford*, 4 Rich. 376; *Dwinelle v. Henriquez*, 1 Calif. 387; *Ogden v. Raymond*, 22 Conn. 379; *Nichols v. Moody*, 22 Barbour, 611; *Hammaraskold v. Bull*, 1 Rich. 493.

. ³ 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 632, 633, (4th edit.)

of any private man;¹ and that it is ready to fulfil them not only with good faith, but with punctilious promptitude, and in a spirit of liberal courtesy. Great public inconveniences would result from a different doctrine, considering the various public functionaries, which the government must employ, in order to transact its ordinary business and operations; and many persons would be deterred from accepting important offices of trust under the government, if they were held personally liable upon all their official contracts.² Take one example only: Every officer in the army or navy, from the commander-in-chief downwards, who should enter into any official contract, or give any orders, which should involve a contract, as, for example, a contract for supplies, or for provisions, or for military materials, might be held personally liable thereon, to his utter ruin.³ By parity of reasoning, upon any such contract, entered into by a public agent on behalf of the government, no suit lies by him; but it must be brought in the name of the government, against the other contracting party.⁴

§ 303. This principle not only applies to simple contracts both parol and written, but also to instruments under seal, which are executed by agents of the government in their own names, and purporting to be made by them on behalf of the government; for the like presumption prevails in such cases, that the parties contract, not personally, but merely officially, within the sphere of their appropriate duties.⁵ Thus, a charter-party, sealed and exe-

¹ *Tippets v. Walker*, 4 Mass. R. 595, 597, 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 632, 333, (4th edit.)

² *Macbeath v. Haldimand*, 1 Term R. 172, 181, 182; *Hodgson v. Dexter*, 1 Cranch, R. 345, 363, 364, *Jones v. La Touche*, 3 Dall. 384; *Reed v. Conway*, 26 Misso. 13.

³ *Macbeath v. Haldimand*, 1 Term R. 172, 180-182; *Hodgson v. Dexter*, 1 Cranch, 345, 363, 364, *Bronson v. Wolsey*, 17 Johns. R. 46; *Belknap v. Reinhart*, 2 Wend. R. 375.

⁴ *Bainbridge v. Downie*, 6 Mass. R. 253; *Bowen v. Morris*, 2 Taunt. R. 374; *Irish v. Webster*, 5 Greenl. R. 171.

⁵ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 213, 214; *Stinchfield v. Little*, 1 Greenl. R. 231; *Macbeath v. Haldimand*, 1 Term R. 172, 181, 182; *Hodgson v. Dexter*, 1 Cranch, R. 345, 363, 364; *Osborne v. Kerr*, 12 Wend. R. 179; *Walker v. Swartwout*, 12 Johns. R. 441, *Bowen v. Morris*, 2 Taunt. R. 379; *Smith on Merc. Law*, §. 1, ch. 5, § 7, pp. 141, 142, (3d edit. 1843). [In *Hodges v. Runyan*, 30 Misso. 91, this rule was applied to a note given by "R, trustee," on behalf of the trustees of a school district.]

cuted by a public officer in his own name, but describing himself as acting on behalf of the king or government, for purposes connected with the public service, has been held not to bind him personally, but to be merely obligatory upon the government.¹ So, an indenture, executed between A. B., describing himself as "secretary of war," of the one part, and C. D. of the other part, for a demise of certain buildings for public purposes, and for a certain period, and containing a covenant, on the part of A. B., to pay the stipulated rent during that period, has been held not to bind A. B. personally; but to bind the government alone.²

§ 304. The same principle applies to cases, where public officers, contracting for a public purpose, afterwards, upon a settlement of accounts with the other contracting party, strike a balance, and in writing promise to pay that balance on a specific day, signing their names, with their official designations annexed, as, for example, as commissioners; for such a written document is quite consistent with an intention not to incur any personal responsibility; but merely to apply the public fund, which might be in their hands at the time prescribed, towards the discharge of the public debt.³

§ 305. The same principle applies to the case, where a public officer receives moneys officially, for the purpose of applying the same to the discharge of the debts, or allowances, of the government; for, in such a case, he acts merely as an agent of the government, and the only obligation or duty, which arises, is to the government, from his official character; and not any personal responsibility to third persons. Hence, it has been held, that no suit will lie against a person, who is secretary of war, for refusing to pay over moneys, which he has received to distribute among certain claimants, as retiring allowances, bestowed upon them by the bounty of the government.⁴

¹ *Unwin v. Woolseley*, 1 Term R. 674, 678; *Walker v. Swartwout*, 12 Johns. R. 444.

² *Hodgson v. Dexter*, 1 Cranch, 345, 363, 364.

³ *Fox v. Drake*, 8 Cowen, R. 191. In this case it was said that he would be personally liable, if, he had public funds in his hands at the time. But see post, § 305, note.

⁴ *Gidley v. Lord Palmerston*, 3 Brod. & Bing. 275. On the occasion of delivering the opinion of the Court in *Gidley v. Lord Palmerston*, Lord Chief Justice Dallas said: "On these facts, the question arises, whether, upon all or any

· § 306. But, although this is the general rule in relation to public agents, yet it is founded upon a mere presumption, and

of the counts in the declaration, the present action can be maintained; and we think, that it cannot be maintained. It is not pretended, that the defendant is to be charged in respect of any express undertaking, or agreement, between him and the testator, or in respect of any other character than his public and official character of secretary at war. It is in that character, and in that only, that his duty is alleged to arise; being, therefore, a duty as between him and the crown only, and not resulting from any relation to, or employment by, the plaintiff, or under any undertaking in any way to be personally responsible to him. The money received is granted by the crown, subject only to the disposition or control of the defendant, as the agent or officer of the crown, and responsible to the crown for the due execution of the trust or duty so committed. There is, therefore, no duty, from which the law can imply a promise to pay the testator, during his life, or to his executor after his death; nor can money be said to have been had and received to the use of the testator, which money belonged to the crown, being received as the money of the crown, and the party receiving it being responsible only to the crown in his public character. On this view of the case, it appears to us, that this action cannot be maintained. But it must fail also on another and a wider ground. This is an action brought against the defendant, as paymaster-general, for an alleged breach of an implied undertaking, said to attach upon him in that character. With reference to this ground, it will be sufficient to advert to a class of cases, too well known and established to require to be more particularly mentioned, and which in substance and result, have established, that an action will not lie against a public agent for anything done, by him in his public character, or employment, though alleged to be, in the particular instance, a breach of such employment, and constituting a particular and personal liability. Such persons, said Lord Mansfield, in one of the cases cited at the bar, are not understood personally to contract; and, in the same case, it was observed, by Mr. Justice Ashurst: 'In great questions of policy, we cannot argue from the nature of private agreements.' 'Great inconveniences would result from considering a governor, or commander, as personally responsible.' 'No man would accept of any office of trust under government, upon such conditions. And, indeed, it has frequently been determined, that no individual is answerable for any engagements, which he enters into on their behalf. There is no doubt, but the crown will do ample justice to the plaintiff's demands, if they be well founded.' Mr. Justice Buller, in the case, added: 'Where a man acts as agent for the public, and treats in that capacity, there is no pretence to say, that he is personally liable.' And, in a subsequent case, it is held, that a servant of the crown, contracting on the part of the government, is not personally answerable. I am aware that these cases are not, in their circumstances, precisely similar to the present; and, perhaps, in respect of some of the circumstances belonging to the present case, I may personally have doubted longer than, I am now satisfied, I ought to have done. But, in their doctrine, they go to this, that, on principles of public policy, an action will not lie against persons, acting in a

is liable to be rebutted by circumstances, which clearly establish an intention between the parties to the contract to create and rely upon a personal responsibility on the part of a public agent.¹ For there is nothing in the general principles or policy of the law, which forbids an agent from waiving his official immunity, and from making himself personally responsible on any contract, made for and on behalf of the government. Where it is not known to the other party, that the agent is acting for the public, it may fairly be presumed, that he intends to trust to the personal credit and responsibility of the agent, even although it may not be to his exclusive credit and responsibility.² But the same result may arise, where there is an express personal responsibility, incurred by a known public agent; or where it may fairly be implied from all the attendant circumstances.³ In cases of such an implied responsibility, the proofs ought to be exceedingly cogent and clear, in order to create such personal responsibility in a known public agent, and to repel the presumption of law, that he contracts only on the credit of the government.⁴ [It is, however, as in other cases, a question for the jury,

public character and situation, which, from their very nature, would expose them to an infinite multiplicity of actions, that is, to actions at the instance of any person, who might suppose himself aggrieved. And though it is to be presumed, that actions improperly brought would fail, and, it may be said, that actions properly brought should succeed, yet, the very liability to an unlimited multiplicity of suits would, in all probability, prevent any proper or prudent person from accepting a public situation, at the hazard of such peril to himself." But see *Myrtle v. Beaver*, 1 East, R. 135, *Rice v. Chute*, 1 East, R. 579, *Freeman v. Otis*, 9 Mass. R. 272; *Fox v. Drake*, 5 Cowen, R. 191; *Anta*, § 304, and note. Quære, if a writ of mandamus might not lie, in such a case, to compel the officer to pay over the public funds in his hands, if appropriated to that purpose? See *Kendall, Postmaster-General, v. United States*, 12 Peters, R. 527. There is some difficulty in reconciling all the authorities, as to the non-payment of moneys in their hands, and other omissions of duty by public officers, and as to the point how far, and when they are responsible to third persons. See *Rowning v. Goodchild*, 3 Wilson, R. 448; *S. C.* 5 Burr. 2716; *Stock v. Harris*, 5 Burr. 2709; *Barnes v. Foley*, 5 Burr. 2711; *Bend v. Hoyt*, 13 Peters, R. 263.

¹ *Copes v. Matthews*, 10 Sm. & Mar. 398.

² *Swift v. Hopkins*, 13 Johns. R. 313.

³ *Macbeath v. Hardimand*, 1 Term R. 172, 180, 182; *Gill v. Brown*, 12 Johns. R. 385; *Freeman v. Otis*, 9 Mass. R. 272.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Bainbridge v. Downie*, 6 Mass. R. 253; *Freeman v. Otis*, 9 Mass. R. 272; *Dawes v. Jackson*, 9 Mass. R. 490; *Osborn v. Kerr*, 12 Wend. R. 179,

to whom was the credit given.¹ The same principle, with the same qualifications, prevails in the Scottish law. A public agent is not ordinarily liable on a contract made by him on behalf of the government; but he may, if he pleases, incur a personal liability on such contract; and he will be deemed so to intend, when he draws a bill or note in his own name under the contract.²

§ 307. Where, however, money is obtained from third persons, by public officers, illegally, but under color of office, it may be recovered back from them, if notice has been given by the party, at the time, to the officer, although the money has been paid over to the government; and if it has not been paid over, but it remains in the officer's hands, it may be recovered back, even without notice.³ And it will make no difference in the case, that the payment was originally made under a misconception or misconstruction of the law, by both or by either of the parties.⁴ We shall hereafter have occasion to examine, how far, and under what circumstances, public agents are liable for their own torts, and for the torts of sub-agents employed by or under them.⁵

§ 307 *a*. In respect to the acts and declarations and representations of public agents, it would seem that the same rule does not prevail, which ordinarily governs in relation to mere private agents. As to the latter, (as we have seen,) the principals are in many cases bound, where they have not authorized the dec-

Belknap v Reinhart, 2 Wend R 375, *Fox v Drake*, 8 Cowen, R. 191. It seems almost impossible to reconcile the case of *Sheffield v. Watson*, 3 Caines, R. 69, with the principles here laid down; or, indeed, with the general bearing of the other authorities on this subject. Indeed, it was shaken to its foundation by the decision in *Walker v. Swartwout*, 12 Johns R. 444, 446. See 2 Liverm on Agency, 273-279, (edit. 1818)

¹ *Brown v. Rundlett*, 15 N H. R. 360; *Hammaraskold v. Bull*, 9 Rich. R. 484.

² Thomson on Bills of Exchange, 229, 230, (2d edit. 1836)

³ Ante, § 301, *Barnes v. Foley*, 5 Burr. 2711; *Frye v Lockwood*, 4 Cowen, R. 454, *Tracy v Swartwout*, 10 Peters, R. 80, *Elliot v. Swartwout*, 10 Peters, R. 187; *Ripley v Gelston*, 9 Johns. R. 201; Ante, § 800, and note. See *Bend v. Swartwout*, 13 Peters, R. 265.

⁴ *Barnes v. Foley*, 5 Burr. 2711; *Tracy v. Swartwout*, 10 Peters, R. 80; *Elliot v. Swartwout*, 10 Peters, R. 187; *Ripley v Gelston*, 9 Johns. R. 201; Ante, § 800, and note. See *Bend v. Swartwout*, 13 Peters, R. 265.

⁵ Post, § 320-322.

larations and representations to be made.¹ But, in cases of public agents, the government, or other public authority, is not bound, unless it manifestly appears that the agent is acting within the scope of his authority, or he is held out as having authority to do the act, or is employed, in his capacity as a public agent, to make the declaration or representation for the government. Indeed, this rule seems indispensable, in order to guard the public against losses and injuries arising from the fraud or mistake; or rashness and indiscretion of their agents.² And there is no hardship in requiring from private persons, dealing with public officers, the duty of inquiry, as to their real or apparent power and authority to bind the government.

CHAPTER XII.

LIABILITY OF AGENTS FOR TORTS.

§ 308. WE come, in the next place, to the consideration of the liability of agents to third persons, in regard to torts or wrongs done by them, in the course of their agency; and this liability may be either of private agents or of public agents. Let us first consider that of private agents. And here the distinction ordinarily taken is between acts of misfeasance or positive wrongs, and nonfeasances or mere omissions of duty by private agents. The law upon this subject, as to principals and agents, is founded upon the same analogies as exist in the case of masters and servants. The master is always liable to third persons, for the misfeasances, and negligences, and omissions of duty of his servant, in all cases within the scope of his employment.³

¹ Ante, §§ 126, 133, 134.

² Lee v. Munroe, 7 Cranch, R. 366.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 396, 397, and notes; Id. 305, 306; Com. Dig. Action, on the Case for Negligence, A. 2, A. 5, A. 6; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 214; Story on Bailments, § 400; Morse v. Slue, 1 Vent. 238; Clarke v. City Corporation of Washington, 12 Wheat. R. 40; Randleson v. Murray, 3 Nev. & Perry, 239; S. C. 8 Adolph. & Ellis, 109; Ante, § 217.

So the principal, in like manner, is liable to third persons for the like misfeasances, negligences, and omissions of duty of his agent, leaving him to his remedy over against the agent in all cases, where the tort is of such a nature as that he is entitled to compensation.¹ And this liability is not limited to principals,

¹ *Lane v. Cotton*, 12 Mod. 468, 489; *Perkins v. Smith*, Sayer, R. 40, 41; Post, § 452-457. See also *Quarman v. Burnett*, 6 Mees. & Welsb. 499; *Priestly v. Fowler*, 3 Mees & Welsb. 1; *Milligan v. Wedge*, 12 Adolph. & Ell. 737, 742; *Schieffelin v. Harvey*, 6 Johns. R. 170; Post, § 452-457; *United States v. Halberstadt*, 1 Gilp. R. 262. As to the cases in which a principal may recover compensation from his agent, for the tort of the latter, see *Farebrother v. Ansley*, 1 Camp. R. 343; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 152, 153; Ante, § 201. As to the cases in which an agent may, or may not, recover compensation for torts done by authority of his principal, see 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, 321-325, (edit. 1818); *Merryweather v. Nixon*, 8 Term R. 186; *Farebrother v. Ansley*, 1 Camp. R. 343; *Stephens v. Elwall*, 1 Mer. & Selw. 259, 261; *Marty n v. Blithman*, Yelv. R. 197; *Fletcher v. Harcott*, Hutton, R. 55; *Adamson v. Jarvis*, 4 Bing. R. 66. In this last case, Lord Chief Justice Best, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said "Auctioneers, brokers, factors, and agents, do not take regular indemnities. These would be indeed surprised, if, having sold goods for a man, and paid him the proceeds, and having suffered afterwards in an action at the suit of the true owners, they were to find themselves wrongdoers, and could not recover compensation from him who had induced them to do the wrong. It was certainly decided in *Merryweather v. Nixon*, that one wrongdoer could not sue another for contribution. Lord Kenyon, however, said, 'that the decision would not affect cases of indemnity, where one man employed another to do acts, not unlawful in themselves, for the purpose of asserting a right.' This is the only decided case on the subject, that is intelligible. There is a case of *Walton v. Hanbury* and others, but it is so imperfectly stated that it is impossible to get at the principle of the judgment. The case of *Phillips v. Biggs* was never decided. But the Court of Chancery seemed to consider the case of two sheriffs of Middlesex, where one had paid the damages in an action for an escape, and sued the other for contribution, as like the case of two joint-obligors. From the inclination of the Court on this last case, and from the concluding part of Lord Kenyon's judgment in *Merryweather v. Nixon*, and from reason, justice, and sound policy, the rule, that wrongdoers cannot have redress, or contribution, against each other, is confined to cases, where the person seeking redress must be presumed to have known that he was doing an unlawful act. If a man buys the goods of another, from a person who has no authority to sell them, he is a wrongdoer to the person whose goods he takes; yet, he may recover compensation against the person who sold the goods to him, although the person who sold them did not undertake that he had a right to sell, and did not know that he had no right to sell. That is proved by *Medina v. Stoughton*, *Sanders v. Powell*, *Crosse v. Gardner*, and many other cases. These

who are mere private persons; but extends also to private corporations, for the misfeasances, negligences, and omissions of duty of their agents, in the course of their employment, whenever they are duly appointed.¹ [A telegraph company is liable for damages caused by the negligence of their agent in transmitting a message. Thus, where L. sent a message to D. for "two hand bouquets," and the operator transmitted the message to D. for "two *hundred* bouquets," whereby D. was put to loss, it was held, that the company were liable.² So also public or municipal corporations are liable for injuries to third persons, resulting from the negligence of subordinate officers or agents acting under their authority and direction, in the construction of public improvements belonging to such corporations.³ In such cases, the maxim, *respondeat superior*, properly applies, in the same manner and to the same extent as in its application to the liabilities of private individuals. But where such agent or officer, although appointed by the corporation, performs duties for or between individuals, in which the corporation has no interest, no

cases rest on this principle, that, if a man having the possession of property, which gives him the character of owner, affirms that he is owner, and thereby induces a man to buy, when, in point of fact, the affirmant is not the owner, he is liable to an action. It has been said that he is, because there is a breach of contract to rest the action on, and, that there is no contract in this case. This is not the true principle. It is this: he who affirms, either what he does not know to be true, or knows to be false, to another's prejudice and his own gain, is, both in morality and law, guilty of falsehood, and must answer in damages."

¹ *Yarborough v. Bank of England*, 16 East, R. 6; *Smith v. The Birmingham Gas Company*, 1 Adolph & Ell. 526; *Green v. London Omnibus Company*, 7 J. Scott, 290; *Whitfield v. South East Railway*, 1 Ellis, Bl. & Ellis, 115; *Scott v. Mayor of Manchester*, 1 Hurl. & Nor. 59; 2 Id. 204; *Salem Bank v. Gloucester Bank*, 17 Mass. R. 1; *Foster v. Essex Bank*, 17 Mass. R. 479; *Riddle v. Proprietors of Locks and Canals on Merrimack River*, 7 Mass. R. 169; *Townsend v. Susquehannah Turnpike Road*, 6 Johns. R. 90; *Gray v. Portland Bank*, 3 Mass. R. 364; *Fowle v. Common Council of Alexandria*, 3 Peters, R. 398, 409; *Rabassa v. Orleans Navigation Company*, 5 Miller, Louis. R. 463, 464; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 33, p. 283, (4th edit.); *Goodloe v. City of Cincinnati*, 4 Hamm. Ohio R. 500; *Hay v. Cohoes Company*, 3 Barbou, Sup. Ct. R. (N. Y.) 42.

[² *New York and Wash. Print. Tel. Company v. Dryburg*, 35 Penn. St. R. 298.]

[³ See *Scott v. Manchester*, 1 Hurl. & Nor. 59, affirmed in *Exchequer Chamber*, 2 Id.; *Lloyd v. Mayor of New York*, 1 Seld. 369.]

such liability arises, and the officer alone is responsible.¹] The agent is also personally liable to third persons, for his own misfeasances and positive wrongs.² But he is not, in general, (for there are exceptions,³) liable to third persons for his own nonfeasances or omissions of duty, in the course of his employment.⁴ His liability, in these latter cases, is solely to his principal;⁵ there being no privity between him and such third persons; but the privity exists only between him and his principal.⁶ And hence the general maxim, as to all such negligences and omissions of duty, is, in cases of private agency, *respondent superior*.⁷ Whether the agent has been guilty of

[¹ *Dayton v. Pease*, 4 Ohio St. R. 50.]

² Story on Bailments, § 404; Post, § 320; *Bell v. Joslyn*, 3 Gray, 309.

³ Post, §§ 314, 315.

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 296-399; *Lane v. Cotton*, 12 Mod. 488, S. C.

1 Ld. Raymond, 616, 655; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 214; Story on Bailm. §§ 400, 404, 507; *Perkins v. Smith, Sayer*, R. 40, 42.

[⁵ See *Henshaw v. Noble*, 7 Ohio St. R. 231.]

⁶ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 395-397, and notes; *Lane v. Cotton*, 12 Mod. 488; S. C. 1 Lord Raymond, 616, 655; *Perkins v. Smith, Sayer*, R. 40, 42; *Cameron v. Reynolds*, Cowp. R. 103; *Rowning v. Goodchild*, 5 Burr. 2721; S. C. 3 Wills. R. 454; Story on Bailm. §§ 402, 101; Smith on Merc. Law, 82, (2d edit.), Id. 145, 146, (3d edit. 1813); *Morse v. Slue*, 1 Vent. R. 238; *Quarman v. Burnett*, 6 Mees. & Welsb. 199; *Rapson v. Cubit*, 9 Mees. & Welsb. 710; *Stone v. Cartwright*, 6 Term R. 411; *Milligan v. Wedge*, 12 Adolph. & Ell. 737; *Winterbottom v. Wright*, 10 Mees. & Welsb. 109, 111; Ante, §§ 201, 217 *cc*; Post, §§ 452, 453, 453 *a*, 453 *b*, 453 *c*, 454 *a*.

⁷ Lord Holt, in his celebrated judgment in *Lane v. Cotton*, 12 Mod. R. 488, expounded this doctrine at large. "It was objected at the bar," (said he,) "that they have this remedy against Breese. I agree, if they could prove that he took out the bills, they might sue him for it; so they might anybody else, on whom they could fix that fact. But, for a neglect in him, they can have no remedy against him, for they must consider him only as a servant; and then his neglect is only chargeable on his master or principal; for a servant or deputy, *quatenus* such, cannot be charged for neglect, but the principal only shall be charged for it. But, for a misfeasance, an action will lie against a servant or deputy, but not *quatenus* a deputy or servant, but as a wrongdoer. As, if a bailiff, who has a warrant from the sheriff to execute a writ, suffer his prisoner by neglect, to escape, the sheriff shall be charged for it, and not the bailiff. But, if the bailiff turn the prisoner loose, the action may be brought against the bailiff himself; for then he is a kind of wrongdoer, or rescuer; and it will lie against any other, that will rescue in like manner. And for this diversity, *vide* 1 Leon. 146; 3 Cro. 143, 175; 41 Ed. III. 12; 1 Ro. 78; which is not well

negligence or not, is not ordinarily a question of law, but of fact, under all the circumstances.¹

§ 309. The distinction, thus propounded, between misfeasance and nonfeasance, between acts of direct, positive wrong, and mere neglects by agents, as to their personal liability therefor, may seem nice and artificial, and partakes, perhaps, not a little of the subtlety and over-refinement of the old doctrines of the common law. It seems, however, to be founded upon this ground, that no authority whatsoever from a superior can furnish to any party a just defence for his own positive torts or trespasses; for no man can authorize another to do a positive wrong.² But, in respect to nonfeasances, or mere neglects in the performance of duty, the responsibility therefor must arise from some express or implied obligation between particular parties, standing in privity of law or contract with each other; and no man is bound to answer for any such violations of duty or obligation, except to those, to whom he has become directly bound or amenable for his conduct. Whether the distinction be satisfactory or not, it is well established; although some niceties and difficulties occasionally occur in its practical application to particular cases.

§ 310. It may be useful to illustrate each of these propositions by some cases which have been treated as clear, or which have undergone judicial decision. And, in the first place, as to the non-liability of agents for their nonfeasances and omissions of duty, except to their own principals. Thus, if the servant of a common carrier negligently loses a parcel of goods, intrusted to him, the principal, and not the servant, is responsible to the bailor, or the owner.³ So, if an under-sheriff is guilty of a negligent breach of duty, an action lies by the injured party

reported, but the inference may be well made from it." S. C. 1 Id. Raym. 646, 653. See also *Morse v. Slue*, 1 Vent. 238, 239, *Hall v. Smith*, 2 Bing. R. 267; *Bradford v. Eastburn*, 2 Wash. Cir. R. 219, *Denny v. Manhattan Company*, 2 Denio, R. 115; Ante, §§ 201, 217 *a*, Post, § 452-461

¹ *Foot v. Wiswall*, 14 John. R. 301, *Savage v. Birkhead*, 20 Pick. R. 167.

² *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 396-398; 3 *Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* 214; *Perkins v. Smith*, 1 Wilson, R. 328; S. C. *Sayer*, R. 41, 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, 257, 258, (edit. 1818); *Stephens v. Elwall*, 4 Maule & Selw. 259; *Fairebrother v. Ansley*, 1 Campb. R. 343; *Morse v. Slue*, 1 Vent. 238.

³ 3 *Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* 214; *Lane v. Cotton*, 12 Mod. 488.

against the high sheriff, and not against the deputy personally, for his negligence.¹ So, if the servant of a blacksmith so negligently conducts himself in shoeing a horse, that the horse is consequentially injured, or afterwards becomes lame, the master, and not the servant, will be liable for the negligent injury.² But, if the servant, in shoeing the horse, has pricked him, or has maliciously or wantonly lamed him, an action will lie personally against the servant himself.³ So, the mere omission of a servant to deliver goods, intrusted to him by his master, when demanded by the real owner, will not amount to a conversion of the goods, if, at the time, the servant states his want of authority to deliver them; and he has no knowledge of the true ownership.⁴ So, it has been said, if an agent is guilty of any deceit, or fraud, or false warranty, in the business or employment of his principal, as, if he knowingly sells or warrants corrupt wines, or other things fraudulently disguised, for and by the authority of his principal, he is not personally responsible therefor to the buyer; but his master alone is liable.⁵ But it may well be doubted, whether an agent can shelter himself from personal responsibility, where he thus directly and knowingly coöperates in a deceit, or misrepresentation, or fraud, to the injury of a third person,

¹ *Cameron v. Reynolds*, Cowp. R. 403; *Paley on Agency*, 396, 397, and notes. See *Morse v. Slue*, 1 Vent. 238.

² 1 Black Comm. 431; *Story on Bailm.* §§ 400, 402. See *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 397 and note; *Post*, § 453. In 2 Black. Comm. 431, it is laid down, "If a smith's servant lames a horse, while shoeing him, an action lies against the master, and not against the servant." The law, as thus laid down, has been doubted by some commentators. See *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 397, note (e), and Mr. (now Mr. Justice) Coleridge's edition of 2 Blackstone's Comm. 431, note. The doubt seems to be founded upon this; whether it is not an act of misfeasance, and not merely negligence. See 1 Chitty's Black. Comm. 431, note. The question, after all, may turn mainly upon this, whether the injury be direct or consequential only. See also *Hay v. Cohoes Co.* 3 Barbour, Sup. Ct. (N. Y.) R. 43.

³ *Story on Bailm.* §§ 402, 409; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 397 and note.

⁴ *Alexander v. Southey*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 247; *Mires v. Solebay*, 2 Mod. 242.

⁵ *Roll. Abridg. Action on the Case*, 95, T. l. 20; 1 Com. Dig. *Action on the Case for Deceit*, B, 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 214; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 152, Id. 30. See *Southerne v. How*, Cro. Jac. 468; 2 Molloy, Jur. Marit. B. 3, ch. 8, § 6; *S. C. Bridgman*, R. 126, 127; *Hern v. Nichols*, Salk. 289; *Grammar v. Nixon*, 1 Str. R. 653; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 398, 399, and note.

although he is authorized to do so by his principal; for it is an illegal act, and contrary to sound morals.¹

§ 311. In the next place, as to the liability of agents to third persons, for their own misfeasances and positive wrongs. In all such cases, (as we have seen,) the agent is personally responsible, whether he did the wrong intentionally, or ignorantly, by the authority of his principal; for the principal could not confer on him any authority to commit a tort upon the rights or the property of another.² Thus, if goods are delivered by the owner to A to keep; if he delivers them to B to keep to the use of A, and B wastes or destroys them, the owner may have an action for the tort against B, although the bailment was not made to him by the owner; for B is a wrong-doer.³ So, if A delivers his horse to a blacksmith, and he delivers him to another blacksmith, who wantonly lames him, A may have an action against the latter; notwithstanding A did not authorize the bailment; for he is a wrong-doer.⁴

§ 312. *A fortiori*, if the principal is a wrong-doer, the agent, however innocent in intention, who participates in his acts, is a wrong-doer also. Thus, if an auctioneer should be employed by a sheriff to sell goods at auction, which he had unlawfully seized upon an execution, as, if the goods did not belong to the execution debtor; the auctioneer, who should sell, would be liable to an action for the tortious conversion, equally with the sheriff.⁵

¹ 19 Hen. 6, 53; Com Dig *Action on the Case for Deceit*, B. Story on Equity Pleadings, § 232; 1 Story on Equity Jurisp. §§ 191, 192, 204; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 386; Ante, § 308.

² Ante, § 309; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 398, 399; *Lane v. Cotton*, 12 Mod. 488; *Perkins v. Smith*, 1 Wils. R. 328; *S. C. Sayer*, R. 40, 42; *Bush v. Steinman*, 1 Bos & Pull. 404, 410; *Richardson v. Kumball*, 28 Maine R. 464.

³ 1 Roll. Abridg. *Action sur Case*, 90, O. 1, l. 15; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 214; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 307.

⁴ 1 Roll. Abridg. *Action sur Case*, p. 90, O. 2, l. 20; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 396, 397; Ante, § 310.

⁵ *Farebrother v. Ansley*, 1 Camph. R. 343; *Adamson v. Jarvis*, 4 Bing. R. 66; Post, § 339. See *Van Brunt v. Schenck*, 11 Johns. R. 377. In this latter case, there had been a seizure of a ship by a revenue officer, for a supposed breach of law, and pending the proceedings under the seizure, he allowed another officer to take possession of, and use the ship. Afterwards, upon the trial, the ship was acquitted; but the Court granted a certificate of probable cause of seizure. The owner of the ship brought an action of trespass against the officer who had used

So, if the agent of a merchant, who has received goods from a bankrupt, after a secret act of bankruptcy, should, pursuant to orders from his principal, sell the goods, an action of trover would lie, in favor of the assignees, against the agent, however ignorant he might be of the defect of title; for a person is guilty of a conversion, who intermeddles with the property of another, without due authority from the true owner; and it is no answer, that he acted as an agent, under the authority of a person, supposed at the time to be entitled as the owner.¹

§ 313. But no action will ordinarily lie against an agent, for the misfeasance, or for the negligence of those, whom he has retained for the service of his principal, by his consent, or authority; any more than it will lie against a servant, who hires laborers for his master at his request, for their acts; unless, indeed, in either case, the particular acts, which occasion the damage, are done by the orders or directions of such agent or servant.² The action, under other circumstances, must be brought, either against the principal, or against the immediate actors in the wrong.³

the ship, and the Court held that trespass did not lie. The Court seem to have thought, that the seizure, being made for a supposed breach of law, divested the possession of the owner. The same decision was made in *Barrett v. Warren*, 3 Hill, R. 348. But Mr. Justice Cowen doubted the correctness of the doctrine, in a very elaborate opinion. Quære, whether the possession of the owner would be divested by the illegal seizure of the sheriff so as to take away the right to maintain trespass against a subsequent holder under the sheriff. There is no doubt, that trover would lie in such a case. But trespass will lie against a *malâ fide* purchaser, and against a second trespasser, who takes by trespass from the first. *Ibid*, *Acker v. Camp*, 23 Wend. R. 372, *Wilbraham v. Snow*, 1 Siderf. R. 438.

¹ *Stevens v. Elwall*, 4 Maule & Selw. 259, *Sharland v. Mildon*, 5 Hare, R. 469; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 399, 400; *Perkins v. Smith*, Sayer, R. 40, 42; S. C. 1 Wilson, R. 328; *McCombie v. Davies*, 6 East, R. 538; *Baldwin v. Cole*, 6 Mod. 212.

² *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 402; *Stone v. Cartwright*, 6 Term R. 411; 3 Chitty Comm. and Manuf. 214. See *Hills v. Ross*, 3 Dall. R. 331; *Nicholson v. Mounsey*, 15 East, R. 388, 387, 388. See ante, §§ 201, 217 a, 313, 321, 322.

³ *Stone v. Cartwright*, 6 Term R. 411; *Brown v. Lent*, 20 Verm. 532; *Bush v. Steinman*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 404, *Denison v. Seymour*, 9 Wend. R. 8, 12; *Rapson v. Curbitt*, 9 Mees. & Welsb. 710; *Quarman v. Burnett*, 6 Mees. & Welsb. 710; *Reedie v. London and Northwestern Railway Co.* 4 Welsby, Hurlstone & Gordon, 255; Post, §§ 454, 454 a.

§ 314. There is, however, one important exception to the rule already stated, as to the non-liability of agents to third persons for the negligences and omissions of duty of themselves and of their sub-agents, founded upon the principles of the maritime law. It is the case of masters of ships, who, although they are the agents, or servants of the owners, are, also, in many respects, deemed to be responsible, as principals, to third persons, not only for their own negligences and nonfeasance, but also for the negligences, nonfeasances, and misfeasances of the subordinate officers and others, employed by and under them.¹ We have already seen, that the master of the ship is responsible upon contracts made by him in regard to the usual employment of the ship, and also upon contracts made by him for the repairs, and necessities supplied for the ship, as well as for the wages of the seamen, employed in navigating the ship.² This liability is founded upon the doctrine of the maritime law, which treats the master, not merely as an agent, contracting on his own behalf, as well as for the owner; but which, upon a broader policy, treats him as, in some sort, a subrogated principal, and qualified owner of the ship, possessing authority in the nature of the exercitorial power, for the time being.³ And his liability, founded upon this consideration, extends not merely to his contracts, but (as we have said) to his own negligences, and nonfeasances, and misfeasances, as well as to those of his officers and crew.⁴ His responsibility for the

¹ Post, §§ 316, 317.

² Ante, §§ 36, 116, 117, 294-300.

³ Ante, §§ 36, 116, 117, 294, 295. Lord Hale, in *Morse v. Slue*, 1 Vent. 238; S. C. 1 Mod. R. 85, (which was an action on the case against the master of a ship, for negligence in the carriage of goods, whereby they were stolen,) in allusion to this point, said: "It is objected, that the master is but a servant to the owners. Answer. The law takes notice of him as more than a servant. It is known, that he may impawn the ship, if occasion be, and sell *bona peritura*. He is rather an officer than a servant." He added: "By the civil law, the master or owner is chargeable, at the election of the merchant." See also *Molloy*, B. 2, ch. 2, § 2. See also Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 9, l. 1, § 2. See post, § 317, note, and ante, §§ 36 and 116.

⁴ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 398; *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 2; *Id.* Pt. 3, ch. 3, § 3; *Id.* Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 1, and notes, (Amer. edit. 1829); *Purviance v. Argus*, 1 Dall. R. 184, 185; 2 *Valin*, Lib. 2, tit. 7, art. 4, p. 171; *Denison v.*

officers and crew has this additional reason for its support, that he is thus induced to exercise a superior watchfulness over their acts and conduct; and, if he were not so made liable for their acts and conduct, he might often, by his connivance in their frauds, misfeasances, negligences, or nonfeasances subject the shippers of goods, as well as the owners of the ship, to great losses and injuries, without their having any adequate redress.¹ The policy of the maritime law has, therefore, indissolubly connected his personal responsibility with that of all the other persons on board, who are under his command, and are subjected to his authority.

§ 315. Hence it is, that the master of a general or carrier ship, as well as the owner, is treated as a common carrier. He is responsible for the goods, in the like manner as any other common carrier; and nothing will discharge him from his responsibility to the owners of the goods, but a loss by some act of Providence, or by some inevitable casualty, or by some public enemy.² If the goods, therefore, are injured, or perish, by the negligence or misfeasance of the crew, or if they are stolen, the master, as well as the owner, is severally liable therefor.³

§ 316. Upon the same ground, the master of a steamboat, employed in the transportation of passengers, is, like the master of a vessel engaged in the merchant service, held liable for the misfeasance and negligence and want of care of all the persons,

Seymour, 9 Wend. 1, 8, 15; *Schieffelin v. Harvey*, 6 Johns. R. 170; Ante, §§ 294, 295, 308, 317, note.

¹ Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 3, ch. 3, § 3, (Amer. edit. 1829); Ante, §§ 116, 117, 293-306.

² *Morse v. Slue*, 1 Vent. R. 238; *Molloy*, B. 2, ch. 2, § 2.

³ Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 3, ch. 3, § 3, ch. 4, § 1, (Amer. edit. 1829); *Morse v. Slue*, 1 Vent. 238, *Molloy*, B. 2, ch. 2, § 2, *Schieffelin v. Harvey*, 6 Johns. R. 170, 176, *Watkinson v. Laughton*, 8 Johns. R. 213, 216. In Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 3, ch. 3, § 3, p. 222, (Amer. edit. 1829,) it is said "As soon as any goods are put on board, the master must provide a sufficient number of persons to protect them; for, even if the crew be overpowered by a superior force, and the goods stolen, while the ship is in a port or river within the body of a county, the master and owners will be answerable for the loss, although they have been guilty of neither fraud nor fault, the law, in this instance, holding them responsible, from reasons of public policy, and to prevent the combinations, that might otherwise be made with thieves and robbers." Ante, § 315.

officers, and crew to whom the management of the steamboat is intrusted. And this rule is applied without any distinction, whether the officers and crew are appointed by the owners or by himself.¹ Therefore, where, by the negligence of the pilot of a steamboat, who was appointed by the owner, a collision took place, whereby another vessel was run down and sunk while the pilot was at the helm, navigating the boat, he having the exclusive control and direction of her course, it was held, that the master of the boat was responsible in damages for the injury by the collision.²

¹ *Foot v Wiswall* 14 Johns R 304. *Denison v Seymour* 9 Wend 8.

² *Denison v Seymour*, 9 Wend R 8 13. Mr Chief Justice Savage in delivering the opinion of the Court went into an elaborate examination of the authorities, and then added: "Were this an action against the master of a vessel engaged in the merchant service it seems to be conceded by all the cases that he would be liable. In such cases, the master is responsible for the diligence of all to whom is intrusted the management of the vessel. On the other hand were the action against the captain of a ship of war the case of *Nicholson v Mounsey* proves that the captain is not responsible for the negligence of the other officers. For this exemption, two reasons seem to be assigned: one is that the captain and his officers are all appointed by the same authority, and the captain cannot appoint or remove his inferior officers: the other reason is that the captain is not a volunteer in the station where he is found. He is obliged from the office which he holds to take command of any vessel to which he may be assigned, with such other officers and crews as he may find there and make the best of them. A steamboat for the transportation of passengers with their baggage, and for carrying small freight, is a merchant vessel and though the pilots are appointed by the owners and not by the captain yet the captain is a volunteer in that service, in the language of Lord Ellenborough. The steamboat service is not like the naval service of a nation. No captain is bound to engage as such, he has a choice, whether he will serve with such persons as the owners choose to put on board as officers. He knows the responsibility of master of a vessel, and if he is unwilling to be responsible for the negligence of the subordinate officers, he is under no compulsion to serve them himself. If he accepts the office of master of the vessel he does so with the knowledge of the responsibility which, as such, he incurs. If the owner of a merchant ship were to stipulate with the master that he should take certain persons for his mates, that, I apprehend, would not alter his responsibility to third person, however it might affect his responsibility to the owner. On the whole, I am of opinion, that the fact of the pilot being chosen by the owners does not alter the law as to the captain's responsibility. Suppose the owners should contract not only with the pilots, but with all the hands on board through the agency of some other person besides the captain, as they probably do, would the captain, therefore, become entirely responsible? And must any one whose vessel has been run down where

§ 317. The same rule is adopted in the maritime jurisprudence of the modern commercial nations of continental Europe, it having been derived from the same common source, the Roman law.¹ By this law, the Prætor gave a remedy against the master and employers of ships, where they had received goods, as carriers, and had not safely delivered them. *Aut Prætor, (says the Digest,) Nautæ, Caupones, Stabularii, quod cujusque saluum fore receperant, nisi restituerint, in eos judicium dabo.*² The reason, assigned in the Digest, is precisely that which governs in the policy of modern maritime nations, that is to say, the necessity of placing confidence in the masters and crews of ships, and the impossibility of shippers of goods being otherwise secure against the injuries sustained by them from the negligences, mis-

a totally irresponsible person was at the wheel bring his suit against a common sailor.³ The owners of a vessel may not be known, they may be residents of a foreign country. It would be adding insult to injury, to say to a man, whose property had been destroyed, that he has his remedy against a common sailor, or the owners who, perhaps live in Europe. My opinion is, that the master of a steamboat is liable like the master of a merchant ship, and that the circumstance of the pilots being appointed by the owners does not discharge that liability so far as third persons are concerned. See also *Nicholson v. Mouncy*, 10 East, R 384. See Abbott on Shipping Pt 2 ch 7, § 1-9, p 173, (Sheep's edit 1840), and *Lacey v. Ingram* (1840) Exch. cited in the Appendix to the same edition.

¹ *Rocce de Nav* n 3 19 55, 57 59 C2 68 2 *Emerigon* ch 4, § 10, p 448, &c
² *Valin Comm Lit* 3 tit 7 art 4, p 161 *Pothier, Charte Partie*, n 45, Post, § 458 1 *Stair's Instit* by Brodie, B 1, tit 12 § 28, 1 *Bell, Comm* § 500, p 465, (4th edit), *Id* §§ 501, 502, p 465-471, *Id* § 505, pp 473, 474, *Id* p 465-476, (5th edit)

² *Dig Lib* 4, tit 9, *Introd*, *Pothier, Pand Lib* 4, tit 9, n 1, 2 The Digest has explained who are meant by *Nautæ*, in this place. The word embraces, in its most extensive signification all those who are employed in the navigation of the ship. But it is here used in a more restrictive sense, as including properly the employer of the ship, commonly called the *exercitor*, an appellation which sometimes is applied to the master, although it is generally used in contradistinction to him. Thus, *Ulpian* says "*Aut Prætor, Nautæ, Nautam accipere debemus eum, qui navem exercet quævis nautæ appellantur omnes, qui navis navigandæ causa in nave sint. Sed de exercitore solummodo Prætor sentit. Nec enim debet, (inquit Pomponius,) per remigum, aut meso-nautam obligari, sed per se, vel per navis ædificatorem, quamquam si ipse alicui e navis committi jussit, tunc dubio debeat obligari.*" *Dig Lib* 4, tit 9, l 1, § 2, *Pothier, Pand Lib* 4, tit 9, n. 2 See also *Dig Lib* 47, tit 5, l 1, *Pothier, Pand Lib* 47, tit 5, n 1, 2, 3, 8, 10, *Dig. Lib* 14, tit 1, l 1, § 2. See 2 *Emerigon*, ch 4, § 10, p 448, &c.; *Post*, § 458.

feasances, and frauds of the masters and crews. *Maxima utilitas est hujus Edicti; quia necesse est plerumque eorum fidem sequi, et res custodiæ eorum committere. Ne quisquam putet graviter hoc adversus eos constitutum; nam est in ipsorum arbitrio, ne quem recipiant. Et nisi hoc esset statutum, materia daretur cum furibus adversus eos, quos recipiunt, cocundi; cum ne nunc quidem abstineant hujusmodi fraudibus.*¹

§ 318. The master of a ship, however, is not, any more than the owner thereof, responsible for wilful trespasses and injuries, done by the persons employed under him, which acts were not ordered by him, or were not in the course of the duty devolved upon such persons.² In all such cases, the proper remedy is against the immediate wrong-doers, for their own misconduct. [As a general rule, a principal who neither authorizes or ratifies a wilful trespass committed by his agent, is not liable therefor. Nor is a corporation liable for a wilful trespass of a person employed by it,³ although the act be sanctioned by some of its managers; as where the plaintiff's boat was run into and damaged by the wilful act of the master of the boat belonging to the corporation, and the trespass was sanctioned by a person who was president of the corporation and its general agent.⁴]

§ 319. In the next place, as to the liability of public agents for torts or wrongs done in the course of their agency. It is plain, that the government itself is not responsible for the misfeasances, or wrongs, or negligences, or omissions of duty of the subordinate officers or agents employed in the public service; for it does not undertake to guarantee to any persons the fidelity of any of the officers or agents, whom it employs; since that would involve it, in all its operations, in endless embarrassments, and difficulties, and losses, which would be subversive of the public interests; and, indeed, laches are never imputable to the government.⁵ Our next inquiry, therefore, is, whether the heads of its

¹ Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 9, l. 1, § 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 1, tit. 9, n. 1.

² Boucher v. Noidstrom, 1 Taunt. R. 568.

³ See Eastern Counties Railway Co. v. Broom, 6 Exch. R. 314; 2 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 406.

⁴ Vanderbilt v. Richmond Turnpike Co. 2 Comstock, (N. Y.) 479. See also Hipp v. The State, 5 Blackford, R. 149.

⁵ See Seymour v. Van Slyck, 8 Wend. R. 403, 422; U. States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. R. 720, 728.

departments, or other superior functionaries, are in a different predicament. And here the doctrine is now firmly established (subject to the qualifications hereinafter stated,) that public officers and agents are not responsible for the misfeasances, or positive wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions, of duty of the sub-agents, or servants or other persons properly employed by and under them, in the discharge of their official duties. Thus, for example, it is now well settled, although it was formerly a matter of learned controversy, that the postmaster-general is not liable for any default, or negligence, or misfeasance of any of the deputies or clerks employed under him in his office.¹ This exemption is founded upon the general ground,

¹ *Lane v. Cotton*, 1 *Ld. Raym.* 616; *S. C.* 12 *Mod.* 482; *Whitfield v. Le Despencer*, *Cowp.* 754; 1 *Bell, Copm.* § 401, p. 377, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 468, (5th edit.); 3 *Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* 214; *Post*, §§ 321, 322. Lord Holt differed from this opinion in *Lane v. Cotton*; but the doctrine of the other judges was afterwards affirmed in *Whitfield v. Le Despencer*, *Cowp. R.* 754. The principles involved in the discussion are thus shortly stated in *Story on Bailm.* § 462. "In the year 1699 an action was brought against the postmaster-general for the loss of a letter containing exchequer bills, by the negligence of his servants and deputies; and three judges against Lord Holt held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The ground of the opinion of the three judges appears to have been, that the post-office establishment is a branch of the public police, created by statute for purposes of revenue, as well as for public convenience, and that the government have the management and control of the whole concern. It is, in short, a government instrument, established for its own great purposes. The postmasters enter into no contract with individuals, and receive no hire, like common carriers, in proportion to the risk and value of the letters under their charge, but only a general compensation from government. The same question was again still more elaborately discussed in a case in the time of Lord Mansfield, brought against the postmaster-general to recover the amount of a bank-note stolen out of a letter by one of the sorters of letters, when the Court adhered to the doctrine of the three judges against the opinion of Lord Holt. Upon that occasion Lord Mansfield said: "The ground of Lord Holt's opinion in that case is founded upon comparing the situation of a postmaster to that of a common carrier, or the master of a ship taking goods on board for freight. Now, with all deference to so great an opinion, the comparison between a postmaster and a carrier, or a master of a ship, seems to me to hold in no particular whatever. The postmaster has no hire, enters into no contract, carries on no merchandise or commerce. But the post-office is a branch of revenue, and a branch of police, created by act of Parliament. As a branch of revenue there are great receipts; but there is likewise a great surplus of benefit and advantage to the public, arising from the fund. As a branch of police, it puts the whole correspondence of

that he is a public officer, and that the whole establishment of the post-office being for public purposes, and the officer employed therein being appointed under public authority, it would be against public policy to make the head of the department personally responsible for the acts of all his subordinate officers; since it would be impracticable for him to supervise all their acts; and discouragements would thus be held out against such official employment in the public service.¹

§ 319 *a*. Similar considerations apply to deputy postmasters, [to contractors for carrying the public mail,²] and other subordinate officers acting under the head of a department, who are compelled, in the course of their official duties, to employ sub-agents, and clerks, and servants, in the public service.³ They are not responsible, either to the government itself, or to third persons, for the misfeasances, or negligences, or omissions of duty of the sub-agents, clerks, and servants so employed under them, unless, indeed, they are guilty of ordinary negligence at least, in not selecting persons of suitable skill, or in not exercising a reasonable superintendence and vigilance over their acts and doings.⁴ In this respect, their responsibility does not seem to differ from that of private agents, who employ sub-agents at the request of their principals.⁵ Indeed, for many purposes, the

the count (for the exceptions are very trifling) under government, and intrusts the management and direction of it to the crown, and the officers appointed by the crown. There is no analogy, therefore, between the case of the postmaster and a common carrier." In truth, in England and in America, the postmasters are mere public officers, appointed by the government; and the contracts, made by them officially, are public, and not private contracts; binding on the government, and not on themselves personally. Ante, § 302-305; *Dunlop v. Monroe*, 7 Cranch, 242, 269; Post, §§ 321, 322.

¹ Ibid. See *Seymour v. Van Slyck*, 8 Wend. 403, 422; *United States v. Kirkpatrick*, 9 Wheat. R. 720, 725; Post, § 320-322.

² *Hutchins v. Brackett*, 2 Foster, 252; *Conwell v. Voorhees*, 13 Ohio, 523.

³ *Rowning v. Goodchild*, 3 Wilson, R. 443; *Stock v. Harris*, 5 Burr. R. 2709; *McMillan v. Eastman*, 4 Mass. R. 378; *Story on Bailm.* § 463; 4 Bell, Comm. § 401, p. 377. (4th edit.); Id. p. 468, (5th edit.); *Whitfield v. Le Despencer*, Cowp. R. 754, 765; *Schroyer v. Lynch*, 8 Watts, 455.

⁴ *Dunlop v. Monroe*, 7 Cranch, 242, 269. In this case, the very point was not positively decided, but the Court intimated an opinion to this effect; and it seems a just inference from the principles applicable to the subject. See *Story on Bailments*, § 463; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 40, pp. 610, 611, (4th edit.)

⁵ Ante, § 313.

deputy postmasters are treated as principals, and substantially, as independent officers of the government.¹

§ 319 *b*. But, although neither the government nor its superior officers, are responsible to third persons for misfeasances, or negligences, or omissions of duty of the subordinates in office, properly or necessarily employed under them, it by no means follows that such subordinates are themselves exempted from all personal responsibility therefor to third persons. On the contrary, the very consideration, that the public superiors are not responsible for the acts and omissions of their subordinates in their official conduct, distinguishes the case from that of mere private agencies, and lets in the doctrine, that, under such circumstances, they shall be held personally responsible therefor to third persons, who are injured thereby. Thus, for example, deputy postmasters are held responsible to third persons, for any injuries or losses sustained by the latter, from the personal negligence or omissions of duty of such deputy postmasters.²

§ 320. *A fortiori*, the same rule applies to cases where the subordinate officers of the government are guilty of direct misfeasances or positive wrongs to third persons in the discharge of their official functions; for, in such cases, they incur the same personal responsibility, and to the same extent, as private agents.³ This is founded upon a very plain principle of common sense and common justice; and that is, that no person shall shelter himself from personal liability, who does a wrong, under color of, but without any authority, or by an excess of his authority, or by a negligent use or abuse of his authority. Where a person is clothed with authority, as a public agent, it cannot be presumed, that the government means to justify, or even to

¹ *Supra*, note (2.)

² *Rowning v. Goodechild*, 3 Wilson, R. 443; S. C. 5 Burr. R. 2715, 2716; 2 W. Black. 906; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 214; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 398, and note. In *Whitfield v. Le Despencer*, Cowper, 765, Lord Mansfield said: "As to an action on the case lying against the party really offending, there can be no doubt of it; for, whoever does an act, by which another person receives an injury, is liable, in an action, for the injury sustained. If the man who receives a penny to carry the letters to the post-office loses any of them, he is answerable; so is the sorter in the business of his department. So is the postmaster, for any fault of his own."

³ *Ante*, §§ 308, 311; *Bayley v. Mayor of New York*, 3 Hill, R. 581.

excuse, his violations of his own proper duty, under color of that authority. And, in cases of this sort, it is not sufficient for public agents to show, that they have acted *bonâ fide*, and to the best of their skill and judgment; for they are bound also to conduct themselves with reasonable skill and diligence in the execution of their trust.¹ Therefore, where commissioners, appointed to pave certain streets, under an act of Parliament, grossly exceeded their powers, by raising the street in front of the plaintiff's house, so as to obstruct the passages to the house, as well as the lights thereof; it was held, that they were liable to an action on the case for damages.² But, if there has been no misfeasance or negligence, and no excess of authority, by public agents, in the execution of their duty, then they will not be liable, although a party may have sustained damages, in consequence of their acts.³

§ 321. The rule, which we have been considering, that where persons are acting as public agents, they are responsible only for their own misfeasances and negligence, and (as we have seen⁴) not for the misfeasances and negligences of those who are employed under them, if they have employed persons of suitable skill and ability, and have not cooperated in or authorized the wrong, is not confined to public officers, or agents of the government, properly so called, in a strict legal sense; but it equally applies to other public officers or agents, engaged in the public service, or acting for public objects, whether their appointments emanate from particular public bodies, or are derived from general laws, and whether those objects are of a local or of a general nature. For, if the doctrine of *Respondet superior* were applied to such agencies, it would operate as a serious discouragement to persons who perform public functions, many of which are rendered gratuitously, and all of which are highly important to the public interest.⁵ In this respect, their case is

¹ Jones v. Bird, 5 Barn. & Ald. 837, 845.

² Leader v. Moxton, 3 Wils. R. 461, S. C. 2 Wm. Black. 924, Hall v. Smith, 2 Bing. R. 156. See also Governor and Company of Plate Manufacturers v. Meredith, 4 Term R. 794.

³ Governor and Company of Plate Manufacturers v. Meredith, 4 Term R. 794. See Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. R. 418.

⁴ Aste, § 319.

⁵ Hall v. Smith, 2 Bing. R. 156. [In the late case of Scott v. The Mayor of,

distinguishable from that of persons acting for their own benefit, or employing others for their own benefit.¹ But the party who

Manchester, 1 Hurl & Nor. 61, Pollock, C. B., said, "I do not mean to say that the decision in *Hall v. Smith* was not a correct one, but more was said than was necessary for the decision of the case." *Harris v. Baker*, 4 M. & Selw. 27, Bayley v. The Mayor of New York, 3 Hill, R. 531, Ante, §§ 319, 319 a. The judgment of the Court, in the case of *Hall v. Smith*, delivered by Lord Chief Justice Best, is very instructive, and states the ground of the distinction with great clearness and force. If commissioners under an act of Parliament," said he, "order something to be done which is not within the scope of their authority, or they are themselves guilty of negligence in doing that which they are empowered to do, they render themselves liable to an action, but they are not answerable for the misconduct of such as they are obliged to employ. If the doctrine of *Respondent superior* were applied to such commissioners, who would be hardy enough to undertake any of those various offices, by which much valuable yet unpaid service is rendered to the country? Our public roads are formed and kept in repair, our towns paved and lighted, our lands drained and protected from inundation, our internal navigation has been improved, ports have been made and are kept in order, and many other public works are conducted by commissioners who act spontaneously. Such commissioners will act no longer, if they are to make amends, from their own fortunes, for the conduct of such as must be employed under them. It would be much better that an individual, injured by the act of an agent should endure an injury unredressed, than that the zeal of the most useful members of the community should be checked, by subjecting them to a responsibility for agents from whose services they derive no benefit and who are seldom under the immediate control of their employers, whilst they are employed on the works they are ordered to do. The commissioners taking the advice of their surveyors and engineers, are to direct what tunnels, or other works, are to be made. Few commissioners know how such works should be executed: they ought not, therefore, to be answerable for an imperfect execution of them, nor can it be expected that they shall attend, day by day, to see that proper precautions are taken against accidents, or get up in the night to see that lights are burned, to warn passengers of the danger from temporary obstructions in the roads. If, by taking their office of commissioners, they have not undertaken the performance of these duties, with what justice can they be charged with the consequences of the neglect of them? The maxim of *Respondent superior* is bottomed on this principle, that he who expects to derive advantage from an act, which is done by another for him, must answer for any injury which a third person may sustain from it. This maxim was first applied to public officers by the statute of Westminster 2, c. 11, from the words of which statute it is taken: 'Si custos quicunque non habeat, per quod justicietur, vel unde solvatur, Respondent superior suus qui custodiam hujusmodi gaolae sibi commisit.' The terms of the statute of Westminster the second, embrace only those who delegate the keeping of gaols to deputies, and were intended only, as Lord Coke

¹ *Hall v. Smith*, 2 Bing. R. 156, *Harris v. Baker*, 4 M. & Selw. 27.

suffers the injury under such circumstances, is not without redress; for he may maintain a suit against the immediate wrong-

tells us, to apply 'to those who, having the custody of gaoi of freehold or inheritance, commit the same to another, that is not sufficient' The principle of the statute has, however, since been extended to sheriffs, who are responsible for their under-sheriffs and bailiffs, but has not been applied to any other public officer. Although the office of sheriffs be now a burdensome one, yet they are entitled to poundage, and other fees, for acts done by their officers, which in old time, might be a just equivalent for their responsibility. In *Bowcher v. Noidstorm, Lawrence, J.*, mentions the case of the captain of the Russell, man-of-war, who was held answerable for the act of one of the lieutenants, who had the command of the watch, in running down an Indian in, whilst the captain was asleep in his cabin. When or by whom that case was decided I do not know, but it is supported by no other decision, that I am aware of, and its authority is shaken by the judgment of the case in which it is cited. The actions in the cases of *Leader v. Moxon, Jones & Bird*, and the *Plate-Glass Company v. Meredith*, were not brought against the commissioners, but against those who did the acts complained of. In the latter case I adverted to that circumstance, as distinguishing it from *Sutton v. Clarke*. If the counsel, who advised the bringing those actions, had thought they could have been maintained against the commissioners, who gave the orders for the works, that occasioned the injuries of the plaintiffs, the commissioners would have been included. *Schmott v. Hamstead* is distinguishable from this case. There, the negligence was brought home to the commissioners of the lottery, who were the defendants, and they were compensated for their services, and were bound to pay due attention to their duty. The commissioners had authority to make the trench, which occasioned the damage to the plaintiff. The *Plate-Glass Company v. Meredith*, already referred to, shows that no action could be maintained against them for what they are authorized to do, although an individual sustain an injury from what has been done. The passage into the plaintiff's premises, in that case, was rendered impassable with carts, by the raising of pavement, by the order of the commissioners. Lord Kenyon says: 'If this action could be maintained, every turnpike act, paving act, and navigation act, would give rise to an infinity of actions. The parties are without remedy, provided the commissioners do not exceed their jurisdiction.' In *Sutton v. Clarke*, the defendant, as a trustee under a turnpike act, who was duly authorized to make a drain, had ordered such drain to be cut in an improper manner; he had, however, given this order after having taken the best advice that could be obtained. Lord Chief Justice Gibbs considered that circumstance as distinguishing the case from that of the *British Plate-Glass Company*, where what was done could not be done in any other manner than that in which it was done. But still his lordship and the rest of the Court held, that as the defendant acted according to the best of his judgment, and with the best advice, he was not answerable for the injury; and he added: 'This case is perfectly unlike that of an individual who makes an improvement in his own land, from which an injury accrues to another; such person must answer for the injury, because he was acting

doer.¹ Upon this ground it has been held, that the trustees of a public turnpike are not liable for the misfeasances or negligences of sub-agents employed by them in the performance of their duty, unless they have directed the act to be done, or have personally coöperated in the negligence.²

for his own benefit.' In *Harris and Cross v. Baker*, the clerk to commissioners for making a road, under an act which contained a clause directing actions to be brought against such clerk for acts done by the trustees, was holden not to be liable to an action for an injury sustained, in consequence of heaps of dirt being left by the side of the road, and no lights being placed to enable persons to avoid such heaps. In this case there was, as in that now before us, great negligence in those employed by the trustees. From these cases I collect, that the law recognizes the principles, which, I venture to state, were founded in sound policy and justice, and that no action can be maintained against a man acting gratuitously for the public, for the consequences of any act which he was authorized to do, and which, so far as he is concerned, is done with due care and attention, and that such a person is not answerable for the negligent execution of an order properly given" Ante, §§ 319, 319 a

¹ Ibid; *Jones v. Bird*, 5 Barn. & Ald 837; *Nicholson v. Mounsey*, 15 East, R. 384; Ante, §§ 313, 319 b

² *Duncan v. Findlater*, 6 Clark & Finell. 903, 910. In this case, the question came from Scotland, and it was held by the House of Lords, that the English law and Scottish law, upon this subject were precisely the same. Lord Cottingham on that occasion reviewed the decisions of both countries, and said: "It is important to preserve the law of Scotland, where it really differs from that of England; but, where that is not so, and no principle of conflicting law is involved, it is a reproach to any system of law, that there should be, in matters of the same kind, and on subjects of the same legislation, a different rule of construction applied in one part of the kingdom and in another. In looking into the authorities in this case, I have in vain sought for a rule of Scotch law peculiar to that country; and in the English law, I find that the principle, on which the liability of employers is founded, was fully recognized in the time of Lord Holt, in *Lane v. Cotton*, and applied in *Bush v. Steinman*, where it was pushed to its fullest extent.* Indeed, there is one Scotch case, that of *Linwood v. Van Hathom*, which is much more restrictive, in respect to the liability of trustees, than some of the English cases, and, certainly, more so, than the case I have just mentioned. But it is supposed, that the regulations of the law are not the same in both countries, upon this point. When trusts are created, it is plain, that, for the public benefit, the courts should have a common principle of dealing with them, on which might be engrafted such special rules as it seemed advisable to adopt, on account of the particular circumstances of one or other of the two countries. In England, we have long held, that trustees of a turnpike-road are not liable in cases of this sort; *Baker v. Harris*, *Humphries v. Meares*, and *Hall v. Smith*. In all these cases it was distinctly held, that such trustees are not answerable but for their own personal default. There is another class of cases, in which it has been decided, that trustees, exceeding the

§ 322. The same doctrine has been applied to public officers, acting in the army or navy, who are held responsible for their own acts and negligences, but are not held responsible for the misfeasances and negligences of the subordinate officers under them, who, indeed, are not ordinarily appointed by them, but are appointed by the government itself. Thus, it has been held, that the captain of a public sloop of war is not answerable for any damage done by her running down another vessel, the mischief appearing to have been done during the watch of the lieutenant, who was upon deck, and who had the actual direction and man-

authority given them, may be personally liable, but keeping within it they are not answerable. In this instance, there is no pretence for setting up personal liability. In some cases, it is true, a person injured may be without a remedy, but the fact, that he may be so, will not alter the principle of law, which was left him in that situation. The *British Plate-Glass Company v. Meredith and Boulton v. Crowther*, the former decided in 1792, are cases, that may be referred to, as showing, that, where trustees or commissioners are appointed under a public act, they are not responsible for the consequences of an act done within the scope of their authority. In both these cases, if the plaintiff had obtained a judgment it would have been against a public body as such, and it was not therefore necessary to consider the question of the personal liability of the trustees. In *Hull v. Smith*, Lord Wynford said "If commissioners, under an act of Parliament order something to be done, which is not within the scope of their authority or are themselves guilty of negligence in doing that, which they are empowered to do, they render themselves liable to an action, but they are not answerable for such as they are obliged to employ." The true distinction is here taken, and the law, thus laid down, has ever since been recognized in England. Lord Brougham, on the same occasion, added "That there was no such decision previous to 1820, is admitted, that all the cases, which have been decided, have been upon the terms of particular turnpike trusts, is not denied, that, therefore, no general rule has been laid down by the Scotch courts, may be taken as admitted, but it may be, that some case has been decided, extending the liability of persons for the acts of their agents, beyond the limit assigned to it by the law of England. But such is not the fact; on the contrary, it is found, that the liability of the principal is more restricted there than here. Such a case as that of *Bush v. Steinhilber*, which was satisfactorily decided here, if it had happened in Scotland, would not have been so decided there, for the reason I have just mentioned. The rule of liability, and its reason, I take to be this, I am liable for what is done for me and under my orders, by the man I employ, for I may turn him off from that employ, when I please; and the reason that I am liable is this, that, by employing him, I set the whole thing in motion; and what he does, being done for my benefit and under my direction, I am responsible for the consequences of doing it." Ante, § 320.

agement of the steering and navigating of the sloop at the time, when the captain was not upon deck, nor was called there by his duty.¹

¹ *Nicholson v. Mounsey*, 15 East, 384. On this occasion, Lord Ellenborough said: "This is a case very important in its consequences, and, if I thought it as doubtful in principle as it is important, I should wish for further consideration before I delivered my opinion. But I cannot entertain any doubt upon it. Captain Mounsey is said to be liable for the damages awarded in this case, by considering him in the ordinary character of the master of the vessel, by means of which the injury was done to the plaintiff's property. But how was he master? He had no power of appointing the officers or crew on board; he had no power to appoint even himself to the station, which he filled on board; he was no volunteer in that particular station, merely by having entered originally into the naval service; but was compellable to take it, when appointed to it, and had no choice, whether or not he would serve with the other persons on board, but was obliged to take such as he found there, and make the best of them. He had no power, either of appointment or dismissal, over them. The case, therefore, is not at all like that of an owner or master, who, according to the principle laid down by Lord Chief Justice Eyre, in *Bush v. Steinman*, is answerable for those, whom he employs, for injuries done by them to others, within the scope of their employment. The principle, perhaps, cannot be impugned, though that was a hard application of it. It does not, however, apply to this case. Here Captain Mounsey was a servant of His Majesty, stationed on board this ship to do his duty there, together with others equally appointed and stationed there by the same authority, to do their several duties. They had each their several duties to perform, only they were to be performed on board the same ship. In the case of *Lane v. Cotton*, now established as law, Lord Holt only differed from the other judges upon the point, whether in truth the clerk in the post-office, to whom the misconduct was, in fact attributable, was the servant of the postmaster, or not. The facts of that case were, indeed, very different from the present; but, even with the power of appointment of such clerks, the postmasters were held not to be liable for their default. Then with respect to the case of *Webb and others v. Drake*, which at first was supposed to have been an authority in support of this action; if, as it is now stated, the captain had originally given the order to proceed in the course, the ship was holding, when the damage was done, there, there might have been some color (I do not mean to say that there was any) for making him liable, as for his personal act. But here, there was no personal interference of the captain with the act of the lieutenant, by which the damage was occasioned; both, indeed, were servants of one common master; but there was no consent by the one to the act of the other, unless that can be inferred from the community of their services. This disposes of the rule, as it affects the case of Captain Mounsey; and it does not touch the case of the other defendant."

CHAPTER XIII.

RIGHTS OF AGENTS IN REGARD TO THEIR PRINCIPALS.

§ 323. HAVING thus considered the duties and obligations of agents to their principals; and their liabilities to their principals, and to third persons, as well in cases of contracts, as in cases of torts, we are next led to the consideration of the rights of agents in respect to their principals, which will, of course, include a review of the duties, obligations, and liabilities of the latter to the former.

§ 324. In the first place then, as to the compensation of agents. Ordinarily, an agent, performing services for his principal, is entitled to a compensation therefor, unless he is a mere gratuitous agent or mandatary, or unless the nature of the service, or the understanding between the parties, repel such a claim. In respect to gratuitous agents or mandataries, the consideration of their rights properly belongs to a treatise on Bailments, and need not be touched in this place.¹ In respect to agents or attorneys in fact, merely to sign a deed, or to do some other single ministerial act for another, it is not usual either to pay, or to stipulate for pay, for the execution of such fugitive acts. They are, ordinarily, treated as acts of friendship or benevolence, and are performed from a mere sense of duty, or from personal regard, and are wholly of a gratuitous nature.

• § 325. Cases may also exist, where services are not intended to be wholly gratuitous, but are to be compensated for; and yet, where the agent has, strictly speaking, no legal claim, as he has stipulated to leave the amount of the compensation altogether to the good-will, and generosity, and sense of duty of his employers. Thus, for example, where an agent performed work for a committee under a resolution entered into by them, "That any service, to be rendered by him, shall be taken into consid-

¹ See Story on Bailm. 153, 154, 196-201.

eration, and such remuneration be made, as shall be deemed right;" it was held, that no action would lie to recover recompense for services performed under the resolution, because the committee were to judge, whether any compensation was due, and ought to be paid, or not. In such a case, the agent is presumed to intend to throw himself entirely upon the mercy and generosity of his employers, and to insist upon no claim as a matter of right.¹ Agreements of this sort are said to happen not unfrequently in contracts with particular departments of the government. However, in cases of this sort, if it is not perfectly clear, that the agent contracts with this understanding; but his contract is, that he shall receive some reasonable remuneration for his services, the amount only to be fixed by his employers; he may then maintain a suit for a reasonable remuneration, if none is fixed by his employers, or none, which in a just sense, is considered as reasonable.²

§ 326. In the ordinary course of commercial agencies, a compensation is always understood to belong to the agent, in consideration of the duties and responsibilities which he assumes, and the labor and services which he performs. This compensation is commonly called a commission; and it is usually the allowance of a certain per centage upon the actual amount, or the value of the business done; as for example, upon the value of the goods bought or sold in the course of the agency.³ The amount of the commissions allowed to auctioneers, and brokers, and factors, and other regular agents, is generally regulated by the usage of trade at the particular place, or in the particular business, in which the agent is employed.⁴ Where there is no usage of trade, a reasonable compensation, to be ascertained by the Court, or jury, as the case may happen to arise at law or in equity, is allowed to the agent. But, in

¹ *Taylor v. Brewer*, 1 M. & Selw. 290.

² *United States v. M'Daniel*, 7 Peters, R. 1; *United States v. Ripley*, 7 Peters, R. 18; *United States v. Fillebrown*, 7 Peters, R. 28.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 106, 101, 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 221, 222.

⁴ *Eicke v. Meyer*, 3 Camp. R. 412; *Cohen v. Paget*, 4 Camp. R. 96; *Roberts v. Jackson*, 2 Starkie, R. 275; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 221, 222; *Smith on Merc. Law*, pp. 54, 55, (2d edit.); *Id.* pp. 100, 101, (3d edit. 1843); *Chapman v. De Tastet*, 2 Starkie, R. 294.

every case, the allowance will be governed by the positive agreement of the parties, whenever such an agreement exists; for where there is an express agreement, it follows, of course, that the implied compensation, from the usage of trade, or the presumed intention of the parties, wholly fails.¹ *Expressum facit cessare tacitum.*

§ 327. The civil law adopted principles of a like nature. In cases of mandates, the services were treated, ordinarily, as gratuitous. If a particular salary or compensation was stipulated for or fixed, the contract fell under a different denomination, — the contract of hire, or *Locatio-conductio*, and the salary or compensation was to be regularly paid.² *De salario autem, quod promisit, apud Præsidentem Provinciæ cognitio, præbebitur.*³ But if there was no certainty in the promise, so that it was treated as a vague and indeterminate pollicitation or promise, no compensation was allowed. *Salarium incertæ pollicitationis peti non potest.*⁴ Or, as Papinian expressed it: *Salarium incertæ pollicitationis neque extra ordinem recte petitur, neque iudicio mandati, ut salarium tibi constituat.*⁵ If no particular sum was agreed on, but a compensation was to be paid, then a reasonable compensation was to be allowed and decreed by the proper tribunal. This reasonable compensation was to be proportionable to the nature and quantity of the particular commerce, business, or affair to be transacted, to the quality of the agent, to the time employed about it, and to the pains taken by the agent. *De proxenetico, quod et sordidum, solent, Præsides cognoscere. Sic tamen, ut in his modis esse debeat, et quantitatis, et negotii, in quo operula ista defuncti sunt, et ministerium quale accommodaverunt.*⁶ Indeed, a similar doctrine must prevail in all countries, which profess to be governed by the rules of enlightened reason and natural justice.⁷

¹ *Bower v. Jones*, 8 Bing. 65; *Miller v. Livingston*, 1 Caines, R. 349; *Robinson v. New York Insur. Co.* 2 Caines, R. 357. See *Stevenson v. Maxwell*, 2 Sandf. Ch. R. 274.

² 1 Bell, Comm. p. 481, (5th edit.)

³ Cod. Lib. 4, tit. 35, l. 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 74.

⁴ Cod. Lib. 4, tit. 35, l. 17; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 74.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 56, § 3; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 74.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 14, l. 8; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 17, § 2, art. 2.

⁷ See 1 Bell, Comm. p. 386, § 409, (4th edit.); Id. § 411; Id. pp. 481, 482, (5th edit.)

§ 328. Besides the ordinary commissions, in some classes of agency, such as cases of factors for the sale of goods, extraordinary commissions are sometimes allowed, either by the usage of trade, or by the positive agreement of the parties. Of this character is what is commonly called a commission *del credere*, which is an extra compensation paid to a factor, in consideration of his undertaking to be responsible for the solvency and punctual payment of the debt, by the parties to whom the goods of his principal have been sold.¹ The nature and extent of the obligation, thus created between the principal and factor, have been already, in some measure, discussed and considered.²

§ 329. The general rule of law, as to commissions, undoubtedly is, that the whole service or duty must be performed, before the right to any commissions attaches, either ordinary or extraordinary; for an agent must complete the thing required of him, before he is entitled to charge for it.³ But cases may occur, in which an agent may be entitled to a remuneration for his services, in proportion to what he has done, although he has not done the whole service or duty originally required. This may arise, either from the known usage of the particular business, or from the entire performance being prevented by the act or neglect of the principal himself;⁴ or from the interven-

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 40, 41, 100, 101.

² Ante, §§ 33, 112, 215; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 41, 42, 111, note; 1 Bell, Comm. p. 387, § 411, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 481, 482, (5th edit.); Smith on Merc. Law, B. 1, ch. 5, § 2, p. 98; Id. § 3, pp. 100, 101, (3d edit. 1843.)

³ Post, § 331; McGavock v. Woodlief, 20 How. U. S. R. 221; Hammond v. Holiday, 1 Carr. & Payne, 384; Broad v. Thomas, 7 Bing. R. 99; Simpson v. Lamb, 33 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 229; 17 Com. B. R. 603; Dalton v. Irvin, 4 Carr. & Payne, 289; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 105, 106.

⁴ Thus, where an agent, employed to sell land at a given price, at a commission of one and one half per cent., found a purchaser at the stipulated price, but the principal declined to sell and rescinded the agent's authority, the latter was held entitled to recover a reasonable compensation in an action for his work and labor, the proper amount of which would seem to be the entire commission agreed upon, inasmuch as the agent had done all he was bound to do, to earn the commission. Prickett v. Budger, 1 J. Scott, (N. S.) 296. See DeBernardy v. Harding, 8 Exch. 822. So, where an agent was to have a commission for all "goods bought" of his principal through the agent's aid, and the latter procured an order for goods which the principal accepted, but was afterwards unable to fill, the agent was held entitled to his full commission, although the goods were never delivered to the buyer. Lockwood v. Levick, 8 J. Scott, (N. S.) 603.]

tion of an overwhelming calamity, or irresistible force, which has rendered it impossible.¹ The same principle would probably be applied to the case of a person, who, during the time of his agency, and before it was completed, should become, by the death of his principal, his executor or administrator; in which case, by operation of law, his right to receive commissions for future acts would be merged in his new character of personal representative.²

§ 330. The right, however, of an agent to receive commissions, either ordinary or extraordinary, is subject to several exceptions, founded, either in the policy of the law, or in the nature of the contract. In the first place, an agent can never recover commissions for his services in any illegal transactions, whether they are positively prohibited by law, or by morals, or public policy.³ Thus, for example, an agent employed to sell for another a public employment, such as an office in the customs, cannot support an action for any compensation for his services; for the transaction is against public policy.⁴ So, an agent employed to assist in smuggling, and selling the smuggled goods, cannot support an action for any compensation.⁵ So, an agent employed to buy or sell the stock of an illegal association, cannot recover any compensation therefor.⁶ So, an agent employed to charter a ship for an illegal voyage, or to assist in carrying on an illegal voyage, cannot recover any compensation therefor.⁷ So, an agreement to allow poundage to an agent upon the

¹ See *Diamond v. Holiday*, 1 Carr. & Payne, 381; *Broad v. Thomas*, 7 Bing. R. 99; *Reed v. Raun*, 14 Barn. & Cressw. 439.

² *Hovey v. Blakeman*, 1 Ves. 596, *Sherrill v. Aye*, 4 Russ. R. 33

³ Post, § 344.

⁴ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 502; *Stackpole v. Earl*, 2 Wils. R. 133; *Waldo v. Martin*, 4 Barn. & Cressw. 319; 6 Dowl. & Ry. 364; *Parsons v. Thompson*, 1 H. Black. 322; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 222, 223, 2 Liverm. on Agency, 8-10, (edit. 1818); *Smith on Merc. Law*, 54, 55, (2d edit.); *Id. B.*, 1, ch. 5, § 2, p. 91; *Id.* § 3, pp. 100, 191, (3d edit. 1843), *Josephs v. Pebre*, 3 Barn. & Cressw. 689; *Ante*, §§ 195, 196; 1 Liverm. on Agency ch. 1, § 2, p. 14-21, (edit. 1818.)

⁵ *Story on Conflict of Laws*, § 244-256; *Armstrong v. Toler*, 11 Wheat. R. 261, 262.

⁶ *Josephs v. Pebre*, 3 Barn. & Cressw. 639.

⁷ See *Haines v. Busk*, 5 Taunt. R. 521.

amount of the bills of all customers, recommended by him, will be held void, as a fraud upon the customers.¹

§ 331. In the next place, the agent is entitled to his commissions only upon a due and faithful performance of all the duties of his agency in regard to his principal.² For it is a necessary element in all such cases, that, as the commissions are allowed for particular services to the principal, it is a condition precedent to the title of the commissions, that the contemplated services should be fully and faithfully performed.³ If, therefore, the agent does not perform his appropriate duties, or if he is guilty of gross negligence, or gross misconduct, or gross unskilfulness, in the business of his agency, he will not only become liable to his principal for any damages, which he may sustain thereby, but he will also forfeit all his commissions.⁴ Slight negligence, or slight omissions of duty, will not, indeed, ordinarily be visited with such serious consequences; although if any loss has occurred thereby to the principal, it will be followed by a proportionate diminution of the commissions.⁵

§ 332. Thus, for example, it is ordinarily the duty of agents to keep regular accounts and vouchers of the business in the course of their agency; and if this duty is not faithfully performed, the omission will always be construed unfavorably to the rights of the agent, and care will be taken, that the principal shall not suffer thereby.⁶ Indeed, cases may occur of such gross neglect

¹ *Wyburd v. Staunton*, 4 Esp. R. 179.

² *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 104; *Sea v. Carpenter*, 16 Ohio R. 412; *Ante*, § 392.

³ *Ante*, § 329.

⁴ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 104, 105; *White v. Chapman*, 1 Starkie, R. 118; *Denew v. Daverell*, 3 Camp. R. 451; *Hamond v. Holiday*, 1 Carr. & Payne, 384; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 222, 223; *Hill v. Featherstonehaugh*, 7 Bing. R. 569; *Shaw v. Arden*, 9 Bing. R. 287; *Dodge v. Tileston*, 12 Pick. R. 328, 332-334; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 54, 55, (2d edit.); *Id.* B. 1, ch. 5, § 8, p. 100-103, (3d edit. 1843); *Callandar v. Oelrichs*, 5 Bing. (N. C.) R. 58. In this last case, damages were recovered against an agent to insure for not giving notice to his principal of his failure to procure insurance, the Court holding it to be an implied part of his duty.

⁵ *Id.*; 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 9, § 1, p. 4-6, (edit. 1818.)

⁶ *Ante*, § 208-204; 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, ch. 9, § (1), p. 4, (edit. 1818); *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 47, 48, 104; *Beaumont v. Boulbee*, 11 Ves. 358; *Lord Chedworth v. Edwards*, 8 Ves. 48; *Lupton v. White*, 15 Ves. 439-443;

and misconduct of agents, in this respect, as to amount to a complete forfeiture of all compensation, which would otherwise belong to the agency.¹ [But where an agent was employed under a written contract to perform, for a fixed quarterly salary, all the duties of a general agent of a manufacturing corporation, one of which was to render a monthly account of the funds in his hands, it was held that a failure to render such accounts would not bar his right to recover his salary for the time he actually remained their agent; although it might have justified his dismissal, or made him liable in damages.²]

§ 333. So, if an agent should grossly misconduct himself in other respects, in the course of his agency; as if he should violate his instructions; or if he should act injuriously to his principal without any authority; or if he should wilfully confound his own property with that of his principal; in these, and the like cases, he might forfeit his whole title to compensation, if the circumstances were aggravated; or, at all events, he would be made to bear all the losses sustained by such misconduct.³ He would also be held to account to his principal; and every doubtful circumstance would be construed unfavorably to his rights and interests.⁴

Massey v. Banner, 4 Madd. R. 413; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 51, 55, (2d edit.); *Id.* B. 1. ch. 5, § 3, pp. 100, 101, (3d edit. 1843); *Clarke v. Moody*, 17 Mass. R. 145. On this ground it is, that if an agent whose duty it is to keep accounts, neglects it, and thereby his own property becomes so mixed up with that of his principal, that the one is not clearly distinguishable from the other, a court of equity will restrain him from disposing of stock standing in his own name, which may have been purchased with the money of his principal, until he clearly shows on oath, how much of it was, or might have been, bought with his own money, and how much with that of his principal. *Ante*, § 179, note, § 205; *Lord Chedworth v. Edwards*, 8 Ves. 48; *Panton v. Panton*, cited 15 Ves. R. 440; *Morgan v. Lewis*, 4 Dow, R. 52; *Hart v. Ten Eyck*, 2 Johns. Ch. R. 108.

¹ 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 468; *White v. Lady Lincoln*, 8 Ves. 371; *Lupton v. White*, 15 Ves. 439-443; *Morgan v. Lewes*, 4 Dow, R. 52; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 104.

² *Sampson v. Somerset Iron Works*, 6 Gray, 120.

³ See *Jones v. Hoyt*, 25 Conn. 386.

⁴ 1 Story on Equity Jurisp. § 468; *White v. Lady Lincoln*, 8 Ves. 363; *Lupton v. White*, 15 Ves. 439-442; *Chedworth v. Edwards*, 8 Ves. 46; *Ante*, § 205; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 47, 48; *Id.* 104, 105; *Denew v. Daverell*, 3 Camp. R. 451; *White v. Chapman*, 1 Stark. R. 113; *Hamond v. Holiday*, 1 Carr. &

§ 334. *A fortiori*, an agent will forfeit his commission, if he engages in any transaction, which amounts to a fraud upon his principal; such as betraying his trust, by acting adversely to his interests;¹ or by embarking his property in illegal transactions; or by being guilty of barratry; or by fraudulently misapplying his funds.² And, if the agent has stipulated to give his whole time and services to his principal, he will not be permitted to derive any commissions, or other compensation, for services in another employment during the same period.³ Indeed, the commissions or other compensation, earned by services in another employment, under such circumstances, would, in equity at least, seem properly to belong to the principal.⁴

§ 334 *a*. It is upon the same general ground that it is held, that the master of a ship is an agent bound to give all his time and attention to his principal. It is his duty, when the ship is employed on a trading adventure, to act for the common benefit of the owners; and when the ship is freighted, or chartered, to obtain freight upon the best terms he can for the owners, free from all bias of separate interest in himself, or of leave given to himself by the charterers to trade for himself; and it has been thought difficult to support a custom which, if legal, would entitle him to trade for himself, when it is his duty to trade to the best of his ability for the joint interest of himself and the other owners, and would give him a discretionary power to place his own interest in competition with the joint interests.⁵

§ 335. Another right of agents is, to be reimbursed all their advances, expenses, and disbursements, made in the course of their agency, on account of, or for the benefit of, their principal.⁶

Payne, 384; Hurst v. Holding, 3 Taunt. R. 32; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 222; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 4, 6, 7, (edit. 1818.) But see Templer v. McLachlan, 5 Bds. & Pull. 136; Dodge v. Tileston, 12 Pick. R. 328; Woodward v. Suydam, 11 Ohio (Stanton) Rep. 362; Clarke v. Tipping, 9 Beavan, R. 284.

¹ Hurst v. Holding, 3 Taunt. R. 32; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 105; Brown v. Croft, 6 Carr. & Payne, R. 16, n.

² See 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 222, note (1); Id. 223.

³ Thompson v. Havelock, 1 Camp. R. 527; Gardner v. McCutcheon, 4 Beav. R. 535.

⁴ Ibid.; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 105, 106.

⁵ Gardner v. McCutcheon, 4 Beavan, 535, 542.

⁶ 2 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 9, § 2, p. 11-23, (edit. 1818); Story on Bailm. §§ 196, 197.

This is naturally, nay necessarily, implied from the very character of every agency, to which such advances, expenses, and disbursements are incident, whenever they fall within the appropriate duty of the agent. Hence, all the incidental charges and expenses incurred for warehouse-room, duties, freight, lighterage, general average, salvage, repairs, journeys, and other acts done to preserve the property of the principal, and to enable the agent to accomplish the objects of the principal, are to be fully paid by the latter.¹ So, if an agent has, at the express or the implied request of his principal, necessarily incurred expenses in carrying on or defending suits for the benefit of his principal, those expenses must be borne by the latter, and the agent will be entitled to recover them from him.²

§ 336. But this liability of the principal proceeds upon the ground, that the advances, expenses, and disbursements have been properly incurred, and reasonably and in good faith paid, without any default on the part of the agent.³ Under such circumstances, it will constitute no objection to the claim, that the advances, expenses, or disbursements have not been attended with all the benefits to the principals, which were expected or intended by the agent; for, his acts being in good faith, in the exercise of a sound judgment, and according to the ordinary course of business, the agent ought not, in justice, to be made responsible for any ultimate failure of success, in the agency.⁴ Cases may, indeed, occur, of such peculiar exigency, as will justify an agent in making advances or incurring expenses, beyond what ordinarily appertain to the regular course of business, for which, nevertheless, the principal will be bound to make him a

¹ Story on Bailm. §§ 196, 197, 357, 358; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 107, 108, 110-113, 124; Smith on Merc. Law, 55, (2d edit.); *Id.* B. 1, ch. 5, § 3, p. 100-103 (3d edit. 1843); ² Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 222, 223; ² Liverm. on Agency, p. 11-22, (edit. 1818); *Ramsey v. Gardner*, 11 Johns. R. 439.

³ *Hays v. Martin*, 1 Esp. R. 162; *Delaware Ins. Co. v. Delannie*, 3 Binn. R. 295; *Spurrier v. Elderton*, 5 Esp. R. 1; ² Liverm. on Agency, 13-16, (edit. 1818); *Curtis v. Barclay*, 5 Barn. & Cressw. 141.

⁴ ² Liverm. on Agency, 14-16, (edit. 1818); *Capp v. Topham*, 6 East, R. 392; Smith on Merc. Law, 56, (2d edit.) p. 100-103, (3d edit. 1843); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 109, 110; *Vandyke v. Brown*, 4 Halst. Ch. R. 655.

¹ Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 2, art. 2; *Ersk. Inst. B. 2, tit. 3, § 38*; Pothier, *Traité de Mandat*, notes 68, 75, 78, 79; ² Liverm. on Agency, 33, (edit. 1818.)

full reimbursement.¹ And, *a fortiori*, this rule will apply, where the agent is clothed with a discretionary authority.² However, if the agent has voluntarily, and officiously, and without any authority, made advances, or payments,³ or has incurred unreasonable, useless, or superfluous expenses, the principal will not be bound to any reimbursement thereof; for it will be imputed to the fault, or negligence, or unskilfulness of the agent.⁴

§ 337. This doctrine, so consonant to reason and justice, is also recognized in the civil law. *Si mihi mandaveris, ut rem tibi aliquam emam, egoque emero meo pretio, habeo mandati actionem de pretio recuperando. Sed et si tuo pretio, impendero tamen aliquid bonâ fide ad emptionem rei, crit contraria mandati actio, aut si rem emptam nolis recipere. Simili modo, et si quod aliud mandaveris, et in id sumptum fecero.*⁵ *Impendia, mandati exsequendi gratiâ facta, si bonâ fide facta sunt, restitui omnimodo debent; nec ad rem pertinet, quod is, qui mandâset, potuisset, si ipse negotium gereret, minus impendere.*⁶ *Sumptus bonâ fide necessario factos, etsi negoti finem adlubre procurator non potuit, iudicio mandati restitui necesse est.*⁷ *Si tamen nihil culpâ tuâ factum est, sumptus, quos in litem probabili ratione feceras, contrariâ mandati actione petere potest.*⁸ *Si quid procurator citra mandatum in voluptatem*

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 109, 109, Wolff v Horncastle, 1 Bos. & Pull 323; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf 222, 223; Smyth on Merc. Law, 55, (2d edit.), Id. B. 1, ch 1, § 3, p 100-103, (3d edit. 1843)

² Wolff v Horncastle, 1 Bos. & Pull 323.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 110, 111, and notes 1, 13; Child v. Morley, 8 T. R. 610, Grove v Dubois, 1 T. R. 112; Wilson v. Creighton, cited 1 Term R. 113; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf 222

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 109, 114, note; Id. 115, 116; Edmiston v. Wright, 1 Campb. R. 88, Howard v. Tucker, 1 Barn. & Adolph. R. 712; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 222, 223; Pothier, Traité de Mandat. notes 75, 76, 78; Beaumont v Boulbee, 11 Ves. R. 358.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 17, tit 1, l 12, § 9; Pothier, Pand Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 53; Pothier, Traite de Mandat. n 69, 2 Liverm on Agency, 12, (edit. 1818.)

⁶ Dig. Lib 17, tit. 1, l 27, § 4; Pothier, Pand Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 67; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 1, art. 11, § 2, arts. 2, 3, Pothier, Traité de Mandat. n. 78.

⁷ Dig. Lib. 17, tit 1, l 56, § 4; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 68; Heinec. Elem. Pand. § 234, 1 Domat, B. 1, tit 15, § 2, art. 3; Pothier, Traité de Mandat. n. 79; 2 Liverm on Agency, 33, (edit. 1818).

⁸ Cod. Lib. 4, tit. 35, l. 4; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 68; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 2, art. 2; Pothier, Traité de Mandat. notes 75, 78, 79.

*fecit, permittendum ei auferre, quod sine damno domini fiat, nisi rationem sumptus istius dominus admittit.*¹ The same maxims are fully recognized in the jurisprudence of the modern commercial nations of continental Europe. Pothier lays it down as a general doctrine, that the mandant, or principal, is, by the contract of mandate, bound to indemnify the mandatary, or agent, for all his disbursements, and for all the liabilities he has incurred in the execution of his agency.² And the same doctrine is found approved by many other jurists.³

§ 338. Not only may the advances and disbursements of an agent, made out of his own funds, be claimed from the principal, when they properly flow from the matters of his agency, but he will also be entitled to interest upon such advances and disbursements, wherever, from the nature of the business, or the usage of trade, or the particular agreement of the parties, it may fairly be presumed to be stipulated for, or due to the agent.⁴ In this respect, the common law is in coincidence with the civil law. *Adversus eum cujus negotia gesta sunt, de pecunia, quam de propriis opibus, vel ab aliis, mutuo acceplam, erogasti, mandati actione pro sorte et usuris potes experiri.*⁵ *Nec tantum id, quod impendi, verum usuras quoque consequar. Usuras autem non tantum ex mora esse admittendas, verum judicem astimare debere si exegerit a debitore suo quis, et solvit, cum uberrimas usuras consequeretur (æquissimum enim erit rationem ejus rei, haberi); aut si ipse mutuatus gravibus usuris, solvit. Et, ut est constitutum, totum hoc ex æquo et bono Juxta arbitratitur.*⁶

§ 339. Upon similar grounds, if an agent has, without his own default, incurred losses or damages, in the course of transacting

¹ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 10, § 10; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 62; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 2, art. 2.

² Pothier, Traité de Mandat notes 68-75.

³ Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, §§ 34, 38; Heinecc. Elem. Juris Nat. et Gent. Lib. 1, cap. 13, § 349; 1 Turnb. Heinecc. Elem. of Law of Nat. and Nat. § 349; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 2, arts. 4, 6.

⁴ Meech v. Smith, 7 Wend. R. 315; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 17, (edit. 1815); Delaware Ins. Co. v. Delaunie, 3 Binn. 295; Trelawney v. Thomas, 1 H. Bl. 303; Bruce v. Hunter, 3 Campb. R. 467; Calton v. Biagg, 15 East, R. 223; Loiard v. Graves, 3 Caines, R. 226.

⁵ Cod. Lib. 4, tit. 35, l. 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 74.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 12, § 9; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, notes 53, 73.

the business of his agency, or in following the instructions of his principal, he will be entitled to full compensation therefor.¹ Thus, for example, if an agent, in consequence of a deception practised upon him by his principal, and in pursuance of orders, innocently makes a false representation of the quality of the goods of his principal, and he is compelled to pay damages to a purchaser on account thereof, he will be entitled to a full remuneration from the principal.² So an agent may recover of his principal damages sustained in defending a suit on the principal's behalf, if the agent was acting within the scope of his authority, and the loss arose from the fact of agency, and without any fault or laches on the agent's part.³ So, if an agent has innocently, and without any notice of an adverse title, converted the property of a third person, under the direction or authority of his principal, claiming it as owner, and a recovery is subsequently had against him therefor by such third person, he will be entitled to a reimbursement from his principal.⁴ Indeed, it may be stated, as a general principle of law, that an agent, who commits a trespass, or other wrong to the property of a third person, by the direction of his principal, if at the time he has no knowledge or suspicion, that it is such a trespass or wrong, but acts *bonâ fide*, will be entitled to a reimbursement and contribution from his principal for all the damages which he sustains thereby.⁵ For, although the general doctrine of the common law is, that there can be no reimbursement or contribution among wrongdoers, whether they are principals, or are agents; yet that doctrine is to be

¹ *Ramsay v Gardner*, 11 Johns R 439, *Powell v Trustees of Newburgh*, 19 Johns R 284, *D'Arcy v Lisle*, 5 Binn R 141, *Stocking v. Sage*, 1 Day, Conn. R 522, *Hill v Pickard*, 5 Wend R 375, *Rogers v Knoeland*, 10 Wend R 219, *Lilhot v Wilker*, 1 Rawle, 126, *Green v Goddard*, 9 Met. 212, a very important case on this subject.

² *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 152, 301, *Southern v. How*, *Bridgeman*, R. 126, 2 *Molloy de Jur Marit* B 3, ch 8, § 6, pp 329, 330, *Cro Jac* 468.

³ *Finlione v Tagliaferro*, 34 Eng Law & Eq R 27, 10 E. F. Moore, P. C. 175.

⁴ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 152, 301, *Adamson v. Jarvis*, 4 Bing. R. 66; *Allaire v Ouland*, 2 Johns Cas 54, *Coventry v. Barton*, 17 Johns. R. 142; *Avery v. Halsey*, 14 Pick R 174.

⁵ *Adamson v Jarvis* 4 Bing R. 66, *Fletcher v Harcott*, *Hutton*, R. 55; *Powell v. Trustees of Newburgh*, 19 Johns R 284; *Avery v. Halsey*, 14 Pick. R 174; *Coventry v. Barton*, 17 Johns. R. 142.

received with the qualification, that the parties know, at the time, that it is a wrong.¹ And in all these cases, there is no difference, whether there be a promise of indemnity, or not; for the law will not enforce a contract of indemnity against a known and meditated wrong; and, on the other hand, where the agent acts innocently, and without notice of the wrong, the law will imply a promise on the part of the principal to indemnify him.² The same doctrine applies to all other cases of losses or damages, sustained by an agent in the course of the business of his agency, if they are incurred without any negligence or default on his own part.³

§ 340. Here, again, the common law only follows out the beneficent principles of the civil law; for, as, on the one hand, the agent is not permitted to reap any of the profits of his agency, properly belonging to his principal:⁴ so, on the other hand, he is held entitled to be indemnified against all losses, which have been innocently sustained by him upon the same account; but for no losses sustained by his own default or negligence. *Ex mandato apud eum, qui mandatum suscepit, nihil remanere oportet; sicuti, nec damnum pati debet.*⁵ *Hæc ita puto vera esse, si nulla culpa ipsius, qui mandatum vel depositum suscepit, intercedat.*⁶ The reason given is very satisfactory. *Multo tamen æquius esse, nemini officium suum, quod ejus,*

¹ *Merryweather v. Nixon*, 8 T. R. 186; *Adamson v. Jarvis*, 4 Bing. R. 66; *Jacobs v. Pollard*, 10 Cush. 287; *Pearson v. Skelton*, 1 M. & W. 501. The case of *Farebrother v. Ansley*, 10 Camp. R. 343, seems overturned in its leading principle by that of *Adamson v. Jarvis*, 4 Bing. R. 66; see also 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, 316-318, (edit. 1818); *Id.* 320, 324, 325; *Fletcher v. Hareott*, *Hutton*, R. 55; *S. C.* *Winch*, R. 48; *Humphrey v. Pratt*, 2 *Dow & Clark*, 288; *Betts v. Gibbins*, 2 *Adolph & Ellis*, 57; *D'Arcy v. Lisle*, 5 *Binn.* R. 441; *Powell v. Trustees of Newburgh*, 19 *Johns.* R. 284; *Coventry v. Barton*, 17 *Johns.* R. 113; *Avery v. Halsey*, 14 *Pick.* 174.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Paley on Agency*, by *Lloyd*, 109, 110, 115, 116; 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, 14, 16, (edit. 1818); 3 *Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* 222, 223; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 55, 56, (2d edit.); *Id.* p. 100-103, (3d edit. 1843); *Capp v. Topham*, 6 *East*, R. 392.

⁴ *Ante*, §§ 192, 207, 214.

⁵ *Dig. Lib.* 17, tit. 1, l. 20; *Pothier, Pand. Lib.* 17, tit. 1, n. 31; 1 *Domat*, B. 1, tit. 15, § 2, arts. 4, 6.

⁶ *Dig. Lib.* 47, tit. 2, l. 61, § 7; *Dig. Lib.* 17, tit. 1, l. 26, § 7; *Pothier, Pand. Lib.* 17, tit. 1, n. 10; *Pothier, Traité de Mandat* n. 75.

*cum quo contraxerit, non etiam sui commodi causâ suscepit, damnosum esse.*¹

§ 341. But it is not every loss or damage, for which the agent will be entitled to reimbursement from his principal. The latter is liable only for such losses and damages as are direct and immediate, and naturally flow from the execution of the agency. If, therefore, the losses or damage are casual, accidental, oblique, or remote, the principal is not liable therefor. In short, the agency must be the cause, and not merely the occasion of the losses or damages, to found a just right to reimbursement.² This, also, was the rule promulgated in the civil law. *Non omnia, quæ impensurus non fuit, mandatori imputabit; veluti, quod spoliatus sit a latronibus; aut naufragio res amiserit, vel languore suo siborumque apprehensus, quædam erogaverit. Nam hæc magis casibus, quam mandato, imputari oportet.*³ The modern jurists of Europe have fully recognized the same doctrine.⁴ Pothier, in broad language, lays it down, that all losses suffered by the agent, (the mandatary,) in the course or execution of his agency, and of which agency was the proximate cause, are to be reimbursed by his principal. But he adds, that we are carefully to distinguish, whether the execution of the agency has been the cause, or only the occasion of the loss; for, if it has been only the occasion, the principal is not bound to indemnity.⁵ [For to give the agent a right to remuneration from his principal, he must have at the time acted strictly in the place of the principal, in accordance with and representing his principal's will and not his own, and the business must be strictly that of the principal, and not in any respect that of the agent. Thus, in a recent case, C contracted with a town to remove a ledge of rock from the highway for a certain price and the stone; he then contracted with A to build a dam for him with said stone, to be paid by the day while he

¹ Dig. Lib. 47, tit. 2, § 5; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 60; Pothier, Traité de Mandat. n. 75; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 18, 19, (edit. 1818).

² 2 Liverm. on Agency, 18-23, (edit. 1818).

³ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 26, § 6; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 61; Pothier, Traité de Mandat. n. 76.

⁴ Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, §§ 34, 38; Pothier, Traité de Mandat. n. 75-78; Heinec. Elem. Juris. Nat. et Gent. Lib. 1, ch. 13, § 349, n.

⁵ Pothier, Traité de Mandat. n. 75, 76.

was getting out the stone and building the dam, A furnishing the powder for the blasting, but having no control over it. While C was getting out the stone, the building of L. was injured by a rock thrown upon it, for which C was compelled to pay damages. It was held he could not recover them of A.¹

§ 312. Attempts have been sometimes made to limit the rights of certain agents, such, for example, as factors, for advances upon goods of the principal in their possession, to a mere lien on the goods themselves, so as to exclude all personal recourse to, and responsibility of, the principal for such advances, if there happens to be a loss or failure of the fund, so that it becomes insufficient to repay the advances. Such a limited responsibility may, doubtless, arise, wherever there is an express agreement between the parties, to that effect, or a clear usage of trade, from which such an agreement may be inferred.² But, independently of such an agreement or usage, the general rule of law is, that advances by a factor are deemed to be made upon the joint credit of the principal and of the fund, including a lien on the latter, as well as a personal responsibility of the former, for the full amount. Where a factor receives a *del credere* commission upon the sale of goods, and he has made advances thereon of a less amount than the price for which they are sold, he must be deemed, by the very guaranty arising out of that commission, to waive any personal recourse to his principal for such advances. If the advances exceed the price, he must be deemed to waive any personal recourse to his principal, to the extent of the price, for which he sells the goods, and to rely solely upon the fund realized from the sale, for his reimbursement *pro tanto*. If, therefore, the advances made are less than the amount, for which the goods are sold, the law, in order to prevent a circuitry of action, founded upon the guaranty, will deem the whole advances paid or extinguished as to the principal, beyond what the factor may actually receive from the sales; and, if the advances are more than the amount of the sales, then the principal will be person-

¹ Corbin v. American Mills, 27 Conn. 274.

² Burrill v. Phillips, 1 Gallis. R. 360; Peisch v. Dickson, 1 Mason, R. 10; Corlies v. Cumming, 6 Cowen, R. 181.

³ Ibid.; Post, §§ 350, 385.

ally liable only for the excess, beyond that amount, and the residue will be deemed paid or extinguished as to the principal. A waiver of personal recourse to the principal may also be presumed from the subsequent conduct of the factor; as if he sells the goods upon credit, and then settles the account with the principal, deducting his commissions, before the credit has expired, and pays over the balance to the principal; for in such a case, the payment of the balance may fairly be treated as an assumption of the outstanding debt on the part of the factor.¹

§ 343. It has been said, that, if an agent abroad, as, for example, a foreign factor, should, at his own risk and peril, evade the payment of foreign customs and duties, he would still be entitled to charge them against his principal, as if they had been actually paid. But it may well be doubted, whether this doctrine is sound or maintainable.² For the factor, by his conduct, violated his own proper duty to his principal, if the act was unauthorized, since he thereby subjected the goods of the latter to the peril of confiscation and forfeiture; and certainly no man can be permitted to found a claim, in a court of justice, upon his own misconduct. Besides, the customs, or duties, not having been paid, there is no ground to assert that the principal ought to reimburse the agent for what he has not in fact paid, but what, contrary to his duty, he has omitted to pay. Indeed, it is difficult to

¹ *Oakley v. Crenshaw*, 4 Cowen, R. 250. See *Robertson v. Livingston*, 5 Cowen, R. 475; *Hapgood v. Batchellor*, 4 Met. 576; *Consequa v. Fanning*, 3 Johns. Ch. R. 600. See *Greely v. Bartlett*, 1 Greenl. R. 172.

² *Smith v. Oxenden*, 1 Ch. Cas. 25; 1 Eq. Abridg. 369; *Borr v. Vandall*, 1 Ch. Cas. 80; *S. C. Nelson*, Ch. R. 87; *Knipe v. Jesson*, 1 Ch. Cas. 76; *Francis's Maxims*, (edit. 1739,) Max. 4, Pl. 8, p. 24; 3 Salk. 235. This doctrine was disapproved of by Lord Keeper North, in an anonymous case in *Skinn.* R. 149, who said, that he was not satisfied with the case of *Vandervaldy v. Barry*, or *Boor v. Vandall*, 1 Ch. Cas. 30; for the factor ventured his master's goods, as well as his own life, by his smuggling. 13 *Viner*, Abridg. Factor, B. pl. 6, in marg. The remark was undoubtedly meant to repel the suggestion, made in the case of *Vandervaldy v. Barry*, that the factor had put his life in danger by the smuggling; by showing, that however that might be, the factor had no right to put the principal's goods also in peril by his fraudulent conduct. See *Paley on Agency*, by *Lloyd*, 107, 168, note (a). *Smith on Merc. Law*, p. 55, (2d edit.); *Id.* B. 1, ch. 5, § 3, p. 102, (3d edit. 1843.) Can commercial agents, who are bound to insure the property of their principals, charge commissions, if they omit this duty, as if it were done?

perceive how an agent can, in law or in morals, found any just claim against his principal, upon a fraud committed upon a foreign government.¹ On the other hand, if the principal, either expressly or impliedly, authorized the agent so to evade the payment of the customs or duties, the principal, and not the agent, ought to have the benefit thereof, unless there be some stipulation to the contrary between them.²

§ 344. In respect to agencies in illegal transactions, the same principles apply as to advances and disbursements by agents, as apply to their commissions.³ None are recoverable, either in law or equity.⁴ For the law will not (as we have already seen) assist any persons in evading the obligations imposed upon the whole community to conform to its directions and prohibitions.⁵ As between principals and agents, in all such cases, the guilt is deemed to be equal; and the maxim is, *In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis*; ⁶ or, as the Pandects state it, *In pari causâ possessor potior haberi debet*.⁷ The parties, therefore, must trust

¹ In 1 Eq. Abridg. 369, 370, (2d edit.), there is a very sensible note on this very point, which deserves to be transcribed, as importing a lofty morality, worthy of universal homage. After referring to the doctrine, that such an evasion of our own laws would be unjustifiable, the writer says: "And why not be deemed a fraud to cheat a foreign State of its customs?" Fraud is always the same, though an alliance in one case is more prejudicial than another. And surely a court of equity should not connive at anything so detrimental to good faith, commerce, and reciprocal assurance, as even smuggling into foreign ports. It is not proceeding on the great maxim, *Quod tibi non vis, alteri non feceris*, to make any distinction in this case in our favor." It is to be regretted that this doctrine has not been fully carried out and sustained in the commercial law. See Story on Conflict of Laws, § 245, *Planche v. Fletcher*, Doug. R. 250, *Boucher v. Lawson*, Cas. Temp. Hard. 84. See ante, § 195-197, Smith on Merc. Law, § 3, p. 50, (2d edit.); Id. p. 106-108, (3d edit. 1843), Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 107, n. (a); Molloy, de Jur. Marit. B. 3, ch. 8, §§ 6, 7.

² But see *Smith v. Oxenden*, 1 Ch. Cas. 25; 3 Salk. 235.

³ Ante, § 330.

⁴ Ante, §§ 195, 196, 235 and note, § 330; Story on Conflict of Laws, § 246-248; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 1, § 2, p. 14-21, (edit. 1818); Id. ch. 8, § 7, p. 467-470; *Josephs v. Pebrer*, 3 Barn. & Cressw. 639; *The Vanguard*, 6 Rob. 207.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ante, §§ 195, 196, 235; *Holman v. Johnson*, Cowp. R. 341; 1 Liverm. on Agency, ch. 1, §§ 2, 14, 15, (edit. 1818.)

⁷ Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 128; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 12, tit. 5, n. 7.

exclusively to the personal faith of each other, as to the fulfilment of their mutual stipulations in illegal transactions. The law will not assist the agent to recover his expenses or advances, or the principal to recover his property, or its proceeds. Each party is left precisely where he is found at the time of the controversy, to bear the burden of his own abandonment of his duty to the law of his country.¹ We have already seen that this same wholesome doctrine is fully recognized in the foreign law;² and it can admit of no question that it is deeply founded in the precepts of Christianity.

§ 345. The civil law proceeded upon the basis of the same wholesome principles. Where money was paid on an illegal or an immoral transaction, in which both parties participated, it could not be recovered from the principal, for whose benefit it was advanced. And, on the other hand, if it had been repaid, it could not be redemanded by the principal. But, where the principal only was engaged in the illegal transaction, there, money advanced by the agent innocently, and without knowledge, which enabled the principal to accomplish it, was recoverable by the agent. [*Ob rem*] *turpem autem, aut ut dantis sit turpitudine, non accipientis; aut, ut accipientis duntaxat, non etiam dantis; aut utriusque.*³ *Ubi autem dantis et accipientis turpitudine versatur, non posse repeti dicimus. Quotiens autem solius accipientis turpitudine versatur, repeti posse.*⁴ *Si ob turpem causam promiseris Titio; quamvis, si petat, exceptione doli mali, vel in factum summovere eum possis; tamen si solveris, non posse te repetere; quoniam, sublata proximâ causâ stipulationis, quæ propter exceptionem inanis esset, pristina causa, id est, turpitudine, superesset. Porro autem, si et dantis et accipientis turpis causa sit, possessorê potiorê esse. Et ideo repetitionem cessare, tametsi, ex stipulatione solutum est.*⁵

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 102, 103, 116, 117; *Josephs v. Pebrer*, 3 Barn. & Cressw. 639, Holland v. Hall, 1 Barn. & Ald. 59; *Armstrong v. Toler*, 11 Wheat. R. 258; Ante, § 235 and note (2).

² Ante, §§ 195, 196; Potluer, *Traité d' Assur.* n. 58; Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 6, § 3; Cod. Lib. 2, tit. 3, l. 6.

³ Dig. Lib. 12, tit. 5, l. 1; Pothier, *Pand. Lib.* 12, tit. 5, n. 1.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 12, tit. 5, l. 3, 4, §§ 2, 3; Pothier, *Pand. Lib.* 12, tit. 5, notes 2, 7, 9.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 12, tit. 5, l. 8; Pothier, *Pand. Lib.* 12, tit. 5, n. 10.

§ 346. A distinction was formerly attempted to be made between cases, which involved an illegality, resulting from positive law, (*malum prohibitum*), and an illegality, existing in the very nature of the transaction, upon principles of natural, moral, and public law (*malum in se*). In the former case, it was held, that money, knowingly advanced to or for the principal, upon an illegal transaction, might be recovered by the agent; in the latter case that it could not.¹ But this distinction is now justly repudiated.² Hence, if an agent should be employed to buy smuggled goods, and he should pay for the goods, and they should come to the hands of his employer, the agent could not recover for these advances from the employer.³ So, if an agent should knowingly advance money to pay for illegal insurances, or for stock-jobbing transactions of his employer, he could not recover it from the latter.⁴ So, if an agent should knowingly advance money to his employer to game with, it would not be recoverable.⁵

§ 347. But, although the rule is thus simple and clear in its elements, it is occasionally somewhat nice and difficult in its application to particular cases. A distinction has been taken between cases, where the money is knowingly advanced in furtherance of an illegal transaction, or where it grows immediately out of it, and cases, where the money is knowingly advanced in a transaction collateral to, although remotely connected with, the illegal transaction. In the latter case, the money advanced may be recovered. The ground of the distinction is, that the new contract, in the latter case, is one degree removed from the origi-

¹ *Faikney v. Reynous*, 4 Burr. 2069; *Petrie v. Hannay*, 3 Term R. 418.

² *Steers v. Lashley*, 6 Term R. 61; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 63, 64, note (c); *Id.* 120; *Bensley v. Bignold*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 335; *Ex parte Mather*, 3 Ves. 373; *Brown v. Turner*, 7 Term R. 631; *Mitchell v. Cockburne*, 2 H. Bl. 379; *Aubert v. Maize*, 2 Bos. & Pul. 271; *Webb v. Brooke*, 3 Taunt. R. 6; *Ex parte Bell*, 1 Maule & Selw. 751; *Canaan v. Bryce*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 180, 183; *Langton v. Hughes*, 1 Maule & Selw. 594; *Armstrong v. Toler*, 11 Wheat. R. 258.

³ *Ex parte Mather*, 3 Ves. 373; *Armstrong v. Toler*, 11 Wheat. R. 258.

⁴ *Stebbins v. Leo Wolf*, 3 Cush. 137; *Ward v. Van Duzer*, 2 Hall, 162; *Ex parte Mather*, 3 Ves. Jr. 373; *Amory v. Merryweather*, 2 Barn. & Cressw. 575; *Aubert v. Maize*, 2 Bos. & Pull. 271; *Canaan v. Bryce*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 179. But see *Armstrong v. Toler*, 11 Wheat. R. 258; *Brown v. Duncan*, 10 Barn. & Cressw. 93.

⁵ *McKinnell v. Robinson*, 3 Mees. & Welsb. 434.

nal illegal transaction; and, as it is in itself perfectly legal in its consideration and formation, as an independent contract, it ought not to be tainted by the illegality of the original transaction; although, at the time, the agent had knowledge of it. Thus, if money due to a principal on an illegal transaction, should be paid over to his agent for him by the party, from whom it is due, it has been held, that the principal may recover it from the agent; for the contract of the agent to pay the money to his principal is not immediately connected with the illegal transaction; but it grows out of the receipt of the money, for the use of his principal.¹ Upon the like ground, it is said, that an agent, who has knowingly made advances to pay the duties due to the government upon goods, which have been previously and fraudulently, by a collusive capture, introduced into the country by the principal, but in which transaction the agent had no part or coöperation, may recover such advances.² So, where goods are smuggled into the country contrary to law, and they are seized, and a prosecution is instituted against the principal, if an agent, knowing the facts, should advance money to assist his employer in his defence upon that occasion, it is said, that he may recover the money advanced from his principal; because such advance is upon a new and valid

¹ *Tenant v. Elliot*, 1 Bos. & Pull 4, *Farmer v. Russell*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 296. See *Warren v. Manuf. Insur. Co* 13 Pick R. 518. In *Wetherell v. Jones*, 3 Barn & Adolph. R. 212, where spirits had been sold without a regular permit, in violation of law, Lord Tenterden said: "We are of opinion that the irregularity of the permit, though it arises from the plaintiff's own fault, and is a violation of the law by him, does not deprive him of the right of suing upon a contract, which is in itself perfectly legal; there having been no agreement, express or implied, in that contract, that the law should be violated by such improper delivery. Where a contract which a plaintiff seeks to enforce, is expressly, or by implication, forbidden by the statute or common law, no court will lend its assistance to give it effect; and there are numerous cases in the books where an action on the contract has failed, because either the consideration for the promise, or the act to be done, was illegal, being against the express provisions of the law, or contrary to justice, morality, and sound policy. But where the consideration and the matter to be performed, are both legal, we are not aware that a plaintiff has ever been precluded from recovering by an infringement of the law, not contemplated by the contract, in the performance of something to be done on his part." See also *Levy v. Yates*, 3 Adolph. & Ellis, 129.

² *Armstrong v. Toler*, 11 Wheat. R. 258.

contract, 'unconnected with the original illegal act, although remotely caused by it.¹ But in all these cases, so put, if the agent is connected with the original illegal transaction, or the advance is a part of the original scheme, and in furtherance of it, it will not be recoverable from the principal; for, then, the agent is properly to be deemed a partaker in the illegality, *particeps criminis*.²

¹ *Armstrong v. Toler*, 11 Wheat. R. 258.

² *Armstrong v. Toler*, 11 Wheat. R. 258; *Farmer v. Russell*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 296, per Eyre, Ch. Just. and Brooke, J.; *Warren v. Manuf. Insur. Co.* 13 Pick. R. 518. The opinion of Brooke, J., is very able and exceedingly difficult to be answered. He puts the grounds against a recovery in a very strong light. The cases in the books are not easily reconcilable with each other; and *Faikney v. Reynous*, (4 Burr. R. 2069,) and *Petrie v. Hannay*, (3 Term R. 418,) are deemed to be overruled in England. They, however, were not so treated in the Supreme Court of the United States, in *Armstrong v. Toler*, (11 Wheat. R. 258.) In this last case, the subject was very much considered, and the leading authorities then existing critically examined. In this case, Toler brought an action to recover money paid by him on account of the goods of Armstrong and others, consigned to Toler, which had been seized as imported contrary to law. Toler, upon the seizure, became a surety on the stipulation bond given upon the delivery up of the goods under the seizure, to abide the event of the suit; and Armstrong's portion of the goods was delivered to him upon his promise to pay Toler his proportion of the amount for which Toler should become liable. The goods were condemned; and Toler paid the appraised value, and brought the action to recover the amount of the money so paid for Armstrong's proportion of the goods. At the trial, Armstrong founded his defence upon the illegality of the transaction. Mr. Justice Washington at the trial, said: "The rule of law under which the defendant seeks to shelter himself against a compliance with his contract, to indemnify the plaintiff for all sums, which he might have to pay on account of the goods shipped from New Brunswick for the defendant, and consigned to the plaintiff, is a salutary one, founded in morality and good policy, and which recommends itself to the good sense of every man, as soon as it is stated. The principle of the rule is, that no man ought to be heard in a court of justice who seeks to enforce a contract founded in, or arising out of, moral or political turpitude. The rule itself has sometimes been carried to inconvenient lengths; the difficulty being, not in any unsoundness in the rule itself, but in its fitness to the particular cases to which it has been applied. Does the taint in the original transaction infect and vitiate every contract growing out of it, however remotely connected with it? This would be to extend the rule beyond the policy which produced it, and would lead to the most inconvenient consequences. Carried out to such an extent it would deserve to be entitled a rule to encourage and protect fraud. So far as the rule operates to discourage the perpetration of an immoral or illegal act, it is founded in the strongest reason; but it cannot safely be pushed further. If, for example, the man who im-

§ 348. An agent may not only forfeit his title to the repayment of advances and disbursements, made by him on account

ports goods for another by means of a violation of the laws of his country, is disqualified from founding any action upon such illegal transaction for the value or freight of the goods, or other advances made on them, he is justly punished for the immorality of the act, and a powerful discouragement from the perpetration of it is provided by the rule. But after the act is accomplished, no new contract ought to be affected by it. It ought not to vitiate the contract of the retail merchant who buys these goods from the importer, that of the tailor who purchases from the merchant, or of the customers of the former amongst whom the goods are distributed in clothing, although the illegality of the original act was known to each of the above persons, at the time he contracted. I understand the rule as now clearly settled, to be, that where the contract grows immediately out of, and is connected with, an illegal or immoral act, a court of justice will not lend its aid to enforce it. And if the contract be in part only connected with the illegal transaction, and growing immediately out of it, though it be, in fact, a new contract, it is equally tainted by it. The case before supposed, of an action for the value of goods illegally imported for another, or freight and expenses attending, founded upon a promise, express or implied, exemplifies a part of the above rule. The latter part of it may be explained by the following case. As, if the importation was the result of a scheme to consign the goods to the friend of the owner, with the privity of the former, that he might protect and defend them for the owner in case they should be brought into jeopardy, I should consider a bond or promise afterwards given by the owner to his friend, to indemnify him for his advances on account of any proceedings against the property or otherwise, to constitute a part of the *res gestæ*, or of the original transaction, though it purports to be a new contract. For it would clearly be a promise growing immediately out of, and connected with, the illegal transaction. It would be, in fact, all one transaction; and the party to whom the promise was made, would, by such a contrivance, contribute, in effect, to the success of the illegal measure. But, if the promise be unconnected with the illegal act, and is founded on a new consideration, it is not tainted by the act although it was known to the party, to whom the promise was made, and although he was the contriver and conductor of the illegal act. Thus, if A should, during war, contrive a plan for importing goods from the country of the enemy on his own account, by means of smuggling, or of a collusive capture, and in the same vessel should be sent goods for B; and A should, upon the request of B, become surety for payment of the duties, or should undertake to become answerable for expenses on account of a prosecution for the illegal importation, or should advance money to B, to enable him to pay those expenses; these acts constituting no part of the original scheme, here would be a new contract, upon a valid and legal consideration, unconnected with the original act, although remotely caused by it; and such contract would not be so contaminated by the turpitude of the offensive act, as to turn A out of court, when seeking to enforce it, although the illegal introduction of the goods into the country, was the consequence of the scheme projected

of his principal, where the transactions are founded in illegality; but he may also, by his*own gross negligence, or fraud, or mis-

by A in relation to his own goods." On a writ of error, the Supreme Court held, that there was no error in this ruling of the Court below. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the Court, commented on the leading authorities and principles; and especially on the charge of the Court below. After quoting the opinion, he said: "If this opinion be contrary to law, the judgment ought to be reversed. The opinion is, that a new contract, founded on a new consideration, although in relation to property respecting which there had been unlawful transactions between the parties, is not itself unlawful. This general proposition is illustrated by particular examples, and will be best understood by considering the examples themselves. The case supposed is, that A, during a war, contrives a plan for importing goods on his own account, from the country of the enemy, and that goods are sent to B, by the same vessel. A, at the request of B, becomes surety for the payment of the duties, which accrue on the goods of B, and is compelled to pay them; can he maintain an action on the promise of B to return this money? The opinion is, that such an action may be sustained. The case does not suppose A to be concerned, or in any manner instrumental in promoting the illegal importation of B; but to have been merely engaged himself in a similar illegal transaction, and to have devised the plan for himself, which B afterwards adopted. This illustration explains what was meant by the general words previously used, which, unexplained, would have been exceptionable. The contract, made with the government for the payment of duties, is a substantive, independent contract, entirely distinct from the unlawful importation. The consideration is not infected with the vice of the importation. If the amount of duties be paid by A for B, it is the payment of a debt due in good faith from B to the government; and, if it may not constitute the consideration of a promise to repay it, the reason must be, that two persons, who are separately engaged in an unlawful trade, can make no contract with each other; at any rate, no contract, which, in any manner, respects the goods unlawfully imported by either of them. This would be to connect distinct and independent transactions with each other, and to infuse into one, which was perfectly fair and legal in itself, the contaminating matter which infected the other. This would introduce extensive mischief into the ordinary affairs and transactions of life, not compensated by any one accompanying advantage. The same principle, diversified in form, is illustrated by another example. If A should become answerable for expenses on account of a prosecution for the illegal importation, or should advance money to B, to enable him to pay those expenses, these acts, the Court thought, would constitute a new contract, the consideration of which would be sufficient to maintain an action. It cannot be questioned, that, however strongly the laws may denounce the crime of importing goods from the enemy in time of war, the act of defending a prosecution instituted in consequence of such illegal importation, is perfectly lawful. Money advanced, then, by a friend, in such a case, is advanced for a lawful purpose, and a promise to repay it is made on a lawful consideration. The criminal importation constitutes no part of this con-

conduct, in his agency, be excluded from all remedy against his principal, even for his advances and disbursements, made in the course of legal transactions. Thus, for example, if an agent should be guilty of gross negligence, either in selling the goods of his principal, to persons who are notoriously insolvent, or in omitting to sell them at the proper time contrary to his orders, whereby they are totally lost to his principal, he will not be entitled to recover from his principal any advances or disbursements, made by him on the same goods.¹ So, if he should purchase

sideration. It is laid down with great clearness, that, if the importation was the result of a scheme between the plaintiff and defendant, or if the plaintiff had any interest in the goods, or if they were consigned to him with his privity, that he might protect and defend them for the owner, a bond or promise, given to repay any advances made in pursuance of such understanding or agreement, would be utterly void. The questions, whether the plaintiff had any interest in the goods of the defendant, or was the contriver of, or concerned in, a scheme to introduce them, or consented to become the consignee of the defendant's goods, with a view to their introduction, were left to the jury. The point of law decided is, that a subsequent independent contract, founded on a new consideration, is not contaminated by the illegal importation, although such illegal importation was known to Toler when the contract was made, provided he was not interested in the goods, and had no previous concern in their importation." The recent authorities, since this case was decided, have not entirely cleared the subject of all difficulty. The distinction between the cases in which a recovery can be had, and the cases in which a recovery cannot be had, of money connected with illegal transactions, which seems now best supported, is this; that, wherever the party seeking to recover is obliged to make out his case by showing the illegal contract or transaction, or through the medium of the illegal contract or transaction, or when it appears that he was privy to the original illegal contract or transaction, there he is not entitled to recover any advances made by him, connected with that contract. But, when the advances have been made upon a new contract, remotely connected with the original illegal contract or transaction, but the title of the party to recover is not dependent upon that contract, but his case may be proved without reference to it, there he is entitled to recover. See Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 62-64, and notes; *Id.* 116-119, note (t); *Id.* 120, 121. Mr. Evans, in his edition of Pothier on Obligations, Vol. 2, App'x No. 1, p. 1-19, has examined this whole subject with great diligence and ability. His conclusion is, that money advanced to pay the debt of another, due upon an illegal transaction, may be recovered by the party lending it, from the party for whom it is advanced, if the lender was not a party to the original transaction, or it was not a part of the original scheme; although, at the time of the advance, he knew of the illegality.

¹ *Dodge v. Tileston*, 12 Pick. 328, 332. See also, *Savage v. Birkhead*, 20 Pick. R. 167.

and pay for goods on account of his principal, and by his gross negligence or disobedience of orders, the goods are not forwarded to the principal at the proper time, but are afterwards destroyed by fire, or other accident, in their transit, before they reach the principal, the agent will not be entitled to recover for the money so paid for the goods.¹ Where the loss does not go to the totality of the claim, the principal will still be entitled to be indemnified, *pro tanto*, to the extent of the loss, by recouping or deducting the amount from the sum due to the agent for his advances and disbursements.²

§ 349. It follows, from what has been already stated, that, if an agent incurs expenses, or makes disbursements, after his authority is revoked, and he has notice of the revocation, he cannot make his principal liable therefor. A revocation may be by the act of the party or by operation of law.³ The former requires no explanation in this place. The latter may arise in various ways. Thus, for example, it may arise, where the principal becomes a bankrupt, and is thereby rendered incapable of acting any further in the disposition of the property, or other subject-matter of the agency.⁴ In such a case, all payments and advances made by an agent, after notice of the bankruptcy of his principal, on account of such property, or other subject-matter, will be treated as made by the agent in his own wrong, so far as the assignees are concerned, and will be disallowed accordingly.⁵ So, also, in the case of the death of the principal, the agency determines by mere operation of law, and similar consequences will follow.⁶ But upon this subject we shall have occasion to speak more fully hereafter.⁷

¹ Williams v. Littlefield, 12 Wend. R. 362.

² Dodge v. Tileston, 12 Pick. R. 328, 332.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 184-189; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 223. 224; Post, §§ 463-469, 480-496.

⁴ Post, §§ 408, 482, 483.

⁵ Vernon v. Hankey, 2 Term R. 113; Copeland v. Stein, 8 Term R. 204; Hankey v. Vernon, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 314; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 121, 122, 187; Post, § 402. Perhaps an exception may properly exist, as to expenses incurred from necessity to preserve the property while it remains in the possession of the agent.

⁶ Post, §§ 448, 490, 496; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 223.

⁷ Post, § 462-500.

§ 350. In respect to the personal remedies, by which the various rights of the agent may be enforced, the consideration thereof properly belongs to a treatise upon actions, or other remedial processes. It may, however, be generally stated, that an agent may insist upon deducting all his advances, expenses, disbursements, and losses, arising in the course of his agency, whenever they are definite and certain, and do not merely sound in damages, from the pecuniary funds in his hands belonging to his principal, by way of recouper, discount, or set-off.¹ Or, where no such funds exist, he may maintain an action at law, or a bill in equity, as the case may require, for the recovery thereof.² Where an agent is a factor in a foreign country, and purchases goods on his own credit for his principal, and ships them to the latter, he is deemed, as between himself and his principal, to be in the same predicament, and entitled to the same rights and remedies, as any common vendor and consignor of the goods; and, consequently, he has the right of stoppage *in transitu*, in case the principal fails, or becomes insolvent, before the transit of the goods is ended by delivery thereof to the principal.³ The case here supposed is where the shipment is made for and consigned to the principal for his account and risk. The same principle applies, *a fortiori*, to the case, where the consignment is made to the order of the factor; for then he is deemed still to retain the constructive possession of the goods, and consequently he has not only the right of stoppage *in transitu*, but also the right of lien for his general balances, like that of factor retaining the actual possession of the goods.⁴ •

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 121-126; *Id.* 111, 112, note; 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, 34, (edit. 1818); *Dale v. Sollett*, 4 *Burr. R.* 2133; *Green v. Farmer*, 4 *Burr. R.* 2220, 2221; *Dinwiddie v. Bailey*, 6 *Ves.* 142; *Ante*, § 344; *Post*, § 385.

² *Ibid.*

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 144, 145; *Frieze v. Wray*, 3 *East, R.* 93; *D'Aquila v. Lambert*, *Ambler, R.* 400; *Sner v. Prescott*, 1 *Atk. R.* 245; *S. C.* 6 *East, R.* 28, note; *Sifkin v. Wray*, 6 *East, R.* 371; *Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 3*, ch. 9, § 5, p. 369, (Amer. edit. 1829); 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, 120-123, (edit. 1818); *Ante*, §§ 268, 290; *Post*, §§ 400, 423, 448.

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 144, 145. See also *Sweet v. Pym*, 1 *East*, 4; *Post*, § 351-390.

CHAPTER XIV.

RIGHT OF LIEN OF AGENTS.

§ 351. INDEPENDENT of the personal remedies, already alluded to, by agents against their principals, for the payment of their commissions, advances, disbursements, and responsibilities, in the course of their agency, there is an established right, which, in many cases, becomes more important and effectual than any other means of remedial redress, that is to say, the Right of Lien of Agents. To the consideration thereof we shall now proceed.

§ 352. A lien has been defined to be a right in one man to retain that which is in his possession belonging to another, until certain demands of him, the person in possession, are satisfied.¹ It is a qualified right, therefore, which may be exercised over the property of another person; and it is founded in natural justice, and the general convenience of commerce and business.² It is sometimes said, that, in strictness of law, it is not either a *jus in re*, or a *jus ad rem*, that is to say, it is not a right of property in the thing itself, or a right of action to the thing itself.³ These descriptions are sufficiently clear to represent the general character of liens. But there are liens, which properly constitute, not merely a right to retain the possession of a thing, but also a right or charge upon the thing itself. Such is the lien of a vendor upon the real estate sold, for the purchase-money; and that of a bottomry bond-holder upon the ship, for the money

¹ Per Grose, J., in *Hammond v. Barclay*, 2 East, R. 227; *Gladstone v. Birley*, 2 Meriv. R. 404; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 34, 35, (edit. 1818); *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 127; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 634, (4th edit.); *Holland's Assignees v. Humble's Assignees*, 1 Starkie, R. 143.

² Per Buller, J., in *Lickbarrow v. Mason*, 6 East, R. 21 n; *Kirkman v. Shawcross*, 6 Term R. 19; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 634, (4th edit.); *Green v. Farmer*, 4 Burr. 2221.

³ *Brace v. Duchess of Marlborough*, 2 P. Willk 491; *Gilman v. Brown*, 1 Masson, R. 221; 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 206; 2 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 1215.

lent.¹ And, so far from a lien being a mere right to retain the possession of a thing, it is in many cases wholly disconnected from the possession; as is the case of the lien of a vendor, as above stated, for the purchase-money; and that of a bottomry bond-holder, for the money due to him, and also that of mariners on the ship and freight, for their wages.²

§ 353. The lien of agents, however, generally (although not universally) falls within the common definition above alluded to, of a mere right to retain a thing, of which the party has possession, until some charge upon it is paid or removed.³ In this respect, it is like the lien or right of retainer of common carriers, wharfingers, shipwrights, blacksmiths, and other artificers; and probably was derived from the same general principle of the common law, which gives to a man who has the lawful possession of a thing, and has expended his money or labor upon it at the request of the owner, a right to retain it until his demand is satisfied.⁴

§ 354. Liens are also divisible into two sorts, particular and general. A particular lien is usually defined to be the right to retain a thing for some charge or claim growing out of, or connected with, that identical thing; such as for labor, or services, or expenses, bestowed upon that identical thing.⁵ Of this nature are the common liens already alluded to, of agents, carriers, and artificers, for their labor, or for money expended upon the thing intrusted to them for particular purposes. These liens are generally favored at the common law, as resting on natural equity, and the general convenience of trade and commerce.⁶ A general

¹ 2 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 1215-1217.

² 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 506; 2 Story on Eq. Jurisp. §§ 1216, 1217.

³ 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 634, (1th edit.); Montagu on Liens, 1; Wilson v. Balfour, 2 Camp. R. 579; Ex parte Heywood, 2 Rose, R. 357; Smith on Merc. Law, 336, (2d edit.), Id. 511, 515, (3d edit. 1843.)

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 127; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 634, 635, (4th edit.); Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 Mees. & Welsb. 270, 283.

⁵ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 127; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 537; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 634, (1th edit.); 2 Liverm. on Agency, 35, (edit. 1818); Smith on Merc. Law, 337, (2d edit.); Id. B. 4, ch. 2, p. 510, (3d edit. 1843); Houghton v. Mathews, 3 Bos. & Phill. 485, 494; Bevens v. Waters, 3 Carr. & Payne, 520; Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 Mees. & Welsb. 270, 283; 2 Bell, Comm. § 773, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 90, 91, (5th edit.)

⁶ Ibid.; Ex parte Deeze, 1 Atk. 228; Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr. R. 2221;

lien is a right to retain a thing not only for charges and claims specifically arising out of, or connected with, that identical thing; but also for a general balance of accounts between the parties, in respect to other dealings of the like nature.¹ It is less favored, and is construed somewhat more strictly, by courts of law, than a particular lien; although, certainly, the tendency of late years, in the commercial community, has been rather to expand than to restrict the cases, in which it is to be implied by the usage of trade.²

§ 355. In regard to particular liens, they may arise in various ways. First, by an express contract; secondly, by an implied contract, resulting from the usage of trade, or the manner of dealing between the parties; or, thirdly, by mere operation of law, from the legal relation and acts of the parties, independently of any contract.³ The last is generally deemed the true source of the particular lien of salvors, innkeepers, common carriers,

Searle v. Morgan, 4 Mees. & Welsb. 270, 288; *Chase v. Westmore*, 5 Mer. & Selw. 180. In *Searle v. Morgan*, 4 Mees. & Welsb. 283, Mr. Baron Parke, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said. "The principle seems to be well laid down in *Bevan v. Waters*, 1 Mood. & Malk. 235, S. C. 3 Carr. & Payne, 520, by Lord Chief Justice Best, that where a bailee has expended his labor and skill in the improvement of a chattel delivered to him, he has a lien for his charge in this respect. Thus, the artificer, to whom the goods are delivered for the purpose of being worked into form, or the farrier, by whose skill the animal is cured of a disease; or the horse-breaker, by whose skill he is rendered manageable, have liens on the chattels in respect of their charges. And all such specific liens, being consistent with the principles of natural equity, are favored by the law, which is construed liberally in such cases." See also *Chase v. Westmore*, 5 Mer. & Selw. 180.

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 127; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 537; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 634, (4th edit.); 2 Liverm. on Agency, 35, (edit. 1818); Smith on Merc. Law. 337, (2d edit.); Id. B. 4, ch. 2, p. 510, (8d edit. 1843); 2 Bell, Comm. § 773, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 90, 91, 105, (5th edit.)

² Ibid.; Montagu on Liens, 1, and cases there cited; *Houghton v. Mathews*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 485; *Rushforth v. Hadfield*, 7 East, R. 228; *Holderness v. Collinson*, 7 Barn. & Cressw. 212; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 544; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 142, 143; *Gladstone v. Birley*, 2 Meriv. R. 404; *Williams v. Littlefield*, 12 Wend. R. 362; Smith on Merc. Law, B. 4, ch. 2, p. 511-516, (3d edit. 1843).

³ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 538, 539; *Green v. Farmer*, 4 Burr. R. 2221; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 127, 128; Montagu on Liens, Pt. 2, chs. 1, 2, p. 26-40; *Searle v. Morgan*, 4 Mees. & Welsb. 270; 2 Bell, Comm. § 773, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 90, 91, (5th edit.)

farriers, blacksmiths, tailors, shipwrights, and other artisans.¹ But, general liens not being (as we have seen)² favored in the law, they must be maintained upon some one of the two former grounds, that is to say, upon the ground of an express contract, or that of an implied contract, resulting from the usage of trade, or from the previous dealings between the parties.³

§ 356. Indeed, it might, perhaps, in strict propriety of language, be said, that all liens arise by operation of law, and that, where they arise by a contract, express or implied, they are more properly pledges, or hypothecations, than liens. It was upon one occasion said, by a learned judge, that "The right of lien does not arise out of any contract whatsoever, but out of a right to hold property till the party claiming the lien has been paid for the operation he performs."⁴ And upon another occasion, another learned judge used expressions still more direct, saying: "Lien, in its proper sense, is a right which the law gives. But it is usual to speak of lien by contract, though that is now in the nature of an agreement for a pledge. Taken either way, however, the question always is, whether there be a right to detain the goods till a given demand shall be satisfied. That right must be derived from law or contract."⁵ Whatever may be the critical force of these remarks, the indiscriminate use of the word lien, as applicable to the right in cases arising from contract, as well as in cases arising by operation of law, is now become so universal, that it would be a vain refinement to attempt to recall, or to perpetuate any distinction between them.⁶

¹ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 538-540, 543; *Green v. Farmer*, 4 Burr. R. 2221; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 336-339, (2d edit.); *Id.* B. 4, ch. 2, § 2, p. 511-516, (8d edit. 1843); 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 631-636, (4th edit.); *Story on Bailm.* § 440; *Blake v. Nicholson*, 3 Maule & Selw. 167; *Chase v. Westmore*, 5 Maule & Selw. 180.

² Ante, § 351

³ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 127, 128; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 544, 546, 547; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 636, (4th edit.); 2 Livers. on Agency, 35, 36, (edit. 1814); *Gladstone v. Birley*, 2 Meriv. R. 401; *Jarvis v. Rogers*, 15 Mass. R. 385, 394, 396; Post, § 375.

⁴ By Lord Chief Justice Gibbs, in *Wilson v. Heather*, 5 Taunt. 642, 645.

⁵ Sir Wm. Grant, in *Gladstone v. Birley*, 2 Meriv. 401.

⁶ In *Searle v. Morgan*, 4 Mees. & Welsb. 278, Mr. Baron Alderson said: "A lien may be created by contract, and it may arise out of an express contract, or

§ 356 a. The Roman law derived its own liens, whether they were pledges, or hypothecations, or simple privileges, from similar sources. They might arise from a contract, either express or implied, or they might arise by mere operation of law. They might be express. *Contrahitur hypotheca per pactum conventum; cum quis paciscatur, ut res ejus propter aliquam obligationem sint hypotheca nomine obligatæ. Nec ad rem pertinet, quibus fit verbis.*¹ *Sicuti est et in his obligationibus, quæ consensu contrahuntur.* They might be implied, or arise by tacit consent. *Pignori esse credantur; quasi id tacite convenerit.*² They might arise by mere operation of law, as in the case of repairs by artificers. *Qui in navem extruendam, vel instruendam credidit, vel etiam emendam, privilegium habet.*³

§ 357. Particular liens were fully recognized and enforced in the Roman law, wherever money, or labor, or services, had been expended on account of the property demanded.⁴ In that law they were well known under the denomination of privileges, and, in many instances, they gave a right of priority of satisfaction, even over claims which were antecedent in point of time. *Privilegia non ex tempore æstimantur, sed ex causâ; et, si ejusdem tituli fuerint, concurrunt, licet diversitates temporis in his fuerint.*⁵ *Interdum posterior potior est priori; ut puta, si in rem istam conservandam impensum est, quod sequens credidit.*⁶ Thus, persons advancing their money to improve the property, shipwrights, architects, undertakers, workmen, artificers, and carriers, were entitled to a lien, or privilege, on the property. *Creditor, qui ob restitutum ædificiorum crediderit, in pecuniâ, quæ credita erit, privilegium exigendi habebit.*⁷ *Qui in navem extruendam, vel in-*

a contract by the custom of trade." See also *Cowell v. Simpson*, 16 Ves. 275; *Chase v. Westmore*, 6 Maule & Selw. 180; *Jarvis v. Rogers*, 15 Mas. R. 389, 394; *Smith v. Plummer*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 582, by Bayley, J.; 2 Bell, Comm. § 793, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 90, 91, 97, (5th edit.); *Smith on Merc. Law*, B. 4, ch. 2, § 2, p. 511-516, (3d edit. 1843).

¹ Dig. Lib. 20, tit. 1, l. 4; 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 2, art. 5.

² Dig. Lib. 20, tit. 2, l. 4; 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 2, art. 5.

³ Dig. Lib. 22, tit. 5, l. 26; 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 5, art. 5.

⁴ 2 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 1221-1223.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 42, tit. 5, l. 32; 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 5, art. 1.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 20, tit. 4, l. 5; 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 5, arts. 2, 3.

⁷ Dig. Lib. 42, tit. 5, l. 24, § 1; 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 5, art. 6.

*struendam credidit, vel etiam emendam privilegium habet.*¹ *Item, si quis in merces sibi obligatas crediderit, vel ut salvæ fiant, vel, ut navium exsolvatur, potentior erit, licet posterior sit. Nam et ipsum navium potentius est. Tantundem dicitur, et si merces horreorum, vel aræ, vel vecturæ jumentorum debetur. Nam et hic potentior erit.*² A factor was entitled to a similar privilege for his advances and disbursements to preserve the property, for the plain reason, that he thereby insured the preservation of the property. *Hujus enim pecunia salvam fecit totius pignoris causam.*³ The same rule was applied to the depositaries, mandataries, and other agents; and the property might be retained in the nature of a pledge. *Quasi pignus retinere potest eam rem.*⁴ Indeed, the civil law went much further than our law upon this subject; for it gave a particular lien or privilege to persons who advanced their moneys to others for the improvement, repair, purchase or building of houses, ships, and other things.⁵ In many cases, too, the civil law made the lien equivalent to a pledge, or what is sometimes called, a tacit mortgage.⁶

§ 358. General liens do not seem to have been distinctly recognized in the Roman law, although it is highly probable that they would be enforced, as in the nature of a pledge, in cases of express contracts for the purpose.⁷ In some cases, indeed, the party might avail himself of the defence by way of set-off, or compensation, as it was called in the Roman law, on account of a general balance of accounts. But this was rather a right resulting from a general doctrine of law, in respect to the extinguishment of mutual claims of the same nature, such as mutual debts, than a distinct right to retain the thing itself for such balance.⁸

¹ Dig. Lib. 42, tit. 5, l. 26; 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 5, art. 5-11; Ante, § 356.

² Dig. Lib. 20, tit. 4, l. 6, §§ 1, 2; 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 5, art. 11.

³ Dig. Lib. 20, l. 6, Introd; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 36, 37, (edit 1818).

⁴ Pothier on Oblig. n. 589, by Evans, (in the French editions, F. 625); 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 5, art. 8; Story on Bailm. §§ 121, 197, 357, 358; Ayliffe's Pand. B. 4, tit. 17, pp 521, 522; Pothier de Dépôt, n. 59; Pothier, Traité de Mandat. notes 69, 78, 79; Cod. Lib. 4, tit. 35, l. 4; Ante, § 356.

⁵ Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 5, art. 5-8; Dig. Lib. 42, tit. 5, l. 26, 34; Cod. Lib. 1, tit. 8, l. 7; Id. tit. 14, l. 17.

⁶ 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 2, § 2, art. 5; Dig. Lib. 20, tit. 1, l. 4; Id. tit. 2, l. 4.

⁷ 2 Liverm. on Agency, 36, (edit. 1818); Ante, §§ 356, 357.

⁸ 2 Bell, Comm. 772, 773, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 90, 91, (6th edit.)

Pothier points out the very distinction, in the case of a deposit. "The depositary cannot, indeed, oppose to the restitution of the deposit a compensation of the credits which he has against the person who intrusted him with it, when these credits arise upon other accounts. But, when the credit arises from the deposit itself, as for the expenses which he has been obliged to incur for the preservation of it, there is a right of compensation, not only in the case of an irregular deposit, but, also, with respect to the deposit of a specific thing, which may be retained, *quasi quodam jure pignoris*, until the credit is discharged."¹

§ 359. Having thus considered the nature of liens, particular, as well as general, it may be proper to say a few words: (1.) In relation to the manner and circumstances, under which they are acquired. (2.) To what claims they properly attach. (3.) How they may be waived or lost; and (4.) In what manner they are to be enforced, or taken advantage of.

§ 360. First. As to the manner and circumstances under which a lien may be acquired. To create a valid lien, it is essential, that the party, through whom, or by whom, it is acquired, should himself either have the true and just ownership of the property, or, at least, a right to vest it. If, therefore, he is not the true owner of the property; or if he has no rightful power to dispose of the same, or to create a lien; or if he exceeds his authority; or if he is a mere wrongdoer; or if his possession is tortious; in these, and the like cases, it is obvious, that he cannot ordinarily create a lien, or confer it on others.² If the rule were other-

¹ Pothier, on Oblig. n. 589, by Evans, (in the French editions, No. 625) See also 2 Liverm. Agency, 36, (edit. 1818); 2 Bell, Comm. §§ 772, 773; Id. pp. 90, 91, (5th edit.) In the Scottish law, the doctrine of lien is known by the name of Retention; and that of set-off by the name of Compensation. 2 Bell, Comm. § 772, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 90, 91, (5th edit.); Id. 103, 106.

² Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 128-131, 134, 139, 140; 2 Bell, Comm. § 774, (4th edit.); Id. 90, 92, (5th edit.); 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 547, 548; *Hiscox v. Greenwood*, 4 Esp. R. 174; *Burn v. Brown*, 2 Starkie, R. 272; *Madden v. Kempster*, 1 Campb. R. 12; *Lanyon v. Blanchard*, 2 C. and P. R. 597; *Jackson v. Clark*, 1 Y. & Jerv. 216; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 38, 39, 69, 70, (edit. 1818); 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 638, 639, (4th edit.); *Lempriere v. Pasley*, 2 Term R. 485; *McCombie v. Davies*, 7 East, R. 5; *Maanss v. Henderson*, 1 East, R. 533; *Ogle v. Atkinson*, 5 Taunt. R. 763; *Montagu on Lien*, Pt. 4, ch. 4, p. 68; *Smith on Merc. Law*, B. 4, ch. 2, p. 511-516, (3d edit. 1843.)

wise, it would enable the party to give to others, what he did not himself possess, which would violate the general maxim, (which has but few exceptions,) that he who has no title himself, cannot transfer a title to another: *Nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest, quam ipsi haberet*.¹ It would be easy to multiply illustrations of this doctrine. But a single one may suffice, which has been already mentioned, that a factor cannot pledge the goods of his principal, so as to create a lien on them, for advances made to himself.² *A fortiori*, a person cannot acquire a lien on himself, founded upon his own illegal or wrongful act, or upon his own misconduct, or breach of duty, or fraud.³

§ 361. In the next place, to found a valid lien there must be an actual or constructive possession of the thing by the party asserting it, with the express or implied assent of the party, against whom it is asserted.⁴ This follows, as a natural consequence, from what has been already said; for a lien is a right to retain a thing, which presupposes a lawful possession, which can arise only from a just possession under the owner, or other party, against whom the claim exists.⁵ The possession, indeed, need not be the actual possession of the party himself; for it is sufficient, if the possession be by his servants or agents in the proper discharge of their duty.⁶ Neither need the possession

¹ Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 51; Pothier, de Vente, n. 7: Ante, § 113, and note.

² Ante, § 113; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 213-232; Doubigny v. Duval, 5 Term R. 604; Story on Bailm. §§ 325, 326; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 204, 205, 547; Jackson v. Clarke, 1 Y. & Jerv. 216; McCombie v. Davies, 7 East, R. 5; Smith on Merc. Law, 342, (2d edit.); Id. B. 1, ch. 5, § 4, pp. 511, 512, (3d edit. 1843); Jarvis v. Rogers, 15 Mass. R. 389, 394-396.

³ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 547, 548; Burn v. Brown, 2 Starkie, R. 272; Smith on Merc. Law, 342, (2d edit.); Id. B. 1, ch. 5, § 4, pp. 511, 512, (edit. 1843); Lucus v. Dorrien, 7 Taunt. R. 278; Taylor v. Robinson, 2 Moore, R. 7; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 139, 140; Lempriere v. Pasley, 2 Term R. See Pearce v. Roberts, 27 Missouri, 179.

⁴ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 547, 549, 550; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 137-139; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 70-72, (edit. 1818); Montagu on Lien, Pt. 1, ch. 1, pp. 4, 5; 2 Bell. Comm. § 774, (4th edit.); Id. p. 91-97, (5th edit.); Rice v. Austin, 17 Mass. R. 197.

⁵ Heywood v. Waring, 4 Camp. R. 291; Hallet v. Barsfield, 18 Ves. 188; Winter v. Coit, 3 Selden, 288; Legg v. Evans, 6 Mees. & Welsb. 41, 42.

⁶ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 547, 549; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 639,

always be direct and actual. It is sufficient, if it be constructive, and operative in point of law. Thus, where property is at sea, the delivery and indorsement of the bill of lading will confer a constructive possession, sufficient to create a lien.¹ So, the delivery of choses in action or other documents or muniments of title, will in many cases, give a good lien upon the property represented, or intended to be conveyed thereby.² Thus, the delivery of a bill of sale of a ship at sea will be a constructive possession, sufficient to sustain a lien, if the ship is taken possession of within a reasonable time after her return.³ So, the delivery of a policy of insurance will give a lien thereon; as will the delivery of a promissory note, to collect and receive the amount.⁴ Still, however, the rule is strictly adhered to that there must be a possession, actual or constructive.⁵ If, therefore, the thing has not yet arrived to the possession of the party, but is still *in transitu*, or if he has only a right of possession, the lien does not attach thereon.⁶

§ 362. In the next place, no right of lien can arise, where, from the nature of the contract between the parties, it would be inconsistent with the express terms or the clear intent of the contract.⁷ Thus, for example, if the goods are deposited in the

(4th edit.); *McCombie v. Davies*, 7 East, R. 5; 2 Bell, Comm. § 774, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 91-97, (5th edit.); *Gainstord v. Detillet*, 13 Martin, R. 281; *Clemson v. Davidson*, 5 Binn. 392.

¹ *Rice v. Austin*, 17 Mass. R. 197; 2 Bell, Comm. p. 91-97, (5th edit.) And see *Davis v. Bradley*, 28 Verm. 118.

² 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 550; *Brown v. Heathcote*, 1 Atk. 160; *Lempriere v. Pasley*, 2 Term R. 185, 491; *Lucas v. Dornien*, 7 Taunt. R. 279; *Haile v. Smith*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 563.

³ *Mair v. Glennie*, 4 M. & Selw. 240; *Robinson v. McDonnell*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 134; *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 4-10, (Amer. edit. 1829.)

⁴ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 130; *Montagu on Lien*, Pt. 1, ch. 1, p. 19; *Liverm. on Agency*, 79, (edit. 1818.)

⁵ 2 Bell, Comm. § 774, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 91-97, (5th edit.)

⁶ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 519; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 137-139; 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, 70-72, (edit. 1818); *Kinlock v. Craig*, 3 Term R. 119; *Id.* 783; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 638, (4th edit.); *Sweet v. Pym*, 1 East, R. 4; *Holland's Assignees v. Humble's Assignees*, 1 Starkie, R. 143; *Hervey v. Liddard*, 1 Starkie, R. 123; *Montague on Lien*, Pt. 1, ch. 1, pp. 5, 6; 2 Bell, Comm. § 774, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 91-97, (5th edit.) See *Anderson v. Clarke*, 2 Bing. R. 20; *Bryan v. Nix*, 4 Mees. & Welsb. 775, 792; *Id.* 791.

⁷ *Chase v. Westmore*, 5 M. & Selw. 180; *Jarvis v. Rogers*, 15 Mass. R. 389,

possession of the party for a particular purpose, inconsistent with the notion of a lien, as, for example, to hold them, or their proceeds, subject to the order of a third person, or to have them transported to another place, or to have them delivered to another person, no lien will attach thereon.¹ So, if the money, for which the lien is asserted, is not due, but is payable at some future time, and in the intermediate time the goods are to be redelivered to the owner, no lien will attach thereon; for, in such a case, the lien will be inconsistent with such intermediate redelivery.² So, no lien will arise, where there is an express agreement between the parties not to insist upon it; or, where it is clear, from the whole transaction, that the party trusted exclusively to the personal credit of his debtor,³ or to another distinct fund.⁴

395-397; Smith on Merc. Law, B. 4, ch. 2, § 2, p. 511-513, (3d edit. 1843.) See *Pinnock v. Harris*, 3 Mees. & Welsb. 532; *Jackson v. Cummins*, 5 Mees. & Welsb. R. 350, 351.

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 140-142; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 549, 550; *Walker v. Birch*, 6 T. Rep. 254; *Jarvis v. Rogers*, 15 Mass. R. 389, 395, 396; *Weymouth v. Boyer*, 1 Ves. Jr. 416; Smith on Merc. Law, 337, 338, (2d edit.); Id. p. 511-513, (3d edit. 1843); 2 Liverm. on Agency, 51-54, (edit. 1818.)

² 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 546; *Crawshaw v. Homfray*, 4 Barn. & Ald. 50; *Scarfe v. Morgan*, 4 Mees. & Welsb. 270, 284; *Judson v. Etheridge*, 1 Crompt. & Mees. 743; *Chase v. Westmore*, 5 M. & Selw. 180; *Williams v. Littlefield*, 12 Wend. R. 362, 370.

³ See *Pinnock v. Harrison*, 3 Mees. & Welsb. 532; Ante, § 342; Post, §§ 366, 385.

⁴ 2 Liverm. on Agency, 53-55, (edit. 1818); 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 638, 639, (4th edit.); *Cowell v. Simpson*, 16 Ves. 275; *Bailey v. Adams*, 10 Wend. R. 201; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 147, 148; *Gilman v. Brown*, 1 Mason, R. 191; *Jackson v. Cummins*, 5 Mees. & Welsb. R. 350, 351; *Sanderson v. Bell*, 2 Crompt. & Mees. 304. In Mr. Metcalf's edition of Yelverton's Rep. 67 a, note (1), there is a full statement of the doctrines on this subject.* See also 5 Edw. 4, 2, pl. 20; 17 Edw. 4, 1; *Davis v. Bowsher*, 5 Term R. 491; *Ja. v. Rogers*, 15 Mass. R. 389, 394-396. We are carefully to distinguish between cases of this sort, where the lien to be asserted is created by mere operation of law, and is excluded by the agreement of the parties, and another class of cases, where the right of set-off is asserted in a suit; for, in the latter cases, the right of set-off (as, for example, in a case of bankruptcy,) would not be taken away by any agreement not to insist upon a lien, or set-off, for a balance of accounts, in regard to goods received by the party for sale, and actually sold under such an agreement, for which the party is sued. The ground of this distinction seems to be, that the general right of set-off, in a suit at law, being secured by statute,

§ 362 *a*. It sometimes becomes a matter of very nice consideration, whether a particular agreement amounts to an original waiver of, or dispensation from, the right of lien, which otherwise might by law attach itself to the particular transaction. Thus, it was formerly thought that, where work was done, or services performed, under an express contract, for a specific stipulated sum, there all right of lien was by implication abandoned.¹ But that doctrine has been since overturned; and the reasonable doctrine established, that the mere existence of a special agreement will not exclude the right of lien; but the terms of it must be such as actually or necessarily are inconsistent with such right.²

§ 363. This doctrine is entirely coincident with that of the Roman law, which, in cases of sales, gave a lien for the purchase-money on the thing sold, unless personal credit was given to the buyer. *Quod vendidi, non aliter fit accipientis, quam si aut pretium nobis solutum sit, aut satis eo nomine factum, vel etiam fidem habuerimus emptori sine ulla satisfactione.*³

§ 364. Secondly. Let us now proceed to the second head of inquiry; what are the debts or claims to which liens properly attach. In general, it may be stated, that they attach only to certain and liquidated demands; and not to those which sound only in damages, and can be ascertained only through the intervention of a jury.⁴ A special contract, may, indeed, exist, by which a lien will be created in cases of this latter sort; as, for example, where there is an express contract to hold goods for an indemnity against future contingent claims, or damages. But the law will not imply a lien for such unliqui-

cannot be taken away by implication from any such agreement. *McGillivray v. Simpson*, 2 Carr. & Payne, R. 320; S. C. 9 Dowl. & Ryl. 35. See *Cornforth v. Rivett*, 2 M. & Selw. 510; *Eland v. Carr*, 1 East, R. 375; *Mayer v. Nias*, 1 Bing. R. 311.

¹ *Brennan v. Currint*, Sayer, R. 224; Bull. Nisi Prius, 45; *Smith on Merc. Law*, B. 4, ch. 2, § 2, pp. 513, 514, (3d edit. 1843.)

² *Chase v. Westmore*, 5 Maule & Selw. 180, *Hutton v. Brigg*, 7 Taunt. R. 26; *Smith on Merc. Law*, B. 4, ch. 2, § 2, p. 512-514, (3d edit. 1843); *Peyroux v. Howard*, 7 Peters, R. 324.

³ Dig. Lib. 18, tit. 1, l. 19; *Owenson v. Morse*, 7 Term R. 64.

⁴ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 548, 549.

⁵ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 548, 549; *Drinkwater v. Goodwin*, Cowp R. 251.

'dated and contingent demands; but the lien, if asserted, must be made out by clear proofs. It may be added, that, generally, the same rules are adopted, in respect to the nature of the claims and demands, for which a lien may be asserted, as regulate the rights of the parties, and allowances, in matters of account; that is to say, they must be legal or equitable claims or demands founded upon a just and moral consideration, and due to the party as a matter of right, and not as matter of mere favor.¹

§ 365. In the next place, the debt or demand, for which the lien is asserted, must be due to the party, claiming it in his own right, and not merely as the agent of a third person.² It must, also, be a debt or demand due from the very person for whose benefit the party is acting, and not from a third person, although the goods may be claimed through him.³ So, the debt or demand, if claimed for a general balance of accounts, must be a balance, arising from transactions of a similar nature with that upon which the particular lien arises. As, for example, if the particular lien is for factorage, the general lien must also be for factorage transactions, and cannot be applied to transactions of a totally dissimilar nature, such as for rent, or for other debts due to the factor, before that relation existed between him and his principal.⁴ Of course, these remarks apply only to cases, where there is no special agreement between the parties, varying the rule; for such an agreement will always constitute the true expositor of the rights of the parties.

§ 366. Thirdly. How a lien may be waived or lost. In the

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 132-134, 137; *Curtis v. Barclay*, 5 Barn. & Cressw. 141.

² Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 132; *Houghton v. Mathews*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 485; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 552, 553; *Montagu on Lien*, Pt. 1, ch. 1, pp. 8, 10; *Ex parte Shank*, 1 Atk. 234.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 132, 147, 148; *Weymouth v. Boyer*, 1 Ves. Jr. 416; *Jackson v. Clark*, 1 Y. & Jerv. 216; *Foster v. Hoyt*, 2 Johns. Cas. 327; *Maanss v. Henderson*, 1 East, 335.

⁴ *Houghton v. Mathews*, 5 Bos. & Pull. 485; *Smith on Merc. Law*, §40, (2d edit.); *Id.* pp. 512, 513, (3d edit. 1813); 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, 65-68; 2 *Kent, Comm. Lect.* 41, p. 538, (4th edit.); *Montagu on Lien*, Pt. 2, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 33, 34; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 134-136; *Walker v. Birch*, 6 Term R. 258, per *Lawrence, J.*; *Jarvis v. Rogers*, 15 Mass. R. 389, 396.

first place, it may be waived by any act or agreement between the parties, by which it is surrendered, or it becomes inapplicable.¹ As, for example, if, while the property is in the hands of the party, with a lien attached to it, he agrees to hold the property exclusively for, or as the property of, a third person, that will amount to an implied waiver of his lien. So, the same result will take place, if he expressly agrees that it shall no longer be subject to the lien; or if he agrees to take another security in lieu of the lien.²

§ 367. In the next place, the voluntary parting with the possession of the goods will amount to a waiver or surrender of a lien; for, as it is a right founded upon possession, it must ordinarily cease when the possession ceases.³ In such cases, it matters not, whether the party absolutely parts with the possession, rightfully or wrongfully; or whether it is with the assent of the owner; or whether it is by his own tortious conversion of the property, or by some other unauthorized act. Thus, if an agent should make a shipment of goods, consigned to the order of his principal, (it would be different, if it were to his own order,)⁴ it would destroy the lien of the agent on those goods equally, whether the shipment were by the orders of the principal, or in violation of his orders; for, in such a case, the transfer of the property would be complete and absolute.⁵ But it might be different in a case, where the transfer was merely qualified, and not absolute; for, if such transfer were rightful, then the lien would not be lost. But, if it were wrongful, then it would be lost.

¹ *Piesch v. Dickson*, 1 Mason, Cir. R. 9.

² *Montagu on Lien*, Pt. 3, ch. 1, p. 40-48; 2 Bell, Comm. § 776, (4th edit.), Id. pp. 96, 97, (5th edit.); 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 556, 557; Ante, § 362.

³ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 142, 144; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 639, (4th edit.); *Kruger v. Wilcox*, cited 1 Burr. 491; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 549, 550, 554, 555; *Sweet v. Pym*, 1 East, R. 4; *Daubigny v. Duval*, 5 Term R. 604; *Owenson v. Morse*, 7 Term R. 61; *Kruger v. Wilcox*, Ambler, R. 254; 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, 75-77, (edit. 1818); 2 Bell, Comm. § 774, (4th edit.); Id. p. 91-97, (5th edit.); Id. pp. 116, 117.

⁴ Ante, § 361; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 144, 145; 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, 75, 76, (edit. 1818); 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 555.

⁵ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 142-144; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 549, 550, 554, 555; *Sweet v. Pym*; 1 East, R. 4; *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 3, ch. 1, § 7, p. 373, (edit. 1829.)

Thus, for example, an agent who has a lien on property, may lawfully transfer and pledge the same to another person as a security, to the extent of the amount due to himself, and for which he has the lien, if he apprizes such person, at the time of the lien, that he is to hold the property solely for the lien and no more; for that being a rightful exercise of his authority, it amounts to a mere appointment of the party to keep possession as his servant, and the lien is not thereby extinguished; for the possession still continues properly to be the possession of the agent.¹ On the other hand, if an agent should tortiously pledge the property of his principal generally for advances made to himself, by that very act his own lien upon the property would be gone, notwithstanding the possession of the pledgee might, in some sense, be treated as his own possession; for the change of possession would be tortious, and be deemed a waiver, or extinguishment of his lien.² So, if a person having a lien on goods, should cause them to be taken in execution at his own suit, he would lose his lien thereby, although he should become the purchaser of them at the execution sale, and they never were removed from his premises; for the sheriff took possession under the execution with his consent, and his possession, as purchaser, is a new and subsequent possession.³

§ 368. Such is the general rule as to possession. But there are certain cases, which constitute exceptions to the application of the rule, and in which, in favor of trade and the apparent intention of the parties, the lien is preserved, although the possession of the property is parted with. Thus, for example, a factor who, by lawful authority, sells the goods of his principal, and

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 144, 145, 217; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 551, 555; Montagu on Lien, B. 1, Pt. 4, ch. 4, p. 74; *McCombie v. Davies*, 7 East, R. 7; *Mann v. Shifner*, 2 East, R. 529, *Gainsford v. Duillet*, 13 Martin, R. 284, 2 Kent, Comm. Lect 41, p. 639, (4th edit.); 2 Liversm. on Agency, 78, (edit. 1818); *Thompson v. Farmer*, 1 Mood & Malk. 48; *Urquhart v. McIver*, 4 Johns. R. 103, *Jarvis v. Rogers*, 15 Mass. R. 399, 408; *Clemson v. Davidson*, 5 Binn. 392.

² *McCombie v. Davies*, 7 East, R. 7; Ante, § 78, 113, and notes Ib.; *Shipley v. Kymer*, 1 M. & Selw. 484; *Solly v. Rathbone*, 2 M. & Selw. 298; *Martini v. Coles*, 1 M. & Selw. 140; *Boyston v. Coles*, 6 M. & Selw. 14; *Cockran v. Irlam*, 2 M. & Selw. 301.

³ *Jacobs v. Latour*, 5 Bing. R. 130. See *Campbell v. Proctor*, 6 Greenl. 12,

parts⁴ with the possession under the sale, is not deemed to lose his lien thereby; but it attaches to the proceeds of the sale in the hands of the vendee, and also to the securities therefor in the hands of the factor, in lieu of the original property.¹ This exception is grounded upon the manifest inconvenience which would otherwise attend all factorage transactions, for a factor would rarely sell, except for ready money, if thereby he should lose his lien; and yet a sale on credit would be, or might be, incomparably more beneficial for his principal. Hence, the law presumes, that the parties tacitly agree, that the securities and proceeds shall stand charged with the original lien; and this tacit understanding is now universally in coincidence with the usage of trade.² Indeed, a factor is deemed, for many purposes, as the owner of the property, especially when he has demands upon it for advances and debts.³ Cases of a similar nature may occur, where there is an express agreement between the parties, that the lien shall not be lost by a transfer of the possession; for, in all such cases, the rule of law is, *Conventio vincit legem*.⁴

§ 369. Another exception is, where the possession has not been voluntarily parted with, but has been taken from the party by fraud, or force, or mistake; for, in such a case, it would be against the first principles of justice to allow the lien to be divested.⁵ Another exception (as we have just seen) is, where the party parts with the possession, *sub modo* only, as upon a pledge of his own lien as security to a third person.⁶ And another exception, of course, is of maritime liens, and other special liens, already alluded to.⁷

¹ Paley, on Agency, by Lloyd, 117; Drinkwater v. Goodwin, Cowp. R. 251, Houghton v. Mathews, 3 Bos. & Pull. 489; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 550, 551, 555, 556; Montagu on Lien, Pt. 1, ch. 1, p. 10; 2 Bell, Comm. § 774, (3), (4th edit.); Id. p. 115-117, (5th edit.)

² Ibid.

³ Drinkwater v. Goodwin, Cowp. R. 251; Houghton v. Mathews, 3 Bos. & Pull. 485.

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 117; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 550, 556; Dodsley v. Varley, 12 Adolph. & Ellis, 632.

⁵ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 556; Montagu on Lien, Pt. 1, ch. 1, p. 11; Pierson v. Dunlop, Cowp. R. 571; Wallace v. Woodgate, Ryan & Mood. R. 193; S. C. 1 Carr. & Payne, R. 575.

⁶ Ante, § 367.

⁷ Ante, § 352.

§ 370. It may be added, under this head, that although a lien is lost by parting with the possession, yet it may revive and re-attach upon the property coming again into the possession of the party entitled to the lien, if it so comes as the property of the same owner against whom his right exists, and no new intermediate equities have affected it.¹ This, at least, is true, in regard to a general lien; for, in such a case, it will attach upon fresh goods which have for the first time come to hand; and there is no reason why it should not equally attach to the old property coming back again. How far the same principle will apply to a specific or particular lien does not seem to be settled; although the intimations in judicial opinions are against it.²

§ 371. Fourthly. In what manner a lien may be enforced and taken advantage of. In respect to the rights conferred upon a party by a lien, it may be stated that they are generally of a very limited nature. As a lien is, ordinarily, nothing more than a right of retainer of the property, the party entitled to the lien cannot ordinarily sell or dispose of the property, in order to satisfy his lien, unless with the consent of the owner, either express or implied, from the nature and objects of the very transaction. Thus, for example, if goods are consigned to a factor for sale, and he makes advances upon them, he is, of course, invested with a right to sell them, and may out of the proceeds satisfy his lien, or use it by way of set-off.³ Nay, in certain cases, where he has made advances as a factor, it would seem to be clear, that he may sell to repay himself for those advances, without the assent of the owner, (*invito domino*,) if the latter, after due notice of the intention to sell for the advances, does not repay him the amount.⁴

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 145, 146; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 557, 558; Whitehead v. Vaughan, Cook's Banking Laws, 579; Spring v. S. Carolina Ins. Co. 8 Wheat. R. 268, 285, 286; 2 Bell, Comm. p. 117, (5th edit.)

² Hartley v. Hitchcock, 1 Starkie, R. 408; Jones v. Pearl, 1 Starkie, R. 556; Bosanquet v. Dudman, 1 Starkie, R. 1; Montagu on Lien, Pt. 1, ch. 1, pp. 19, 20; 2 Bell, Comm. § 774, (4), (4th edit.); Id. pp. 116, 117, (5th edit.)

³ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 551; Pothonier v. Dawson, Holt's N. P. Rep. 363; Zoit v. Millaudon, 16 Martiu, R. 471; Montagu on Lien, Pt. 1, ch. 3, pp. 23, 24; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 103, 104, (edit. 1818); 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 642, (4th edit.); 2 Bell, Comm. p. 117, (5th edit.)

⁴ This point was expressly decided in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the case of Parker v. Brancker, 22 Pick. R. 40. [In England it has been de-

But, except in a few and limited cases of this sort, the right of the holder of the lien seems to be confined to the mere right of retainer, which may be used as a defence to any action for the recovery of the property, brought against him, or, as a matter of title, or special property, to reclaim the property by action, if he has been unlawfully dispossessed of it.¹ In many cases, however, where the lien itself does not confer a right of sale, a Court of Equity will decree it, as a part of its own system of remedial justice;² and Courts of Admiralty are constantly in the habit of decreeing a sale, to satisfy maritime liens, such as bottomry bonds, seamen's wages, repairs of foreign ships, salvage, and other claims of a kindred nature.³

§ 372. But it seems, that even a lien or right of retainer is not, or may not be, deemed, under all circumstances, an unqualified right at least, as against the owner; for it has been said, that, although an agent has a lien upon the property of his principal for any advances or balance due him, yet he has not a right to retain more of the property, when demanded by the principal, than is sufficient to secure and satisfy his lien; and, as to the residue, he is bound to obey the orders of the principal.⁴ This is

cided, that the factor has no right to sell the goods, contrary to the orders of his principal, though the latter has neglected a request to repay the advances. *Smart v. Sayers*, 5 Mann., *Grant & Scott*, R. 895.] See also 3 Chitty on Comm. and Mann" 571. In *Pothonier v. Dawson*, Holt's N. P. Rep. 383, Lord Chief Justice Gibbs said: "Undoubtedly, as a general proposition, a right of lien gives no right to sell the goods. But when goods are deposited, by way of security, to indemnify a party against a loan of money, it is more than a pledge. The lender's rights are more extensive than such as accrue under an ordinary lien in the way of trade. These goods were deposited to secure a loan. It may be inferred, therefore, that the contract was this: 'If I (the borrower) repay the money, you must redeliver the goods; but if I fail to repay it, you may use the security I have left to repay yourself.' I think, therefore, the defendant had a right to sell." See *Zoit v. Millaudon*, 16 Martin, R. 470; 3 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, 612, (4th edit.); *Rice v. Austin*, 17 Mass. R. 197.

¹ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Mannf. 551; *The Ship Packet*, 3 Mason, 334; *Greene v. Farmer*, 1 Burr. 2218; 2 Liversm. on Agency, 103, 104, (edit. 1818); *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 131; *Scott v. Franklin*, 15 East, 428.

² 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 612, (4th edit.); 2 Liversm. on Agency, 103, 104, (edit. 1818); 1 Story on Eq. Juris-p. § 506; 2 Story on Eq. Juris-p. §§ 1216, 1217.

³ Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 3, ch. 10, § 2, and note to American edition, 1829; *Id.* Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 10-17, and notes; *Id.* §§ 17, 27-29; *Id.* Pt. 4, ch. 1, § 1.

⁴ *Jolly v. Blanchard*, 1 Wash. Cir. R. 252, 255.

§ 376. And, first, in relation to factors. It is now incontrovertibly established, as a matter of law, derived from long usage, and admitted without proofs, that factors have a general lien upon every portion of the goods of their principal in their possession, and upon the price of such as are lawfully sold by them, and the securities given therefor, for the general balance of the accounts between them and their principal, as well as for the charges and disbursements, arising upon those particular goods.¹ The lien may also extend to all sums for which a factor has become liable, as a surety or otherwise, for his principal, wherever the suretyship has resulted from the nature of the agency, or it has been undertaken upon the footing of such a lien.² But it does not extend to other independent debts, contracted before, and without reference to, the agency.³

§ 377. The general lien of a factor will attach, not only to goods which have actually come into the factor's possession in the lifetime of the principal, but also to goods which, at the death of the principal, are *in transitu* to the factor, and afterwards come to his hands, where he has advanced money, or accepted bills on account of them, to the extent of such advances or acceptances, and the incidental charges of the consignment.⁴ If goods come to the possession of the factor after a secret act of bankruptcy, committed by the principal, the

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 128, 129, note; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 640, (4th edit.); 2 Liverm. on Agency, p. 38, (edit. 1818); 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 544-546; Smith on Merc. Law, 338, 339, (2d edit.); Id. B. 4, ch. 2, § 2, p. 515, (3d edit. 1843:); *Kruger v. Wilcox*, Ambler, R. 252; *Hudson v. Granger*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 22, 31, 32; *Godin v. London Assur. Co.* 1 W. Bl. 104; S. C. 1 Burr. 489; *Jarvis v. Rogers*, 15 Mass. R. 389, 396; *Peisch v. Dixon*, 1 Mason, R. 10; *Burrill v. Phillips*, 1 Gallis. R. 360; 2 Bell, Comm. §§ 799, 800, (4th edit.); Id. p. 114-118, (5th edit.)

² Liverm. on Agency, 38-40, (edit. 1818); *Drinkwater v. Goodwin*, Cowp. R. 251; *Foxcroft v. Devonshire*, 2 Burr. R. 931; *Hammond v. Barclay*, 2 East, R. 227; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 129, 130.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 134-136; *Drinkwater v. Goodwin*, Cowper, R. 251; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 65, 66, (edit. 1818); *Houghton v. Mathews*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 485; *Stevens v. Robins*, 12 Mass. R. 182; Smith on Merc. Law, 339, 340; *Olive v. Smith*, 5 Taunt. 56; Ante, § 365.

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 140; *Hammond v. Barclay*, 2 East, R. 227; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 44, 45, (edit. 1818); 2 Bell, Comm. §§ 800, 801, (4th edit.); Id. p. 114-118, (5th edit.)

factor will not be entitled to retain the goods against the assignees, for advances or acceptances, made after such act of bankruptcy, upon the faith of the consignment of the goods to him, although such act was unknown to him at the time of the advances or acceptances; for the act of bankruptcy divests the property out of the bankrupt.¹ Whether the like effect would be produced, where the act of bankruptcy was committed after the advances or acceptances were made, and while the goods were *in transitu* to the factor, is a point, upon which doubts have been entertained; but the weight of judicial opinion seems against the lien.²

§ 378. This general lien, given to factors, has been established, upon its manifest tendency to aid the interests of trade and commerce, and to promote confidence and a liberal spirit on the part of factors in respect to advances to their principals.³ It is deemed to exist in all cases, until the contrary presumption is clearly established. But, if such a presumption is clearly established, and, *a fortiori*, if an express agreement repelling it, is proved, then the lien of the factor fails, as every other lien does, when it contravenes the intention of the parties.⁴ It was formerly thought, that this lien of a factor was dissolved by the death of the principal, and that it could not be asserted against the specialty creditors of the deceased.⁵ But this doctrine has no just foundation in principle; and it has long since been deemed utterly unsupportable.⁶

§ 379. Secondly. In relation to Insurance Brokers. This class of agents, also, have now, by general usage, a lien upon

¹ Copland v. Stein, 8 Term R. 199.

² Nichols v. Clent, 3 Price, R. 547. But see Foxcroft v. Devonshire, 2 Burr. 931; Kinlock v. Craig, 3 Term R. 119, 763; Lempriere v. Pasley, 2 Term R. 485; Hammond v. Barclay, 2 East, R. 227; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 42-48; Id. 69-74; Id. 78, (edit. 1818); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 121-123; Montagu on Lien, B. 1, Pt. 4, ch. 4, p. 79; Rice v. Austin, 17 Mass. R. 197; 2 Bell, Comm. § 800, (4th edit.); Id. p. 114-118, (5th edit.)

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 128, 129.

⁴ Ante, § 362; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 51-54, (edit. 1818); Walker v. Birch, 4 Term R. 258; Mabarr v. Massias, 2 W. Black. R. 1072; Weymouth v. Boyer, Ves. Jr. 416.

⁵ Chapman v. Darby, 2 Vern. R. 117; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 79, (edit. 1818.)

⁶ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 128, 129, note (m); Montagu on Lien, B. 1, Pt. 4, ch. 4, p. 77-80. See Lempriere v. Pasley, 2 Term R. 485, 490, 491.

the policies of insurance in their hands, procured by them for their principals, as also upon the moneys received by them upon such policies, not only for the amount of their commissions and the premiums for the particular policies, but also for the balance of their general insurance account with their employers.¹ But the lien does not extend to cover any balance due upon business, foreign to that of effecting policies of insurance, as the usage does not extend to such a claim;² although, in many cases, it may be made available by way of set-off, and, in cases of bankruptcy, by way of mutual debt and mutual credit.³ The lien, also, for a general balance, extends to cases, where the insurance broker procures a policy for, and in the name of, another, who acts as agent for a third person, where the agency is unknown to the broker; for, in such a case, the broker has a right to treat with the agent, as if he were the principal, and his rights are not controllable by such secret agency.⁴ But, where it is known to the broker, that the party acts for another, there his lien is strictly confined to the commissions, and premium, and charges on that very policy.⁵

§ 380. Thirdly. In relation to Bankers. Bankers, in like manner, have a general lien upon all notes, bills, and other securities,

¹ 2 Liverm. on Agency, 79, 80, (edit. 1819); 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 546; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 130; *Castling v. Aubert*, 2 East, R. 325, 330, 331; *Mann v. Skiffner*, 2 East, R. 523, *Hovil v. Pack*, 7 East, R. 164; *Cranston v. The Philad. Insur. Co.* 5 Binn. 538; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 339, 340, (2d edit.); *Id.* B. 4, ch. 2, § 2, p. 516, (3d edit. 1843); *Spring v. So. Car. Insurance Co.* 8 Wheat. R. 268, 285, *Moody v. Webster*, 3 Pick. R. 454; 2 Bell, Comm. § 804, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 114-118, (5th edit.)

² 2 Liverm. on Agency, 80-87, (edit. 1818); *Olive v. Smith*, 5 Taunt. R. 56; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 131-136, *Id.* 147; 2 Bell, Comm. § 804, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 120-123, (5th edit.); *Ante*, § 365.

³ *Olive v. Smith*, 5 Taunt. R. 56; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 80-87, (edit. 1818); *Parker v. Carter*, *Cooke*, Bank. Law, 567, (5th edit.); 2 Bell, Comm. §§ 807, 812, (4th edit.), *Id.* p. 120-123, (5th edit.); *Ante*, § 370.

⁴ Liverm. on Agency, 87-98, (edit. 1818); *Mann v. Forrester*, 4 Campb. R. 60; *Westwood v. Bell*, 4 Campb. R. 349; *Foster v. Hoyt*, 2 Johns. Cas. 437; *Mann v. Henderson*, 1 East, R. 335.

⁵ *Ibid.*; *Snook v. Davidson*, 2 Campb. R. 218; *Mann v. Skiffner*, 2 East, R. 523; 2 Bell, Comm. § 804, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 120-123, (5th edit.); *Swift v. Dyson*, 16 Peters, R. 1, 21, 22; *Bank of the Metropolis v. The New England Bank*, 17 Peters, R. 174; S. C. 1 Howard, Sup. Ct. R. 234.

deposited with them by their customers, for the balance due to them on general account.¹ Indeed, they may properly be considered as holders for value of notes, and bills, and other securities, indorsed in blank, and deposited with them, for all advances, and for all acceptances, past and future made by them, for a customer, which exceeds its cash balance.² And, under such circumstances, they may sue upon such securities, and recover thereon, at least to the amount of the balance due to them.³

§ 381. But here, as in other cases of lien, the right to retain for the general balance of accounts may be controlled by any special agreement, which shows, that it was not intended by the parties; as it may also be repelled by circumstances, showing, that the securities did not come into the hands of the banker, or were not held by him, in the ordinary course of business.⁴ Thus, for example, if securities have been deposited with a banker, as a pledge for a specific sum, and not as a pledge generally, that will repel the inference, that they were intended to give a lien for the general account or balance between the parties.⁵ So, a banker will not have a lien for his general balance of account on muni-ments, or securities, casually left at his banking house, after he has refused to advance money on them as a security.⁶

§ 382. Fourthly. In regard to Common Carriers. They have

¹ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 131; *Davis v. Bowsher*, 5 Term R. 468; *Bolton v. Puller*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 546; *Giles v. Perkins*, 9 East, 11; *Bolland v. Bygrave*, 1 Ryan & Mood. 271; *Jourdaine v. Lefevre*, 1 Esp. R. 66; *Smith on Mercantile Law*, 334, 339, (2d edit.); *Id.* pp. 514, 515, (3d edit. 1843); 2 Bell, Comm. § 803, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 118-120, (5th edit.)

² *Bosanquet v. Dudman*, 1 Starkie, R. 1; *Scott v. Franklin*, 15 East, R. 428; *Ex parte Bloxam*, 8 Ves. 531; *Heywood v. Watson*, 4 Bing. R. 496; *Bramah v. Roberts*, 1 Bing. New Cas. 469; *Percival v. Frampton*, 2 Crompt., Mees. & Rose. 180; *Swift v. Tyson*, 16 Peters, R. 1, 21, 22.

³ *Ibid*; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 131; *Bolland v. Bygrave*, 1 Ryan & Mood. 271.

⁴ *Ante*, § 362.

⁵ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 131; *Vanderzee v. Willis*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 21; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 338, 339, (2d edit.); *Id.* B. 4, ch. 2, § 2, pp. 514, 515, (3d edit. 1843); 2 Bell, Comm. § 803, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 118-120, (5th edit.)

⁶ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 131; *Lucas v. Dorrien*, 7 Taunt. R. 278; *Mountfort v. Scott*, 1 Turn. & Russ. 274; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 338, 339, (2d edit.); *Id.* B. 4, ch. 2, § 2, pp. 514, 515, (3d edit. 1843); 2 Bell, Comm. § 803, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 118-120, (5th edit.)

lien, not only for the freight and charges of carrying the particular goods, but sometimes also for the general balance of accounts due to them. This general lien seems to have originated in special agreements and notices; but it has now become common. Still, however, it is so little favored, as a matter of public policy, that if disputed, it must be shown to exist in the particular case, either by a general usage, or by a special agreement, or by a particular mode of dealing between the parties.

§ 383. Fifthly. In regard to Attorneys at Law, and Solicitors in Equity. They also have a general lien upon all the papers and documents of their clients in their possession, not only for all the costs and charges due to them in the particular cause, in which the papers and documents come to their possession, but also for the costs and charges due to them for other professional business and employment in other causes. This has long been the settled practice, and is now fully recognized as an existing general right.² But the lien upon papers and documents is only commensurate with the right of the client, who delivers the papers and documents to the attorney, and is not valid against third persons, claiming by a distinct title.³ Thus, for example, if a client, who deposits deeds and title papers with an attorney, be only tenant for life, the lien will be good against him, but not against the remainder-man.⁴ The lien of an attorney or solicitor also extends, in England, to all moneys received, and judgments recovered, and costs taxed, for his client, subject only to any deductions, which the other party may have a right to, by way of cross-costs, or set-off.⁵ The practice in America is probably variable, being governed by local practice, or by statutory provisions.

¹ *Rushforth v. Hadfield*, 6 East, R. 519; S. C. 7 East, R. 224; *Wright v. Snell*, 15 Barn. & Ald. 350; *Jarvis v. Rogers*, 15 Mass. R. 389, 395, 396; 2 Bell, Comm. § 781, 790; *Id.* p. 99-102, (5th edit.)

² *Ex parte Nesbitt*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 279; *Ex parte Stirling*, 16 Ves. 252; *Ex parte Pemberton*, 18 Ves. 382; *Stevenson v. Blakelock*, 1 Maule & Selw. 535; *Hollis v. Claridge*, 4 Taunt. 807; *Montagu on Lien*, B. 1, Pt. 4, ch. 3, p. 59-67; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 335, 339, (2d edit.); *Id.* B. 1, ch. 2, § 2, pp. 514, 515, (3d edit. 1843); 2 Bell, Comm. § 796, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 111-114, (5th edit.)

³ *Hollis v. Claridge*, 4 Taunt. R. 807.

⁴ *Ex parte Nesbitt*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 279; *Montagu on Lien*, B. 1, Pt. 4, ch. 3, p. 61.

⁵ *Montagu on Lien*, B. 1, Pt. 4, ch. 3, p. 59-63.

The lien also is strictly confined to papers and documents, which come into the possession of the attorney or solicitor in the course of professional employment.¹ But, upon this class of cases, it seems unnecessary to dwell, as agencies of this sort are not within the intended scope of these Commentaries.

§ 384. Sixthly. There are other cases in which a general lien has been admitted to exist in regard to particular classes of agents; such, for example, as packers, acting as factors, calico-printers, fullers, dyers, and wharfingers.² But, in all cases of this sort, the general lien arises, either from the usage of the particular trade, or from a special agreement of the parties, or from the peculiar habit of dealing between them.³ Independently of the existence of one or other of these sources of right, the law confines the parties to the particular lien on the goods themselves, incurred or due on their sole account; and the burden of proof is on those who set up a general lien, to establish it by clear and determinate evidence.⁴

§ 385. We may close this part of the subject, in relation to liens by agents, by remarking, that the mere fact, that an agent has a lien upon the property confided to him, either for his commissions, advances, disbursements, or expenses, upon that property, or for his general balance of account, does not limit the right of the agent to that mere fund; but the principal is still liable to him personally, in a suit *in personam*, for the amount of the same claims.⁵ For, by the general rule of law, an agent, in such cases, trusts both to the fund and to the person of his principal.⁶ [And a factor who makes advances on goods consigned

¹ Montagu on Lien, B. 1, Pt. 4, ch. 3, pp. 61, 62, *Stevenson v. Blakelock*, 1 Maule & Selw. 535; 22 Pick. 210; 2 Met. 478; 4 Gray, 357.

² Montagu on Lien, B. 1, Pt. 2, ch. 1, § 2, p. 31-34; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 546; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 130, 131; Smith on Merc. Law, 389, (2d edit.); Id. B. 4, ch. 2, § 2, pp. 514, 515, (3d edit. 1843); 2 Bell, Comm. § 792, (4th edit.); Id. p. 105-110, (5th edit.); Ante, § 34.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.; *Holderness v. Collinson*, 7 Barn. & Crossw. 212; 2 Bell, Comm. § 792 (4th edit.); Id. p. 105-110, (5th edit.)

⁵ Ante, §§ 342, 362, 366.

⁶ *Berrill v. Phillips*, 1 Gallis. R. 360; *Peisch v. Dickson*, 1 Mason, R. 10; *Cox v. Cummings*, 6 Cowen, R. 181; *Beckwith v. Sibley*, 11 Pick. R. 482; Ante, §§ 342, 362, 366.

to him, may maintain an action to recover the money advanced, even before the goods are sold, unless there is an agreement to the contrary.¹ But this personal liability may be waived by an express agreement between the parties, or by a course of dealing between them, which justifies the same conclusion.² The burden of proof of such a waiver, however, will lie upon the principal, and cannot be inferred from the mere relation of principal and factor.³

§ 386. Let us, in the next place, consider what are the rights of sub-agents, in regard to their immediate employers, and also in regard to the superior or real principal. It may be generally stated, that where agents employ sub-agents in the business of the agency, the latter are clothed with precisely the same rights, and incur precisely the same obligations, and are bound to the same duties, in regard to their immediate employers, as if they were the sole and real principals. This is the general rule.⁴ But it is, of course, liable to exceptions; for where by the usage of trade, or the agreement between the parties, sub-agents are ordinarily or necessarily employed to accomplish the ends of the agency, there, if the agency is avowed, and credit is exclusively given to the principal, the intermediate agent may be exempted from all responsibility to the sub-agent.⁵ But, unless such exclusive credit is given, the intermediate agent will be liable to the sub-agent, although the superior or real principal may also be liable.⁶

§ 387. In regard to the superior, or real principal, the general rule of law is, that, if an agent employs a sub-agent, to do the whole, or any part of the business of his agency, without the knowledge or consent of the principal, express or implied, there, inasmuch as no privity exists in such a case between the principal and the sub-agent, the latter will not be entitled to claim from the principal any compensation for commissions, or advances, or disbursements, in the course of his sub-agency. But

¹ Upham v. Lefavour, 11 Met. 174.

² Ibid.

³ Burrill v. Phillips, 1 Gall. R. 460; Peisch v. Dickson, 1 Mason, R. 10; Corlie v. Cummings, 6 Cowen, R. 181; Beckwith v. Sibley, 11 Pick. R. 482; Ante, §§ 342, 362, 366.

⁴ Ante, §§ 217, 289; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 49.

⁵ Ante, §§ 1, 5, 201, 289.

⁶ Ante, §§ 14, 15, 217. See Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 49.

his sole remedy therefor is against his immediate employer, and his sole responsibility is also to him.¹ But, where, by the usage of trade, or the express or implied agreement of the parties, a sub-agent is to be employed, there a privity is deemed to exist between the principal and the sub-agent, and the latter may, under such circumstances, well maintain his claim for such compensation, both against the principal and the immediate employer, unless exclusive credit is given to one of them; and if it is, then his remedy is limited to that party.²

§ 388. In the next place, in relation to the lien of sub-agents. We have seen, that, ordinarily, an agent has not a power to substitute a sub-agent in his stead, so as to bind the principal to the act of the latter, except where there is an express agreement, or usage of trade, which justifies it.³ We have also seen, that, generally, a sub-agent is only responsible to his immediate employer, and not to the paramount principal;⁴ although this, again, may be affected by the express agreement of the parties, or by the usage of trade, creating a direct privity between them.⁵ If, therefore, no privity exists between the principal and the sub-agent, no lien can be acquired by the latter against the former, unless so far as he may claim, by way of substitution, the lien of his immediate employer, of which we shall presently speak. But, wherever such a privity does exist, the sub-agent will incur a direct and immediate responsibility to the principal, and not merely to the agent who employs him.⁶ He will also have a reciprocal personal claim against the principal, and will be clothed with a lien against him to the extent of the services performed, and the advances and disbursements properly made, by him, on account of the sub-agency.⁷

¹ Ante, §§ 13-15, 217; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 40; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 64-66, (edit. 1818); Cull v. Backhouse, cited 6 Taunt. 148; Schmaling v. Toddlinson, 6 Taunt. R. 147.

² Ibid.

³ Ante, § 13-15; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 54-66, (edit. 1818.)

⁴ Ante, §§ 13-15, 217; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 54-60, (edit. 1818.)

⁵ Ante, §§ 217, 289.

⁶ Ante, §§ 201, 217.

⁷ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 148, 149; Snook v. Davidson, 2 Campb. R. 218; Lanyon v. Blanchard, 2 Campb. R. 597; Mann v. Shiftner, 2 East. R. 523, 529; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 87-98, (edit. 1818); Lincoln v. Battelle, 6 Wend. R. 475.

§ 389. A sub-agent, who is employed by an agent to perform a particular act of agency, without the privity or consent of the principal, may also acquire a lien upon the property thus coming into his possession, against the principal, for his commissions, advances, disbursements, and liabilities thereon, if the principal adopt his acts, or seeks to avail himself of the property or proceeds, acquired in the usual course of such sub-agency.¹ For the principal will not be allowed to avail himself of the benefits of the transaction, without at the same time subjecting himself to its burdens.² If he ratifies the acts of the sub-agent, he thereby clothes those acts with all the proper accompaniments of an original authority.³ If he does not ratify them directly, still, if he seeks to avail himself of the acts of the sub-agent, so as to found derivative rights upon them, and not merely to avail himself of his original rights in his own property, paramount of those acts and independent of their aid, he must take the acts with all the responsibilities, and charges, and incidents annexed to them, according to the well-known maxim, *Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus*.⁴ But a sub-agent has no general lien upon the property of the principal, on account of any balance due to him from the immediate agent, who employs him, when he knows or has reason to believe, that the latter is acting for another person at the time of his sub-agency.⁵ At the same

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 149, 149; Id. 49; Montagu on Lien, Pt. 1, ch. 4, p. 72-74; Snook v. Davidson, 2 Campb. R. 218; Lanyon v. Blanchard, 2 Campb. R. 597, 598; Westwood v. Bell, 4 Campb. R. 348, 353.

² Ante, § 242-244, 249.

³ Ibid. §§ 253, 258, 259, ante, (4.) See also Willinks v. Hollingsworth, 6 Wheat. R. 259; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 54-66, (edit. 1818.) We should carefully distinguish between cases of this sort, and cases where the principal seeks only to avail himself of his original rights in his property, which has been improperly confided to, and sold by, a sub-agent. The bringing of a suit for the property, or for the proceeds, under such circumstances, will not subject the principal to the charges and expenditures incurred thereon by the sub-agent, unless the form of the action establishes a ratification of the proceedings. See ante, § 259, and note; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 56-66, (edit. 1818); Schmalzing v. Tomlinson, 6 Taunt. R. 147.

⁴ 1 Q. R. 99; Branch, Maxims, 182, (edit. 1824); Solly v. Rathbone, 2 M. & Selw. 298; Cockran v. Irlam, 2 M. & Selw. 301, note; Ante, § 113, and note.

⁵ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 147-149; Maaness v. Henderson, 1 East, R. 335; Mann v. Shiffner, 2 East, R. 523, 529, n.; Westwood v. Bell, 4 Camp. R. 348;

time, however, he will be at liberty to avail himself of his general lien against the principal to the extent of the lien, particular or general, which the agent himself has at the same time against the principal, by way of substitution to the rights of the agent, if the acts of the latter, or his own, are not tortious.¹ In this respect, there seems to be an admitted difference between the case of a pledge, or other unauthorized act. by an agent or factor, which is treated as a tortious act, and the creation of a sub-agency, and the delivery of the property to the sub-agent, in order to effectuate the original purposes of the principal, according to the usual course of business.² In the latter case, the delivery of the property to the sub-agent is treated as a rightful pledge, *sub modo*, in his favor, to the extent of the lien of the original agent.³

§ 390. In many cases, however, a sub-agent, who acts with-

Montagu on Lien, B. 1, Pt. 4, ch. 4, p. 74-76; 2 Liversm on Agency, 87-98, (edit. 1818.)

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 147-150; Maass v. Henderson, 1 East, R. 335; Mann v. Shiffner, 2 East, R. 523, 529; M'Combie v. Davies, 7 East, R. 7; Solly v. Rathbone, 2 M. & Selw. 298; Cockran v. Ilam, 2 M. & Selw. 301, note; Schmahng v. Tomlinson, 6 Taunt. R. 147; Montagu on Lien, B. 1, Pt. 4, ch. 4, p. 74-76. In the case of Snook v. Davidson, 2 Campb. R. 218, it seems to have been held by Lord Ellenborough, that the sub-agent could not hold, by way of substitution, the lien of his immediate employer for his general balance against the principal, but only his lien for the premium on the particular policy. This doctrine may not, at first sight, seem reconcilable with the decision of the Court in Mann v. Shiffner, 2 East, R. 523, where a sub-agent of a policy was held entitled to retain, to the extent of the general balance of his immediate employer, against the principal. The distinction between the cases seems to be, that, in the case in 2 East, R. 523, the employment of the sub-agent was in the usual course of business; whereas in the case in 2 Camp. 218, it was held, that there was no privity between the principal and the sub-agent, he not being employed in the usual course of business. But, as the principal sought to recover the policy, so procured by the sub-agent, it seems difficult to perceive why the action did not amount to a ratification of the sub-agency; and then the sub-agent, as servant of his immediate employer, would be entitled to retain for the general balance, upon the principle decided in 2 East, R. 523.

² Ante, §§ 78, 118, 5; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 213; Id. 143; Solly v. Rathbone, 2 M. & Selw. 298; Cockran v. Ilam, 301, note; Montagu on Lien, B. 1, Pt. 40, ch. 4, p. 73.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 145, 147-155; M'Combie v. Davies, 7 East, R. 7; Ante, § 118, and note.

out any knowledge, or reason to believe, that the party employing him is acting as an agent for another, will acquire a right-ful lien on the property, for his general balance. Thus, for example, if a sub-agent, or broker, at the request of an agent, should effect a policy on a cargo, supposing it to be for the agent himself, but, in fact, it should be for a third person, for whom the agent has purchased the cargo, and afterwards, and while the policy is in the broker's hands, he should make advances to the agent, before any notice of the real state of the title to the property, he will be entitled to a lien on the policy, and on the money received on it, to the extent of the money so advanced; and also (as it should seem) for his general balance of account against the agent.¹ For the broker may well be

¹ Mann v. Forrester, 4 Camp. R. 60; Westwood v. Bell, 4 Camp. R. 348, 353; Smith on Merc. Law, 340, (2d edit.); Id. pp. 515, 516, (3d edit. 1843;) Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 148, 149; 2 Liveim. on Agency, 87-92; Montagu on Lien, B. 1, Pt. 4, ch. 1, pp. 75, 76; Westwood v. Bell, 4 Camp. R. 349, 353. In this last case, Lord Chief Justice Gibbs said: "I hold, that, if a policy of insurance is effected by a broker, in ignorance that it does not belong to the persons by whom he is employed, he has a lien upon it for the amount of the balance which they owe him. In this case, Clarkson has misconducted himself, and is liable for not disclosing that he was a mere agent in the transaction; but the defendants, who had every reason to believe that he was the principal, are entitled to hold the policy. If goods are sold by a factor in his own name, the purchaser has a right to set off a debt due from him, in an action by the principal for the price of the goods. The factor may be liable to his employer for holding himself out as the principal; but that is not to prejudice the purchaser, who *bonâ fide* dealt with him as the owner of the goods, and gave him credit in that capacity. The lien of the policy-broker rests on the same foundation. The only question is, whether he knew, or had reason to believe, that the person, by whom he was employed, was only an agent; and the party who seeks to deprive him of his lien must make out the affirmative. The employer is to be taken to be the principal till the contrary is proved. If the plaintiff's assent to the employment of Clarkson is denied, then he can have no right to the policy, and there is no privity between the parties. The argument about pledging the policy is fallacious. This never was a policy of the plaintiff's, which he held unincumbered, and handed over to his agent. In its very origin and creation it was burdened with the lien. It never has been the plaintiff's for an instant, but subject to the lien which is now claimed. The rights of the parties do not stand on the same footing, if Clarkson had said he had authority to pledge the policy; but, as if he had said, 'The goods to be insured are mine, the policy is for my benefit alone, and I agree that, when it is effected, it shall remain in your hands till the whole of the balance I owe you is satisfied; and on the strength, you will con-

supposed to have made the advances, or delayed his demands, relying on the credit of the policy, which is allowed to remain in his hands. So, if a factor should sell goods of his principal in his own name, without any notice on the part of the purchaser, that the goods are not his own, the purchaser will be entitled to set off a debt, due to him from the factor, against the price of the goods.² The ground of this doctrine undoubtedly is, that, where any person holds himself out as a principal, with the consent of the owner, third persons, who deal with him *bonâ fide*, are entitled to all the rights which they would have if he were the real principal.³ And so, if a party assumes to act as principal, being only an agent, the real principal shall not be permitted to avail himself of the benefit of the transaction, without subjecting himself to the burdens which would attach to the transaction, if the ostensible party were the real party in interest.⁴

to trust me.' If that had passed, can I say, that the defendants are to be stripped of their rights on account of a fact of which they had no knowledge, and that they are to deliver up to a stranger the policy which they have effected under a contract, that they should hold it as a security for the balance due to them from their employer? Nor do the cases cited on the part of the plaintiff at all contradict the doctrine I am laying down. In *Snook v. Davidson*, the person who employed the defendants to effect the policy, said that it was for a correspondent in the country. In *Lanyon v. Blanchard*, likewise, the defendant must be taken to have had notice that the person who employed him was not the principal. The representation made by Crowdy, that he had authority to endorse the bill of lading, was abundantly sufficient to show that he was only an agent; and I entirely subscribe to what Lord Ellenborough is there supposed to have laid down respecting the risk which the defendant run in giving faith to that representation. The subsequent case of *Mann v. Forrester*, is quite decisive. The doctrine stands upon authority as well as upon principle. I should have had no difficulty in determining the question, were it entirely new; and I find myself strongly fortified by the opinions of other judges." See also *George v. Claggett*, 2 Esp. R. 557; S. C. 7 Term R. 359; *Rabone v. Williams*, 7 Term R. 361, n.; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 325-327, 329, 330; *Baring v. Corrie*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 137.

¹ Ibid.

² *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 325; *Coppin v. Walker*, 7 Taunt. R. 239; *Lime Rock Bank v. Plimpton*, 17 Pick. R. 159; 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 77 and notes, (2d edit.); see *Young v. White*, 7 Beavan, R. 506.

³ Ibid.

⁴ *Paley on Agency*, 172-175; *Hovil v. Pack*, 7 East, R. 164, 166; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 87-98, (edit. 1818); *Fergusson v. Carrington*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 59; Ante, § 389. See *Hurlburt v. Pacific Ins. Co.* 2 Sumner, R. 475; Ante, § 389.

CHAPTER XV.

RIGHTS OF AGENTS IN REGARD TO THIRD PERSONS.

§ 391. HAVING considered the rights of agents in regard to their principals, we may next proceed to the consideration of their rights in regard to third persons, which will also include a review of the duties and obligations of the latter to the former. We have already had occasion to remark, that, in general, agents, acting openly and notoriously as such, do not, by their acts or contracts, made or done in the name of their principals, incur any personal responsibility whatever; but they are treated not so much as parties thereto, as they are as instruments, through whom the acts or contracts of their principals are effected.¹ Hence it is, that, ordinarily, an agent, contracting in the name of his principal, and not in his own name, is not entitled to sue, nor can he be sued, on such contracts.² Thus, an agent selling the goods of his principal in his name, and as his agent, cannot ordinarily sue on the contract, as for goods sold and delivered. This is clearly illustrated in the common case of a sale made by a clerk or shopman in a shop, who has no right whatsoever to sue on the contract; but the right belongs exclusively to his superior or employer. So, if a purchase is made by a clerk or shopman, for and in the name of his principal, the latter only is liable on the contract; for the natural, if not the necessary, implication, in such cases, is, that credit is exclusively given to the principal, and that the clerk or shopman acts as a mere naked agent for him in making the bargain.³ We have seen, that the Roman law originally proceeded upon an opposite principle, holding the agent, in such cases, personally and exclusively liable, until the Prætor introduced an equitable remedy against the principal.⁴

¹ Ante §§ 160, 161, 261-263.

² *Id.*, § 102, note, §§ 160, 161, 169, 170, 261-263; *Gunn v. Cantine*, 10 Johns. R. 387; 2 Livers on Agency, 215, 216, (edit. 1818).

³ Ante, §§ 160, 161, 261-263, 269, 270.

⁴ Ante, §§ 163, 261, 262, 269, 271.

§ 392. But there are exceptions to, or rather modifications of, the doctrine in both respects. We have already had occasion to state, that, where agents contract in their own name, although notoriously for their principals, they are deemed to be parties to the contract, and are liable thereon: and that such liability may exist, notwithstanding the principal is also liable on the same contract.¹ But the exceptions, or modifications of the doctrine, which now require our more immediate attention, respect the cases, where the agent acquires rights against third persons, notwithstanding he acts merely as agent. This subject naturally divides itself into two branches: first, the cases in which agents acquire rights, founded upon contracts made by them in that character, against third persons; and secondly, the cases, in which they acquire rights against such persons, founded upon the torts of the latter to them in the course of their agency.

§ 393. And, first, in relation to the rights of agents against third persons, founded upon contracts made by them. These rights, being in derogation of the general doctrine already stated, apply only to special and particular cases. They are all resolvable into the following classes: First, where the contract is made in writing expressly with the agent, and imports to be a contract personally with him, although he may be known to act as an agent.² Secondly, where the agent is the only known or ostensible principal, and, therefore, is, in contemplation of law, the real contracting party.³ Thirdly, where by the usage of trade, or the general course of business, the agent is authorized to act as the owner, or as a principal contracting party, although his character as agent is known.⁴ Fourthly, where the agent has

¹ Ante, § 154-159, 161, 266-270, 275; *Pentz v. Stanton*, 10 Wend. R. 271; *Beebee v. Robert*, 12 Wend. R. 413; *Higgins v. Semor*, 8 Mees. & Welsb. 480; Ante, § 270, note.

² See ante, §§ 266, 269, 275, 278; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 210, 211; *Clay v. Southern*, 7 Exch. R. 717; *Burrell v. Jones*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 47; *Iveson v. Conington*, 1 Barn. & Cressw. 160; Post, § 394-396; 1 Liversm. on Agency, 215-221, (edit. 1818); *Banfill v. Leigh*, 8 T. Rep. 571. See *Hudson v. Granger*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 27, 32, 33; *Fisher v. Ellis*, 3 Pick. R. 322; *Faulfield v. Adams*, 16 Pick. 381; Ante, §§ 260, 260 a, 269, 270; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 631, 632, (4th edit.) But see *Garland v. Reynolds*, 2 Applet. 1, R. 45.

³ See ante, 102, note, 160, 161, 266-270, 293; Post, § 396.

⁴ See ante, § 268-270, 278; Post, 397.

made a contract, in the subject-matter of which he has a special interest or property, whether he professed at the time to be acting for himself, or not.¹ In all these cases, the agent acquires personal rights, and may maintain an action upon the contract, in his own name, without any distinction, whether his principal is, or is not, entitled also to similar rights and remedies on the same contract.²

394. The first class may be illustrated by the common instance of a promissory note, given to an agent as such, for the benefit of his principal, where the promise is, to pay the money to the agent *eo nomine*, in which case he may sue on the note in his own name.³ So, a promissory note, promising to pay A and B, "trustees of —," (naming the corporation,) may be sued by A and B, as proper parties thereto.⁴ So, a promissory note, made payable, or indorsed to A, "cashier," or order, may be sued by him personally, he being the cashier of a bank.⁵ So, a promissory note, payable to A, "commissioner and agent for the inhabitants of the county of B," may be sued by A, as a proper party.⁶ So, if a promissory note should contain a promise by the maker to pay to A, for the use or the benefit of B, a certain sum of money, A, and not B, would be the proper person to maintain an action on the note.⁷ So, a promise to pay A, "guardian of B," may be sued by A, and cannot be sued by B.⁸ So, a note to A and B, trustees of the corporation of B, might be sued by A and B, and not by the corporation.⁹ So, where a bond is

¹ Smith on Merc Law, p 138, (3d edit 1843) See *Dunlap v. Lambert*, 6 Clark & Fennell 600, 626, 627, *Bryan v. Wilson*, 27 Ala R. 215, Post, §§ 394, 397, 407, 408, 424.

² See ante, §§ 160, 162, 268-270, 272-275, 278.

³ *Commercial Bank v French*, 21 Pick 486, *Fairfield v. Adams*, 16 Pick. R. 381; *Fisher v Ellis*, 3 Pick 322, Ante, §§ 260, 260 a, 269, 270. But see *Inhabitants of Garland v. Reynolds*, 2 Applet R 45, and other cases cited in note to ante, § 269 *Binney v Plumley*, 5 Vermont R. 500.

⁴ *Binney v Plumley*, 5 Vermont R. 500

⁵ *McHenry v Ridgely*, 2 Scamm R Ill. 309; *Porter v. Nekervis*, 4 Rand. Virg R 3æ *Johnson v Catlin*, 27 Verm 89, Post, § 395.

⁶ *McConnell v. Thomas*, 2 Scamm Ill R. 313. But see ante, § 269, note; and post, § 395.

⁷ *Buffum v. Chadwick*, 8 Mass R 103, *Doe v. Thompson*, 2 Foster, 217.

⁸ *Wheelock v Wheelock*, 5 Verm. R. 433.

⁹ *Binney v. Plumley*, 5 Verm 500.

given to A, for the use of himself and B, it will be treated as a bond given to A, and he is solely entitled to sue thereon, as obligee; and B can neither sue thereon, nor release it at law.¹ So, where an acceptance is, to pay an agent the amount of a bill of exchange, he may, although he is a known agent, sue thereon in his own name.² So, if an agent is the shipper of goods, and by the bill of lading they are deliverable to him or his assigns, he paying freight, he may sue thereon, although he is a known agent; for the bill of lading amounts to a direct contract with him.³ [So, the person named as shipper in a bill of lading, may sue the carrier for injury to the goods, although he has neither a general or special property therein.]⁴ So, if a sale note purport to be made by A, on account of B, and the purchaser is to pay A, by a bill payable at a future day, it seems, that A may sue on the contract, especially if he has a beneficial interest in it.⁵ So, if a negotiable note is indorsed in blank, and sent by the owner to his agent for collection, the agent may sue thereon in his own name, as indorsee.⁶ So, where a policy of

¹ *Offley v. Warde*, 1 Lev. 235. See also the Reporter's note to *Piggott v. Thompson*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 149 (a).

² *Van Staphorst v. Pearce*, 1 Mass. R. 258.

³ See *Joseph v. Knox*, 3 Camp. R. 320, 1 Liversm. on Agency, 216, 217, (edit. 1810) *Griffith v. Ingledew*, 6 Serg. & Rawle, 429. But see *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 3, p. 216, (Amer. edit. 1829), *Id.* Pt. 3, ch. 7, § 1, p. 285-287, and note to Amer. edit. 1829. See *Sargent v. Morris*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 277, Ante, §§ 263-264.

⁴ [*Bianchard v. Page*, 8 Gray, 261, where the subject is very fully examined by Shaw, C. J.]

⁵ *Atkins v. Amber*. 2 Esp. R. 493; 2 Liversm. on Agency, 217-219, (edit. 1818.)

⁶ *Solomons v. Bank of England*, 13 East, R. 135, n; *Clarke v. Pigot*, 12 Mod. R. 195; *Adams v. Oakes*, 6 Carr. & Payne, 70; *De la Chaumette v. Bank of England*, 9 Barr. & Cressw. 208; *Little v. O'Brien*, 9 Mass. R. 123; *Brigham v. Marean*, 7 Pick. R. 40; *Banks v. Eastin*, 15 Martin, R. 291; Ante, §§ 227, 228; 1 Bell, Comm. § 412, p. 392, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 493, 494, (5th edit.); *United States v. Dugan*, 3 Wheat. R. 172, 180; *Guernsey v. Burns*, 25 Wend. 411; *McConnell v. Thomas*, 2 Scamm. Ill. R. 313; *Story on Bills of Exchange*, § 224; contra, *Thatcher v. Winslow*, 5 Mason, R. 58; *Sherwood v. Roys*, 14 Pick. R. 172. The latter was a note payable to bearer, and held by the agent to collect; but no transfer of the property was intended. There were some peculiarities in this case, as well as in that of *Thatcher v. Winslow*, which distinguish them from

insurance is procured to be underwritten by an agent in his own name, for the benefit of a particular person, or for whom it may concern, the agent may sue thereon, in his own name, for any loss occurring under the policy; for he is treated as a direct party to the contract, and the underwriter undertakes to pay the loss to him.¹ And yet, in such a case, there is no doubt that the principal may sue in his own name, on the same policy.² So, in the case of a bill of lading, signed by the master, he may sue for the freight and primage.³ So, upon a charter-party, executed by the master in his own name, on behalf of the owner, he may sue for any breach of the covenants contained therein on the part of the charterer.⁴ Indeed, for many purposes, as we have already seen, masters of ships are treated as possessing the powers and rights of owners.⁵ The same principle applies generally to cases, where contracts are made by agents with third

the other cases, and may, perhaps, reconcile them with the general doctrine, stated in the text.

¹ Ante, §§ 109, 111, 160, 161, 272, 273; Post, § 498; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 361, 362; 2 Story on Equity Jurisp. § 460; *Usparicha v. Noble*, 13 East, R. 332; *Sargent v. Morris*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 277, 280.

² *Ibid.* We have already seen, that this doctrine is not peculiar to the English law; but that it is recognized in the jurisprudence of continental Europe. See ante, §§ 109, 111, 272, 273; 1 Emerigon, Assur. ch. 5, § 3, pp. 137, 138; *Id.* § 4, p. 139-141; Pothuer, *Traite d'Assur.* n. 96; 2 Valin, *Comm. Liv.* 3, tit. 6, art. 3, pp. 132, 133. In *Sargent v. Morris*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 277, 280, Mr. Justice Bayley said: "Now, I take the rule to be this, — if an agent acts for me, and on my behalf, but in his own name, then, inasmuch as he is the person with whom the contract is made, it is no answer to an action in his name to say, that he is merely an agent, unless you can also show that he is prohibited from carrying on that action by the person on whose behalf the contract was made. In such cases, however, you may bring your action, either in the name of the party by whom the contract was made, or of the party for whom the contract was made. In policies of insurance, it is a common practice to bring your action, either in the name of the agent or principal." Where the policy of insurance is under seal, there, upon principles already suggested, the action must be brought exclusively in the name of the agent. Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 362; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 211; Ante, §§ 155, 160-162; *Id.* 272-278; *Shack v. Anthony*, 1 M. & Selw. 573.

³ *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 3, ch. 7, § 4, p. 282-288, (Amer. edit. 1829); *Id.* Pt. 3, ch. 3, § 11, p. 246-249.

⁴ *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 3, ch. 1 § 2, (Amer. edit. 1829); Ante, §§ 116, 158, 161, 275, 276, 294; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 210, 211; Post, §§ 399, 400.

⁵ Ante, §§ 116, 160 a, 161, 294, 298, 299.

persons, under the seal of both parties, and the contracts are in their own proper names; for, in such cases, the principal cannot be treated as a party in form, or entitled to avail himself of the contract *ex directo*, however he may be indirectly bound by, or entitled to avail himself of it.¹

§ 395. In all the foregoing cases, it is apparent, that the agent is the direct party, with whom the contract is made; and, therefore, no difficulty can arise as to his title to sue.² But it is sometimes a matter of difficulty, upon the face of a writing, to ascertain who is the proper party contracted with, whether he be the principal, or the agent. In such cases, resort must be had to the whole instrument, in order to ascertain who that party is; and, when the proper interpretation is fixed, the law will act accordingly upon it. Some cases may be useful to illustrate the difficulty as well as to show the manner in which it has been overcome. Thus, for example, where A, in writing, agreed to pay the rent of certain tolls, which he had hired for three years of certain commissioners for drainage, "to the treasurer of the commissioners," it was held, that no action was maintainable by the treasurer in his own name for the rent, but that it was a promise to the commissioners to pay the rent to the person whom they should, from time to time, appoint to receive it.³ So, where certain persons signed a subscription paper, to take certain shares in a turnpike corporation, set against their names, and to pay on demand to A. B. or order, all assessments, made by the corporation for the purposes of the road; it was held, that A. B. (who was agent of the corporation) could not recover upon the promise in his own name; but that the suit must be brought in the name of the corporation, upon the ground, that, there being no consideration between the agent and the subscribers, he could not support an action.⁴ So, where an attorney gave a receipt

¹ Ante, §§ 155, 160, 160 a, 161, 162, 272, 278, 275-278; *Hopkins v. Mehaffey*, 11 Serg. & Rawle, 129; Ante, § 273, note (1); 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 211; *Hanford v. McNair*, 9 Wend. R. 54; *Blood v. Goodrich*, 9 Wend. R. 68; *Spencer v. Field*, 10 Wend. R. 87; *Potts v. Rider*, 3 Hamm. Ohio R. 71.

² See *Hudson v. Granger*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 27, 32, 33.

³ *Piggott v. Thompson*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 147, 150; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 215, 216; (edit. 1818.)

⁴ *Gilmore v. Pope*, 5 Mass. R. 491; Ante, § 274. It is somewhat difficult to reconcile this case with other admitted doctrines. If there be a consideration for

by which he acknowledged, that he had received of A. B. an agreement between C. & D. "assigned to S. S., to collect the

a promise, it does not seem material, from whom it comes. [See *Colburn v. Phillips*, 13 Gray, 66.] See on this point *Piggott v. Thompson*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 147, and the note (a), of the Reporters, p. 149. Lord Alvanley, in the case of *Piggott v. Thompson*, said: "It is not necessary to discuss, whether, if A let land to B, in consideration of which the latter promises to pay the rent to C, his executors and administrators, 'may maintain an action on this promise.'" The Reporters, in their note, say: "This very point arose in *Lowther v. Kelly*, 8 Mod. 115, where the plaintiff's attorney had made a lease by indenture to the defendant in his own name, rendering rent to the plaintiff, whom the defendant covenanted to pay. But the case appears to have been adjourned, after argument, without any decision. It is said by Levinz, J., in *Gilby v. Copley*, 3 Lev. 139, that, when a deed is made *inter partes*, a stranger shall not take advantage of a covenant made for his benefit. But, where it is not made *inter partes*, he may, whether the deed be indented or not. For this he cites *Cooker v. Child*, 111. 24, and 25, Car. 2, B. R., which was an action on a charter-party indented in these terms: 'This indented charter-party witnesseth, that Bindley, master and part owner of the ship, with the consent of Cooker, the other part owner, hath let the ship to Child, on such a voyage,' and Child covenanted with Bindley, *non* with Cooker, to pay £300, and it was held, that Cooker might maintain the action. Lord Holt also, in *Salter v. Kingley*, Carth. 77, held, that one party to a deed could not covenant with another, who was no party, but a mere stranger to it. So, where a bill was sealed in this manner: 'Received of A £40 to the use of B and C, equally to be divided, to be repaid at such a time to the use of B and C,' it was resolved, that B and C might each sue for £20. *Shaw v. Sherwood*, Cro. Eliz. 729, affirmed in error, Yelv. 23. But, where a bond was made to A for the benefit of B, it was adjudged the latter could neither sue upon it, nor release it, he not being a party to the bond. *Osley v. Ward*, 1 Lev. 235. Vide etiam 2 Inst. 673. With respect to the right of a third person to sue upon a parol promise made to another for his benefit, there is great contradiction among the older cases, all which are collected 1 Vin. Abridg. fol. 333-337, Actions of Assumpsit, Z. But, in *Dutton v. Poole*, Mich. 29, Car. 2, B. R. 2 Lev. 210; S. C. 1 Vent 318; S. C. Sir T. Raym. 302; and S. C. Sir T. Jones, 102, the point seems to have been very fully considered and very solemnly decided. There, the father of the plaintiff's wife, being seised of a wood, which he intended to sell to raise fortunes for younger children, the defendant being his heir, in consideration that he would forbear to sell it, promised to pay his daughter, the plaintiff's wife, £1,000, for which the action was brought; and it was held, that the plaintiff might well maintain the action; which decision was affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber. In that case, indeed, some stress was laid upon the nearness of relationship between the plaintiff's wife and her father, to whom the promise was made. But another case has since occurred, to which that reason does not apply. In *Martin v. Hinde*, Cowp. 437, the plaintiff declared against the defendant, rector of A, upon an instrument in writing, dated, &c., whereby

money therein contained," it was held, that A. B., being the mere agent of S. S., could not sue the attorney for the moneys col-

the defendant promised the plaintiff to retain him as curate, till, &c., and to allow him £50 per annum. The instrument produced in evidence was a certificate, addressed to the bishop, whereby the defendant nominated the plaintiff his curate, and promised to allow him £50 per annum. Upon this evidence the plaintiff was, after argument, held entitled to recover against the defendant. So in *Marchington v. Vernon*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 101, in *notis*, Buller, J. expressly says: "If one person makes a promise to another for the benefit of a third, that third may maintain an action upon it." The decision in *Gilmore v. Pope*, 5 Mass. R. 491, seems also in direct conflict with the doctrine in *Higgins v. Senior*, 8 Mees. & Welb. R. 834, 844; *Ante*, §§ 160, 460 a, 270. See also *Binney v. Plumley*, 5 Verm. R. 500. See also 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, 217-220, (edit. 1818), *Taunton and South Boston Turnpike v. Whiting*, 10 Mass. R. 327, 336, commenting on *Gilmore v. Pope*, 5 Mass. R. 491. [In *Colburn v. Phillips*, 13 Gray, 66, Hoar, J., said: "In *Gilmore v. Pope*, 5 Mass. 491, which was an action upon a subscription for shares in a turnpike company, with a promise to pay the assessments to the plaintiff, who was an agent of the company, the plaintiff was nonsuited, and Parsons, C. J., said: 'The action cannot be maintained in the name of a mere agent of the corporation, as in this transaction the plaintiff has alleged himself to be; there being no consideration, as between the agent and subscribers, to support an action of assumpsit.' This remark of the Chief Justice would seem to assume that, to support a promise, the consideration must always move from the party to whom the promise is made. On examining the case, the promise is found to be a part of a contract to take and pay for shares in the turnpike road, in consideration of being admitted as associates in the corporation. This is very clearly a contract with the corporation. The promise is to pay the assessments to Gilmore, or order; but there is not in terms any promise to Gilmore himself. The apparent purport, then, as well as the legal effect of the instrument, was an agreement with the corporation from whom the consideration proceeded. It would therefore stand as a promise to A, upon a consideration received from A, to pay a sum of money to B; upon which it is now well settled in this Commonwealth that B can maintain no action, except under certain peculiar and limited conditions. *Mellen v. Whipple*, 1 Gray, 317; *Pield v. Crawford*, 6 Gray, 116; *Dow v. Clark*, 7 Gray, 198. In *Bullum v. Chadwick*, 8 Mass. 103, the Court decided, that where a note was made to the plaintiff, describing him as agent of the Providence Hat Manufacturing Company, the action could be maintained by him, although the objection was suggested that he was a mere agent, and that the consideration moved from the company alone. They distinguish the case of *Gilmore v. Pope*, which was cited by the defendants' counsel, and observe that in that case 'the contract was directly with the corporation.' In the case of *Commercial Bank v. French*, 21 Pick. 486, it was decided, that a promissory note made to 'the cashier of the Commercial Bank,' the note being the property of the bank, was a contract with the bank, on which the corporation might sue. *Gilmore v. Pope* is cited as sustaining the decision; but the case rests upon

lected; but that the suit should be by S. S. So, where a bill of lading acknowledged that the master had received the goods of

the doctrine that, by a just construction of the language used, as terms of description, the contract was made with the bank. In *Eastern Railroad v. Benedict*, 5 Gray, 561, it was determined that upon an order payable 'to D. A. Neale, President of the Eastern Railroad Company,' the corporation, being the real party in interest, might sue in its own name. The authorities were fully examined and discussed, and we are satisfied with the correctness of the decision; but no question arose in that case whether the action might not have been maintained, if brought in the name of the payee. In *Gunn v. Cantine*, 10 Johns. 387, the action was upon a receipt given to an attorney, upon an undertaking to collect the money due upon a contract belonging to his principal; but the Court notice the fact that there was no express promise to pay the money collected to the attorney; and only decide that the promise implied by law from the instrument was to the principal, a view consistent with that which we have suggested in regard to the case of *Gilmore v. Pope*. There is a class of cases in which it has been held that a promise to a public officer, in his official capacity, must be enforced by a suit in the name of the public body for which he acts. *Pigott v. Thompson*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 147; *Irish v. Webster*, 5 Greenl. 171. *Garland v. Reynolds*, 20 Maine, 45. The principle is analogous to that which holds that one who signs a contract as a public officer is not personally responsible upon it, though the ground upon which it is put is, that a just construction of the contract makes it the contract of the principal. In *Thatcher v. Winslow*, 3 Mason, 58, Mr. Justice Story held, that an agent, not having any legal or equitable interest in a promissory note, cannot sue as indorsee upon it. The only authorities which he names in support of the doctrine, are *Gunn v. Cantine* and *Gilmore v. Pope*, before cited. If the effect of the decision is merely this, that putting a promissory note into the hands of an agent, indorsed in blank, without any authority express or implied to him to bring a suit upon it, will not constitute such a transfer of the note to him as will support an action upon it in his name, we have no doubt of its correctness. *Sherwood v. Roys*, 14 Pick. 172. But in Story on Agency, § 294, it is said that 'if a negotiable note is indorsed in blank, and sent by the owner to his agent for collection, the agent may sue thereon in his own name as indorsee;' and in § 161, that 'if an agent should procure a policy of insurance in his own name, for the benefit of his principal, the agent, as well as the principal, may sue thereon.' In §§ 392, 393, 395, 396, the doctrine is stated in the broadest terms, that whenever the contract is made in writing expressly with the agent, and imports to be a contract personally with him, and also where he is the only known or ostensible principal, and therefore is, in contemplation of law, the real contracting party, he may sue in his own name. And such is the general current of the authorities; and we are satisfied that, to support an action upon an express promise, it is in general immaterial whether the consideration move from the promisee or from another. In *Baxter v. Read*, cited in *Dyer*, 272 *b*, note, it was 'adjudged, that where Baxter had retained Read to be miller to his aunt, at ten shillings per week, this will support an action on the case; for although it is not

A, and the master undertook to deliver them to A, and in his name, according to usage, to B or his assigns, (he or they) paying freight; and the goods were the property of A; it was held, that A, not B, ought to bring a suit for the goods, or for damages done to them.¹ So, where a bill of lading was for a shipment of goods consigned to A for the account of B; it was held, that B, and not A, was the proper party to bring an action for the non-delivery.² So, where the mayor of a corporation, in be-

beneficial to Baxter, it is chargeable to Read.' In *Goodwin v. Willoughby*, Pop. 178, Doderidge, J., says: 'If a stranger saith, "Forbear such a debt of J. S. and I will pay it," it is a good consideration for the loss to the plaintiff.' In *Sargent v. Morris*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 277, it was held that the consignee could not sue for damage to goods shipped on board the defendant's vessel, the consignee being only the agent of the consignor, and having no present interest in the goods at the time of the injury. But there the bill of lading stated the receipt of the goods from the consignor, and undertook 'to deliver the same to you, and in your name, according to custom and usage, to Mr. Sargent or his assigns, paying freight,' &c. In *Sims v. Bond*, 5 Barn. & Adolph. 363, and 2 Nov. & Munn. 616, Lord Denman asserts, that 'it is a well-established rule of law, that where a contract, not under seal, is made with an agent in his own name, for an undisclosed principal, either the agent or the principal may sue upon it.' In the case at bar, the contract was with the plaintiff in his own name, no other principal was disclosed, and it was executed on his part. We think the promise of the defendants was upon a sufficient consideration, and may be enforced by the person to whom it was expressly made."]'

¹ *Sargent v. Morris*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 277. See also *Evans v. Marlett*, 1 Ld. Raym. 271; 12 Mod. R. 156; 3 Salk. 291. But see *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 361; Ante, §§ 263, 269, 271, 394.

² *Read*. It has been matter of some contrariety of opinion, whether, if a bill of lading contains a clause, that the goods shall be delivered to the shipper or his assigns, and it is indorsed to an agent of the shipper, the agent can, as consignee, maintain an action for the non-delivery or conversion of the goods, as he has no interest in them before they come to hand. In *Coxe v. Harden*, 4 East, R. 211, the Court intimated a strong opinion, that he could not. Lord Ellenborough, in *Waring v. Cox*, 1 Campo. R. 369, ruled the same point the same way. But Mr. Paley says, that it seems at present to be settled, that he may, provided the consignment be not countermanded. But for this he cites no authority, except an unreported anonymous decision before Lord Ellenborough, at the sittings after Trinity Term, 1810. *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 364. See *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 3, ch. 2, § 3, p. 216, (Amer. edit. 1829); Ante, § 271 and note. In *Griffith v. Ingledew*, 6 Serg. & Rawle, 429, goods were shipped at Liverpool by A on his own account, but by the bill of lading they were made deliverable to B or his assigns at Philadelphia. The freight on the goods was paid at Liverpool by A. It was held, that B could maintain an action against the owner of the ship for loss

half of himself and the rest of the burgesses and commonalty of the corporation, signed in his own name, as mayor, a memorandum of a sale of some real estate of the corporation with the purchaser, and they thereby mutually agreed to perform and fulfil, on each of their parts respectively, the conditions of the sale; it was held, that the mayor could not maintain an action upon the agreement against the purchaser for a breach thereof; for he acted merely as agent of the corporation, and did not contract on behalf of himself personally.¹ So, where a note was given by B to A, "Treasurer of the committee of the surplus fund" of a town, for money loaned by it with the authority of the town, it was held, that the suit was properly brought in the name of the town, and could not be properly brought by A in his own name, as he had no interest in the note.² So, where a note was given to A, the land agent of a State, in his official capacity, it was held, that the suit ought to be brought in the name of the State, and not of A.³ So, where a note was given payable "to the cashier of the Commercial Bank, or order," it was held, that the bank might properly maintain a suit thereon in its corporate name.⁴ So, where a person subscribed an engagement to pay

by the negligent carriage of the goods, although B was but an agent, for the legal property by the bill of lading vested in B in trust for A. This last case contains a review of the English decisions, and as there was a difference of opinion on the Bench, (Mr. Justice Gibson dissenting,) the point was examined with extraordinary care and ability. See *Amos v. Temperley*, 8 Mees & Welsb. 798, Ante, §§ 263, 274; *Dunlap v. Lambert*, 6 Clark & Fennell. R. 600, 626, 627, Ante, § 274 and note.

¹ *Bowen v. Morris*, 2 Taunt. R. 374, Ante, § 154. It must be admitted, that some of these cases stand upon very nice and critical grounds. The true principle undoubtedly is, that, wherever, taking the whole language of the instrument together, it is to be inferred, that the promise is made, not to the agent personally, but through him to the principal, there the suit should be brought in the name of the principal, and not of the agent. But there certainly is no legal difficulty in making a promise to an agent to pay him money, or to deliver to him goods for the use or benefit of his principal; and in such a case it should seem, that the agent might maintain a suit in his own name upon such a contract. See ante, §§ 154, 395, 2 *Liverm. on Agency*, 215-225, (edit 1818).

² *The Inhabitants of Garland v. Reynolds*, 2 Appleton, R. 45. But see ante, § 394.

³ *Irish v. Webster*, 5 Greenl. R. 171.

⁴ *Commercial Bank v. French*, 21 Pick. R. 486. And see *Eastern Railroad v. Benedict*, 5 Gray, 561; Ante, §§ 154, 155, 161, 269, 270, 275. See also *Medway*

to A. B., or order, as assessments on shares taken by him in a turnpike corporation, it was held, that the corporation might maintain an action thereon, A. B. being their agent, and that the agent A. B., could not.¹ So, a note given to A, "as town treasurer," is not suable in his own name,² but is suable in the name of the town.³ The like interpretation has been applied to a note payable to A, "town treasurer, or his successors in office,"⁴ and to a note payable to the selectmen of the town of A.⁵ [But in a later case in the same court, this doctrine was doubted, and it was there held that a promissory note payable to "A. B., cashier," might be sued by A. B. in his own name.]

Cotton Manufactory v. Adams, 10 Mass. R. 360; *Ante*, § 269, note; *Woodstock Bank v. Downer*, 27 Verm. 482.

¹ *Taunton and South Boston Turnpike v. Whiting*, 10 Mass. R. 327; *Gilmore v. Pope*, 5 Mass. R. 491. It is very difficult, if not impracticable, to reconcile all the cases upon this subject. Many of them might be reconciled by the doctrine, that either the agent or the principal might sue in such cases. See *Dupont v. Mount Pleasant Co.* 9 Richardson, 259.

² [*See quare*, as to not being suable in his own name.]

³ *Hinds v. Stone*, *Brayton's Rep.* 230.

⁴ *Arlington v. Hinds*, *D. Chipman's R.* 431.

⁵ *Middlebury v. Case*, 6 Verm. R. 165.

[⁶ *Johnson v. Catlin*, 27 Verm. 87. And Bennett, J., said: "At somewhat of an early day, in the case of the Town of Arlington v. Hinds, 1 D. Chip. 431, it was held that where the note was given to Luther Stone, town treasurer, or his successors in office, the action might be maintained on it in the name of the town of Arlington; and, in that case, the position was advanced by the judge who gave the opinion of the Court, that, though the action might be maintained in the name of the town, yet it would not follow but what Stone might also have the action in his own name. The principles of that case have been followed in several subsequent cases. The case in Chipman arose under somewhat peculiar circumstances, and the Court must have been pressed with the necessity of sustaining that action to prevent a failure of justice in that particular case, and the Court found it necessary to assume that the law-merchant was not adopted in this State, in order to avoid the effect of the position that, upon commercial paper, the person who appears upon the face of the paper to have the legal interest, must sue; and that you cannot resort to matter *alunde* the note to determine who may sue upon it. But it has long been settled in this State, that the law merchant was a part of our law, so that it now appears that the very ground upon which the case of *Arlington v. Hinds*, was based, has been long since swept away. If the principles which are applicable to the case of principal and agent could have been rightly applied to the case of *Arlington v. Hinds*, it might have been sound. In such case it is familiar law, that the action may be brought in the

§ 396. The second class of cases would seem scarcely to require any illustration; for, as the agent acts in his own name, without disclosing any other principal, it follows, as an irresistible inference, that the other contracting party binds himself personally to the agent. This, indeed, would seem justly to follow from the reciprocity of obligation on the other side; for (as we have already seen) the agent is in every such case undeniably bound by his personal promise to the other party.¹ Hence it is, that if an agent sells the goods of his principal in his own name, and as if he were owner, he is entitled to sue the buyer for the price in his own name, although the principal may also sue.² [So, if he sells goods on a condition not complied with, he may maintain replevin for the same.³] And, on the other hand, if he buys goods in his own name, as purchaser, he may maintain action on the contract against the

name of the principal from whom the consideration moves, or in the name of the agent with whom the contract was ostensibly made. Though this Court have been repeatedly called upon to repudiate the case of *Arlington v. Hinds*, as being a departure from the principles of the law-merchant, they have hitherto declined; and subsequent decisions have been made upon the authority of that case, which would seem to be opposed to the current of the cases which have been decided upon the principles of the commercial law. It may be a matter of some importance that there should be a uniformity of decision on commercial questions in the different States, and how long our courts will adhere to the authority of the case of *Arlington v. Hinds* for the sake of preserving uniformity in our own decisions, though it mars the symmetry of the commercial law, must depend upon the subsequent adjudications of this Court. There may be a difficulty, as the counsel argue, upon the principles of the commercial law, in holding that either the cashier or the bank can maintain an action on this bill, at their own election. But let that be as it may, we think it is clear that this action is well brought. The cases are numerous, where it has been held in cases of promissory notes and bills of exchange, that a promise to the agent, naming him, and not his principal, although the word agent, or cashier, be added to his name, is a promise to the agent as an individual, and the addition is simply descriptive of the person.”]

¹ Ante, § 266–270, 290, 291; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 211–214; Ante, § 160; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 288, 289; Id. 361, 362; Id. 364–367; *Leeds v. The Marine Insur. Com.* 6 Wheat. 565; *Sims v. Bond*, 3 Barn. & Adolph. 393.

² Ante, §§ 290, 291, 293; *Beebee v. Robert*, 12 Wend. 413; *Bickerton v. Burrell, & M. & Selw.* 383. See also *Rayner v. Grote*, 15 Meeson & Welsby, R. 359; Post, § 426, note.

³ *Tyler v. Freeman*, 3 Cush. 261.

seller, whether it be for a delivery thereof, if wrongfully withheld, or upon any warranty on the same, in the same manner as if he were the only party in interest.¹ The principle will apply with far greater force, when the agent has an interest in the property, or a lien on it, as we shall more fully see in the succeeding pages.²

§ 397. The third class of cases is, where, by the usage of trade, or the general course of business, the agent, although known to be acting as such, is dealt with, as if he were the owner or principal, so that the contract is deemed a personal contract with him. In cases of this sort, it seems to be wholly immaterial, whether the contract is deemed to be exclusively made with the agent, or whether the real principal, also, has a right, as an implied party, to avail himself of the contract.³ The fourth class of cases is, where the agent has made a contract, in the subject-matter of which he has a special interest or property; whether he professed at the time to be acting for himself or not. For the most part, the illustrations arising under the third and fourth classes, embrace mixed considerations, dependent upon the usage of trade and business, and a special interest or property of the agent in the thing contracted for, or the business done. They will, therefore, be conveniently discussed together. It may be laid down, as a general rule, that wherever an agent, although known to be such, has a special property in the subject-matter of the contract, and not a bare custody thereof, or where he has acquired an interest in it, or has a lien upon it, he may, in all such cases, sue upon the contract.⁴ Thus, for example, as we have seen, an auctioneer may maintain an action in his own name, for goods sold by him at

¹ Ante, §§ 290, 291, 293; *Beebee v. Robert*, 12 Wend. 413; *Bickerton v. Burrell*, 5 M. & Selw. 383. See also *Rayner v. Grote*, 15 Meeson & Welsby, R. 459; Post, § 496, note.

² 1 *Livrm. on Agency*, 220, (edit. 1818); 3 *Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* 211; Post, § 397.

³ Ante, §§ 269, 270, 272-280; Post, § 403-412, 418-440.

⁴ *Atkins v. Amber*, 2 Esp. R. 493; Ante, § 164; 1 *Livrm. on Agency*, 215-219, (edit. 1818); *Joseph v. Knox*, 3 Camp. R. 320; *Williams v. Millington*, 1 H. Black. 81, 84; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 361, 362; *Sargent v. Morris*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 276, 280, 281; 3 *Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* 210, 211; *Leeds v. The Marine Ins. Com.* 6 Wheat. 565.

public or at private auction.¹ It will make no difference in the case, that the goods are even sold on the land of the owner, and are known to be his property; for an auctioneer has a possession, coupled with an interest, in goods which he is employed to sell, and not a bare custody, like a servant or shopman.² An auctioneer, also, has a special property in the goods to be sold, and a lien for the charges of the sale, and for his commissions.³

§ 398. Upon a similar ground, if an agent is answerable to his principal for the price of the goods sold by him, or for any other debt contracted by or with him in the course of his agency, he will be entitled to sue for the price, or other debt, in his own name.⁴ Thus, for example, an agent selling under a *del credere* commission, is entitled to sue for the price of the goods sold by him. Indeed, as between himself and the vendee, he is generally treated as the owner of the goods; and of course he is entitled to the general rights of an owner; but still he is so, subject to the superior rights of the principal, not incompatible with his own.⁵ So, if an agent procures a policy of insurance in his own name for his principal, and pays the premium; and it turns out, in the event, that the policy never attached, or is void from some circumstance, of which he had no knowledge; he may sue for and recover back in his own name the premium, which he has paid therefor.⁶ So, if an agent has transferred the money or property of his principal, under circumstances which give him a right to recover it back, he may do so in his own name, notwithstanding his principal may maintain a like suit therefor; the agent (as was said by Lord Mansfield) may maintain the suit from the authority of the principal, and the princi-

¹ Ante, § 27.

² Ante, § 27; *Williams v. Millington*, 1 H. Black. 81, 84. See also *Robinson v. Rutter*, 30 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 401, *Coppin v. Walker*, 7 Taunt. R. 237; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 210, 211; *Coppin v. Craig*, 7 Taunt. R. 248.

³ *Williams v. Millington*, 1 H. Black. 81, 85, Ante, § 27.

⁴ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 210, 211.

⁵ *Houghton v. Mathews*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 485, 489; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 211; Post, §§ 402, 403.

⁶ *Ocm v. Bruce*, 12 East, 225. See *Leeds v. Mar. Ins. Com.* 6 Wheat. 565.

pal may maintain it, as proving it paid by the agent.¹ But perhaps, strictly speaking, the agent acquires such right, because of his responsibility for the money or property to his principal, and the interest which he has in indemnifying himself. Indeed, the proposition may be laid down in broader terms, that, if an agent pays money for his principal, by mistake or otherwise, which he ought not to have paid, the agent, as well as the principal, may maintain an action to recover it back.²

§ 399. The cases of contracts made by masters of ships, relative to their repairs and usual employment, and other incidental contracts, belonging to their office and duties, fall under the like consideration. We have seen that the master of a ship is ordinarily liable on all such contracts, made in virtue of his office; and there is a reciprocal obligation on the other party to the master.³ Indeed, it would be an anomaly to hold that the contract is, for the purpose of charging the master, personal on his part; and, at the same time, that there is not, on the other side, a correspondent responsibility to him; since the foundation of the contract, in every such case, must be a mutual and reciprocal consideration, sufficient to create a mutual and reciprocal obligation.

§ 400. But the most common illustration of the third class of cases, and that, indeed, which presents the principles upon which it is founded in its clearest form, is that of a factor. In regard to foreign factors, it has been already stated that they are generally treated, not only as principals, in all contracts made with them

¹ *Stevenson v. Mortimer*, Cowp. R. 805; *Holt v. Ely*, 1 Ellis & Blackb. 795; 1b Eng. Law & Eq. R. 422.

² Post, § 435, *Stevenson v. Mortimer*, Cowper, R. 806. In this case Lord Mansfield said: "The ground of the non-suit at the trial was, that this action could not be well maintained by the plaintiffs, who are the owners of the vessel in question, but it ought to have been brought by the master, who actually paid the money. That ground, therefore, makes now the only question before us; as to which, there is not a particle of doubt. *Qui jacit per alium, facit per se*. Where a man pays money by his agent, which ought not to have been paid, either the agent or principal may bring an action to recover it back. The agent may, from the authority of the principal; and the principal may, as proving it to have been paid by his agent." See also *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 362, and *Bickerton v. Burrell*, 5 Maule & Selw. 383.

³ Ante, §§ 36, 116, 266-268, 294, 295, 298, 299; *Coppin v. Craig*, 7 Taunt. R. 243; 1 Bell, Comm. 422, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 523-538, (5th edit.)

and by them, but also as exclusive principals, (unless other circumstances repel the presumption,) whether they are known to be acting for others, or not;¹ so that exclusive credit is ordinarily deemed to be given by them and to them; and they alone, therefore, are ordinarily entitled to maintain actions on such contracts.² This doctrine is in conformity to the general usage of trade; and it was, in all probability, originally derived from it, as affording a just exposition of the intentions of all parties, and as being founded in public-policy and convenience, and in the safety, if not the necessities of commerce.³

§ 401. The same doctrine has been applied with some modifications, to the case of domestic factors. The latter are, by the usages of trade, treated as principals, although not as exclusive principals (for the real principal may sue and be sued on the contracts of his factor); and this without any distinction, whether, in making the contract they are known to be acting as factors, or not; whether they act under a *del credere* commission, or not.⁴ In every contract so made by them, they are entitled to sue, and may be sued, as principals.⁵

§ 401 *a*. The case of factors, both foreign and domestic,

¹ Ante, §§ 268, 290, and the authorities there cited; Post, §§ 423, 448, 1 Bell, Comm § 209, (4th edit.); Id p 491, (5th edit.), 1 Liverm on Agency, 226, 227, (edit. 1818); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 218, 334, 373, Addison v Gandasequi, 4 Taunt. 574, Thomson v Davenport, 9 Bain & Cressw 78.

² Ante, §§ 268, 290, Wilson v Zuluetta, 14 Q. B. Rep 405, Post, § 428, 1 Liverm. on Agency, 226, 227, (edit. 1818); 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf * 302, 303. See Taintor v Prendergast, 3 Hill, R. 72.

³ Ibid. It seems to have been held in Taintor v Prendergast, 3 Hill, R. 72, 73, that the agent is liable equally, whether his principal be a foreigner or not, if he does not disclose his principal, unless exclusive credit has been given to the agent. Ante, § 268; Trueman v Loder, 11 Adolph. & Ell 589, Kirkpatrick v. Stainer, 22 Wend. R. 244.

⁴ Ante, §§ 34, 110-112, 161, 162, 266, 268, 290, 293; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 324, 361; Houghton v. Mathews, 3 Bos. & Pull. 485, 489, 1 Liverm. on Agency, 226, 227, (edit. 1818); Leverick v. Meigs, 1 Cow. R. 645, 668, 664; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf 201, 202; 2 Bell, Comm §§ 417, 418, (4th edit.); p. 491, (5th edit.)

⁵ Ante, §§ 34, 110-112, 161, 162, 266, 268, 290, 293; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 361; Houghton v. Mathews, 3 Bos. & Pull. 485, 489; Sadler v. Leigh, 4 Campb. R. 195; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 215-221, (edit. 1818); Id. 226, 227, Girard v. Taggart, 5 Serg. & Rawle, R. 27; Smith on Merc. Law, B. 1, ch. 5, § 6, pp. 182, 189, (3d edit. 1843.)

affords an equally striking illustration of the fourth class of cases. Where factors are employed to sell goods, they are understood to be special owners, to be entitled to the management, control, and possession of the goods, and to have full authority to sell them (as indeed they usually do) in their own names.¹ Where they are employed to buy goods, similar considerations apply. They become personally liable to pay for them (although their principal may also be liable); and they have a right to the possession of them, and a special ownership in them.² In both cases they have also a lien on them, or their proceeds, for their commissions, disbursements, and advances touching them, as well as a lien for their general balance of accounts, subject to the exceptions already stated.³ They may also maintain suits in their own name for trespasses and torts committed on all goods, while in their possession as factors, founded upon their special ownership and rights therein.⁴

§ 402. But although agents are thus entitled, in a variety of cases, to maintain actions upon contracts made for, or on behalf of their principals, whether known or unknown; yet the right thus conferred upon them is not unlimited, either in regard to their principals, or in regard to the other contracting parties. Subject to the exceptions, which will be presently stated,⁵ this right of agents is subordinate to, and controllable by, their principals; and in favor of the other contracting parties, this right is also modified, so as not to work any injustice or wrong to them.⁶ Both parts of this proposition may require some illustration; and then the exceptions will naturally follow. *

¹ Ante, §§ 34, 110-112, 161, 266, 268, 290, 293.

² Ante, §§ 39, 110-112, 161, 162, 266, 268, 290, 293; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 210, 211.

³ Ante, §§ 34, 372, 373, 376, 377, 379; Post, § 407; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 210, 211; 2 Bell, Comm. § 799-802, (11th edit.); Id. B. 114-118, (5th edit.); Hudson v. Granger, 5 Barn. & Ald. 27, 32-34.

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 285-288; Id. 363-368; Williams v. Millington, 1 H. Black. 81; Smith on Merc. Law, 77, (2d edit.); Id. B. 1, ch. 5, § 6, pp. 138, 139, (3d edit. 1843); 1 Liverm. on Agency, 236, 227, (edit. 1818); Post, § 415.

⁵ Post, § 407-410.

⁶ Smith on Merc. Law, 77, (2d edit.); Id. B. 1, ch. 5, § 6, pp. 138, 139, (3d edit. 1843); Atkyns v. Amber, 2 Esp. R. 493; Ante, §§ 160, 161, 269, 270.

§ 403. In the first place, then, the right of agents is subordinate to, and controllable by, their principals.¹ Wherever the principal, as well as the agent, has a right to maintain a suit upon any contract, made by the latter, he may generally supersede the right of the agent to sue, by suing in his own name.² So, the principal may, by his own intervention, intercept, suspend, or extinguish the right of the agent under the contract; as, if he makes other arrangements with the other contracting party, or waives his claims under it, or receives payment thereof, or in any other manner discharges it.³ This, indeed, results from the general principle of law, that every man may waive rights, or extinguish rights, the benefit whereof exclusively belongs to himself; and, that, whatever rights are acquired by an agent are acquired for his principal. *Quicquid acquiritur servo, acquiritur domino.*⁴ *Quilibet potest renunciare juri, pro se introducto.*⁵ Of course this doctrine is applicable only to cases of pure agency, where the agent has no lien or other interest, or superior right in the property. If he has any, to the extent of such lien, and other interest and right, he is entitled to protection against the principal.⁶

¹ Post, §§ 410, 429.

² *Sadler v. Leigh*, 4 Camp. R. 194; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 221, (edit. 1818); *Paley on Agency*, 285-288; Id. 326, Id. 363-367; Id. 111, note (3); *Taintor v. Prendergast*, 3 Hill, R. 72, 73; *Girard v. Taggart*, 6 Serg. & Rawle, 27. In the case of *Sadler v. Leigh*, the contract was made with a factor, for the purchase of goods for his principal. The latter afterwards became bankrupt. Lord Ellenborough held, that the factor was a good petitioning creditor, under the bankrupt laws, for the debt. But, it appearing, that after the purchase, there had been a communication between the principal and the purchaser, whereby the former agreed to consider the latter as his debtor, and he had taken steps for recovering the debt directly from the purchaser, Lord Ellenborough held, that the factor's right was gone. He said: "This last fact, I think, is fatal to the petitioning creditor's debt. After the intervention of the principal, the right of the factor to sue was gone. The debt was then due to the principal, in the same manner, as if the sale had been made personally by him in the first instance." *Ante*, 160, 161, 269, 270.

³ See *Coppin v. Walker*, 7 Taunt. R. 237; *Coppin v. Craig*, 7 Taunt. R. 243; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 862; *Morris v. Cleasby*, 1 Maule & Selw. 576; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 226-228, (edit. 1818); *Walker v. Russ*, 2 Wash. Cir. R. 233; § *Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* 201-203.

⁴ 16 *Finl. Abridg.* 327; Co. Litt. 117 a.

⁵ 2 *Inst.* 134; *Wingate, Maxims*, p. 488.

⁶ *Ante*, §§ 371, 372.

§ 404. In the next place, in respect to the rights of the other party, with whom the agent has contracted. If the suit is brought in the name of the agent, instead of the principal, upon any contract knowingly made by the former for the latter, the other contracting party will generally be entitled to make the same defence, and establish the same claims against the agent, that he would be entitled to, if the suit were brought in the name of the principal.¹ Thus, for example, if a sale of goods is made by an auctioneer, or other agent, notoriously for his principal, the purchaser may, if he has no notice of any claims or demands of the agent upon the principal, make payment to the principal; and his payment will be available in a suit brought by the auctioneer, or other agent, notwithstanding any latent claims or liens, which the auctioneer or agent may have; for it is his duty in such a case to make his claims known to the purchaser, otherwise the latter may fairly presume, that a payment to the principal will be a just fulfilment of his contract.² So, in the like case, if the purchaser has a set-off against the principal, and has bought in reference to that claim, he may set off the claim in a suit brought by the agent, with the same effect, as if it were brought by the principal.³ So, if the purchaser has purchased of the agent upon the just belief, authorized by the facts of the case, that he is the real principal, he may avail himself of any set-off, which he has against the agent, as well as the principal, in any suit brought by the latter upon the contract; for, in such a case, he will be entitled to avail himself of the like set-off, if the suit is in the name of the principal.⁴

¹ *Atkyns v. Amber*, 2 Esp. R. 498; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 201-203, 211; Smith on Merc. Law, 77, (2d edit.); Id. pp. 135, 136, 139, (3d edit. 1843); *Leeds v. The Marine Ins. Co.* 6 Wheat. 565, 570, 571, *Taintor v. Prendergast*, 8 Hill, R. 72; Post, §§ 419, 420.

² *Coppin v. Walker*, 7 Taunt. R. 237; *Coppin v. Craig*, 7 Taunt. R. 248; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 211.

³ *Coppin v. Walker*, 7 Taunt. R. 237; *Coppin v. Craig*, 7 Taunt. R. 248; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 89, 90, (edit. 1818); *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 326, 327; *Stewart v. Aberdein*, 4 Mees. & Welsh. 218, 219, 228; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 201-203; *Leeds v. Marine Ins. Co.* 6 Wheat. 565, 570.

⁴ *Paley on Agency*, 287-289, 325-328 and note, 329, 330; *George v. Cliggett*, 7 Term Rep. 359; *Rabone v. Williams*, 7 Term Rep. 360, note (a); *Stracey v. Deely*, 7 Term Rep. 361, note; *Baring v. Corrie*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 137. See also

§ 405. The same doctrine applies to other matters of defence. Thus, if a suit is brought by an agent upon a negotiable note, given to him for the benefit of his principal, the maker, or other party sued, may avail himself of the same defects of title, such as fraud, or want of consideration, as if the principal had brought the suit in his own name;¹ for, although, in such a case, the agent is entitled to sue, yet, if he claims no beneficial interest in the note, and has acquired no lien on it for advances or otherwise, he is treated as a naked holder, asserting the mere rights of his principal, and is affected by the same equities as the latter.²

§ 406. The doctrine has been carried a step farther. For, if an auctioneer, or other agent, should avowedly contract with another for the purchase of property for a third person, as the agent of the latter, [who is named in the contract as principal,] when in fact he is himself the real principal, he will not only not be permitted to escape thereby from any defence to a suit, brought in his own name upon the contract; but he will not be allowed to maintain any suit in his own name on the contract as principal, without giving notice, before bringing the suit, of his real character in the transaction; for, otherwise, the vendor may be taken by surprise, and may be prevented from taking steps to avoid the suit, which he might have taken, if he had been apprized of all the facts.³

Lime Rock Bank v. Plimpton, 17 Pick. 159, *Leeds v. Marine Ins. Co.* 6 Wheat. R. 565, 570. See 2 Smith's Select Cases, 77 and note, 79, 80; *Warner v. McKay*, 1 Mees. & Welsb. 595; Post, § 419.

¹ Ante, §§ 227, 228; *Solomons v. Bank of England*, 13 East, R. 135, n.; *De la Chaumette v. Bank of England*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 208; S. C. 2 B. & Adolph. 385; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 238, 285-287, 326, 363, note (3), 364-367.

² Ibid.

³ See *Humble v. Hunter*, 12 Q. B. Rep. 359; *Bickerton v. Burrell*, 5 Maule & Selw. 383. On this occasion Lord Ellenborough said: "This is an action founded upon a contract made by the plaintiff in the character of agent to an individual, named by him as principal; and the question is upon the plaintiff's title to sue. In the ordinary transactions of commerce, a man may sell or purchase in his own name; and yet it does not follow that the contract is his; but the transaction is open to explanation, and others, who do not appear as parties to the contract, are frequently disclosed, and step in to demand the benefit of it. But where a man assigns to himself the character of agent to another, whom he

[§ 406 a. On the other hand, it has been expressly adjudged, that a person who contracts as agent for an unknown and un-

names, I am not aware that the law will permit him to shift his situation and declare himself the principal, and the other to be a mere creature of straw. That, I believe, has never yet been attempted. Now, on the face of this agreement, it is stated that the plaintiff made the purchase, paid the deposit, and agreed to comply with the conditions of sale for Richardson, and in the mere character of agent. Is not this account of himself to be taken *fortissime contra profitemum*: that is, that he was really treating in the character which he assigned to himself at the time of the purchase? And has not the defendant, with whom the plaintiff dealt as agent, a right still to consider him as such, notwithstanding he would now sue in the character of principal? Supposing that he might, under a different state of circumstances, have entitled himself to sue in his own name; surely the defendant ought to have had notice of the plaintiff's real situation before he is subjected to an action at the plaintiff's suit, and while it was open to him to make a tender. It was proposed to call Mrs. Richardson to prove that she had no interest in the transaction; and a reason was assigned why her name appeared in it, namely, that the purchase was intended for her benefit. Admitting this to be so, yet the question still occurs, whether a man who has dealt with another in the character of agent, is at liberty to retract that character without notice, and to turn round and sue in the character of principal. As to which, it appears to me, that the defendant ought at least to have an opportunity of knowing, by means of a specific notice, before he is dragged into a court of justice, the real situation in which the plaintiff claims to stand, in order that he may judge how to act. In the present case, *non constat* but that the defendant would have tendered the money. It was the plaintiff's fault originally, that he misled the defendant by assuming a situation, which did not belong to him; and therefore he was bound to undeceive the defendant before bringing an action. This seems to follow from a consideration of what the common principles of justice demand, which accord with the cases decided upon this subject. I recognize the authority of the Duke of Norfolk *v.* Worthy, which was merely the case of an undisclosed principal at the time of sale. Dr. Bethune's case is of like import; and it has been settled in many cases that a principal, when disclosed, may step in and exercise his own rights. But it is wholly without precedent, I believe, and, as it seems to me, contrary to justice, that a person who has exhibited himself as agent for another should at once throw off that character and put himself forward as principal, without any communication or notice to the other party." [But see *Rayner v. Grote*, 15 Mees. & Welsb. R. 359. In this case the plaintiff made a written contract for the sale of goods, in which he describes himself as the agent of A., and the buyer accepted and paid the price of a portion of the goods, and then had notice that the plaintiff was himself the real principal, and not the agent of A. It was decided that the plaintiff might sue in his own name for the non-acceptance of, and non-payment for the residue of the goods. In delivering the judgment of the Court, Baron Alderson considered the case of *Bickerton v. Burrell*. "And it may be observed," he said, "that this case is

named principal, may himself sue as principal, if he was in fact such, unless it appear that the other party relied on his character as being only an agent, and would not have contracted with him as principal, if he had known him to be such.¹]

really distinguishable from *Bickerton v. Burrell*, on the very ground on which that case was decided; for here, at all events, before action brought and trial had, the defendants knew that the plaintiff was the principal in the transaction. Perhaps it may be doubted whether that case was well decided on such a distinction, as it may fairly be argued that it would have been quite sufficient to prevent any possible inconvenience or injustice, and more in accordance with former authorities, if the Court had held that a party named as agent under such circumstances as existed in that case, was entitled, on showing himself to be the real principal, to maintain the action, the defendant being, however, allowed to make any defence to which he could show himself to be entitled, either as against the plaintiff or as against the person named as principal by the plaintiff in the contract. It is not, however, necessary for us, in the present case, to question the authority of that decision.”]

¹ [*Schmalz v. Avery*, 3 Eng. Law and Eq. R. 391; 16 Q. B. R. 655, — Patterson, J., said: “This was an action of assumpsit on a charter-party, not under seal, against the defendant, a ship-owner, for not taking the cargo on board according to the charter-party. The question raised on the plea of non-assumpsit is, whether the action will lie at the suit of the present plaintiff. The charter-party, in terms, states that it is made by Schmalz & Co., the plaintiffs, as agents for the freighter. It then states the terms of the contract, and concludes with these words: ‘This charter-party being concluded on behalf of another party, it is agreed that all responsibility on the part of Schmalz & Co. ceases as soon as the cargo is shipped.’ The declaration treats the charter-party as made between the plaintiff and the defendant, without mentioning the character of the plaintiff as agent, and without any reference to the concluding clause, thereby treating the plaintiff as principal in the contract. At the trial, it was proved, that the plaintiff was, in point of fact, the real freighter. No objection was taken to the admissibility of the evidence by which that fact was established; but at the close of the plaintiff’s case it was objected, that he was concluded by the terms of the charter-party, and fixed with the character of agent; so that he could sue only in that character, and consequently that there was a variance between the declaration and the proof. A verdict was found for the defendant, with liberty to enter a verdict for the plaintiff for 5*l* 10*s*., if the Court should be of opinion that he was entitled to sue as principal, notwithstanding the terms of the charter-party; and a rule *nisi* was obtained so to enter it. We are of opinion that the rule must be made absolute. It is conceded, that if there had been a third party who was the real freighter, such third party might have sued, although his name was not disclosed in the charter-party; but the question is, whether the plaintiff can fill both characters of agent and principal, or rather, whether he can repudiate that of agent and adopt that of principal, both characters being referred to in the charter-party, but the name of the

§ 407. Such is the general rule applicable to this subject; but, as has been already suggested, it is liable to exceptions,

principal not being therein mentioned. The cases principally relied on for the defendant were *Bickerton v. Burrell*, 5 Maule & Selw. 383, and *Rayner v. Grote*, 15 M. & W. 359, in both which cases the supposed principal was named in the instrument of contract; also the case of *Humble v. Hunter*, 12 Q. B. 310; 12 Jur. 1021. In the case of *Bickerton v. Burrell*, the plaintiff, on the face of the contract, professed to enter into it as agent for C. Richardson. At the trial, C. Richardson was called to prove that her name was used without her knowledge, and that she had nothing to do with the contract. Lord Ellenborough refused to receive the evidence, and nonsuited the plaintiff. A rule *nisi* to set aside the nonsuit was obtained, but, upon argument, was discharged, on the ground that a person who has exhibited himself as agent for another, whom he names, cannot at once throw off that character, and put himself forward as principal, without any communication or notice to the other party. All the judges relied on the want of such notice, which seems to have been the chief ground of the decision; for they considered that the defendant was thereby placed in great difficulty, as he had contracted, in point of law, with Richardson, and not with the plaintiff, and might have no means of ascertaining or even conjecturing, that she was not the real party. The soundness of that ground of decision was somewhat doubted in the late case of *Rayner v. Grote*. There the plaintiff contracted as agent for Johnson, but was, in truth, himself the principal; he sued the defendant for not accepting and paying for the goods. The defendant had accepted and paid for a great part of the goods sold, and knew, before he refused the residue, that the plaintiff was the real principal; and so the case was distinguishable from that of *Bickerton v. Burrell* upon the very ground on which that decision proceeded, and the plaintiff was held to be entitled to sue. The case of *Humble v. Hunter*, was an action by Grace Humble, on a charter-party signed by her son, J. C. Humble, in which he was described as the 'owner of the good ship or vessel called *The Ann*.' There the son was called at the trial, and, after objection taken to his admissibility, proved that he executed as agent for the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had a verdict. The Court, however, granted a new trial, on the ground that it was not competent for a third party to come in and claim to be the principal, and so contradict the express statement of the contract itself. The case turned upon the form of the contract; for it was conceded, that if the words 'owner of the good ship,' &c. had been omitted, the plaintiff might have sued, on showing that she was the real owner, and that the son was her agent only. Such evidence would not have contradicted the contract, but would only have let in a third party who was really interested, in conformity with the current of authorities in cases of contracts executed by agents, and in their own names. The case of *Jenkins v. Hutchinson*, 13 Jur. 763, was also cited for the defendant, but it proceeded on a different ground, and is not applicable to the present question. There the defendant was sought to be charged as principal on a charter-party executed by him, on the face of it, as agent for Barnes; he had, in truth, no authority from Barnes, nor was he

founded upon the same considerations of reciprocal equity and justice, as the general rule itself.¹ The rule, properly and pri-

himself interested at all; and the Court held, that he could not be sued as principal without showing that he really was so. A distinction was taken on the argument in the present case, by the defendant's counsel, between an executed and an executory contract; and it was said, that whatever might be the rule in the former class of cases, where the defendant has received the benefit of the contract, and it is probably immaterial to him whom he pays, yet that in the latter class the defendant cannot be properly held answerable to B, having expressly contracted with A; and a passage in the judgment of the Court, in the case of *Rayner v. Grote*, was much relied on, which is this: 'If, indeed, the contract had been wholly unperformed, and one which the plaintiff, by merely proving himself to be the real principal, was seeking to enforce, the question might admit of some doubt. In many cases, such as, for instance, the case of contracts, in which the skill or solvency of the person who is named as the principal may reasonably be considered as a material ingredient in the contract, it is clear that the agent cannot then show himself to be the real principal, and sue in his own name; and it may be fairly urged that this, in all executory contracts, if wholly unperformed, or if partly performed without the knowledge of who is the real principal, may be the general rule.' With this passage we entirely agree; but it is plain that it is applicable only to cases where the supposed principal is named in the contract; if he be not named, it is impossible that the other party can have been in any way induced to enter into the contract by any of the reasons suggested. In the present case, the names of the supposed freighters not being inserted, no inducement to enter into the contract, from the supposed solvency of the freighters, can be surmised. Any one who could prove himself to have been the real freighter and principal, whether solvent or not, might most unquestionably have been sued on this charter-party. The defendant cannot have been in any way prejudiced in respect of any supposed reliance on the solvency of the freighter, since the freighter is admitted to have been unknown to him, and he did not think it necessary to inquire who he was. It is, indeed, possible that he may have been contented to take any freighter and principal, provided it was not the present plaintiff; and he may have relied on the terms of the charter-party, indicating that the plaintiff was an agent only, being willing to accept of any one else, be he who he might, as principal. After all, therefore, the question is reduced to this, whether we are to assume that the defendant did so rely on the character of the plaintiff as agent only, and would not have contracted with him as principal if he had known him so to be; and are to lay it down as a broad rule, that a person contracting as agent for an unknown and unnamed principal, is precluded from saying, 'I am myself' that principal.' Doubtless, his saying so does in some measure contradict the written contract, especially the concluding clause, which says: 'This charter-party being concluded on behalf of another party,' &c., for there was no such other party. It

¹ Ante, § 402.

marily, has its due operation, where the agent, entering into the contract, is the mere representative of the principal, and has acquired no interest, or lien, or other claim under it, in virtue of his agency; for, if he has acquired any such interest, lien, or other claim, then, to the extent thereof, he is entitled to protection, as well against the principal, as against the other contracting party.¹ Thus, for example, a factor or other agent has a lien on the goods intrusted to him for sale for his commissions and advances, and, when he has sold the goods, this lien will attach upon the price in the hands of the purchaser; and to this extent the factor, or other agent, may insist upon payment from the purchaser to himself, in opposition to the claims of the principal, and also of the purchaser against the principal.² But, to entitle the factor, or other agent, in such a

may be that the plaintiff entered into the charter-party for some other party, who had not absolutely authorized him to do so, and afterwards declined taking it; or it may be that he intended originally to be the principal. In either case the charter-party would be, strictly speaking, contrabanded; yet the defendant does not appear to be prejudiced, for as he was regardless who the real freighter was, it should seem that he trusted for his freight to his lien on the cargo. But there is no contradiction of a charter-party, if the plaintiff can be considered as filling two characters, namely, those of agent and principal. A man cannot, in strict propriety of speech, be said to be an agent to himself; yet, in a contract of this description, we see no absurdity in saying, that he might fill both characters — that he might contract as agent for the freighter, whoever that freighter might turn out to be, and might still adopt that character of freighter himself if he chose. There is nothing in the argument that the plaintiff's responsibility is expressly made to cease 'as soon as the cargo is shipped, for that limitation plainly applies only to his character as agent, and, being real principal, his responsibility would unquestionably continue after the cargo was shipped. Upon the whole, we are of opinion, that this rule must be made absolute."]

¹ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 211; Post, § 424; Smith on Merc. Law, 77, (2d edit.); Id. pp. 135, 136, 139 (3d edit. 1843); Drinkwater v. Goodwin, Cowp. R. 251, 255; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 217-219, 226, 285-288, 336, (edit. 1818); Id. 364-367; Morris v. Cleasby, 1 Maule & Selw. 576; Hudson v. Granger, 5 Barn. & Ald. 27, 32-34. If he is an agent acting under a *del credere* commission, he has an undoubted right to sue, so as to protect himself from liability under his guaranty. And the principal cannot displace his rights, without, at the same time, waiving the guaranty. See 1 Liverm. on Agency, 226, 227, (edit. 1818); Schrimshire v. Alderton, 2 Str. R. 1183; Houghton v. Mathews, 3 Bos. & Pull. 189; Morris v. Cleasby, 1 Maule & Selw. 576; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 285-287, 364-366.

² 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 211; Ante, §§ 34, 372-379, 401; Post, § 424;

case, to this privilege, he must give notice thereof to the purchaser, before the latter has made payment to the principal; or, if the purchaser insists upon a set-off against the principal, before such right of set-off has attached to the transaction.¹ In short, the purchaser is entitled to protection, then, and then only, when he has no notice of the claim of the factor, or other

Smith on Merc. Law, 77, (2d edit.); Id. B. 1, ch. 5, § 6, p. 189, (3d edit. 1843); Drinkwater v. Goodwin, Cowp. R. 251, 255; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 285-287; Id. 326; Id. 364-367; Hudson v. Granger, 5 Barn. & Ald. 27, 32-34. Lord Mansfield, in delivering the opinion of the Court, in the case of Drinkwater v. Goodwin, Cowp. R. 251, 255, said: "The maxim of law, which says, that it shall not be in the power of any man, by his election, to vary the rights of two other contending parties, is a very wise maxim, as well as a very fortunate one for the parties who are so disputing; because by giving notice to such person to hold his hand, and offering him an indemnity, he renders himself liable to the true owner, if after such notice he takes upon himself to decide the right. And, therefore, though the purchaser of goods from a factor has a right to pay him the money, and be discharged, yet, when the principal and factor have a dispute, the buyer, with notice of such dispute, has no right to prejudice the title of the principal. This case, therefore, is in the nature of a bill of interpleader. The defendant is the stakeholder, the assignees and Jeffries are contending, and the Court is to decide. Jeffries claims the money, as having a lien on it, and the assignees claim it, as standing in the place of the bankrupt. Jeffries claims it, as having a lien. To consider the case, therefore, first, upon the general question, we think, that a factor who receives cloths, and is authorized to sell them in his own name, but makes the buyer debtor to himself, though he is not answerable for the debts, yet he has a right to receive the money. His receipt is a discharge to the buyer, and he has a right to bring an action against him to compel the payment; and it would be no defence for the buyer in that action to say, that, as between him and the principal, he (the buyer) ought to have that money, because the principal is indebted to him in more than that sum: for the principal himself can never say that, but where the factor has nothing due to him. There is no case, in law or equity, where a factor, having money due to him to the amount of the debt in dispute, was ever prevented from taking money for cloths in his hands." From the language of the Court in this case, it has been inferred, that the agent cannot maintain a suit of this sort without first giving, or offering to give, an indemnity to the other contracting party. It may, perhaps, deserve consideration, whether this is absolutely indispensable; since the factor, or agent, by his contract, acquires a right to sue, as the primary contracting party. An indemnity is, without doubt, ordinarily tendered; and, if not offered, the case may properly be deemed a case for a bill of interpleader in equity. See Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 364, 365; Post, § 409.

¹ Drinkwater v. Goodwin, Cowp. R. 251, 255; Coppin v. Walker, 7 Taunt. 287; Coppin v. Craig, 7 Taunt. 248; Atkyns v. Amber, 2 Esp. R. 498; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 211; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 326, 364, 365.

agent, and has acted in good faith, and has acquired rights by the transaction, superior to, and inconsistent with, those of the factor or agent. *A fortiori*, this principle will apply, where the purchaser is guilty of a gross concealment of his claim upon the principal, which has, in fact, operated as a fraud upon the factor or other agent.¹

§ 408. It is upon this same ground, that, when a factor, or other agent, has a lien for advances, or otherwise, to the full extent of the price or value of the goods of his principal, sold by him, he is entitled to receive payment of the proceeds from the purchaser, not only in opposition to his principal, but in opposition to his assignees, in case of his bankruptcy;² for, although the bankruptcy of the principal operates as a revocation of the authority of the factor, or other agent, yet it cannot operate to defeat or destroy his lien. In truth, in such a case, the factor, or other agent, has a complete power to dispose of the whole of such proceeds as he may please, as his own property, against the principal and his assignees. Therefore, if he is indebted to the purchaser of the goods in an equivalent amount, he may set off the one debt against the other, with the assent of the purchaser, and it will be a complete payment and extinguishment of the price, so as to bar any action therefor, by the principal or his assignees.⁴

•§ 409. From what has been already said, it follows, as a natural consequence, that if the purchaser of goods from a factor, or other agent, who has a lien thereon, should, after notice thereof by the factor, or other agent, pay over the money to the principal, he will, nevertheless, be liable to the factor, or other agent, for the same, and the payment will be no defence in an action brought therefor against him. In some of the authorities the qualification is added, that the purchaser should not only have notice, but should have an indemnity, or offer of indemnity, from the factor, or other agent, to protect him against a suit by the

¹ *Atkins v. Amber*, 2 Esp. R. 498; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 217-219, (edit. 1818); *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 326, 364, 365.

² *Hudson v. Granger*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 27, 32-34; Ante § 407.

³ *Ibid.*; Ante, § 349; Post, 482, 483.

⁴ *Hudson v. Granger*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 27, 32-34; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 285-288; Ante, § 407; Post, § 424.

principal.¹ But it seems at least a questionable point, whether there is any principle of law, which positively requires such an indemnity, or offer of indemnity.²

§ 410 It also follows, from the premises, that, subject only to these special rights of the factor, or other agent, the principal may, in all cases, assert his own general rights over every contract of purchase and sale, made on his behalf in the course of the agency.³ Hence he may recover from the purchaser of goods, under a sale made by his agent, the residue of the price, deducting the entire claim of his factor, or other agent.⁴ So, if he extinguishes or satisfies the entire claim of his factor, or other agent, his right to recover the whole price is unquestionable, and cannot be resisted by the other contracting party, unless upon equities, which attach to the transaction against the principal, or the agent, or against both. Payments, also, made by the purchaser, will, subject to the like exceptions, operate as an extinguishment, *pro tanto*, of the debt, as indeed has been already suggested.⁵

§ 411. Similar principles apply to matters of defence by an agent, who is sued upon any contract upon which he becomes personally responsible, as well as his principal. Thus, for example, if a factor is employed to buy goods, and he purchases them in his own name, not disclosing any other principal, and he has in his own right a set-off against the seller, he may avail himself of it in a suit brought against him by the seller.⁶ So, if he sells goods under the like circumstances, he may set off the price of the goods against a debt, personally due from himself to the purchaser, at least if the principal does not interpose against it.⁷

§ 412. In respect to the rights of agents to maintain actions

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 365, 366, *Drunkwater v. Goodwin*, Cowp R. 251.

² *Ibid*. But see ante, § 407, note.

³ Ante, §§ 402, 403.

⁴ Ante, § 403, *Huntington v. Knox*, 7 Cush. 374.

⁵ Ante, § 407.

⁶ This seems to be a natural result from the reciprocal right of the buyer, in such a case, to set off a debt due to him from the factor, who does not disclose any principal. Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 326, 327; Ante, § 404.

⁷ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 112, note; *Id.* 286, 287; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 226-232, (edit. 1818); *Morris v. Cleasby*, 1 M. & Selw. 576, 579. See *Young v. White*, 7 Beavan, R. 506.

upon contracts made personally with them, there is another exception, founded upon motives of public policy, which should here be noticed. We have already seen that public agents are not ordinarily personally liable upon any contracts made by them, in their official character or otherwise, for or on behalf of the government.¹ A reciprocity exists upon the like contracts in favor of the other party. As public agents are not ordinarily suable, so they cannot ordinarily sue thereon. Thus, for example, where a naval officer shipped seamen for the public service on board of a public ship, and took a contract from a surety for their rendering themselves on board at the proper time; it was held, that the government only, and not the officer, could sue on the contract.² So, where a bill of exchange was indorsed to the Treasurer of the United States, it was held, that it was competent for the United States, in their own name, to sue upon such indorsement, as having the sole interest in the property.³ On the other hand, if a public agent should personally bind himself (as he may) by a contract for the benefit of the government, and thereby become personally liable to the other contracting party thereon, there he would have a reciprocal right to hold such other party personally liable to him on the same contract, for any breach thereof.⁴

§ 413. We may close this part of our subject by remarking, that although an agent (known to be such) is ordinarily entitled to receive payment of any debt, due to his principal, in the course of his agency, wherever that right results from the usage of trade, or from an express agreement, or from an implied authority, resulting from the course of dealing between the parties; yet, we are not to understand, that the agent thereby acquires any right to receive payment, except in the ordinary modes of business.⁵ He has no right to change the security of his principal for the debt, or to make himself the debtor to the principal for the like amount, in lieu of the person who owes the debt,

¹ Ante, § 302-307.

² *Bainbridge v. Downie*, 6 Mass. R. 253.

³ *United States v. Dugan*, 3 Wheat. R. 172, 180.

⁴ Ante, §§ 306, 398.

⁵ Ante, §§ 98, 103, 109, 181, 215; Post, §§ 429, 430; *Thompson on Bills of Exchange*, p. 370-373, (2d edit. 1836.)

without the consent of the principal, express or implied to that effect. Thus, for example, if an agent has authority to receive for his principal a debt due from a third person to him, and the agent owes the like amount, or a greater, to such third person, he has no right to substitute himself as the debtor to his principal, giving him credit for the amount, or to set-off the debt, due by him to such third person, against the debt due by the latter to his principal. But there may be a usage of trade, or a particular dealing between the principal and agent, which would justify such a set-off. And, indeed, it is said to be a common usage between insurance brokers, and underwriters upon policies, thus to set off losses on policies; and for the broker then to charge himself with the amount of the losses, and to give credit to his principal therefor.¹

§ 414. Let us now proceed to the second branch of our inquiry, In what cases agents acquire rights against third persons founded upon the torts of the latter, in the course of their agency. We have already had occasion to remark, that factors and other agents in virtue of their possession of the property of their principals, are entitled to maintain actions of trespass and

¹ *Stewart v. Aberdien*, 4 Mees. & Welsb. 211, 228. On this occasion, Lord Abinger is reported to have said: "It must not be considered, that, by this decision, the Court means to overrule any case, deciding, that, where a principal employs an agent to receive money, and pay it over to him, the agent does not thereby acquire any authority to pay a demand of his own upon the debtor, by a set-off in account with him. But the Court is of opinion, that, where an insurance broker, or other mercantile agent, has been employed to receive money for another, in the general course of his business, and where the known general course of business is, for the agent to keep a running account with the principal, and to credit him with sums, which he may have received by credits in account with the debtors, with whom he also keeps running accounts, and not merely with moneys actually received, the rule laid down in those cases cannot properly be applied, but it must be understood, that, where an account is *bonâ fide* settled according to that known usage, the original debtor is discharged, and the agent becomes the debtor, according to the meaning and intention, and with the authority, of the principal." There is some mistake in the language attributed to Lord Abinger, in the first sentence above quoted, and he probably intended to state the reverse case from that, which the language imports. I have given, in the text, what I presume was his real meaning. See ante, §§ 98, 99, 103, 181; *Barker v. Greenwood*, 2 Younge & Coll. 415; *Morris v. Cleasby*, 1 M. & Selw. 576, 579.

trover against third persons for any torts or injuries, affecting that possession.¹

§ 415. So, if an agent is induced, by the fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation of a third person, to purchase goods for his principal, or to sell goods for his principal, and thereby he sustains a personal loss, he will be entitled to maintain a suit against such third person for such wrongful act or deceit.² Thus, for example, if a factor should buy goods for his principal, which were falsely and fraudulently represented by the seller to be of a particular quality, or growth, or manufacture, which alone he was authorized to buy for his principal, and the principal should refuse to receive them, or the factor should be otherwise injured thereby, he would be entitled to a full recompense from the seller for tort.³

§ 416. But, except in cases of this sort, or in cases of a kindred nature, the remedies in favor of agents against third persons for mere torts seem to be circumscribed within very limited boundaries. We may, therefore, dismiss this part of the subject with the following brief and general summary of the whole doctrine; that the remedy of agents for mere torts is confined to cases where their right of possession is injuriously invaded, or where they incur a personal responsibility, or loss, or damage in consequence of the tort.

¹ See *Wiley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 363; *Solomons v. Bank of England*, 13 East, 135, note; *De la Chaumette v. Bank of England*, 9 B. & Cressw. 208; *Williams v. Millington*, 1 H. Black. 81. See *Joseph v. Knox*, 3 Campb. R. 320; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 77, (2d edit.), Id. B. 1, ch. 5, § 6, p. 139, (3d edit. 1843), *Burton v. Hughes*, 2 Bing. R. 173; *Rooth v. Wilson*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 59; *Story on Bailm.* §§ 93, 152.

² *Ante*, § 401.

³ See *ante*, 201, 398, 402.

CHAPTER XVI.

RIGHTS OF PRINCIPALS AGAINST THIRD PERSONS.

§ 417. WE come, in the next place, to the consideration of the Rights of Principals, which are acquired by, and under, or in virtue of, any agency, against third persons. These rights are naturally divisible into two sorts: first, those which are acquired under the contracts made by their agents; and, secondly, those which are acquired on account of torts or injuries done to their property or rights in the course of the agency. Many of the topics belonging to this head have incidentally come under review in the discussions in the preceding pages. They will, therefore, be briefly examined in this place, with such further illustrations as their importance may require.

§ 418. And first, in relation to contracts. We have already seen, that the principal is bound by the acts and contracts of his agent, done with his consent, or by his authority, or adopted by his ratification.¹ In such cases, there arises a reciprocal obligation to the principal, on the part of the third person, with whom such contracts are made, and for whose benefit, and with whose consent, such acts are done. In short, the general doctrine, in all such cases, is, that the principal, as the ultimate party in interest, is entitled, against such third persons, to all the advantages and benefits of such acts and contracts of his agents.²

§ 419. This doctrine applies, *a fortiori*, to every case where the agent does not contract in his own name, but solely in the name of his principal; for, in such a case, the principal is not

¹ Ante, § 147 154, 160, 161, 239, 242-244, 269, 270, 272; Paley on Agency by Lloyd, 324; *Seignior and Wolmer's case*, Godb. R. 360, 361; *Routh v. Thompson*, 13 East, 274; *Hagedorn v. Oliverson*, 2 Maule & Selw. 485; *Maclean v. Dunn*, 4 Bing. R. 722. 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 201-203; *Bridge v. Niagara Ins. Company*, 1 Hill, R. 247.

² Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 223-326; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 281-284, (edit. 1818); 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 201; *Grojan v. Wade*, 2 Starkie, R. 443; *Small v. Atwood*, 1 Younge, R. 407, 457.

only a contracting party, but he is the sole contracting party, exclusive of the agent, and is alone competent to sue or enforce any other remedy thereon.¹ In all cases of this sort, however, the principal, while he is entitled to all the advantages and benefits of the contract of his agent, must take them with all the attendant burdens, and subject to all the attendant just counter-claims and defences of the other contracting party.² Thus, if the contract of the agent is impeachable, on account of the fraud, imposition, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of the agent, the principal is affected with all the consequences thereof, and cannot avail himself of his own innocence, to support what would otherwise be an unfounded or defective title.³ So, if the agent has sold goods in his own name, no other person being known as principal, and the agent agrees, at the time of the sale, that the vendee may set off against the price a debt due to him by the agent, that set-off will be as good against a suit brought by the principal, as it would be, if the suit was brought by the agent for the price.⁴ [But a purchaser, being a creditor of the agent or the vendor of an estate, and dealing with the agent in the absence of his principal, and without any special authority of the principal for the purpose, is not entitled, as against the principal, by agreement with the agent alone, to place his debt, really due from the same agent, to the debit of the principal, on account of the purchase-money; and any such arrangement will be treated as invalid.⁵]

§ 120. Upon the same ground, liable to the like exceptions,

¹ Ante, §§ 261, 262.

² Ante, § 402-404. [But this rule would not allow a purchaser of goods, bought of an agent, but in fact belonging to a foreign principal, to plead a discharge in bankruptcy to an action by such principal, which would have been a good bar, had the agent been the real principal; at least, not when the fact was disclosed to the purchaser, that the goods belonged to a foreign principal, although his name was not given. *Haley v. Merriam*, 7 Cush 242.]

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 325; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 202, 203, 208.

⁴ Ante, §§ 237, 403, 404; Post, § 441; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 285, (edit 1818); 1 Liverm. on Agency, 90, 91, (edit. 1818); Weswood v. Bell, 4 Campb. R. 349; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 325-327, and note (h), and Stracey v. Deey, there cited; S. C. 7 Term R. 361, note; George v. Clagett, 7 Term R. 359, 361; Rabone v. Williams, 7 Term R. 360, note a.

⁵ Young v. White, 7 Beavan, R. 506.

the principal is ordinarily entitled to the same remedies against such third persons, in respect to such acts and contracts, as if they were made or done with him personally. Thus, for example, if goods are bought or sold by an agent, the principal may maintain an action in his own name upon the contract, for the price or for the delivery of the goods.¹ The rule (it is said) equally applies, whether the principal be a foreign, or a domestic principal.² It will not make any difference, that the agent may also be entitled to sue upon the contract; for, as we have seen in a great variety of cases, the agent and the principal have each a several right to sue on the same contract, the rights of the latter being in general, and subject to the exceptions already stated, paramount to those of the former.³ Neither will it make any difference, in such cases, that the agent is a factor, acting under a *del credere* commission; ⁴ nor that the principal, at the time of entering into the contract, is unknown or unsuspected; ⁵ nor that the third person has dealt with the agent, supposing him to be the sole principal.⁶ The only effect of the last consideration is, that the principal will not be permitted to intercept the rights

¹ Ante, §§ 110, 161, 269, 270, 272, 402, 403, Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 323, 324; *Brewster v. Saul*, 8 Louis. R. 296

² *Taintor v. Prendergast*, 3 Hill, R. 72.

³ Ante, §§ 269, 270, 410, 411.

⁴ Ante, §§ 110, 161, 270, 272; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 324; *Id.* 111, and note (3); *Leverick v. Meigs*, 1 Cowen, R. 645, 663-665, 670, 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 201, 202.

⁵ Ante, § 270, *Isley v. Merriam*, 7 Cush. 242; *Taintor v. Prendergast*, 3 Hill, N. Y. R. 72; *Small v. Atwood*, 1 Younge, R. 407, 452. On this occasion Lord Lyndhurst said "Where a contract is entered into by a person as agent for another, though it is not known that he is contracting in the character of agent at law an action may be maintained either in the name of the agent or in the name of the principal; and, in a Court of Equity, I apprehend it is perfectly clear, that where a contract is entered into by an agent in his own name, but really on behalf of other persons, it is necessary that those other persons, as being interested in the subject-matter of the suit, should be, in some shape or other, parties to the contract"

⁶ Ante, §§ 266, 267, 291-294; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 201, 202; *Smith on Merc.*, Law, B. 1, ch. 5, § 5, pp. 134, 135, (3d edit. 1843); *Brewster v. Saul*, 8 Louis. R. 296; *Williams v. Winchester*, 19 Martin, 22; *Leverick v. Meigs*, 1 Cowen, R. 645, 663-665; *Hicks v. Whitmore*, 12 Wend. R. 548; *Walter v. Ross*, 2 Wash. Cir. R. 283; *Grojan v. Wade*, 2 Starkie, R. 443; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 682, (4th edit.)

of such third person in regard to the agent; but he must take the contract, subject to all equities, in the same way as if the agent were the sole principal.¹ Thus, for example, if the agent is the only known or supposed principal, the person dealing with him will be entitled to the same right of set-off, as if the agent were the true and only principal.² But, subject to these rights, and those of the agent himself, the principal may generally sue upon such a contract, in the same manner as if he had personally made it.

§ 421. This doctrine is of high antiquity in the common law; and it is so entirely consonant to natural and reciprocal justice, that it probably had its foundation in the earliest rudiments thereof. It was recognized in an early case, where the principal had authorized his servant to compound and settle a debt with the debtor, and the debtor made a composition and settlement with the servant, and promised the latter to pay the balance; and it was held, that the principal might maintain an action in his own name upon the promise.³ So, the principal may

¹ Smith on Merc. Law, 73, 84, (2d edit.); Id. B. 1, ch. 5, § 5, p. 134, 135. (3d edit. 1843); Coates v. Lewes, 1 Campb. R. 444; Gibson v. Winter, 5 Barn. & Adolph. 96; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 632. (1st edit.); Ante, §§ 390, 404, 407, 419, 420.

² Smith on Merc. Law, 74, 75, (2d edit.); Id. B. 1, ch. 5, § 5, pp. 134, 135, (3d edit. 1843); Coates v. Lewes, 1 Campb. R. 444; Ante, §§ 390, 404, 407, 419, 420; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 277-280, 288, 289; Stracey v. Deey, 7 T. R. 361 note; Carr v. Hinckliff, 4 Barn. & Cressw. 547; Taylor v. Kymer, 3 Barn. & Adolph. 320; Baring v. Corrie, 2 Barn. & Adolph. 137; Gibson v. Winter, 5 Barn. & Adolph. 96; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 201-203; Taintor v. Prendergast, 3 Hill, R. 72; Young v. White, 7 Beavan, R. 506.

³ Seignior and Walmer's case, Godb. R. 360; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 328; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 201. In Seignior and Walmer's case, (Godb. R. 360,) Mr. Justice Dodderidge said: "An assumpsit to the servant for the master is good to the master; and an assumpsit, by the appointment of the master of the servant, shall bind the master, and his assumpsit. 27 Ass. If my baily of my manor buy cattle to stock my grounds, I shall be chargeable in an action of debt; and, if my baily sell corn or cattle, I shall have an action of debt for the money; for, whatsoever comes within the compass of the servant's service, I shall be chargeable with, and likewise shall have advantage of the same. If a servant selleth a horse with warranty, it is the sale and contract of the master, but it is the warranty of the servant, unless the master giveth him authority to warrant it; for a warranty is void which is not made and annexed to the contract; but there it is the warranty of the servant, and the contract of the master. But if the master do agree unto it after, it shall be said, that he did agree to it *ab initio*."

sue upon a contract, made by his servant for labor and services, if he originally authorized the servant to make the contract, or subsequently ratified it; at least if, at the time, the other contracting party knew that the servant was not acting *sui juris*, or if he afterwards had notice thereof from the principal, before the price of the labor and service were paid to the servant.¹

§ 422. There are exceptions, indeed, to this doctrine, most of which have been already alluded to, where the principal can neither sue, nor be sued, upon the very contract, made by his agent, although it has been made by his authority, or in the course of the agency.² Thus, if the instrument is under seal, and is exclusively made between the agent and the third person,

As, where a servant doth a disseisin to the use of his master, the master not knowing of it, and then the servant makes a lease for years, and then the master agrees, the master shall not avoid the lease for years, for now he is in, by reason of his agreement, *ab initio*. When the servant promiseth for the master, that the master shall forbear to sue, &c., and shall by such a day deliver to the defendant the obligation, &c., and the defendant promiseth to pay the money at such a day; and the master, having notice thereof, agreeth to it, it is now the promise of the master *ab initio*: for it is included in his authority, that he should agree, compound, &c., and he hath power to make a promise." Judgment in the principal case was given for the plaintiff. But see ante, §§ 59, 132.

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 339. Mr. Lloyd's note on this subject deserves to be cited. Mr. Paley, in his text, had said "Whether a master may bring an action for the recovery of his servant's earnings, seems to be a point unsettled." (See Co. Litt. 117 a, Mr. Hargrave's note.) Mr. Lloyd then adds: "There would not, however, be much difficulty in deciding such a point, when it arose. The question would be, first: Was the transfer of service originally made with the master's assent; if not, it seems clear that the master might, by subsequently adopting the act, maintain an action for work and labor done by his servant. If yes, there is then the further question, whether the servant, in that particular employment, was to be considered as the servant of his original master, or that of the person immediately employing him. And it is submitted, that, if the master were liable for wages to the servant during the period of the substituted employment, the inference would arise, that he still considered the servant as his own, and did not intend to waive the benefit of his earnings. But, if, by previous agreement, he were released from a proportionate amount of wages, then the contrary conclusion would be the more reasonable. If payment have been made to the servant, in ignorance that he was the servant of another, probably in that case the employer would be discharged."

§§ 160, 160 a, 161, 162, note, 278, 294; *Handford v. McNair*, 9 Wend. R. 68. *v. Goodrich*, 9 Wend. R. 68.

as, for example, if it is a charter-party or bottomry bond, made by the master of a ship in the course of his employment, the principal can neither sue, nor be sued thereon, although he may be bound thereby, and may be entitled to collateral rights and remedies growing out of it.¹

§ 423. Another exception is, where an exclusive credit is given to and by the agent, and, therefore, the principal cannot be treated as in any manner whatsoever a party to the contract, although he may have authorized it, or may be entitled to the benefit of it. Thus, a foreign factor, buying or selling goods, is ordinarily treated, as between himself and the other party, as the sole contracting party; and the real principal cannot sue, or be sued, on the contract.² This is a general rule of commercial law, founded upon the known usage of trade: and it is strictly adhered to, for the convenience and safety of foreign commerce.³

§ 424. Another exception is, where the agent has a lien or claim upon the property bought or sold, or upon its proceeds, which is equal to, or exceeds, the amount or value thereof; for, in such a case, (as we have seen,) the rights of the agent are paramount to those of the principal: and the principal has no right to sue thereon, unless with the consent of the agent; and, if he does sue, and the other party has received notice of the lien, the suit will be ineffectual, or at the peril of the party sued.⁴ If any other doctrine were to prevail, the right of lien of the agent might be defeated at the mere will of the principal.

§ 425. The differences, in these respects, between our law and the Roman law, have already, in some measure, come un-

¹ Ante, §§ 158, 160, 160 a, 161, 162 273, 276-278, 294; Post, § 450; *Shack v. Anthony*, 1 M. & Selw. 573; *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 3, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 163, 164, (Amer. edit. 1829.) See *Tilson v. Warwick Gas Company*, 4 Barn. & Cressw. 962, 968, per Bayley, J.; *Fletcher v. Gillespie*, 3 Bing. R. 635; *Ersk. Instit. B. 3, tit. 3, § 47-49*; *Dubois v. Delaware and Hudson Canal Co.* 4 Wend. R. 285; *Hall v. Bainbridge*, 1 Mann. & Grang. 12.

² Ante, §§ 268, 279, 290, 400; Post, § 448.

³ Ante, §§ 268, 279, 290, 400; *Thompson v. Davenport*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 87; *Paterson v. Gandasequi*, 15 East, R. 62; *Addison v. Gandasequi*, 4 Taunt. R. 574; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 66, (2d edit.); *Id.* pp. 122, 123, (3d edit. 1845).

⁴ Ante, §§ 393, 397, 407, 408.

der our notice; ¹ but it may not be without use to present some of them a little more fully in this place. By the Roman law, as it originally stood, the principal could not ordinarily sue or be sued, on the contract made through the instrumentality of his agent; but the latter was generally treated as the proper and sole contracting party.² This was subsequently altered by the edicts of the Prætor, so far as it respected the rights of third persons to institute suits against the principal, in cases falling within the reach of the exercitorial and institorial actions.³ But the exercitorial action did not lie in favor of the owner or employer (*exercitor*) against the other party contracting with the master. He was not, however, without a remedy; for, if there was a contract of hire with the master, the owner or employer might recover the hire in a direct action, *ex locato*; if there was a gratuitous contract, he might maintain an action *ex mandato*. So the Digest has declared. *Sed ex contrario, exercenti navem adversus eos, qui cum magistro contraxerunt, actio non pollicetur, quia non eodem auxilio indigebat; sed aut ex locato cum magistro, si mercede operam ei exhibet; aut si gratuitam, mandati agere potest.*⁴

¹ Ante, §§ 163, 261, 271

² Ante, §§ 163, 261, 271. Pothier, after quoting the doctrine of Paulus in the Digest, "Per Procuratorem non semper acquirimus actiones," (Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 3, l. 72,) adds, in a note "Dicit, non semper; quia, ut mox videbitur, actio utilis interdum nobis ex contractu Procuratoris accommodatur; quod est contra principia juris, quæ non permittunt aliquid acquiri per personam juri nostro non subjectam." Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, n. 9, marg. note (1)

³ Ante, §§ 163, 261, 271; Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1: Id. tit. 3, l. 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 10, 11, 18, Id. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 1, 9, 10, 17, 18; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, §§ 43, 46.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 18; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 18, and Pothier's note (1). Pothier says "Scilicet, ut Magister ipsi suas cedat actiones" He adds, in another place, speaking of the case of Institors: "Eadem equitas occurrit, ut hoc casu detur etiam actio exercitori versus eum, qui cum Magistro navis contraxit" Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 4, marg. n. (3). See also Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 18, where he says that, in cases of owners of provision ships, a broader right is allowed. "Solent plane Præfecti propter ministerium annonæ, item in provinciis Præsides Provinciarum, extra ordinem eos juvare ex contractu Magistrorum." Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 18, citing Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 18. He then adds, in a note (3): "Exercitores avium ad annonam inservientium. Cæteris autem exercitoribus non datur adversus eos, qui cum Magistro contraxerunt; nisi forte eo casu, quo aliter

§ 426. The institorial action was also, in its terms, apparently limited to suits against the principal. *Æquum Prætori visum est, sicut commoda sentimus ex actu Institorum, ita etiam obligari nos ex contractibus ipsorum, et conveniri.*¹ But no like action lay against the other contracting party by the principal. However, he was not without remedy, since, by a cession of the right of action from the Institor, he might, in some cases, maintain a suit founded thereon against the other party. *Sed non idem facit circa eum, qui Institorem præposuit, ut experiri possit. Sed, si quidem serrum proprium Institorem habuit, potest esse securus, adquisitis sibi actionibus. Si autem vel alienum serrum, vel etiam hominem liberum, actione deficiatur; ipsum tamen Institorem, vel Dominum ejus convenire poterit, vel mandati, vel negotiorum gestorum.*² It is added: *Marcellus autem ait, debere dari actionem ei, qui Institorem præposuit, in eos, qui cum eo contraxerint.* And Gaius held, that the principal might maintain the suit, if he could not otherwise vindicate his right: *Ex nomine, quo Institor contraxit, si modo aliter rem suam servare non potest.*³

§ 427. In special cases, also, where the contract, made through an agent, was declared to be directly obligatory between the principal and the other contracting party, (as, for example, in case of a sale,) the principal might maintain a direct action thereon. Thus the Digest puts it: *Si Procurator vendiderit, et caverit emptori; queritur, an Domino, vel adversus Dominum, actio dari debeat? Et Papinianus (Lib. 3, Responsorum) putat, cum Domino ex empto agi posse utili actione, ad exemplum Institorie actionis, si modo rem vendendam mandavit; ergo et per contrarium dicendum est, utilem ex empto actionem Domino competere.*⁴

§ 428. But, except in these and a few other cases, the general

rem suam servare non possent;" and he then refers to Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 4.

¹ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 1.

² Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 4, 17. Pothier adds in his note (2 to n. 4): "Ut actionem ex hoc contractu Institoris, sive in ejus potestate Institor est, quæsitam cedat."

³ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 4.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 4.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 19, tit. 1, l. 13, § 25; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, n. 9, and marg. note (3).

rule seems to have prevailed in the Roman law, that reciprocal actions lay, in cases of agency, only between the direct and immediate parties thereto.¹ The modern nations of Continental Europe seem, with great wisdom, to have adopted the general doctrine of allowing reciprocal actions between the principal and the other contracting parties, wherever it is not excluded by the nature, or by the express terms, of the contract.²

§ 429. The rights of principals against third persons, arising from the acts and contracts of their agents, may be further illustrated by the consideration of payments made to, or by, the latter. And, first, in relation to payments made to agents. Such payments are good, and obligatory upon the principal, in all cases, where the agent is authorized to receive payment, either by express authority, or by that resulting from the usage of trade, or from the particular dealings between the parties.³ In such cases the maxim of the Roman law is justly applied; *Quod jussu alterius solvitur, pro eo est, quasi ipsi solutum esset*.⁴ But the principal may intercept such payment, by giving notice to the debtor not to pay to the agent, before the money is paid; and, in such a case, if the agent has no superior right, from a lien or otherwise, any subsequent payment, made to the agent, will be invalid, and the principal may recover the money from the debtor.⁵

¹ Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, n. 9, marg. note (1), Ante, §§ 163, note 1, 261, 272, 425, Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, §§ 43, 46.

² Ante, §§ 163, 261, 272, Pothier on Oblig. n. 72, 82, 447, 448; 1 Stair, Instit. B. 1, tit. 12, § 16, Ersk. Instit. B. 3, tit. 3, § 43-47.

³ Ante, §§ 98, 99, 181, 113 Post, § 440, 2 Liverm. on Agency, 226, 232; (edit. 1818); Id. 283-285, Smith on Merc. Law, 67, 68, (2d edit.), lb. B. 1, ch. 5, § 4, pp. 124, 125, (3th edit. 1813); Ante, §§ 98, 181, 215, 413; Post, § 451; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 111, 112, note, Id. 278-281, 285, 288, 325-327; Baring v. Corrie, 2 B. & Ald. 137, Favenc v. Bennet, 11 East, R. 36; Morris v. Cleasby, 1 Maule & Selw. 576, 579, 1 Liverm. on Agency, 226-232, (edit. 1818.) Payment to a sub-agent will sometimes bind the agent, so as to make him responsible to his principal for any loss of the money in the hands of the sub-agent. Taber v. Perrott, 2 Gallis R. 565, Ante, § 231 (a).

⁴ Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 180, Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, n. 470, (n. 505 of the French editions.)

⁵ Ante, §§ 112, 403, 403, 407, Favenc v. Bennet, 11 East, R. 36; Morris v. Cleasby, 1 Maule & Selw. 576, 579; 1 Liverm. on Agency, 226-232, (edit. 1818); Powell v. Nelson, cited 15 East, R. 65; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 111, 112, and note; Id. 285-288, 326-328; Scrimsbire v. Alderton, 2 Str. R. 1182; Mann

§ 430.* The modes and circumstances, under which such payments are made to the agent, may also have a material bearing on the rights of the principal. If the payments are received by the agent, according to the ordinary course of business, or even if they are made out of the ordinary course of business, if the agent alone is known, or is supposed to be the principal, and the debtor has no notice of any claim by the real principal, the latter will be bound thereby.¹ But, if the transaction is on behalf of a known principal, or the principal is afterwards disclosed, no subsequent payment but such as is strictly authorized by the usual course of business, or by the particular usage of trade, or by the express or implied authority of the principal, will bind him; and, if made otherwise, the principal may, notwithstanding, recover the amount from the debtor.²

v. Forrester, 4 Campb. R. 60; *Stewart v. Aberdeen*, 4 Mees. & Welsb. 218, 225, 228; *Corlies v. Cumming*, 6 Cowen, 181, 186.

¹ Ante, §§ 98, 106, 109, 181, 413; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 270-281, 288; Ante, §§ 98, 181, 215, 413; *Fayene v. Bonnet*, 11 East. R. 38; *Coates v. Lewis*, 1 Campb. R. 444; *Blackburn v. Scholes*, 2 Campb. R. 341, 343, *Morris v. Cleasby*, 1 Maule & Selw. 576, 579, 1 Livers. on Agency, 226-232, (edit 1818); *Smith on Merc. Law*, 74, 75, (2d edit.), 11 B. 1, ch. 5, § 4, pp. 124, 125, 135, 136, (3d edit. 1843); *De Valengin's Adm'r v. Duff* 14 Peters' R. 282. Hence it is, that if the principal be unknown and undisclosed, the agent may vary the terms of the contract, and receive payment in any manner he may please, since he acts as and is supposed to be the principal. *Blackburn v. Scholes*, 2 Campb. R. 341, 343. See *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 281-284. In *Stewart v. Aberdeen*, 4 Mees. & Welsb. 214, 218, which was a case where an insurance broker had received payment of a loss by a set-off with the underwriter according to usage Lord Abinger, at Nisi Prius, in summing up, expressed his opinion, "that the notion had been pushed too far about the actual payment in cash; and that it appeared to him, that, if one man has to pay another money on account of his principal, and there is money due to him from such other person, it makes no difference to the principal, whether there is an interchange of bank-notes, or a mere transfer of accounts from one side to the other; and that it is equally a payment if it is done without fraud. He, however, left the whole facts to the jury, and directed them to consider, whether parties, effecting insurance for their own benefit through an agent, must not know what is the habit of dealing between the broker and underwriter, and whether the authority to settle must not mean, that the broker should settle in the same way as is the custom to settle with underwriters." The Court held his direction right. Ante, § 429, note. See also *Carr v. Hinchliff*, 4 Bart. & Cressw. 547; *Gibson v. Winter*, 5 Barn. & Adolph. 96.

² *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 278-281; *Townsend v. Inglis*, Holt, N. P. Rep.

§ 431. Secondly, in relation to payments made by agents for their principals. In these cases, any mode of payment by the agent, accepted and received as such by the other contracting party, as an absolute payment, will discharge the principal, whether he be known or unknown, and whether it be in the usual course of business, or not.¹ Thus, for example, if a factor, or other agent, should be employed to purchase goods for his principal, or should be intrusted with money to be paid for his principal, and the creditor or seller should take the note of the factor or agent, payable at a future day, as an absolute payment, the principal would be entirely discharged from the debt, and the creditor, having thus given exclusive credit to the factor or agent, would have no remedy except against the latter.² The question, in most cases of this sort, is not, generally, so much a question of law, as of fact; that is to say, whether the note is received as a conditional payment, or as an absolute payment; whether it is received with the knowledge, that there is another principal, or not; and whether there is an exclusive credit given to the agent or not.³

§ 432. On the other hand, in all cases of this sort, where exclusive credit is given to the agent, or an absolute payment is acknowledged, either by receiving a security, or otherwise, the agent has a right to substitute himself to the creditor, and to

278; *Stewart v. Aberdeen*, 4 Mees. & Welsb. R. 218, 228; *Underwood v. Nicholls*, 17 Com. B. Rep. 239; 33 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 321; Ante, §§ 98, 181, 410, 413, 429.

¹ Post, § 440.

² Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 204; Ante, 266-268, 287-300; *Seymour v. Psychlau*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 14, 17-19; *Strong v. Hart*, 6 Barn. & Cressw. 160, approved in *Anderson v. Hillies*, 10 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 497; *Smith v. Ferrand*, 7 Barn. & Cressw. 19; *Marsh v. Pedder*, 4 Campb. R. 257.

³ *Seymour v. Psychlau*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 14; Ante, §§ 290, 291, 293, 296, 297; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 250-252; *Strong v. Hart*, 6 Barn. & Cressw. 160; *Smith v. Ferrand*, 7 Barn. & Cressw. 19; *Porter v. Talcott*, 1 Cowen, R. 359, 383, 385; *Johnson v. Weed*, 9 Johns. R. 310; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 207-212, (edit. 1818); *Everett v. Collins*, 2 Campb. R. 515; *Corlies v. Cummings*, 6 Cowen, R. 181, 187; *Muldon v. Whitlock*, 1 Cowen, R. 290, 303-305; *Schermerhorn v. Loines*, 7 Johns. R. 311; *Cheever v. Smith*, 15 Johns. R. 276; *Tapley v. Martens*, 8 Term R. 451; *Marsh v. Pedder*, 4 Campb. R. 257; *Jaques v. Todd*, 3 Wend. R. 83; *Lincoln v. Battelle*, 6 Wend. R. 475; *Tobey v. Barber*, 5 Johns. R. 68; *Pentz v. Stanton*, 10 Wend. R. 271.

recover the amount from his principal, in the same manner, although not in the same form of action, as if it had been actually paid by him. Therefore, if an insurance broker, by the usage of business, or by the agreement of the parties, is exclusively liable to the underwriters for the premium, and they credit him therefor accordingly, he is entitled to recover the amount from his principal, even though he has not actually paid the money to the underwriters.¹ But this doctrine is confined to cases where

¹ See *Seymour v. Pychlau*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 14; *Power v. Butcher*, 10 Barn. & Cressw. 329. On this latter occasion, Mr. Justice Bayley said: "This is an action by the assignees of an insurance broker, for work and labor, and premiums, against the defendants, who are ship-owners, and had employed the broker to effect certain policies on their behalf, which he did effect with a company of which he was a member. Now, according to the ordinary course of trade between the assured, the broker, and the underwriter, the assured do not, in the first instance, pay the premium to the broker, nor does the latter pay it to the underwriter. But, as between the assured and the underwriter, the premiums are considered as paid. The underwriter, to whom, in most instances, the assured are unknown, looks to the broker for payment, and he to the assured. The latter pay the premiums to the broker only, and he is a middle-man between the assured and the underwriter. But he is not solely agent; he is a principal to receive the money from the assured, and to pay it to the underwriters. In this case, the policies were not in the ordinary form, but by deed, and the broker covenanted to pay the premiums to the underwriters; and in consideration of that covenant the policies were effected. The underwriters, therefore, took a covenant from the broker to pay the premium, instead of acknowledging the receipt of the premium, as they do in the ordinary case of a policy by simple contract. In such a case, the action would be maintainable at the suit of the broker, on the principle, that he was entitled to call upon the assured for the payment of those premiums which he had become liable to pay to the underwriters, and which they had acknowledged the receipt of. The assured have had the benefit of the policies; and, if the underwriters were liable upon the risk, they were warranted in calling upon the broker to pay the premiums. In point of justice, the assured ought to pay the broker, or, in the event, which has happened, of his failure, his assignees. In an ordinary case, the assurers would have no claim upon the assured for the premium, because, by the policy, they acknowledge the receipt of it. Here there is no such acknowledgment, and, therefore, it may be said, the assurers may claim the premiums from the assured. A contract cannot be raised by implication of law, except in the absence of an express contract. Now, here there was an express contract between the underwriters and the assured, through the agent, and by that contract the underwriter agreed to look to the broker alone for the premiums. The assured have had the same benefit from the policies, as if the premiums had been advanced to the underwriters at the moment when the policies were effected. Then, it is necessary to consider in

it results from the usage of trade, or from the express or implied agreement of the parties. For, if a factor, or other agent, should buy goods for his principal in his own name, and on his own exclusive credit, payable at a future day, he would not be at liberty, as between himself and his principal, (unless the purchase was agreed between them so to be made,) to consider himself as the vendor, or to sue for the value of the goods before the expiration of the credit.¹

§ 433. The doctrine may be carried further; for, if a creditor of the principal settles with the agent, and takes a note or

what situation the broker stands, in order to ascertain whether he is not entitled to call upon the assured for the premiums. The underwriters have a claim upon him for the full amount of premiums; and, if that be so, he ought to recover those premiums from those persons who have had the benefit of the policies."

¹ *Seymour v. Pychlau*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 14, 16-18. This case was presented under somewhat peculiar circumstances. The purchase of the goods was made by an agent for a foreign merchant then in England. The agent gave his acceptances, payable at six months, for the amount. But the goods were known to be purchased for the foreign merchant, and the invoices were made out in his name. The agent brought an action against his principal for goods sold and delivered, before the acceptances became due, pending which suit he became bankrupt. The Court held the action not maintainable. Lord Ellenborough said: "There is not one feature in the case, to show that the plaintiff was to buy in order to assume the character of seller to the defendant. The relation between the parties is this; the defendant, coming from Russia, wants the accommodation of a person in this country to become responsible for him; the defendant is to pay to the plaintiff a commission for the service, done; when a person pays another a commission, such other person stands in the relation of factor or agent; but this commission is to be paid when he has performed the duty. What is the duty? to pay for the goods; then, if the defendant is now liable to the plaintiff for the debt, he does not derive the benefit intended to be earned by the payment of commission. Upon the latter point, there is not any pretence for saying, that the price is demandable instantane. Let us look at the reason of the thing; the defendant wants credit, and yet he is called upon to pay his agent immediately. The plaintiff was to pay by a bill at six months; when he has paid that bill, then he may sue the defendant, and not before. If it were otherwise, the plaintiff would be placed in a worse situation with respect to his agent, than he would with respect to the seller. I think, therefore, that, as there was not in this case any thing to import a contract of buying and selling, and as immediate payment was contrary to the nature of the thing, and the expectancy of the parties, and, as there was not any express stipulation to that effect, the plaintiff has failed in both points."

other security from the latter, for the amount due by the principal, although, as between the parties, it is intended only as a conditional payment; yet, if the creditor gives a receipt, as if the money were actually received, or the security were an absolute payment, so that the agent is thereby enabled to settle, and does settle, with the principal, as if the debt had been actually discharged, and the principal would otherwise be prejudiced, the debt will be deemed, as to the latter, absolutely discharged.¹

§ 434. Upon this ground, where work was done for the principal, and the account was presented to his steward, who gave his own check on a banker for the amount; and thereupon the creditor gave a receipt for the money on account of the principal; and, upon the dishonor of the check, the creditor accepted another draft for the amount, payable at a future time from the steward; it was held, that, if the principal had, in the mean time, settled his accounts with his steward, or had dealt with him differently in consequence of that receipt, so that he would be prejudiced thereby, the principal would be discharged.² The same doctrine will apply to the case of a ship's husband, or a shipmaster, contracting a debt for supplies, or for repairs of the ship, where an exclusive credit is originally given to him, or an absolute payment is afterwards acknowledged, by a receipt, upon a note or other security being given by such agent for the amount, whereby he is enabled to settle with, and to receive the amount, in credit or otherwise, from the owners.³

§ 435. The foregoing are cases, where payments made by the agent are available for the principal, as being for his benefit.

¹ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 204; Wyatt v. Marquis of Hertford, 3 East, R. 117; Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 1, ch. 3, § 8, and note (1) to the Amer. edit. 1829, p. 76; 1 Laverm. on Agency, 207-212, (edit. 1818); Marsh v. Pedder, 4 Campb. 257; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 250-252.

² Wyatt v. Marquis of Hertford, 3 East, R. 117; Cheever v. Smith, 15 Johns. R. 276; Muldon v. Whitlock, 1 Cowen, R. 290, 303-305; 1 Laverm. on Agency, 207-212. (edit. 1818.)

³ Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 1, ch. 3, § 8, note (1) (Amer. edit. 1829), Reed v. White, 5 Esp. R. 122; Stewart v. Hall, 2 Dow, R. 19; Cheever v. Smith, 15 Johns. R. 276; Schermerhorn v. Loines, 7 Johns. R. 311; Muldon v. Whitlock, 1 Cowen, R. 290, 303-305.

But payments may have been made by an agent injuriously to the principal; and the question often arises, under what circumstances the principal is entitled to recover back the money so paid. In the first place, he may recover it back, when the whole consideration fails; as in the case of a deposit upon account of a purchase, where the bargain is rescinded, or becomes incapable of being performed.¹ So, if an agent to insure pays a premium upon a policy to the underwriters, or they acknowledge on the policy, that they have received the premium, and the policy never attaches, the principal may recover back the premium from them.² In the next place, if an agent pays money, under a mistake of fact, for his principal, the latter may recover it back from the party who has received it;³ [and it seems also if the money be paid under a mistake of the legal obligation of his principal.⁴] In the next place, where money has been illegally extorted from an agent in the course of his employment, the principal may recover it back. Thus, for example, if his agent pays duties for which the goods are not liable, and the goods are withheld until the duties are paid, the principal may recover the amount back.⁵ In the last place, where an agent has paid money, by some fraud or imposition practised upon him, and also where he himself has participated in a fraudulent payment to another person, cognizant of the fraud, the principal may recover it back.⁶

§ 436. Secondly, as to the rights of principals on account of torts or injuries done to their property or rights, in the course of the agency, by third persons. This may be very briefly disposed of. The tort or injury may be one in which the agent

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 335; *Duke of Norfolk v. Worthy*, 1 Campb. R. 337, 339; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 75, 76, (2d edit.); *Id.* B. 1, ch. 5, § 4, p. 124-126, (3d edit. 1843); *Post*, § 451.

² Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 335, 336; *Dalzell v. Mair*, 1 Campb. R. 332; *Power v. Butcher*, 10 Barn. & Cressw. 329.

³ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 336; *Id.* 236; *Ancher v. Bank of England*, Doug. R. 637; *Treuttell v. Barandon*, 8 Taunt. R. 100; *Sigourney v. Lloyd*, 8 Barn. & Cressw. 622; *S. C.* 5 Bing. R. 525; *Ante*, § 398.

⁴ *United States v. Bartlett, Davies*, R. 9.

⁵ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 336, 337; *Stevenson v. Mortimer*, Cowp. R. 805; *Elliott v. Swartwout*, 10 Peters, R. 137; *Ante*, § 307.

⁶ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 336-338; *Clarke v. Shee*, Cowp. R. 197; *Taylor v. Pumer*, 3 Maule & Selw. 562; *Ante*, §§ 224, 229, 230.

himself has been a party, as well as the third person; or it may be a tort or injury, in which the latter alone has acted, and is alone responsible. In the former case, the agent and the third person are jointly, as well as severally, liable to the principal; and he may sue both, or either of them.¹ In the latter case, the third person is liable to the principal, although he may also be liable for the tort to the agent.²

§ 437. We may illustrate these principles by a few cases. Thus, if an agent tortiously converts the property of his principal; as, if he sells or pledges it to a third person, without right or authority, the latter will generally be liable, equally with the agent, for the conversion.³ This doctrine applies in all cases, where the third person knew and participated in the illegal or unauthorized act of conversion. It also applies in all cases of a special agency, (but not of a general agency,) even though the third person was not cognizant of, or party to, the tort, but acted *bonâ fide*, and without notice.⁴ Thus, if A, not being a general agent of B, sells a horse of B to C, without due authority, or by an excess of authority, C, and every subsequent vendee under him, will be liable to B, for the conversion. But if A were the general agent of B, although he violated his private orders, A alone, and not C, or any subsequent vendee, would be liable for the conversion.⁵

§ 438. On the other hand, the agent may have conducted himself within the true scope of his duties, and the tort or injury may arise wholly from the misconduct of a third person. Thus, if a third person should wrongfully convert, or misuse, or injure the property of the principal, while it is in the posses-

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 310-342; Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule & Selw. 562.

² Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 363; Ante, § 229.

³ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 204-206; Clarke v. Shee, Cowp. R. 197; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 213-218, 339-342; Ante, §§ 224, 229, 230.

⁴ Ante, §§ 228, 229; Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule & Selw. 576; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 205, 206; Paley on Agency, 213-218, 339-342; McCornie v. Davis, 6 East, R. 538; Smith on Merc. Law, 74, 75. (2d edit.); Id. B. 1, ch. 5, § 4, pp. 124, 125, (3d edit. 1843); Anon. 12 Mod. 514; Baldwin v. Cole, 6 Mod. 212; Taylor v. Kymer, 3 Barn. & Adolph. 320.

⁵ Ante, §§ 73, 126-133; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 205, 206; Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38.

sion of the agent, the principal may maintain an action in his own name against the wrongdoer, for damages for the tort. So, if, in the sale of goods to an agent, the seller has been guilty of a gross fraud, the principal may maintain an action for any loss which he has sustained thereby. So, if a master of a ship should let the ship to hire to a charterer, and the latter, having possession of the ship, should, by his misconduct on the voyage, cause the ship to be seized and confiscated by a foreign government, or should cause her to be lost or destroyed by his negligence, or should convert her to his own use, by going on other voyages, or by selling her; in all these cases the principal may maintain an action for the wrong.¹

§ 439. In many cases of an illegal conversion of property by a third person, as well as by his agent, the principal may have an election of remedy; as, for example, in the case of a tortious sale, he may waive the tort, and maintain an action for the proceeds of the sale; or he may bring trover against the wrongdoer.² Sometimes the one course is more desirable than the other; but it is so, only when the interests of the principal may be enhanced thereby. Thus, if the wrongdoer has sold the goods of the principal for a high price, it will be most favorable to the latter to pursue his remedy for the price or proceeds. On the other hand, if the goods have been sold at an undervalue, then an action of trover would be the more beneficial remedy, as the principal would be entitled to recover the full price or value of the goods.

§ 440. We may close this head of inquiry by remarking, that the acts of agents, within the scope of the authority delegated to them, will enure to the benefit of the principal in a variety of cases, not falling under the preceding heads. In all such cases, the acts are treated as the acts of the principal, and are generally available for him, in the same manner and with the same effect as if personally done by himself; according to the old approved maxim, *Qui per alium facit, per seipsum facere videtur*.³

¹ Ante, § 229-231. Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 172, 173, and note (n); Id. 324, 325, note (e); *Hunter v. Prinseps*, 10 East, R. 378, 394; *Clarke v. Shee*, Cowp. R. 197.

² *Ibid.*

³ Co. Litt. 258; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 143; Branch, Max. (Amer. edit.

Thus, as we have seen, payment by an agent is payment by the principal, and may be pleaded as such.¹ So, a demand by an agent, duly authorized by the principal, if he shows his authority, or his authority is admitted by the other side, is a demand by the principal, for the purpose of founding a right or an action for the principal.² In many cases, too, as we have seen, the subsequent ratification of an unauthorized act, such, for example, as a demand, or notice, or claim, of an unauthorized agent, will avail to bind the principal, as well as to confer rights upon him.³ But this is true, only when the act is beneficial to the principal, and does not create an immediate duty on another party to do some other act, or does not subject the latter to some loss, damage, or injury : for then, if permitted, it would have a retroactive effect to defeat or control preexisting rights, or to found duties a compliance with which was not obligatory, or even justifiable, at the time, and, of course, which the law will not be so unreasonable as to encourage or establish.⁴

CHAPTER XVII.

RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS AGAINST PRINCIPALS.

§ 111. WE next come to an inquiry into the rights of third persons against principals, arising either from the contracts, or

1821.) v. 122 Smith on Merc. Law, 69, (2d edit.) ; Id. pp. 103, 104, 121, 122, (3d edit 1813)

¹ Ante, § 431.

² Smith on Merc. Law, 73-75, (2d edit.) ; Id. B. 1, ch. 5, § 5, pp. 133, 134, (3d edit 1813) ; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 343, 344 ; Bothlingk v. Ingles, 3 East, R. 381 ; Roe v. Davis, 7 East, R. 361 ; Coore v. Callaway, 1 Esp. R. 115 ; Coles v. Bell, 1 Camp. 478, n.

³ Ante, §§ 244, 245, 218, 219 ; Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. R. 722 ; Wilson v. Anderton, 1 Barn. & Adolph. 450 ; Bartram v. Farebrother, 4 Bing. R. 572.

⁴ Ante, § 245-247 ; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 206, 207 ; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 343-347 ; Solomons v. Dawes, 1 Esp. R. 83 ; Smith on Merc. Law, 73, 74, (2d edit.) ; Id. p. 133-135, (3d edit. 1813) ; Doe v. Walters, 10 Barn. & Cressw. 626.

the acts, or the torts of their agents. Many topics, which would arrange themselves for consideration under this head, have been unavoidably discussed in the preceding pages. The subject, therefore, will be briefly considered in this place; but, at the same time, as it will become indispensable to bring all matters touching it under review, in order to a complete examination of it, it will necessarily involve some repetitions.

§ 442. In the first place, then, as to the rights of third persons against principals, growing out of the contracts of their agents. It may be generally stated, that wherever an agent, having proper authority, makes a contract for or on behalf of his principal, that contract becomes obligatory on the principal; and the other contracting party has ordinarily the same rights and the same remedies against the principal, as if he had personally made the contract.¹ There are exceptions to this doctrine, founded upon special considerations, some of which will presently fall under our notice. The whole doctrine rests upon the maxim already referred to, *Qui facit per alium, facit per se*; and it is a plain and obvious dictate of natural justice, that he who is to receive the benefit shall bear the burden; and that he who has acquired, through his agent, certain fixed rights and remedies upon the contract, against the other contracting party, shall be the latter.

§ 443. But the responsibility of the principal to third persons is not confined to cases where the contract has been actually made under his express or implied authority. It extends further, and binds the principal in all cases where the agent is acting within the scope of his usual employment, or is held out to the public, or to the other party, as having competent authority, although, in fact, he has, in the particular instance, exceeded or violated his instructions, and acted without authority.² For, in all such cases, where one of two innocent persons is to suffer, he ought to suffer who misled the other into the contract, by holding out

¹ Smith on Merc Law, 55-58, (2d edit); Id. B. 1, ch. 5, § 4, p. 103-108, (3d edit. 1843), Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 343-345; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 201-205, 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 629, 630, (4th edit.) See also Todd v. Emly, 7 Mees. & Welsb 427.

² Ante, §§ 72, 105, 127, 128; Kerns v. Piper, 4 Watts, R. 222.

the agent as competent to act, and as enjoying his confidence.¹ We have already seen, that this doctrine applies to a large class of agencies, where the party acts under a general authority, as contradistinguished from a special authority.² To the other illustrations, we may add the case of the master of a ship. If he makes a particular engagement or warranty, relating to the conveyance of goods, according to the usual employment of the ship, the owners will be bound by such engagement or warranty, although it is made without their knowledge or approbation, or against their orders.³ So, if the principal should clothe the agent, although a mere special agent, with all the apparent muniments of an absolute title to the property in himself, the principal would be bound by the acts of the latter; as, for example, if he should clothe him with the apparent title to property by a bill of lading of a shipment, as by making the shipment appear to be on account of the agent, or should trust him with negotiable securities, indorsed in blank. a sale or disposal thereof by the agent, although in violation of his private orders, would bind the principal, and give correspondent rights and remedies to third persons, who become *bonâ fide* possessors under such sale, or other act of disposal, against him.⁴

§ 444. So, upon similar grounds, the rights of third persons will be protected, where they deal with an agent, supposing him to be the sole principal, without any knowledge that the property involved therein belongs to another person. This has been already alluded to, in cases where purchases are made of a factor, or other agent, holding himself out as the principal, or supposed to be such, and the buyer has a set-off against such agent or factor.⁵ In such cases, the set-off is equally good, whether a suit be brought in the name of the principal, or of the factor or agent, for the price of the goods.⁶ So, if an agent, em-

¹ Ante, §§ 17, 18, 73, 126, 127, 131-133, 227, 228; Post, § 470; Smith on Merc. Law, 56-59, (2d edit.); Id. B. 1, ch. 5, § 4, p. 103-111, (3d edit. 1843), 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 202, 203.

² Ante, §§ 17, 18, 73, 126-133, 227, 228.*

³ Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 6-8, p. 94-98, (Amer. edit. 1829); Ellis v. Turner, 8 Term R. 531; Ante, §§ 73, 126-133.

⁴ Ante, §§ 34, note, 227, 228.

⁵ Ante, §§ 390, 404, 407, 419, 420.

⁶ Ante, §§ 419, 420; Smith on Merc. Law, 74, 75, (2d edit.); Id. B. 1, ch. 5,

ployed to collect money, and to remit it to his principal, should lend it to a person to whom he is indebted in a larger amount, the latter, if he has no knowledge that the money does not belong to the agent, may retain it as a set-off, and may resist a suit therefor by the principal, although notice of the claim of the principal is given to him, before the suit is brought.¹ But, where an agent is known to be merely acting as such in the transaction, a third person, dealing with him with full notice, cannot avail himself of any right of set-off, which he may have against the agent.²

§ 445. So, if a contract is originally made without the authority of the principal, he may, by a ratification of it, give it validity, so as to confer upon the other contracting party the same rights and remedies as if he had personally made it;³ for, as we have seen, the general maxim is, that a subsequent ratification is equivalent to a prior authority: *Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur, et mandato priori æquiparatur*.⁴ This is so regularly true, that if an agent purchases goods for his principal, without due authority, and signs a written contract therefor, and the contract is within the statute of frauds, yet, if the principal subsequently ratifies it, the ratification will make the contract good within the statute of frauds, so as to bind the principal.⁵

§ 5, pp. 135, 136, (2d edit 1843), Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 277-280, 288, 289, 326, 383; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 202; *Morris v. Cleasby*, 4 Maule & Selw. 566; *George v. Clagett*, 7 Term R. 359; *Pickering v. Busk*, 16 East, R. 38; *Whitehead v. Tuckett*, 15 East, R. 400.

¹ *Lime Rock Bank v. Plumpton*, 17 Pick. 159.

² *Hurlburt v. Pacific Ins Co* 2 Sumner, R. 471. *Young v. White*, 7 Beavan, R. 506. But where the principal has parted with all beneficial interest in any property, the agent cannot make a valid sale thereof, nor a valid contract in respect thereto, so as to bind the principal, although the latter still retain the legal title. Thus, although the registered owner of a ship would be liable *prima facie* for repairs done thereon, this presumption may be rebutted by proof that he has parted with the beneficial interest. *Jennings v. Griffiths*, *Ryan and Mood*, 42; *McIver v. Humble*, 16 East, R. 169; *Curling v. Robinson*, 7 Mann & Grang. 339.

³ Ante, § 239-260; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 60, (2d edit.); *Id.* p. 108, (3d edit. 1843.)

⁴ *Maclean v. Dunn*, 4 Bing. R. 722; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 60; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 44; *Co. Litt.* 207 a; Ante, § 239-260, (2d edit.); *Id.* p. 108, (3d edit. 1843.)

⁵ Ante, § 244; *Maclean v. Dunn*, 4 Bing. R. 722; *Kinnitz v. Surry*, *Paley on*

§ 446. The liability of the principal to third persons upon contracts made by his agent, within the scope of his authority, is not varied by the mere fact, that the agent contracts in his own name, whether, he discloses his agency or not, provided the circumstances of the case do not show that an exclusive credit is given to the agent.¹ Thus, if an agent purchases goods in his own name for his principal, without disclosing the latter, the principal will be liable, when discovered, to the vendor, for the price.² So, if the agent purchases the goods, and states, at the time, that he purchases as agent, but does not disclose the name of his principal, the latter will not be absolved from the contract; for, in such a case, as the principal is not known, it is impossible to say that the vendor has made his election not to trust the principal, but exclusively to trust the agent.³ He may credit both, or either; and he is not to be presumed to have an intention to elect either exclusively, until the name and credit of both are fairly before him.⁴ If no exclusive credit has been given by the vendor, in such cases, either to the principal or to the agent, it will make no difference in the rights of the vendor that there is a private and unknown agreement between the principal and agent, that either of them should be exclusively liable for the amount; for such agreements, however valid between the parties, cannot be admitted to change the rights of third persons, who are strangers to them.⁵ Neither,

Agency, by Lloyd, 171, note; *Soames v. Spencer*, 1 Dowl. & Ry. 32; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 59, 60 (2d edit.); *Id.* pp. 108, 133, 134, (3d edit. 1843)

¹ 1 Bell, Comm. § 418. (1th edit.). *Id.* B. 3, ch. 3, pp. 191, 492, (5th edit.); *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 243, 244, *Ante*, §§ 147, 269, 270.

² *Ante*, § 266-270, 420; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 343-345; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 65, 66, (2d edit.); *Id.* B. 1, ch. 5, § 5, pp. 133, 134, (3d edit. 1843); *Paterson v. Gandasequi*, 15 East, R. 62; *Addison v. Gandasequi*, 4 Taunt. R. 574; *Railton v. Hodgson*, 4 Taunt. R. 576, n.; *Wilson v. Hart*, 7 Taunt. R. 295; *Thomson v. Davenport*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 78, 86, 88; *Bickerton v. Burrell*, 5 Maule & Selw. 383; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 213-245; *Jones v. Littledale*, 6 Adolph. & Ellis, 490; *Seymour v. Pychlau*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 14, 17, 18; *Rayner v. Grote*, 15 Mees. & Welsb. R. 359. See *ante*, § 106, note.

³ *Ante*, § 266-270; *Thomson v. Davenport*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 78; *Higgins v. Senior*, 8 Mees. & Welsb. 440; *Ante*, § 270.

⁴ *Thomson v. Davenport*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 78, 86, 88.

⁵ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 334, 343-345; *Rich v. Coe*, Cowp. 636; *Precious v. Able*, 1 Esp. Rep. 350; *Kymer v. Suwercropp*, 1 Camp. R. 109; *Waring v.*

for the same reason, will a set-off, which the principal has against the agent, be, under such circumstances, available against the vendor.¹

Favenck, 1 Camp. R. 85; Speering v. De Grave, 2 Vern. 643; Ante, § 280-300, 431-433.

¹ Waring v. Favenck, 1 Campb. R. 85; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 245, 334; Heald v. Kenworthy, 28 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 537; 10 Exch. 739. Mr. Bell, in his excellent Commentaries on Mercantile Jurisprudence, 1 Bell, Comm. § 418, (4th edit.); Id. pp. 491, 492, (5th edit.) has summed up the whole doctrine on this subject in a very satisfactory manner. "Third parties, who have dealt with the factor, have their claim against the estate of the principal as if they had dealt with him-self. The agent's contract entered into, *factoris nomine*, the principal's name being disclosed, forms a good ground of action or claim against the principal, provided the power is proved. And in this case there will be no action against the factor, unless the principal is abroad. Such is the case of a rider to a manufacturing house. In taking an order in the name of the house, he binds the house to furnish the article. In such cases, the claim may either be, first against the principal, as the buyer of goods, for the price; or, secondly, against the principal, as the seller of goods, for delivery of the goods, or for damages. In the former case, the claim is merely for a dividend, even where the goods are still with the agent or factor, and distinguishable. In the latter, the claim also is merely personal. But where the agent is neutral, as a general commission-agent, who unites the business of a custodian with that of a broker, acting for both parties, the property may, in such situations, be held as transferred, so as to vest a real right in the buyer. Where the contract is not in the principal's name, but generally as with a factor, the election will be with the third party to hold to the credit of the factor, or to seek his remedy against the principal. And the remedy against the principal will not be hurt, either, first, by any private agreement between the principal and the factor, that the factor alone shall be responsible; or, secondly, where the principal has paid the price to his agent, who has squandered it; unless the day of payment has been allowed to pass, and the principal has been led to believe that the agent alone was relied on; or, thirdly, by the circumstance of the factor failing, with a large balance due to the principal. Where notice is given of the principal, and the third party chooses to rely on the factor, he will be entitled so to do, but will not also have his claim against the principal. Even where the factor contracts in his own name, the principal is bound to the third party, on his name and interest being disclosed. But, in such case, the principal and factor will reciprocally have the benefit of their private stipulations, as to responsibility, and of their correlative rights, in respect to the state of the balance in account between them. A *del credere* commission affects the settlement only between the principal and factor, relative to the money to be recovered from third parties. So, a factor with a *del credere* is responsible that the buyer shall pay the price. But although the factor will, on the buyer's failure, (himself being insolvent,) have the beneficial interest in claiming on the buyer's estate, he is not so much a creditor as, on the one hand, to deprive the buyer of the benefit of retention or compensation against the principal; nor, on

§ 446 *a*. The fact that the agent has contracted in his own name in writing, yet with the assent of his principal and for his benefit, will not exclude the principal from liability, unless exclusive credit is given to the agent. Thus, if an agent with the assent of his principal and for his benefit draws a bill of exchange in his own name on his principal, which is taken by a party in the business of the principal, (as to raise money for him,) although the principal may not be directly bound as drawer of the bill, but the principal only, yet the party advancing the money on the bill may have an action for money paid, &c., against the principal for the amount of the advances.¹

§ 447. The exceptions to this liability of the principal may easily be gathered from what has been already stated. If the principal and the agent are both known, and exclusive credit is given to the latter, the principal will not be liable, although the agent should subsequently fail; for it is competent to the parties to agree to charge one, exonerating the other; and an election, when once made, becomes conclusive and irrevocable.²

§ 448. In the common case of purchases by a factor, for a principal, resident in a foreign country, we have already seen, that the credit is, from the general usage of trade, deemed to be exclusive; and, therefore, the principal is never, or, at least, is not ordinarily, deemed liable therefor.³ And even with re-

the other, to give his own creditors the benefit of the claim against the buyer, while they pay only a dividend to the principal. In the former case, compensation or retention against the principal will discharge the guarantee; in the latter the principal will have his claim against the buyer on the bankruptcy, and also against the factor on his guarantee. Claims may be made by third parties against the estate of the principal, in consequence of the acts of the agent, though unauthorized by the principal. Thus, the representations of the agent, in the strict course of the contract, will be taken to form a part of the contract with the principal; and the concealment or misrepresentation of the agent will also affect the principal. In the same way, notice to a factor or agent will be held as notice to the principal, provided such factor has power to treat and negotiate the contract. And finally, the principal is liable civilly for the neglect or fraud of his agent, committed in execution of the authority given to him."

¹ *Allen v. Coit*, 6 Hill, N. Y. R. 318; *Rogers v. Coit*, 6 Hill, N. Y. R. 322.

² *Ante*, §§ 161, 278, 279, 291, 423, 432; *Abbott on Shipp.* Pl. 1, ch. 2, § 8, p. 76, note (1), (Amer. edit. 1829); *Id.* Pl. 2, ch. 3, §§ 2, 3, p. 100-102, *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 244, 245.

³ *Ante*, §§ 268, 279, 290, 296, 297, 350, 423, 432, 434; *Thomson v. Daven-*

spect to domestic factors, a similar conclusion may arise from the previous dealings between the parties, or the peculiar circumstances of the particular transaction. Thus, for example, if an agent purchases goods for his principal, who is known, and stands by at the time of the purchase, and the vendor gives credit to the agent, that is ordinarily deemed an election to charge him alone.¹ *A fortiori*, the presumption of an exclusive credit to the agent will arise in such a case, if the agent is a domestic factor, and the principal is a foreigner, transiently in the country.² The case of an exclusive credit, given to shipmasters, for supplies or repairs, constitutes another illustration of the same doctrine; although, in a variety of cases, the material man may have a lien on the ship, as well as the responsibility of the shipmaster and ship-owner, for the supplies or repairs.³

§ 419. The liability of the principal to third persons, where the purchase is made in the name of his agent, and the principal is not known or disclosed at the time, is qualified by another consideration; and that is, that the principal will not be made personally liable, if, in the intermediate time, he has settled with his agent, without any suspicion of his own personal liability, or if he would otherwise, without any default on his own part, be prejudiced by being made personally liable. Therefore, if, in the intermediate time, the principal has paid the agent for goods purchased in the name of the latter, or if the state of the accounts between the agent and the principal would make it unjust that the principal should be held liable to the vendor, such fact of payment, or such a state of accounts, would be a good defence

port, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 78, 87; Paley on Agency, 243-246, 248, 334; Smith on Merc. Law, 66, (2d edit.) Id. pp. 122, 123, (3d edit. 1833); 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 203; 1 Bell, Comm. § 418, (4th edit.); Id. p. 491, (5th edit.) As to the case of a principal resident in another State of the United States, see *Tainter v. Prendergast*, 3 Hill, R. 72, and ante, § 268, note.

¹ *Addison v. Gandasqui*, 4 Taunt. R. 574, 580; *Wilson v. Hart*, 7 Taunt. R. 295. See *Warng v. Favenck*, 1 Campb. R. 85; *Kymer v. Suwercropp*, 1 Campb. R. 109; Ante, §§ 400, 406, 423.

² *Ibid.* See also *Seymour v. Pychlau*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 14, 16-19.

³ See *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 2, ch. 3, § 3-18, and notes to Amer. edit. 1829; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 245, 246; *Rich v. Coe*, Cowp. R. 637; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 243-246; Ante, §§ 294, 434; Post, § 450.

to a suit brought by the vendor against the principal.¹ The same result would arise, if the vendor had accepted a negotiable security from the agent, for the amount, payable at a future day, or had given him a receipt, by which he had in the meantime settled with his principal, or the latter had been induced to deal differently with the agent, from what he would otherwise have done.² So, if the vendor had suffered the day of payment for

¹ Per Bayley, J., in *Thomson v. Davenport*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 88, 89; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 243, 244, 248-253; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 65-66, (2d edit.); *Id.* pp. 122, 123, (3d edit. 1813); *Ante.* § 131. But see *Waing v. Favenck*, 1 Camp. R. 85; *Kymer v. Suwercropp*, 1 Campb. R. 109; *Smyth v. Anderson*, 7 C. B. 21.

² *Ante.* §§ 288, 291, 433, 434; *Porter v. Talcott*, 1 Cowen. R. 359; 3 *Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* 204; *Wyatt v. Marquis of Hertford*, 3 East, R. 147; *Cheves v. Smith*, 15 Johns. 276; *Cleland v. Walker*, 11 Ala. 1058; *Hyde v. Paige*, 9 Barbour, 150; *French v. Price*, 24 Pick. 13; *Fisher v. Commonwealth*, 31 Penn. St. R. 406. See *Johnson v. Claves*, 15 N. H. R. 332; *Marsh v. Pedder*, 4 Campb. R. 257; 1 *Liverm. on Agency*, 207-217, (edit. 1818); *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 243-247, 250-253; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 65, 66, (2d edit.); *Id.* B. 1, ch. 2, § 4, pp. 121, 122, (3d edit. 1813). Mr. Lloyd, in his edition of *Paley on Agency*, 246-254, has made a summary of the principal cases. Although it is somewhat long, its practical utility has induced me to cite it at large in this place. "Indeed, there are several ways, in which the liability of the principal may be affected, in purchases made by his agent, of which the following summary may be useful. 1st. The purchase may be made by the broker, expressly for and in the name of his principal. In that case, if the principal be debited by the seller, he only, and not the broker, will be liable. 2d. A broker may purchase in his character of broker, for a known principal; but the seller may choose, nevertheless, to take him for his debtor rather than the principal in whose credit he may not have the same confidence, and, after this deliberate election, the seller cannot afterwards turn round and charge the principal. 3d. The broker may buy in his own name, without disclosing his principal; in which case, the invoices will, of course, be made out to him, and he will be debited with the account. If now, before payment, the seller discover that the purchase was in fact made for another, he may, at his choice, look for payment either to the broker or the principal, — to the former upon his personal contract, — to the latter to the contract of his agent; and the adoption of the purchase by the principal will be evidence of the agent's authority. But, 4th. If, after the disclosure of the principal, the seller lie by and suffer the principal to settle in account with his broker for the amount of the purchase, he cannot afterwards charge the latter, so as to make him a loser, but will be deemed to have elected the broker for his debtor. And, 5th. If the principal be a foreigner, it seems, that, by the usage of trade, the credit is to be considered as having been given to the English broker, and that he only, and not the foreign buyer, will be liable. That question, however, is for the jury. 6th. There is still an intermediate case,

the goods to pass by, without demanding payment, and had thereby induced the principal to suppose that credit was exclu-

where, upon a purchase by a broker, the seller, knowing that he is acting as broker in the transaction, but not for whom, makes out the invoice to him, and debits him with the price; can the seller afterwards, when the name of the principal is made known to him, substitute him as the debtor, and call upon him for payment? On the one part, it is said, the principal, in debiting the broker, can have exercised no election; because election implies a preference, and there can be no preference, when the principal is unknown. On the other part, it is answered, that the seller might have known by simply asking the question, and that the omitting to make the inquiry is decisive evidence of a deliberate preference of the broker. The Court of King's Bench has decided, that the principal, in such case, is not discharged; but the decision has not been considered very satisfactory, and is certainly not implicitly acquiesced in. 7th. It was laid down by Parke, J., in a case which underwent much consideration, that wherever the broker has stated to his principal, and the latter has *bonâ fide* adopted, a contract different from that under which the purchase was actually made, the seller cannot call upon the principal for payment; because the seller sues on the contract under which the goods were really sold, and is, therefore, bound to show that the principal authorized or ratified that contract, and not a different one, substituted by the broker. And, although the Court hesitated to adopt this proposition in its full extent, yet they were unanimously of opinion, that, if the seller have furnished the broker with the means of so mis-representing the contract to his principal, and the latter have actually paid the broker, according to the terms communicated to him, he will thenceforth be released from all liability to the seller. 8th. Payment by the agent will, of course, discharge the principal. And it is a general principle, that if the creditor voluntarily give an enlarged credit to the agent of the debtor, or adopt a particular mode of payment whereby the principal is placed in a worse situation than he would otherwise have been, the liability of the original debtor is discharged; and, therefore, if a creditor, voluntarily, and for his own accommodation, take a security from an agent of the debtor, who afterwards fails, having in his hands funds of his principal adequate to the payment of the demand, he cannot afterwards resort to the principal. But, if the creditor take the security, not voluntarily and for his own convenience, but because he is unable at the time to procure cash, or if he take it conditionally, and not as absolute payment, or if the principal be in no respect prejudiced by the accommodation afforded to the debtor, then, to whatever extent the indulgence may have been carried, the principal will not be released. It seems, in short, that nothing will operate as a discharge to the principal, which could not be pleaded as payment, or as accord and satisfaction between the creditor and the agent. And, therefore, a receipt, given by the creditor to an agent or broker, does not necessarily of itself operate as a discharge to the principal; nor has it that effect, unless the principal appear to have dealt differently with his agent. The consequence of the receipt, as by passing it in his accounts, and giving him further credit upon the faith of that voucher. But, where the receipt is the means of

sive given to the agent, and upon the faith of that he had paid over the amount to the agent, or settled it in account with him, the principal would be discharged.¹ [But, in all these cases, it seems to be essential, that the vendor should in some way have either deceived the principal, or induced him to alter his position and accounts towards his agent, before he is deprived of his remedy against the principal. And it is now settled, that the simple fact that the principal has paid his agent the funds with which to pay the plaintiff, does not deprive the plaintiff of his right to look to the principal, if the agent fail to pay over according to

accrediting the agent with his principal, or altering the situation of the latter, the creditor can only resort to the agent. Accordingly, in the insurance trade, where the usage is for the broker of the assured to charge his employer with premiums as paid to the underwriter, though in fact there be no money paid, but a running account kept between the broker and underwriter, it is held, that the receipt in the policy, whereby the underwriter confesses himself paid the premium, is conclusive, as between him and the principal. In case of the sale of goods to an agent, payable upon time, if the time of payment has not elapsed, the principal, whether known or unknown, cannot, by a premature payment to, or settlement with, the agent, exonerate himself from responsibility to the vendor, unless it is clear, from all the circumstances, that an exclusive credit was given to the agent. *Smith on Merc. Law*, 65, 66, (2d edit.); *Id. B. 1, ch. 5, §§ 121, 122*, (3d edit. 1843); *Waring v. Favenck*, 1 Campb. R. 85; *Kymer v. Suwercropp*, 1 Campb. R. 109. In this last case, Lord Ellenborough said: "A person selling goods is not confined to the credit of a broker, who buys them; but may resort to the principal, on whose account they are bought; and he is no more affected by the state of accounts between the two, than I should be were I to deliver goods to a man's servant, pursuant to his order, by the consideration of whether the servant was indebted to the master, or the master to the servant. If he lets the day of payment go by, he may lead the principal into the supposition, that he relies solely on the broker; and if, in that case, the price of the goods has been paid to the broker on account of this deception, the principal shall be discharged. But here, payment was demanded of the defendant on the several days it became due, and no reason was given him to believe that his broker alone was trusted. He has received a great part of the coffee, and enjoyed the benefit of it; the right of the vendors is entire, unless he has paid them, or some person authorized by them to receive payment. *Kenyon & Co.* had no such authority; therefore, he is still liable. The rest of the coffee was stopped, only to prevent its getting into the hands of the insolvent brokers; and, as payment was to precede the delivery, it was enough, if the plaintiffs, on being paid, were ready to have delivered it."

¹ *Kymer v. Suwercropp*, 1 Campb. R. 109; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 243-246; *Smith on Merc. Law*, B. 1, ch. 5, § 4, pp. 121, 122, (3d edit. 1843.) See *Smyth v. Anderson*, 7 C. B. 21.

his orders.¹ So, in a recent case, *M.*, the owner of a ship, applied to a broker to effect an insurance on it, and the broker signed a policy on behalf of *G.*, an underwriter. The ship being lost the broker settled with *M.*, giving him a credit note. It was usual to pay credit notes at a month from their date. The broker had sufficient funds of *G.* to pay the loss, both at the time of signing the policy and at the giving of the credit note. Nearly three months after the credit note was given, and while the same was unpaid the broker failed. It was held, that *M.* might still call upon *G.* for payment.²

§ 450. Another exception* may arise from the form of the contract, where, although it is authorized by the principal, and is in

[¹ *Heald v. Kenworthy*, 10 Exch. 739; 28 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 537 — Parke, B., said. "If a man order an agent to buy goods, he is bound to see that his agent pays for them, and the giving of money to his agent for that purpose, does not amount to payment, unless the money be actually so applied. It is true, the cases furnish *dota* upon which some argument to the contrary may be hung. First, there is the *dictum* of Bayley, J., in *Thomson v. Davenport*, to the effect that, if the agent 'does make himself personally liable, it does not follow that the principal may not be liable also, subject to this qualification, that the principal shall not be prejudiced by being made personally liable, if the justice of the case is that he should not be personally liable.' He then goes on to say: 'If the principal has paid the agent, or if the state of accounts between the agent here and the principal would make it unjust that the seller should call on the principal, the fact of payment, or such a state of accounts, would be an answer to the action brought by the seller where he had looked to the responsibility of the agent.' That expression is somewhat vague, but it is quite true when properly understood. If, for example, the principal is induced, by the conduct of the seller, to pay his own agent, on the faith that the agent will settle with the seller, in such a case the seller would be precluded from recovering, as it would be unjust for him to do so. But, under ordinary circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, unless he has either deceived the defendant or induced him to alter his position. This is the case of *Wyatt v. The Marquis of Hertford*. So in the case of *Kymer v. Suwercropp*, the observations of Lord Ellenborough are quite correct, as the fact of the seller's allowing the day of payment to pass may afford evidence of deceit, and of his having induced the principal to pay his agent. The same conclusion is to be drawn, from the judgment of my brother Maule, in *Smyth v. Anderson*, and his language is not at all at variance with the other decisions with reference to the effect of payment. He observes: 'Payment, however, is only put in the *dicta* to which I have adverted, as an instance of its being unjust or unfair that the seller should enforce the contract against the principal. The result is, that, under the circumstances of the present case, the seller may recover against the principal.' See also *Smyth v. Anderson*, 7 Com. R. 21.]

**Macfarlane v. Giannacopulo*, 3 Hurl. & Norm. 859.

the course of his business, yet it is exclusively, in its form, and character, and operation, a contract between the agent and the third person.¹ In such cases, the principal is not directly liable to such third person upon the contract, although, in some cases, he may be indirectly liable.² Thus, where a contract is made under seal between the agent in his own name and a third person, the principal cannot sue or be sued thereon, although it may be authorized by him; as, for example, in case of a charter-party, or a bottomry bond, sealed and executed by the master of a ship; or in a contract, made by the agent under his own seal, for the purchase or sale of goods, or for a lease, or for any other thing to be done, where the covenants, although on behalf of the principal, are exclusively in the names of the agent and the third person.³

¹ Ante, §§ 49, 160 a, 161, 278, 422, 431.

² Ante, §§ 151, 160, 160 a, 161, 278, 422; *Dubois v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co.* 4 Wend. R. 285; *Hall v. Bainbridge*, 1 Mann. & Grang. 42.

³ Ante, §§ 155-158, 160, 161, 162 note, 263, 273-275, 276, 278, 279, 291, 422; *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 3, ch. 1, § 2, p. 163-165, (Amer. edit. 1829); *Paley on Agency*, 381-384; *Wells v. Evans*, 20 Wend. R. 251; Ante, § 49, note. Lord Tenterden, in his work on Shipping. Pt. 3, ch. 1, § 2, p. 163-165, refers to this doctrine, in the following passage: "I have before observed, that the execution of a charter-party by the master, although said to be done on behalf of the owners, does not furnish a direct action, grounded upon the instrument itself, against them. This depends upon a technical rule of the law of England, applicable as well to this as to other cases, and not affected by the mercantile practice of executing deeds for, and in the name of absent persons; the rule of the law of England being, that the force and effect, which that law gives to a deed under seal, cannot exist, unless the deed be executed by the party himself, or by another for him, in his presence, and with his direction; or, in his absence, by an agent, authorized to do so by another deed; and, in every such case, the deed must be made and executed in the name of the principal. The agent, indeed, either of the owner or merchant, may, and sometimes does, execute a charter-party, and covenant in his own name for performance by his principal, so as to bind himself to answer for his principal's default, by force of the deed. And, in an action to recover freight or demurrage, claimed in pursuance of a charter-party by deed, it has been held, the declaration must be specially framed on the deed itself. If such a charter-party be made between the master and the merchant, in pursuance of which goods are delivered to the merchant and his partners, the freight cannot be recovered in an action upon the case, brought by the owners against the merchants. So, if the owner execute a deed to the merchant, containing the usual covenant for a right delivery of the cargo, he cannot be sued by the merchant for not delivering it, in an action upon the case, grounded on the bill

§ 451. In the next place, as to the liability of principals to third persons for the acts of their agents. This topic may be

of lading signed by the master. But, where a charter-party, under seal, was made by the master in that character, with merchants who did not know that he was also a part-owner in the ship, as in fact he was, it was held, that they might sue him and the other owners in an action upon the case, for a breach of such general duties as were not inconsistent with the stipulations of the charter-party, such as the not providing necessaries for the voyage, and employing a negligent and unskilful master. And, whether the instrument be under seal or not, an action at law, grounded upon it, must be brought in the name of the party to it, and not in the name of another, to whom he may have assigned his interest. And, therefore, the purchaser of a ship, previously chartered, cannot sue for the freight earned under the charter-party in his own name, although payment to him will be a good discharge to an action brought in the name of the seller, at least if the purchase be made before the ship sails on the voyage. In like manner, where goods were shipped, in pursuance of a charter-party made by the master with one Partridge, and whereby he engaged to receive a cargo of fruit from the agents or assigns of Partridge, and deliver the same to him or his assigns; and, upon a shipment, he signed a bill of lading, stating the goods to have been shipped by one Strange, by order of Rovedino & Moores, to be delivered to the order of Moores, and freight to be paid according to the tenor of the contract of affreightment; it was held, that Moores could not maintain an action against the master for negligence in the stowing of the fruit. Another technical rule of the law of England, applicable also to the contract by charter-party, under seal, should be noticed in this place. If a charter-party is expressed to be made between certain parties, as between A and B, owners of a ship, whereof C is master, of the one part, and D and E, of the other part, and purports to contain covenants with C, nevertheless, C cannot bring an action in his name upon the covenants expressed to be made with him, nor give a release of them, even although he seals and delivers the instrument. But if the charter-party is not expressed to be made between parties, but runs thus: 'This charter-party indented witnesseth, that C, master of the ship W., with consent of A and B, the owners thereof, lets the ship to freight to E and F; and the instrument contains covenants by E and F, to and with A and B; in this case, A and B may bring an action upon the covenants, expressed to be made with them; although, unless they seal the deed, they cannot be sued upon it. This latter, therefore, is the most proper form.' See also *Atty v. Parish*, 4 Bos. & Pull. 104. In *Tilson v. Warwick Gas Light Company*, 4 Barn. & Cressw. 962, 968, Bayley, J., said: "I am not convinced by the case of *Atty v. Parish*, that, where a contract appears upon the face of a declaration to be such, that the plaintiff may recover, whether the contract be by deed or not, that it is necessary to declare upon the deed, if there be one. The strong impression of my mind is, that, upon principle, although there be a deed between the parties, yet, if there be a debt, independent of the deed, the amount of which, however, is to be ascertained by the deed, the existence of the deed will not prevent the party from recovering that debt upon

dismissed in a few words; for the whole doctrine turns upon the obvious maxim, that he, who acts by another, acts by himself: *Qui facit per alium, facit per se*.¹ Hence it is, that the delivery of goods by a third person to an agent, and the acceptance of goods by an agent for his principal, is, in contemplation of law, a delivery to, and acceptance by, the principal.² Hence, also, a delivery of goods to the servant of a carrier, in the course of his employment, is a delivery to the carrier himself, and binds him to responsibility to the owner.³ A delivery of goods to a master of a ship is a delivery to the owner or employer. [But a master of a ship, or other agent, has no power to bind his principal by a receipt for goods as delivered, which in fact, never were delivered.⁴] A delivery of goods to the consignee, who is agent of the shipper, is a delivery to the latter.⁵ So, payments, made by a third person to the agent, in the course of his employment, is payment to the principal; and, whether actually paid to the principal, or not, by the agent, it is conclusive upon him.⁶ So, if the money is, from any circumstances, recoverable back, as, if

the common counts. And where there was a charter-party, under which the cargo was to be sent alongside the ship, at the merchant's expense, the master rendering the customary assistance with his boats and crew, and the cargo lying about thirty yards from the edge of the wharf, the master applied to the defendant's factor for laborers, to remove it into the boats, and he refused, saying he would abide by the charter-party, and the master hired laborers for the purpose, it was held, that the shipowner might recover such expense in an action of assumpsit, notwithstanding the charter-party." *Fletcher v. Gillespie*, 3 Bing. R. 60. See *Banorjee v. Hovey*, 5 Mass. R. 11, *Kimball v. Tucker*, 10 Mass. R. 192. It is not, in the present state of the authorities, easy to say, in what cases the principal may or may not sue or be sued, upon written and sealed contracts of his agent, either directly or indirectly, as the cases do not seem to be in perfect harmony with each other, or to furnish any very clear or definite rule. See ante, §§ 49 note, 160, 161, 275-278, 294, 422.

¹ Ante, § 134-139; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 69, (2d edit.); *Id.* B. 1, ch. 5, § 4, p. 127-130, (3d edit. 1843); *Paley on Agency*, by *Lloyd*, 293; 1 *Bell, Comm.* § 413, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 493, (5th edit.)

² *Smith on Merc. Law*, 69, (2d edit.), *Id.* p. 127-130, (3d edit. 1843); *Paley on Agency*, by *Lloyd*, 553; *Mead v. Hammond*, 1 Str. R. 505; 3 *Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* 207.

³ *Ibid.*; *Staples v. Alder*, 2 Mod. R. 309; *Taylor v. —*, 2 Ld. Raym. 792.

⁴ *Grant v. Norway*, 2 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 337; *Hubbersty v. Ward*, 18 Id. 501; *Coleman v. Riches*, 29 Id. 323.

⁵ *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 2, 8, p. 90-99, (Amer. edit. 1829.)

⁶ Ante, § 429.

it is paid by mistake, or upon a consideration that has failed, the principal will be liable to repay it, although he may never have received it from his agent.¹ So, a tender to an authorized agent will be a good tender to the principal.² Notice, also, to an agent, in the course of his employment, is notice to the principal.³ So, the representations, declarations, and admissions of the agent, in the course of his agency, are deemed a part of the *res gestæ*, and equally obligatory upon the principal, as if made by himself.⁴ So, a demand, made of an agent, of goods pawned to his principal, upon a tender of the money due, will, upon the refusal of the agent, if usually intrusted to deliver up such property, amount to evidence of conversion to bind the master.⁵

* § 452. In the next place, as to the liability of the principal, to third persons, for the misfeasances, negligences, and torts of his agent. It is a general doctrine of law, that, although the principal is not ordinarily liable (for he sometimes is) in a criminal suit,⁶ for the acts or misdeeds of his agent, unless, indeed, he has authorized or coöperated in those acts or misdeeds; yet, he is held liable to third persons in a civil suit for the frauds, deceptions, concealments, misrepresentations, torts, negligences,⁷ and other malfeasances, or misfeasances, and omissions of duty, of his agent, in the course of his employment, although the principal did not authorize, or justify, or participate in, or, indeed, know of such misconduct, or even if he for-

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 293; *Carey v. Webster*, 1 Str. R. 480; *Mathew v. Haydon*, 2 Esp. R. 509; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 207; Ante, §§ 408, 418, 435.

² Anon. 1 Esp. R. 349; *Goodland v. Blewith*, 1 Campb. 477; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 208; Ante, §§ 103, 147.

³ Ante, § 140; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 209.

⁴ Ante, § 184-189; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 208, 209.

⁵ *Jones v. Hart*, 2 Salk. 441; S. C. Ld. Raym. 738; Com. Dig. *Action on the case for Negligence*, A. 1-A. 6; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 305; 4 Bac. Abridg. *Master and Servant*, K.; Ante, § 247.

⁶ *Attorney-General v. Siddon*, 1 Tyrwh. R. 41; *Rex v. Goutch*, 1 Mood. & Malk. 437; *Rex v. Almon*, 1 Leading Crim. Cases, 241 and note; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 294-298; Id. 305, 306; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 209, 210; *Hunter v. The State*, 1 Head, (Tenn.) 160; *Smith on Merc. Law*, B. 1, ch. 1, § 180, (3d edit 1843.)

⁷ *Butt v. Butten*, 26 Verm. 112; *Linsley v. Lovely*, Id. 128.

bade the acts, or disapproved of them.¹ In all such cases, the rule applies, *Respondet Superior*; and it is founded upon public policy and convenience; for in no other way could there be any safety to third persons in their dealings, either directly with the principal, or indirectly with him through the instrumentality of agents.² In every such case, the principal holds out his agent, as competent, and fit to be trusted; and thereby, in effect, he warrants his fidelity and good conduct in all matters within the scope of the agency.³

¹ Southwick v. Estes, 7 Cush. 385; Reeves v. State Bank, 8 Ohio St. R. 476; Philadelphia Railroad Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 468; Hunter v. The Hudson River Iron Co. 20 Barbour. 507; Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 205-210; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 294-296, 301-307; Smith on Merc. Law, 70, 71, (2d edit.); Id. B. 1, ch. 5, § 3, p. 127-130, (3d edit. 1843); Ante, §§ 139, 217, 308-310; Doe v. Marten, 4 Term R. 66, per Lord Kenyon; Bush v. Steinman, 1 Bos. & Pull. 404; Att'y-Gen'l v. Siddon, 1 Tyrwh R. 41; Ante, §§ 308, 311, 315-319; Milligan v. Wedge, 12 Adolph. & Ellis, 737, 742; Quirman v. Burnett, 6 Mees. & Welsb. 499; Weed v. Panama Railroad, 3 Smith. (N. Y.) 369; Locke v. Stearns, 1 Mete. R. 560; Penn. Steam Navig. Co. v. Hungerford, 6 Gill & Johns. R. 291. [If a large number of employees on a railroad suddenly refuse to work, and without any good cause, the company are liable for damages arising from the delay in forwarding freight thereby caused. Blackstone v. N. Y. & Erie Railroad, 6 Smith, (N. Y.) 48.]

² Ante, § 308; 1 Black. Comm. 431, 432; Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 11; Ellis v. Turner, 8 Term R. 533; Bush v. Steinman, 1 Bos. & Pull. 404; Laughner v. Pointer, 5 Barn. & Cressw. 517; Randleson v. Murray, 8 Adolph. & Ellis, 109; Milligan v. Wedge, 12 Adolph. & Ellis, 737; Quirman v. Burnett, 6 Mees. & Welsb. 499; Rapson v. Cubitt, 9 Mees. & Welsb. 710; Winterbottom v. Wright, 16 Mees. & Welsb. 109, 111; Ante, §§ 308, 311; Wilkins v. Gilmore, 2 Humphreys, 140; Leggett v. Simmons, 7 Sm. & Mar. 318; Penn. Steam Co. v. Hungerford, 6 Gill & Johns. 291; Johnson v. Barber, 5 Gilman, 425; Harris v. Mabr., 1 Iredell, 240.

³ See the opinion of Lord Holt in Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. R. 490; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 294, 301-307; 4 Bac. Abridg. Master and Servant, K.; Stickeney v. Munroe, 44 Maine, 204; Ante, § 11-13, 315, 316, 319; Hern v. Ni-hols, 1 Balk. 289. Mr. Justice Blackstone, in his Commentaries, gives a different reason, and says: "We may observe, that, in all the cases here put, the master may be frequently a loser by the trust reposed in his servant, but never can be a gainer; he may frequently be answerable for his servant's misbehavior, but never can shelter himself from punishment, by laying the blame on his agent. The reason of this is still uniform and the same; that the wrong done by the servant is looked upon in law as the wrong of the master himself; and it is a standing maxim, that no man shall be allowed to make any advantage of his own wrong." 1 Black. Comm. 432. It seems to me, that the reason here given is

§ 453. A few cases may serve to illustrate this doctrine. Thus, a carrier will be liable for the negligence of his agent, by which the goods committed to his custody are damaged or lost.¹ So, he will be liable for the tortious conversion of the property by his agent.² So, the owner of a ship will be liable for damages and losses, arising to a shipper of goods by reason of the negligence, the fraud, the unskilfulness, or the tortious acts of the master.³ So, if the master of a ship should negligently run down, or come into collision with another ship, the owner would be liable to the party injured for the damages occasioned thereby.⁴ So, if a servant should negligently drive his master's carriage or cart,⁵ as to overturn another carriage, or to run over an individual, and do him injury, [or leave his master's cart in the street, where it is struck by a third person, and the plaintiff thereby injured,⁶] the master would be liable for the damages.⁷ [So, if a person directs his servant to remove the snow and ice from the roof of his house, and through the negligence of the servant, or

artificial and unsatisfactory, and assumes, as its basis, a fact, which is the reverse of the truth in many cases, for the master is liable for the wrong and negligence of his servant, just as much, when it has been done contrary to his orders and against his intent, as he is when he has cooperated in or known the wrong

¹ Story on Bailm. § 499-563; 1 Bell, Comm. § 397-400, (4th edit.); Id. p. 463-465, (5th edit.); *Cogg v. Bernard*, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 919, 920.

² Ante, §§ 310, 315, 316, *Moir v. Sluc*, 1 Vent. R. 238, S. C. 1 Mod. R. 85

³ 4 Bac. Abridg. *Master and Servant*, K; Ante, § 315-317; *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 6-8, p. 94-98, (Amer. edit. 1829), Id. p. 99, note (1), and cases there cited; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 297, 298.

⁴ *Abbott on Shipp* Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 11, and note (1) (Amer. edit. 1829); and cases there cited; *The Thames*, 5 Rob. 345; *The Dundee*, 1 Hagg. Admur. R. 109; *The Woodrop Sims*, 2 Dodson, R. 83; *The Neptune the 2d*, 1 Dodson, R. 467; *Stone v. Ketland*, 1 Wash. Cir. R. 142; Ante, § 315-317; *Shaw v. Reed*, 9 Watts & Serg. 72.

⁵ [And although the horse and vehicle belong to the agent, yet if it is used by him about his master's business with his knowledge and consent, and by the agent's negligence is driven against another horse, the master is liable although the agent was also going on private business of his own. *Patten v. Rea*, 2 J. Scott, (N. S.) 606.]

⁶ *Hidge v. Goodwin*, 5 C. & P. 190.

⁷ *Jones v. Hart*, 2 Salk. 441; *Brucker v. Fromont*, 6 Term R. 659; *Morley v. Gaisford*, 2 H. Black. 442; *McManus v. Crickett*, 1 East, R. 107, 108; *Johnson v. Small*, 5 B. Monroe, 25; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 295; *Booth v. Mister*, 7 Carr. & Payne, 66. See *Quarman v. Burnett*, 6 Mees. & Welsb. 499; *Post*, §§ 453 a, 453 b, 453 c.

of a stranger employed by him, or of a friend who volunteers to assist him, a passenger in the street is injured by the ice, the master is liable.¹ So, if a man's servant wrongfully pile up his master's wood in the highway and thereby an injury is caused to a traveller, the master is responsible, although he was sick at the time, and knew nothing of the fact.² Perhaps the form of the action against the master must be case and not trespass, unless he personally ordered the particular wrongful act.³ So, if a servant of a smith should injure a horse in shoeing him, or an assistant of a surgeon should treat a patient with gross want of skill, the principal would be liable for the damages.⁴ [So, where the defendant hired a laborer for six weeks, at weekly wages, and in that time the plaintiff, not knowing of such arrangement, employed the same laborer to do a job for him, which was being done, when the defendant claimed and received of the plaintiff payment for the job, on the ground that the laborer's earnings during the six weeks belonged to him, the defendant was held responsible to the plaintiff for damages arising from the negligent manner in which the work—thatching wheat—was performed.⁵] So, if an agent should sell a piece of cloth, and warrant it to be good, an action of deceit would lie against the master.⁶ So, if an agent should fraudulently sell false jewels, or should fraudulently deceive a third person, in the matter of his agency, the principal, even if not coöperating in the act, would be liable therefor.⁷

¹ *Althorp v. Wolfe*, 8 Smith, (N. Y.) 355. And see *Booth v. Mister*, 7 C. & P. 66.

² *Harlow v. Humiston*, 6 Cowen 189.

³ *Yerger v. Warren*, 31 Penn. St. R. 319; *Railroad Co. v. Wilt*, 4 Wharton, 143; *The Thames Steamboat Co. v. Housatonic Railroad Co.* 24 Conn. 40.

⁴ *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 298; 4 Bac. Abridg. *Master and Servant*, K.; Ante, § 310.

⁵ *Holmes v. Onion*, 2 J. Scott, (N. S.) 790.

⁶ 4 Bac. Abridg. *Master and Servant*, K.; *Attorney-General v. Siddon*, 1 Tyrwh. R. 41, 46, 47.

⁷ *Smith on Merc. Law*, 70, 71, (2d edit.); Id. B. 1, ch. 5, § 3, p. 127-130, (3d edit. 1843); *Hern v. Nichols*, 1 Salk. 289; *Grammar v. Nixon*, 6 Str. R. 653; *Attorney-General v. Siddon*, 1 Tyrwh. R. 41, 44, 48, 49; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 301-303; *Crockford v. Winter*, 1 Camph. R. 125. See also *Randleson v. Murray*, 8 Adolph. & Ellis. 109; S. C. 3 Nev. & Perry, 289; Ante, §§ 308, 311; *Milligan v. Wedge*, 12 Adolph. & Ellis, 737; *Hughes v. Boyer*,

§ 453 *a.* But very nice questions may arise, and often do arise, as to the person, who, in the sense of the rule, is to be deemed the principal or employer in particular cases. Suppose, for example, a person should hire a coach and horses of a stable-keeper for a day, or a week, or a journey, and they are driven by a coachman who is furnished and hired by the stable-keeper; and the coachman, during the time, should, in driving, be guilty of some negligent act, by which an injury should occur to a third person; the question would arise whether the stable-keeper or the hirer would be responsible therefor. It seems formerly to have been thought, that in such a case the hirer was to be deemed the principal or employer, and, as such, responsible for the injury.¹ But the better opinion, maintained by the more recent authorities, is to the contrary;² for, in such a case, the coachman is to be treated, as in truth the servant of the stable-keeper, and continued in his employment, notwithstanding the temporary hiring; and he could not at the same time be properly deemed the servant both of the stable-keeper and the hirer.³ The same rule would apply to a man who hires a carriage and horses to travel from stage to stage on a journey; the carriage and horses are employed for the benefit or pleasure of the travel-

9 Watts, R. 556; Story on Bailm § 403 a; Quarman v. Burnett, 6 Mees. & Welsb. 499; Rapson v. Cullett, 9 Mees. & Welsb. 710; Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mees. & Welsb. 109, 111.

¹ See the opinion of Mr. Justice Heath in *Bush v. Steinman*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 404, 406, and that of Holroyd, J., and Bayley, J., in *Laugher v. Pointer*, 5 Barn. & Cressw. 564, 568.

² *Quarman v. Burnett*, 6 Mees. & Welsb. 499, 500, 510; *Hughes v. Boyer*, 9 Watts, R. 556; *Weyrant v. H. Y. & H. Railroad*, 3 Duer, 360. [Where the defendant was the registered proprietor of several cabs, in London, on which was his name as proprietor, Y. a licensed cab driver hired of the defendant a cab and two horses for fifteen hours, at a fixed price, depositing his license with the defendant, but received the earnings of the cab during those hours, for his own benefit, the defendant exercising no control over him; Y. being employed by the plaintiff to transport some luggage lost a part of it by negligence: it was held, that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff for such loss, partly by force of the Metropolitan Hackney Carriage Acts, Stat. 1 & 2 W. IV. c. 22, and Stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 86; *Powles v. Hider*, 6 Ellis & Bl. 208.]

³ *Per Littledale, J.*, in *Laugher v. Pointer*, 5 Barn. & Cressw. 547. See *Chilcot v. Bromley*, 12 Ves. 114. *Reedie v. London & Northwestern Railway Company*, 4 Welsby, Hurlstone & Gordon, 255.

ler, and yet the law has never considered the traveller liable, but the owner only, for the negligence of the driver.¹ The case of the hire of a hackney coach affords a stronger illustration. There the owner of the coach, and not the hirer for his temporary convenience or profit, will be held to be responsible for the negligence of the coachman.² Upon the like ground the hirer of a wherry on the Thames, to go from one place to another, would not be responsible for the conduct of the waterman; nor the owner of a ship, chartered for a voyage on the ocean, for the misconduct of the crew, employed by the charterer.³

§ 453 *b*. But a case of a more nice character may easily be put, and, indeed, has undergone a judicial decision. Suppose a person to be the owner of a coach, and he hires from a job-master horses and a driver for the coach to draw them for a day, or a drive, and, through the negligence of the driver, an injury is done to a third person; the question would arise, who is responsible for the wrong, whether the owner of the coach, or the owner of the horses, who also hires the driver. It has been recently adjudged, after no inconsiderable conflict of opinion in prior cases, that the owner of a coach is not, and that the owner of the horses is, under such circumstances, the responsible principal.⁴ [So in a recent case, where the owner of a ferry hired

¹ *Ibid.*; *Sammell v. Wright*, 5 Esp. R. 263, *Dean v. Branthwaite*, 5 Esp. R. 35.

Ibid.; *Per Littledale, J.*, and Lord Tenterden, in *Laugher v. Pointer*, 5 Barn. & Cressw. 562, 563, 578, 579; *McLaughlin v. Prior*, 4 Mann. & Grang. 48. See *Bard v. John*, 26 Penn. St. R. 482.

³ *Per Lord Tenterden*, in *Laugher v. Pointer*, 5 Barn. & Cressw. 578, 579.

⁴ *Quarman v. Burnett*, 6 Mees. & Welsh 499, 509, 510; *Story on Bailm.* § 403 *a*, note; *Post*, 454. In the case of *Laugher v. Pointer*, 5 Barn. & Cressw. 547, where the owner of a carriage hired of a stable-keeper a pair of horses to drive it for a day, and the stable-keeper provided a driver, through whose negligent driving an injury was done to the horse of a third person, the Court of King's Bench were equally divided upon the question, whether the owner of the carriage was liable for the injury or not; Lord Tenterden and Mr. J. Littledale held him not liable, and Mr. J. Bayley and Mr. J. Holroyd held him liable. The opinions of the learned judges, on that occasion, exhausted the whole learning on the subject, and, on that account, should be attentively studied. The decision in *Quarman v. Burnett* affirmed the doctrine of Lord Tenterden and Mr. J. Littledale, and that decision has been uniformly adhered to in all the later cases. See *Randleson v. Murray*, 8 Adolph. & Ellis, 109; *Milligan v. Wedge*,

of T. for one day a steam-tug and crew to assist in ferrying passengers across, and T. sent and paid the crew, and was paid by the owner of the ferry for the services of the tug and crew, and a passenger was injured while crossing by a breaking of the tackle of the tug, through the negligence of the crew, T. was held liable, whether the passenger did or did not also have a remedy against the owner of the ferry.¹] The true distinctions and doctrines, which govern, or ought to govern, the cases, were upon that occasion, fully expounded by the learned judge,² who delivered the opinion of the Court. "Upon the principle," (said he,) "that *Qui facit per alium, facit per se*, the master is responsible for the acts of his servant; and that person is undoubtedly liable, who stood in the relation of master to the wrongdoer; he, who had selected him as his servant, from the knowledge of, or belief in, his skill and care, and who could remove him for misconduct, and whose orders he was bound to receive and obey; and whether such servant has been appointed by the master directly, or intermediately through the intervention of an agent, authorized by him to appoint servants for him, can make no difference. But the liability, by virtue of the principle of relation of master and servant must cease, where the relation itself ceases to exist; and no other person than the master of such servant can be liable, on the simple ground, that the servant is the servant of another, and his act the act of another. Consequently, a third person, entering into a contract with the master, which does not raise the relation of master and servant at all, is not thereby rendered liable; and to make such person liable, recourse must be had to a different and more extended principle, namely, that a person is liable not only for the acts of his own servant, but for any injury, which arises by the act of another person, in carrying into execution that, which that other person has contracted to do for his benefit. That, however, is too large a position, as Lord Chief Justice Eyre says, in the case of *Bush v. Steinman*, and cannot be maintained to its full extent, with-

¹ 2 Adolph. & Ellis, 737; *Rapson v. Cubitt*, 9 Mees. & Welsb. 710; *Martin v. Temperley*, 4 Q. B. Rep. 298; *Reedie v. London & Northwestern Railway Co.* 4 Walsby, Hurlstone & Gordon, 255.

² *Delvill v. Tyrer*, 1 Ellis, Bl. & Ellis, 899.

³ Mr. Baron Parke.

out overturning some decisions, and producing consequences which would, as Lord Tenterden observes, 'shock the common sense of all men;' not merely would the hirer of a post-chaise, hackney-coach, or wherry on the Thames, be liable for the acts of the owners of those vehicles, if they had the management of them, or their servants, if they were managed by servants; but the purchaser of an article at a shop, which he had ordered the shopman to bring home for him, might be made responsible for an injury committed by the shopman's carelessness, whilst passing along the street."¹

§ 453 c. Another case of a novel character, calling for the exposition of the general principles applicable to this subject, recently occurred in America. A brig, which was towed at the stern of a steamboat, employed in the business of towing vessels in the river Mississippi, below New Orleans, was, through the negligence of the master and crew of the steamboat, over whom those in charge of the brig had no control, brought into collision with a schooner lying at anchor in the river. A suit was brought by the owners of the schooner against the owner of the brig for the damages sustained by the collision; and the question was, whether the owners of the brig were liable therefor. It was held, upon full argument, that they were not, upon the ground, that the master and crew of the steamboat were not the servants of the owner of the brig; were not appointed by him; did not receive their wages or salaries from him; had no power to order or control them in their movements; and had no contract with the master and crew of the steamboat, but only through the master with the owners of the steamboat for a participation in the power of the steamboat, derived from the public use and employment thereof by the owners.²

¹ See also *Milligan v. Wedge*, 12 Adolph. & Ell. 737; *Winterbottom v. Wright*, 10 Mees. & Welsh 139, 111; Post, § 451 a.

² *Sproul v. Hemmingway*, 14 Pick. R. 1. Mr. Chief Justice Shaw, in delivering the opinion of the Court in this case, said: "The owners of a vessel or coach are held liable for damages to third persons, occasioned by the negligence or unskilfulness of those who are in the management of the ship or coach. 1. Either because they are engaged or employed by them, are subject to their order, control, and direction, and so are to be deemed, either generally or for the particular occasion, their servants. 2. Or, in respect to their being engaged in the business or employment of the owners, conducting and carrying on such business for the AGENCY.

§ 453 *d.* It will be observed, that the rule is generally laid down, that the principal is liable to third persons for the mis-

profit or pleasure of the owners, by reason of which the acts done in the prosecution of such business, shall be taken *civiliter* to be done by the employers themselves, and thus, whether the persons whose negligence is the cause of damage have been retained and employed by the principal himself, or by the procurement of others, employed by him for the purpose. Tried by either of these principles, we think, that the defendant is not responsible for damages attributable to the carelessness or want of skill of the master and crew of the towing vessel. They were not the servants of the defendant, were not appointed by him, did not receive their wages or salaries from him, the defendant had no power to remove them, had no power to order or control them in their movements, had no contract with them, but only through them, with the owners of the steamboat, for a participation in the power, derived from the public use and employment of that vessel by her owners. After making such contract, it was perfectly in the power of the owners of the steamboat to appoint another master, pilot, and crew, and the defendant would have had no cause of complaint. Nor can the master and crew of the steamboat, in any intelligible sense, be considered as in the employment or business of the defendant, any more than a general freighting ship, her officers and crew can be considered as in the employment of each freighter of goods, or the master and crew of a ferry-boat in the employment of the owners of each coach, wagon, or team, transported thereon. The steamboat was engaged in an open, public distinct branch of navigation, that of towing and transporting vessels up and down the Mississippi for a certain toll or hire, for the profit of the owners. The defendant seemed to have the same relation to the steamboat that a freighter has to a general ship, or a passenger to a packet. The defendant participated in the benefit but incidentally and collaterally, he did not share in the profits of the business, one, which, from its magnitude, may well be called the trade of towing. Such a trade may be considered as much a public and distinct employment, as that of freighting or conveying passengers. The steamboat was in no sense in the possession of those whom she was employed to tow. If it is contended, that the defendant is liable on the ground, that the steamboat was, for the time being, in his possession, occupation, or employment, then it would follow, that the defendant would be liable for the negligence of the officers and crew of the steamboat, as well whether the plaintiff's vessel was struck by the defendant's vessel, The Burton, as struck by either of the other vessels towed, or by the steamboat herself, which cannot for a moment be contended. The case may well be illustrated by considering the condition of one of the side vessels, firmly lashed to the steamboat, and governed wholly by its movements. The payment for the privilege of being thus moved or transported, is precisely like freight paid for heavy luggage, timber, or spars, for instance, carried in or upon a ship. The whole conduct or management is entirely under the control of the master and crew of the towing vessel in the one case, as it is of the freighting ship in the other. If collision takes place between the side ship, thus firmly lashed, and another vessel, it is as directly attributable to the steam-

feasances, negligences, and omissions of duty, of their servants and agents. And the question, therefore, remains to be considered, whether the same rule applies to cases of different agents, employed by the same principal, where one by his misfeasance, or negligence, or omission of duty, does an injury to the other, as is applied to strangers to that relation. This, like many other questions of an important nature, arising from the complicated business of modern society, has not, until recently, become a subject of judicial examination. Two classes of cases may be suggested; (1st.) Where the different agents are employed in the same business or employment by the principal; (2d.) Where different agents are employed in different businesses or employments by the same principal. In respect to the former, the doctrine at present maintained is, that the principal is not liable for any such injury, done to one agent by another agent, while engaged in the same business or employment. The reason as-

boat, and her officers and crew, as if the steamboat herself had come into collision with the other vessel. The towed ship is the passive instrument and means, by which the damage is done. But there is no difference, in this respect, between the condition of one of the side ships, and a ship towed astern, except this: that, on board the ship towed astern by means of a cable, something may, and ought to be done by the master and crew, in steering, keeping watch, observing and obeying orders and signs; and, if there be any want of care and skill in the performance of these duties, and damage ensue, then the case we have been considering does not exist; the damage is attributable to the master and crew of the towed ship, and they and their owners must sustain it. The jury were so instructed at the trial, and it was left to them to find whether the damage was caused by the negligence of the one or the other. Then, supposing all duties faithfully performed on board the towed vessel, and the damage to be caused by the negligence or misconduct of the master and crew of the steamboat, there is no difference between the case of the side ship, which is wholly passive, and the ship astern, which is partially so. The case most nearly resembling this, perhaps, is that of a vessel chartered, where, for a certain time, the whole use and benefit of the ship is transferred to the charterers, but the officers are appointed, and the crew engaged and subsisted by the owners; in which case it is held, that the owners, and not the charterers, are responsible to third persons for any damage occasioned by the negligence of the officers and crew. *Fletcher v. Braddick*, 5 Bos. & Pull. 182. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court are of opinion, that the defendant is not responsible for damage arising from the negligence or unskillfulness of the master, officers, and crew of the steamboat; that the direction, in this respect, at the trial; was correct, and that there must be judgment on the verdict."

signed is, that the mere relation of master and servant, or principal and agent, creates no contract, and therefore no duty, on the part of the principal, that the servant or agent shall suffer no injury from the negligence of others, employed by him in the same business or service; and that, in such cases, the servant or agent takes upon himself the hazards of any such injury, which may arise in the course of such business or employment; and his remedy for any such injury, by the misconduct or negligence of a fellow-servant or agent, lies solely against the wrongdoer himself. Any other doctrine (it is said) would lead to mischievous consequences, and create responsibilities on the part of principals, the nature and extent of which could scarcely be measured; and the public policy, upon which the rule itself is founded, would be subverted, instead of being subserved, by giving it such a comprehensive grasp. Thus, for example, where two servants of the same master were employed in conveying goods in a van of the master, in his business, and by negligence, in the overloading of the van by one, it broke down upon the road, and thereby the other received a severe injury, for which he brought an action against his master, founded upon such negligence; it was held, that the action was not maintainable.¹ [So,

¹ *Priestley v. Fowler*, 3 Mees & Welsb 1. In this case, Lord Abinger, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: "If the master be liable to the servant in this action, the principle of that liability will be found to carry us to an alarming extent. He who is responsible, by his general duty, or by the terms of his contract, for all the consequences of negligence in a matter in which he is the principal, is responsible for the negligence of all his inferior agents. If the owner of the carriage is, therefore, responsible for the sufficiency of his carriage to his servant, he is responsible for the negligence of his coach-maker, or his harness-maker, or his coachman. The footman, therefore, who rides behind the carriage, may have an action against his master for a defect in the carriage, owing to the negligence of the coach-maker, or for a defect in the harness, arising from the negligence of the harness-maker, or for drunkenness, neglect, or for want of skill in the coachman; nor is there any reason why the principle should not, if applicable in this class of cases, extend to many others. The master, for example, would be liable to the servant for the negligence of the chambermaid, for putting him into a damp bed; for that of the upholsterer, for sending in a crazy bedstead, whereby he was made to fall down, while asleep, and injure himself; for the negligence of the cook, in not properly cleaning the copper vessels used in the kitchen; of the butcher, in supplying the family with meat of a quality injurious to health; of the builder, for a defect in the foundation of the house, whereby it fell, and injured both the master and the servant by

where the defendant employed the plaintiff, a bricklayer, and the defendant's foreman erected a scaffolding with unsound timber, in consequence of which it fell while the plaintiff was at work upon it, it was held that the defendant was not liable, it not being contended that the defendant's foreman was deficient in skill, or an improper person to be employed for that purpose.¹ It might be otherwise if the defendant had been negligent in the selection of improper servants.²

§ 453 *e.* A case of quite as novel a character, has recently occurred, and is illustrative of the same doctrine. Two persons were employed by a railroad company in their business, the one as an engineer to manage the engines and cars on the road, the other to tend the management and shifting of certain switches on the railway. The latter, although he was properly selected by the company, as a person of due skill and reasonable diligence, negligently put or left a switch across the rail-

the ruins. The inconvenience, not to say the absurdity, of these consequences, affords a sufficient argument against the application of this principle to the present case. But, in truth, the mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation, on the part of the master, to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of himself. He is, no doubt, bound to provide for the safety of his servant, in the course of his employment, to the best of his judgment, information, and belief. The servant is not bound to risk his safety in the service of his master, and may, if he thinks fit, decline any service, in which he reasonably apprehends injury to himself; and in most of the cases, in which danger may be incurred, if not in all, he is just as likely to be acquainted with the probability and extent of it, as the master. In that sort of employment, especially, which is described in the declaration in this case, the plaintiff must have known, as well as his master, and probably better, whether the van was sufficient, whether it was overloaded, and whether it was likely to carry him safely. In fact, to allow this sort of action to prevail would be an encouragement to the servant to omit that diligence and caution, which he is in duty bound to exercise on the behalf of his master, to protect him against the misconduct or negligence of others, who serve him, and which diligence and caution, while they protect the master, are a much better security against any injury the servant may sustain by the negligence of others engaged under the same master, than any recourse against his master for damages could possibly afford." See also the late case of *Wiggett v. Fox*, 36 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 486; 11 Exch. R. 832.

¹ *Wignore v. Jay*, 5 Exch. R. 354; *Tarrant v. Webb*, 18 C. B. 797; *Fox v. Sandford*, 4 Sneed, 36.

² *Tarrant v. Webb*, 18 C. B. 797; *Degg v. Midland Railway Co.* 1 Hurl. & Norn. 773.

way, whereby the engine and cars were thrown off the track, and the engineer was severely injured. He brought an action therefore against the company; and it was held, upon full argument, that the action was not maintainable; but that the action should have been against the wrongdoer himself. The ground upon which the Court proceeded, was, that neither principle, nor authority, nor public policy, justified such an extension of the rule; and that the perils incident to such a service, were as likely to be known to the agent as to the principal; and might be distinctly foreseen and provided against by him in his rate of compensation, if he chose, and he must be presumed, in the absence of any different contract, to take them upon himself.¹ [And the same rule was applied to the case

¹ Farwell v. The Boston & Worcester Railroad Corporation, 4 Met. R., 49. Mr. Chief Justice Shaw, in delivering the opinion of the Court, went into an elaborate examination of the whole subject, and said: "This is an action of new impression in our courts, and involves a principle of great importance. It presents a case, where two persons are in the service and employment of one company, whose business it is to construct and maintain a railroad, and to employ their trains of cars to carry persons and merchandise for hire. They are appointed and employed by the same company to perform separate duties and services, all tending to the accomplishment of one and the same purpose,—that of the safe and rapid transmission of the trains; and they are paid for their respective services, according to the nature of their respective duties, and the labor and skill required for their proper performance. The question is, whether, for damages, sustained by one of the persons so employed, by means of the carelessness and negligence of another, the party injured has a remedy against the common employer. It is an argument against such an action, though certainly not a decisive one, that no such action has before been maintained. It is laid down by Blackstone, that, if a servant, by his negligence, does any damage to a stranger, the master shall be answerable for his neglect. But the damage must be done while he is actually employed in the master's service; otherwise, the servant shall answer for his own misbehavior. 1 Bl. Comm. 431; M'Manus v. Crickett, 1 East, 106. This rule is obviously founded on the great principle of social duty, that every man, in the management of his own affairs, whether by himself, or by his agents or servants, shall so conduct them as not to injure another; and, if he does not, and another thereby sustains damage, he shall answer for it. If done by a servant, in the course of his employment, and acting within the scope of his authority, it is considered, in contemplation of law, so far the act of the master that the latter shall be answerable *civiliter*. But this presupposes, that the parties stand to each other in the relation of strangers, between whom there is no privity; and the action, in such case, is an action sounding in tort. The form is trespass on the case, for the consequential damage. The

of a brakeman on a railroad, who was injured by a collision caused by the negligence of a brakeman on another train.¹]

maxim, Respondeat superior, is adopted in that case, from general considerations of policy and security. But this does not apply to the case of a servant bringing his action against his own employer, to recover damages for an injury arising in the course of that employment, where all such risks and perils as the employer and the servant respectively intend to assume and bear, may be regulated by the express or implied contract between them, and which, in contemplation of law, must be presumed to be thus regulated. The same view seems to have been taken by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in the argument; and it was conceded, that the claim could not be placed on the principle indicated by the *maxim, Respondeat superior*, which binds the master to indemnify a stranger for the damage caused by the careless, negligent, or unskilful act of his servant in the conduct of his affairs. The claim, therefore, is placed, and must be maintained, if maintained at all, on the ground of contract. As there is no express contract between the parties, applicable to this point, it is placed on the footing of an implied contract of indemnity, arising out of the relation of master and servant. It would be an implied promise, arising from the duty of the master, to be responsible to each person employed by him, in the conduct of every branch of business, where two or more persons are employed, to pay for all damage occasioned by the negligence of every other person employed in the same service. If such a duty were established by law, — like that of a common carrier, to stand to all losses of goods not caused by the act of God or of a public enemy, — or that of an innkeeper, to be responsible, in like manner, for the baggage of his guest; it would be a rule of frequent and familiar occurrence, and its existence and application, with all its qualifications and restrictions, would be settled by judicial precedents. But we are of opinion, that no such rule has been established, and the authorities, as far as they go, are opposed to the principle. *Priestley v. Fowler*, 3 Mees. & Welsb. 1; *Murray v. South Carolina Railroad Company*, 1 McMullan, 385. The general rule, resulting from considerations as well of justice as of policy, is, that he, who engages in the employment of another, for the performance of specified duties and services, for compensation, takes upon himself the natural and ordinary risks and perils incident to the performance of such services; and, in legal presumption, the compensation is adjusted accordingly. And we are not aware of any principle, which should except the perils arising from the carelessness and negligence of those who are in the same employment. These are perils, which the servant is as likely to know, and against which he can as effectually guard, as the master. They are perils incident to the service, and which can be as distinctly foreseen and provided for, in the rate of compensation, as any others. To say, that the master shall be responsible, because the damage is caused by his agents, is assuming the very point which remains to be proved. They are his agents to some extent, and for some pur-

¹ *Hayes v. The Western Railroad Corporation*, 3 Cuah. 270. See also *McDermott v. Pacific Railroad*, 30 Missouri, 115.

In neither of these cases, could there be the least doubt, that the principal would have been liable, if the injury had been

poses; but whether he is responsible in a particular case, for their negligence, is not decided by the single fact, that they are, for some purposes, his agents. It seems to be now well settled, whatever might have been thought formerly, that underwriters cannot excuse themselves from payment of a loss by one of the perils insured against, on the ground, that the loss was caused by the negligence or unskillfulness of the officers or crew of the vessel, in the performance of their various duties as navigators, although employed and paid by the owners, and, in the navigation of the vessel, their agents. *Copeland v. New England Marine Ins. Co.* 2 Met. 440-443, and cases there cited. I am aware, that the maritime law has its own rules and analogies, and that we cannot always safely rely upon them in applying them to other branches of law. But the rule in question seems to be a good authority for the point, that persons are not to be responsible, in all cases, for the negligence of those employed by them. If we look from considerations of justice to those of policy, they will strongly lead to the same conclusion. In considering the rights and obligations arising out of particular relations, it is competent for courts of justice to regard considerations of policy and general convenience, and to draw from them such rules as will, in their practical application, best promote the safety and security of all parties concerned. This is, in truth, the basis, on which implied promises are raised, being duties legally inferred from a consideration of what is best adapted to promote the benefit of all persons concerned, under given circumstances. To take the well-known and familiar cases already cited; a common carrier, without regard to actual fault or neglect in himself or his servants, is made liable for all losses of goods confided to him for carriage, except those caused by the act of God or of a public enemy, because he can best guard them against all minor dangers, and because, in case of actual loss, it would be extremely difficult for the owner to adduce proof of embezzlement, or other actual fault or neglect, on the part of the carrier, although it may have been the real cause of the loss. *The risk is therefore thrown upon the carrier, and he receives, in the form of payment for the carriage, a premium for the risk, which he thus assumes. So of an innkeeper; he can best secure the attendance of honest and faithful servants, and guard his house against thieves. Whereas, if he were responsible only upon proof of actual negligence, he might connive at the presence of dishonest inmates and retainers, and even participate in the embezzlement of the property of the guests, during the hours of their necessary sleep; and yet it would be difficult, and often impossible to prove these facts. The liability of passenger carriers is founded on similar considerations. They are held to the strictest responsibility for care, vigilance and skill, on the part of themselves and all persons employed by them, and they are paid accordingly. The rule is founded on the expediency of throwing the risk upon those who can best guard against it. Story on Bailments, § 590, *et seq.* We are of opinion, that these considerations apply strongly to the case in question. Where several persons are employed in the conduct of one common enterprise or undertaking, and the safety of each depends much on the care and

occasioned by his own personal negligence or omission of duty. [In a still later case in the same court, the plaintiff was an operative in the defendant's mill; the defendant's superintendent had the charge of lighting the mill and managing the gas for that purpose. On one occasion he so negligently managed the gasometer, that large quantities of gas escaped into the mill and greatly injured the plaintiff at her work. The Court held the defendant company not liable.¹ And although the servant guilty

skill with which each other shall perform his appropriate duty, each is an observer of the conduct of the others, can give notice of any misconduct, incapacity, or neglect of duty, and leave the service, if the common employer will not take such precautions, and employ such agents as the safety of the whole party may require. By these means, the safety of each will be much more effectually secured, than could be done by a resort to the common employer for indemnity in case of loss by the negligence of each other. Regarding it in this light, it is the ordinary case of one sustaining an injury in the course of his own employment, in which he must bear the loss himself, or seek his remedy, if he have any, against the actual wrongdoer." [See also *Murray v. S. C. Railroad Co.* 1 McMullan, 385; *McDaniel v. Emanuel*, 2 Richardson, 455; *Hayes v. The Western Railroad*, 3 Cush. 270; *Coon v. The Utica, &c. R. R.* 6 Barbour, 231; 1 Selden, 492; *King v. The Boston & Worcester R. R.* 9 Cush. 112; *Brown v. Maxwell*. 6 Hill, 592; *Skip v. Eastern Counties Railway Co.* 24 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 397; 9 Exch. 223; *Sherman v. The Rochester & Syracuse Railroad Co.* 15 Barbour, 571; *Ryan v. The Cumberland Valley Railroad*, 11 Harris, 354; *Cook v. Parham*. 24 Ala. 21; *Horne v. Illinois Central Railroad*, 15 Illinois, 550; *Russell v. Hudson River Railroad*, 17 N. Y. 134.

¹ [Albro v. Agawam Canal Co. 6 Cush. 75. Fletcher, J., said: "This case cannot be distinguished in principle from the case of *Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad*, 4 Met. 49; and the same point has been since adjudged in the case of *Hayes v. Western Railroad*, 3 Cush. 270.

"The principle of these decisions is, that when one person engages in the service of another, he undertakes, as between him and his employer, to run all the ordinary risks of the service, and this includes the risk of negligence on the part of others in the service of the same employer, whenever he, such servant, is acting in the discharge of his duty to his employer, who is the common employer of both. In the present case, the injury of which the plaintiff complains appears to have happened, while she was acting in the discharge of her duty to the defendants, as her employers, in their factory, and to have been occasioned by the negligence of another person, who was also engaged in the defendants' service, in the same factory.

"It cannot affect the principle, that the duties of the superintendent may be different, and perhaps may be considered as of a somewhat higher character than those of the plaintiff; inasmuch as they are both the servants of the same master, have the same employer, are engaged in the accomplishment of the same general

of negligence is the superior of the servant injured, and the latter is subject to the control of the former, so that he could not guard against his negligence, their common employer is not liable.^{1]}

§ 453 *f.* Whether the same rule would apply to a case, where the agents are engaged in different and distinct employments or business by the same principal, is a point upon which there does not seem hitherto to have been any positive adjudication; and the principles asserted in the other case, where the employment or business is the same, do not necessarily govern it. Suppose two ships, owned by the same person, and engaged in different voyages, and by a collision between them, caused by the negligence of the master of one, the master of the other should receive a grievous injury in his person or property; would he have no redress against the principal, upon the ground of the maxim, *Respondeat superior*? Suppose a commission-merchant, employed by the owner to sell goods for him in Boston, should embark in a steamboat, owned by the same person, for New York, on his own private business, and, in the course of the voyage,

object, are acting in one common service, and derive their compensation from the same source.

"The plaintiff and the superintendent must be considered as fellow-servants, within the principle and meaning of the cases above referred to, and the other adjudged cases on this subject. There is no allegation, that the superintendent was not a fit and proper person to be employed by the defendants to perform the duties assigned to him, but only that he was chargeable with negligence and unskilfulness, on the particular occasion when the plaintiff was injured in the manner described. It would have presented a very different case, if the defendants had employed an unfit and improper person, and in that way the plaintiff had been exposed to and had suffered injury.

"In the decision of the case of *Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad*, the case of *Priestley v. Fowler*, 3 M. & W. 1, was referred to as an authority in point. There have recently been two other English cases (*Hutchinson v. York, Newcastle & Berwick Railway*, 5 W. H. & G. 343; *Wignmore v. Jay*, *ib.* 354,) which fully sustain the doctrine and decision of *Priestley v. Fowler*. It is very clear, therefore, upon the adjudged cases, that this action cannot be maintained, and that judgment must be entered for the defendants."

¹ *Sherman v. Rochester Railroad Co.* 17 N. Y. 153. And see *Degg v. Midland Railway Co.* 1 H. & N. 773; *Seymour v. Maddox*, 16 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 326; *King v. Boston & Worcester Railway*, 9 Cush. 113; *Gillshannon v. Stony Brook Railroad*, 10 Cush. 228; *Keegan v. Western Railroad*, 4 Seld. 175. See *Ormand v. Holland*, 1 Ellis, Bl. & Ellis, 102.

he should suffer great personal injury from the gross carelessness of the master of the steamboat; would it be a good answer to an action brought by him against the owner, that he was the agent of the latter, as well as the master? Suppose a foreign factor should embark his own private goods in a ship belonging to the principal, paying therefor the customary freight for the carriage of the like goods, and during the voyage, by the gross negligence of the master of the ship, the goods should be damaged or destroyed; would the owner be exempted from all liability therefor? Suppose a carpenter, employed to build a house for the owner of a stage-coach, should, in travelling in the coach, paying the usual fare, by the overturning of the coach through the gross negligence of the coachman, have his limbs fractured, would the owner be free from all liability, and the suit lie solely against the wrongdoer? These questions are propounded for the mere purpose of showing that there are, or may be, intrinsic difficulties and inconveniences in pressing the doctrine, resulting from the relation of agency, to such a large extent.

[§ 453 g. Since the former edition of this work, however, the question suggested in the last section has been directly involved in a recent decision in the Court of Exchequer. It was there held, that a railway company is not liable for an injury to one of their servants, occasioned by the negligence of other servants in guiding another train, with which the train on which the plaintiff was riding, came in collision.¹ But the contrary has

¹ [Hutchinson v. York, Newcastle, &c., Railway, 5 Exch. R. 343. [See also Whoolan v. Mad River Railroad, 8 Ohio St. R. 249.] Alderson, B., said: "This was an action under Lord Campbell's Act, brought by the plaintiff as administratrix of her deceased husband, Joseph Hutchinson, to recover compensation from the defendants on the ground that he had met with his death by reason of the negligence of their servants. [His Lordship stated the pleadings.] On this record the question is, whether the defendants are liable for an injury occasioned to one of their own servants by a collision, while he was travelling in one of their carriages, in discharge of his duty as their servant, in respect of which injury they would undoubtedly have been liable, if the party injured had been a stranger travelling as a passenger for hire. We think they are not. This case appears to us to be undistinguishable in principle from that of Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1. In that case the plaintiff was the servant of the defendant, and had sustained an injury by the defendant having overloaded a van, in which he, the plaintiff, was travelling by direction of defendant in discharge of

been held in Ohio, where a brakeman was injured by the carelessness of a conductor on the same train, under whose com-

his ordinary duties. That case was fully considered, and the Court, after a verdict for the plaintiff, arrested the judgment, on the ground that a master is not in general liable to one servant for damage resulting from the negligence of another; and some of the inconveniences, not to say absurdities, which would result from a contrary doctrine, were there pointed out. The principle, upon which a master is in general liable to answer for accidents resulting from the negligence or unskilfulness of his servant, is, that the act of his servant is in truth his own act. If the master is himself driving his carriage, and from want of skill causes injury to a passer-by, he is of course responsible for that want of skill. If, instead of driving the carriage with his own hands, he employs a servant to drive it, the servant is but an instrument set in motion by the master. It was the master's will that the servant should drive, and whatever the servant does in order to give effect to his master's will may be treated by others as the act of the master. 'Qui facit per alium, facit per se.' So far there is no difficulty. Equally clear is it, that though a stranger may treat the act of the servant as the act of his master, yet the servant himself, by whose negligence or want of skill the accident has occurred, cannot. And, therefore, he cannot defend himself against the claim of a third person; nor, if by his unskilfulness he is himself injured, can he claim damages from his master upon an allegation that his own negligence was, in point of law, the negligence of his master. The grounds for these distinctions are so obvious as to need no illustration. The difficulty is as to the principle applicable to the case of several servants employed by the same master, and injury resulting to one of them from the negligence of another. In such a case, however, we are of opinion that the master is not in general responsible, when he has selected persons of competent care and skill. Put the case of a master employing A and B, two of his servants, to drive his cattle to market. It is admitted, that if by the unskilfulness of A, a stranger is injured, the master is responsible. Not so, if A, by his unskilfulness, hurts himself, he cannot treat that as the want of skill of his master. Suppose, then, that by the unskilfulness of A, B, the other servant, is injured while they are jointly engaged in the same service, there we think B has no claim against the master. They have both engaged in a common service, the duties of which impose a certain risk on each of them, and in case of negligence on the part of the other, the party injured knows that the negligence is that of his fellow-servant and not of his master. He knew, when he engaged in the service, that he was exposed to the risk of injury, not only from his own want of skill or care, but also from the want of it on the part of his fellow-servant, and he must be supposed to have contracted on the terms that, as between himself and his master, he would run this risk. Now, applying these principles to the present case, it follows that the plaintiff has no title to recover. Hutchinson, in the discharge of his duty as one of the servants of the defendants, had put himself into one of their railway carriages under the guidance of others of their servants, and by the neglect of those other servants, while they were engaged together with him in one common service, the accident occurred. This

mand and control the brakeman was. They were declared not to be fellow-servants within the meaning of the foregoing cases,

was a risk which Hutchinson must be taken to have agreed to run when he entered into the defendant's service, and for the consequences of which, therefore, they are not responsible. The declaration, indeed, states the accident to have arisen from the combined neglect of the servants who were managing the carriages in which the deceased was travelling, and of others of their servants who were managing the train with which the plaintiff's carriage came into collision. And Mr. Hill argued, that this allegation is divisible, and that, in order to sustain the declaration, it would not be necessary to prove any negligence on the part of the train in which Hutchinson was travelling; that it would be sufficient to prove negligence on the part of the other train; and so he contended that, even admitting the defendants would not be liable for any neglect on the part of those who were managing the train in one of the carriages in which Hutchinson was travelling, yet there could be no principle exempting them from liability for the acts of those who, though equally with Hutchinson servants of the defendants, were not at the time of the accident, engaged in any common act of service with him. But we do not think there is any real distinction between the two cases. The principle is, that a servant, when he engages to serve a master, undertakes, as between him and his master, to run all the ordinary risks of the service, and this includes the risk of negligence on the part of a fellow-servant, whenever he is acting in discharge of his duty as servant of him who is the common master of both. The death of Hutchinson appears on the pleadings to have happened while he was acting in the discharge of his duties to the defendants as his master, and to have been the result of carelessness on the part of one or more other servant or servants of the same master while engaged in their service; and whether the death resulted from the mismanagement of the one train or of the other, or of both, does not affect the principle; in any case it arose from carelessness or want of skill, the risk of which the deceased had, as between himself and the defendants, agreed to run. It may, however, be proper with reference to this point to add, that we do not think a master is exempt from responsibility to his servant for an injury occasioned to him by the act of another servant, where the servant injured was not, at the time of the injury, acting in the service of his master. In such a case the servant injured is substantially a stranger, and entitled to all the privileges he would have had, if he had not been a servant. It was contended that the plea in this case is bad on special demurrer, as being but an argumentative denial of the cause of action stated in the declaration. But we think Mr. Addison successfully showed this objection to be unfounded. Though we have said that a master is not in general responsible to one servant for an injury occasioned to him by the negligence of a fellow-servant while they are acting in one common service, yet this must be taken with the qualification that the master shall have taken due care not to expose his servant to unreasonable risks. The servant, when he engages to run the risks of his service, including those arising from the negligence of fellow-servants, has a right to understand that the master has taken reasonable care to protect him from such risks by asso-

and the company were held responsible.¹ So it has been held, that if a day laborer on a railroad is carried to and from

ciating him only with persons of ordinary skill and care; and the object of the plea in this case is to show that the defendants had discharged this duty, the omission to discharge which might have made them responsible to the deceased. The plea, therefore, appears to us not to be open to the objection insisted on. For these reasons we are of opinion that the plaintiff has shown no ground of action, and so our judgment must be for the defendants." • See also *Sherman v. The Rochester, &c. Railway Co.* 15 Barbour, 574; *Ryan v. Cumberland Valley Railroad*, 11 Harris, 384; *Gilshannon v. Stony Brook Railroad*, 10 Cush. 228.]

¹ [*Cleveland, &c. Railroad Co. v. Keary*, 3 Ohio St. R. 201; *Little Miami Railroad v. Stevens*, 20 Ohio R. 415; *Gillenwater v. Madison Railroad*, 5 Port. (Ind.) R. 339; *Fitzpatrick v. New Albany Railroad*, 7 Port. (Ind.) 426; *Chamberlain v. M. & M. Railroad*, 11 Wisc. 238. In the 3 Ohio St. R., Ranney, J., said: "But it is very confidently claimed that this view of the law is at variance with all the adjudged cases in England and in this country — not only with the decisions of every court, but with the opinion of every judge of those courts. We are referred, in proof of this position, to the cases of *Priestley v. Fowler*, 3 M. & W. 1; *Hutchinson v. The York, N. & B. Railway*, 5 Ex. R. 243, and *Wigmore v. Jay*, Ib. 354, decided by the English Court of Exchequer; *Murray v. The South Carolina R. R. Co.* 1 McMullon, 385, by the Court of Appeals of that State; *Farwell v. The Boston & Worcester R. R. Co.* 4 Met. 49; and *Hayes v. The Western R. R. Co.* 3 Cush. 270, by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts; and *Coon v. The Utica & Syracuse R. R. Co.* 1 Selden, R. 492, by the Court of Appeals in New York. We entertain the highest respect for these Courts, and their undivided opinions upon any question arising upon the principles of the common law, would cause us to hesitate long before we differed from them. But even upon such a question, we should be compelled to follow the dictates of our own understandings; and the more especially should we feel at perfect liberty to do so, when they did not profess to base their decisions upon any settled principle of law, but undertook to declare a new rule for their action. If such a rule did not seem to us consistent with the analogies of the law, and calculated to promote justice, we should feel bound to reject it. Upon this question, we find no occasion to depart from established principles. It lies upon those who deny the defendant in error the benefit of these principles, to show some good reason for the exclusion. We have carefully examined all these cases, and can find in none of them any such reason, or any denial of the principle upon which we base this decision. While we cannot approve all that is said in some of them, no one of them has determined the question now before us. *Priestley v. Fowler* was decided in 1837, and is the first case to be found in the English books where the limitation of the liability of the master is even hinted at. The action was brought by a servant against his master, for the negligence of another servant in overloading a van, by which the plaintiff was injured. It was held the action could not be maintained. Chief Baron Abinger, in delivering the opinion, says:

work by the engine and train of the company, without charge, and receives an injury, while on such passage, through the negli-

‘There is no precedent for the action by a servant against a master. We are therefore, to decide the question upon general principles; and in doing so we are at liberty to look at the consequences of a decision one way or the other.’ He accordingly looked at the consequences, with a view to the actual state of English society, and concluded they would carry him to an ‘alarming extent.’ After referring to several instances where the liability of the master would attach, he concludes that ‘the inconvenience, not to say absurdity of these consequences,’ afford a sufficient argument against the action. It can admit of very little doubt, that holding the relation of master and servant to exist between the buyer and seller of a coach or a harness, (instances put by his Lordship,) would, indeed, be both inconvenient and absurd. It is unnecessary to examine, at any length, the other cases decided in that court. Upon a similar state of facts, they each follow and affirm the doctrine of *Priestley v. Fowler*. As these cases were decided upon no settled principle of the common law, but upon general principles, with a view to consequences, I may be permitted to refer to the opinion of another Court equally learned and able, sitting in the same kingdom, and subject to review, if I am not mistaken, in the same ultimate tribunal. In the case of *Dixon v. Ranken*, (1 Am. Railway Cases, 569.) determined by the highest Court in Scotland, as late as 1852, the doctrines of the English cases were repudiated, and an exactly contrary decision made. The Lord Justice Clerk, after referring to the English decisions, proceeds to say: ‘The master’s primary obligation in every contract of service, in which his workmen are employed in a hazardous and dangerous occupation, for his interest and profit, is to provide for, and attend to, the safety of the men. That is his first and leading obligation, paramount even to that of paying for their labor. This obligation includes the duty of furnishing good and sufficient machinery and apparatus, and of keeping the same in good condition; and the more rude and cheap the machinery, and the more liable on that account to cause injury, the greater his obligation to make up for its defects by the attention necessary to prevent such injury. In his obligation is equally included, as he cannot do everything himself, the duty to have all acts by others whom he employs, done properly and carefully, in order to avoid risk. This obligation is not less than the obligation to provide for the safety of the lives of his servants by fit machinery. The other servants are employed by him to do acts which, of course, he cannot do himself, but they are acting for him, and instead of himself, as in his hands. For their careful and cautious attention to duty, and for their want of vigilance, and for their neglect of precaution by which danger to life may be caused, he is just as much responsible as he would be for such misconduct on his own part, if he were actually working or present. And this particularly holds as to the person he intrusts with the direction and control over any of his workmen, and who represents him in such a matter.’ And he adds: ‘There have been many cases in Scotland, at all periods, and during the last fifty years, a very large number, which proceeded on this as a fixed principle of the law as to the contract of service.’ Lord Cockburn, after stating that ‘the

gence of the engineer of the train, the company are not liable.¹ But where a railroad company employ a contractor to repair a

plea that the master is not liable, rests solely on the authority of two or three very recent decisions of English Courts,' says 'If this be the law of England, I speak of it with all due respect. But it most certainly is not the law of Scotland. I defy any industry to produce a single decision, or dictum, or institutional indication, or any trace of any authority to this effect, or of this tendency, from the whole range of our law. If such an idea exists in our system, it has, as yet, lurked undetected. It has never been condemned, because it has never been stated.' After alluding to the fact that the rule had been pressed upon the Court not only on account of the weight of the English authority, but for its own inherent justice, he proceeds 'This last recommendation fails with me, because I think that the justice of the thing is exactly in the opposite direction. I have rarely come upon any principle that seems less reconcilable to legal reason. I can conceive some reasonings for exempting the employer from liability altogether, but not one for exempting him only when those who act for him injure one of themselves. It rather seems to me that these are the very persons who have the strongest claim upon him for reparation, because they incur danger on his account, and certainly are not understood, by our law, to come under any engagement to take these risks on themselves.' Such is the diversity of opinion, not only as to the existence of the doctrine, but also as to its justice and propriety, found to obtain in two of the learned Courts in Great Britain, both uncontrolled by any statutory regulation, or other consideration peculiar to the system of law administered by either, but each determining the obligation arising from a relation, founded upon contract, which must be the same in England and Scotland. The case of *Murray v The S. C. Railroad*, 1 McMullan, 385, was decided in 1841. The plaintiff was a fireman, and was injured by the carelessness of the engineer. A majority of the Court held that he could not recover. Judges O'Neill and Gantt, and Chancellor Johnston dissented. They admit that the plaintiff took upon himself, as a consequence of his contract, all the ordinary risks of the employment, and that he could not claim for injuries, against which the ordinary prudence of his employers could not provide; but they insist that injuries from negligence do not belong to these ordinary risks; that the company was bound to carry him safely, while he was bound to serve them faithfully, and that neither party should be permitted to extend or abridge the contract. 'That the master cannot exact other services than those stipulated for; nor, by any indirection, subject the servant to any other than the ordinary perils incident to the employment; and that if he does, by any agency whatever, or by any means, whether of design or negligence, accumulate upon the servant, while in the performance of his duty, any dangers beyond those inherent in the service itself, they fall upon the latter, not as a servant, (for his contract does not bind him to endure them,) but as a man, and the law entitles him to redress.' The

¹ *Gilshannon v. Stony Brook Railroad*, 10 Cush. 228. But see *Russell v Hudson River Railroad*, 5 Duer, 39; 5 Port. (Ind.) 339; 7 Port. (Ind.) 436.

bridge for a specified sum, and he employs laborers to work thereon by the day, the latter are not the servants of the company; and

next case in order of time, is that of *Farwell v. The Boston & Worcester R. R.* 4 Met. 49. The plaintiff, an engineer on the defendant's road, was injured by the negligence of a switch tender. His right to recover against the company, was denied in a very ingenious opinion by C. J. Shaw; in which the general proposition is maintained, that a master who uses due diligence in the selection of competent servants, and furnishes them with suitable means to perform the service in which he employs them, is not liable for the carelessness of one resulting in injury to another, while both are engaged in the *same service*. Of judicial determinations, he was able to bring to his support only the cases of *Priestley v. Fowler*, and *Murray v. The S. C. Railroad*; and characterizing it 'as in some measure a nice question,' he says: 'We would add a caution against any hasty conclusion as to the application of this rule to a case not fully within the same principle.' That it was not intended, by this decision, to foreclose the question now before us, is evident from the later case of *Hayes v. The Western Railroad*, 3 Cush. 270, in which the negligence charged, was that of a brakeman, acting, as was claimed, *pro tempore*, as conductor; and it was argued, that although the company were not liable to a laborer, for the neglect of another laborer, yet they were answerable for the neglect of an officer, such as the conductor was. The Court expressly declined expressing any opinion upon the soundness of this distinction, and held that it did not properly arise upon the facts of the case. The case of *Coon v. The Syracuse & Utica R. R.* 1 Selden, 492, was brought by a trackman, employed by the defendants to keep a certain portion of their road in order, who claimed to have been injured by the negligence of the managers of a train running upon the road. The Court considered the case governed by the authorities to which I have referred, and especially the one from *Metcalf*, and gave judgment for the defendants. Judges Gardner and Foot only, expressed opinions. The former said, the good sense of the principle, when applied to individuals engaged in the same service, was sufficiently obvious; but that there might be more doubt of its justice in reference to those whose employments are distinct, although both may be necessary to the successful result of a common enterprise. And the latter admits that it 'has been unfolded and brought to view within the last twenty years, and principally by the new business commenced within that period, and now extensively prosecuted, of transporting persons and property by steam on railways.' I have now referred to every decision of a Court of last resort, within my knowledge, bearing upon the question under consideration. While the principle of *respondet superior* is as old as the law itself, it is everywhere admitted that no such exception to its operation as is now contended for was ever asserted until the case of *Priestley v. Fowler* was decided. That case, and those made upon its authority in England and America, have all proceeded upon the general ground of exempting the master from responsibility to one servant for injuries arising from the carelessness of another engaged in the common service, because the servant, by his contract, takes these risks upon himself. None of them have in terms declared that he is not liable

if they are injured while at work on the bridge, by the negligence of those in charge of a passing train, and without fault themselves, they can recover of the company.¹ So where A., a servant of J. & Co., who had been employed by R. to carry cotton from a warehouse, was injured by the negligence of R.'s porters in lowering the bales of cotton from the upper floor of the ware-

for the negligent and careless conduct of him to whom he delegates the power of control and command over them. The Court, whose authority has been most relied on in this country, has expressly refused to declare it. Even to this extent the doctrine has been resolutely resisted at every step by distinguished jurists. To speak of it, therefore, as a settled principle of the common law, is to confound ideas. To adopt it without a conviction of its justice and propriety, is to abuse the power with which the law has invested us. Our plain duty is to endeavor to ascertain the true nature of the relation between the parties, and the inherent elements of the contract on which it is founded, and from them deduce the principle that ought to govern. For, as has been said by an elegant writer. 'If law be a science, and really deserves so sublime a name, it must be founded on principle, and claim an exalted rank in the Empire of Reason.' And upon a question like this, what is good sense at Westminster is good sense at Edinburgh, or wherever else parties may contract. Tested in this manner, it seems to us clear, in a case like the present, that as between the company and those employed to labor in subordinate situations under the control of a superior, two distinct classes of obligations arise — the one resting upon the company, and the other upon the servants — and both founded upon what each, either expressly or impliedly, has agreed to do in execution of the contract. It is the duty of the company to furnish suitable machinery and apparatus, and, as they reserve the government and control of the train to themselves, and intrust no part of it to these servants, to control it and them, with prudence and care. As the necessity for this prudence and care is constant and continuing, the obligation is performed only when it is constantly exercised, and they cannot rid themselves of it by devolving this power upon the conductor. If they intrust him with its exercise, in the language of Judge Story, they 'in effect warrant his fidelity and good conduct.' It is the duty of the servants to obey the orders of the superior thus placed over them, and to perform as he shall direct. If they fail to do this, and injure each other, they violate their engagements to the company, and are alone answerable for the wrongs they may do. In such case there is no failure of the company to do, what as between them and these servants, it was understood they should do, when the servants entered the service. But they cannot be made to bear losses arising from carelessness in conducting the train, over which their employer gave them no power or control, either separately or collectively, until we are prepared to say that justice and public policy require the consequences of duty omitted by one party to be visited upon the other, although stripped of all power to prevent such consequences."]

¹ Young v. N. Y. Central Railroad, 30 Barbour, 229.

house into his lorry, it was held that A. had a right of action against R. for such negligence.¹

[453 *h.* Whether the same rule prevails, where the injury arises from defective apparatus, machinery, or tools, in the hands of a fellow-servant, may not perhaps be fully settled.² It has been thought in some cases, that the principle of non-liability of a principal for the injury caused to one servant by another, was not applicable to such a case, but only when the injury happened without any fault or misconduct of the principal, either in the act which caused the injury, or in the selection or employment of the agent by whose fault it happened. It has therefore been held, that a fireman engaged on a railroad, might recover for an injury received by the bursting of a boiler of an engine *known* to the defendants to be defective; at least if such defect was not known to the plaintiff, and he himself was without fault.³ And

¹ [Abraham v. Reynolds, 5 Hurl. & Norm. 143. A servant in the employment of the E. L. Company, engaged in repairing a carriage in a siding at a station in the joint occupation of the E. L. Company and the L. & Y. Company, was killed by an engine of the L. & Y. Company being shunted into the siding at which he was at work. It appeared that the rules for the regulation of the station were published, headed in the joint names of the two companies; and that the servants employed in shunting the engines were the joint servants of the two companies, but the engine drivers and persons employed, as the deceased was, in repairing the carriage, were the separate servants of each company. It was found that the rules as to the precautions to be taken before shunting trains into sidings, had been observed, and that there had been no negligence on the part of the deceased, the shuntsman, pointsman, or engine driver; but that the accident was occasioned by the rules being defective. It was held, that the L. & Y. Company were liable for the injury, being found by the jury guilty of negligence. Vose v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway Co., 2 Hurl. & Norm. 728.]

² [Where a master, who was a contractor and builder, employed the plaintiff as a mason upon a house he was erecting, and a boarding had been put up to protect the building from carriages passing in the road, which projected far into the street, although there was sufficient room for carts to pass, and a cart which was being driven along the street by a third person, swung against the boarding and knocked down a machine standing between it and the building, which was used for lifting stones for the building, whereby the plaintiff was thrown into the cellar and hurt, it was held, the master was not liable, both because the servant, knowing the position of the boarding and the machine, voluntarily continued to work, and because the connection of the master in the accident was too remote. Assop v. Yates, 2 Hurl. & Norm. 768.]

³ Keegan v. The Western Railroad Corporation, 4 Selden, 175. And see Williams v. Clough, 3 Hurl. & Norm. 258; Roberts v. Smith, 2 Hurl. & Norm.

actual notice to the defendant, of the defect, must be averred and proved;¹ although it has been held that if the master's ignorance of the defect was owing to his own gross negligence, he is as much liable as if he had actual notice.² [W. requested his hired man, G., to assist him in placing certain railroad cars and trucks, which he had sold and agreed to ship from Cleveland to Toledo, on a vessel; to do which it was necessary to raise them from the dock by the use of machinery and manual effort. G. consented. While raising one of the trucks, a part of the machinery gave way, owing to which the truck fell upon G., breaking both his legs. It was held, that if W. had no charge of, or control over, the operation of shipping the cars, etc., but, on the contrary, the duty of shipping them rested solely upon the master of the vessel, and he had the entire control over the operation, and W. was acting merely as his assistant or servant, the action should have been brought against the owner of the vessel, and not against W. But if it was W.'s duty to ship them, or if it was the joint duty of him and the master of the vessel, he was (as between him and G.) liable for the injury, if it resulted from his neglect, or that of the master of the vessel, to provide suitable machinery; the defect in the machinery being unknown to G. The general rule is, that an employer who provides the machinery, and oversees and controls its operation, must see that it is suitable; and if an injury to the workman happen by reason of a defect, unknown to the latter, and which the employer by the use of ordinary care could have cured, such employer is liable for the injury.³] On the other hand, if the defective character of the machinery or apparatus is not known to the principal, and the servant sustains an injury thereby, he would not, it seems, have any cause of action against his principal.⁴ [In a recent case the master was a sugar refiner, and em-

213; *Paterson v. Wallace*, 1 Macqueen, 748; *Brydon v. Stewart*, 2 Macqueen, 30. See *Griffiths v. Gidlow*, 3 Hurl. & Norm. 648; *Byron v. N. Y. State Printing Telegraph Co.* 26 Barbour, 39.

¹ *McMillan v. The Saratoga & Washington Railroad Co.* 20 Barbour, 449.

² *Noyes v. Smith*, 28 Verm. 59. See *Perry v. Marsh*, 25 Alab. 659; *Noyes v. Rutland & Burlington Railroad*, 1 Williams (Vt.) 110.

³ *McGatrick v. Wason*, 4 Ohio St. R. 566.

⁴ [*Strange v. McCormack*, in Dis. Ct. of Penn., Boston Law Rep., April, 1851, p. 619; *Lowrie, J.*, there said: "Where a person undertakes to work, by means of

ployed a servant to fill the sugar moulds and hoist them up to higher floors in the warehouse, by means of machinery; and the

machinery that is dangerous in its operation, and receives an injury from it in its ordinary operation, is the employer liable? The answer is plain — He is not. But as the question involved in this cause seems to have never been decided by our Courts, it will not be out of place to refer to the reasons and principles upon which the solution of the question depends. It has been said, that the liability of the employer can arise only in cases of breach of contract, or of a public duty. But this proposition does not fully present the difficulty of this case; for wherever the law imposes a private duty from one man to another, it implies a contract to perform that duty, and the question still remains, — Does not the law impose on the employer the duty to have his machinery constructed in such a manner that it will operate with reasonable safety to the persons working at it? This, it must be observed, is a question of *legal*, not of *moral* duty. The *moral* duty, which every man owes to those in his employment to consult their safety, will not be disputed. This is a duty prompted by the ordinary feelings of human charity, and may be of no more perfect obligation than the duty which one owes to another to warn him of approaching danger — a duty enforced by no sanctions but those of the moral law. It will not be pretended, if the defendant had warned the plaintiff that the machinery was dangerous, and then the plaintiff had agreed to risk it, that in such case the defendant would be liable for the unfortunate result of the experiment. But the law very properly presumes that every man who undertakes a business understands the character of the business, and of the tools and machinery with which it is to be done; and on this account it is a fair presumption, that he undertakes the risk for what he considers a sufficient compensation. If he ignorantly and presumptuously undertakes the work, it is not wrong that he should himself bear the natural consequences. If the machinery is dangerous, in its character or by reason of its want of repair, a proper workman is presumed to know it at least as well as his employer, and has a right to decline the work; and if he does not, he takes the risk. It is not necessary to say how the law would be, where one is induced by false representations to work with unsafe machinery. If the duty claimed to exist here is founded on any other principle than kindness, it must be a principle involving the legal duty of protection. But where the law imposes this duty, it requires the correlative duty of subjection, a relation which would be repudiated with scorn in the present instance. There is one illustrious instance, wherein the law protects the weak and ignorant from the exactions of the more powerful, and even from his own ignorance; and this is by the laws forbidding all worldly employment on the Lord's day. Looking at this in a merely legal point of view, (and here we can no otherwise view it,) it is easy to see that thousands of people, even in a Christian land, would have no day of physical rest were it not for these laws. But this protection is afforded by the law, not required of the employers. There is another large class of cases, wherein the law affords its protection to persons who are indiscreetly seduced into engagements by those who stand in a relation towards them by which an undue influence may be ex-

usual mode of attaching the moulds to the machine was by placing them in net bags, which effectually prevented any accident; which mode had been adopted by the master until, from motives of economy, he substituted a kind of clip, which laid hold of the rim of the mould; and the servant used this mode, until on a certain occasion, when he himself had filled the mould, and fastened it to the clip, the clip, by some jerk in raising the mould, slipped off, and the mould fell on the servant's head and killed him, it was held, that was no evidence to go to the jury of the master's liability; inasmuch as assuming it was not the servant's own negligence in fixing the clip, yet if the clip was itself dangerous, the servant knew it as well as the master, and ought not to have used it.¹ And in a still later case it was held, that an employee cannot recover for an injury suffered in the course of his employment from a defect in the machinery used by his employer, unless the employer knew, or ought to have known, of the defect, and the employee did not know it, or had not the means of knowledge.]² And, in another case, a

exercised. But the relation of employer and employee has never been supposed to be of this character. There is no relation of confidence or dependence between them. Both are equal before the law, and considered equally competent to take care of themselves. No protection is legally due by one, nor subjection by the other; and of course no action lies for failure of protection. As a general rule, the law leaves all men free to make their own bargains, and decides between them according to their contracts, without diminishing the freedom of either in order to protect him against the other. Suppose there was actual carelessness on the part of the manager in the arrangement of the cards, so that their operation was defective; this is only another way of saying that the plaintiff was set to work with imperfect instruments. If he had been set to cut wood with the defendant's axe, and it had become detached from the handle, I suppose it would not have been claimed that the defendant was liable for an injury thus occasioned to the plaintiff. Yet I do not perceive the difference between that case and this; for if the machinery, in this instance, is more complicated, the person using it is presumed to have more skill and care. Even the manager himself is, (as far as concerns the plaintiff,) but one of the instruments by which the defendant carries on his business; an instrument just as likely to be defective as any of the unintelligent instruments by which the business is effected, and the persons employed are all subject to the risk of his occasional negligence and unskillfulness, and cannot transfer the risk to the employer."]

¹ *Dynen v. Leach*, 40 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 491, in the Court of Exchequer, April 18, 1857. This case does not appear to be in the regular Exchequer Reports.

² *Hayden v. Smithville Man. Co.* 29 Conn. 548.

fireman on a railroad locomotive, who had been injured, as he contended, by the breaking of a defective switch, managed by another servant, sought to recover of the railroad company, on the ground that the latter was liable for the defective character of their apparatus; but, as the company were expressly acquitted of the gross negligence, the Court held, that the company would be responsible only for want of ordinary care and diligence.¹ [A master is, however, responsible for the result of, not employing servants of ordinary skill and care in the work upon which they are engaged, and if an injury arises to one servant from the incompetency or want of ordinary skill in a fellow-servant, while both are engaged about their master's business, it has been said that the master is liable.²]

[§ 453 *i.* The rule of law that a master is not in general responsible for his servant for injury occasioned by the negligence of a fellow-servant in the course of their common employment, applies to the case of a person injured while gratuitously assisting the servants in their work. Therefore, where the servants of a railway company were turning a truck on a turntable, and a person not in the employment of the company volunteered to assist, and while so engaged, other servants of the company negligently propelled a steam-engine and thereby caused the death of the person who had so volunteered; but the other servants were persons of competent skill, and the company did not authorize the negligence, it was held that they were not liable to the administrator of the person so injured.³]

¹ *King v. Boston & Worcester Railroad Corporation*, 9 Cush. R. 112. See *Sullivan v. M. & M. Railroad*, 11 Iowa, 421.

² *Wiggett v. Fox*, 36 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 486. And see *Tarrant v. Webb*, 38 Id. 281; *Wright v. New York Central Railroad*, 28 Barbour, 80.

³ [*Degg v. Midland Railway Co.* 1 Hurl. & Norm. 773; 40 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 376. *Bramwell, B.*, there said: "The facts stated by the declaration and the plea demurred to may be thus summed up. The defendants were possessed of a railway, and carriages and engines; their servants were at work on the railway in their service with those carriages and engines; the deceased voluntarily assisted some of them in their work; other of the defendants' servants were negligent about their work, and by reason thereof the deceased was killed; the defendants' servants were persons competent to do the work; the defendants did not authorize the negligence.

"We are of opinion that, under these circumstances, the action is not maintainable. The cases show that if the deceased had been a servant of the defend-

§ 454. This liability of the principal for the misfeasances, and negligences, and torts of his agents and servants, extends not

ants, and injured under such circumstances as occurred here, no action would be maintainable, and it might be enough for us to say that those cases govern this, for it seems impossible to suppose that the deceased, by volunteering his services, can have any greater rights or impose any greater duty on the defendants than would have existed had he been a hired servant. But we were pressed by an expression, to be found in those cases, to the effect that 'a servant undertakes as between him and the master, to run all ordinary risks of the service, including the negligence of a fellow-servant; *Wiggett v. Fox*, 11 Exch. 822, S. C. 36 Eng. Rep. 486; and it was said there was no such undertaking here. But in truth there is as much in the one case as in the other; the consideration may not be as obvious, but it is as competent for a man to agree, and as reasonable to hold that he does agree, that if allowed to assist in the work, though not paid, he will take care of himself from the negligence of his fellow-workmen, as it could be if he were paid for his services.

"But we were also told that there was and could be no agreement; that *Degg* was a wrongdoer, and therefore the action was maintainable. It certainly would be strange that the case should be better, if he were a wrongdoer, than if he had not been. We are of opinion that this argument cannot be supported. We desire not to be understood as laying down any general proposition, that a wrongdoer never can maintain an action. If a man commits a trespass to land, the occupier is not justified in shooting him, and probably if the occupier were sporting or firing at a mark on his land, and saw a trespasser, and fired carelessly and hurt him, an action would lie. Nor do we desire to give any opinion on the cases cited of *Bird v. Holbrook*, 4 Bing. 628, and *Lynch v. Nurdin*, 1 Q. B. 29. But it is obvious, and a truism, to say that a wrongdoer cannot, any more than one who is not a wrongdoer, maintain an action, unless he has a right to complain of the act causing the injury, and complain thereof against the person he has made defendant in the action. Now it may be that, had the mischief here resulted from the personal act of the master, he knowing that the deceased was there, the master would have been liable; and that, as the defendants' servants knew the deceased was on the railway, and because they knew that, were guilty of a wrong to him, they are liable to an action; but on what reason or principle should the defendants be? If a servant is driving his master in a carriage, and a person gets up behind, and the servant, knowing it, drives carelessly and injures that person, the servant may be liable, but why the master? The law for reasons of supposed convenience, more than on principle, makes a master liable in certain cases for the acts of his servants—not only in cases in the nature of contract, which depend on different considerations, but in cases independent of contract, such as negligent driving in the public streets when damage is thereby done. This is a responsibility the law has put on them; there is a duty on them, to take care that their servants do no damage to others by negligence in their work for their master, or to compensate the sufferer where such damage is done. The public interest may require this for the public benefit; but why should a

only to the injuries and wrongs of the agent, who is immediately employed by the principal in a particular business, but also to the injuries and wrongs done by others, who are employed by that agent under him, or with whom he contracts for the performance of the business; for the liability reaches through all the stages of the service.¹ Thus, for example, where the owner of a house employed an agent to repair the house for a stipulated sum; and the latter contracted with C. to do the work, and with D. to furnish the materials; and D.'s servant, by negligently leaving the materials in the road, occasioned an injury to the plaintiff; he was held entitled to maintain an action for damages

wrongdoer have power to create such a responsibility, and such a duty? No reason can be assigned. Some acts are absolutely and intrinsically wrong, where they directly and necessarily do an injury, as a blow; others only so from their probable consequences. There is no absolute or intrinsic negligence: it is always relative to some circumstances of time, place, or person. It is not negligent or wrong for a man to fire at a mark in his own grounds at a distance from others, or to ride very rapidly in his own park; but it is wrong so to fire near to, and so to ride on, the public highway; and, though the quality of the act is not altered, it is wrong in whoever does it, and so far it is as though it were intrinsically wrong. So the act of firing, or riding fast in an inclosure, becomes wrong if the person doing it sees there is some one near whom it may damage. But the act is wrong in him only for the personal reason that he knows of its danger; it would not be wrong in any one else who did not know that. Now, for a wilful act intrinsically wrong by a servant, the master is not liable. By a parity of reason he ought not to be where the act, not wrong in itself, is only so for reasons personal to the servant, and his wilful disregard of them. The master's liability ought to be limited to that which he may anticipate and guard against, namely, the middle class of cases we have put. However this may be, it seems to us there can be no action except in respect of a duty infringed, and that no man by his wrongful act can impose a duty: and as a direction by the master to drive furiously, or in the way called carelessly, in his park, would not be wrong in the master, it cannot be made so by a trespasser getting there and being hurt, so that, *quod* the master, it is *damnum absque injuria*; and, if not a wrong in the master when expressly ordered, it cannot be if done by the servant against his orders. The defendants might, if they had thought fit, have directed their servants to move and propel trucks against other trucks without any notice or precaution; in short, to do what the plaintiff complains of, and if their servants chose to work on those terms, although it might be a wasteful way of using their engines and carriages, no one could say it was wrongful; then the deceased cannot make it so by coming there himself. Upon these grounds then, whether he is considered a wrongdoer or not, we are of opinion the action cannot be maintained, and that the plea is good."]

¹ See *Reeves v. State Bank*, 8 Ohio State R. 476.

therefor, against the owner.¹ So, where a warehouseman employed a master porter to remove some barrels of flour from his

¹ *Bush v. Steinman*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 409; *Ante*, § 322, note (1.). [But the authority of *Bush v. Steinman* has been, in the modern cases, entirely denied. See *Knight v. Fox*, 5 Exch. R. 721; 1 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 477, and *Bennett's* note; *Overton v. Freeman*, 8 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 479; *Hilliard v. Richardson*, 3 Gray, 349;] *Nicholson v. Mounsey*, 15 East, R. 384; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 296, 297; *Weyland v. Elkins*, Holt's N. P. Rep. 227; S. C. 1 Starkie, R. 272; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 69, (2d edit.); *Id.* pp. 127, 128, (3d edit. 1813.) Lord Chief Justice Eyre's opinion, in *Bush v. Steinman*, shows the difficulty of this doctrine, and the grounds on which it is founded. "At the trial," said he, "I entertained great doubts with respect to the defendant's liability in this action. He appeared to be so far removed from the immediate author of the nuisance, and so far removed even from the person connected with the immediate author in the relation of master, that to allow him to be charged for the injury sustained by the plaintiff, seemed to render a circuit of action necessary. Upon the plaintiff's recovery, the defendant would be entitled to an action against the surveyor; the surveyor, and each of the sub-contracting parties in succession, to actions against the persons with whom they immediately contracted; and, last of all, the lime-burner would be entitled to the common action against his own servant. I hesitated, therefore, in carrying the responsibility beyond the immediate master of the person who committed the injury, and I retained my doubts upon the subject, till I heard the argument on the part of the plaintiff, and had an opportunity of conferring with my brothers. They, including Mr. Justice Buller, are satisfied that the action will lie; and, upon reflection, I am disposed to concur with them, though I am ready to confess, that I find great difficulty in stating with accuracy the grounds on which it is to be supported. The relation between master and servant, as commonly exemplified in actions brought against the master, is not sufficient; and the general proposition that a person shall be answerable for any injury which arises in carrying into execution that which he has employed another to do, seems to be too large and loose. The principle of *Stone v. Cartwright*, with the decision of which I am well satisfied, is certainly applicable to this case; but that of *Littledale v. Lord Lonsdale* comes much nearer. Lord Lonsdale's colliery was worked in such a manner by his agents and servants, (or possibly by his contractors, for that would have made no difference,) that an injury was done to the plaintiff's house; and his Lordship was held responsible. Why? Because the injury was done in the course of his working the colliery; whether he worked it by agents, by servants, or by contractors, still it was his work; and, though another person might have contracted with him for the management of the whole concern, without his interference, yet, the work being carried on for his benefit, and on his property, all the persons employed must have been considered as his agents and servants, notwithstanding any such arrangement; and he must have been responsible to all the world, on the principle of *sic utere tuo, ut alienum non ledas*. Lord Lonsdale having empowered the contractor to appoint such persons under him, as he

warehouse, and the master porter used his own tackle, and brought and paid his own men, and an injury was done to the

should think fit, the persons appointed would, in contemplation of law, have been the agents and servants of Lord Lonsdale. Nor can I think that it would have made any difference, if the injury complained of had arisen from his Lordship's coals having been placed by the workmen on the premises of Mr. Littledale; since it would have been impossible to distinguish such an act from the general course of business in which they were engaged, the whole of which business was carried on, either by the express direction of Lord Lonsdale, or under a presumed authority from him. The principle of this case, therefore, seems to afford a ground which may be satisfactory for the present action, though I do not say that it is exactly in point. According to the doctrine cited from Blackstone's Commentaries, if one of a family 'layeth or casteth' anything out of the house, which constitutes a nuisance, the owner is chargeable. Suppose, then, that the owner of a house, with a view to rebuild or repair, employ his own servants to erect a hord in the street, (which being for the benefit of the public, they may lawfully do,) and they carry it out so far as to encroach unreasonably on the highway; it is clear that the owner would be guilty of a nuisance; and, I apprehend, there can be but little doubt, that he would be equally guilty, if he had contracted with a person to do it for a certain sum of money, instead of employing his own servants for the purpose; for, in contemplation of law, the erection of the hord would equally be his act. If that be established, we come one step nearer to this case. Here the defendant, by a contractor, and by agents under him, was repairing his house; the repairs were done at his expense, and the repairing was his act. If, then, the injury complained of by the plaintiff was committed in the course of making those repairs, I am unable to distinguish the case from that of erecting the hord, or from *Littledale v. Lonsdale*, unless, indeed, a distinction could be maintained, (which, however, I do not think possible,) on the ground of the lime not having been delivered on the defendant's premises, but only at a place close to them, with a view to being carried on to the premises and consumed there. My brother Buller recollects a case, which he would have stated more particularly, had he been able to attend. It was this. A master having employed his servant to do some act, the servant, out of idleness, employed another to do it; and that person, in carrying into execution the orders, which had been given to the servant, committed an injury to the plaintiff, for which the master was held liable. The responsibility was thrown on the principal, from whom the authority originally moved. This determination is certainly highly convenient and beneficial to the public. Where a civil injury of the kind now complained of, has been sustained, the remedy ought to be obvious, and the persons injured should have only to discover the owner of the house, which was the occasion of the mischief; not be compelled to enter into the conceals between that owner and other persons, the inconvenience of which would be more heavily felt, than any which can arise from a circuitry of action. Upon the whole case, therefore, though I still feel difficulty in stating the precise principle on which the action is founded, I am

plaintiff by the falling of a barrel on him, in consequence of the tackle failing, while it was used by the porter's men; it was held,

satisfied with the opinion of my brothers." See this case commented on in *Duncan v. Findlater*, 6 Clark & Finnell. R. 891, 908, 909, 918, by Lord Cottingham, and Lord Brougham, where it seems to have been thought to push the doctrine of the liability of the principal to its fullest extent. Mr. Holt has appended a very able note (p. 229), on this subject, to the case of *Weyland v. Elkins*. The following extract contains some striking illustrations and comments on the doctrine: "The responsibility of the master," says he, "for the acts of his servant, has been extended by recent cases to a length beyond the ordinary course of practice, and which, unless the principle be duly understood, may appear contrary both to reason and the principles of general equity. The question is of very general concern, and the cases rest upon some nice distinctions, which, however subtle and remote, are perfectly consonant with the principles of legal liability; a very different thing from moral criminality. The foundation of this branch of our law, is avowedly in the maxim of the Roman Code, (1 Inst. tit. 5,) *Qui facit per alium, facit per se*: namely, that the agency of a servant is but an instrument; and that any man, having authority over the actions of another, who either expressly commands him to do an act, or puts him in a condition of which such act is a result, or by the absence of a due care and control, (either previously in the choice of his servant, or immediately in the act itself,) negligently suffers him to do an injury, shall be responsible for the act of his servant, as if it were the act of himself. All the cases rest upon the development of this principle. We shall here subjoin some of those main divisions, into which it seems to distribute itself. 1. The first case of such responsibility is the express command of the master; and here the principle is too obvious to need an explanation. 2. The second head is that of reasonable presumption, or, in legal terms, a general command. Whatever a servant is permitted to do, in the ordinary course of his business, is equivalent to this reasonable presumption and general command. Thus, if an innkeeper employ a drawer who serves his guests with wine injurious to their health, the party injured may bring an action against the master. 1 Roll. Abr. 95. Upon the same principle, by the common law, (till altered by the statute of Anne,) if a servant keep his master's fire negligently, so that his neighbor's house be burnt down thereby, an action lies against the master, because this negligence occurred in his service. Otherwise, if the servant, going along the street with a torch, by negligence set fire to the house of a neighbor; for there he is not in his master's immediate service, and must answer the damage personally. Noy's Max. ch. 44. In all such cases, the term in our law books, general command, is equivalent to the words, the general deputation, or voluntary substitution, of the servant for the master, within the line of his particular employ; and, therefore, all the acts of the servant, within such particular line, are very properly regarded as the acts of the master. 3. The third head of such responsibility is, where the absence of a due care and control by a master, either in the previous choice of a servant, or in the immediate act itself, has occasioned an injury to another. In all such cases, the master is

that the warehouseman was liable therefor, and that the men were in point of law to be deemed his servants.¹ So, the owner

legally as well as morally criminal for the act of his servant, and, therefore, becomes a subject of legal as well as of moral imputation. Thus, a chemist, who employs an unskilful apprentice to mix up drugs and vend in his shop, and the master of a stage-coach, employing a negligent driver, are responsible for the acts of their respective servants. Nor does it make any distinction in these cases, whether such injury be the effect of negligence or wilfulness in the servant, so long as it is within the scope of the master's employ. The reason of this is twofold; in the first place, because the master, who alone could know his servant, is bound to make choice of a proper one in every respect, both as to good character, which would exclude such wilfulness, and as to skill, which would exclude such negligence. 4. According to the above definition, (that the servant is the deputy of the master only within the limits in which he is employed,) the master is not responsible for any act of his servant, which makes no part or connection with his service, and which he might or would have committed without such service, such acts being contemporary only with his service, but not any result from it. For example, if my coachman drive over the leg of another man, I am responsible for the injury; but, if he get off his coach-box and horse-whip a man in the street, it is his act, and not mine. It is nothing which I could foresee or prevent; it is not the result of character, or the absence of any proper quality which I ought, acting with ordinary discretion, to have required in a driver. All the cases under this exception rest upon the same distinction. The injurious act, for which the master is made responsible, must be something growing out of the particular service, and be committed, *quatenus in servitio*. 5. To instance a few more cases. In Bro. Abr. tit. *Trespass*, pl. 435, it is said: 'If my servant, without my notice, put my beasts in another's land, my servant is the trespasser, and not I; because, by the voluntary putting of the beasts there, without my assent, he gains a special property for the time, and so, to this purpose, they are his beasts.' The reason here given, is an example of the subtilty of our old law-writers, who preferred a reason, however technical and remote, to one more obvious and familiar. In *Middleton v. Fowler*, Salk. 282, Holt, C. J., places the law upon its proper foundation, when he states it, as a general position, 'that no master is chargeable with the acts of his servant, but when he acts in the execution of the authority given him.' In other words when a servant quits sight of the object for which he was employed, and without reference to his master's business or orders, commits, from his own malice, some wilful and independent act, he is no longer presumed to be acting in pursuance of his general authority as a servant; and, according to the doctrine of Lord Holt, his master is not responsible for the act which he does. Thus, in *McManns v. Cricket*, 1 East, 106, the Court of King's Bench determined, that a master was not liable in trespass for the wilful act of his servant in driving his

¹ *Randleston v. Murray*, 8 Adolph. & Ellis, 109. See also *Witte v. Hague*, 2 Dowl. & Ry. 33.

of a ship, who appoints the master, and desires him to appoint, and select, and employ, a proper crew, will be responsible for the

master's carriage against another; such act being done without the direction or assent of the master; admitting, at the same time, that the master would be liable for any damage occasioned by the negligence and unskillfulness of his servant, whilst in his employ. In the same manner, although the master of a ship is not discharged of his responsibility for the acts of his crew, notwithstanding they are done under the direction of a pilot, who, by the regulations of a statute, supersedes the master, for the time, in the government of the ship; yet, if one of the ship's crew does a wilful act of injury to another ship, without any direction from, or privity with, the master, trespass cannot be maintained against the master, although he was on board at the time. *Bowcher v. Noidstrom*, 1 Taunt. 568; and see the cases referred to in the argument. So, in a later case, *Nicholson v. Mounsey*, 15 East, 384, it was determined, that the captain of a sloop-of-war was not responsible in an action on the case, which is a material distinction, for damages done by running down another vessel; the mischief appearing to have been committed during the watch of the lieutenant, who was upon deck, and had the actual management of the sloop at the time; and when the captain was not upon deck, and was not called by his duty to be there. That case, however, was determined upon this principle: 1. That the defendant and the lieutenant were equally the servants of a superior, and stationed on board by the same authority. 2. That the defendant had no power either to appoint or dismiss his officers and crew. 6. With respect to the description of agents and servants, for whose acts the master may be responsible, there is a peculiarity in the English law, which embraces a very wide and extensive relation. In the civil law the liability was narrowed to the person standing in the relation of a paterfamilias to the wrongdoer. Dig. Lib. 9, tit. 3. Our law extends not only to cases where the agent is a domestic, but it throws the responsibility upon the principal, from whom the authority, of which the injury is a consequence, originally moved. Thus, where a master, having employed his servant to do some act, and the servant, out of idleness, employed another to do it, and that person, in carrying into execution the orders, which had been given to the servant, committed an injury to the plaintiff, the master was held responsible. Reported from Buller, J., by Eyre, C. J., in *Bush v. Steinman*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 404. 7. The general proposition, that a person shall be answerable for an injury, which arises in carrying into execution that which he has employed another to do, is perhaps too large and loose; but in the case of *Littledale v. Lord Lonsdale*, 2 H. Bl. 267-269; and in *Bush v. Steinman*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 404, the principle was carried to a great extent. In the former case, the defendant was held responsible for an injury to the plaintiff's horse, done by persons with whom he had contracted, (and not merely employed as agents or servants,) to work a colliery, on the ground that the colliery was the defendant's property; that it was upon his land; and that the description of persons working it could make no difference in his responsibility. In *Bush v. Steinman*, the decision was that a man having a house by the road-side, contracted with B to repair it for a

negligent acts of the crew, for they are to be deemed his servants for the management and government of the ship. [But the owners of a vessel are not liable for the negligence of stevedores employed to unload the cargo by the consignees of the charterers of the vessel, for a gross sum.²] The same principle prevails,

stipulated sum; B contracted with C to do the work; and C with D to furnish the materials. The servant of D brought a quantity of lime to the house and placed it in the road, by which the plaintiff's carriage was overturned; it was held, that A was answerable for the damage sustained. In this case, the Court principally relied upon the case of *Littledale v. Lonsdale*. See likewise, *Stone v. Cartwright*, 6 T. R. 411; *Flower v. Adam*, 2 Taunt. 314; *Payne v. Rogers*, 2 H. B. 350; *Leslie v. Pounds*, 4 Taunt. 649." See also *Laughier v. Pointer*, 5 Barn. & Cressw. 547, where most of the cases are reviewed; *Hughes v. Boyer*, 9 Watts, R. 559; *Milligan v. Wedge*, 12 Adolph. & Ellis, 737, 742; *Brown v. Lent*, 20 Verm. 533. [The authority of *Bush v. Steinman* seems to be shaken in a recent English case, *Reedie v. London & Northwestern Railway Co.* 4 Welsby, Hurlstone, & Gordon, 244.]

¹ Per *Littledale, J.*, in *Laughier v. Pointer*, 5 Barn. & Cressw. 547, 554, per Lord Tenderden; *Id.* p. 574-576.

² [*Linton v. Smith*, 8 Gray, 147. *Thomas, J.*, there said: "The defendants were the owners of an English vessel called *The Syphax*. They entered into a charter-party to take a cargo from London, and deliver it alongside of the vessel to the owners in the port of Boston. The consignees of the vessel in Boston, with the consent of the master, made a contract with John and Daniel Hurley, stevedores, to discharge the cargo on to the wharf. By this contract, the stevedores were to unload the entire cargo for a certain gross sum, to find all that was necessary therefor, and to make good all damage to the cargo in unloading; the master and crew having nothing to do with it. The business of stevedores is a separate, distinct, well-recognized business in Boston, which the Hurleys had followed for many years. While, under this contract, the stevedores were unloading the vessel, the plaintiff's leg was broken through the negligence of the stevedores or the men in their employ.

"The question is, whether the owners of the vessel are liable for that injury? This question, stated in another form, is, whether the relation existing between the owners of the vessel and the stevedores was that of master and servant or contractor and contractee. (The word is a bad one, but there is no substitute.)

"The general rule is, that he who does the injury must respond. The well-known exception is, that the master shall be responsible for the doings of the servant whom he selects and through whom, in legal contemplation, he acts.

"But when the person employed is in the exercise of a distinct and independent employment, and not under the immediate supervision and control of the employer, the relation of master and servant does not exist, and the liability of a master for his servant does not attach.

where the owner of a farm has it in his own hands, and he does not personally interfere in the management, but appoints a bailiff

"Such, we think, is the case at bar. The Hurleys were exercising a distinct business, under an entire contract, for a gross sum. The relation is that of contractor and contractee.

"The law upon this subject has been so recently considered by us in *Hilliard v. Richardson*, 3 Gray, 349, that we content ourselves with referring to two or three cases quite directly in point.

"In the well-known case of *Laugher v. Pointer*, 5 B. & C. 547, the owner of a carriage hired of a stable-keeper a pair of horses to draw it for a day, the owner of the horses providing a driver, through whose negligent driving an injury was done to the horse of a third person. It was held by Lord Tenderden and Littledale, J., that the owner of the carriage was not liable. Bayley and Holroyd, JJ., dissenting.

"The case of *Quarman v. Burnett* arose in the Exchequer upon the same state of facts as in *Laugher v. Pointer*. The Court of Exchequer adopted and affirmed the view of the law before taken by Lord Tenderden and Mr. Justice Littledale, and held that the owner was not liable; a very elaborate opinion being delivered by Mr. Baron Parke. 6 M. & W. 499.

"In *Milligan v. Wedge*, 12 Ad. & El. 737, and 4 P. & Dav. 714, the buyer of a bullock at Smithfield Market employed a licensed drover to drive it from Smithfield. The drover employed a boy to drive. Mischief was occasioned by the bullock through the careless driving of the boy. It was held by all the judges of the Queen's Bench that the owner of the bullock was not liable.

"There is also a well-considered case in Michigan, to the same point. *De Forrest v. Wright*, 2 Mich. 368. A public licensed drayman was employed to haul a quantity of salt from a warehouse and deliver it at the store of the employer, at so much a barrel. While in the act of delivering it, one of the barrels, through the carelessness of the drayman, rolled against and injured a person on the sidewalk. The Court held, that the employer was not liable for the injury; the drayman exercising a distinct and independent employment, and not being under the immediate control and supervision of the employer.

"The case of *Randleson v. Murray*, 8 Ad. & El. 109, and 3 Nev. & P. 239, would seem at first to conflict with the cases before referred to. A warehouseman employed a porter to remove a barrel from his warehouse. The master-porter employed his own men and tackle. Through the negligence of the men the tackle failed, and the barrel fell and injured the plaintiff. The warehouseman was held liable. The report does not show whether the porter was acting upon a contract to do the job for a specific sum or on wages. The case is put, in the decision, on the relation of master and servant. See remarks of Lord Denman, C. J., and Williams, J., in *Milligan v. Wedge*, 12 Ad. & El. 741, 742, and 4 P. & Dav. 717.

"The distinction upon which these cases and many others referred to and examined in *Hilliard v. Richardson* turns is, whether the relation of master and servant, or that of contractor and contractee. The line of separation may

or hind, who hires other persons under him, all of them being paid out of the funds of the owner, and selected by himself, or by a person specially deputed by him; for the owner will be answerable for any damage, which happens through their default, because their neglect or default is his, as they are appointed by and through him.¹ So, in the case of a mine, if the owner employs a steward or manager to superintend the working of the mine, and to hire under-workmen, and he pays them on behalf of the owner; these under-workmen become the immediate servants of the owner, and the owner will be answerable for their default in doing any acts on account of their employer.² So, where a corn-factor was absent from his shop, and during his absence, his sister managed his business; and she, wanting to send out some corn to a customer, for this purpose employed a person, who occasionally worked for her brother, and who, at the time of such employment, was in a state of inebriety; and the man so employed, contrary to the practice in the corn-factor's shop, took out the corn on a small warehouse truck, which he negligently left in the road, whereby a person, driving along in a chaise, was injured; it was held that the corn-factor was liable in an action at the suit of the person injured, for this negligent act of the drunken man, upon the ground, that the employment of a drunken man was in itself an act of negligence, and that, by such employment through his agent, the corn-factor set the whole thing in motion, and must, therefore, be liable for the consequences.³ So, where the owner of land employed a mechanic to make a drain for him on the land, and to extend it therefrom to a public drain, the mechanic procuring the necessary materials, hiring laborers, and charging a compensation for his services and

be sometimes indistinct and shadowy, but in the case before us it is sufficiently clear.

"We are of opinion, upon the facts stated, that the owners of the vessel were not liable, and that the exceptions must be sustained." See also *Blakie v. Stenbridge*, 24 Boston Law Rep. 428.]

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*; *Stone v. Cartwright*, 6 Term R. 415; *Littledale v. Lord Lonsdale*, 2 H. Black. R. 267, 269; *Bush v. Steinman*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 404.

³ *Wanstall v. Pooley*, Mich. Term, 1841, Q. B., cited 6 Clark & Finnell. R. 910, note. See also *Dunlap v. Findlater*, 6 Clark & Finnell. R. 894, 903, 909, 910.

disbursements; it was held, that the mechanic was to be deemed in the service of his employer, so as to make the employer responsible to a third person, who sustained damage in his property by reason of the want of skill, or want of due care and diligence, on the part of the mechanic, and those employed under him in digging the drain.¹ [So where A employed B at a stipulated sum, to remove a house from one side of the street to the other, and B hired all the hands, A having nothing to do with the operations in moving the building, A was nevertheless held liable for the negligence of B, in leaving a hole open in the street, whereby the plaintiff's horse was killed.² The simple fact, however, that the person who did the work was employed by the job, and not by the day, cannot be decisive upon the question of the employer's liability. For if the relationship of master and servant exists at the time, if the employer had the power to control the manner in which the work is done, he is responsible for the negligence of the servant who executes it.³ So in *Burgess v. Gray*,⁴ the defendant had employed one Palmer to make a drain from his house to the street sewer, and Palmer's men left a pile of dirt in the street, whereby the plaintiff was injured; but the jury having found upon the evidence that the defendant had not completely parted with the control over the work, the Court of Common Pleas held him legally liable for the injury, although Palmer was doing the work by contract, and was himself a master-builder. [The liability of one person for

¹ *Stone v. Codman*, 15 Pick R 297. It does not appear, that in this case the work was undertaken to be done by the mechanic by the job, or as an independent employment. If it had been, it might have admitted of a very different consideration. [And see *Peachey v. Rowland*, 16 Eng Law & Eq R 442, and *Bennett's note*.] See post, § 454 a.

² [*Wiswall v. Brinson*, 10 Medell, 554, *Sed quere*, and *Ruffin*, C J, dissented, in an able judgment. In *Stone v. Cheshire Railroad Corporation*, 19 N. Hamp R 100, where a railroad corporation contracted with certain persons to build a section of the road, and while the contractors, or their servants, were blasting rocks upon the road, and a stone fell upon the plaintiff and injured him, it was held, that he had his remedy against the railroad corporation, and the cases of *Bush v. Steunman*, and *Lowell v. Boston & Lowell Railroad*, 23 Pick 24, were fully approved.]

³ *Badler v. Henlock*, 4 El & Bl 570, 30 Eng Law & Eq R 167. See the case cited, post, § 454 c, in the judgment to *Hilliard v. Richardson*.

⁴ 12 Mass R. Rep 578: See post, opinion in *Hilliard v. Richardson*.

damages arising from the negligence or misfeasance of another, on the principle of *respondent superior*, is confined in its application to the relation of master and servant, or principal and agent, and does not extend to cases of independent contracts not creating those relations, and where the employer does not retain the control over the *mode* and *manner* of the performance of the work under the contract. But where the employer retains the control and direction over the *mode* and *manner* of doing the work, and an injury results from the negligence or misconduct of the contractor or his servant or agent, the employer is placed under a liability equal and similar to that which exists in the ordinary case of principal and agent.¹

§ 404 *a*. But here again nice questions have arisen in the application of this last doctrine to cases of sub-agency, where the facts presented the inquiry, when, and under what circumstances, the parties employed are to be deemed the servants or sub-agents of the principal employer, and when only the sub-agents of the immediate person, by whom they are actually employed. In the former case, the principal employer is liable for their negligent acts; in the latter, not. Some cases may be put to illustrate the embarrassments which occasionally surround the subject, and perhaps make it difficult to lay down any positive rule of distinction, applicable to all the varieties of human transactions. In one case, a builder was employed by a committee of a club to make extensive alterations and improvements in the club-house, and, among other things, to prepare and fix the necessary gas-fittings. The builder made a sub-contract with a gas-fitter, to execute the latter portion of the work, by whom, or whose servants, it was performed in such a negligent manner, that the gas exploded, and seriously injured the plaintiff and his wife. A suit was brought against the builder; and the question arose whether he was responsible for the injury. It was held, that he was not, because the gas-fitter did not stand to him in the relation of a servant, but was a mere sub-contractor.²

¹ [Cincinnati v. Stone, 5 Ohio St R. 38. See Clark v. Vermont & Canada Railroad, 28 Verm. 103, Pawlet v. Rutland & Wash. Railroad, Id. 297. See Blackwell v. Wiswall, 24 Barbours, 355; Ladd v. Chotard, 1 Alab. 366; Felson v. Deall, 22 Verm. 170.]

² Rapson v. Cubitt, 9 Mees. & Welsb. 710. See also Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mees. & Welsb. R. 109, 111.

In another case, where the buyer of a bullock employed a licensed drover to drive it from Smithfield, in London, to his slaughter-house, without the city; and, by the by-laws of the city, no person but a licensed drover can drive cattle for hire from Smithfield, though the owner may drive them himself; the drover employed a boy to drive the bullock to the slaughter-house; and the bullock did the mischief complained of, while the boy was driving him; it was held, that the boy was not the servant of the butcher, and, therefore, he was not liable for the negligent acts of the boy.¹ [In another case, a railroad company contracted under seal with certain persons, to make a portion of the line, and, by the contract, reserved to themselves the power of dismissing any of the workmen of the contractors; the workmen in constructing a bridge over a public highway, negligently caused the death of a person passing along the highway beneath, by allowing a stone to fall upon him; after elaborate argument, it was decided, in an action against the company, by the administratrix of the deceased, that they were not liable, and that the terms of the contract did not make any difference.²] The ground of these decisions seems to have been, that, where the party employed by the principal exercises a distinct and independent employment, he, and the persons whom he employs under him, are not to be deemed the servants of the principal, but he stands in the relation of a sub-contractor only, and the persons employed by him are his own servants.³

[§ 454 *b*. Thus, where the defendants contracted to pave a certain highway district, but sub-contracted with B to pave a particular street therein, and B's men negligently left a pile of paving-stones in the street, over which the plaintiff fell and broke

¹ *Milligan v. Wedge*, 12 Adolph. & Ell. 739. [This case is explained in *Sadler v. Hancock*, 30 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 169; 4 El. & Bl. 570.]

² *Reedie v. London & Northwestern Railway Co.* 4 Welsby, Hurlstone & Gordon, 244. See *Cuthbertson v. Parsons*, 10 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 452; *Buffalo v. Holloway*, 3 Seld. 493; *Hickcock v. Plattsburgh*, 16 N. Y. R. 161; *Kelly v. New York*, 1 Kernan, 432; *Storrs v. Utica*, 17 N. Y. R. 107; *Blake v. Ferris*, 1 Selden, 48; *Pack v. Mayor of N. Y.* 4 Seld. 222.

³ See *Milligan v. Wedge*, 12 Adolph. & Ell. 737, and particularly what was said by Lord Denman, and by Mr. J. Williams. See also *Martin v. Temperley*, 1 Q. B. Rep. 298; *The Jurist*, February 25, 1843, No. 320, p. 159. See *The Agriculturist*, 14 pp. 157, 159.

his leg, it was held that the defendants were not liable, although they filled all the stones, and sent them to the street in their carts.¹ So, where the defendant employed A to fill in the earth over a drain leading from the defendant's house to the main sewer in the highway, and A's men, after filling up the drain, left the earth piled up so high above the level of the road, that the plaintiff drove against it and was injured, it was held that the defendant was not liable, A doing the work as a contractor, and the defendant not having anything to do with the manner in which the work was done, and the negligent manner not being necessary to the execution of the work.² So in *Knight v. Fox*,³ a railway company entered into a contract with A to construct a branch line; A contracted with the defendant to erect a tubular bridge, part of the works; the defendant had a surveyor, C, whom he paid by a yearly salary of £250, to attend to his general business; and after obtaining the contract for the bridge, he contracted with C to provide the necessary scaffolding, for which he was to receive £40 irrespective of his salary, the defendant to furnish the requisite materials including light. One of the poles of the scaffolding rested on a highway, and from the want of sufficient light, the plaintiff fell over the pole at night and broke her leg. It was held that the defendant was not liable for the injury; C being at the time in the relation of a subcontractor to the defendant, and not a servant, or agent. In like manner where a railway company contracted with B to excavate a road in order to lay an embankment for the railway, and the work was done under the general superintendence of the company's surveyor, who furnished the plans, but the foreman of B was the person to decide in what manner the directions of the surveyor should be carried out, and the surveyor directed the foreman to cut through only the half of a certain road at once; but B's men, notwithstanding this direction, cut through the whole, whereby the plaintiff's adjoining land was

¹ *Overton v. Freeman*, 8 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 479; 11 Com. B. Rep. 867.

² See *Hilliard v. Richardson*, post, § 454 c.

³ *Peachey v. Rowland*, 13 Com. B. Rep. 182; 16 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 442, and Bennett's note.

³ 1 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 477, and Bennett's note; 5 Exch. R. 721.

inundated, it was held that the railway company was not liable for the injury.¹]

[§ 454 c. This whole subject of the law of *Respondēt superior* was fully examined in a late case in Massachusetts, in which the authorities were very elaborately and critically examined by Judge Thomas, and the true principle of the law on this subject clearly stated. In that case the evidence tended to prove the following facts: Between the hours of five and six in the afternoon of December 5th, 1851, the plaintiff was driving in a wagon in and through a highway, when the horse suddenly took fright at a pile of boards lying by the side of the way, but within its limits, bolted from his course, and carried the wheel of the wagon violently against a post near the edge of the sidewalk, whereby the plaintiff was thrown violently from the wagon, and seriously injured. The boards were placed there the same afternoon, and not long before the occurrence of the accident, by a teamster, acting under the direction of Lewis Shaw, with the intention of allowing them to remain till the morning of the next day, and then removing them to the land adjoining the highway. This land, and the buildings upon it, belonged to the defendant, and were in his possession, except so far as they were occupied by Shaw in the execution of a written contract with the defendant, and under license from him. By that contract, Shaw agreed, for a specific price, and before a day named, to alter a certain paper factory into two dwelling-houses, according to a plan and specifications annexed to the contract, and to make certain repairs thereon, and to furnish all the requisite ma-

¹ [Steel v. The Southeastern Railway Co. 32 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 366. Cresswell, J., said: "I also am of opinion that there was no evidence in this case that could properly have been left to the jury to show that the defendants or their servants had been guilty of any such negligence as to make them responsible. The person who did the work proved that he was employed by Furness. If it could have been shown that the plaintiff's land was flooded in consequence of something done by the orders of Mr. Phillips, the company's surveyor, it might have been said that it was the same as if Phillips had done it with his own hands, and then the company would have been responsible. But, it seems that the order given by Phillips was, to do the work in a different manner from that adopted by Furness's men. This was work done under a contract, — whether parcel or otherwise, is immaterial, — and there is nothing to show negligence in any one for whose acts the company are responsible."]

terials. The defendant also gave Shaw license to use, while he should be engaged in the execution of the contract, one of the buildings upon the land to shape and finish work for buildings of his own, in which the defendant had no interest. Shaw procured the boards and brought them to the place, chiefly for the purpose of using them in the alteration of the defendant's buildings, under the written contract, and was, at the time of the accident, actually engaged in the execution of that contract. The presiding judge instructed the jury, among other things, that "the act of laying and leaving the boards in the highway by Shaw must, for the purposes of this action, be deemed the act of the defendant;" and that, "as the boards at which it was alleged that the horse took fright, were procured by Shaw, to be used, in whole or in part, in performance and execution of the written contract between him and the defendant, and were materials necessary therefor, the defendant was responsible for the acts of Shaw, in placing the boards in the highway, and suffering them to remain there: and that his liability in relation thereto was in all respects the same as the liability of Shaw." But this ruling was reversed by the whole Court.¹

¹ [Hilliard v. Richardson, 9 Gray, 349. In a very elaborate judgment, Thomas, J., said. "The questions raised by the report are upon the instructions given by the presiding judge to the jury. The material question, that upon which the case hinges, is whether, upon the facts reported, the defendant is liable for the acts and for the negligence and carelessness of Shaw. In looking upon the case reported, it is to be observed, 1st. That the acts done by Shaw, and which are charged as negligence, were not done by any specific direction, or order, or request of the defendant. 2dly. That between the defendant and Shaw the ordinary relation of master and servant did not exist. 3dly. That the acts done, and which are charged as negligence, were not done upon the land of the defendant. They did not consist in the creating or suffering of a nuisance upon his own land, to the injury of another. 4thly. That the boards placed in the highway were not the property of the defendant; that he had no interest in them, and could exercise no control over them. 5thly. That the defendant did not assume to exercise any control over them. 6thly. That there is no evidence of any purpose on the part of the defendant to injure the plaintiff, or anybody else, or so to use his property, or suffer it to be so used, as to occasion an injury. Was the defendant liable for the negligent acts of Shaw in the use of the highway? As a matter of reason and justice, if the question were a new one, it would be difficult to see on what solid ground the claim of the plaintiff could rest. But he says that such is the settled law of this Commonwealth, and that the question is now no longer open for discussion. Three cases are especially

But where a person is employed to do an *unlawful* act, by which an injury is occasioned to a third person, the employer is

relied upon by the plaintiff, as settling the rule in *Massachusetts*. They are *Stone v. Codman*, 15 Pick. 297; *Lowell v. Boston and Lowell Railroad*, 23 Pick. 24; and *Earle v. Hall*, 2 Mete. 353. *Stone v. Codman* was this. The defendant employed one Lincoln, a mason, to dig and lay a drain from the defendant's stores, in the city of Boston, to the common sewer. By reason of the opening made by Lincoln and the laborers in his employment, water was let into the plaintiff's cellar, and his goods were wet. 1. Lincoln procured the materials and hired the laborers, charging a compensation for his services and disbursements. 2. The acts causing the injury to the plaintiff's goods were done upon the defendant's land, and in the use of it for the defendant's benefit. 3. There was no contract, written or oral, by which the work was to be done for a specific price, or as a job. 4. The case is expressly put upon the ground that between the defendant and Lincoln the relation of master and servant existed. The Chief Justice, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: 'Without reviewing the authorities, and taking the general rule of law to be well settled, that a master or principal is responsible to third persons for the negligence of a servant, by which damage has been done, we are of opinion, that, if Lincoln was employed by the defendant to make and lay a drain for him, on his own land, and extending thence to the public drain, he (Lincoln) procuring the necessary materials, employing laborers, and charging a compensation for his own services and his disbursements, he must be deemed, in a legal sense, to have been in the service of the defendant, to the effect of rendering his employer responsible for want of skill, or want of due diligence and care; so that, if the plaintiff sustained damage by reason of such negligence the defendant was responsible for such damage.' The case well stands on the relation of master and servant. The work was under the control of the defendant. He could change, suspend or terminate it, at his pleasure. Lincoln was upon the land with only an implied license, which the defendant could at any moment revoke. The work was done by Lincoln, not on his own account but on the defendant's. The defendant was indeed acting throughout by his servants. The injury was done by the escape of water from land of the defendant to that of the plaintiff, which the defendant could have and was bound to have prevented. The second case relied upon by the plaintiff is that of *Lowell v. Boston and Lowell Railroad*, 23 Pick. 24. In a previous suit, (*Currier v. Lowell*, 16 Pick. 170,) the town of Lowell had been compelled to pay damages sustained by Currier by reason of a defect in one of the highways of the town. That defect was caused in the construction of the railroad of the Boston and Lowell Company. It consisted in a deep cut through the highway, made in the construction of the railroad. Barriers had been placed across the highway, to prevent travellers from falling into the chasm. It became, in the construction of the railroad, necessary to remove the barriers, for the purpose of carrying out stone and rubbish from the deep cut. They were removed by persons in the employ of the Corporation, who neglected to replace them. Currier and another person, driving along the high-

liable for the injury although the person employed be a contractor, and the act be that of his servants. In such case it is

way in the night-time, were precipitated into the deep cut, and seriously injured. Currier brought his action against the town of Lowell, and recovered damages. This action was to recover of the railroad corporation the amount the town had been so compelled to pay. The railroad corporation denied their responsibility for the negligence of the persons employed in the construction of that part of the railroad where the accident took place, because that section of the road had been let out to one Noonan, who had contracted to make the same for a stipulated sum, and had employed the workmen. This defence was not sustained; nor should it have been. The defendants had been authorized by their charter to construct a railroad from Boston to Lowell, four rods wide through the whole length. They were authorized to cross turnpikes or other highways, with power to raise or lower such turnpikes or highways, so that the railroad, if necessary, might pass conveniently over or under the same. St. 1830, c. 1, §§ 1, 11. Now, it is plain that it is the corporation that are intrusted by the legislature with the execution of these public works, and that they are bound, in the construction of them, to protect the public against danger. It is equally plain that they cannot escape this responsibility by a delegation of this power to others. The work was done on land appropriated to the purpose of the railroad, and under authority of the corporation, vested in them by law for the purpose. The barriers, the omission to replace which was the occasion of the accident, were put up and maintained by a servant of the corporation, and by their express orders; and that servant had the care and supervision of them. The accident occurred from the negligence of a servant of the railroad corporation, acting under their express orders. The case, then, of *Lowell v. Boston and Lowell Railroad* stands perfectly well upon its own principles, and is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. The Court might well say, that the fact of Noonan being a contractor for this section did not relieve the corporation from the duties or responsibility imposed on them by their charter and the law, especially as the failure to replace the barriers was the act of their immediate servant, acting under their orders. The only respect, it seems to us, in which this case aids the doctrine of the plaintiff, is that the learned Judge who delivered the opinion of the Court cites with approbation the case of *Bush v. Steinman*, 1 Bos. & Fall. 404, as 'fully supported by the authorities and well-established principles.' It is sufficient to remark, in passing, that the decision of the case before the Court did not involve the correctness of the rule in *Bush v. Steinman*. The case of *Earle v. Hall*, 2 Met. 353, is the third case cited by the plaintiff as affirming the doctrine upon which he relies. Hall agreed to sell land to one Gilbert. Gilbert agreed to build a house upon and pay for the land. While the agreement was in force, Gilbert, in preparing to build the house on his own account, by workmen employed by him alone, undermined the wall of the adjoining house of the plaintiff. It was held that Hall was not answerable for the injury, although the title to the land was in him at the time the injury was committed. The general doctrine is stated to be, that we are not merely to inquire who is

not material that the workmen were not under the immediate direction of the person sought to be charged; for if the whole

the general owner of the estate, in ascertaining who is responsible for acts done upon it injurious to another, but who has the efficient control, for whose account, at whose expense, under whose orders is the business carried on, the conduct of which has occasioned the injury. The case of *Bush v. Steinman* is cited as a leading case, 'very peculiar, and much discussed,' but we do not perceive that the point it decides is affirmed. The general scope of the reasoning in *Earle v. Hall*, as well as the express point decided, are adverse to it. These cases, neither in the points decided, nor the principles which they involve, support the rule contended for by the plaintiff. But the plaintiff says that the well-known case of *Bush v. Steinman* is directly in point, and that that case is still the settled law of Westminster Hall. If so, as authority, it would not conclude us; though, as evidence of the law, it would be entitled to high consideration. Upon this case of *Bush v. Steinman* three questions arise: 1. What does it decide? 2. Does it stand well upon authority or reason? 3. Has its authority been overthrown or substantially shaken and impaired by subsequent decisions? 1. The case was this: A, having a house by the roadside, contracted with B to repair it for a stipulated sum, B contracted with C to do the work, C with D to furnish the materials, the servant of D brought a quantity of lime to the house, and placed it in the road, by which the plaintiff's carriage was overturned. Held, that A was answerable for the damage sustained. 2. At the trial, Chief Justice Eyre was of opinion that the defendant was not answerable for the injury. In giving his opinion at the hearing in banc, he says he found great difficulty in stating with accuracy the grounds on which the action was to be supported, the relation of master and servant was not sufficient, the general proposition, that a person shall be answerable for any injury which arises in carrying into execution that which he has employed another to do, seemed to be too large and loose. He relied, as authorities, upon three cases only: *Stone v. Cartwright*, 6 T. R. 411; *Littledale v. Lonsdale*, 2 H. Bl. 267, and a case stated upon the recollection of Mr. Justice Buller.

"*Stone v. Cartwright* lays no foundation for the rule in *Bush v. Steinman*. The decision was but negative in its character. It was that, no action would lie against a steward, manager, or agent, for the damage of those employed by him in the service of his principal. This is the entire point decided. Lord Kenyon said: 'I have ever understood that the action must be brought against the hand committing the injury, or against the owner for whom the act was done.' The injury complained of was done upon the land of the defendant, and by his servants. It consisted in so negligently working the defendant's mine as to undermine the plaintiff's ground and buildings above it, so that the surface gave way. The mine was in the possession and occupation of the defendant; the injury was direct and immediate, the workmen were the servants of the owner. The case of *Littledale v. Lonsdale*, in its main facts, cannot be distinguished from *Stone v. Cartwright*. It stands upon the same grounds. The defendant's steward employed the under-workmen. They were paid out of the defendant's

work itself be illegal, and cannot be done at all except by a wrongful act, the original employer is responsible.^{1]}

funds. The machinery and utensils belonged to the defendant, and all the persons employed were his immediate servants. The third case was but this: A master having employed his servant to do some act, this servant, out of idleness, employed another to do it; and that person, in carrying into execution the orders which had been given to the servant, committed an injury to the plaintiff, for which the master was held liable. What was the nature of the acts done does not appear. And whether the case was rightly decided or not, it is difficult to see any analogy between it and the case the Lord Chief Justice was considering. Mr. Justice Heath referred to the action for defamation, brought against Tattersall, who was the proprietor of a newspaper with sixteen others. The libel was inserted by the persons whom the proprietors had employed by contract to collect the news and compose the paper; yet the defendant was held liable. It would seem to be not very material who composed the paper, but who owned and published it. Mr. Justice Heath also cited, as in point, the case of *Rosewell v. Prior*, 2 Balk. 460, which was an action upon the case for obstructing ancient lights. The defendant had erected upon his land the obstruction complained of. There had been a former recovery for the erection; this suit was for the continuance. The premises of the defendant had been leased. The question was, whether the action would lie for the continuance after his lease. '*Et per Curiam*. It lies; for he transferred it with the original wrong, and his demise affirms the continuance of it; he hath also rent as a consideration for the continuance, and therefore ought to answer the damage it occasions.' Mr. Justice Rooke, in addition to the cases of *Stone v. Cartwright*, and *Littledale v. Lonsdale*, alluded also to the case of *Michael v. Alestree*, 2 Lev. 172, in which it was held that an action might be maintained against a master for damage done by his servant to the plaintiff in exercising his horses in an improper place, though he was absent, because it should be intended that the master sent the servant to exercise the horses there. See *Parsons v. Winchell*, 5 Cush. 595. The examination of these cases justifies the remark that *Bush v. Steinman* does not stand well upon the authorities, and is not a recognition of principles before that time settled. The rule it adopts is apparently for the first time announced. Does it stand well upon the reasoning of the Court. We think all the opinions given in it lose sight of these two important distinctions: In the cases cited and relied upon, the acts done, which were the subjects of complaint, were either acts done by servants or agents, under the efficient control of the defendants, or were nuisances created upon the premises of the defendants to the direct injury of the estate of the plaintiffs. The servant of the lime-burner was not the servant of the defendant; over him the defendant had no control whatsoever; to the defendant he was not responsible. There was no nuisance created on the defendant's land. It does not appear that the defendant owned the fee of the highway. The case is put on the ground that the lime was put near the premises of the defendant,

¹ *Ellis v. The Sheffield Gas Co.* 2 El. & Bl. 767; 22 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 198.

§ 455. The liability of the principal to third persons, for the misfeasances, negligences, and torts of their agents and ser-

and with a view of being carried upon them. The lime was not on the defendant's land, he did not direct it to be put there, he had not the control of the man who put it there. Mr Justice Heath said. 'I found my opinion on this single point, viz, that all the sub-contracting parties were in the employ of the defendant.' This is not so, unless it be true that a man who contracts with a mason to build a house employs the servant of the man who burns the lime. Mr Justice Rooke said 'The person, from whom the whole authority is originally derived, is the person who ought to be answerable, and great inconvenience would follow if it were otherwise.' It cannot be meant that one who builds a house is to be responsible for the negligence of every man and his servants who undertakes to furnish materials for the same. Such a rule would render him liable for the most remote and inconsequential damages. But the act complained of did not result from the authority of the defendant. The authority under which the servant of the lime-burner acted, was that of his master. And neither the lime-burner nor his servant was acting under the authority of the defendant, or subject to his control. The defendant might, with the same reason, have been held liable for the carelessness of the servant who burnt the lime, and of the servant of the man who furnished the coals to burn the lime. § Was the doctrine of the case of *Bush v. Steinhilber* been affirmed in England, or has it been overruled and its authority impaired? The plaintiff cites the case of *Sly v. Edgley*, at *nisi prius*, 6 Esp. R. 6. The defendant, with others, then owning several houses, the kitchens of which were subject to be overflowed, employed a bricklayer to sink a large sewer in the street. The bricklayer opened the sewer and left it open, and the plaintiff fell in. It was contended that the bricklayer was not the servant of the defendant. He was employed to do a certain act, and the mode of doing it, which had caused the injury, was certainly his own. Lord Ellenborough is reported as saying 'It is the rule of *respondet superior*, what the bricklayer did, was by the defendant's direction.' It does not appear how the bricklayer was employed. If not by independent contract, the case stands very well on the relation of master and servant. A case at *nisi prius*, so imperfectly reported can have but little weight. Another case at *nisi prius* was that of *Matthews v. West London Waterworks*, 3 Campb. 403, in which the defendants, contracting with pipe-layers to lay down pipes for the conveyance of water through the streets of the city, were held liable for the negligence of workmen employed by the pipe-layers. The case is very briefly stated, and no reasons, given by Lord Ellenborough for his opinion, reported. It may stand on the ground that the defendants, having a public duty to discharge, as well as right given, could not delegate this trust, so as to exempt themselves from responsibility. This case is alluded to in *Overton v. Freeman*, 11 C. B. 872, hereafter to be examined, where Maule, J., makes the following remarks concerning it 'That is but a *nisi prius* case; the report is short and unsatisfactory, and the particular circumstances are not detailed.' In *Harris v. Baker*, 4 M. & S. 27, and in *Hall v. Smith*, 9 Bing. 156, it was held that trustees or commissioners, intrusted with

vants, may also arise, although the act is not done, or the wrong is not committed, within the scope of the ordinary business of

the conduct of public works, were not liable for injuries occasioned by the negligence of the workmen employed under their authority. These cases stand upon the ground that an action cannot be maintained against a man, acting gratuitously for the public, for the consequences of acts which he is authorized to do, and which on his part are done with due care and attention. They give no sanction whatever to the doctrine of *Bush v. Steinman*. In *Randleson v. Murray*, 8 Ad. & El. 109, a warehouse man in Liverpool employed a master porter to remove a barrel from his warehouse. Through the negligence of his men the tackle failed, and the barrel fell and injured the plaintiff. Held, that the warehouse-man was liable. The case is put distinctly on the relation of master and servant. Lord Denman said: 'Had the jury been asked whether the porters, whose negligence occasioned the accident, were the servants of the defendant, there can be no doubt they would have found in the affirmative.' The injury occurred also in the direct use of the defendant's estate. In *Burgess v. Gray*, 1 C. B. 578, the defendant, owning and occupying premises adjoining the highway, employed one Palmer to make a drain from his land to the common sewer. In doing the work, the man employed by Palmer placed gravel on the highway, in consequence of which the plaintiff, in driving along the road, sustained a personal injury. There was evidence that, upon the defendant's attention being called to the gravel, he promised to remove it. The matter left to the jury was whether the defendant wrongfully put, or caused to be put, the gravel on the highway. 'I think,' says Tindal, C. J. 'there was evidence to leave to the jury in support of that charge. It, indeed, this had been the simple case of a contract entered into between Gray and Palmer, that the latter should make the drain and remove the earth and rubbish, and there had been no personal superintendence or interference on the part of the former, I should have said it fell within the principle contended for by my brother Byles, and that the damage should be made good by the contractor, and not by the individual for whom the work was done.' After adverting to the evidence that the soil was placed upon the road with the defendant's consent, if not by his express direction, he says: 'I therefore think the case is taken out of the rule in *Bush v. Steinman*, which is supposed to be inconsistent with the later authorities.' Coltman, J., said: 'I think there was evidence enough to satisfy the jury that the entire control of the work had not been abandoned to Palmer.' Creswell, J., said: 'No precise contract for the work was proved; nor was it shown that Palmer was employed to do the work personally, the mode of doing it being left to his judgment and discretion. I think there was abundant evidence to show that the defendant at least sanctioned the placing of the nuisance on the road.' Erie, J., said: 'The work was done with the knowledge of the defendant, and under his superintendence, and for his benefit.' This well-considered case, it is plain, so far from affirming the rule in *Bush v. Steinman*, is carefully and anxiously taken out of it by the counsel and by the Court, with the strongest intimation by the latter, that, but for the difference, the action could not be main-

the principal, if it is done or committed by the previous command, or with the subsequent assent, adoption, or ratification of

tained. The latest case in England, referred to in the learned argument of the plaintiff's counsel, as affirming the doctrine of *Bush v. Steinman*, is *Sadler v. Henlock*, in the Queen's Bench, (1855,) 4 El. & Bl. 570. The defendant, with the consent of the owner of the soil and the surveyor of the district, employed one Pearson, a laborer, but skilled in the construction of drains, to cleanse a drain running from the defendant's garden under the public road, and paid five shillings for the job. Held, that the defendant was liable for an injury occasioned to the plaintiff by reason of the negligent manner in which Pearson had left the soil of the road over the drain. The case is put by all the judges distinctly on the relation of master and servant. And Crompton, J., said: 'The test here is, whether the defendant retained the power of controlling the work. No distinction can be drawn from the circumstance of the man being employed at so much a day or by the job. I think that here the relation was that of master and servant, not of contractor and contractee. It is only on the ground of a contractor not being a servant that I can understand the authorities.' The case of *Bush v. Steinman* is not referred to by either of the justices, but the distinction of servant and contractor runs through the whole case—a distinction which is wholly inconsistent with the doctrine of *Bush v. Steinman*. In *Laugher v. Pointer*, 5 B. & C. 517, and 8 D. & R. 556, (1826,) where the owner of a carriage hired of a stable-keeper a pair of horses to draw it for a day, and the owner of the horses provided a driver, through whose negligent driving an injury was done to the horse of a third person, it was held by Lord Tenterden, C. J., and Littledale, J., that the owner of the carriage was not liable for such injury; Bayley and Holroyd, Justices, dissenting. This case is, in substance, the one put by Mr. Justice Heath, in illustration and support of the judgment in *Bush v. Steinman*. In the opinions of Lord Tenterden and of Littledale, J., the doctrines of *Bush v. Steinman*, in their application to personal property, are examined, and their soundness questioned. In *Quarman v. Burnett*, 6 M. & W. 499, (1840,) the same question arose in the Exchequer as in *Laugher v. Pointer* in the King's Bench, and the opinions of Lord Tenterden and Littledale, J., were affirmed, in a careful opinion pronounced by Baron Parke. In the course of it, he says: 'Upon the principle that *qui facit per alium facit per se*, the master is responsible for the acts of his servant; and that person is undoubtedly liable who stood in the relation of master to the wrongdoer—he who had selected him as his servant, from the knowledge of or belief in his skill and care, and who could remove him for misconduct, and whose orders he was bound to receive and obey; and whether such servant has been appointed by the master directly, or immediately through the intervention of an agent authorized by him to appoint servants for him, can make no difference. But the liability, by virtue of the principle of relation of master and servant, must cease where the relation itself ceases to exist.' These cases, however, do not overrule *Bush v. Steinman*, as to the liability of owners of real estate. The case of *Milligan v. Wedge*, 12 Ad. & El. 787, and 4 P. & Dav. 714, (1840,) is also in relation to the use of personal

the principal. Thus, if the principal should direct his agent to commit a trespass, or to make a conversion of the property of a

property, and rests upon the rule settled in *Quarman v. Burnett*. But in this case Lord Denman suggests a doubt whether the distinction as to the law in cases of fixed and movable property can be relied on. The case of *Rapson v. Cubitt*, 9 M. & W. 710, (1842,) was this: The defendant, a builder, employed by the committee of a club to make certain alterations at the club-house, employed a gas-fitter, by a subcontract, to do that part of the work. In the course of doing it, by the negligence of the gas-fitter, the gas exploded and injured the plaintiff. Held, that the defendant was not liable. The reasons upon which this decision is based do not well consist with the rule in *Bush v. Steinman*. The case of *Allen v. Hayward*, 7 Ad. & El. N. R. 960, (1845,) is still more directly adverse. But we pass from these to cases directly in point. In the cases of *Reddie and Hobbit v. London and Northwestern Railway*, 4 Exch. 244, 251, (1849,) the defendants, empowered by act of parliament to construct a railway, contracted under seal with certain persons to make a portion of the line, and, by the contract, reserved to themselves the power of dismissing any of the contractors' workmen for incompetence. The workmen, in constructing a bridge over a public highway, negligently caused the death of a person passing beneath, along the highway, by allowing a stone to fall upon him. In an action against the company, it was held, that they were not liable, the terms of the contract making no difference. In the judgment of the Court, given by Baron Rolfe, (now Lord Chancellor Cranworth,) alluding to the supposed distinction as to real property, the Court say: 'On full consideration, we have come to the conclusion that there is no such distinction, unless, perhaps, in cases where the act complained of is such as to amount to a nuisance; and, in fact, that, according to the modern decisions, *Bush v. Steinman* must be taken not to be law, or, at all events, that it cannot be supported on the ground on which the judgment of the Court proceeded.' Without sanctioning this doctrine, as it affects a public trust, it is very plain that it directly overrules the doctrine of *Bush v. Steinman*. The case of *Knight v. Fox*, 5 Exch. 721, (1850,) is, if possible, a stronger case in the same direction — a decision which it is plain could not have been made if the doctrines of *Bush v. Steinman* were the law of Westminster Hall. There are three cases remaining. In *Overton v. Freeman*, 11 C. B. 867, (1851.) A contracted to pave a district, and B entered into a subcontract with him to pave a particular street. A applied the stones, and his carts were used to carry them. B's men, in the course of the work, negligently left a heap of stones in the street. The plaintiff fell over them and broke his leg. It was held, that A was not liable, even though the act complained of amounted to a public nuisance. And Maule, J., said, that the case of *Bush v. Steinman* 'has been considered as having laid down the law erroneously.'

"In *Peachey v. Rowland*, 13 C. B. 82, (1853.) the defendants contracted with A to fill in the earth over a drain which was being made for them across a portion of the highway from their house to the common sewer. A, after having filled it in, left the earth so heaped above the level of the highway as to consti-

third person, or he should subsequently ratify or adopt the act, when done for his own use or benefit, he will be liable, as an

tute a public nuisance, where by the plaintiff, in driving along the road, sustained an injury. The case had this other feature. A few days before the accident, and before the work was finished, one of the defendants had seen the earth so heaped over a portion of the drain, but beyond this there was no evidence that either defendant had interfered with or exercised any control over the work. It was held, there was no evidence to go to the jury of the defendants' liability. *Bush v. Steinman* appears not to have been cited by counsel or alluded to by the Court. The still more recent case of *Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Consumers' Co.* 2 El. & Bl. 767, (1853,) cited by the counsel for the plaintiff, only determined that a party employing another to do an act unlawful in itself will be liable for an injury such act may occasion—very familiar and well-settled law. *Bush v. Steinman* is no longer law in England. If ever a case can be said to have been overruled, indirectly and directly by reasoning and by authority this has been. No one can have examined the case without feeling the difficulty of that clear-headed Judge, Chief Justice Eyre, of knowing on what ground its decision was put. It could not stand on the relation of master and servant. That relation did not exist. It could not stand upon the ground of the defendant having created or suffered a nuisance upon his own land to the injury of his neighbor's property. The line was on the highway. There is no rule to include it but the indefinitely broad and loose one that a person shall be answerable for any injury which arises in carrying into execution that which he has employed another to do—a rule which ought to have been and was expressly repudiated. The case of *Leslie v. Pounds*, 4 Taunt. 619, not cited in the argument, has some resemblance to the cases before referred to. This was an action against the landlord of a house leased, who, under contract with the tenant who was bound to repair, employed workmen to repair the house, and superintended the work. Being remonstrated with by the commissioners of pavements as to the dangerous state of the cellar, he promised to take care of it, and had put up some boards temporarily as a protection to the public. They proved insufficient, and the plaintiff falling through, the landlord was held liable. The case was decided on the ground that the landlord was making the repairs, and that the workmen were employed by him, and were his servants. The suggestion is made that, whatever may be the result of the later cases in England, the doctrine of *Bush v. Steinman* has been affirmed in this country. The cases in this Court we have already examined. The case of *Bailey v. Mayor, &c. of New York*, 3 Hill, 581, and 2 Denio, 433, was an action brought against the corporation of New York, for the negligent and unskilful construction of the dam for the waterworks at Croton River, by the destruction of which, injury was occasioned to the mills of the plaintiff. The city was held responsible. This case rests well upon the ground that where persons are invested by law with authority to execute a work involving ordinarily the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and always affecting rights of third persons, they are to be liable for the faithful execution of the power, and cannot escape responsibility by delegating to others the power with

original trespasser or wrongdoer.¹ [So, if the principal directs his servant to do some act, as to "go and get" a neighbor's horse,

which they have been intrusted. *Blake v. Ferris*, 1 Seld. 48, seems to conflict with *Bailey v. Mayor, &c. of New York*. Certain persons were permitted to construct a public sewer at their own expense; they employed another person to do it at an agreed price for the whole work; the plaintiffs received an injury from the negligent manner in which the sewer was left at night. It was held, that the persons who were authorized to make the sewer were not responsible for the negligence of the servants of the contractor. This case utterly rejects the rule of *Bush v. Steinman*. The case of *Stevens v. Armstrong*, 2 Seld. 435, was this. A bought a heavy article of B, and sent a porter to get it; by permission of A, the porter used his tackle and fall; through negligence, the porter suffered the article to drop, by which C was injured. It was held, that the porter acted as the servant of B, and that A was not answerable. Yet this was an injury done on A's estate, by his permission, and in the use of his property. This case also rejects the rule of *Bush v. Steinman*. In *Lesh v. Wabash Navigation Co.* 14 Ill. 85, where a corporation was authorized to take materials to construct public works, and contracted with others to do the work and find the materials, and the contractors nevertheless took the materials under the authority granted to the corporation, the corporation were held liable therefor. If the Court could find that the materials were taken under the authority of the corporation, the case will stand perfectly well under the rule of *Lowell v. Boston & Lowell Railroad*, and *Bailey v. Mayor, &c. of New York*. The cases of *Willard v. Newbury*, 22 Verm. 458, and *Batty v. Duxbury*, 21 Verm. 155, rest on the same principles. In the case of *Wiswall v. Brinson*, 10 Ired. 554, the Court held an owner of real estate responsible for the negligence of the servants of a carpenter with whom the defendant had contracted, for a stipulated price, to remove a barn on to his premises. This case (in which, however, there was a divided judgment, Rufin, C. J., dissenting, in a very able opinion,) certainly sustains the doctrine of *Bush v. Steinman*. *De Forrest v. Wright*, 2 Mich. 366, not cited, is in direct conflict with the rule of *Bush v. Steinman*. A public, licensed drayman was employed to haul a quantity of salt from a warehouse, and deliver it at the store of the employer, at so much a barrel. While in the act of delivering it, one of the barrels, through the carelessness of the drayman, rolled against and injured a person on the sidewalk. It was held, that the employer was not liable for the injury, the drayman exercising a distinct and independent employment, and not being under the immediate control and direction or supervision of the

¹ Ante, §§ 244, 312, 313; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 305-307; Com. Dig. *Trespass*, C. 1; *Bates v. Pilling*, 6 Barn. & Cressw. 38; Story on Bailm. §§ 400, 402-404; Co. Litt. 207 a. Lord Coke, in 4 Inst. 317, says, that, by "the common law, he that receiveth a trespasser and agreeth to a trespass after it is done, is no trespasser, unless the trespass was done to his use or for his benefit, and then, his agreement subsequent amounteth to a commandment; for, in that case, *Omnia, ratihabito retrotrahitur et mandato æquiparatur.*"

expecting that the servant will obtain the owner's permission, but the servant, misunderstanding the direction, takes him without leave, the master is liable for any injury to the horse, while used by the servant in his master's business.¹ So, where the master directs his servant to cut timber on his land in a designated direction, and the servant, not knowing where the lines were, cut on the land of an adjoining owner, the master was held liable.²] So, although the relation of master and servant should not exist in a particular case; yet a party may, by his

employer. This is a well-considered case, rejecting the rule of *Bush v. Steinman*, and sanctioning the result to which we have been brought in the case at bar. We have thus, at the risk of tediousness, examined the case at bar as one of authority and precedent. The clear weight and preponderance of the authorities at common law is against the rule given to the jury. The rule of the civil law seems to have limited the liability to him who stood in the relation of *paterfamilias* to the person doing the injury. Inst. lib. 4, tit. 5, §§ 1, 2; 1 Domit lib. 2, tit. 8, sec. 1; Dig. lib. 9, tit. 2, § 1. Viewing this as a question, not of authority, but to be determined by the application to these facts of settled principles of law, upon what principle can the defendant be held responsible for this injury? He did not himself do the act which caused the injury to the plaintiff. It was not done by one acting by his command or request. It was not done by one whom he had the right to command, over whose conduct he had the efficient control, whose operations he might direct, whose negligence he might restrain. It was not an act done for the benefit of the defendant, and from the doing of which an implied obligation for compensation would arise. It was not an act done in the occupation of land by the defendant, or upon land to which, upon the facts, he had any title. To say that a man shall be liable for injuries resulting from acts done near to his land, is to establish a rule as uncertain and indefinite as it is manifestly unjust. It is to make him liable for that which he cannot forbid, prevent, or remove. The case cannot stand on the relation of master and servant. It cannot stand upon the ground of nuisance erected by the owner of land, or by his license, to the injury of another. It cannot stand upon the ground of an act done in the execution of a work under the public authority, as the construction of a railroad or canal, and from the responsibility for the careful and just execution of which public policy will not permit the corporation to escape by delegating their power to others. It can only stand, where *Bush v. Steinman*, when carefully examined, stands, upon the general proposition, that a "person shall be answerable for any injury which arises in carrying into execution that which he has employed another to do—to adopt which would be to ignore all limitations of legal responsibility." See, farther, *Pawlet v. Rutland Railroad*, 28 Verm. 297.

Moir v. Hopkins, 16 Ill. 313. And see *May v. Bliss*, 22 Verm. 477; *Peller v. ...*, 18 Ill. 283.

... v. Hazen, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 20.

own conduct, make himself responsible for the neglect or improper act of the servant. Thus, although the hirer of job-horses and servants will not ordinarily be liable for the negligent acts of the servants, since the relation of master and servant is now held not to exist between them; yet the hirer may become so responsible by his own conduct, by taking the actual management of the horses, or ordering the servant to drive in a particular manner, which occasions the damage complained of, or by ordering his absence at the particular moment, when the damage occurs.¹

§ 456. But, although the principal is thus liable for the torts and negligences of his agent; yet we are to understand the doctrine with its just limitations, that the tort or negligence occurs in the course of the agency. For the principal is not liable for the torts or negligences of his agent in any matters beyond the scope of the agency, unless he has expressly authorized them to be done, or he has subsequently adopted them for his own use or benefit.² Hence it is, that the principal is never liable for the unauthorized, the wilful, or the malicious, act or trespass of his agent.³ Thus, if a servant, while driving the carriage of his master, should wilfully or maliciously run against or upset another carriage, or run down and injure a person in the road, or should jump from his box, and beat a person; in all these cases, he, and not his master, would be liable for this wanton wrong and mischief.⁴ [So,

¹ Per Baron Parke, in delivering the opinion of the Court, in *Quarman v. Burnett*, 6 Mees. & Welsh. R. 499, 507. See *Laugher v. Pointer*, 5 Barn. & Cressw. 547; *Story on Bailm.* § 403 a.

² Ante, §§ 319, 454, 455, and note, *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 305-307; 4 Inst. 317; Mr. Holt's remarks, ante, 454, note; *Croft v. Alison*, 4 Barn. & Ald. 590; *Story on Bailm.* §§ 400, 402, 403; *Bac. Abridg. Master and Servant*, L.

³ *Harris v. Nicholas*, 5 Munford, 483; *Brown v. Purman*, 2 Harris & Gill, 316; *Puryear v. Thompson*, 5 Humphreys, 397; *Kerns v. Piper*, 4 Watts, 222; *Richmond S. Co. v. Vanderbilt*, 1 Hill, 480; *Weed v. Panama Railroad*, 3 Smith, (N. Y.) 367.

⁴ *McManus v. Crickett*, 1 East, R. 106; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 69, 70, (2d edit.); *Id.* B. 1, ch. 5, § 3, p. 127-130, (3d edit. 1843); *Croft v. Alison*, 4 Barn. & Ald. 590; *Bacon's Abridgment, Master and Servant*, L. The judgment of Lord Kenyon, in *McManus v. Crickett*, 1 East, R. 106, may be considered as the leading judgment on this subject, and states the distinctions with fulness and accuracy. I have, therefore, cited it at large. "This, (said his lordship,) is an action of trespass, in which the declaration charges, that the defendant with force and arms, drove a certain chariot against a chaise, in which the plaintiff was

if a man's carman, after finishing his work for the day, instead of putting up his horse and cart, as it was his duty to do, drives a

driving in the king's highway, by which the plaintiff was thrown from his chaise and greatly hurt. At the trial, it appeared in evidence, that one Brown, a servant of the defendant, wilfully drove the chariot against the plaintiff's chaise, but that the defendant was not himself present, nor did he in any manner direct or assent to the act of the servant; and the question is, if, for this wilful and designed act of the servant, an action of trespass lies against the defendant, his master? As this is a question of very general extent, and as cases were cited at the bar, where verdicts had been obtained against masters for the misconduct of their servants under similar circumstances, we were desirous of looking into the authorities on the subject, before we gave our opinion; and after an examination of all, that we could find, as to this point, we think, that this action cannot be maintained. It is a question of very general concern, and has been often canvassed; but I hope at last it will be at rest. It is said in Bro. Abr. tit. *Trespass*, pl. 435: 'If my servant, contrary to my will, chase my beasts into the soil of another, I shall not be punished.' And in 2 Roll. Abr. 538: 'If my servant, without my notice, put my beasts into another's land, my servant is the trespasser, and not I; because, by the voluntary putting of the beasts there, without my assent, he gains a special property for the time, and so to this purpose they are his beasts.' I have looked into the correspondent part in Vin. Abr., and as he has not produced any case contrary to this, I am satisfied with the authority of it. And in Noy's Maxims, ch. 44: 'If I command my servant to distrain, and he ride on the distress, he shall be punished, not I.' And it is laid down by Holt, C. J., in *Middleton v. Fowler*, Salk. 282, as a general position, 'that no master is chargeable with the acts of his servant, but when he acts in the execution of the authority given him.' Now, when a servant quits sight of the object for which he is employed, and, without having in view his master's orders, pursues that which his own malice suggests, he no longer acts in pursuance of the authority given him, and, according to the doctrine of Lord Holt, his master will not be answerable for such act.* Such, upon the evidence, was the present case; and the technical reason, in 2 Roll. Abr. with respect to the sheep, applies here; and it may be said, that the servant, by wilfully driving the chariot against the plaintiff's chaise, without his master's assent, gained a special property for the time, and so to that purpose the chariot was the servant's. This doctrine does not at all militate with the cases, in which a master has been holden liable for the mischief arising from the negligence or unskilfulness of his servant, who had no purpose but the execution of his master's orders. But the form of those actions proves, that this action of trespass cannot be maintained; for, if it can be supported, it must be upon the ground, that, in trespass, all are principals. But the form of those actions shows, that, where the servant is in point of law a trespasser, the master is not chargeable as such, though liable to make a compensation for the damage consequential from his employing of an unskilful or negligent servant. The act of the master is the employment of the servant; but from that no immediate prejudice arises to those who may suffer from some subsequent act of the servant.

fellow-servant to his home, without his master's leave, and in returning runs over a traveller, the master is not responsible.¹

If this were otherwise, the plaintiffs, in the cases mentioned in 1 Lord Raym. 739, (one, where the servants of a carman, through negligence, ran over a boy in the streets and maimed him; and the other, where the servants of A, with his cart, ran against the cart of B, and overturned it, by which a pipe of wine was spilled,) must have been nonsuited from their mistaking the proper form of action, in bringing an action upon the case, instead of an action of trespass; for there is no doubt of the servants in those cases being liable as trespassers; even though they intended no mischief; for which, if it were necessary, *Weaver v. Ward*, in Hobart, 134, and *Dickenson v. Watson*, in Sir Thomas Jones, 205, are authorities. But it must not be inferred from this, that in all cases, where an action is brought against the servant for improperly conducting his master's carriage, by which mischief happens to another, the action must be trespass. *Michael v. Allestree*, in 2 Levinz, 172, where an action on the case was brought against a man and his servant, for breaking a pair of horses in Lincoln's Inn Fields, where, being unmanageable, they ran away with the carriage and hurt the plaintiff's wife, is an instance to show, that trespass on the case may be the proper form of action. And, upon a distinction between those cases, where the mischief immediately proceeds from something in which the defendant is himself active, and where it may arise from the neglect or other misconduct of the party, but not immediately, and which, perhaps, may amount only to a nonfeasance, we held, in *Ogle v. Barnes*, 8 Term Rep. 158, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The case of *Savignac and Roome*, 6 Term Rep. 125, which was much pressed, as supporting this action, came before the Court on a motion in arrest of judgment; and the only question decided by the Court was, that the plaintiff could not have judgment, as it appeared that he had brought an action on the case for that which in law was a trespass; for the declaration there stated, that the defendant, by his servant, wilfully drove his coach against the plaintiff's chaise. *Day v. Edwards*, 5 Term Rep. 648, was also mentioned, which was an action on the case, in which the declaration charged the defendant personally with furiously and negligently driving his cart; that, by, and through the furious, negligent, and improper conduct of the defendant, the said cart was driven and struck against the plaintiff's carriage; and, on demurrer, the Court were of opinion, that the fact complained of was a trespass. And, in the last case that was mentioned, of *Brucker v. Fromont*, 6 Term Rep. 659, the only point agitated was, whether evidence of the defendant's servant having negligently managed a cart supported the declaration, which imputed that negligence to the defendant; and the Court with reluctance held, that it did, on the authority of a precedent in Lord Raymond's Reports, 264, of *Tuberville and Stamp*. In none of these cases, was the point now in question, decided; and those determinations do not contradict the opinion we now entertain, which is, that the plaintiff cannot recover, and that a nonsuit must be entered."

¹ [*Mitchell v. Crasweller*, 13 C. B. 237; 16 Eng. Law and Eq. R. 448, and see Bennett's note. The true principle was well and clearly laid down in the

So, where a servant kindled a fire on his master's land, and by his direction, but afterwards during his master's absence, and without his orders, carried some fire to another field, to kindle a fire there, and by so doing burnt the plaintiff's grass, the master was held not liable.¹ So, the master of a ship is not liable for a wilful act of injury, done to another ship by his crew, although he would be for such an injury, done by their negligence.² [And where the drivers of an omnibus, contrary to the orders of the owners, repeatedly surrounded the omnibus of another line, and thus prevented passengers from entering, their principals were held not liable, although in one sense the acts were done for their benefit.³ So, where a person employed by a railway

late case of *Church v. Mansfield*, 20 Connecticut, 284, (1850). In that case, it was said: "In order to render a master liable for a trespass committed by his servant, it is necessary to show, that the acts constituting such trespass were done while the servant was acting under the authority of the master. If the master was ignorant of such acts, no presumption of his having authorized them will arise from their having been done for his benefit, and from his silence regarding them. Therefore where A employed B to make coal on A's land, and transport it with A's teams and carts, to A's furnace, for his benefit; and C brought trespass against A, for B's unnecessarily making roads on C's land, and passing thereon, with teams and carts, to A's furnace, on the trial, there was no evidence that A authorized the acts complained of, or knew that B had committed, or intended to commit, them, unless this might be inferred from the facts above stated; and the Court instructed the jury, that if B had done these acts, under these circumstances, the presumption was, that they were done by the authority and under the direction of A, it was held, that this was a misdirection, for which a new trial should be granted."

¹ [*Wilson v. Peverly*, 2 N. H. R. 548. But if the injury happens as a consequence resulting from acts done by the master's commands, he cannot shield himself from responsibility by showing that his instructions were not strictly pursued by his servant in doing the act. Thus, in *Armstrong v. Cooley*, 5 Gilman, 509, (1849,) where the plaintiff's grain and hay were destroyed, by reason of a fire on the prairie, set by a servant of the defendant by his directions, he was not permitted to avoid responsibility, by showing that he directed the fire to be set only when the wind was in a particular direction, but that it was in fact set when the wind was in a different direction. See *Simons v. Monier*, 29 Barbour, 419.]

² *Bowcher v. Noidstrom*, 1 Taunt. R. 568. See, as to how far ship-owners are liable in cases of pilots, *Lucy v. Ingram*, 6 Mees. & Welsb. 302; *The Maria*, 1 Rob. New R. 95; *Martin v. Temperley*, 4 Q. B. R. 298; *The (English) Jurist*, Feb. 25, 1843, No. 320, p. 150; *The Agricola*, Id. p. 157; Post, § 656 a, and note.

³ *Green v. Macnamara*, 1 Law Times R. (N. S.) 9; 8 J. Scott, (N. S.) 980. This case is not in the English edition.

company, wrongfully arrests a traveller for the non-payment of his passage-money, but, without any instructions from the company so to do, and without any authority in the company to order such arrest, or any ratification by them,¹ the company are not liable.² But where an omnibus conductor dragged a drunken passenger out of the omnibus with *unnecessary* violence, and threw him down in the middle of the street, and another vehicle passing at the same moment injured him, without any fault in the driver of the latter vehicle, the proprietor of the omnibus was held liable.^{3]}

§ 456 a. From what has been already stated, the master of a ship, and the owner also, is liable for any injury, done by the negligence of the crew employed in the ship.⁴ The same doctrine will apply to the case of a pilot, employed by the master or owner, by whose negligence any injury happens to a third person or his property; as, for example, by a collision with another ship, occasioned by his negligence. And it will make no difference in the case, that the pilot, if any is employed, is required to be a licensed pilot: provided the master is at liberty to take a pilot, or not, at his pleasure; for, in such a case, the master acts voluntarily, although he is necessarily required to select from a particular class.⁵ On the other hand, if it is compulsive upon the master to take a pilot, and, *a fortiori*, if he is bound to do so under a penalty, then, and in such case, neither he, nor the owner, will be liable for injuries occasioned by the negligence of the pilot;⁶ for, in such a case, the pilot cannot be

¹ *Eastern Counties Railway Co. v. Brown*, 2 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 406.

² *Roe v. The Birkenhead, &c. Railway Co.* 7 Eng. Law and Eq. R. 546; 7 Exch. R. 36.

³ [*Seymour v. Greenwood*, Court of Exchequer, 24 Boston Law Rep. 125.] Pollock, C. B., said: "The state of the law upon this subject has been much expanded since the case of *Scott v. Shepherd*, 2 Bl. 892, and *M'Manus v. Crickett*, 1 East, 106. Any one who reads those cases cannot fail to see that the principle was not then so considered as to work out all the legal considerations attending it."]

⁴ Ante, § 315-317, 453.

⁵ *The Neptune* 2d, 1 Dodson, Adm. R. 467; *The Maria*, 1 Rob. New Adm. R. 95; *Att'y-Gen'l v. Case*, 3 Price, R. 302; *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 2, ch. 7, §§ 8, 9, and cases there cited, (5th edit. by Serg. Shee); *Id.* Addenda, p. 599; *Lucey v. Ingram*, 6 Mees. & Welsb. 302.

⁶ *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 2, ch. 7, § 8 (6th edit. by Shee, 1840); *Att'y-Gen'l v.*

deemed properly the servant of the master or the owner, but is forced upon them; and the maxim, *Qui facit per alium facit per se*, does not apply.¹ In short, the rule of the common law seems to be, that, wherever a man is absolutely compellable by law to employ a particular individual in a given matter, the law, which compels him to employ that individual, takes away his responsibility arising from any act of that individual.² But, if he is only compellable to select from a class of privileged persons, there he will be responsible for the acts of the persons whom he selects and employs. Therefore it has been held, that, where a barge-owner in London employed persons as watermen to navigate on the Thames, none being allowed by law to act as such, except freemen of the city, or apprentices of freemen or of their widows; there, if he selects or employs any watermen, they are to be deemed his servants, and he is responsible for their negligence, although he must select from the class, if he employs any in the business; and, even if he is not at liberty to employ his own servants to navigate the river and carry his own goods, unless they are freemen, or apprentices of freemen or of the widows, belonging to their class.³ The distinction between this case and the case of the pilot is certainly a very nice one; but it turns apparently upon this ground, that, in the case of the pilot, the master is bound to take one, and, in the other case, the barge-owner is only restricted, as to the class of persons, whom he shall employ, not being compellable to employ any. Unless the distinction were allowed to prevail, the owner or master of a British ship would not be responsible for the negligence of the crew, since they are compellable to select the crew from a partic-

Case, 3 Price, R. 302, *Cairuthers v Sidebottom*, 4 Maule & Selw. 77; *The Maria*, 1 Rob. New Adm R 95; *Lucey v Ingram*, 6 Mees. & Welsb. 302; *The Agricola*, *The (English) Jurist*, Feb 25, 1843, No. 320, p. 157; *Smith v Condry*, 1 Howard's Sup Court R. 28, S. C. 17 Peters, R. 20; *The Protector*, 1 W. Robin. New Adm. R 45, *Bennet v Moira*, 7 Taunt. R. 258; *McIntosh v Slade*, 6 Barn. & Cressw. 657, *The Ship Duke of Sussex*, 3 W. Robin. New Adm R 270, 272.

* Ibid.

* Ibid.

* *Martin v Temperley*, 4 Q. B. Rep. 298; *The (English) Jurist*, Feb. 25, 1842, No. 320, p. 150. But see *The Agricola*, Id. p. 157, 158; *Milligan v Wedge*, 12 *Engl. & Ell. R.* 737.

ular class, that is, three-fourths at least of the crew must be British seamen.¹

¹ *Ibid.* It is observable, that the cases above cited generally turn upon the distinction, whether the master or employer is absolutely compellable or not to take a pilot, or to employ a particular person (not merely one of a class, from which he may select,) or not. The British Pilot Acts generally, but not universally, make it compulsive, under a penalty, upon the master of a ship to take a pilot, and in such cases exempt the master and owner from responsibility for the negligence of the pilot. But, in some cases, the master has an option to employ a pilot or not; and, in case he elects not to employ one, he is by law required to pay the pilotage fee, or a part thereof, to any pilot who offers himself, and whose services are demanded. In these latter cases, the question has arisen, whether the master and owners are responsible for the negligence of the pilot, if one is taken by the election of the master. The present learned Judge of the High Court of Admiralty (Dr. Lushington), has held, that there is no difference in principle, whether the master or owner is compellable, under a penalty, to take a pilot, and whether he has an election to take or not, but if he declines to take one, then he is to pay pilotage, and he deems the pilotage so paid, as in the nature of a penalty. But there seems great reason to doubt the correctness of this doctrine. In the first place, the penalty is properly and strictly designed, as a punishment for an offence; in neglecting or refusing to comply with a positive duty imposed by law, and the penalty is in no just sense to be treated as a commutation for liberty to commit the offence, and to omit the duty. In the other case no such positive duty exists, and it is left to the choice of the master to take a pilot or not, according to his own discretion. The taking of the pilot is, then, a voluntary act, and not a compulsive act. In the next place, the compensation to be paid to the pilot, or the pilotage allowed him, in case of the master's declining to employ him, is not a penalty, or in the nature of a penalty, to compel the party to take a pilot, but is more properly to be treated as a remuneration of the pilot for keeping himself at all times ready to perform the duty of a pilot, when required, and to encourage him to encounter the hazards and perils incident to such a service, and to secure adequate skill and ability for the safety and protection of vessels navigating the coasts and harbours of the country. It is, therefore, a compensation, *pro opera et labore*, founded in a sound public policy, to secure protection, and prompt assistance, and ready skill, to all persons who may require them in navigation, rather than a punishment for a dereliction of duty. See the ship *Duke of Sussex*, 3 W. Robins. New. Adm. Rep. 270, 272. In America, certainly, no such doctrine has ever been invoked; and the owners and masters of ships are held liable for the negligence of pilots, in cases where they are not compellable to take them; although, if not taken, half pilotage, or some other proportion of pilotage, is required to be paid to the pilot who offers. *Williamson v. Price*, 16 Martin, R. 399, *Yates v. Brown*, 8 Pick. R. 28. See also the opinion of Sir John Nicholl in *The Girolamo*, 3 Hagg. Adm. R. 169, 172. Indeed, in the case of *Williamson v. Price*, 16 Martin, R. 399, the Supreme Court of Louisiana went much further and seems to have held, that, even if the

§ 457. We have already had occasion, also, to notice another exception, or, more properly speaking, another limitation of the doctrine of the responsibility of principals for the malfeasances, and negligences, and torts, of their agents and servants, in the course of their employments, and that is in the case of public agents.¹ The latter are responsible for their own personal malfeasances and negligences only, and not for the malfeasances and negligences of the persons who are employed under them, if they are persons of reasonable skill and discretion, and the agents themselves have not directed or coöperated in the wrong.² This doctrine is founded partly upon considerations of public policy, and partly results from the fact, that these subordinates are often appointed by another independent authority, and are not controllable by, or immediately responsible to, the public agents.³

§ 458. The Roman law, in like manner, in many cases, made the principal liable for the torts and negligences of his agents and servants.⁴ It has been supposed, that the Roman law never was as extensive in its reach as our law; in other words, that it never did create a general liability of principals for the wrongs and negligences of their agents, but limited it to particular classes of cases; and that the liability of principals, so far as it

taking of a pilot on board was a compulsive duty, and not optional, still the owners were liable for the negligence of the pilot actually employed. See also *Bussy v. Donaldson*, 4 Dall. R. 206, which seems to have adopted the same doctrine. And this seems also to have been the opinion entertained by Lord Stowell, upon general principles; *The Neptune* 2d, 1 Dodson, Adm. R. 467; and by Sir John Nicholl in *The Girolamo*, 3 Hagg. R. 169. But see the able note of Mr. Curtis, on this subject, in his work on Merchant Seamen, pp. 195, 196, note. Even under the British Pilot Acts, in order to exempt the owner from responsibility, the collision, or other act, occasioning the damage, should be exclusively caused by the negligence, unskilfulness, or misconduct of the pilot alone; for, if it be in part caused by the unskilfulness, misconduct, or negligence of the master or mariners, the owner will still remain liable therefor. *The Protector*, 1 Rob. Adm. R. 48; *The Diana*, 1 W. Rob. New Adm. R. 181; *Smith v. Cowdry*, 17 Peters, R. 20, S. C. 1 Howard's Sup. Ct. R. 28.

¹ Ante, § 320-322.

² Ante, § 320-322, 455. See Lord Abinger's remarks in *Winterbottom v. Wright*, 20 Mees. & Welsb. 109, 114, 115.

³ Ante, §§ 321, 322 and notes.

⁴ Ante, § 318.

is recognized in that law, is mainly dependent upon the Prætor's edict, and was not worked out of the original materials of the Roman jurisprudence. Whether this supposition be correct or not, it is clear, that, in certain classes of cases, the Prætor, by his edict, either introduced a new and more rigid liability, or he gave to that, which previously existed, an additional force, and in some respects, a more onerous obligation. Thus, masters and employers of ships, innkeepers, and stable-keepers, were made responsible for the safety and due delivery of the goods committed to their charge; and, of course, if the loss or damage were occasioned by the negligences or wrongs of their servants, and not by themselves, their responsibility was not varied.¹ *Ait Prætor;*

¹ Ante, § 318: Story on Bailm. §§ 164, 565: Dig. Lib. 1, tit. 9, l. 1, § 3; Heinecc. Pand. Lib. 4, tit. 8, § 546-548; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 1, tit. 9, n. 1, 2, 8; 1 Domat. B. 1, tit. 16, § 1, arts. 3, 5; Id. § 2, art. 2; Id. § 3, art. 1. Lord Stair, in his Institutes, (B. 1, tit. 13, § 3,) seems manifestly to have considered this edict, as introducing, for the first time, the liability of principals for the acts and defaults of their agents, and of making that liability more rigid, in many cases, upon the ground of public policy. His language is "In the civil law there is a deposition of a special nature, introduced by the edict. *navæ, caupones, stabularii*, 'quod cujusque saluum fore receptum, nisi restituerit, in eos iudicium dabo.' By this edict, positive law, for utility's sake, hath appointed, that the custody of the goods of passengers in ships, or strangers in inns, or in stables, shall be far extended beyond the nature of deposition, which obliges only for fraud, or supine negligence, them who have expressly contracted for their own fact. But this edict, for public utility's sake, extends it: first, to the restitution of the goods of passengers and voyagers, and reparation of any loss or injury done by the mariners, or servants of the inn or stable. Whereas, by the common law, before that edict, in this and such other cases, there was no such obligation; much less are persons now obliged for their hired servant's fact or fault, except facts wherein they are specially intrusted by them. But, because the theft and loss of goods is very ordinary in ships, inns, and stables, therefore this edict was introduced for the security of travellers. Secondly, the edict extends this obligation, even to the damage sustained by (the act of) other passengers or strangers in the ship, inn, or stable, for the which, the master of the ship, innkeeper, or keeper of the stable, could be no ways obliged but by virtue of this edict. Thirdly, they were made liable for the loss or theft of such things absolutely from which they were free by no diligence, but were not liable for accident or force; that is, sea-hazard must always be excepted." See also 1 Bell, Comm. § 398-402, 500, 505, (4th edit.); Id. p. 463-476 (5th edit.) See Story on Bailm. § 400-402, 458, 464-466. There are certainly passages in the Digest, which make principals responsible for the faults and negligences of their agents and servants, beyond those specially pointed out in the Prætor's edict. This responsibility seems, however, to have been limited to cases where the principal

*Nautæ, Caupones, Stabularii, quod cujusque saluum fore receperint, nisi restituent, in eos judicium dabo.*¹ The reason assigned is, that the rule is well founded in public policy and convenience, and is the only means to prevent losses by fraud or connivance.² *A fortiori*, if the act was done with the consent of the principal, he was liable. *Quamquam, si ipse alicui e nautis committit jussit, sine dubio debeat obligari.*³ The liability of the principal for the acts and negligences of the agents, as well as for his own, is fully proclaimed in the comments of the Roman law. Thus, for example, it is said, as to the owners or employers of ships; *Et sunt quidam in navibus, qui custodiæ gratiâ navibus præponuntur, ναυψύλακες, id est, navium custodes et dietarii. Si quis igitur ex his receperit, puto in exercitorem dandum actionem; quia is, qui eos hujusmodi officio præponit, committi eis permittit.*⁴ The same doctrine is also applied to innkeepers. *Caupo præstat factum eorum, qui in eâ cauponâ, ejus cauponæ exercendæ causâ, ibi sunt. Item eorum, qui habitandi causâ ibi sunt. Viatorum autem factum non præstat.*⁵ The same doctrine is also applied to stable-

was guilty of some negligence in employing negligent and improper agents and servants. Thus, in the Digest, the opinion of Pomponius is approved: "Videamus, an et servorum culpam, et quocunque induxerit, præstare conductor debeat? Et quatenus præstat? Utrum, ut servos noxiæ dedat, an vero suo nomine teneatur? Et adversus eos quos induxerit, utrum præstabit tantum actiones, an quasi ob propriam culpam tenebitur? Mihi ita placet, ut culpam etiam eorum, quos induxit, præstet suo nomine, etsi nihil convenit, si tamen culpam in inducendis admittit, quod tales habuerint, vel suos, vel hospites." Digest, Lib. 19, tit. 2, l. 11; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 19, tit. 2, n. 30, 31. See also Dig. Lib. 9, tit. 2, l. 29, §§ 9, 11, Pothier, Pand. Lib. 19, tit. 2, n. 31. See Story on Bailm. § 401; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 4, § 2, arts. 5, 6; Id. B. 2, tit. 8, § 1, art. 1-9; Id. § 4, art. 8. Again: Qui "columnam transportandam conduxit, si ea dum tollitur, aut portatur, aut reponitur, fracta sit, ita id periculum præstat, si qua ipsius, eorumque, quorum operâ uteretur, culpa acciderit. Culpa autem abest, si omnia facta sunt quæ diligentissimus quisque observaturus fuisset." Dig. Lib. 19, tit. 2, l. 25, § 7; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 19, tit. 2, n. 32.

¹ Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 9, l. 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 4, tit. 9, n. 1, 2; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 1, arts. 2, 4, 6; Id. § 2, art. 2; Id. § 3, art. 1-3; Heinecc. ad Pand. Lib. 4, tit. 8, § 546-548, 551; Ante, § 318.

² Ante, § 318, and note; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 1, art. 7.

³ Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 9, l. 1, § 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 4, tit. 9, n. 2; Ante, § 318, note (2); 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 1, art. 5.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 9, l. 1, § 3; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 4, tit. 9, n. 2; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 2, art. 1-4.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 5, l. 1, § 6; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 47, tit. 5, n. 3; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 1, arts. 3, 6.

keepers. *Caupones autem et stabularios æque eos accipiemus, qui cauponam vel stabulum exercent, institoresve eorum.*¹ *Eodem modo tenentur caupones et stabularii, quo exercentes negotium suum recipiunt. Cæterum, si extra negotium receperint, non tenebuntur.*² And the whole doctrine is summed up in another passage, where it treats of the liability of such principals for the frauds, deceits, and thefts of their agents or servants, without their knowledge. *Item exercitor navis, aut cauponæ, aut stabuli, de dolo aut furto, quod in navi, aut cauponâ, aut stabulo, factum erit, quasi ex maleficio teneri videtur, si modo ipsius nullum est maleficiû, sed alicujus eorum, quorum operâ navis aut cauponam aut stabulum exercet. Cum enim neque ex maleficio, neque ex contractu, sit adversus eum constituta hæc actio, et aliquatenus culpæ reus est, quod operâ malorum hominum utitur; ideo, quasi ex maleficio, teneri videtur.*³ Here we have the rule of the liability of owners and employers of ships and stable-keepers, and the reason for it. They are responsible for the tort and fraud of their agents and servants, although they are not parties to it, *quasi ex maleficio*, as if they themselves were wrongdoers, because they have made use of the services of such bad agents and servants in their employment.

§ 459. And heré, again, the like limitations to this liability were recognized in the Roman law, as exist in ours. The prin-

¹ Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 9, l. 1, § 5; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 4, tit. 9, n. 2, 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 1, art. 3.

² Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 9, l. 3, § 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 4, tit. 9, n. 3; Post, § 459.

³ Inst. Lib. 4, tit. 5, § 3; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 1, art. 7. Id. § 2, art. 1-4. The same rule is laid down in the Digest. "In eos, qui naves, cauponas, stabula exercebunt, si quid a quoquo eorum, quosve ibi habebunt, tortum factum esse dicetur, judicium datur; sive furtum ope, consilio exercitoris factum sit; sive eorum ejus, qui in eâ navi navigandi causâ esset. Navigandi autem causâ accipere debemus eos, qui adhibentur, ut navis naviget, hoc est. nautas." Dig. Lib. 47, tit. 5, Introd. and l. 1; Pothier in Pand. Lib. 47, tit. 5, n. 1, 3. "Quæcunque de furto diximus, eadem et de damno debent intelligi. Non enim dubitari oportet, quin is, qui saluum fore recinit, non solum a furto, sed etiam a damno recipere videatur." Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 1, l. 5, § 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 4, tit. 9, n. 3; Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 1, l. 1, § 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 1, n. 6; Heinecc. Pand. Ps. 1, Lib. 4, tit. 8, § 551-554; Story on Bailm. § 464-468; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 1, §§ 28, 29; Id. B. 3, tit. 2, § 43-45; 1 Bell, Comm. § 398-406, (4th edit.); Id. p. 465-476, (5th edit.); 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, Introd.; Story on Bailm. § 401.

cial was not liable for the torts or negligences of his agents or servants, except in cases within the scope of their employment. Thus, for example, the innkeeper was liable only for the torts or thefts, or damages of his servants, done or committed in his inn, or about the business thereof; and not for such torts or thefts committed in other places. *Eodem modo tenentur cauponæ et stabularii, quo exercentes negotium suum recipiunt. Caterum, si extra negotium receperint, non tenebantur.*¹ So, the owner or employer of a ship was not liable for the torts or thefts, or damages of the mariner, unless they were done or committed in the ship, or about the business thereof. *Debet exercitor omnium nautarum, suorum, sive liberi, sive servi, factum præstare. Nec immerito factum eorum præstat, cum ipse eos suo periculo adhibuerit. Sed non alias præstat, quam si in ipsâ nave damnum datum sit.*

• *Cæterum, si extra navem, hæc a nautis, non præstabit.*²

§ 460. Similar principles were applied in the Roman law to the ordinary agents employed in the common business of trade and commerce, called *Institores*; ³ and also to the cases of domestic servants and persons belonging to the family. *Prætor ait de his, qui dejecerint, vel effuderint; Unde in eum locum, quo vulgo iter fiet, vel in quo consistitur, dejectum vel effusum quid erit, quantum ex eâ re damnum datum facturum erit, in eum, qui ibi habitaverit, in duplum judicium dabo.*⁴ *Si servus, insciente domino, fecisse dicetur, in judicio adjuciam, aut noxam dedere.*⁵ These seem to be the most important cases, specially and positively provided for in the Roman law. That law does not seem to have recognized, to the full extent, the general maxim, *Respondeat superior*, inculcated by our law.⁶

¹ Dig. Lib. 4; tit. 9, l. 3, § 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 4, tit. 9, n. 3, Ante, § 458.

² Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 9, l. 7, Pothier, Pand. Lib. 47, tit. 5, n. 1; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 1, art. 7, Id. § 2, art. 1-4.

³ Ante, § 8; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 1; Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 5, § 1-9; Pothier on Oblig. n. 121, 453, by Evans; Id. in French edit. n. 121, 189.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 9, tit. 3, l. 1; Id. l. 27, § 11; 1 Black. Comm. 431; Inst. Lib. 4, tit. 3, § 1; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 46; Dig. Lib. 19, tit. 2, l. 11; 1 Domat, B. 2, tit. 6, § 1, art. 1-9.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 9, tit. 3, l. 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 9, tit. 3, n. 1; Inst. Lib. 4, tit. 5, § 1, 2.

⁶ See 1 Stair's Inst. B. 1, tit. 13, § 3; Ante, 454, note. Mr. Holt, in the note

§ 461. The modern nations of continental Europe have adopted the doctrine of the Roman law to its full extent, and some of them, at least, seem to have carried it further. Pothier lays down the rule in the following broad terms: "Not only is the person, who has committed the injury, or been guilty of the negligence, obliged to repair the damage, which it has occasioned; those who have any person under their authority, such as fathers, mothers, tutors, preceptors, are subject to this obligation, in respect of the acts of those who are under them, when committed in their presence, and generally when they could prevent such acts, and have not done so. But, if they could not prevent it, then they are not liable; *Nullum crimen patitur is, qui non prohibet, quum prohibere non potest* (l. 109, ff. de reg. jur.)¹ Even when the act is committed in their sight, and with their knowledge; *Culpa caret, qui scit, sed prohibere non potest* (l. 50, ff. d. tit.)² Masters are also answerable for the injury occasioned by the wrongs and negligence of their servants. They are even so, when they have no power to prevent them, provided such wrongs or injuries are committed in the exercise of the

already cited in § 454, note 1, says, that, "In the civil law the liability was narrowed to the person standing in the relation of a paterfamilias to the wrongdoer." It is also observable, that Mr. Le Blanc and Mr. Marshall, in arguing the case of *Bush v. Steinman*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 405, assert, that "The liability of the principal to answer for his agents is founded in the superintendence and control, which he is supposed to have over them, citing 1 Black. Comm. 431.) In the civil law, that liability was confined to the person standing in the relation of paterfamilias to the person doing the injury." For which they cite Inst. Lib. 4, tit. 5, § 1, 2d Dig. Lib. 9, tit. 3. These citations clearly prove, that the paterfamilias is liable for the wrongful acts and negligences of his domestics; but they do not prove, negatively, that other persons were not liable, as principals, in any other cases, for the wrongs and faults of their agents. The text shows, that, in many other cases, besides that of a paterfamilias, the principal was, in the civil law, liable for such wrongs and faults. The learned counsel seem to have misunderstood the true meaning of the text of Blackstone's Commentaries, which by no means insists upon any such limitations. Mr. Justice Heath, in the same case, seems to have entertained the notion, that the Roman law was, or might be, as limited as the learned counsel supposed. But he added, "Whatever may be the doctrine of the civil law, it is perfectly clear, that our law carries such liability much further." S. C. 1 Bos. & Pull. 409. See also Story on Bailm. § 464-469.

¹ Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 109.

² Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 50.

functions, in which the servants are employed by their masters, although in the master's absence. This has been established, to render masters careful in the choice of those whom they employ. With regard to their wrongs, or neglects, not committed in these functions, the masters are not responsible."¹ The doctrine of the Roman law seems to be followed with more scrupulous exactness in the laws of Spain² and of Scotland,³ where, in treating of the liability of principals for the acts of their agents, the specific enumerations of the Roman law are to be found followed out.

CHAPTER XVIII.

DISSOLUTION, OR DETERMINATION, OF AGENCY.

§ 462. WE come, in the next place, to the consideration of the manner, in which an agency may be dissolved or determined, and the effect thereof. And a dissolution of the agency may take place in two different ways: first, by the act of the principal or agent, and, secondly, by operation of law. The former takes place, wherever there is a revocation by the principal, or a renunciation by the agent. The latter may take place in various ways: first, by the termination of the agency by the mere efflux of time, or by the expiration of the period, or by the occurrence of the event, to which, and by which, it was originally limited; secondly, by the change of the state or condition of the principal, or of the agent; thirdly, by the death of either party; and, fourthly, by the natural cessation of the power, in consequence of the extinction of the subject-matter, or of the principal's power over it, or by the complete execution of the power.⁴

¹ Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, n 121, 453, (in the French edit n 121, 489.)

² Moreau & Carl Partidas, 5, tit. 8, l 26, p 743, Story on Bailm. § 465-466.

³ Black. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 43-46; 2 Bell, Comm. § 398-406, (4th edit.); Id. n. 473-475, (5th edit.); 1 Stair, Inst. B. 1, tit. 13, § 3.

⁴ See Pothier, de Mandat, n. 100, 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 643, (4th edit.)

§ 463. First. Let us consider the dissolution of an agency by the revocation of the principal. In general, the principal has a right to determine or revoke the authority given to his agent at his own mere pleasure; for, since the authority is conferred by his mere will, and is to be executed for his own benefit and his own purposes, the agent cannot insist upon acting, when the principal has withdrawn his confidence, and no longer desires his aid.¹ This is so plain a doctrine of common sense and common justice, that it requires no illustration or reasoning to support it. [And although the agent is appointed under seal, it has been *held* that his authority may be revoked by parol.²] At what time the revocation will take effect, and the mode by which it is accomplished, will presently come under our consideration.³

§ 464. The Civil Law contained an equally broad doctrine. *Si mandavero erigendam pecuniam, deinde voluntatem mutavero, an sit mandati actio vel mihi, vel hæredi meo? Et ait Marcellus; Cessare mandati actionem, quia extinctum est mandatum, finita voluntate.*⁴ The same principle has infused itself into the jurisprudence of modern Europe, as, indeed, it could not fail to do, since it is but an application of a maxim, founded upon the natural rights of men in all ages, in regard to their own private

Pothier, in his edition of the Pandects, (Lib. 17, tit. 1, tertia pars, Introd. to n. 75.) "Potissimæ causæ, ex quibus mandatum solvitur, hæc sunt; mors mandatarii; mors mandatoris; si mandator revocaverit mandatum; si mandatarius mandato renuntiaverit." Mr. Thomson, in speaking of the law of Scotland, says: "Mandates terminate, in general, by the death of the mandant or mandatory; by the insanity of the latter; by revocation; by renunciation, or by the sequestration of the mandant, which vests his estate, and all the rights connected with it, in his creditors. The mandatory's bankruptcy does not appear to be inconsistent with the continuance of his mandate." Thomson on Bills of Exchange, p. 224, 225, (2d edit. 1836.)

¹ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 170, 184-188; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 308, (edit. 1818); Story on Bailm. § 202, 207-209; United States v. Jarvis, Davis, R. 289.

² Brookshire v. Brookshire, 8 Irede 1, 74.

³ Post, § 470-475.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 12, § 16; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 79; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 4, art. 1; Heinecc. Elem. Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, § 238; Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 27, § 9.

concerns, when the law has not interfered to prohibit the exercise of them.¹

§ 465. Such is the general rule; and it strictly applies in all cases where the authority has not been actually exercised at all by the agent.² For, in such a case, the principal may exercise his power of revocation at any moment. So, if it has been in part put in the course of execution, but not to such an extent as to become obligatory between the parties; as, if preliminary proceedings only have been instituted.³ Thus, for example, if a broker should enter into a verbal agreement to sell goods for his principal, and the sale is within the reach of the statute of frauds, (which requires the agreement to be in writing,) and, before the broker signs the written agreement of sale, the principal should revoke his authority, the revocation will have full validity.⁴ So, if the sale respects lands, and is within the statute of frauds, the same rule will, under the like circumstances, apply. So, if an insurance broker should negotiate a policy of insurance for his principal, and before it is completed, the principal should dissent, and repudiate the transaction, the revocation will be complete and operative.⁵ Upon a similar ground, if a broker should deliver money or goods to a bailee, to be delivered to a third person, he may countermand the order at any time before the delivery thereof to the third person, or his assent thereto.⁶ But after the third person has assented thereto, the bailment is not countermandable, if there is a valuable consideration for the bailment.⁷

§ 466. But let us suppose that the authority has been in part

¹ Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, n. 471, (in French edit. n. 510), 1 Bell, Comm. § 413, (4th edit.); Id. p. 488-490, (5th edit.); Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 40; 1 Stair, Inst. B. 1, tit. 12, § 8.

² 2 Liverm. on Agency, 309, (edit. 1818.)

³ Post, §§ 466, 467.

⁴ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 185; Farmer v. Robinson, 2 Campb. R. 339, n.

⁵ Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 185; Warwick v. Blade, 3 Campb. R. 127; Bristow v. Porter, 2 Stark. R. 50.

⁶ Story on Balm. § 207-210; Scottburn v. South Staffordshire Railway, 8 Esch. R. 341; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 223, 224; Lewis v. Sawyer, 44 Maine, 332.

⁷ Hodges v. Anderson, 8 Birn & Cresw. 842; Creager v. Link, 7 Md. R. 101; 2 Story on Equity Jurisp. § 1041-1047; Post, § 477.

actually executed by the agent; in that case the question will arise, whether the principal can revoke the authority, either in the whole or as to the part which remains unexecuted. The true principle would seem to be, that if the authority admits of severance, or of being revoked, as to the part which is unexecuted, either as to the agent or as to third persons, then, and in such case, the revocation will be good, as to the part unexecuted, but not as to the part already executed. But if the authority be not thus severable, and damage will thereby happen to the agent, on account of the execution of the authority *pro tanto*, there the principal will not be allowed to revoke the unexecuted part, or, at least, not without fully indemnifying the agent.¹ As to the rights of the other contracting party in this last case, they are not affected by the revocation; but he will retain them all, as well as all the remedies, consequent upon any violation of them, in the same manner as if no revocation has taken place.²

§ 467. Perhaps there is no direct authority in our law for the support of this proposition.³ But it stands so clearly approved by natural justice, as well as by the principles of the Roman law and the jurisprudence of modern commercial nations, that it is difficult to resist it. Thus, it is laid down in the Roman law, as a principle of broad and general justice: *Nemo potest mutare consilium suum in alterius injuriam*.⁴ And the very case is put, of a purchase authorized and afterwards revoked. *Si mandassem tibi, ut fundum emerces, postea scripsissem, ne emerces; tu antequam scias me vetuisse, emisces; mandati tibi obligatus ero, ne damno officiatur is, qui suscipit mandatum*.⁵ The reason here assigned, for making the sale obligatory, has great force; for damage might otherwise happen to the agent. Pothier says,

¹ 1 Bell, Comm. § 413, (4th edit.); Id. p. 489, (5th edit.), Post, § 483, note, 494; United States v. Jarvis, Daver, R. 274.

² See 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 223, 224, 2 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 1041-1047; Hodgson v. Anderson, 3 Barn. & Cresw. 812; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 9.

³ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 223, 224; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 643, (4th edit.); Story on Bailm. § 208, 209, 1 Bell, Comm. § 413, (4th edit.); Id. p. 489, (5th edit.) But see United States v. Jarvis, Daver, R. 274.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 75.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 15; Pothier Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 89.

that if the agent, when he receives knowledge of the revocation of his authority, has already commenced executing the business, he is nevertheless authorized to do whatever may be a necessary duty or consequence of that which he has commenced, (*faire ce, qui est une suite nécessaire de ce qu'il avoit commencé,*) and the principal will be bound thereby.¹

§ 468. Domat lays down the doctrine in the following terms: "The power and charge of a proxy, or other agent, expire by the change of the will of the person who made choice of him. For this choice is free, and he may revoke his order whenever he thinks fit; provided he makes known his revocation to the person whom he revokes, and that all things be still entire. But if the proxy, or other agent, had already executed the order, or begun to execute it, before he knew anything of the revocation, it would be without effect, as to what had been already executed; and he will be indemnified as to any obligation into which the said order may have engaged him."² So, Erskine lays it down, as the law of Scotland, that to justify a revocation, matters must remain entire. "For, (says he,) if the mandatary has executed a part of his commission, and thereby becomes concerned that it should not be revoked; if, for instance, he should, on the faith thereof, have obliged himself to purchase goods from a third party, the mandant cannot effectually revoke his commission till he relieve the mandatary from such engagements."³

§ 469. It follows, from what has been said, that, when the power of an agent is revoked or terminated, that also of any substitute, appointed by and under him, it being a dependent power, is ordinarily also revoked. This is a natural result from the presumed intention of the principal, who, in withdrawing or terminating the authority of his agent, withdraws, by implication, the derivative authority of his substitute, whether it is expressly provided for in the original delegation or not.⁴ It is

¹ Pothier, de Mandat, n. 121.

² 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 4, art. 1, by Strahan.

³ Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 40; 1 Bell, Comm. § 413, (4th edit.), Id. p. 488-490, (5th edit.)

⁴ Pothier, de Mandat, n. 112; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 307, 308, (edit. 1818), § 496.

also a result of law; for, as the agent could not, after the revocation, do the act personally, neither could the substitute, acting in his stead, since the source of the authority has ceased to exist. And, accordingly, Pothier assigns this as the reason of the rule.¹ Exceptions may exist; as where, from the express terms, or from the nature of the power, it is a just inference that the principal intends that the substitute shall continue to act for him, notwithstanding the revocation of the authority of his immediate agent.² In many cases of the appointment of public officers, it is expressly provided that their deputies shall continue to act, notwithstanding the removal, or death, or incapacity, of the superior officer who appointed them. The same presumption may arise in some cases of a private agency. Thus, for example, the removal, or death, or incapacity, of the master of a ship, who has appointed the mate, will not be understood to revoke the appointment of the latter; for it is ordinarily the duty of the mate to act as master, whenever the place of the master is vacant from any cause whatsoever, and no other substitute is provided by the owner.

§ 470. In the next place, let us consider, at what time, and under what circumstances, the revocation, by the act of the principal, takes effect. And here the rule of our law is equally clear, and comprehensive, and just. As to the agent himself, subject to what has been already stated, it takes effect from the time when the revocation is made known to him; and as to third persons, when it is made known to them; and not before. Until, therefore, the revocation is so made known, it is inoperative. If known to the agent, as against his principal, his rights are gone; but, as to third persons, who are ignorant of the revocation, his acts bind both himself and his principal.³ [Thus, where an agency, constituted by writing, was revoked, but the written authority was left in the hands of the agent, and he subsequently exhibited it to a third person, who dealt with him as agent, on the faith of it, without any notice of the revocation, the act of the agent, within the scope of the author-

¹ Pothier, de Man lat, n. 112.

² Post, § 490.

³ Beard v. Kirk, 11 New Hamp. R. 397.

ity, was held to bind the principal.¹] Hence it is, that, if a clerk or agent is employed to sign, indorse, or accept bills and notes for his principal, and he is discharged by the principal, if the discharge is not known by persons dealing with him, notes and bills subsequently signed, indorsed, or accepted, by the clerk or agent, will be binding upon the principal.² Indeed, this is but another application of the known maxim of law and equity, that, where one of two innocent persons must suffer, he shall suffer who, by his confidence, or silence, or conduct, has misled the other.³

§ 471. Pothier has stated the reason in succinct but accurate terms, illustrating it by referring to the case of payments, made in ignorance of the revocation, where the principal is clearly bound. "The reason (says he), is, that the mistake of the debtor; who pays after the revocation of the procuration, arises rather from the fault of the creditor, who ought to apprise him of the revocation, than of the debtor himself, who, seeing an authority to receive, and having no reason to suppose that it has been revoked, has a sufficient ground for making the payment accordingly. Therefore, it is not just, that he should suffer from this mistake, and be liable to a second payment; the creditor, who alone is in fault, is the only person who should suffer."⁴

§ 472. The same persuasive doctrine is fully recognized in the Roman law. *Sed, si quis mandaverit, ut Titio solvam, deinde veturit eum accipere, si ignorans prohibitum eum accipere solvam, liberabor. Sed si sciero, non liberabor.*⁵ *Si Titium omnibus negotiis meis præposuero, deinde retuero eum, ignorantibus debitoribus, administrare negotia meæ; debitores ei solvendo, libera-*

¹ *Salte v. Field*, 5 Term R. 215, per Buller, J; *Anon. v. Harrison*, 12 Mod. 346; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 188, Id. 570; *Hazard v. Treadwell*, 1 Str. R. 506; 2 *Laverm. on Agency*, 306, 310, (edit. 1818), 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 644, (4th edit.); *Morgan v. Stell*, 5 Binn. R. 305; *Story on Bailm.* § 208; 1 *Bell, Comm.* 413, (4th edit.); Id. p. 488-490, (5th edit.); *Bowenbank v. Morris*, Wallace, R. 126; *Beard v. Kirk*, 11 New Hamp. R. 397.

² § 3 *Chitty on Comm. and Manuf.* 197.

³ *Ante*, §§ 127, 443.

⁴ *Pothier on Oblig.* by Evans, n. 80, n. 474, (in French edition, n. 80, 510.)

⁵ *Dig. Lib.* 46, tit. 3, l. 12, § 2; *Pothier, Pand. Lib.* 46, tit. 3, n. 31; 1 *Domat*, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 9.

*buntur. Nam is qui omnibus negotiis suis aliquem proponit, intelligitur etiam debitoribus mandare, ut procuratori solvant.*¹ *Dispensatori, qui, ignorante debitore, remotus est ab actu, recte solvitur. Ex voluntate enim Domini ei solvitur; quam si nescit mutata, qui solvit, liberatur.*² The converse proposition, that a payment to an agent, who has no authority, or whose authority is exceeded, or known to be revoked, is invalid, as is clearly maintained.³ *De quo palam proscriptum fuerit, Ne cum eo contrahatur, is præpositi loco non habetur. Non enim permittendum erit cum Institore contrahere. Sed, si quis nolit contrahi, prohibeat; cæterum, qui præposuit, tenebitur ipsâ præpositione.*⁴

§ 473. Domat sums up the doctrine in the following language: "The power of factors and agents is determined by their revocation. But if, after they are recalled, they treat with persons, who knew nothing of their being recalled, what they shall have transacted will oblige the master, unless the revocation has been published, if it was the custom so to do, or that by other circumstances the person, who treated with the factor, might have known, that he ought not to have treated with him."⁵ Indeed, this may be said to be the universal rule laid down in all modern jurisprudence.⁶

§ 474. In the next place, as to the modes by which an authority may be revoked. It may be express, as by a direct and formal declaration, publicly made known, or by an informal writing, or by parol; or it may be implied from circumstances.⁷ What circumstances will, or will not, amount to a revocation, or to notice of a revocation, by implication, cannot be stated with any definite certainty. But there are some acts which

¹ Dig. Lib. 46, tit. 3, l. 34, § 3; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 46, tit. 3, n. 31.

² Dig. Lib. 46, tit. 3, l. 51; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 46, tit. 3, n. 34; Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 27, § 10.

³ Dig. Lib. 46, tit. 3, l. 34, § 4; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 46, tit. 3, n. 33; Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 11, § 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 7.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 3, l. 11, § 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 14, tit. 3, n. 7.

⁵ 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 16, § 3, art. 9, by Strahan.

⁶ Pothier, de Mandat, n. 121; 1 Bell, Comm. § 413, (4th edit.); Id. p. 488-490, (5th edit.)

⁷ Story on Bailm. §§ 207, 208; Morgan & Stell, 5 Binn. 305; Copeland v. Merc. Ins. Co. 6 Pick. R. 198; Smitson on Merc. Law, pp. 131, 132, (3d edit., 1843.)

admit of little or no doubt. Thus, for example, if the principal appoints another person to do the same act, this will ordinarily be construed to be a revocation of the power of the former agent.¹ The same presumption existed in the civil law. *Julianus ait; Eum, qui dedit diversis temporibus procuratores duos, posteriorem dando priorem prohibuisse videri.*² The same doctrine is recognized in the French law.³ This presumption, however, arises only in cases where there is an incompatibility in the exercise of the authority by both; for, if the original agent has a general authority, and the second agent is appointed only for a special object or purpose, there, the revocation will operate only *pro tanto*, and not as a total revocation. The maxim of the Roman law is as follows: *In toto jure generi per speciem derogatur, et illud potissimum habetur, quod ad speciem directum est.*⁴ On the other hand, if the first authority is special, and the second authority is general, it seems to have been thought, that the presumption ought to be the other way, namely, that the second is not designed to operate as a revocation of the first.⁵ But this may probably depend upon very nice considerations.

§ 475 A revocation may also arise by implication or presumption from various other circumstances. Thus, if the principal should intrust another with authority to collect certain debts for him, and should deliver him at the time the vouchers or instruments, negotiable or otherwise, by which such debts are evidenced, and which are to be delivered to the debtors, when paid; and afterwards the principal should take back the vouchers, or other instruments, that will be an implied revocation of the authority of the agent.⁶ So, if the principal should himself collect the debts, that also will be an implied revocation.

§ 476. We have already stated, that the general rule is, that the principal may revoke the authority of his agent at his

¹ Morgan v. Stell, 5 Binn. R. 305; Copeland v. Merc. Ins. Co. 6 Pick. R. 198; Story on Bailm. § 208.

² Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 3, l. 31, § 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 3, n. 27; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 4, art. 2.

³ Pothier, de Mandat, n. 114, 115.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 80; Pothier, de Mandat, n. 115-117.

⁵ Pothier, de Mandat, n. 15.

⁶ Ibid. 118.

mere pleasure.¹ But this is open to some exceptions, which, however, are entirely consistent with the reason, upon which the general rule is founded. One exception is, when the principal has expressly stipulated, that the authority shall be irrevocable, and the agent has an interest in its execution. Both of these circumstances must concur; for, although in its terms an authority may be expressly declared to be irrevocable; yet, if the agent has no interest in its execution, and there is no valid consideration for it, it is treated as a mere nude pact, and is deemed in law to be revocable, upon the general principle, that he, who alone has an interest in the execution of an act, is also entitled to control it.

§ 477. But, where an authority or power is coupled with an interest, or where it is given for a valuable consideration, or where it is a part of a security, there, unless there is an express stipulation, that it shall be revocable, it is, from its own nature and character, in contemplation of law, irrevocable, whether it is expressed to be so upon the face of the instrument, conferring the authority or not.² Thus, for example, if a power of attorney,

¹ Ante, § 462.

² Smith on Merc. Law, 71, 72, (2d edit.); Id. B. 1, ch. 5, § 4, pp. 131, 132, (3d edit. 1843); 2 Liverm. on Agency, 308, 309, (edit. 1818); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 184, 185; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 223, 224; Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Adm'r, 2 Mason, R. 244; Id. 342; S. C. 8 Wheat. R. 177; 1 Peters, R. 1; Bromley v. Holland, 7 Ves. 28; Lepard v. Vernon, 2 V. & Beam. 51; Watson v. King, 4 Campb. R. 227, 273; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 643, 644, (4th edit.); Gausson v. Morton, 10 Barn. & Cressw. 731; Story on Bailm. § 209. See also Metcalf v. Clough, 2 Mann. & Ry. 178; Smyth v. Craig, 3 Watts & Serg. 14; Smart v. Sanders, 5 Manning, Granger & Scott, 895; Knapp v. Alvord, 10 Paige, R. 205; Marfield v. Douglas, 1 Sandford, Superior Ct. R. (N. Y.) 360. This doctrine was much considered in the case of Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Adm'r, 8 Wheat. R. 174; S. C. 1 Peters, R. 1: and the distinction between a mere power, and a power coupled with an interest, was there clearly pointed out. On that occasion, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall explained, what was meant by a power coupled with an interest, and said: "It becomes necessary to inquire, what is meant by the expression 'a power coupled with an interest?' Is it an interest in the subject, on which the power is to be exercised, or is it an interest in that which is produced by the exercise of the power? We hold it to be clear, that the interest, which can protect a power after the death of a person, who creates it, must be an interest in the thing itself. In other words, the power must be engrafted on an estate in the thing. The words themselves would seem to import this meaning. 'A power coupled with an interest,' is a power, which accom-

to levy a fine is executed, as a part of a security to a creditor, the power is irrevocable.¹ So, if a letter of attorney to sell a ship is taken as a security upon a loan of money, it is irrevocable.² So, if the principal assigns all his effects for the benefit of his creditors, and gives the assignee a power of attorney to collect and receive all debts and outstanding claims, the power is irrevocable.³ So, if a power of attorney to sell lands is given to a creditor to pay his debts out of the proceeds of the sale, the power is irrevocable.⁴ So, a remittance to an agent of money or goods, to be delivered to a creditor in discharge of his debt, is irrevocable, after the creditor has assented thereto, and signified his assent to the agent.⁵ The ground of this doctrine is, that a party shall not be at liberty to violate his own solemn engagement, or to vacate his own security by his own wrongful act; for that would be to enable him to perpetrate a fraud upon innocent persons, who have placed implicit confidence in him, which is against the clearest principles of justice and equity. But a power of attorney, although irrevocable by the party, and although founded upon a valuable consideration, or given as a security, is nevertheless, as we shall presently see, revoked by the death of the party, unless it be also coupled with an interest.⁶

§ 478. Secondly. In the next place, the agency may be determined by the renunciation of the agent.⁷ This renunciation may be before any part of the authority is executed, or when

panies, or is connected with, an interest. The power and the interest are united in the same person. But, if we are to understand by the word 'interest,' an interest in that which is to be produced by the exercise of the power, then they are never united. The power, to produce the interest, must be exercised, and by its exercise is extinguished. The power ceases, when the interest commences, and, therefore, cannot, in accurate law language, be said to be 'coupled' with it.' See also Com. Dig. *Attorney*, C. 9, 10.

¹ *Walsh v. Whitcomb*, 2 Esp. R. 565; *Paley on Agency*, by Lloyd, 184.

² *Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Adm'r*, 2 Mason, R. 244; *Id.* 342; S. C. 8 Wheat. R. 274; 1 Peters, R. 1.

³ *Walsh v. Whitcomb*, 2 Esp. R. 565.

⁴ *Gausson v. Morton*, 10 Barn. & Cressw. 731.

⁵ *Hodgson v. Anderson*, 3 Barn. & Cressw. 842; *Creager v. Link*, 7 Md. R. 267; 2 Story on Equity Jurisp. § 1041-1043; Ante, § 465.

⁶ Post, §§ 488, 489.

⁷ See *Case v. Jennings*, 17 Texas. 661.

it is in part executed.¹ But, in either case, if the agency is founded upon a valuable consideration, the agent, by renouncing it, makes himself liable for the damages which his principal may sustain thereby.² If the agency is purely voluntary and gratuitous, there, according to our law, the principal will not be entitled to any damages for its non-execution. But if it was in part executed, and then renounced, and the principal sustains damages thereby, the agent will be held responsible therefor, upon the known distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance, in cases of gratuitous agency.³ But in all cases, where the agent renounces his agency, he would seem to be bound to give notice thereof to the principal; and if he does not, and damage is thereby sustained, it may, perhaps, if the omission be fraudulent, give rise, even in our law, to a claim for damages, even though it be a case of gratuitous agency.⁴

§ 479. The Roman law, upon this point, differed in some respects from our law. In that law, if an agent even gratuitously undertook to perform a particular business or act, he was bound to perform it, if he was able to perform it, and no just excuse intervened. And if he did not, and the principal sustained any damage thereby, the agent was responsible therefor.⁵ *Sicut autem liberum est.* (says the Digest,) *mandatum non suscipere, ita susceptum consummare oportet, nisi renunciatum sit. Renunciari autem ita potest, ut integrum jus mandatori reservetur, vel per se, vel per alium, eandem rem commodè explicandi, aut si redundet in eum captio, qui suscepit mandatum. Et quidem, si is, cui mandatum est, ut aliquid mercaretur, mercatus non sit, neque renunciaverit, se non empturum, idque suâ, non alterius culpâ fecerit, mandati actione teneri cum convenit. Hoc amplius tenebitur, (sicuti Mola quoque scripsit,) si eo tempore per fraudem renunciaverit, cum jam recte emere non possit.*⁶ Again: *Et, si susceptum*

¹ Story on Bailm. § 202.

² Story on Bailm. § 136; Jones on Bailm. 101; 3 Black. Comm. 157; Elsee v. Gatward, 5 Term R. 113; Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. R. 81.

³ Story on Bailm. § 9, 164-172.

⁴ See Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 22, § 11, cited post, § 479.

⁵ Story on Bailm. § 164-172; Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 27, § 11; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 4, art. 3-6.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 22, § 11; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 25; Id. n. 80.

*non impleverit, tenetur.*¹ And again: *Ad comparandas merces datâ pecuniâ, qui mandatum suscepit, fide ruptâ, quanti interest mandatoris, tenetur.*² And again: *Qui mandatum suscepit, si potest id explere, deserere promissum officium non debet; alioquin, quanti mandatoris intersit, damnabitur.*³ If he could not perform the act, he was bound to give notice to the principal, if practicable; otherwise, he was responsible in damages. *Si vero intelligit, explere se id officium non posse, id ipsum, cum primum poterit, debet mandatori nunciare; ut is, si velit, alterius operâ utatur. Quod si, quum possit nunciare, cessaverit, quanti mandatoris intersit, tenebitur. Si aliquâ ex causâ non poterit nunciare, securus erit.*⁴ But if the principal sustained no damage by the renunciation, then the agent was not liable in any action on account of his renunciation. *Mandavi, ut negotia gereres; si nihil deperierit, quamvis nemo gesserit, nulla actio est; aut si alius idonee gesserit, cessat actio mandati. Et in similibus hoc idem erit probandum.*⁵ The same rule seems to prevail in those modern nations which have derived the basis of their jurisprudence from the Roman law.⁶

§ 480. Thirdly. In the next place, as to the revocation of the agency by operation of law. Thus, as we have seen, may arise in various ways. And first, where the agency terminates by the expiration of the period, during which it is to exist and to have effect.⁷ Thus, for example, if an agency is created by the principal to endure for a year, it becomes extinct when that year has expired. So, if a person, about to depart on a voyage, should, by power of attorney, appoint an agent to manage his

¹ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 5, § 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 25.

² Cod. Lib. 4, tit. 35, l. 16; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 25; Id. n. 80.

³ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 27, § 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 26, Id. n. 80.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 8, § 6; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 27; Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 27, § 11.

⁶ Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 40; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 3, arts. 1, 12; Id. § 4, art. 3-5; Pothier, de Mandat, n. 38-45; Story on Bailm § 161.

⁷ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 283; Blackburn v. Scholes, 2 Campb. R. 341-344; Comm. Dig. Attorney, B. 9, 10; 1 Bell, Comm. § 413, (1), (4th edit.); Id. p. 488-490, (5th edit.); 2 Liverm. on Agency, 307, (edit. 1818); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 188, 189; Smith on Merc. Law, 72, (2d edit.); Id. pp. 181, 182, (3d edit. 1845); Dickinson v. Lilwall, 4 Campb. R. 279.

affairs until his return home, there, upon his return home, the authority would expire by its own limitation.¹ Indeed, Pothier contends, that if a power is given by a person, going abroad, to an agent to manage his affairs, without containing any words of limitation as to its duration, it ought to be presumed to be revoked upon his return home, unless there are some circumstances in the case to repel that presumption; such as allowing the agent to act in the agency, without objection, after his return home.²

§ 491. Fourthly. A revocation by operation of law may be, by a change of condition, or of state, producing an incapacity of either party.³ This proceeds upon a general rule of law, that the derivative authority expires with the original authority, from which it proceeds. The power of constituting an agent is founded upon the right of the principal to do the business himself; and, when that right ceases, the right of creating an appointment, or of continuing the appointment of an agent, already made, for the same purpose, must cease also.⁴ In short, the derivative authority cannot generally mount higher, or exist longer than the original authority. Thus, if an unmarried woman should, as principal, execute a power of attorney, or give any other authority to an agent, and afterwards she should marry, the marriage would, *ipso facto*, amount to a revocation of the power; for a married woman has, in general, by our law, no right to authorize an agent to do any act in her name, or to engage in any contract for her, or to dispose of any of her property.⁵ So, if a principal should become insane, that would, or might, operate as a suspension, or revocation of the authority of his agent, during the continuance of the insanity;⁶ for the party

¹ 1 Bell, Comm. § 413, (4th edit.); Id. p. 488-490, (5th edit.); Pothier on Oblig. n. 474, (n. 509 of French edit.); Pothier, de Mandat, n. 119.

² Pothier, de Mandat, n. 119. See also Id. n. 112; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 307, (edit. 1818.)

³ Story on Bailm. § 206; Pothier, de Mandat, n. 111, 112.

⁴ 2 Liverm. on Agency, 306, (edit. 1818); Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Adm'r, 8 Wheat. R. 174, 202-204; Pothier, de Mandat, n. 103.

⁵ 2 Liverm. on Agency, 307, (edit. 1818); Anon. 1 Salk. 117, 399; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 645, (4th edit.); White v. Gifford, 1 Roll. Abridg. 331, title *Authorita*, E. pl. 4; Anon. W. Jones. R. 388; Charnley v. Winstanley, 5 East, R. 266; Story on Bailm. § 206.

⁶ Davis v. Lane, 10 N. H. Rep. 156.

himself, during his insanity, could not personally do a valid act; and his agent cannot, in virtue of a derivative authority, do any act for and in the name of his principal, which he could not lawfully do for himself.¹

¹ Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Adm'r, 8 Wheat. R. 174, 201-204. This is clear, where the party's lunacy is established under an inquisition, or where he is put under guardianship. But some doubt seems to be entertained, whether, before such inquisition or guardianship, there is any implied suspension or revocation of the agent's authority. Mr. Bell (1 Bell, Comm. § 418, pp. 395, 396, 4th edit.; Id. p. 488-490, 5th edit.) considers insanity, not so established, to be no suspension or revocation of the authority. He says, in the fifth edition, (the language in the fourth edition slightly differs,) "Insanity is not an implied natural termination to a mandate; nor is there an existing will to recall the former appointment; nor is the act notorious, by which the public may be aware of such failure of capacity. It was to this interesting question chiefly, that the metaphysical discussion, to which I have already alluded, was applied. But the strong practical ground of good sense, on which the question was disposed of, as relative to the public, was, that insanity is contradistinguished from death by the want of notoriety; that all general delegations of power, on which a credit is once raised with the trading world, subsist in force to bind the grantor, until recalled by some public act or individual notice; and that, while they continue in uninterrupted operation, relied on by the public, they are, in law, to be held as available generally; leaving particular cases to be distinguished by special circumstances of *mala fides*. The question does not appear to have occurred in England; but the opinion of very eminent English counsel was taken in a case, which was tried in Scotland, and they held the acts of the procurator to be effectual to the public against the estate of the person, by whom the procuratory was granted." He states, in his note, the Scottish case, in the following words. "Pollock against Paterson. The case, in which this question occurred to be tried, was compromised (10th December, 1811, 16 Faculty Decis. 369) after the first decision given on the question. The opinions of the judges are peculiarly worthy of perusal; not being confined to the narrow state of the question, as it occurred technically, but extending to a large and comprehensive discussion of the general question, as to the effect of insanity on such powers." In another note, he refers to the opinions of counsel taken in England, in these words: "After stating the terms of the procuration, and that, after the insanity of the grantor, the procurator had continued to carry on the business of a banker for the principal, the question put was, 'Whether, in these circumstances, the transactions of Mr. John Paterson, under his father's procuration, are good to those, who transacted with him, from the date of it to the period of stopping.' The answer by Sir Vicary Gibbs, (afterwards Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas,) Sir Samuel Romilly, and Mr. Adam, (now Lord Chief Commissioner of the Scottish Jury Court,) was, 'We think they are good.'" Mr. Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, inclines to the same opinion. 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 645, (4th edit.); Smith on Merc. Law, p. 132, (3d edit. 1845.) In Wallis v. Manhattan Bank, 2 Hall, R. 495, it was held by the Court, that the

§ 482. Upon similar grounds, the bankruptcy of the principal operates as a revocation of the authority of his agent, touching any rights of property, of which he is divested by the bankruptcy;¹ for the bankrupt thereby ceases to be the owner, and consequently is incapable of personally passing any title to it; and the act of his agent cannot have any higher validity.² But, as to other rights and property, which do not pass by the bankruptcy, but remain personally in the bankrupt, (as, for example, the rights and property which he holds as trustee, or as guardian, or as executor,) the authority of his agent will not be suspended or revoked by his bankruptcy.³ So, if he has, before his bankruptcy, executed a bill of sale of a ship, and given a letter of attorney to sign an indorsement on the certificate of registry, in compliance with law, to make the sale complete, the power is not revoked by his bankruptcy; for it is but a formal act, which a court of equity would compel him to execute.⁴

§ 483. And here, again, the same exception exists in relation

lunacy of a person, who has executed a power of attorney, does not operate to revoke it, at least, until the fact of his lunacy has been properly established by an inquisition. Would a deed, or a sale, executed personally by a party manifestly insane at the time, be valid? If not, can his agent be in a better condition, if the agent is to execute the deed, or do the act, in the name of his principal, and not in his own name? But see Thomson on Bills, pp. 226, 227, (2d edit. 1836,) cited at large; Post, § 494. note.

¹ See *Ogden v. Gillingham*, Baldwin, 38.

² 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, p. 644, (1st edit.); *Minett v. Forrester*, 4 Taunt. R. 541; 1 Bell, Comm. § 113, (4th edit.); Id. p. 488-490, (5th edit.); Ante, §§ 349, 408; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 307, (edit. 1818); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 187; 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 223, 224; Story on Bailm. § 211; *Parker v. Smith*, 16 East, R. 382. In this last case, Lord Ellenborough held: "And, inasmuch as the bankrupt was not competent, after his bankruptcy, to pay or apply this fund himself, in satisfaction of these claims of the assured, it follows, as a consequence, that he could not authorize his broker so to do; otherwise the derivative and implied authority would be stronger and more extensive than the original and principal authority of the party himself; which cannot be. The consequence is, that the authority of the agent, the broker's, was virtually countermanded and extinct by that act of bankruptcy, by which the bankrupt's own original power over the subject-matter ceased, and became transferred to others."

³ 3 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 223; *Dixon v. Ewart*, 3 Meriv. 322; *Smith on Merc. Law*, 72, (2d edit.); Id. B. 1, ch. 5, §§ 131, 132, (3d edit. 1843); Post, § 486.

⁴ *Dixon v. Ewart*, 3 Meriv. R. 322; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 187, 188.

to mere cases of incapacity, which has been already suggested in relation to the right of revocation by the principal. The doctrine does not apply to the case of an authority coupled with an interest; for that may still be executed, notwithstanding the marriage, or insanity, or bankruptcy of the principal, for the plain reason, that it need not be executed in the name of the principal; but it will be valid, if executed in the name of the agent.¹ Therefore, where a factor has possession of the goods of his principal, with a power to sell, and has made advances on the consignment, he is still entitled to sell, for his indemnification, to the extent of such advances, notwithstanding the bankruptcy of his principal.²

§ 484. Principles very similar are adopted in the jurisprudence of foreign countries. Thus, Pothier lays it down that an authority ceases by the change of condition of the principal. As, if a creditor is a woman, who afterwards marries, her authority, previously given to an agent to receive money for her, is revoked by her change of condition; and payment to him, if the debtor knows of the marriage, will be invalid.³ So, a power given by a person having a quality or character to receive for the creditor, expires when that quality or character ceases. Thus, if the tutor of a minor gives a power to receive a debt due to the minor, the debtor cannot safely pay, upon the authority of the power, after the minority has expired; because the quality or character of the tutor, who gave the authority, having ceased, a payment

¹ Ante, § 477.

² 2 Liverm. on Agency, 307, (edit. 1818); *Alley v. Hooton*, 4 Campb. R. 325;

³ 1 Bell, Comm. § 413, (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 488-490, (5th edit.), Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 187, 188, Ante, § 477.

³ 1 Bell, Comm. § 413 (4th edit.); *Id.* p. 488-490, (5th edit.) Mr. Bell insists upon other exceptions, which, perhaps, may fall within the same reason. He says: "Express or tacit revocation, by act of the principal, or by death, bankruptcy, or insanity, will have no effect, either to deprive the factor of the benefit of his authority, in extricating himself from transactions already begun, or from the consequences of his having acted; or to deprive others, who have relied on his powers, of the benefit of the transactions, on which they have previously entered with him; or even to disturb transactions entered into, while he still appeared to hold his authority undiminished." *Id.* p. 489, (5th edit.) See also *Erskine's Inst.* B. 3, tit. 3, § 40; Ante, § 466.

⁴ Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, n. 475, (n. 511 of the French edition); Pothier, *de Mandat*, n. 112.

to himself would be void and ineffectual.¹ This results from the maxim of the Roman law: *Quod jussu alterius solvitur, pro eo est, quasi ipsi solutum esset*;² since the maxim tacitly involves the converse proposition, that, where payment is made to a person, having no authority to receive it, it is no payment to the creditor. So, if a person who has given an authority becomes incapable, by a change of his condition, as if he is interdicted from acting for himself, and is placed under the guardianship of a curator, the authority is revoked.³

§ 485. In the next place, as to the incapacity of the agent. Here the same rule does not reciprocally apply in its full extent; for, although an agent may be incapacitated to act for himself, he is not, in all cases, necessarily incapacitated to act for another. Thus, for example, although an infant cannot act for himself, he may, nevertheless, be the agent of another person.⁴ So, a married woman, at least, unless she is prohibited by her husband, may also be the agent of another person.⁵ And if she is appointed an agent before marriage, the marriage does not, *per se*, necessarily operate as a revocation of her agency; since there is, or may be, nothing in the marriage incompatible with her executing an authority or an agency. *A fortiori*, where her agency is coupled with an interest, it is not only not revoked by her marriage, but it is irrevocable; for the husband and wife have an interest in its execution.⁶

§ 486. The case of the bankruptcy of the agent is, in some respects, governed by the same rule. It does not necessarily suspend or revoke the power of the bankrupt to act as an agent for another, by doing a formal act, which passes no interest; such, for example, as executing a deed in the name of another.⁷

¹ Post, § 500.

² Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, n. 476, (n. 512 of the French edition); Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 180; Pothier, de Mandat, n. 112.

³ Pothier, de Mandat, n. 111.

⁴ Ante, § 7; Thomson on Bills of Exchange, p. 220, (2d edit. 1836.)

⁵ Ante, § 7. Query, whether the prohibition of the husband would, in all cases, incapacitate the wife to do a mere ministerial act for another, as his agent, involving no labor or duty inconsistent with her duty to her family, as, for example, to deliver a deed?

⁶ Anon. 1 Salk. 117; *Rèignolds v. Davis*, 12 Mod. R. 383; *Marder v. Lee*, 3 Burr. R. 1469, 1471.

⁷ 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 41, pp. 644, 645, (4th edit.); *Dixon v. Ewart*, 3 Meriv. R. 322; Ante, §§ 477, 482.

Neither does it prevent him from doing an act as principal, where it is the mere execution of an existing trust, which he might be compelled to execute.¹ Neither will it affect his right as a factor, with the consent of his assignees, to enforce his lien for commissions and advances, or for a general balance, due to him from his principal, upon the goods of the latter, or the proceeds thereof, against the purchaser of the goods.² But it is said, that it will amount to a revocation of his authority to receive any money from the purchaser, or from other persons, upon the account of his principal.³ By the foreign law, also, the bankruptcy of the agent operates as a revocation of his authority for the satisfactory reason, that it is presumed that the confidence of the principal in him is thereby destroyed.⁴

§ 487. The case of the insanity of the agent would seem to constitute a natural, nay, a necessary revocation of his authority; for the principal cannot be presumed to intend, that acts, done for him, and to bind him, shall be done by one who is incompetent to understand, or to transact, the business which he is employed to execute. The exercise of sound judgment and discretion would seem to be required, in all such cases, as preliminaries to the due execution of the authority.

§ 488. Fifthly. A revocation may be, by operation of law, by the death either of the principal, or of the agent. This is an ancient and well-settled doctrine of the common law.⁵ It

¹ *Dixon v Ewart*, 8 Meniv 322, Ante, § 482

² *Hudson v Granger*, 5 Barn & Ald 27, 31, 32

³ *Hudson v Granger*, 5 Barn & Ald 27, 31, 32, 2 Kent, Comm Lect. 41, p 645, (4th edit); Story on Bailm § 211

⁴ Pothier, de Mandat, n 120, Story on Bailm § 211

⁵ Littleton, § 66, Co. Litt. 52, Shipman v. Thompson, Willes, R. 104, 105; Wynne v Thomas, Willes, R. 563, 565, Wallace v Cooke, 5 Esp R 117, 118; Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 185, 186, 2 Liverm. on Agency, 301-304, (edit. 1818); Smith on Merc. Law, 72, (2d edit.), Id. pp 131, 132, (3d edit. 1843); Bac. Abriddg. Authority, E; 3 Chitty on Comm and Manuf 223, 2 Kent, Comm Lect. 41, pp 645, 646, (4th edit), Story on Bailm. § 203-205, Smout v. Ilbery, 10 Mees. & Welsb 1, Campanari v. Woodburn, 28 Eng Law & Eq R 321, Wilson v Edmonds, 4 Foster, 517; Blades v. Price, 9 Barn. & Crossw 167; Galt v. Holloway, 4 Peters, R. 332, 344; Rigs v Cagg, 2 Humph Tenn. R. 350; Scruggs v. Driver, 31 Ala 274; Saltmarsh v Smith, 32 Ala 404; Harper v. Little, 3 Conn. 44; Ante, §§ 264, 477; Gale v. Tappan, 12 New Hamp. 145, Houghtaling v. Marvin, 7 Barbour, 412; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333; Hoston

will make no difference, that the power is declared in express terms to be irrevocable; for, if it be not coupled with an interest,

v. Cantril, 11 Leigh, 137. In *Cassiday v. McKensie*, 4 Watts & Serg. R. 282, [approved in *Carriger v. Whittington*, 26 Missouri, 313,] the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held, that a payment of money to an agent, after the death of his principal, the death being unknown to both parties, was good, and bound the estate of the principal. Mr. Justice Rogers, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: "But finally, it is contended, that a payment, after the death of the principal, is not good. It is conceded, that the death of the principal is, *ipso facto*, a revocation of a letter of attorney. But does it avoid all acts of the attorney, intermediate between the death of the principal and notice of it? In *Salte v. Field*, 5 Term Rep. 214, Mr. Justice Buller observes: 'It has been questioned, with respect to an agent acting under a power of attorney, whether acts, done by him, before he knows of the revocation of his warrant, are good against the principal, and it seems, that the principal, in such a case, could not avoid the acts of his agents, done *bona fide*, if they were to his disadvantage, though he might consent to avoid such as were for his benefit.' And in *Hazard v. Treadwell*, (Str. 506; 12 Mod. 346.) it is ruled, that the credit, arising from an ostensible employment, continues, at least with regard to those, who have been accustomed to deal on the faith of that employment, until they have notice of its being at an end, or till its termination is notorious. And these are principles, founded on the most obvious justice. Thus, if a man is the notorious agent for another, to collect debts, it is but reasonable, that debtors should be protected in payments to the agent, until they are informed that the agency has terminated. But this, it is said, is only true of an agency terminated by express revocation, and does not hold of an implied revocation by the death of the principal. It would puzzle the most acute man to give any reason, why it should be a mispayment, when revoked by death, and a good payment, when expressly revoked by the party in his lifetime. In *Watson v. King*, 1 Campb. 272, however, it is ruled, 'that a power of attorney, though coupled with an interest, is instantly revoked by the death of the grantor; and an act, afterwards, *bona fide* done under it by the grantee, before notice of the death of the grantor, is a nullity. Lord Ellenborough says, a power, coupled with an interest, cannot be revoked by the person granting it; but it is necessarily revoked by his death. How can a valid act be done in the name of a dead man?' It will be observed, that the reason is purely technical. How can a valid act be done in the name of a dead man? And it might with as much propriety be asked, How can a valid act be done by an agent, whose authority is revoked by his principal? But, notwithstanding the opinion thus confidently expressed, it is now an admitted exception, that, where the power or authority is coupled with an interest in the thing actually vested in the agent, then an act, done by him after the death of his principal, is good. And the reason given by Chief Justice Marshall, in *Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Adm'r*, (8 Wheat. 174.) is, that the agent, having the legal title in the property, is capable of transferring it in his own name, notwithstanding the death of the principal; and the death of the principal has no operation upon his act. The power, given

although irrevocable by the party, it is revoked by his death.¹ The doctrine seems to be a natural deduction or presumption

by the principal, is, under such circumstances, rather an assent or agreement, that the agent may transfer the property vested in him, free from all equities of the principal, than strictly a power to transfer. The whole reasoning of the Court, in *Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Adm'r*, shows their anxiety to rid themselves of the absurdity, into which a strict adherence to the principle, that death is a revocation of a power, would lead them. Why not place it on the rational ground, that, although the conveyance would be bad at law, yet it would be good in equity, when made *bonâ fide* without any notice whatever of the death of the principal? But, be this as it may, the principle does not apply here. There is no act to be done. This money has been paid by the debtor, and received by the agent, in good faith; and why should it not be good, when the authority is revoked by death, as it confessedly is, when expressly revoked by the principal in his lifetime? Here the precise point is, whether a payment to an agent, when the parties are ignorant of the death, is a good payment. In addition to the case in *Campbell*, before cited, the same judge, Lord Ellenborough, has decided, in 5 Esp. 117, the general question, that a payment, after the death of the principal, is not good. Thus, a payment of sailor's wages, to a person having a power of attorney to receive them, has been held void, when the principal was dead at the time of the payment. If, by this case, it is meant merely to decide the general proposition, that by operation of law, the death of the principal is a revocation of the powers of the attorney, no objection can be taken to it. But if it is intended to say, that this principle applies, where there was no notice of death, or opportunity of notice, I must be permitted to dissent from it. In addition, it is contrary to the opinion of Lord Loughborough in *Tate v. Hilberts*, (2 Ves. Jun.) where, on a question, whether a check, given by a dying person to a relation, but not presented in his lifetime, could be enforced, as *donatio causa mortis*, against the executor, he said, if the donee had received the money upon the check immediately after the death of the testator, and before the cashier was apprised of it, he was inclined to think no Court would have taken it from him. And what would he have said, if the attempt had been made to subject the banker, when he was ignorant of the death? But, if this doctrine applies, why does it not apply to the case of factors, foreign or domestic, to commission merchants, to supercargoes, and masters of ships, and to various other agencies, which the necessities of commerce may require? In the case of a foreign factor, for example, has it been supposed, that his acts, after this implied revocation of authority, are void? Cases of this kind must often have occurred; and it would astonish the mercantile world to be informed, that the factor was liable on a contract, made in the name of his principal, because he was dead, a fact of

¹ *Mitchell v. Eades*, Prec. A. 125; *Lepard v. Vernon*, 2 Ves. & Beam. R. 51; *Watson v. King*, 4 Campb. R. 272; S. C. 1 Starkie, R. 121; *Wilson v. Edmonds*, 4 Foster, 317; *Primm v. Stewart*, 7 Texas, 178; *Houston v. Robertson*, 6 Taunt. R. 444; *French v. Rousmaniere's Adm'r*, 8 Wheat. R. 174, 201-208, 206, 207; Ante. 447.

of the actual intention of the parties. But it has this additional reason to support it, that, as the act must, if done at all, be done in the name of the principal, it is impossible, that it can properly be done, since a dead man can do no act; and we have already seen that every authority, executed for another person, presupposes that the party could, at the time, by his personal execution of it, have made the act valid.¹

which he was ignorant, and of which he could not by any possibility be informed; or that the merchant, who was trusting his goods on the credit of the principal, was to be cast on him, who may have been of doubtful solvency, for payment. Can it be, that a payment, made to an agent from a foreign country, and from one of our cities to the Western States, employed for the special purpose of collecting debts, is void, because his principal may have died the very day before the actual receipt of the money? That a payment may be good to-day, or bad to-morrow, from the accidental circumstance of the death of the principal, which he did not know, and which by no possibility he could know? It would be unjust to the agent and unjust to the debtor. In the civil law, the acts of the agent, done *bonâ fide* in ignorance of the death of his principal, are held valid and binding upon the heirs of the latter. The same rule holds in the Scottish law; and I cannot believe the common law is so unreasonable, notwithstanding the doubts expressed by Chancellor Kent, in the 2d volume of his Commentaries, p. 646."

¹ Ante, §§ 147, 148, 264; Coombes's case, 9 Co 76, 77, Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Adm'r, 8 Wheat. R. 174, 200-205; Clarke v. Courtney, 5 Peters, R. 319, 349-351. This subject is very amply illustrated in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Adm'r, 8 Wheat. R. 291. Among other things he says: "This instrument contains no words of conveyance, or of assignment, but is a simple power to sell and convey. As the power of one man to act for another depends on the will and license of that other, the power ceases when the will or this permission is withdrawn. The general rule, therefore, is, that a letter of attorney may, at any time, be revoked by the party who makes it, and is revoked by his death. But, this general rule, which results from the nature of the act, has sustained some modification. Where a letter of attorney forms a part of a contract, and is a security for money, or for the performance of any act which is deemed valuable, it is generally made irrevocable in terms, or, if not so, is deemed irrevocable in law. Although a letter of attorney depends, from its nature, on the will of the person making it, and may, in general, be recalled at his will, yet, if he binds himself for a consideration, in terms or by the nature of his contract; not to change his will, the law will not permit him to change it. Rousmaniere, therefore, could not, during his life, by any act of his own, have revoked this letter of attorney. But does it retain its efficacy after his death? We think it does not. We think it well settled, that a power of attorney, though irrevocable during the life of the party, becomes extinct by his death. This principle is asserted in Littleton, § 66, by Lord Coke, in his Commentary on that section, (52 b.) and in

§ 489. The only admitted exception in our law, if, indeed, that properly constitutes an exception, is the case, where the power or authority is coupled with an interest in the thing, actually vested in the agent.¹ The reason of this exception is entirely compatible with the general ground upon which the rule is founded. It is, that the agent having the legal title to the property vested in himself, is capable of transferring it in his own name, notwithstanding the death of the principal; and the death of the principal

Willes's Reports, (105, note, and 565) The legal reason of the rule is a plain one. It seems founded on the presumption, that the substitute acts by virtue of the authority of his principal, existing at the time the act is performed, and on the manner in which he must execute his authority, as stated in Coombes's case. In that case it was resolved, that 'When any one has authority, as attorney, to do any act, he ought to do it in his name who gave the authority' The reason of this resolution is obvious. The title can regularly pass out of the person in whom it is vested, only by a conveyance in his own name, and this cannot be executed by another for him, when it could not, in law, be executed by himself. A conveyance in the name of a person, who was dead at the time, would be a manifest absurdity. This general doctrine, that a power must be executed in the name of the person who gives it, a doctrine founded on the nature of the transaction, is most usually engrafted in the power itself. Its usual language is, that the substitute shall do that which he is empowered to do in the name of his principal. He is put in the place and stead of his principal, and is to act in his name. This accustomed form is observed in the instrument under consideration. 'Hunt is constituted the attorney, and is authorized to make and execute a regular bill of sale in the name of Rousmaniere. Now, as an authority must be pursued in order to make the act of the substitute the act of the principal, it is necessary that this bill of sale should be in the name of Rousmaniere; and it would be a gross absurdity, that a deed should purport to be executed by him, even by attorney, after his death, for the attorney is in the place of the principal capable of doing that alone which the principal might do.' Pothier puts the doctrine upon analogous reasoning, of a similar, though perhaps of a less technical nature. The principle (says he) is drawn from the nature of the contract of mandate. The principal, (*le mandant*), by his contract, charges the agent to do something in his place or stead, *vice versa* the agent, (*le mandataire*), in executing the mandate, lends his agency (*ministre*) to the principal, who is deemed to do, by the agency of his agent, what is intended by the mandate. Now, the agent cannot any further lend his agency to a principal who is dead, and therefore he cannot further execute the mandate after the death of the principal. Pothier, de Mandat, n 103.

Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Adm'r, 8 Wheat R. 174, 201-206; 2 Kent, Comm. 445, 546, (4th edit.); Shipman v. Thompson, Willes, R. 104, note (a); 100; Ante, §§ 164, 477, 478; Michigan Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth, 20 Mich. 31; Marston v. Pioche, 8 California R. 522.

pal, therefore, has no operation upon his act. The power, given by the principal, is, under such circumstances, rather an assent or agreement that the agent may transfer the property vested in him, free from any equities of the principal, than strictly a power to transfer.¹

1 Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in *Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Adm'r*, 8 Wheat. R. 174, stated the grounds of this distinction very fully. "The interest or title in the thing being vested in the person who gives the power, remains in him, unless it be conveyed with the power, and can pass out of him only by a regular act in his own name. The act of the substitute, therefore, which in such a case is the act of the principal, to be legally effectual, must be in his name, must be such an act as the principal himself would be capable of performing, and which would be valid if performed by him. Such a power necessarily ceases with the life of the person making it. But if the interest or estate passes with the power, and vests in the person by whom the power is to be exercised, such person acts in his own name. The estate, being in him, passes from him by a conveyance in his own name. He is no longer a substitute, acting in the place and name of another, but is a principal, acting in his own name, in pursuance of powers, which limit his estate. The legal reason, which limits a power to the life of the person giving it, exists no longer, and the rule ceases with the reason on which it is founded. The intention of the instrument may be effected without violating any legal principle. This idea may be in some degree illustrated by examples of cases, in which the law is clear, and which are incompatible with any other exposition of the term 'power coupled with an interest.' If the word 'interest,' thus used, indicated a title to the proceeds of the sale, and not a title to the thing to be sold, then a power to A, to sell for his own benefit, would be a power coupled with an interest; but a power to A, to sell for the benefit of B, would be a naked power, which could be executed only in the life of the person who gave it. Yet for this distinction no legal reason can be assigned. Nor is there any reason for it in justice; for a power to A, to sell for the benefit of B, may be as much a part of the contract, on which B advances his money, as if the power had been made to himself. If this were the true exposition of the term, then a power to A to sell for the use of B, inserted in a conveyance to A of the thing to be sold, would not be a power coupled with an interest, and, consequently, could not be exercised after the death of the person making it; while a power to A, to sell and pay a debt to himself, though not accompanied with any conveyance, which might vest the title in him, would enable him to make the conveyance, and to pass a title not in him, even after the vivifying principle of the power had become extinct. But every day's experience teaches us, that the law is not, as the first case put would suppose. We know, that a power to sell for the benefit of B, engrafted on an estate conveyed to A, may be exercised at any time, and is not affected by the death of the person who created it. It is, then, a power coupled with an interest, although the person, to whom it is given, has no interest in its exercise. His power is coupled with an interest in the thing, which enables him to execute it in his own name, and is, therefore, not dependent on the life of

[489 *a*. A recent case furnishes an illustration of this principle. A person, going abroad on account of ill health, employed an agent to carry on his business, with complete possession and control of his property, with a written power to sell all or any of the furniture, stock, and property at any time in his hands, and to apply the proceeds to the security or payment of a specified note, indorsed by such agent and a third person, or of any other note given in renewal of the same, or for which the agent might become responsible. It was held, that the possession of the property being connected with the power for the protection and indemnity of the agent, as well as for other purposes, the agent had a power coupled with an interest, which survived after the death of the principal abroad, and authorized the agent to sell the property for his protection and indemnity, after such death.¹]

§ 490. The same principle applies, *a fortiori*, to the death of the agent; for it then becomes practically impossible for him to execute the power, either in his own name, or in the name of his principal. But a further reason exists why it should not be executed by his personal representatives; and that is, that the principal must be presumed to have placed a confidence and trust in the personal character and skill of his agent, which might not equally extend to his representatives.² The same reasoning will

the person who created it. The general rule, that a power of attorney, though irrevocable by the party during his life, is extinguished by his death, is not affected by the circumstance, that testamentary powers are executed after the death of the testator. The law, in allowing a testamentary disposition of property, not only permits a will to be considered as a conveyance, but gives it an operation, which is not allowed to deeds, which have their effect during the life of the person who executes them. An estate, given by will, may take effect at a future time, or on a future contingency, and in the mean time descends to the heir. The power is, necessarily, to be executed after the death of the person, who makes it, and cannot exist during his life. It is the intention, that it shall be executed after his death. The conveyance, made by the person to whom it is given, takes effect by virtue of the will, and the purchaser holds his title under it. Every case of a power, given in a will, is considered in a Court of Chancery as a trust for the benefit of the person for whose use the power is made, and as a devise or bequest to that person."

¹ *Knap v. Alvord*, 10 Paige, R. 205.

² *Ex parte Mandat*, n. 101. See *Merrick's estate*, 8 Watts & Serg. R. 402; *Bravard*, 495: *City Council v. Duncan*, 2 Id. 225.

apply to the case of a substitute, who is appointed by the agent under a power of substitution. The death of the agent extinguishes the power of the substitute; for the agent is accountable to the principal for the acts of his substitute, since he is appointed by, and in place of, the agent; and the appointment is, therefore, naturally withdrawn by the death of the appointer.¹ But a distinction may well exist in this matter, where the substitute is to be treated as the sole agent of the principal; as, if the power be to the agent, and if he cannot or will not act, then that he may appoint another to act as the agent of the principal, and not as a substitute under himself.² For, in this latter case, the death of the agent will not revoke the appointment made by him of the sub-agent.³

§ 491. These doctrines are not peculiar to our law. In the Roman law the rule was fully recognized, that a mere power or authority expired by the death either of the principal, or of the agent. *Mandatum, re integró, Domini morte finitur.*⁴ *Inter casus omittendi mandati etiam mors mandatoris est; nam mandatum solvitur morte.*⁵ *Morte quoque ejus, cui mandatum est, si is integro adhuc mandato decesserit, solvitur mandatum.*⁶ But there was this qualification of the doctrine in the Roman law, that, if the business was in part executed by the agent, at the time of the death of the agent, (but not otherwise,) the remainder might be executed by his heir, who succeeded to the authority.⁷ This

¹ Pothier, de Mandat, n. 105; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 308, (edit. 1818); Ante, § 469.

² Ante, § 469.

³ Pothier, de Mandat, n. 105; *Smith v. White*, 5 Dana, 370, Story on Bailm. § 20.

⁴ Cod. Lib. 4, tit. 35, l. 15; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 76; Pothier, de Mandat, n. 108; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 4, art. 6.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 26, Intro.; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 76.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 27, § 3; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 75.

⁷ Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 75; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 304, 305; (edit. 1818); Pothier, de Mandat, n. 101; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 4, art. 7. This distinction in the Roman law between cases, where the mandate is wholly unexecuted, and where it is partly executed, as to the validity of the subsequent acts of the agent or of his representatives, does not seem founded in any very satisfactory reasoning. Domat has stated it, (1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 4, arts. 7 and 8,) and has added the following very sensible questions. "But, if a proxy, or other agent, were charged with an affair, which could not admit of delay, such as the

was expressly laid down in the case of a deceased partner, where the heir was held to be authorized to complete the execution of the inchoate act of the deceased partner. *Hæres socii, quamvis socius non est, tamen ea, quæ per defunctum inchoata sunt, per hæredem explicari debent.*¹ So, the acts of the agent, done *bonæ fide*, in ignorance of the death of his principal, were held valid and binding upon the heirs of the latter.² *Si tamen per ignorantiam impletum est, competere actionem utilitatis causâ dicitur. Julianus quoque scripsit, morte solvi mandatum, sed obligationem aliquando durare.*³ *Si quis debitori suo mandaverit, ut Titio solveret, et debitor, mortuo eo, cum id ignoraret, solverit, liberari eum oportet.*⁴ Hence Paulus declared: *Mandatum mortis mandatoris, non etiâ mandati actio solvitur.*⁵ *A fortiori*, the same rule was applied, where the authority was not to be executed until after the death of the principal.⁶ *Idem est, et si mandavi tibi, ut post mortem meam hæredibus meis emeris fundum.*⁷

care of gathering in a harvest, or any other pressing and important affair, and, just as he is going to execute the order, or after he has already begun it, he learns the death of the person, from whom he received his order, and he cannot give notice of it to the heirs or executors, who happen to be absent, may not he, and even ought not he, to execute the order?" And again—"But, if the heir, or executor, of the proxy, knowing the order, that was given him, and seeing, that the absent master could not look after his own affairs, and that there would be danger of some loss, if he did not take care of it; would not he be obliged to do what were in his power, such as to continue to till the land, or to gather in the harvest?" See also Story on Bailm. §§ 202, 204.

¹ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 2, l. 40; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 2, n. 59; Pothier, de Mandat, n. 101; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 4, arts. 7, 8.

² 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 15, § 4, arts. 7, 8.

³ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 26, Introd.; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 77.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 26, § 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 77; Pothier, de Mandat, n. 106.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 58, Introd.; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 77; Dig. Lib. 48, tit. 2, l. 32.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 12, § 17; Id. l. 48; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 78.

⁷ Dig. Lib. 17, tit. 1, l. 18; Pothier Pand. Lib. 17, tit. 1, n. 78; 2 Liverm. on Agency, 805, 806, (edit. 1818.) The same doctrine is still more succinctly expressed in the Institutes. "Item, si adhuc integro mandato, mors alterutrius interveniat, id est, vel ejus, qui mandaverit, vel illius, qui mandatum suscepit, nihil mandatum. Sed utilitatis causâ receptum est, si eo mortuo, qui tibi mandatum dedit, ignorans eum decessisse, executus fueris mandatum, posse te actionem habere; alioqui justa et probabilis ignorantia tibi damnum edfer-

• § 492. From the Roman law, similar principles have been imported into the commercial jurisprudence of the modern nations of continental Europe. Pothier says: "The mandate is extinguished by the natural or civil death of the principal, (or mandant,) when it happens, before the agent, (or mandatary,) has executed it. For example, if I have authorized you to purchase a certain thing for me, the power, which I have given you, ceases with my death, and my heirs are not obliged to take, on their own account, the purchase made by you after my death."¹ "But, (he adds,) although the mandate is thus extinguished by the death of the principal, nevertheless, if the agent, being ignorant of the death of the principal, has in good faith transacted the business, with which he was charged, the heirs and other representatives of the principal are bound to indemnify him, and to ratify what he has done."² Again, he says: "Nevertheless, there are cases, in which the agent, although he has knowledge of the death of his principal, not only may, but ought to, act in the business intrusted to him. As, for example, if one is charged with gathering the vintage of another, and hears of the death of his principal at the very time, when the vintage cannot properly be deferred, as the grapes of the country are then fit to be gathered, and there is not time to advise his heirs thereof, who live at a distance, there it will be the duty of the agent to gather the vintage, notwithstanding such death."³ So, if the act, required to be done, is to be done after the death of the principal, the same rule will apply.⁴

§ 493. Pothier adds another most important exception to the rule, as applicable to the business of commerce. Although, (says he,) regularly, every mandate ends with the death of the person giving it, yet it has, for the benefit of commerce, been established, that the commission of these agents, (or manda-

ret. Et huic simile est, quod placuit, si debitores, manumisso dispensatore Titii, per ignorantiam liberto solverint, liberari eos, cum aliqui strictâ jurisdictione non possent liberari; quia alii solvissent, quam cui solvere debuerint." Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 27, § 10.

¹ Pothier, de Mandat, n. 103.

² Pothier, de Mandat, n. 106; Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, n. 81, 448, 475; Id. French edit., n. 81, 448, 511.

³ Pothier, de Mandat, n. 107.

⁴ Pothier, de Mandat, n. 108.

taries,) shall last even after the death of the merchant, who appointed them, until it is revoked by the heir, or other successor. And, in contracting for the business, to which they are appointed, they bind the heir of the merchant who appointed them, or the vacant possession if he has left no heir.¹

¹ Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, n. 448; Id. n. 80, 475; Id. French edit. n. 81, 449, 511; Pothier, de Mandat, n. 109. See also Emerig. sur Assur. tom. 2, p. 120. Other illustrations will be found in Mr. Cushing's very valuable translation of Pothier on the Contract of Sale, n. 32. Pothier there says: "In this contract, as in others, the consent of the parties may be manifested, not only between those who are present together, but also between those who are at a distance from each other, by means of letters, or through the intervention of an agent *per epistolam, aut per nuntium*. In order that the consent of the parties may take place in the last-mentioned case, it is necessary, that the will of the party, who makes a proposition in writing, should continue until his letter reaches the other party, and until the other party declares his acceptance of the proposition. This will is presumed to continue, if nothing appears to the contrary. But, if I write a letter to a merchant living at a distance, and therein propose to him to sell me a certain quantity of merchandise, for a certain price; and, before my letter has time to reach him, I write a second, informing him, that I no longer wish to make the bargain; or if I die; or lose the use of my reason; although the merchant, on the receipt of my letter, being in ignorance of my change of will, or of my death, or insanity, makes answer that he accepts the proposed bargain; yet there will be no contract of sale between us; for, as my will does not continue until his receipt of my letter, and his acceptance of the proposition contained in it, there is not that consent or concurrence of our wills, which is necessary to constitute the contract of sale. This is the opinion of Bartholus, and the other jurists, cited by Bruneman, ad l. 1, § 2, D. de contrah. empt. (Dig. Lib. 18, tit. 1, b. 1, § 2,) who very properly rejected the contrary opinion of the Gloss, *ad dictam legem*. It must be observed, however, that if my letter causes the merchant to be at any expense, in proceeding to execute the contract proposed; or, if it occasions him any loss, as, for example, if, in the intermediate time between the receipt of my first and that of my second letter, the price of that particular kind of merchandise falls, and my first letter deprives him of an opportunity to sell it before the fall of the price; in all these cases, I am bound to indemnify him, unless I prefer to agree to the bargain, as proposed by my first letter. This obligation results from that rule of equity, that no person should suffer from the act of another; *Nemo ex alterius facto gravari debet*. I ought, therefore, to indemnify him for the expense and loss which I occasion him by making a proposition, which I afterwards refuse to retract. For the same reason, if the merchant, on the receipt of my first letter, and before receiving the second, which contains a revocation of it, or being in ignorance of my insanity or death, which prevents the conclusion of the bargain, has taken the merchant's account and forwards the merchandise; though, in that case, there is no contract of sale between us, yet he will have a right to

*§ 494. Similar principles will be found adopted into the jurisprudence of Scotland. Thus, it is laid down by Erskine, in his Institutes, that mandates expire by the death of the mandant, (the principal,) both because it is presumed that the commission was accepted from a personal regard to him, and because the will of the mandant, which alone supports the commission, ceases necessarily upon his death. They expire by the death of the mandatary, (the agent,) because the commission was given from the mandant's special confidence in him.¹ But, (he adds,) if a mandatary, ignorant of the mandant's death, continue to execute the commission *bonâ fide*, what he doth under that *ignorantia facti* must be ratified by the mandant's heir; for, till the mandatary knew of his employer's death, it was his duty to go on in the management. But if the mandatary, ignorant, perhaps, that mandates are vacated by the death of the mandant, shall, after his knowledge of it, proceed to execute a commission, which he had accepted at the desire of the deceased, what he does cannot affect the mandant's heir; for ignorance of law can give no man a right to manage the affairs of another, who had given him no commission. Yet this is to be understood, *rebus integris*. For if part of the commission had been executed before the mandant's death, by which the management would suffer if the whole were not to be carried into immediate execution, the powers given by the mandate are not accounted to have expired, and the mandatary not only may, but ought, to continue his management.² In the same manner, if the mandatary should die after having begun a course of management, which

compel me or my heirs to execute the proposed contract, not in virtue of any contract of sale, but of my obligation to indemnify him, which results from the rule of equity above mentioned." The decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in *McCulloch v. The Eagle Insurance Co* 1 Pick. 278, is in conformity to this general doctrine. But the English decisions are to the contrary, holding that the offer by the mail is a continuing offer up to the time when the other party assents thereto, and then becomes obligatory on both parties. *Adams v. Lindsell*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 681; Long on Sales, by Rand, (1839,) pp. 182, 183. See also Pothier de Change, n. 179. [And such is now the well-settled English¹ and American law, on this subject.]

¹ Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 40; 2 Bell, Comm. § 413, (4th edit.); Id. p. 488-490, (5th edit.)

² Ante, §§ 465, 466, 483.

required to be carried on without delay, his heir may execute what was left unfinished by his ancestor.¹

§ 495. Reasonable as these doctrines seem, and convenient as they must be admitted to be, for the practical purposes of trade and commerce, it has been thought that they do not prevail in the common law, as recognized either in England or in America.²

¹ Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 3, § 41; 2 Bell, Comm. § 413, (4th edit.); Id. p. 488-490, (5th edit.)

² 2 Comm. Lect. 41, p. 646, (4th edit.) See also Story on Bailm §§ 204, 205; Ante, §§ 465, 466, 483 Mr. Thompson, on the subject of the limitation of the agency, says: "Mandates terminate, in general, by the death of the mandant or mandatary; by the insanity of the latter; by revocation; by renunciation; or by the sequestration of the mandant, which vests his estate, and all the rights connected with it, in his creditors. The mandatary's bankruptcy does not appear to be inconsistent with the continuance of his mandate. But the rights of third parties are differently affected by its termination, from the cause now stated, according as they have or have not been led to believe in its continuance. Any person allowing another to exercise a general management of his affairs, whether by express or tacit mandate, contracts thereby an implied obligation to the public, that the mandate shall be held *quoad* him as continued, until its termination becomes notorious, or has been made known to the party contracting. In this view, as the mandant's death and bankruptcy are notorious events, the presumption is, that every person is aware of them; and, therefore, contracts made subsequently with the mandatary, or acts performed by him, will not be valid, unless it is proved by the parties making them that these events were unknown to the mandatary or the contracting party, and could not have been known by ordinary diligence. Further, if a factor has advanced money before his constituent's death or bankruptcy, on the faith of goods consigned to him, he will be entitled, even after these events, to sell the goods for his indemnification. Such advances change the contract from mandate to loan and security. But, on the principles which have been now mentioned, there is no ground to presume that the revocation or renunciation of a general mandate, (neither of them being notorious,) are known to third parties; and, therefore, the contracts of such parties with a general agent will be effectual, unless it is proved that they knew, or ought to have known, of the renunciation or recall. For instance, a servant, who had power to draw bills in his master's name, may bind him by bills so drawn after his dismissal, if the party taking them had not time to know of it. The kind of information which is necessary to exclude this risk, shall be afterwards considered with reference to the dissolution of partnership. In the event of the mandant's supervening insanity, which is not in itself notorious, it seems to follow, from the mandant's implied contract with the public, that transactions, made even after it, with the mandatary, shall stand, unless with reference to parties who knew of the insanity. Such parties cannot be said to be *bonâ fide* to contract; or rather, it cannot be said, that, with regard to them, (as they cannot plead want of notice,) the mandant's insanity annulled the mandatary's powers. The same rule,

But it may be doubted whether our law deserves such a reproach, at least to the full extent in which it is usually imputed to it. Regularly, indeed, where the act to be done must be done in the name of the principal, and not in that of the agent, the authority is extinguished by the death of the principal, because it has then become incapable of being so executed.¹ And it should seem that this would be equally true in the Roman law, and in the jurisprudence of continental Europe, under the like circumstances. The difference on this subject between our law and the latter seems to rest, not so much upon a difference of principle, as upon the difference in the modes of executing the authority. Under the Roman law, the agent ordinarily executed his authority in his own name, and thereby bound his principal, indirectly, by his contract, *et mandato*, and himself personally.² An execution of the authority in the name of his principal was not generally allowed or required. In the jurisprudence of modern continental Europe, the rule of the Roman law would seem still to exist, so far, that the agent may bind the principal by the act done in his, the agent's, own name, *et mandato*; although he is also at liberty to do the act in the name of his principal, in which latter case he may escape from any personal responsibility.³

under the same limitations, appears to hold with regard to all mandates, which however limited in their terms, are acted on before the public as general mandates, the public being entitled to rely on them as general mandates till their termination is made known. It has been said that limited mandates, (which expire, in general, from the causes already mentioned, or by performance of the business for which they were granted,) are not, like general powers, capable of extension by mere inference and *bona fides*. But the mandant, by suffering such a mandatary to act, enters into the same implied contract with the public as in a general mandate, namely, that the mandate shall continue till its termination is made known; and, therefore, though it be recalled, or have ceased, all facts falling within the scope of it will be good, as to third parties, unless its revocation is notorious, or has been intimated to them. The case of a limited partnership, to be afterwards noticed, which entitles third parties, after its dissolution, to rely on contracts within the scope of it, made by any one partner in the company's name, before the dissolution is made known to them, affords an illustration of this principle." Thompson on Bills, p. 224-227, (2d edit. 1836.)

¹ Ante, §§ 147, 148, 148.

² Ante, §§ 163, 271; 1 Starr, Inst. B. 1, tit. 12, § 16.

³ Ante, § 163, and note, 265 a; Polier on Oblig. n. 82; Smout v. Ilberry, 10 Mees. & Welsh, B. 1.

This is certainly the doctrine in Scotland.¹ Where the act, notwithstanding the death of the principal, can and may be done in the name of the agent, there seems to be a sound reason why his death should not be deemed to be a positive revocation under all circumstances, and that a subsequent execution of it may be valid. [And this principle has recently been adopted in the American law. Thus, where A had, by letter, requested and authorized B to make sale of a tract of wild land for him, and B, in accordance with the request and authority as expressed by the letter, made a contract of sale and received part of the purchase-money, and gave possession of the land to C for A, in accordance with the contract, shortly after the death of A, but without knowledge of that event, and C afterward paid the residue of the purchase-money due on the contract to the guardian of the heirs of A, on demand thereof; and afterward the heirs having brought an action to recover possession of said lands, and C having, thereupon, commenced suit against them to enjoin their proceeding in such action, it was held that the transaction being a matter *in pais*, and not by deed, or necessary to be done in the name of the principal, and being in good faith on the part of B and C, and within the apparent authority of B as so expressed by A without knowledge of his death, the heirs and representatives of A are estopped to deny such apparent authority of B, and the contract is obligatory on them.²] But,

¹ 1 Stair, Inst. B. 1, tit. 12, § 16.

² [Ish v. Crane, 8 Ohio St. R. 520. Sut'ill, J., in an able judgment there said: "As a general rule, it is well understood that the authority of the agent, depending upon the power he possesses to represent his principal, must be regarded as terminated upon the termination of his power; and that the death of the principal terminates the power of the agent. The death of the principal is said to be a revocation, by operation of law, of the power of the agent to act as an agent. And it is insisted (and there are some authorities to that effect), that a revocation of the authority of the agent, by the death of the principal, necessarily leaves all acts of the agent done thereafter, in no respect binding upon the estate or representatives of the principal.

"I apprehend, however, that the weight of authorities upon this subject will be found to go no further than to hold absolutely void acts of the agent, after the death of his principal and without notice, which must necessarily be done in the name of the principal.

"One of the oldest and leading authorities referred to in support of the general proposition that all acts of the agent, not coupled with an interest, after the

where the act is required to be done in the name of the principal, the same objection would seem to lie to it in the foreign law as does lie in our law.

death of the principal, are absolutely void, is Littleton. But upon referring to that authority, it is found to be merely this. If a man maketh a deed of feoffment to another, and a letter of attorney to one to deliver to him seizin by force of the same deed; yet if livery of seizin be not executed in the life of him which made the deed, this availeth nothing, for that the other had nought to have the tenements according to the purport of the said deed before livery of seizin made; and if there be no livery of seizin, then, after the decease of him who made the deed, the right of these tenements is forthwith in his heirs, or in some other. Coke on Litt. § 66.

“Sir Edward Coke, in his commentary on this section, remarks: ‘Here albeit the warrant of attorney be indefinite without limitation of any time, yet the law prescribeth a time, as Littleton here saith, in the life of him that made the deed; but the death not only of the feoffor, of whom Littleton speaketh, but of the feoffee also, is a countermand in law of the letter of attorney, and the deed itself is become of none effect, because, in this case, nothing doth passe before livery of seizin. For if the feoffor dieth, the land descends to his heirs; and if the feoffee dieth, livery cannot be made to his heirs, because, then he should take by purchase, where heirs were named by way of limitation. And herewith agreeth Bracton. “*Item oportet quod donacionem sequatur receptio, cum in vita donatoris et donatorii.*” Therefore, a letter of attorney to deliver livery of seizin after the decease of the feoffor, is void.’

“The same doctrine has been applied in the case of fines and common recoveries, in which it has uniformly been held, where an appearance has been entered and a judgment suffered under and by virtue of a warrant of attorney after the death of the vouchee, that, upon the death of the vouchee, the warrant of attorney became void, and the judgment thereon of no effect. *Wynne v. Wynne*, 7 Mod. Rep. 503, and Will. Rep. 563, where the same case is reported. The action was one of common recovery. The recovery was of Easter term, 1740. The writ of entry tested the 2d of April, returnable (*quind. pasch.*) the 20th April, fixing the appearance day the 23d, on which day the record showed that the defendant, William Thomas, the tenant, appeared and vouched J. Apperley and Alatheia, his wife, whereupon a writ of summons and *warrantum* was awarded, returnable on the morrow of Ascension (May 16th), of that year. The dedimus to take the warrant of attorney was tested the 25th April. The warrant of attorney was executed by J. Apperley and wife, on the 30th, and the mittimus by which it was sent out of chancery into that Court (the Common Pleas), was tested the 8th of May. Alatheia died on the 10th of May. It was held, that the warrant of attorney by Alatheia, so executed, was revoked by her death, and did not authorize the attorney to enter an appearance on the 16th, (after her death), nor authorize a judgment of recovery.

“It will readily occur to any one, that in relation to the conveyance of the title of land, either by the execution of a deed of conveyance, or by suffering a

§ 496. Now, our law recognizes this very distinction in its fullest force. In the case of an authority coupled with a vested

common recovery, the power of the agent must necessarily terminate on the death of the principal. Even a deed signed and sealed by one, with the intent and wish to deliver the same, would, from the necessity of the case, be inoperative to convey a title by delivery after the death of the maker of the deed. The title of the land passing, upon his death, *instantly*, to the heir or devisee of the deceased, no action of the attorney, even if his powers continued, could affect the title. His action would have the same relation to the title as it would, the principal living, and having before conveyed the title to a stranger, if the attorney, in ignorance of the fact, by virtue of his power of attorney, should afterwards execute a deed of conveyance of the same land to another.

"But there is no necessity of this kind for holding the authority of the agent to make contracts within his agency terminate *instantly* upon the death of the principal.

"The termination of the authority of the agent by virtue of his agency, upon the death of the principal, seems rather to rest upon the general rule of law, that the derivative authority expires with the original authority from which derived.

"It is said, as a reason for the termination of the power of the agent upon the expiration of the power of the principal, that it is impossible that the power of the agent, who is only to act for or in the stead of the principal, as his representative can in fact be greater or continue longer than the power of the principal. But the power of the principal may be terminated by bankruptcy or lunacy, and in the case of a *feme sole*, by coverture. In each of those cases, a revocation of the agency by operation of law, by change of condition or state of the principal, producing in him an incapacity to act legally, obtains under the general rule, as well as in case of revocation by the death of the principal. The general rule that such change of state, terminating the power of the principal to act, is a revocation of the agency by operation of law, obtains in each of the cases named. And the question arises in each, whether there is in fact any exception to the application of the general rule. Is coverture, bankruptcy, lunacy or death, terminating, as they respectively do, the power of the principal, to be regarded as so terminating the authority of the agent, that his acts are necessarily to be regarded in all cases as void, and of no binding effect upon the representatives or estate of the principal?

"The general rule that a mere power or authority expires by the death of either the principal or agent, is recognized in the civil law, as well as at common law. Yet under the civil law it has always been held that the acts of an agent done in good faith in discharge of the duties of the agency, after the death of the principal, and in ignorance of the event on the part of those concerned in the transaction, were valid and binding upon the representatives of the principal. 1 Dom. B. 1, tit. 15, sec. 4, art. 7-8.

"Pothier, in treating upon this subject, says: 'The mandate is extinguished by the natural or civil death of the principal (or mandant) when it happens before

interest in the thing, we have already seen, that it is not extinguished by the death of the principal, for the very reason, that

the agent (or mandatary) has executed it. For example, if I have authorized you to purchase a certain thing for me, the power which I have given you, ceases with my death, and my heirs are not obliged to take, on their own account, the purchase made by you after my death.' But, he adds, 'although the mandate is thus extinguished by the death of the principal, nevertheless, if the agent, being ignorant of the death of the principal, has in good faith transacted the business with which he was charged, the heirs and other representatives of the principal are bound to indemnify him, and to ratify what he has done.'

"But while it is conceded that in Scotland, and in all other countries where the principles of the civil law obtain, this rule is recognized, that the acts of an agent, done *bonâ fide*, after the death of the principal, but without notice of his death, are valid and binding, it insisted that the same rule does not find favor at common law.

"Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, vol. ii. page 616, in treating upon this subject, uses the following language: 'By the civil law, and the law of those countries which have adopted the civil law, the acts of an agent done *bonâ fide* after the death of the principal, and before notice of his death, are valid and binding on his representatives. But this equitable principle does not prevail in the English law; and the death of the principal is an instantaneous and absolute revocation of the authority of the agent unless the power be coupled with an interest.'

"The great learning and deservedly high reputation of the author, has, doubtless, tended to give more confidence to the doctrine thus unqualifiedly expressed, than the authorities to which he refers for its support would seem to warrant. The first authority referred to by Mr. Kent is the case of *The King v. Corporation of Bedford Level*, 6 East's Rep. 356. It will be perceived, however, upon reference to the authority, that the question was only incidentally presented in that case. The question arose as to the validity of the act of a *deputy registrar* after the death of the principal registrar. The Solicitor-general Wilson, and Abbott, in their argument upon this point, used the following language: 'He is a mere ministerial officer, having no discretion to exercise; this is most like the case of a steward of a manor who may take surrenders and do other ministerial acts, though not legally invested with the office; because, as it is said in *Knowles v. Luce*, Moor, 112, those for whom such acts are done know not the extent of his title. And there Manwood, C. B., who delivered the judgment of the Court, compares it to the case of an under-steward when the head steward is dead, whom he considers to have a color of authority; so that if he assemble the tenants and they do their service at the court, the acts which he does are good. And he distinguishes that from the case of an officer who acts without either color or right.' Lord Ellenborough, in delivering his opinion in the case, held that the appointment of the deputy registrar must be regarded as made by the principal registrar Cole, and added: 'If, then, it were to be considered as the deputy of Cole, his authority would necessarily expire on the death of his principal. I feel

"it can still be executed in the name of the agent, he having the vested legal or equitable title in the thing, which he can trans-

myself pressed, however, with the authority of the doctrine in the case of Moor, that the acts of an under-steward may be good after the death of his principal; and it is a very important point to be considered how far that may be carried. Lawrence, J., and Le Blanc, J., respectively expressed similar opinions upon the same question.

"Lord Ellenborough, C. J., on the next day delivered the opinion of the whole Court. In the opinion he uses the following language: 'The case pressed upon us from Moor 112, on being considered, is not, we think, an authority against this opinion, where Manwood, C. B., says, "there is a diversity between copyhold grants by a steward who has a color and no right to hold a court, and one who has neither color or right; for if one who has color assemble the tenants and they do their service, the acts are good which he does, as the under-steward when the head steward is dead." But this must be understood of acts of the under-steward after the death of his principal, and before his death is known, for if that were known to the tenants, what color could he have to act?'"

"The case of Shipman v. Thompson, Will. Rep 103, is referred to by Mr. Kent as another authority in point. That case was as follows: An action of assumpsit was brought by an executor, in his own name, against an attorney constituted by the testator to collect money for him of his tenants, to recover money which the attorney had collected from the tenants, as such attorney, after the death of the testator, the principal. The main question seems to have been, whether the action for money had and received could be maintained against the attorney in the name of the executor. The following is the language of that part of the opinion of Mr. B. Fortescue, before whom the cause was tried, which seems in point: 'It is quite a new debt, created by the defendant to the executor since the death of the testator, and a new cause of action which was not subsisting before. The defendant was never indebted to the testator for this money, and the original debtors, the tenants, are discharged.'

"The case of Watson, etc. v. King, 4 Campb. N. P. Rep 272, another case referred to by the commentator, presented the question incidentally as follows: Maxwell, the intestate, being the owner of three fourths part of the ship Little William, in April, 1813, gave a power of attorney to one Ward, to whom he was largely indebted, authorizing him to sell them. He then sailed in the ship Effort for Bermuda. In February, 1814, he was with this ship at Jamaica, and sailed in her for England with a large fleet, under convoy of H. M. ship Valiant. A hurricane soon after arose, in which several of the fleet foundered. The Effort parted company on the 7th of March, and was never more heard of. On the 8th of June following, Ward, under the power of attorney, sold Maxwell's interest in the Little William to the defendant, and indorsed the register in Maxwell's name. The suit brought by Watson and his wife, described in the declaration as administratrix of Maxwell, was an action of trover, to recover of King the three fourths of the ship held by him under said purchase. Among other objections to recovery, it was urged that the power of attorney, being coupled with an inter-

fer or change by his own act, as owner.¹ And it seems reasonable to believe, that the same doctrine would be fully recog-

est, was not revoked by the death of the intestate. Lord Ellenborough delivered the opinion of the Court, and is reported to have decided this point as follows: 'A power coupled with an interest cannot be revoked by the person granting it; but it is necessarily revoked by his death. How can a valid act be done in the name of a dead man?' The opinion was delivered by Lord Ellenborough in 1815, ten years after the opinion he delivered in the case of *The King v. The Corporation of Bedford Level*, in 6 East above referred to; and *without any qualification of his former opinion*. The question as to whether the title of Maxwell had been transferred by *his name*, after his death, being indorsed upon the register, is obviously quite a different one from the one under consideration here.

"The case of *Bergen & Bergen v. Bennett*, also cited by Mr. Kent, (1 Caines' Cases 1), was simply this: On the 12th April, 1776, Bennett executed to Vanderhilt a bond for £600, payable in one year, and for further security gave a mortgage on sixty-seven acres of land. Shortly after this, on the 8th of November, 1776, the mortgagor died intestate, leaving the respondent, Wilhelmus Bennett, fifteen years of age, his eldest son and heir at law. The usual power to sell was contained in the mortgage, which, *together with the power*, was, on the 10th of April, 1777, registered in the office of the county clerk, *in the book for registering mortgages*. In the registry the mortgage was, as usual, abbreviated; but the power was, though *not recommended as deeds usually are*, set forth in the registry of the mortgage *in hoc verba*, excepting as to the latter part declaring the sale to be a perpetual bar, etc., which was totally omitted. On the 13th of April, 1781, Teunis Bergen, the appellant, purchased the bond and mortgage for £700. In 1783, the respondent, the heir of the mortgagor, left the State and went to Nova Scotia. On the 11th of March, 1804, notice of sale of the premises, at public vendue, was published by Teunis Bergen. Upon the day fixed by the notice, the premises were offered and sold at public vendue to Michael Bergen, the other appellant, for \$700. The sale appeared to have been fairly made. In 1788, the respondent came back to that State, and on the 3d of February, 1800, filed his bill to redeem the premises, for the reason, among others, 'because the power to sell contained in the mortgage expired with the life of the donor.' The opinion was delivered by Kent, J., reversing the decree of the Court of Chancery, permitting the heir to redeem; and upon the point raised he used the following language: 'I conclude, therefore, that the power to sell was not revoked by the death of the mortgagor, and that the decree cannot be supported on the ground that was taken in the Court below.'

"The case of *Harper v. Little*, 2 Greenl. 14, also referred to by the commentator, only decides the familiar principle of law that a deed, made after the death of the principal, in his name, under a power of attorney executed by him when living, is inoperative to convey the title of lands. Another case referred to by Mr. Kent is that of *Hunt v. Administrator of Rousmanier*, 2 Mason's Rep. 214.

¹ Ante, §§ 488, 489.

nized in our law in all other cases of authority, where the act to be done may lawfully be done in the sole name of the agent.

Hunt filed his petition in equity charging that Rousmanier, in his lifetime, borrowed of him, Hunt, \$1450, January 11, 1820, and gave a bill of sale of his interest in the brig *Marcus*, then at sea, for collateral security for the payment of the loan; and on the 13th day of the same month executed a power of attorney authorizing the plaintiff to execute a bill of sale of his interest, three fourths of the brig, to himself or any other person he should think proper, etc., reciting in a proviso that the same was given for collateral security for the payment of the note of \$1450, payable in ninety days, etc.; and that the intestate, on the 6th of May, 1820, died; that the defendants, administrators of the intestate, had refused to pay, and he had therefore advertised the three fourths of the brig for sale, by virtue of the power aforesaid, for the payment of said demand, but that the administrators forbade the sale, and refused to suffer the plaintiff to avail himself of his said security, etc. Upon hearing the case on demurrer the following points were held by the Court: 1. That a power coupled with an interest does not expire on the death of the person creating it; 2. A naked power does not necessarily expire with the death of the person creating it. And upon this point the following language is used by Judge Story in giving the opinion: 'When, therefore, it is said that a naked power is extinguished by the death of the person creating it, the language is meant to be confined to those cases in which, as in the case now before the Court, the power is to be executed in the name and as the act of the grantor, and not of the grantee.' The same case afterwards came before the Supreme Court, (8 Wheat. 201,) and was in that Court decided upon the same ground. Chief Justice Marshall, in pronouncing the opinion, resolves the case under the general rule that the death of the principal was a revocation of the letter of attorney; and as the sale was to be made in the name of the principal, and after his death was known, no power to sell was held by the holder of the letter of attorney.

"I have thus particularly referred to each of the authorities given by Mr. Kent in support of the doctrine expressed by him upon this subject.

"Mr. Justice Story, in treating of the subject, is much more guarded and less positive as to the doctrine of the common law differing from the civil law.

"After mentioning the rule prevailing in Scotland, and recognized in all countries where the civil law prevails, that if the agent, being ignorant of the death of his principal, has, in good faith, transacted the business with which intrusted, his acts are to be held valid, he adds: 'Reasonable as these doctrines seem, and convenient as they must be admitted to be, for the practical purposes of trade and commerce, it has been thought that they do not prevail in the common law as recognized either in England or in America.' And here reference is made by Mr. Story to the opinion of Mr. Kent already referred to. 'But' (continues Mr. Story,) 'it may be doubted whether our law deserves such a reproach, at least to the full extent in which it is usually imputed to it. Regularly, indeed, where the act to be done must be done in the name of the principal, and not in that of the agent, the authority is extinguished by the death of the principal,

Thus, for example, a factor, as special owner of the goods may, and indeed usually does, sell them in his own name.¹ So, a

because it has then become incapable of being so executed.' Story on Agency, § 495. Mr. Story did not insist upon any exception or limitation of the rule in relation to the revocation of the authority of the agent by the death of the principal, inconsistent with the doctrine expressed by Littleton & Coke, already referred to. In §§ 147, 148, and 150, of his work upon Agency, Mr. Story concedes that the death of the principal necessarily extinguishes the power of an agent to make a conveyance under seal in the name of his principal, or to execute a bond or any sealed instrument, in the name of the principal, after his death, that can be obligatory upon his representatives. He, however, uses the following language in § 152: 'But when an act is to be done *in pais*, or in any other manner than by a written instrument *under seal*, then the act will be so construed, if it may be, as most effectually to accomplish the end required by the principal.' And the same doctrine is, with equal clearness, expressed in the opinion of the Court in the case of *Hunt v. Romanier*, 2 Mason, 244.

"The distinction thus made between acts of an agent by *deed*, and necessarily to be done in the name of the principal, and acts done *in pais*, and not necessarily to be done in his name, let us suppose the principal to have appointed two agents to transact business for him at a remote distance. One is employed and empowered to sell, survey, and give possession of his land, and to receive payment and receipt therefor. The other agent is authorized to execute deeds of conveyance of the lands respectively to purchasers, upon presentation of receipts of payment, respectively, from the other agent, upon their contracts of sale. The limitation or exception to the rule recognized by Mr. Story would hold the acts of the agent, in selling, giving possession, and receiving and receipting the purchase price of the lands, to be valid, even if done after the death of the principal, if done in good faith and in ignorance of the event. The limitation of the rule would hold those acts valid and binding upon the representatives and estate of the principal as *acts in pais*; while it would still regard the acts of the *other agent*, in executing and delivering deeds *in the name* of the principal, as *void ex necessitate*, and utterly inoperative to convey title after the death of the principal. And the fact of the title of land, by an arbitrary rule of law, passing *instantly* upon the death of the owner, by descent or devise, shows the necessity of the termination of the powers of the attorney and agent for the execution of the deeds, upon the death of the principal.

"At the times that Mr. Kent and Mr. Story respectively expressed their views upon this subject, the revocation of the authority of the agent by death, I am not aware of the existence of a single well-considered adjudicated case upon the point, either in this country or England.

"It seems to have been upon the analogies of the law, as these eminent jurists respectively viewed them, that each formed his opinion.

"I admit that since the time that Mr. Kent expressed his opinion, there have

¹ Ante, §§ 33, 34, 161.

supercargo generally buys and sells in his own name. So, the master of a ship, in the usual course of exercising his authority,

been cases adjudicated both in this country and in England far more in accordance with the doctrine he asserted than the cases he referred to; and which certainly seem to rather support Mr. Story's views than his own. In the case of *Rigs, Aertson & Son v. Cage*, Adm'r, 2 Humph. 350, decided in 1840, the Supreme Court of Tennessee refer to and fully recognize the doctrine of Mr. Kent as expressed in his *Commentaries*, vol. ii. p. 645. But it does not appear from the report of the case that the correctness of the doctrine as laid down by Mr. Kent, was questioned by either counsel or court. Judge Green, who delivered the opinion in that case, perhaps may be said to have recognized the same view of the law, incidentally, at the preceding term of that Court, in the case of *Jenkins v. Atkins*, 1 Humph. 294. In the case of *Gale v. Tappan*, 12 N. H. Rep. 146, in which it was held that a demand made by an attorney, appointed by the payee in his lifetime, after his death, was without authority, the Court say generally, 'that an authority of this kind is determined by the death of the principal.' But in that case it does not appear that the demand was made in ignorance of the death of the principal, or that it was not a case properly to be resolved under the general rule. The doctrine, as laid down by Mr. Kent, seems to have been fully recognized by the King's Bench in the case of *Blades v. Free*, executor of Clark, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 167. But the limitation or exception to the general rule, here under consideration, does not appear from the report to have been argued by counsel, or particularly considered by the Court, but seems to have been passed, *sub silentio*, as it was by the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

"I know of no other adjudicated case directly in point denying the limitation or exception to the rule existing at common law, as well as under the civil law. Nor are there perhaps a greater number of adjudicated cases to be found directly in point to maintain the converse of the proposition. But in this dearth of authorities, I think the weight of authority, English and American, is in favor of the existence of the limitation or exception to the rule at common law, as well as under the civil law. And the argument arising from the analogies of the law, I regard as very decidedly in favor of the exception and limitation of the rule being recognized.

"The authority of the agent, arising as it does from the relation of the agent to his principal, would seem *logically* to depend necessarily upon the continuance of that relation. But such *in law* is not the fact. It is admitted that one having been an agent, may, after he has ceased to be such, still have power to bind his principal by his acts. The only real question in dispute between those affirming and denying the limitation or exception under consideration, is, as to the extent of the power of one having ceased to be an agent in fact, to execute the office of agent.

"Let us briefly advert to the authorities upon this point, which are undisputed: —

"*Harrison's case*, as called, 12 Mod. Rep. 346, is reported thus: 'A servant had power to draw bills of exchange in his master's name, and afterward is

"contracts in his own name, as *Dominus navis*.¹ Thus, he purchases supplies, gives bottomry bonds, makes charter-parties, and

turned out of service.' Holt, Chief Justice: If he draw a bill in so little time after, that the world cannot take notice of his being out of service, or if he were a long time out of service, but that kept so secret that the world cannot take notice of it, the bill in those cases shall bind the master.'

"Howard v. Treadwell, 1 Strange 506, a leading case, was as follows: The defendant, who was a considerable dealer in iron, and known to the plaintiff as such, though they had never dealt together before, sent a waterman to the plaintiff for iron on trust, and paid for it afterwards. He sent the same waterman a second time with ready money, who received the goods, but did not pay for them; and the Chief Justice ruled the sending him upon trust the first time and paying for the goods, was giving him credit so as to charge the defendant upon the second contract.

"In treating of when a revocation of the power of the agent by his principal takes effect, Mr. Story says: As to the agent himself, subject to what has already been stated, it takes effect from the time when the revocation is made known to him: and as to third persons, when it is made known to them, and not before. Until, therefore, the revocation is so made known, it is inoperative. If known to the agent, as against his principal, his rights are gone: but as to third persons, who are ignorant of the revocation, his acts bind both himself and principal. Thus, where an agency, constituted by writing, was revoked, but the written authority was left in the hands of the agent, and he subsequently exhibited it to a third person who dealt with him as agent on the faith of it, without any notice of the revocation, the act of the agent, within the scope of the authority, was held to bind the principal. Hence it is, that if a clerk or agent is employed to sign, indorse, or accept bills and notes for his principal, and he is discharged, if the discharge is not known by persons dealing with him, notes and bills subsequently signed, indorsed or accepted by the clerk or agent, will be binding on the principal. Indeed, this is but another application of the known maxim of law and equity, that where one of two innocent persons must suffer, he shall suffer who, by his confidence or silence, or conduct, has misled the other.' Story on Agency, § 470.

"In the extract given, Mr. Story fully approves the doctrine held in the case of *Anon. v. Harrison*, 12 Mod. Rep. and also that of *Burd v. Kirk*, 11 N. H. Rep. 397, in which it was held, where an agency, constituted by writing, is revoked, but the written authority is left in the hands of the agent, and he exhibits it to a third person, who, on the faith of it, and without notice of the revocation, deals with him as an agent, within the scope of its authority, the principal is bound thereby. Indeed, I apprehend, upon this point there is no difference between the views entertained by Mr. Kent and Mr. Story. In his Commentaries, Vol. ii. p. 645, Mr. Kent, after affirming the rule of the common law and the civil law to be the same, uses the following language upon the subject of the revocation of

¹ Ante, §§ 36, 294, 315.

sells the ship, in cases of necessity, in his own name; and these acts are constantly treated, when within the scope of his ordi-

the power of the agent by the principal. 'Even if the notice had reached the agent, and he concealed the knowledge of the revocation from the public, and the circumstances attending the revocation were such that the public had no just ground to presume a revocation, his acts, done under his former power, would still be binding upon his principal.'

"It thus appears evident from the authorities, that the actual revocation of the powers of the agent by the principal, does not, in *all* cases, terminate his authority. In precisely such a case as the one under consideration, if the revocation of the powers of the agent had been actually made by the principal in his lifetime, and he had proceeded to make sale as he did by virtue of the letter which he still held and exhibited, all would agree in pronouncing the acts of the agent binding, and the sale valid.

"But by what reasoning from analogies, or otherwise, can it be shown to be material in the case, whether the revocation of the powers of the agent be *actually made by the principal*, or whether the revocation be by *operation of law* merely?

"In the former case the revocation is intentional, and actually made by the principal; in the latter it is only accidental, and to be inferred from a given state of facts and without the expressed will, and perhaps even against the will, of the principal. There is, then, no apparent reason why a revocation of an agency, by operation of law, by coverture, bankruptcy, lunacy, or death, should at all exclude the limitation or exception to the rule in such a case as the present. The substantive fact, that the agent has ceased to have authority to represent his principal, obtains equally in either case. And yet, paradoxical as it may seem, it is evident, from the authorities, that the agent may, under certain circumstances, continue to represent and bind the interests of his former principal; after the actual revocation of his authority.

"Now upon what principal does the obligation, imposed by the acts of the agent after his authority has terminated, really rest? It seems to me the true answer is, public policy. The great and practical purposes and interests of trade and commerce, and the imperious necessity of confidence in the social and commercial relations of men, require that an agency, when constituted, should continue to be duly accredited. To secure this confidence, and consequent facility and aid to the purposes and interests of commerce, it is admitted that an agency, in cases of *actual* revocation, is still to be regarded as continuing, in such cases as the present, toward third persons, until actual or implied notice of the revocation. And I admit, that I can perceive no reason why the rule should be held differently in cases of revocation by mere operation of law.

"It seems to me that, in all such cases, the party who has, by his own conduct, purposely invited confidence and credit to be reposed in another as his agent, and has thereby induced another to deal with him in good faith, as such agent, neither such party nor his representatives ought to be permitted, in law, to gain-say the commission of credit and confidence so given to him by the principal. And

nary duties and employment, as binding upon his owner.¹ Now, in all these cases of factors, (and especially, if they are for-

I think the authorities go to that extent. (See *Pickard v. Sears*, 6 Ad. & Ell. 475.) The extensive relations of commerce are often remote as well as intimate. The application of this doctrine must include factors, foreign as well as domestic, commission merchants, consignees and supercargoes, and other agents remote from their principal: and who are required, for long periods of time not unfrequently, by their principal to transact business of immense importance, without a possibility of knowing perhaps even the probable continuance of the life of the principal. It must not unfrequently happen that valuable cargoes are sold and purchased in foreign countries by the agent, in obedience to his instructions from his principal, after and without knowledge of his death. And so, too, cases are constantly occurring of money being collected and paid by agents, under instructions of the principal, after and without knowledge of his death. In all these cases, there is certainly every reason for holding valid and binding the acts so done by the agency which the principal had, in his life, constituted and ordered, that there would be to hold valid the acts of one who had ceased to be his agent, by revocation of his power, but without notice to the one trusting him as agent.

"But I have said, that I think the weight of authorities are in favor of the limitation, or exception, to the rule insisted upon: and I will here briefly state the authorities relied upon in support of the proposition.

"It may be observed, in the first place, that the doctrine, as expressed and illustrated by Littlton and by Coke, is not inconsistent with the limitation of the rule. In the case of *Shipman v. Thompson*, Will. Rep. 105, Mr. B. Fortescue, in giving judgment, speaking of money collected of tenants of the principal *after* his death, by an attorney appointed by him in his lifetime, remarked as follows: 'The original debtors, the tenants, are discharged;' intimating thereby that he regarded the payment by the tenants to the attorney of the principal, *after* his death, as payment to the representative of the principal. In the case of *Knowles v. Luce*, Moor, 112, Justice Manwood held, that, where the under-steward, *not knowing* the death of the head-steward, had assembled the tenants and they rendered service under him, although he had no authority in fact *after* the death of the head-steward, his death not being known, it was such *color* of authority, on the part of the under-steward, as to make obligatory his acts of receiving the service.

"And the same doctrine is clearly recognized by Lord Ellenborough, in the case of *The King v. Redford Level*, 6 East, 356. In the case of *McDonald v. McDonald*, Buck, 399, cited to Justice Bailey in the trial of the case of *Blades v. Free*, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 167, it was said, and not disputed, that the Vice-Chancellor referred to a case tried by Lord Mansfield, in which he held, that acts done under a power of attorney in India after the death of the principal, but in ignorance of the fact, were to be held binding upon his representatives. In *Russell on*

sign factors,) and supercargoes, and masters of ships, cases must constantly have arisen, in which the principal has died during

Crimes, 317, it is said: 'Again, the death of the principal will operate as a revocation of the authority,' etc. 'But where the factor or broker has authority to do an act in his own name, then it would seem that the death of the principal will not, *ipso facto*, determine such authority.' In Chitty on Com. and Manuf. 233, the law is said to be, that the acts of a legal agent may be good, done after the death of his principal, before notice thereof to those who are interested in his acts, as being done under a color of authority which strangers could not examine. In Chitty on Contr. 19, is the following language: 'And it is said that a sale or purchase by an agent, even after the death of his principal, if made without notice of the fact, will bind the representatives of the latter.' In the case of Davis v. Lane, 10 N. H. Rep. 156, it was held, that the authority of the agent, when revocable by the principal, was suspended or revoked by his lunacy, in consequence of an entire loss of mental power. But held also, that if the principal, by letter or otherwise, had enabled the agent to hold himself out as having authority, and the incapacity of the principal is not known to those dealing with the agent, within the scope of his apparent authority, the principal and those claiming under him, are precluded from setting up the insanity as a revocation.

"At the September term of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in 1842, the question under consideration first came before that Court, in the case of Cassiday v. M'Kinzie, 4 Watts & Serg 282. To sustain the plea of payment of a certain judgment against Peter Cassiday, entered April 1, 1837, in favor of Eli M'Kinzie, the executors of Cassiday offered in evidence the following order. —

"Mr. Peter Casidy please pay to the bearer Robert Burgoon whatever sum of money the Court should make to me as I am not able to come up to Court to git it myself and I doyt wish you to pay it to John M'Kinsey and the receipt of Robert Burgoon shall be good to you for the same.

"ELI M'KINZEE.

"N. B. Pay the money to no person but Robert Burgoon."

"The defendant below then called Robert Burgoon as a witness, to prove a number of receipts given by him for money upon the order, and the payment of the money as thereby expressed. The receipts were respectively dated Sept. 29, 1838; Jan. 11, 1839; April 15, 1839; June 12, 1839; Nov. 8, 1839; and Nov. 15, 1839. The receipts were admitted to be genuine, but objected to on the ground that the payments to Burgoon were not binding on the plaintiff, who was appointed administrator of M'Kenzie, June 21, 1839. The defendant also offered to prove, that the intestate went to the western country soon after giving the order to Burgoon; and that the money was paid to Burgoon without any knowledge of the death of M'Kenzie. The Court excluded the evidence and made a bill of exceptions."

"The plaintiff in error, before the Supreme Court, insisted that the money paid to Burgoon by Cassiday, before knowledge of the death of M'Kenzie, was

the agency, or during the voyage and adventure; and yet transfers and sales have as constantly been made, when the

a valid payment. It was urged by the defendant in error that the death of the principal McKenzie was a revocation of the power of the agent, Burgoon, and therefore the payments to Burgoon were void.

"The Supreme Court was unanimous in the opinion that the acts of the agent, done after the death of the principal and without knowledge of his death, were binding upon the parties. Justice Johnson, delivering the opinion of the Court, uses the following language: 'This money has been paid by the debtor in good faith and received by the agent in good faith, and why should it not be good when the authority is revoked? It is confessedly so when expressly revoked by the principal in his lifetime. Can it be that a payment

made to an agent from a foreign country and from one of our cities to the western States employed for the special purpose of collecting debts, is void because his principal may have died before the actual receipt of the money?'

It would be no matter if the agent had paid to the debtor

'In the case of *Dick v. Felt & Duglity v. Pig & Bacon*, 17 Missouri Rep. 234 the same question came before the Supreme Court of Missouri at its October term, 1852. The holding of that Court was the same as in Pennsylvania. The Court were unanimous in the opinion that the rule that the act of an agent done after the death of the principal without notice is void applies to those acts which must be done in the name of the principal and not to those acts which the agent may do in his own name.

"But the case under consideration is not one in which the acts of the agent could only be executed in the name of the principal. The agent La Ferri was not an agent to convey the title to the land, but only to negotiate a bargain with some one in relation to the conveyance. The instructions given by the principal to sell were as follows: 'I would be very glad James if you would sell my land. I am anxious to sell, do try to sell it you can, and I will satisfy you for it. I want you to do the best you can for me, for I am poor and needy.' Under the authority thus given La Ferri might have made a verbal contract, upon exhibiting the letter, and have given possession and received part payment.

"There is no more necessity for the contract of sale in this case, to have been made in the name of the principal than there would have been for the agent to have made a contract for the sale of a horse or any other article of personal property, in the name of the principal. The act of delivering the horse, in the one case, and giving possession of the land in the other, and receiving all or part of the purchase-money, and promising a good title on full payment, would in either case, be a valid execution of such agency. Thus in the case of *Bowen v. Morris*, 2 Taunt. 374, 385, where, on a sale of real property by the corporation of Caermarthen, at public auction, May 11, 1801, David Bowen had become the purchaser, and the same was witnessed by a memorandum in writing of the tenor following: 'The above mentioned premises comprised in lot 10, were this day sold to David Bowen (the defendant below) for £1000, subject to the conditions of the sale within mentioned, and David Bowen, the purchaser or highest bidder

death of the principal must have been unknown. No case has as yet been decided, that, at the common law, the power was

of the said lot, and Thomas Morris, Esq, the mayor of the said corporation, on behalf of himself and the rest of the burgesses and commonalty of the borough of *Cuermarthen*, the vendors of the premises, do hereby mutually agree to perform and fulfil, on each of their parts respectively, the within conditions of sale. Signed, T. Morris, Mayor. David Bowen.'

"And which contract of the mayor afterwards, on the 22d of June, 1801, was approved by resolution, and order duly made and entered at a corporate meeting of the borough, held in pursuance of their charter. After being twice argued at great length it was unanimously held by the Court, Mansfield, C. J., giving the opinion, that the contract was 'on behalf of the corporation.' The mayor, says the Court, 'did not contract on behalf of himself personally, but on behalf of the corporation; that he acted merely as an agent.'

"The letter to La Feiry, it is to be remarked, was not a power of attorney, or intended to authorize him to convey the lands, only to make a contract of sale, a bargain. So when A, an agent duly authorized, wrote on a note, 'by authority from B, I hereby guaranty the payment of this note,' and signed in his own name, A, it was held to be the guaranty of the principal, and not of the agent. *N. E. Mar. Ins. Co. v. De Wolf*, 8 Pick. 56.

"Although the rule is somewhat strict in relation to the mode of executing sealed instruments by an agent, where, from the objects of the instrument, it is essential they should be in the name and under the seal of the principal in order to give legal operation to the same, yet the rule is less strict, and, indeed, receives a liberal exposition in all contracts not under seal made by the agent. 'In such cases,' says Mr. Story, 'in furtherance of public policy of encouraging trade, if it can, upon the whole instrument, be collected that the true object and intent of it are to bind the principal, and not the agent, courts of justice will adopt that construction of it, however informally it may be expressed.' The same doctrine is laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of *Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria v. Bank of Columbia*, 5 Wheat Rep. 326; also by the Supreme Court of New York, in the cases of *Pentz v. Stanton*, 10 Wend. 271, and *Townsend v. Hubbard*, 4 Hill's Rep. 351.

"The contract under consideration would fall under this liberal exposition, and would have been obligatory upon the principal, if he had survived, even though his name were not subscribed to the contract. It would have been sufficient that it appeared on the face of the contract that it was made for him by the agent.

"If, then, any contract, made by an agent after the death of his principal, without knowledge of the event, in law can, and in equity ought, to be held binding, this is such a contract.

"I believe the weight of authority is in favor of the rule being the same at common law as in the civil law, in regard to acts thus done after the death of the principal. But if doubtful, or even if the weight of authorities were against the exception existing at common law, in favor of the binding character of the acts of the agent, the reason in favor of the exception is unanswerable."

not lawfully exercised after the death of the principal under such circumstances. On the contrary, the general understanding seems to be that the acts done by the factor, supercargo, and master, are, under such circumstances, binding upon all the parties in interest. These cases seem, in truth, to be disposed of by the single consideration, that they either are, in fact, cases of powers coupled with an interest, or are governed by the like analogy.

§ 497. The same doctrine seems to be understood to apply to cases of policies of insurance, procured by insurance brokers in their own names, but for and on behalf of their principals, whose right to receive the moneys for losses upon such policies, after the death of their principals, is admitted, without any distinction, whether the death be known or unknown. Being parties to the contract, they are treated, as to the underwriters, as principals, for the purpose of receiving such losses.¹ And, if an insurance broker were authorized to procure a policy of insurance, and should execute his order, but before the execution thereof the principal should, unknown to him, die, it would certainly deserve consideration, whether, in such case, the policy would be utterly void by the supposed revocation of the order by operation of law.

§ 498. Whether, therefore, our law be so strict and rigid in its character, as to the implied revocation, resulting from the death of the principal, in cases where the agency can be, nay, ordinarily is, and should be, executed in the name of the agent, and not of the principal, (as has been often supposed,) is a point, which may, perhaps, be entitled to further consideration and examination than it has been thought hitherto to require.² If it be thus strict and rigid, it certainly must involve very many practical inconveniences and embarrassments, without obtaining any clear assignable good to the community at large: But, upon such a subject, it is the duty of the commentator to abstain from any further reflections.³

¹ Ante, §§ 161, 272, 304

² See *Dick v. Page*, 17 Missouri, 231.

³ As to how far a revocation of authority by the death of the principal, unknown to both parties, will affect the agent with liability for goods purchased for the principal, see *Smout v. Ilberry*, 10 Mees. & Welsb. 1, Ante, § 465 a.

§ 499. Sixthly. As to the dissolution or determination of agency by the extinction of the subject-matter of the agency, or of the principal's power over it, or by the complete execution of the trust confided to the agent.¹ Neither of these cases can require any illustration to make them more clear or intelligible. The dissolution results from the very nature of the agency. If the subject-matter of the agency has become extinct, as, if the principal authorizes his agent to sell a particular ship, of which he is the owner, and the ship is afterwards lost, sunk, or destroyed, it is manifest, that there is a physical impossibility of doing the act. If the owner has sold the ship to another person, before any sale by the agent, there then arises an implied revocation of the authority.² If the agent, in pursuance of his authority, makes a complete sale of the ship, the agency is, *functus officio*, and, therefore, has its natural termination; ³ [and the agent cannot rescind the contract.⁴] So, if in any other manner the principal's power over the subject-matter becomes extinct, the agency over it also ceases. Thus, a guardian ceases to have any power over his ward's property, when the latter comes of age; and, therefore, the guardian cannot authorize any further act to be done respecting it.⁵

§ 500. Here these Commentaries upon the Law of Agency are brought to their natural close. Upon reviewing the whole subject, it cannot escape the observation of the diligent reader, how many of the general principles, which regulate it, are common to the Roman law, to the law of Continental Europe and Scotland, and to the commercial jurisprudence of England. To the latter, however, we are indebted, not only for the fullest and most comprehensive exposition of these principles, but for the most varied and admirable adaptations of them to the daily business of human life. It is, indeed, to be numbered among the proudest achievements of England that, while the peculiar doctrines of her own common law have been cultivated and illustrated by her lawyers, and administered by her Judges, with a sagacity and

¹ Story on Bailm. § 207; Pothier, de Mandat, n. 172.

² Story on Bailm. § 207.

³ See Paley on Agency, 188, 189, Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 276.

⁴ Bradford v. Bush, 10 Alabama, 386; Smith v. Rice, 1 Bailey, 649.

⁵ See Story on Bailm. § 207. Pothier de Mandat n. 119. Antea § 422.

learning and ability rarely equalled and never excelled, Westminster Hall has promulgated the more enlarged and liberal principles of her commercial jurisprudence with a practical wisdom and enlightened policy, which have commanded the respect of the world, and silently obtained for it an authority and influence, more enviable and more extensive even than those acquired by her arts or her arms.

INDEX.

THE REFERENCES ARE TO THE SECTIONS

A

ABANDONMENT,	Sections
When an agent may make in case of emergency	103
ACCOUNTS When agents must keep and render	203, 204, 332
Negligence in keeping of them	203, 204, 332, 333
ACTIO DIRIGIT What it is	163
<i>Utile</i> What it is	163
<i>Executorial</i> , What it is	42, 115, 163
<i>In tutoria</i> , What it is	163
ADMISSIONS OF AGENT When they bind principal or not	134-141 451, 452
(See REPRESENTATION OF AGENT)	
ADVANCES AND DISBURSEMENTS OF AGENT,	
When agent may sell to reimburse himself for	74, note
When repayable by principal	335-338
When not	348, 349
In illegal transactions not recoverable	330, 344-348
Right to, when forfeited by misconduct	348, 349
ADVERSE INTEREST IN AGENT , Effect of	9 10, 210, 211
ADVOCATES , Who are deemed	24
Duties of	24
AGENCY , Nature of	1-4
Different kinds of	24-37
Denomination of, in civil law,	4
Subject-matter of, what may be	11-13
What may not be	12, 13
What acts are personal to the agent	12, 13
How corporations act in cases of	16, 52, 53
Construction of powers in cases of	21, 58-123
General, what	17-19, 123
Special, what	17-19, 123

AGENCY, Continued.

	Sections
Rights, powers, and duties of general and special agents, different	126-134
When joint only	42, 43
When joint and several	42-44
Dissolution of agency	462-500
By act of the party	463-469, 476
By operation of law	462, 480, 488-500
By revocation of the principal	463-469
Effect of revocation, as to the agent	470-474
As to sub-agent	469
In case of part execution of power	465-469
When power is coupled with an interest, it is not revocable	476, 477, 483, 497
How, and in what modes, revocation may be by principal	474, 475, 500
Revocation by renunciation of agent	462, 478, 479
By change of state or condition of principal	480-486
By insanity of principal	481, 483, 484, 487
By marriage of principal	481
By bankruptcy of principal	482
When bankruptcy not a revocation	482
Revocation by change of state or condition of agent	481, 485, 486
When marriage of agent is, or is not, a revocation	485
When bankruptcy of agent is, or is not	486
When insanity of agent is	487
Revocation by death	488-494
Death of principal, when it is a revocation	488
When not	489
Death of an agent is a revocation	490-492
Effect of revocation by death when unknown	490-500
In the Roman law	491-494
In our law	490, 495-500
Effect of death of agent as to sub-agent	490
Dissolution by extinction of subject-matter	499

(See DISSOLUTION OF AGENCY.)

AGENT, Definition of	3
Who may not be an agent	5, 7-14
An infant	7, 8
A married woman	7, 8
Monk	7
Person outlawed or attainted	7
Villein	7
Alien	7
Who may be an agent	7, 9, 210
Idiot	7
Lunatic	7
Person non compos mentis	7

AGENT, Continued.

	Sections
A man cannot be principal and agent at the same time	9, 10, 210, 211
Nor a trustee, guardian, &c	9, 10, 210, 211
Agent cannot delegate his authority	14, 15, 29, 34
Corporation must act by	16
Nature and extent of authority of	17-22
General, who is	17-20, 22, 126-133
Special, who is	17-20, 22, 126-133
Rights and powers of general agent	21, 126-133, 224
Rights and powers of special agent	20, 21, 126-133, 224
Reasons for distinction between a general and special agent	126-133, 224
Universal agent, who is a	21
Powers of agent, how construed	21, 58, 125
When he can, or cannot, delegate his power	14-16, 29, 34, 108
Different kinds of agents	23-37
Attorney in law	24
Attorney in fact	25
Auctioneer	26, 27, 107, 108
Broker	24-32, 34, 109
Factor	33-35, 110-113
Consignee	33-35
Supercargo	33
Ship's husband	35
Master of ship	36, 116-123
Partner	37, 124, 125
Cashier of a bank	114, 115
Sub-agent	15, 201, 217, 386, 390
Agent cannot act for both parties ordinarily	31, 210-212, 214
Power of joint agents	42, 43
When power joint and several	42-44
How agent must execute authority	42, 44, 57-90, 144-181
When joint sale for several principals good, or not	179, note
Appointment of	46-56
Mode of appointment of	46-56
When it may be by parol	46-56
When it must be by deed	47-49, 51, 52
Authority of, when implied	54-56, 84-123
Incidental powers of	58-61, 84, 97-125
What powers not implied	76-84
How power of agent to be executed	86, 146-173
What agent may do in cases of necessity	85, 118, 141, 142, 193, 194, 198, 208, 237
When he may sell on credit	60, 109, 110, 209
When not	60, 109, 110, 209
When can bind principal by signing bill of lading	111, 120-122
When he may insure	

AGENT, Continued.

	Sections
When he is bound to insure	111, 189, 192
When his declarations and representations bind his principal, or not	134-139, 452
Duties and obligations of, to his principal	144-216
Mode of executing authority by	146-182
When the authority must be executed in the name of the principal	147-160
Contracts of, when void	166-171
What is a good execution, or not, of authority	147-160, 179, <i>note</i>
What in commercial instruments	154-160
When agent liable on an instrument or contract, or not	116, 154-160, 266-300
When he may sue in his own name	112, 161, 398-404
When not	28, 391, 392, 402-404
Diligence, what is required of agents	182-189, 206
Duty of agents to keep accounts	203, 204, 208, 332
Instructions to be followed by, except in cases of unforeseen emergency	89, 189-192
When instructions may be deviated from	85, 118, 141, 142, 193, 194, 198, 208, 237
Not to mix his principal's property with his own	200, 205, 208
Must conform to usage of trade	77, 78, 195, 199
For what negligences liable	192, 198-200, 202, 204, 217
When he may employ a sub-agent	201
How he must deposit the principal's money	200, 208
When a depositary, duties of	206
Profits made by, belonging to principal	192, 207, 214, 340
Cannot purchase for himself, at expense or to the injury of his principal	210, 211
When deemed a trustee for his principal	210, 211
Having an adverse interest, cannot act for his principal	210, 211
Cannot set up title of third persons, adverse to the interest of his principal	217
Duty of giving advice and notice to principal	208
Cannot act adversely to his principal	210, 214
Cannot be both buyer and seller	9, 210-214
Cannot receive application for insurance from himself	9
Cannot set up title adverse to his principal	217
Exception, where principal has obtained goods by fraud	217
Agent accountable only to immediate principal	217
When sub-agent is accountable to, or not	201, 217 a
When responsible for conduct of sub-agent, or not	201, 217 a, 231 a
When responsible for negligence, or not	190, 200, 217-220
Liabilities of agent to principal	217 b-235
For nonfeassances and misfeassances	199, 200, 217-220, 333
For what damages liable	217 c-223

AGENT, *Continued.*

	Sections
Remote and proximate cause of damage	217-221,
Defences of agent against suits by the principal	235-261
No loss or damage to principal	222, 236, 238
Illegality of transaction	195-198, 235
Speculation against public policy	235, 238
Deviation from necessity	85, 141, 142, 193, 194, 201, 208, 237
Ratification by the principal	239-261
What amounts to a ratification	252-261
What is no defence to agent	223
No defence, that in other cases the principal has received benefit	223
Defences of agent against suits by third persons	411
Liabilities of agents to third persons	261-323
On contracts	261-307
When agent liable on contract	155-159, 262-292
Liable on contract in his own name	264-275
When he has no authority	264, 265
When principal not disclosed	266-268, 268 a
When agent a foreign factor	268, 290, 409
On written contract	269-278
On contract under seal	147, 150, 152-156, 180, 273, 277, 278
When there is no other responsible principal	280-290
On implied contract	274, 276-279
Cases of private agents, acting for public companies	276-279, 282-288
When agent and principal are both liable	160, 161, 278, 291-300
When agent is not liable	261-263
When no credit given to him	287-300
In case of voluntary associations	287-289
Liabilities of agent of club	286-289
What is proof of exclusive credit to	297-300
Effect of exclusive credit to	434, 447-449
Effect of giving time to agent	134, 447-449
Liability of agent to third persons for money paid him by mistake	300
Liability of, to third persons for torts	308-322
When not liable	308-311
When liable for torts or negligences of his sub-agents	201, 217 a, 315-322
When not	217 a, 313, 314, 319
Not liable for his own nonfeasances to third persons	308-310
But is liable for misfeasances	308-310
Reason of the distinction between nonfeasances and misfeasances	308-310
Not liable for wilful trespasses of sub-agents	319
Public agents, when liable on contracts, or not	302-306, 412

AGENT, Continued.

	Sections
When liable for tortious acts, or not	307, 319-322
Rights of agents as to principals	324-350
Commissions and compensation	324, 327,
<i>Del credere</i> commission	328
When commissions lost or forfeited	330-334
Commissions of, lost by illegal transactions	330
So by negligence	331
So by fraud or misconduct	333, 334
So by gross omission to keep accounts	332
By breach of orders	333
Reimbursement of advances of	335-338
Advances of, when forfeited or lost	339, 343-350
Expenses and disbursements of	335-337
When forfeited or lost	344-350
Reimbursement of damages to, when and what	339
Rights of, <i>in personam</i> , against principal	342, 350, 385
Expenses of, after revocation of authority when payable or not	349
Personal remedies of, against principal	342, 350, 385
Right of lien of agent	351-390
Particular lien, what it is	344-358
General lien, what it is	341, 348, 375
How lien is acquired	359, 363
To what debts it attaches	364-366
How lien is waived or lost	336-370
How lien is enforced	371-373
What agents are entitled to a particular lien	373, 374
What agents, to a general lien	375-390
Lien of factors	376-378
Of insurance brokers	379
Of bankers	350, 381
Of common carriers	382
Of attorneys at law	383
Of solicitors	388
Of sub-agents	386, 390
Rights of agents as to third persons	391-416
In cases of contract	102, <i>note</i> , 391-412
When agent is a party to a contract, or not	403-412
When contract is in writing with agent	393-398
When he does not disclose his principal	396
When by usage of trade agent is a party	397
When he personally contracts, though as agent	398
Contracts by master of a ship	36, 116, 266-268, 295-300, 434, 443
When his rights are superior to those of principal	407, 424
When his rights controllable by his principal	402, 403, 418, 420

AGENT, *Continued.*

	Sections
When he may replevin goods sold	396
When he may sue for money advanced	385
When agent may sue on contract, or not	102, 391-395
Rights of third persons upon contracts of agent	404-406, 420, 421
Payment to or by agent, when good, or not	58, 98, 99, 181, 191, 413, 429-431, 440
Rights of, against third persons, for torts	414-416
For frauds	415

ATTORNEY, Definition of

Letter of, what it is	3, 24
Cannot act as principal at the same time	3
Liable for negligence	9, 210, 212, 213
Lien of	200
Cannot delegate his authority	383
In law	12-14
In fact	24
Joint power of, how executed	25
Joint power of, how executed	43, 44

AUCTIONEERS, Who are

Powers and rights and duties of	27, 107, 108
Cannot delegate authority	108
Whether they may warrant goods sold by them	107, note
Whether they have in all cases a right to receive the purchase-money on sales	102, 108, note
Cannot sell on credit	209

AUTHORITY, How given

When it may be delegated, or not	3
Naked, what is	11-15
Coupled with an interest	12, 13
Implied power to delegate	161, 173, 176, 477, 489
Construction of, when general language used	14, 15
When joint only	21, 22, 62-71
When joint and several	42, 43
Joint, how executed	42-44
How authority is to be executed	42-44, 116-155, 161, 162, 165
Whether revocable by parol, when under seal	49, note
How authority coupled with an interest is to be executed	104, 173
When exceeded, effect of	166-173
When is an excess of, or not	166-175
When less done than authorized, how far binding	166-174
When it must be strictly pursued, or not	78, 79, 165-172, 179-187
When joint agents must all execute	42-44
When it is several as well as joint	42-44
When it may be given by parol	46-48

AUTHORITY, Continued.

	Sections
When it must be by deed	49, 51-63
Execution of deed, in presence of principal	51
Of agent to bind principal as surety	69
Of corporation, when and how given and executed	52, 53
When authority need not be given by deed	54-56, 58-62
When implied generally	54-56, 58, 62, 84, 89-103
Nature and extent of	57-143
How construed	21, 22, 62-71, 74-75
Incidental powers	57-76, 81-83, 85-87, 94-106
Incidental powers of particular agents	107-126
How written instruments construed	62-72, 74-76
How commercial instruments construed	69, 74, 75, 77, 82, 83
Distinction between authority and private instructions	73
Instructions, how construed	73-75, 77, 78, 79
Parol evidence to explain, when admissible, or not	76, 77, 79-83
Deviation from, when excused	83, 115, 141-143, 193, 237
What not implied	77, 79, 98, 99, 119
Distinction between general and special authority	
as to third persons	17-22, 73, 126-133
Mode of execution of	146-164
When coupled with an interest	164, 173
When to be executed in name of principal	147-153
How deeds to be executed by agent	146-152
How other instruments	152-155
When principal bound by mode of execution	147-155
When agent bound by mode of execution	156-160, 264, 278
What is a deviation from authority, or not	167, 172
When execution of, is good <i>pro tanto</i> , or not	167-172

B**BAILIFF OF A MANOR,**

What acts he may do	101
What leases he may make	101

BANK, CASHIER OF,

Implied powers of	114, 115
When his acts bind the bank	114, 115
When his acts do not bind the bank	114, 115

BANKER, When agent may deposit with

Lien of	202, 208, 218
Lien of	380

BILL OF LADING, Who liable on, for freight

When agent personally liable on bills, drawn, indorsed, or accepted by him	263, 274, 394, 395
--	--------------------

BILLS AND NOTES, When agent personally liable on bills, drawn, indorsed, or accepted by him

When agent personally liable on bills, drawn, indorsed, or accepted by him	183, 269
--	----------

BILLS AND NOTES, Continued.

	Sections
When agent can draw or indorse, and how	59
BOTTOMRY BY MASTER OF SHIP	118, 450
BOUGHT AND SOLD NOTE, What	28, <i>note</i>
BROKER, Definition of ●	28
Does not act in his own name	28-34, 109
May buy and sell goods	28, 29, 211
Has not custody of goods	28, 34
Bought and sold note of	28, <i>and note</i>
Powers and duties of	28-32, 34, 34 a, 109, 187, 209
Cannot delegate his authority	13, 29, 34 a, 109
For whom he is agent	28, 31
When for both parties	28, 31
Different kinds of	32
Implied powers of	28, 58, 109, 225-227
To insure, when he may receive loss	58, 103, 191
When he may refer or compromise a debt	58
When he cannot sell on credit	109, 226
Cannot generally receive payment	109
Policy broker, authority of	58, 103, 109
May adjust and receive losses on policies	58, 103, 109, <i>and note</i> , 191
Diligence required of	127
When broker may sue in his own name, or not	109, 161
Has no lien	34
Sometimes acts as factor	34, <i>note</i>

C.

CARRIERS, COMMON, lien of	373, 382
CASHIER OF BANK	115
Powers of	115
May dispose of bank funds, to pay its debts	115
May draw checks on other banks for its funds	115
What powers he has not	115
Cannot bind the bank by his unauthorized declaration or act	115
Payment of forged check by, when it binds the bank	115
CAUSE, Proximate and remote, of loss, effect of	219, 220
CLUB, Committee of, how and when liable, or not	286-289
COMMISSION, When agent entitled to	326-330, 348
When not	329-333, 348
Not, on illegal transaction	330
Not, when guilty of negligence	331-333
Not, when guilty of misconduct	331-334
When forfeited	331-334
COMMISSION, Del credere, Meaning of	33, 112, 215, 328
COMMISSION MERCHANT, Definition of	33
COMPOSITION OF DEBT, When agent may make	99

Sections

COMPROMISE OF DEBT	99
When agent may make	99
CONFUSION OF PROPERTY, By agent	179, note, 200, 205, 332, note
Effect of, by joint sale of property of several principals	179, note, 205
CONSENT, Tacit, when implied in favor of agent	54-56, 87-93
CONSIGNEE, Definition of	33
Rights of	111, 274, 395
Joint consignees	44
When property vests in	111, 274, 395
May insure for his principal	111
When agent consignee liable for freight	274
When he may sue on bill of lading	274, 395
CONSIGNMENT,	
When treated as joint	42-44
When as several	42-44
To or by partners	39, 44
By part-owners	40
To agent, effect of	274, 395
CONSTRUCTION,	
Of written instruments, belongs to the courts	63, 63 a
Of powers of agency	21, 58 125
CONTRACT, When agent may sue on	102, 161, 391 402
When principal may sue on	160-163, 402, 403, 418-429
When agent bound by	154-160, 268-300
When principal bound by	116-160, 275-300, 412-452
Whether principal liable for, under seal	49
Contracts of agents acting for both parties voidable	211
CONTRIBUTION, When agent is entitled to for damages	339
When not	339 341
CONVERSION OF PROPERTY by agent	210, 215, 217, 225
Remedy of principal in case of	224, 229, 230, 436, 437
CORPORATION, How it must act	16, 52, 53
Must act by agent	16, 52, 53
How appointment made by	52, 53
Cannot delegate authority	13, 14
When authority by, need not be under its seal	52, 53
Implied authority of, to act and make contracts	52, 53
Liable for tort of agent	308
When notice to its agent binds or not	140-140 b
Whether notice to the directors is notice to	140 a, 140 b
CREDIT, Sale on	60, 109, 110, 200, 210
When an agent may sell on credit	60, 109, 110, 200, 209, 226
When not	60, 108-110, 209, 226
Exclusive credit, when given to the principal or agent	280-300, 431-433, 446, 447, 449

CREDIT, *Continued.*

Effect of exclusive credit 288, 289, 296-299, 432, 440-449 Sections

CUSTOM OF TRADE, Effect of, as to authority

of agent 60, 77, 86, 87, 96, 106, 189, 225, 226

D

DAMAGES, For what, agent is liable

Proximate and remote 217 c-221

Rules of ascertaining 217 c-221

Probable, agent not liable for 220, 221

Proximate and remote, when agent liable for 217 c-221

When agent entitled to 339

From principals 339

From third persons 414 115

When agent not entitled to 341

DEATH OF PRINCIPAL, Revocation of authority 349, 488, 491-496

Effect on acts of agent, when the death is unknown 458

DECLARATIONS,

Of agents when they find principal or not 134-139

Of cashiers of bank when banking on the banks 114 115

DEED, Authority to execute, must be under seal 49-51

Execution by agent in presence of principal 51

Must be executed, how by corporation agents 149

DEFENCES, of agent 235 261

For not procuring insurance 222

For omissions in policy 222

For omissions of duty 222

What a good defence 222

Illegality of transaction 195, 222, 235

No damage has occurred 235, 238

Overwhelming necessity 85, 115, 141, 142, 193, 237

What not a defence 223

Of third persons, to suits by agents 404-409

By principal, to suits by third persons 432-435

By third persons, to suits by principals 404-409, 418-431

To suits by agents 404-409

When giving credit to agent is a good defence 432-435

DEL CREDERE COMMISSION, Definition of 33, 112, 215, 328

Effect of 33, 112, 215, 234

Makes no difference in extent of authority 112, 215

Duties of factor with such a commission 215, 234

Compensation of factor under such a commission 328

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY,

When it may be made, or not 2, 6, 11-16, 29, 34, 108

Agent cannot delegate 14-16, 29, 34, 108

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY, Continued.

	Section
Corporation cannot delegate	13, 14
Except in special cases	14, 15
Factor and broker cannot	14, 15, 29, 31
Auctioneer cannot	108
When substitution good, or not	13-15
Auctioneer has no right of	108
Nor broker	29, 109
Nor factor	34 a, 110
Nor policy broker	109
Shipmaster, when he may delegate his authority	36, 120
DEMAND, by agent, when good, or not	247, 440
Effect of ratification of an unauthorized demand	247
Of payment by unauthorized agent, not good	247
DEPOSIT, When agent must make, of his principal's money	208
In what manner to be made	208, 218
When agent liable for loss of, or not	202, 206, 208, 218
Must be made in name of principal	208
DEVIATION FROM AUTHORITY,	
When excused	85, 118, 141-143, 193, 237
When not excused	189-194
DEVIATION FROM VOYAGE,	
When a defence for an agent	218, 219
When owner and master responsible for loss of goods after deviation	218
DILIGENCE, What degree required of agents	182-188
Governed by usage of trade and habits of business	185-191
(See NEGLIGENCE)	
DISCHARGE OF PRINCIPAL, By acts of creditor	432-434
By agents taking or giving security	433, 434
DISSOLUTION OF AGENCY	485-500
By act of party	463-469
By operation of law	462, 480, 488-500
By revocation of principal	463-469
In cases of part execution of power	465-469
What amounts to a revocation	474, 475, 500
At what time it takes effect	470-474
By renunciation of agent	462, 478, 479
Revocation by change of state or condition	480-486
By insanity of principal	481-484
By marriage of principal	481
By bankruptcy of principal	482
When bankruptcy not a revocation	482
Revocation by change of state or condition of agent	481, 485, 486
When marriage of agent is, or is not	485
When bankruptcy of agent is, or is not	486

DISSOLUTION OF AGENCY, *Continued.*

	Sections
When insanity of agent is	487
By death	488-494
By death of principal	488
When death of principal is not	489
When power coupled with an interest not	476, 477, 483, 497
By death of agent	490-492
Whether power in all cases revoked by death in our law	490-500
In cases of supercargoes, factors, and masters of ships, when death of principal unknown	491-500
DUTIES TO GOVERNMENT, When principal liable for	335, 336
When principal not liable for	343, 344
Not to agent, for duties illegally evaded	343-345
Illegal, not repayable to agent	344, 345
Saved by smuggling, not allowed to agent	343

E.

ELECTION OF PRINCIPAL OR AGENT as debtor,

When allowed	447, 448
------------------------	----------

ELECTION OF REMEDY against principal or agent . 101, 269, *note*, 291,

294, 295

In the Roman law discharged the other party	294, 295
---	----------

But not in our law	291, 295
------------------------------	----------

EQUITY, Owner may be bound in equity, by the act or contract

of his agent, when not at law	148, 153, <i>note</i> , 162
---	-----------------------------

EVIDENCE, Parol, when admissible to explain authority, or

not	62, 76, 79, 80, 83
---------------	--------------------

Not admissible to enlarge authority	76-81
---	-------

EXCESS OF AUTHORITY by agent, effect of 165-174

What is an excess	165-174
-----------------------------	---------

What not	165-174
--------------------	---------

When execution of authority good <i>pro tanto</i>	167-172
---	---------

EXECUTION OF AUTHORITY 41, 57-90, 141-181

Mode of, to bind principal	147-164
--------------------------------------	---------

When agent bound by mode of	147-160, 263-290
---------------------------------------	------------------

When good <i>pro tanto</i>	167-172
--------------------------------------	---------

When coupled with an interest	164, 173
---	----------

(See AUTHORITY.)

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS,

Cannot act adversely to the estate	211
--	-----

Cannot buy or sell for themselves	211
---	-----

EXERCITORIAL ACTION, What it is 163

EXERCITOR NAVIS, Who is in Roman law 116, 117

F.

Sections

FACTOR, Definition of	83-84 a
Differs from a broker, in what respects	34, 110-114, 131
Is a general agent	34, 110-114, 131
General powers and rights of	110-114, 131
Buys and sells in his own name	34, 110-114
Powers of, in cases of necessity	85, 141-143
When bound by his contract, as well as his principal	112, 266-268, 290, 400
Foreign factor	268, 290, 400
Domestic factor	268, 401
Special property of, in goods	34, 111
Lien of	34, 113, 373, 376, 378
Powers and duties of	34, 34 a, 110-113, 181, 209
Cannot delegate his authority	34 a
Diligence and skill required of	186
When he may sell on credit	60, 110, 209
Incidental and implied authority of	110-113, 131
May insure	111
May sell in his own name	110, 112, 398-403
Cannot pledge or barter goods	113, 225
May pledge for advances for principal	113
May pledge for charges	113
When he may make a joint sale for several principals	179, note
When he may sell to reimburse advances	71, note
Rights of	107-110
Lien of, particular and general	378-378, 407
Rights of, when superior to those of principal	407-411, 423, 124
Rights of, when subordinate to those of principal	402, 403, 110, 418-420
When he may sue or be sued on contract	112, 400-402
When he may be sued	290, 400-402, 147, 448
When he may maintain an action for tort to property	401
Foreign factor, when deemed the sole principal	268, 290, 432, 448
FACTORAGE, or commission	33
FEME COVERT, (See MARRIED WOMAN.)	
Cannot authorize others to act for her generally	6
May in special cases	6
May be an agent	7, 8
FOREIGN PRINCIPAL, When agent liable on contract for	268, 290, 400
FRAUD OF AGENT, When principal liable for	126, 127, 139, 458
FRAUD UPON AGENT, When he may sue for	416
FREIGHT, When agent is liable for	268, 274, 395

G.

	Sections
GENERAL AGENT , Meaning of	17, 18
When his acts bind his principal	60, 70, 73, 126-128, 131
Even though he violates instructions	73, 126-133
Reasons of the doctrine	127 and note, 133
Factor is a general agent	110-114, 131, 224
Master of a ship is a general agent	116-123, 128
GUARANTY (DE CREDERE)	33, 112, 215, 328
GUARDIAN , Cannot be principal and agent at the same time	9

H.

HOMAGE , Cannot be done by an agent	12
HYPOTHECATION ,	
When master of ship may hypothecate ship	116
When he may hypothecate cargo also	118

I.

IDIOTS AND LUNATICS , Cannot be principals	6
Cannot be agents	7
IGNORANCE OF LAW , No excuse	225, 226
ILLEGAL ACTS , Authority to do, not presumed	197
ILLEGAL COMMISSIONS , Not recoverable	330
(See ADVANCES .)	
ILLEGAL CONTRACTS of agency are void	195-197, 235, 330, 344-348
ILLEGAL INSTRUCTIONS , Not obligatory	195-197, 235
ILLEGAL PAYMENTS , When recoverable back, or not	300, 301, 344, 345
IMPLIED POWERS	55-60, 87, 92-125
When powers are implied	55-60, 87, 92-125
When not	77-80, 98, 99
INCIDENTAL AUTHORITY of agent	55-60, 87, 92, 125
INCIDENTAL DUTY of agent	192-210
INCIDENTS to principal authority, What are	58-60, 73, 77, 78, 85-88, 96-120
INDEMNITY , When agent entitled to	339, 340
When not	341
INDORSEMENT , When agent is authorized to make	59
Power of partner to make	124
Of negotiable instruments, apparent title by	227, 228
Effect of, by agent	269
INFANTS , Cannot delegate authority	6
May be agents	7
INNKEEPERS , How and when responsible for acts of their servants	458, 459
INSTITOR , Meaning of, in civil law	

	Sections
INSTITUTIONAL ACTION, What	168
INSTRUCTIONS, How construed	72-83, 86, 96, 198, 199, <i>note</i>
When principal bound, although violated	70-73, 126-183, 184-197
When deviation from, is excusable, or not	85, 118, 141, 193-198, 237, 333
Illegal, not to be followed	195-197, 235
How and when to be followed	188, 192, 198
Breach of, when agent liable for	332, 333
Commissions lost by breach of	331-333
When restrictive of authority, or not	72-74, 78, 198
Usages of trade, effect of, on	60, 76, 77, 86, 96, 104, 159, 196, 199
Parol evidence to explain, when admissible or not	76-82
Deviation from, when excused	85, 118, 141, 194-196, 237
When not	189-192
INSURANCE, Who may insure	111, 189-192
When broker	32, 58, 189-192
When factor	111, 189-192
When consignee may make	111, 189, 192
Who is bound to insure	189-192
Who may not insure	35
Ship's husband may not	35
How orders for insurance executed	191
Defences of agent for not procuring, what are good	222
Broker, duties and diligence required of	187, 190, 191
Broker, when he may receive loss	58, 103, 191
Abandonment by agent, when good	103
When agent may adjust loss	103, 191
When agent may insure or not	111, 189-191
When agent responsible for negligence in procuring insurance	218
When agent may sue on policy	109, 111, 161, 272, 394
When principal may sue on policy	161
In cases of necessity, whether agent may make	141
INSURANCE BROKER	32
Lien of, general and special	373, 379
Rights of	58, 103, 109 and <i>note</i> , 191
Duty of	58, 187, 190, 191
May adjust and receive losses	58, 103
When bound to demand payment of losses	191
INTEREST, Joint, in property, in cases of agency	38, 39
Several in cases of agency	38, 39
Coupled with a power, effect of	164, 173
On advances when allowed to agent	398
When agent bound to pay interest	205, 221

INTERPRETATION OF INSTRUMENTS,

Sections

Generally belongs to the court 63, note, 74, note

But in commercial instruments the meaning of
particular phrases sometimes is left to the jury . . . 74, note, 75

INVESTMENT OF PROPERTY,

When agent bound to make, or not for the principal . . . 205, 206

J.

JOINT AGENTS

Powers and rights of 42

When all must act, or not 42

Liability of 232, 233

JOINT CONSIGNMENT 38, 39, 42-44

When to be treated also as several, or not . . . 38, 39, 42-44

JOINT INSTRUCTIONS 38

How treated 38

JOINT INTERESTS. In cases of agency, 38, 39, 42-44

JOINT OWNERS OF SHIPS 40

Powers and rights of 40, 41

Majority of, govern 40, 41

JOINT POWER OF ATTORNEY 42-44

What may be done under 42-44

When all must execute 42, 43

When joint and several 42, 44

JOINT PRINCIPALS 38, 39

Instructions by 38, 39

Powers and rights of 38, 39

JOINT SALE for several principals, When good, or not . . . 179, note

How loss apportioned among them 38, note

JOINT TENANTS 38, 39

L.

LEASES. What, and when, a bailiff of manor may make . . . 101

LETTER OF ATTORNEY. What 3

How construed 62-72

LETTERS OF INSTRUCTIONS. How construed 73-76

When restrictive of authority, or not 70, 75-83

LIEN. Of agents 351-390

Nature of lien 352, 353

Particular, what 354

General, what 354

Particular, how it arises 355-357

Who entitled to 355-357, 373-400

How acquired 359-363

LIEN, Continued.

	Sections
For what claims and debts	364, 365
How waived and lost	366-371
How revived	370
How enforced	371, 372, 385, 407-412
General, who entitled to	373-385
Does not exclude personal responsibility	385, 407-412
When personal responsibility waived	385
Of sub-agents	388-390
Of auctioneers	27
Of attorneys	393
Of factors	31, 374
Of brokers	31, 379
Of bankers	380
Of common carriers	352

M.

MANDATORY, In civil law	4
MANDATE, In civil law, what	1
MANDATUM, In civil law	4
MARRIED WOMAN,	
Cannot generally delegate authority	6
May in special cases,	6
May be an agent	7, 8
Rights of, as to separate property	7, 8
MASTERS, When liable on contracts of servants	442-451
When for torts of servants	308, 452-456
When not	313, 317, 456, 458-462
MASTER OF SHIP	36
Powers and duties of	36, 116-123
As to employment of ship	116-121
As to repairs of ship	116, 117
What he may do, or not	36, 116-121
As to shipment of officers and seamen	120
As to equipment and repairs of ship	119, 122, 123
When he may delegate his authority	36, 120
Power to hypothecate	116, 117
Treated as quasi owner	116, 117, 278, 294, 315
Treated as general agent of owner	116, 117, 128
Has special property in ship	36, 116, 117
When liable on contracts	116, 117, 160-161, 278, 294
When he may sue in his own name	116, 161
For freight	116
For a tort to ship	116
Power over cargo	118, 141

MASTER OF SHIP, Continued.

	Sections
Power in cases of necessity	118, 141
When agent of underwriters	118
When owner bound, although master disobeys his instructions	126-183, 448
Powers of, when supercargo	36
When his acts bind the owner, though made in his name	161, 294-296
Sale by, in cases of necessity	118, 141
When master bound by contract	294-299, 399
When exclusive credit given to, or not	294-299
Liability of, to third persons for torts	308, 315
Liability of, to third persons for his own negligences	308, 315-317
Liability of, to third persons for the negligences of his crew	315-318
Not liable for wilful trespasses of his crew	318
When he may sue or be sued on contracts	294-299, 399

MISREPRESENTATIONS OF AGENT

(See REPRESENTATION)

MONEY, Paid by or to agent, when recoverible back	398, 435, 451
Paid by or to agent by mistake, when recoverable, and by whom	398, 435, 451
Paid by mistake to agent, when recoverable back from him	300

N

NECESSITY, When it excuses deviation from orders	83, 118, 141, 142, 193-198
Power of master of ship, in cases of, over cargo	118, 141, 208, 237

* Power of other agents, in cases of	85, 141, 193, 237
Agents from necessity, powers of	85, 118, 141, 142, 193, 237
Salvors, power of, in cases of	142
Sale in cases of,	118, 141-143

NEGLIGENCE, When agent responsible for	199-201, 217 226, 333, 348
When agent liable for negligence of sub-agent	201, 217, 217 a, 321, 322
When not	202
When principal liable for negligence of agent	252-262, 452-456

Is ordinarily a question of act, not of law 308

NEGLIGENCE OF AGENTS,

When principal responsible for	252 262, 452-456
Public agent, when liable for acts of sub-agent, or not	322-332, 447
* When public agent liable for his own torts	319-322

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS,

Sections

Apparent title to, in agent, effect of	34, note, 228
NEGOTIUM GESTOR , of the civil law	142, 143
NOTICE , When notice to agent is notice to principal, or not	140, 451
When agent bound to give notice to principal of his acts	208
By unauthorized agent, not good	245-247
Effect of notice, that agent is violating his duty 72, 73, 127, 224-228	
What is notice of defect of title, or not	228
Effect of notice, that agent is acting as such	444
What is, to corporation or not	140 a, 140 b
Whether notice to one director of corporation is	140 a, 140 b

O.

OFFICERS, PUBLIC , When liable on their contracts	306
When not	302-306
When liable for torts and illegal acts	307, 319, 320-332
Not liable for torts of under-officers	319, 321, 322
Not liable for negligence of under-officers	319, 319 a, 321, 322
When they cannot sue on contracts	412
ORDERS , Construction of	69-75, 82, 86
Parol evidence to vary, when admissible, or not	62, 76, 77, 79, 81
Usage of trade, effect on	77, 78, 86
Breach of, agent liable for	189-192, 217-224, 333
Deviation from, when excusable	83, 141, 193, 237
When not	191-198, 223, 226
Illegal, not to be obeyed	195
Defence for breach of	217-222

OWNER OF SHIP,

When bound by acts of master	116-123, 294-299
When he may sue or be sued on contracts of master	161
When bound by contracts of master	116-123, 294-299
When bound for torts and negligences of master and crew	308, 413, 456 a
When, of the pilot	456 a
Not liable for wilful trespasses of master and crew	319

OWNERSHIP, APPARENT,

Effect of	34, 98, 110-112, 164, 224, 227, 328
Of negotiable securities	85, 92, 227, 228
Acquiescence in	90-93

P.

PARTNER , Agents of partnership	37, 39, 124, 125
When one partner may bind the partnership	37, 39, 124, 125
When not	37, 39, 124, 125

PARTNLR, Continued

	Sections
Consignment by	39
Instructions by	39
May delegate power to agents	39
May pledge and sell partnership property	124
May borrow money	124
May make and negotiate notes	124

PART OWNERS OF SHIPS

Powers and rights of	40, 41
When majority of govern	40, 41

PAYMENT, To or by agent, when good 58, 98 99 181, 191 413 429-431, 440

When not	98 99 191, 413, 440
Implied authority to receive or not	58, 98 102, 103, 191
In what manner to be received	98 103 181 202, 413, 430
Must be in money	98 103, 181 181, 202, 215, 413, 430
Factor may receive	112
Broker may not receive	109
Policy broker may receive	58 103 109 and note, 191
When agent must demand	191, 200
Demand of, by unauthorized agent not good	247
To agent when recoverable or not	300, 301
To agent when recoverable back from agent or not	300, 301
Illegal, effect of	300, 301
Of illegal interest not recoverable back	344-348
When taking security amounts	432-435 449
By mistake	430 451

PILOT, When owner liable for negligence or not 456 c

When master liable therefor	316
-----------------------------	-----

PLEDGE, When power to exists or not 78 99

Factors have not general power to	112 113, 225
Factors may pledge in special cases	114
When principal may recover	225

POLICY BROKERS Duties of 32, 58, 187

Diligence of	191
Powers and rights of	58, 191
Lack of	54, note, 379

POLICY OF INSURANCE BY AGENT

When agent may procure	111, 190
When agent bound to insure	111, 190
Who may sue thereon	109 112 161 272 334
When agent may sue	109 112, 161, 272 394
When principal may sue thereon	109 161, 394

POSTMASTER DEPUTY Liable for his own defaults 319 b, 321

Not liable for defaults of clerks	319 a, 321
-----------------------------------	------------

POSTMASTER-GENERAL Not liable for defaults of deputies 319, 321**POWER, When joint (See AUTHORITY)** 42-44

When joint and several	42, 43
------------------------	--------

POWER *Continued.*

Sections

attorney, how construed	62-69
Incidental powers	58-60, 73, 77, 78, 85-126
Implied powers	55, 56, 58, 59, 87-89, 100-156
How executed	42, 44, 146-155, 161, 162
And in whose name	146-155, 161, 162
What, not implied	76-78, 98, 99
Mode of execution of	145-155, 161, 162, 165
Coupled with an interest, how executed	164, 173
Coupled with an interest not revoked by death of principal	476, 477, 183
PRINCIPAL , Definition of	3
Who may delegate authority	6
Who not	6
Infant	6
Married woman	6
Idiot or lunatic	6
Cannot at same time act as agent	9, 210, 211, 213
When bound by his silence or acquiescence	87-92
When bound by act of general agent	126-133, 165
When bound by mode of execution of power	147, 155
When bound by instrument executed by agent	147-155, 161, 162
When not	147-155, 165
When bound as surety by agent's writing	69
When he may avail himself of instrument executed by agent	160, 418-421
When he may sue on instrument executed in name of agent	160-163, 269, note, 402, 403, 418, 428
When he may sue on contract of his factor	161, 270
When he may sue on contract of master of ship	161
When he may be sued	161, 269, 270
How far bound, when authority exceeded	165, 166
What is an excess of authority	165-172
Liability of agent to	217 b-234
When agent not liable to	235-237, 239, 240
Remedy of, <i>in rem</i>	224, 229-231
Remedy for conversion of his property	229-231
When liable for torts of his agent	252-262, 465-474
When liable for torts of sub-agent	201, 217, 308, 309, 321
When not liable for torts of agent	320, 156-461
When responsible for acts of servants of his agents or sub-contractors	453-455
Personal responsibility of, to agent	324, 342, 350, 345
For commissions	324, 326, 328
For advances and disbursements	335, 346
For damages	339, 340
For what damages not liable	341

PRINCIPAL, Continued.

	Sections
When liable on notes or bills made by agent	79
When not liable for duties paid by agent	343
Rights of, against agent	217-234, 402, 403, 407-410
Rights of, against third persons	402-410, 417-422, 429-440
Liability of, to third persons on contracts of agent	160 a, 161, 404, 418-421
Liability of, for agent's expense in defending a suit	339
Right of, to sue on contracts of agent	402, 403, 410
Right of, to sue for torts to his property	436-439
When he has no right to sue third persons	422-424, 432
When money paid to or by agent recoverable back	435
Rights of, against third persons for torts and frauds	436-4
When and what acts of agent enure for benefit of principal	44
Exclusive credit to agent exonerates	288, 289, 396, 432, 446
Rights of third persons against	361, 404-407, 442-462
On contracts of agent	442-452
For acts of agent	451, 452
For torts and negligences of agent	452-462
PROCURATION, What	3
How construed	70, 71
Extent of power by	87-89
PROCURATORS, In civil law	24
In law	24
In fact	25
How appointed	47-49
When authority of, is implied	56
Powers of	61
How powers of, construed	70, 71
PROFITS, Made by agent, belong to principal	192, 207, 214, 340
Probable, not a rule by which to fix damages	220, 221
PROXENETÆ of the civil law	30
Were brokers	30
PROXIMATE CAUSE of damage, What is	217-221
PUBLIC AGENT, When liable on contract	302-306
When not	302-306
When he may sue on contract	412
When not	412
Acts and representations of, do not bind the public, unless he has authority	307 a, 314
When exclusive credit given to	306
When liable for illegal acts and demands	307
When liable for his own torts	319-322
When liable for acts of sub-agents	328-332, 386, 388
When not liable for torts of sub-agents	319-322
When he cannot sue on contracts	302
Representations by, when they bind the government, or not	307 a

PUBLIC AGENT, Continued.

Sales by, whether he may warrant on sales	Sections 107, note 5
PURCHASE, Agent cannot make, to injury of principal	210, 211

R.**RATIFICATION BY PRINCIPAL**

Effect of	239-260
Effect of, as to third persons	239-244, 249, 251
When it binds third persons	244, 440, 145, 455
When not	244, 440 145
Effect of, on sub-agency	215-247, 110
Of part, effect of	249, 4 10
Not good for part, and bad for part	250
Cannot be recalled	250
What will amount to	242, 250
When implied generally	252-260
When implied from silence	90 253-260
When implied from habits of dealing	90, 255 259
When implied from acquiescence	260
	90

REFERENCE (See ARBITRATION)

When agent has power to refer	58
-------------------------------	----

RELEASE, When agent may make, of debt 97, 102

REMEDIES OF PRINCIPAL, Against agent 217-234

In rem 221, 229-231

In personam 232 233

Against third persons 102-410, 417, 122, 429 431

REMOTE CAUSE OF DAMAGE, What is 217 220

When agent liable for 217, 220

When not 220

REPRESENTATION OF AGENT (See ADMISSION)

Of private agent, when it binds principal,
or not 134-139, 451, 452

Of cashier of a bank, when it binds the bank 110

Of public agent, when it binds the government, or not 307 a

REVOCATION OF AGENCY 462-500

By act of principal 463 465 169, 176

By operation of law 480-496

By expiration of time 180

By change of state or condition 481-484

By bankruptcy of principal 349, 403, 482, 483

By marriage of principal 481-483

By insanity of principal 481

By death of principal 349, 488, 491-496

By extinction of subject-matter 489

By incapacity of agent 485

By renunciation of agent 478, 479

REVOCACTION OF AGENCY, *Continued.*

	Sections
By marriage of agent	485
By bankruptcy of agent	486
By insanity of agent	487
By death of agent	488, 490-496
When principal may revoke or not	463, 465
In cases of part execution	466-468, 491-499
Powers coupled with interest are irrevocable	408, 477, 483, 485, 489, 490
And not revoked by death	477, 489, 497-499
Effect of revocation in general	470-473, 497-499
Of power of agent, when it revokes power of substitute or sub-agent	469, 490
By parol, when authority under seal	463
Modes of revocation	474, 475

(*See DISSOLUTION OF AGENCY.*)

RIGHTS OF AGENT. (<i>See AGENT.</i>)	324-350, 392-416
--	------------------

RIGHTS OF PRINCIPAL	217-231, 402-410, 419
-------------------------------	-----------------------

(*See PRINCIPAL.*)

RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS,

Against agents	101-406, 420, 421
Against principals	160 a, 161, 163-406, 442-462
When principal bound, or not	160 a, 161, 412-452
On contracts of agents	160 a, 161, 442-452
• For acts of agents	451
For torts and negligences of agents	452-461
For torts and negligences of sub-agents	454, 454 a
By subsequent ratification of acts of agents	244, 440, 445, 455
When principal not liable for torts or negligences of agents	456-461

S.

SALE BY AGENT	226-228
-------------------------	---------

When binds principal, or not	226-228
--	---------

Apparent title in agent, effect of	226-228
--	---------

In cases of necessity	118, 141-143
---------------------------------	--------------

SALE ON CREDIT, When agent may make	60, 226
---	---------

When not	60, 78, 108, 109, 226
--------------------	-----------------------

SALE BY FACTOR, Of goods of different owners, when taking one joint note for, good	179, <i>note</i> , 205
--	------------------------

SALE BY PUBLIC AGENT, Does not include warranty	107, <i>note</i>
---	------------------

SALE BY SAMPLE, When agent may make	109
---	-----

SALVORS, Are agents from necessity	142
--	-----

Powers of	142
---------------------	-----

SEAL, Authority under, when necessary	49, 242, 252
---	--------------

SECURITY, Taking by a creditor from agent, effect of	433, 434
--	----------

SECURITY, Continued.

	Sections
When it discharges principal	483, 484
SERVANTS, Negligence of.	313-318
When principal responsible for	313-317, 465-474
When not	313-315, 327
SET-OFF, When a purchaser has a right of, against principal	
or not	390, 400, 407, 419, 420, 444, 446
When against agent	404, 407, 419, 420, 444
When sub-agent has the right of	390
When agent has the right of, against his principal	350, 407, 408
When he has, against a purchaser	411
SHIP'S HUSBAND, Definition of	35
Powers and duties of	35
Has no power to insure	35
Or to borrow money	35 <i>note</i>
Effect of exclusive credit to	434
SHIP-MASTER	36
Powers, rights, and duties of	36, 116-124
When supercargo, powers of	36
SHIP-OWNERS, Powers and rights of majority	39, 40
When they may sue or be sued on contracts of	
master	161, 278, 294-300, 422, 434, 446, 449, 450
SILENCE OF PRINCIPAL	87-96
Effect of	87-96
SMUGGLING, By agent, gives no rights to him	343-348
SOLD AND BOUGHT NOTE OF BROKER, What	28
SOLICITORS, Lien of	383
SPECIAL AGENT, Meaning of	17-22
When his acts bind principal, or not	126-153, 224
SPECULATION SALE, When void	238
STANDING BY, and acquiescence of principal, Effect of	87-94
STEAMBOATS, MASTERS OF,	
Liable for torts and negligences of their crew	315-318
Not liable for wilful trespasses of crew	319
STEAMBOATS, OWNERS OF,	
Liable for torts and negligences of master and crew	315-318
Not liable for wilful trespasses of their crew	319
STOCKS, Must be sold for cash	78
SUB-AGENT, Lien of	387-390, and <i>note</i>
Rights of	386-390
To whom he is accountable	15, 201, 203, <i>note</i> , 217 a, 321, 322, 386, 388
When accountable to agent	201, 203, <i>note</i> , 217 a, 231 a
When accountable to the principal	201, 217 a, 508
When he may be employed, or not	15, 201, 217 a, 386-392
When agent responsible for, or not	201, 217, 217 a, 231 a, 319-322, 386, 388

SUB-AGENT, Continued.

When principal liable for acts of, or not	319, 454, 454 a
Ratification of act of, by principal, effect of	249, 389
When his powers are revoked by revocation of power of agent by principal	469
When revoked by death of the agent	490
SUBSTITUTE , When agent may appoint or not	13-15, 28, 34 a
To whom substitute is liable, and when	15, 217 a, 313
Implied power to substitute, when it exists	13-15
When power of, revoked	469
SUPERCARGO , Meaning of	33
Master of ship is sometimes	36
Generally buys and sells in his own name	497
SURETY , Cannot buy the debt for himself	211

T.

TACIT CONSENT , Inferred from silence and knowledge	87-96
TENDER , By or to agent, when good, or not	103 a, 247, 451
By or to unauthorized agent, not good	103, 247
TITLE apparent in agent	227, 228, 443
Sale in such case by agent binds principal	227, 228
TORTS , When agents liable for, to third persons	308-322
When third persons are liable to principals for	435-440
When principals are liable for torts of their agents	308-311, 452-455
When not liable	318, 456-461
When third persons liable to agents for	414-416
When liable to the principal	312, 436-439
When agents liable to principal for	201, 217 c, 408-422
When principal liable for torts by one agent to another in the same employment, or not	453 d-453 f
TRUSTEE , Cannot act as agent and principal at the same time	9, 210-214
Cannot buy or sell the property for himself	9, 210-214
When agent deemed a trustee for his principal	210, 211
TRUST PROPERTY ,	
When it may be followed in the hands of third persons	229-231

U.

USAGE OF TRADE	60, 77, 86, 96, 106, 189, 199
Effect of, in cases of agency	60, 77, 86, 96, 106, 189, 199, 225, 226
Powers implied from	60, 77, 86, 106, 225, 226
How it affects instructions	77, 78, 189, 198, 199
When and how to be followed	77, 78, 198, 199
Deviation from, effect of	96, 198, 199

INDEX.

USAGE OF TRADE, *Continued.*

	Sections
When sale on credit may be	60, 200, 226
. When not	78, 200, 226
When usage will not excuse agent	199, 200
Illegal, not to be obeyed	195-197

V.

VOUCHERS AND ACCOUNTS, To be kept by agents	332
---	-----

W.

WARRANTY, When agent may make	9, 122, 413
When not	102, 132, 413
Auctioneer whether he may make, on sale of goods	107, <i>note</i>
Public agent cannot make	108, <i>note</i>

